

Resistance and Change in World Politics

International Dissidence

Edited by

Svenja Gertheiss, Stefanie Herr,
Klaus Dieter Wolf, Carmen Wunderlich



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These days, with citation indices and impact factors becoming the gold standard of academic publication, it is becoming increasingly difficult to convince in particular younger scholars that there is still a point in contributing chapters to edited volumes, even if they undergo peer review. Strategic considerations are legitimate, but should not be the only reason to publish research. We are firmly convinced that a journal article would not have been an appropriate format to bring together the depth and richness of collaborative research projects like the one presented here. An edited book corresponds much better with the objectives in question as long as it follows a coherent framework to which all contributors agree to refer to and the editors do not shy away from making themselves unpopular by reminding them.

We hope that this work can demonstrate this. The editors and contributors share a notion of global politics as heterarchy where rule is conceived as institutionalised super- and subordination of an often diffuse character. Our Frankfurt contribution to a critical approach in International Relations observes and theorises rule incorporated in normative orders by way of observing and theorising resistance. By systematically contrasting cases of change with cases in which rule persists, we want to identify conditions under which radical alternatives prosper or languish, and learn more about the range of possible alternatives to existing orders.

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CONTENTS

Approaching International Dissidence: Concepts, Cases, and Causes	1
Svenja Gertheiss and Stefanie Herr	
Health Before Patents: Challenging the Primacy of Intellectual Property Rights	45
Klaus Dieter Wolf and Saskia Scholz	
Challenging Sovereignty and State Control of Violence at Sea? The Operations of Private Anti-Piracy Security Providers	79
Carolin Liss	
National Liberation Movements and the UN: Favour Won and Lost?	109
Stefanie Herr	
Delegitimisation à la Carte: The ‘Rogue State’ Label as a Means of Stabilising Order in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime	143
Carmen Wunderlich	

Protecting Religion: Muslim Opposition and Dissidence against Western Representations of Islam	187
Claudia Baumgart-Ochse	
Turnkey Tyranny? Struggles for a New Digital Order	215
Thorsten Thiel	
Migration under Control: Sovereignty, Freedom of Movement, and the Stability of Order	243
Svenja Gertheiss	
Conclusion	281
Svenja Gertheiss and Klaus Dieter Wolf	
Index	301

LIST OF ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS

AI	Amnesty International
ACTA	Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BIMCO	Baltic International Maritime Council
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BRICSAM	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CCC	Chaos Computer Club
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CISPM	Coalition of Undocumented Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers
CW	Chemical Weapons
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DDoS	Distributed denial-of-service attack
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ECRE	European Council on Refugees and Exiles
EEF	Electronic Frontier Foundation
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque separatist group
EU	European Union
EU3+3	France, Germany, United Kingdom plus China, Russia, USA
EURODAC	European Dactyloscopy
EUROSUR	European border surveillance system
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, guerilla movement
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights

FOC	Flag of Convenience
FRONTEX	Frontières Extérieures
G20	Group of 20
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GUARDCON	Standard Contract for the Employment of armed and unarmed Security Guards on Vessels
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IP	Intellectual Property
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Intellectual Property Committee
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IR	International Relations
JCPOA	Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapon States
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWS	Nuclear Weapon States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PCASP	Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
PIPA	Protect IP Act
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMSC	Private Military and Security Company
SAMI	Security Association for the Maritime Industry
SC	Security Council
SOPA	Stop Online Piracy Act
SSO	Ship Security Officer
STCW 95	Standard of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping

SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
TRIPS	Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTR	United States Trade Representative
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

LIST OF FIGURES

- | | | |
|--------|---|-----|
| Fig. 1 | Occurrences of the terms ‘illegal migration’ and ‘irregular migration’ in EU documents issued between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2014, 344 | 267 |
| Fig. 2 | Number of EU documents issued in the period from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2014 in which the terms ‘border control’ or ‘migration management’ appear, 344 | 268 |

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	Two trajectories of dissidence	12
Table 2	Classificatory list of potential causes underlying the ascription and outcome of dissidence	16
Table 3	'Rogue states' and their designation as state sponsors of terrorism in US State Department listings (begun 1979)	157

