Holocaust Memory in a Globalizing World

Edited by Jacob S. Eder,
Philipp Gassert and
Alan E. Steinweis

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Table of Contents

Holocaust Memory in a Globalizing World
Introduction

Jacob S. Eder

About one and a half decades ago, in the summer of 2000, Tariana Turia, New Zealand's Associate Minister for Maori Affairs and herself a member of New Zealand's indigenous Maori community, sparked a public controversy by equating the Maoris' experiences during the colonial period with the fate of Europe's Jews during the Holocaust.[1] Addressing the nation's Psychological Society, Turia pondered the long-term consequences of traumatic experiences and contemporary suffering among the Maori, many of whom live in wretched circumstances, very much like indigenous minorities in other former European colonies. She said: »I understand that much of the research done in this area has focused on the trauma suffered by the Jewish survivors of the holocaust [sic!] of World War Two. I also understand the same has been done with the Vietnam veterans. What seems to not have received similar attention is the holocaust suffered by indigenous people including Maori as a result of colonial contact and behaviour.«[2]

Turia's statement received significant public attention and – not surprisingly – negative reactions, above all from New Zealand's political elites, the media, and Jewish organizations, all of which rejected her comparison as inaccurate and inappropriate.[3] She was, in fact, probably the first high-ranking non-German politician from a Western nation to accuse a predecessor of her own government of having committed a »holocaust« (historians in general do not consider the treatment of the Maori under British colonial rule an act of genocide[4]). From Maori scholars and interest groups and the political Left, however, Turia received support. Several commentators not only agreed with her, but also equated

1 MacDonald (2003), pp. 386-389. For the following see also: the epilogue of Eder (2016), pp. 197-209.

2 »What Tariana Turia said – in full,« NZ Herald, 31 August 2000, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=149643 (22 July 2016).

3 Cf. for the problem of analogies to the Holocaust, e. g., Steinweis (2005), pp. 276-289, and Assmann (2010), pp. 110 f.

4 MacDonald (2003), pp. 383 f. This marks a difference, for example, in comparison to the cases of Australia's Aborigines or Native Americans.

the colonial »oppressors« with Hitler and argued that »many Jews have taken ownership of [the term] 'holocaust' to describe the extreme horror of their […] genocide, […] [which] serves to demean and belittle suffering by other people.«[5] And as recently as 2012, New Zealand saw another controversy when Keri Opai, a Maori scholar, drew similar parallels in a radio interview, comparing crimes committed by the British during New Zealand's colonial period with the Holocaust. He said: »If you really knew what went on, all the awful stuff, that really does break down to a holocaust [sic!]. I know we might get in trouble for saying those words but it is absolutely true. That is what happened, we are still recovering from that.«[6]

Referring to a »Maori Holocaust« in this context clearly served a number of political purposes, such as raising awareness of the crimes of colonialism and/or drawing parallels to the history of victimization of other persecuted or ostracized minorities. Yet these references also reflect a discourse characteristic of many parts of the world. There can be little doubt that in many European countries, Israel, and North America, the Holocaust has become a paradigm for mass crime and genocide, a metaphor for barbarism and human rights violations, and the fate of the Jews has become a universally recognized point of reference for other victim groups.[7] Today, Holocaust memory certainly constitutes a key component of historical consciousness and political culture in unified Germany, many other European countries, Israel, and the United States. But also in places like New Zealand, a country home to a host of Holocaust museums, memorials, and educational programs, it apparently makes perfect sense for the indigenous minority to reference the Holocaust when talking about its own victimization.

Aside from the controversial and at times even ideologically charged issue of comparing genocides and the related question about the »uniqueness« of the Holocaust,[8] one can identify at least two further transnational links that underscore the complexity and interconnectedness of the engagement with the Holocaust on a global scale. First, Holocaust

5 As quoted in ibid., p. 391.

6 Suzannah Hills, Academic sparks outcry for comparing Britain's colonisation to New Zealand to Holocaust, Daily Mail, 6 February 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2097261/Academic-sparks-outcry-comparing-Britains-colonisation-New-Zealand-Holocaust.html (22 July 2016).