Approaching International Dissidence: Concepts, Cases, and Causes

Svenja Gertheiss and Stefanie Herr

“Resistance at the heart of the European crisis regime” is the paradigmatic slogan of the European-wide ‘Blockupy’ movement. Mass demonstrations and, on occasion, violent clashes with police bear witness to the movement’s fundamental rejection of the austerity politics practised by the European Union (EU)—an institution which it sees as a key defender of an anti-democratic neo-liberal order operating against the interests of the people (Blockupy 2015). Since the end of the Cold War and under the impetus of ever more rapid globalisation and its ambivalent effects, international politics has come to be characterised by this kind of conflict between, on the one hand, representatives of what is perceived to be the dominant world order and, on the other, fundamental opposition to the norms and institutions of this order (‘dissidence’). Dissidents—be they state or non-state actors—do not just question the normative foundations of existing political institutions and regulations; they frequently seek to institute radically different concepts of political order. In some cases, they succeed in bringing (partial) change to the global order and are (re)admitted to the international community; in others, their attempts fail and they continue to be delegitimised as ‘pariahs’ by proponents of the dominant order.

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In their quest to identify fundamental principles of order in the realm beyond the state, theorists of International Relations (IR) have traditionally opposed ‘anarchy’ to ‘international society’. More recently, as scholarly attention has turned both to the increasing overlap which globalisation has brought about between the international and domestic spheres and to the advent of ‘new’ actors, alternative notions of order have begun to proliferate (Bially Mattern and Zarakol 2016). One of the manifestations of this has been that concepts formerly reserved to the domestic sphere—‘authority’ and ‘rule’, for example—have been adapted to help inform the analysis of transnational and international relations. Elsewhere, critical theorists, social movement scholars, and those researching into norm contestation have begun to focus on the (empirically observable) emergence of currents of resistance to dominant actors, structures, and ideas. Most recently, scholars have begun to draw links between these two perspectives (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014; 2015), posing such questions as: (How) Are rule and resistance at the international level related to one another? Are they mutually constitutive and/or causally connected? How do they interact? How might they change over time?

Empirically, these questions touch on multiple phenomena, with an array of different actors challenging existing orders across several policy fields and proposing a variety of alternative approaches to political problems. Actors in different categories—from individual states to armed non-state groups, from civil society activists to corporations—have at various times seen themselves and/or their practices branded as ‘illegal’ and have been accused of breaching the fundamental principles that underpin world affairs. They have been charged, variously, with defying state sovereignty, flouting agreements regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failing to respect private property. These actors themselves, meanwhile, have justified their actions by reference to individual or collective human rights or to equality among states. In some cases, this resistance subsides over time: dissidents are either defeated in their enterprise and (re)join ‘the Establishment’ or else replace the latter with a new order. In other cases, by contrast, fundamental opposition continues but the dominant order manages to prevail.

Although the issue of normative change does figure in IR norm research (Acharya 2004; Checkel 1999; Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2013; Engelkamp et al. 2012; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ulbert 2012;

Wiener 2004; Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2013), studies have tended to focus on change brought about by ‘respected’ actors who largely support the existing order and are simply seeking to refine it. But normative change at the international level can also be brought about by radical resistance that seeks to establish an entirely different order and this process has so far barely figured in the literature. In our view, the reasons for this lacuna are threefold, namely theoretical biases in specific research traditions; the contemporary focus on international politics as a problem-solving technique; and an implicit or explicit normative predisposition vis-à-vis dissenters.

Neither the realist nor the (neo)liberal paradigm of international politics offers an adequate analytical framework from which to address radical resistance to basic ordering principles. Besides being generally sceptical in regard to the idea that norms and institutions might have any relevance beyond the instrumental, realists have shown a chronic disregard for non-state actors, with the result that they have a very limited perspective on the phenomenon of radical resistance. (Neo)liberal IR theory, meanwhile, though acknowledging the diversity of actors and the importance of norms and values in determining actor behaviour, tends to attribute failures in cooperation to institutional ineffectiveness or inefficiency rather than to systemic inequalities of power. Against these paradigmatic backgrounds, we argue that international dissidence—that is, radical opposition, by a diversity of actors, to core institutions and norms of international politics—can only be described, explained, and evaluated from a perspective that sees global politics as a system of rule and international institutions as manifestations of that system (Daase and Deitelhoff 2015).

Although such a perspective has the same interest in normative orders and regulatory structures as do governance-based approaches (Benz 2004; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006), it is grounded in a different notion of politics. To put it in very basic terms, the governance paradigm—in its primary form, at least—treats governance arrangements not first and foremost as instruments of political rule but as tools for coordinating action geared to problem-solving (Mayntz 2008; Wolf 2012). Again, constructivist approaches commonly highlight the benefits of institutionalised interaction but fail to explore the ‘dark side’ of institutions—namely their tendency to consolidate exclusion and replicate coercive relations. Accordingly, the governance literature has evaluated legitimacy mainly on the basis of output-related criteria such as regulatory effectiveness. Even in those cases where input-related criteria such as

participation or transparency do get taken into account, their relevance is regarded as lying mainly in their usefulness in increasing compliance. We seek to make good these shortcomings by returning to a notion of politics as rule and of normative orders as systems of rule. This approach links back to the original conception of government as the exercise of power for the purposes of creating and implementing collectively binding rules for the distribution of material and immaterial public goods. Input-related issues of control of power, resistance, and self-determination then move back into the picture, and this in turn leads us to open the black box of radical dissent. We conceive of such dissent not as an objective fact of social life or as implying a normative judgement but as a strategic construction embedded in a system of power. Dissidence manifests when actors claim to be opposed to rule or when representatives of a dominant order denounce others as lawless troublemakers. We believe that by infusing these understandings into the research on normative orders, we can contribute to critical theory building on normative change. In particular, we are able to show how and why fundamental transformation occurs—or does not occur—and thus help “clarify [the] range of possible alternatives” to existing orders (Cox 1981: 130). By systematically contrasting cases of change with cases in which rule persists, we can identify the conditions under which radical alternatives prosper or languish.

The approach we propose brings a further amendment to critical theory in that it avoids normative predisposition. Just as the ‘problem-solving’ notion of politics is almost automatically biased against ‘troublemakers’ who disrupt the orderly conduct of affairs, critical theory can be seen as equating resistance with emancipation (Kratochwil 2007: 34; Manguashca 2003: 18; Rengger and Thirkell-White 2007: 6). By understanding dissidence (also) as a strategically employed social construction, we remain alert to the fact that repressiveness is not the preserve of the ruling order. Dissidence too can result in exclusion and discrimination, especially when it succeeds in changing the dominant order. By way of example: religiously motivated dissidents pressing for specific faith-based principles to be incorporated into governance arrangements typically delegitimise normative convictions rooted in other denominations or in secularism, and, in cases where their efforts are successful, other (transnational) societal groups may fall victim to severe repression.

Against this background, the present chapter sets out to recast a number of IR concepts with a view to advancing the theoretical account of how and why change occurs in the global order. We begin by clarifying the notions of dominant or ruling order, opposition, and dissidence. We then outline our overall approach to the subject matter, the methods used, and the cases selected for study. Drawing on previous research into contentious politics and norm contestation, and on IR theory more generally, we turn to the possible causes of dissidence and the mechanisms whereby it either takes hold or withers away.

CONCEPTUAL AND TERMINOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Before exploring the conditions under which actors become international ‘pariahs’ and subsequently either succeed or fail in getting (re)admitted to the circle of ‘good global citizens’, we need to specify how we understand the concepts of ruling order and dissidence. As we construe them, the former represents a modification of traditional conceptions of the international system and the latter non-normatively designates fundamental resistance to key elements of an order in a specific policy field.

International Order

Unlike IR realists, we do not assume that the international system is essentially anarchical. Although this system is not comparable to the hierarchical orders that prevail within (consolidated) states, actors whose activities transcend borders are nevertheless embedded in structured regularities—both material and normative—that entail adaptation and compliance as well as shaping expectations (Zimmermann et al. 2013: 37). This international-level order, however, is not a singular, all-encompassing phenomenon. Rather, it is made up of a number of diverse partial—for example, regional or sectoral—orders lacking an overarching logic or common hub. It is polycentric and heterarchical (Donnelly 2009: 12–7; Neyer 2002; Junk and Volk 2013: 51).