7 Levy and Sznaider (2001); Eckel and Moisel (2008), pp. 9-25; Assmann and Conrad (2010), pp. 1-16. See also: Garber (1994).

8 See, e. g.: Rosenfeld (1999), pp. 28-61.

memory has gained such an important position in New Zealand, a country far away from the former sites of Nazi extermination camps, that it seems to block out, or at least overshadow, the history of victimization of local, indigenous minorities. Second, it is very likely that Maori representatives had been looking abroad for inspiration. As the political scientist David MacDonald has argued, they »have been strongly influenced in the recent past by North American indigenous activists […], whose arguments and style have been borrowed to advance Maori interests.«[9]

*

This volume addresses how a multifarious engagement and confrontation with the aftermath of the Holocaust has emerged, developed, and changed in numerous locations around the globe. Few historical events have had a comparable significance for world – and especially European – history in the 20th century. None have made a similar impact on politics, society, and culture, broadly defined, in the countries of the Holocaust's perpetrators, its victims, and its so-called bystanders, and also in countries with no apparent connection to the mass murder of close to six million European Jews during the Second World War. This volume, however, does not only set out to ask how mainstream or majority societies – as loaded as these terms may be – have engaged with the legacies of the Holocaust, but it also intends to look beneath the surface and across national, social, and ethnic dividing lines. The essays assembled here thus explore and elaborate on the following questions: How have minority groups, with their own experience of violence or persecution, responded to manifestations of Holocaust memory? How has the Holocaust evolved as the epitome of the suffering of a minority at the hands of the majority and thus gained paradigmatic significance? How has demographic change affected Holocaust memory in those countries that have a historical link to the Holocaust? How have immigrants engaged with the crucial role that Holocaust history plays in the political culture, media, and educational systems of the West? How and why have societies that were not affected by Nazi occupation and extermination policies engaged with the legacies of the Holocaust, and what does the Holocaust mean to the residents of those countries?

Given the significance of the mass murder of Europe's Jews as a centerpiece for the West as a community of memory, we know relatively lit-

9 MacDonald (2003), pp. 383, 396 f.

tle about how minorities, some of whom have experienced or internalized the memories of other acts of violence, persecution, and genocide, have reacted and adjusted to these memorial cultures.[10] Pursuing this angle will provide key insight into the integrative social function of historical narratives, but will also expose their limits. We also need to explore how mainstream memory cultures have attempted to address or integrate minorities and ask why and to what extent the legacies of the Holocaust have gained salience in societies and countries not directly affected by Nazi anti-Jewish policies, such as South Africa or China. This volume pays close attention to the internal dynamics of these processes as well as to the relevant political goals and rhetorical strategies. It takes international, transnational, and global connections into consideration, while also paying attention to the national, regional, and local contexts. And it examines the tensions that have emerged between these national and cultural particularities, on the one hand, and the universal dimensions of Holocaust memory, on the other.[11]

The volume analyzes the development and functioning of Holocaust memory in several countries and regions of the globe. Fourteen case studies focus on the evolution and function of Holocaust memory discourses in Europe, North and South America, Israel, South Africa, and Asia. The volume locates and analyzes contradictions within, and challenges to, a development that scholars have come to refer to as the »globalization« or »universalization« of Holocaust memory.[12] It by no means aims for a comprehensive view – a potentially endless and probably impossible undertaking – and it also explicitly excludes certain regions of the world, such as former Communist Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union, not because these cases would be not relevant or important, but rather because post-Nazi, post-Fascist, and post-Communist societies in Europe have developed according to specific dynamics that have been analyzed in a growing body of scholarship.[13] Instead, the vol-

10 See, e. g.: Georgi (2003) and Jikeli (2012). Cf. the announcement for the 2016 Dachauer Symposium zur Zeitgeschichte, Geschichte von gestern für Deutsche von morgen? Die Erfahrung des Nationalsozialismus und historisch-politisches Lernen in der (Post-)Migrationsgesellschaft, http://www.dachauer-symposium.de (5 August 2016).