Within each of these orders, particular elements of rule come to the fore. These emerge from the multiple power relations that affect all transnational and international actors, both constitutively and behaviourally. Manifested in discursive formations, in formal and informal regimes, and in the distribution of material capabilities (Maignashca 2003: 21), these institutionalised

power structures regulate access to decision-making processes, govern material and non-material status, and determine actors' postures vis-à-vis one another (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 1; Junk and Volk 2013: 56). They thus create or perpetuate inequality and patterns of subordination and dominance—in other words, a ruling order. They do this in each distinct policy field but not necessarily in the same configuration across all of them (Daase and Deitelhoff 2013: 168), as is demonstrated by the case of neo-liberalism, which, though dominating policymaking in the economic sphere over the past few decades, has proved far less relevant in religious politics.

This account of the multiplicity of order and the nature of rule leads us to certain important conclusions regarding the origins and emergence of resistance at the international level. As intimated in Foucault's famous dictum "Where there is power, there is resistance", contradiction and dissent are inherent in international relations (Junk and Volk 2013: 7).¹ From a Foucaultian perspective, power is not a capability but an ever-present relational phenomenon that manifests in multiple ways. This means that resistance, where it occurs, is not directed against a specific repressive power but is itself a productive force working against the current *order* of power (Wüschner 2013: 36–8). Power begets resistance in the sense that the latter is possible only within this order (Kupke 2008: 37; Maiguashca 2003: 20). As indicated above, order at the international level is heterarchical, lacking a single, unified pattern of rule applying across all policy fields. At the same time, 'real-world problems' rarely, if ever, touch on one policy field only, and so necessarily come within the ambit of more than one political order. Consequently, resistance too can unfold from within a number of orders of power, some of which may overlap or compete with one another as regards adaptation and compliance. International-level rule is thus open to challenge from multiple angles.

This (theoretically) possible scope for resistance implies that particular relations of dominance and subordination are unlikely to be permanent: change in the ruling order is possible over time. But we are left with the question as to the conditions under which such change occurs, particularly in cases where it impinges upon fundamental ordering principles (see below).

Types of Resistance

Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff have taken the Foucaultian notion of an ontological relationship between power and resistance and developed it into an epistemology for IR theory-building. They argue that

although the heterarchical nature of the international system's underlying order makes rule at this level difficult to identify, it is possible to reconstruct the latter by identifying resistance to it (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014). With this in mind, they distinguish two types of resistance: that which occurs from within widely shared norms, procedures, and institutions—which they term 'opposition'; and that which operates outside these parameters—which they term 'dissidence'. Besides allowing inferences regarding structures of rule, this differentiation also offers insights into the conditions under which radical resistance emerges and either succeeds or fails to bring about change in the ruling order.

Opposition

Although much debated, opposition—particularly parliamentary opposition—is a well-established concept in the analysis of domestic politics (Helms 2004: 24; 2008; Oberreuter 1975; Best 2013: 314). Democracy theorists, among others, use the labels 'pro-system' and 'anti-system' to distinguish between oppositional forces that are willing to 'play along' and work with the existing order and those that reject the fundamental norms and rules of the existing polity (Blondel 1997: 470; Mair 2007: 3–4; Sartori 1966: 151). Pro-system or moderate opposition, representing as it does a situation in which rulers and opponents recognise each other as legitimate political agents (Rudzio 2000: 232; Leca 1997: 595), differs from rebellion, which is perceived (by the government) as a criminal attempt to seize power and (by the dissenting forces) as a bid to secure liberation from illegitimate rule. In terms of pro-system opposition, there are two elements from the intra-state level that can be adapted for use in characterising the relationship between opposition and rule at the international level. Firstly, opposition thus defined aims to provide alternative policy options from within the system (Dahl 1965: 11–2); and secondly, where such opposition aspires to take over power, it accepts the established 'rules of the game' governing such transitions (Dahl 1965: 15). There is a third element, however, which points up a major difference between domestic and international opposition, namely institutionalisation of the relationship between opposition and rule, which is essentially lacking in the international sphere. Together with the absence of a coherent hierarchical order across policy fields, this makes international opposition—and thus its relations to both rule and dissidence—a far more contingent phenomenon than its domestic counterpart (Deitelhoff and Thiel 2014: 434–6).

In terms of the first element—the proposal of alternative policy options—domestic opposition typically promotes solutions that differ, sometimes radically, from those pursued or proposed by government. At the same time, however, it accepts the basic normative principles of the polity, as enshrined, say, in the constitution, and conforms to the relevant formal and informal rules and procedures (Daase and Deitelhoff 2013: 166). Thus, opposition parties frequently challenge bills introduced by the ruling party or coalition, and work to get them rejected, but they do not blockade the parliament building to stop a ballot. Similarly, pro-system oppositional groups from civil society exercise their political rights and freedoms but do not take up arms (Daase 2014: 6). As Sartori (1966: 15) put it: “An opposition must oppose, but not obstruct.” Abstracting from this, it is possible to say, with regard to opposition at the international level, that oppositional actors articulate alternative policy options and that neither the options they propose nor the means they employ to get them enacted violate the ‘fundamentals’ of global governance—such as the principle of state sovereignty.

The second element, that of transition to power, is marked by the same adherence to the implicit and explicit ‘rules’. At the domestic level, pro-system oppositional forces seek to acquire control over the centre(s) of power but do so without attempting to do away with the system of rule. Here again, the attempt to enact change is conducted in accordance with constitutional procedures. Given the lack of a common constitutional foundation at the international level, ‘constitutional’ power change such as this is more difficult to identify here. We take a constructivist approach and look to the actors involved as a basis for evaluation. Thus, when critics of the status quo move from the margins of a governance arrangement to its core and increasingly enforce their policy preferences—with the explicit or implicit consent of the (erstwhile) protagonists—it can plausibly be assumed that the change in power relations that is occurring is doing so within the ‘rules of the game’. Research into peaceful power shifts—both between great power states and ‘sideways’ to non-state actors (Hauffler 2003: 226; Kahler and Lake 2003: 1; PRIF Research Department III 2012: 13)—highlights a number of such processes of change. That said, transitions within the international-level ruling order do not follow pre-defined paths.

The difficulty involved in transferring insights about regular transitions between a government and a ‘government in waiting’ from the

domestic to the international level is inherently related to the mismatch that exists between the domestic and international spheres as regards the third characteristic of opposition—institutionalisation (Daase 2014: 3; Daase and Deitelhoff 2013: 169; Dahl 1965: 18; Helms 2004). In intra-state settings, a (temporarily) stable relationship exists between representatives of the dominant forces (the government) and those of the opposition. This stabilises expectations in regard to behaviour and thus conditions interaction between the two groups. In particular, the opposition will usually criticise government policy even if its own aims differ only marginally from what is actually implemented. In other words, what determines its behaviour here is its functional role rather than any substantive considerations. This functional role operates across all policy fields essentially independently of the concrete decisions made by government.² At the international level, however, opposition is best conceived of precisely in relation to substantive matters and thus also as conceptually linked to specific policy fields. Oppositional actors and those at the centre of the ruling order can therefore easily shift across policy fields: actors who criticise policies in one field may dominate governance in others. The absence of a ‘world government’ precludes the emergence of a clearly localisable ‘world opposition’ (Daase and Deitelhoff 2013: 170). As a consequence, expectations about roles also have little opportunity to manifest themselves. The relationship between ‘rulers’ and ‘opposition’ is marked by much greater contingency in the international than in the domestic sphere.

Dissidence

Given these difficulties, a further concept—that of radical opposition or dissidence—proves useful here in explaining how resistance emerges and either prevails or dissolves. By observing instances of fundamental rather than moderate critique, we are more easily able to identify mechanisms of change and stability—and thus also contribute to (critical) theory building. Such a focus, precluding as it does both blindness to power and the urge to problem-solving, is able to expose the ‘dark side’ of global governance.