11 See, e. g.: Bauerkämper (2012a), pp. 15 f.

12 Levy and Sznaider (2001), and Assmann and Conrad (2010).

13 See, e. g.: the relevant chapters in Blacker, Etkind, and Fedor (2013); Brumlik (2010); Flacke (2004); Müller (2002); Fugo, Kansteiner, and Lebow (2006); Mink and Neumayer (2013); Pakier and Wawrzyniak (2015).

ume aims to provide case studies in order to offer a new perspective on the development of Holocaust memory in a global perspective and will pay specific attention to non-Western countries and non-Western minorities. This introduction will briefly situate the book in the historical as well as historiographical context, and then outline seven perspectives from which to approach its subject matter.

*

The Holocaust is today considered a transnational event, as Nazi Germany and its allies persecuted and killed Jews and other victim groups in almost all territories under their control during World War II.[14] As numerous scholars have shown over the past years, the afterlife of the Holocaust has also become a transnational phenomenon.[15] The links among the various memorial cultures connected to the Holocaust require some explanation. The origins of these connections lie in the developments of the 1960s and 1970s, yet have exerted their full force only since the 1990s, when Holocaust commemoration experienced dramatic growth, not only in Europe, but also on a global level.[16] The Eichmann Trial, the Six-Day War, and the broadcast of the NBC miniseries *Holocaust* in 1978/79 accelerated a process that led to the designation of a multitude of murderous anti-Jewish policies of Nazi Germany as a discrete event, the »Holocaust.« Interconnected international and transnational Holocaust memorial cultures, however, are mostly a phenomenon of the last 20 years or so. The past two decades have seen a boom in the creation of memorials, museums, educational programs, and of scholarly and academic institutions dedicated to the study of the Holocaust.[17]

Since the end of the Cold War and accompanying the process of European integration, the Holocaust has become a negative »founding myth« in Europe.[18] In 2005, Tony Judt even suggested that »Holocaust recogni-

14 See, e. g.: Schmid (2008), p. 174. For the following, see also: Eder (2016), especially pp. 199 ff.

15 In addition to the already cited volumes, see, e. g.: the epilogue of Judt (2005), pp. 803-831; Allwork (2015); Kübler (2012); Kroh (2008); Müller (2007); Rupnow (2008); Ruprecht and Koenig (2015); Surmann (2012).

16 Eckel and Moisel (2008). See also: Novick (1999).

17 See, e. g.: Shosh Rotem (2013).

18 Goldberg (2012), p. 188. See also: Kübler (2012), pp. 11-30, and Pakier and Stråth (2010).

tion« had become »our contemporary European entry ticket.«[19] Judt was also thinking of countries like Poland, which needed over 60 years to acknowledge responsibility for the suffering of Polish Jews during World War II and only did so during the final phase of its accession negotiations with the EU. The acknowledgement of responsibility for one's past crimes – a difficult process for many collaborators of the Nazi regime as well as former colonial powers or countries like Serbia – and the promotion of »lessons« from such events have since become key elements of what it means to belong to the European political community.