Like rule and opposition, international dissidence is a social construction and thus includes a relational aspect: dissidents reject, or are alleged to reject (a specific interpretation of), basic intersubjective meanings and fundamental behavioural norms (Daase and Deitelhoff 2013: 165). Which meanings

are ‘basic’ and which norms ‘fundamental’ cannot be determined objectively but depends on actors’ attitudes and the relevant discourse. This means that, in the empirical world, there is no clear, unambiguous boundary between opposition and dissidence. Conceptually, opposition is defined by a mutual recognition, on the part of the actors involved, that, despite substantive disagreements on policy, the different actors and their practices are operating within established parameters. Dissidence begins to emerge when this kind of mutual acceptance wanes and actors no longer agree as to whether the parties in question are operating inside or outside the accepted parameters. In other words: dissidents violate (or are accused of violating) the ‘rules of the game’, and the rules, in their turn, are seen as being imposed by the ruling order (Daase and Deitelhoff 2013: 165); opposition, by contrast, operates at the periphery of power but not beyond the pale of order. Looking at the international level: opposition manifests when solutions to concrete political problems are proposed which, though different from those actually pursued, are deemed by the majority of the other actors involved to be in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law and with established procedures; dissidence, meanwhile, involves not only substantively divergent claims but also a rejection of the international legal framework (or the dominant interpretation of this) and a recourse to disruptive means. Though a potential indicator of dissidence, violence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of it. The use of force as a means of self-defence, for example, is deemed acceptable in both national and international law.

This account highlights the fact that dissidence as an empirically observable phenomenon may be looked at in two ways—either as ‘self-ascribed’ or as ‘other-ascribed’. In other words, actors can themselves claim to espouse radically different policy goals and choose to obstruct regular political processes or they can be alleged to be doing these things. In explaining why dissidence emerges and under what conditions it dissolves or prevails, we therefore need to take two distinct trajectories into account.

*The Two Trajectories of Dissidence: Dissidence by Ascription
and Dissidence by Choice*

Dissidence as a social construction is observable in two contexts: when actors are accused of violating the fundamental rules of the game in a particular policy field, and when actors style themselves as political

renegades rising up against oppression. These latter ‘dissidents by choice’ defend their policy proposals as being radically different but nonetheless political in nature and legitimate. Of note, both trajectories involve dynamic processes that may feed on, or impede, each other.

Where dissidence is ascribed by others, the actors in question, and their practices, are the subject of continual attempts at delegitimation. Dissenters are no longer accepted as proposing alternative political solutions capable of being debated. Instead, they are denounced as mere troublemakers disrupting the ‘orderly process’ of (global) governance and needing to be dealt with by other than political means. As Junk and Volk (2013: 57) put it: “Depoliticizing is . . . the central strategy of rule to preserve the status quo”. Depoliticisation ‘creates’ dissidence by portraying certain actors and their practices as being in breach of national or international law and of violating other fundamental normative elements of order. This criminalisation leads to the “displacement of the political into the realm of law” (Randeria 2007: 43) and to the substitution of supposedly objective judgement for substantive debate. In some instances, actual violence is used to repress the ‘outlaws’ in question. Such processes can be observed, for example, in regard to some non-state armed groups that become denounced as ‘terrorists’, fought by the police and eventually even by (international) military means.

Self-styled dissidence occurs where actors who disregard the prevailing order in a specific policy field frame their disruptive measures as a political statement against an allegedly imposed order (Daase 2014: 3). In this case, the actors concerned may, for instance, boycott global or policy field-specific institutions as a way of protesting against the governance structures they object to. Such ‘dissidence by choice’ develops in a process of politicisation: the actors involved claim to be addressing public concerns and demand that their positions be subjected to public debate rather than dealt with in the courts or through administrative channels (Zürn et al. 2012: 73–4). The move to topple the current order, like the move to maintain it, may eventually turn violent. Virtual attacks on Information and Communications Technology systems of governmental institutions or multinational cooperations constitute disruptive practices. They are used by hacktivists to protest alleged transgressions into the private sphere of citizens, among others. Table 1 summarises these processes.

Of course, neither dissidence by ascription nor dissidence by choice develops in a vacuum. The two trajectories are interrelated: international actors who face criminalisation are likely to respond by arguing that their

Table 1 Two trajectories of dissidence

<i>Trajectory</i> <i>Process</i>	<i>Dissidence by ascription</i>	<i>Dissidence by choice</i>
Result	'Outlawing' of actors or their practices as violating fundamental principles of an order	Rejection of an allegedly imposed order in words and deeds
Strategies	Delegitimisation Criminalisation	Justification as political
Means	Rhetorical condemnation Legal action Institutional exclusion Repression by force	Rhetorical condemnation Boycotting of institutions Deliberate breach of obligations/rejection of 'obedience' Violent rebellion

practices represent legitimate political alternatives; proponents of the dominant order, for their part, will defend the latter against attack from self-defined dissidents, denounce the latter as 'pariahs', and/or (try to) maintain the order by force. Thus, the reciprocal dynamics of ascription and self-stylisation can cause opposition to 'spiral' into dissidence and prompt rule-versus-resistance disputes to escalate into violent conflict.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE SELECTION

Working within the conceptual framework just outlined, this book explores the constitutive or causal links between international-level rule and resistance and the shifts in the relationship between the two. It focuses particularly closely on the latter aspect, attempting, specifically, to identify the conditions under which state and non-state dissidents either secure recognition and succeed in changing the dominant order or, by contrast, remain outsiders. It asks what makes dissidents successful and, conversely, how a ruling order is maintained. By systematically comparing a number of cases, the book sheds light on the actors and processes involved in the developments in question and helps identify the mechanisms that determine whether dissidence succeeds or fails. Its discussion of the delegitimisation and, conversely, justification of

dissidence as a social construction put to strategic purpose, and its analysis of successful international-level dissidence, bring something new to critical theory building in International Relations. More specifically, the final chapter will assess three different perspectives to reach evaluative normative conclusions. The book argues that resistance—even, in some cases, in its radical form of dissidence—is necessary for the innovation of politics. Governance arrangements therefore need, and ought, to leave room for dissent if decay is to be avoided.

In order to ensure the robustness of our conclusions, all case studies follow the same analytical model. This consists of two parts—one descriptive and one explanatory. The descriptive section traces dissidence, as a social construction, along the two trajectories described above and assesses the interaction of the two trajectories over time. Each case study identifies an existing norm conflict, either in the form of two conflicting norms (in other words, where a fundamental principle underlying the ruling order faces challenge from dissident actors promoting an alternative normative foundation for the political order) or in the form of differing interpretations of a single existing norm, each based on a significantly different notion of order. It then traces the development of dissidence over time and determines whether it was successful or not. The success in question is conceptualised unidimensionally: dissidence is deemed successful where there is a change in the normative order that reflects the dissidents' normative preferences.³

The explanatory sections of the case studies focus on the causes of the success or failure of dissidence. Causes are identified in a reiterative process of inductive and deductive reasoning (see below). We ask under what conditions it is possible for criminalisation to be maintained or, conversely, for dissidents to recast their positions as appropriate political responses to public concerns? Answers to these questions also provide insights into the conditions that produce ruling-order resilience in the face of radical resistance. Mechanisms of rule and resistance are identified via causal patterns of success and failure of dissidence which emerge from structured and focused comparison of the case studies. On the basis of this comparison, we are able to venture a number of cautious generalisations.

In order to lend weight to these generalisations, we ensure that the cases selected reflect different types of development and different degrees of success and failure over time. The cases include situations in which actors or practices become delegitimised retrospectively, in which

dissident actors or practices eventually achieve acceptance, in which radical resistance persists over long periods of time without gaining normative ground, and in which actors are stigmatised in an apparently arbitrary manner and outcomes are consequently extremely fluid. The spectrum of cases thus covers examples of successful and unsuccessful dissidence and of situations where the results were mixed. It also includes examples in which dissidence emerges mainly as a result of ascription and examples in which it develops primarily as a result of choice. As there is no obvious empirical correlation between the trajectories of dissidence and its success or failure, we assume that other factors and conditions are relevant to explain the latter outcome. These conjectures are specified below.

The Case Studies

Saskia Scholz and Klaus Dieter Wolf analyse a case of successful dissidence in which a coalition of developing states and civil society groups managed to get the World Trade Organization regulations on generic drugs altered in a way that ensures priority is given to public health rather than to patent protection.

The challenge which ship-owners and private security firms successfully launched against states' monopoly on the use of force is the subject of Carolin Liss's analysis. She describes how piracy on the high seas created security problems which private enterprise seemed better placed to resolve than state agencies.

Stefanie Herr documents the way in which self-proclaimed national liberation movements gained international recognition during decolonisation but were later recast as terrorists. From the 1990s in particular, she explains, their legitimacy was undermined and their membership of international institutions such as the United Nations was revoked.

So-called rogue states are the focus of the case study by Carmen Wunderlich, in which she describes how, having been designated international pariahs by the USA, some countries (Cuba, Iran, Libya) have eventually managed to cast off this ascription, at least temporarily, whilst others have persisted in their radical resistance (North Korea) or been coerced back into the prevailing order (Iraq).

The way in which powerful actors delegitimise previously accepted practices comes under scrutiny from Thorsten Thiel. He documents how activists promoting Internet freedom increasingly face state vilification and criminalisation in the name of cyber security.

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse explores the clash between those who espouse a liberal order based on freedom of expression and those who champion the protection of religion, notably Islam. She recounts how, against the background of violence on ‘the Arab street’, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation ultimately failed to secure an amendment to the UN human rights *acquis* that would have outlawed the ‘defamation’ of religious belief and thus endowed it with a special status.

Finally, Svenja Gertheiss assesses the stability of the global order governing international migration. Despite the efforts of migrant and human rights groups, she explains, freedom of movement continues to be curtailed by the rights of sovereign states to restrict mobility across their borders.

The methods used in the case studies range from qualitative content analysis to process tracing and discourse analysis. All the studies follow a theory-guided inductive approach. In this connection, the next section sets out a number of factors and conditions that we consider relevant in regard to both delegitimising and self-descriptive designation as ‘dissident’ and in regard to the success or failure of dissidence.

EXPLAINING DISSIDENCE AND ITS OUTCOMES

With the help of previous research—particularly IR research into norms and normative change but also the broader study of contentious politics—it is possible to draw up a classificatory list of potential causes underlying the ascription and ultimate outcome of dissidence (see [Table 2](#)).

We make eclectic use of previous research to formulate various conjectures about causal relations. These help focus the empirical analysis in a theoretically informed way and provide a framework for systematic comparison.⁴

Causes of Ascription/Self-Description as Dissident

When dissidence is (de)constructed—by, respectively, proponents of a ruling order, seeking to delegitimise opponents as ‘outlaws’, or critics of that order, seeking to present themselves as dissidents—the underlying logic can be interest-based or ideational/norm-related. To bring out the distinction between these potential causal processes more sharply, and to clarify their operation, we address each of the two trajectories described above separately, even though in practice they most often occur in combination.

Table 2 Classificatory list of potential causes underlying the ascription and outcome of dissidence

Causes of ascription/self-description as dissident
a) Interest-related
b) Identity-related
c) Norm-related
d) Self-perpetuating dynamics
Causes of the success/failure of dissidence
<i>Features of the normative context</i>
e) Norm characteristics
f) Type of norm conflict
g) Nature of the normative frame of reference/institutional setting
<i>Actor characteristics and strategies</i>
h) Actor characteristics
i) Strategies and behaviour
<i>Contextual change</i>
j) External events and developments
k) Technological progress

Interest-Based Causes

Strategic ascription or self-ascription as ‘dissident’, and the delegitimisation of opponents entailed by this, are among the means used by political actors to secure their power when under domestic pressure and in fear of losing the support of their constituencies.⁵ The strategy of pointing the finger at an enemy as a way of safeguarding one’s own power is well known and much discussed—under the rubric of ‘diversionary theory’—as a domestic-level explanation of international conflict. The concept of the “new *raison d’État*” (Wolf 1999) likewise relates to the strategy of scapegoating, describing as it does a situation in which external actors are blamed for internal problems or unpopular political measures (see also Morgan and Bickers 1992). Proponents of the ruling order may pursue such strategies in order to maintain their privileged position in the international system. When used as a coercive diplomatic strategy, however, scapegoating can backfire: it may actually lend strength to the object of blame and consolidate its regime by subduing internal dissent against it (Davies 2012: 313ff.). Conversely, self-description as dissident can help maintain internal support against allegedly oppressive forces from outside.