Such an endeavor is perhaps best exemplified by the creation of the so-called Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, inaugurated in Stockholm in 1998. Its founding led to the first international political summit of the new millennium with a large number of political leaders, including 23 heads of states, in attendance.[20] Under its current name, International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, this organization aims to specify, for instance, regulations for commemoration ceremonies or the place of the Holocaust in high school education.[21] The designation of a Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27, the day the Red Army liberated the Auschwitz Concentration Camp in 1945, marks another example of attempts to install the Holocaust into a pan-European, global memory. Since 2005 the United Nations has also officially remembered the victims of National Socialism on that day, but it would be misleading to speak of a European or even worldwide »homogenization« of Holocaust memory.[22] Instead, national differences and distinctions have remained intact (or were even reinforced), as the very divergent modes of commemorating January 27 across the European continent illustrates.[23]

Obviously, this development extends far beyond European borders and has affected places far from the historical sites of the Holocaust. The Association of Holocaust Organizations, for example, lists several hundred full and affiliate members worldwide and extends well beyond Jewish organizations, for which the memory of the Holocaust has an obvious

19 Tony Judt, Europe: Rising from the House of the Dead, The Globalist, 25 August 2010, http://www.theglobalist.com/europe-after-world-war-ii-rising-from-the-house-of-the-dead/ (22 July 2016).

20 Assmann (2010), pp. 101-105. Cf. Kroh (2008), pp. 111-200, and Kübler (2012), pp. 17 f.

21 Allwork (2015), pp. 147-155.

22 Rupnow (2008), p. 70.

23 Schmid (2008).

significance.[24] While memorials, museums, and scholarly centers exist in many countries, the United States deserves special attention. The products of its memorial culture have shaped the debates over, the imagery of, and the understanding of this event well beyond the North American continent, especially outside the walls of the academic ivory towers.[25] In the United States, the Holocaust represents – unlike any other historical event, including slavery or the fate of Native Americans – absolute evil and the antithesis to the values of America's civil religion. It has become a paradigm for assessing human behavior, a unique »moral reference« point for all political strata of American society, and the bearer of universal »lessons.«[26] The proclivity to appropriate the Holocaust for political purposes sometimes takes extreme and extremely ahistorical forms. This does not only include comparing abortion or the breeding and slaughtering of animals for human consumption to the Holocaust, but also using the event as an historical example to make a case against gun control, as put forward by former Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson in 2015.[27]

To cite another recent example from mainstream American life, since 1993, the United States has had a national Holocaust Memorial Museum on the Mall in Washington.[28] On the occasion of the museum's 20th anniversary celebration in 2013, former President Bill Clinton, who had been present at the museum's opening ceremony, reminded his compatriots that this museum was America's »conscience.«[29] His speech illustrated the paradigmatic significance of Holocaust memory for the contemporary United States. Clinton described the Holocaust as a »human disease« and as a »virus« that the »Nazis gave to the Germans,« which ultimately could be reduced to »the idea that our differences are more important than our common humanity.« According to Clinton, this »virus« had not only caused Germans to perpetrate the Holocaust, but was also to blame

24 Rosenfeld (2011), pp. 9 f. See also: the Association of Holocaust Organizations' members directory: http://www.ahoinfo.org/membersdirectory.html.

25 Novick (1999); Eder (2016); Flanzbaum (1999); Mintz (2001).

26 Novick (1999), pp. 11-15. See also: Judt with Snyder (2012), p. 273.

27 Rosenfeld (2011), pp. 74 f., and Alan E. Steinweis, Ben Carson Is Wrong on Guns and the Holocaust, New York Times, 14 October 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/opin ion/ben-carson-is-wrong-on-guns-and-the-holocaust.html?_r=0 (22 July 2016). See also: Cole (1999).

28 Linenthal (2001).

29 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, U.S. Holocaust Museum 20th Anniversary Tribute (Video), 29 April 2013, C-Span, http://www.c-span.org/video/?312271-1/us-holocaust-museum-20th-anniversary-tribute (22 July 2016).

for the discrimination of women in Pakistan or the terrorist attack on the Boston marathon in 2013. Through this utterly ahistorical misrepresentation of (German) antisemitism and the Holocaust, and by using the experiences of Jews during the Third Reich as a vehicle for moral lessons, Clinton affirmed an alleged moral superiority of the United States as well as the centrality of the Holocaust's lessons for such a view of the world: if America succeeded in promoting the »truth« of the Holocaust to »all of human kind,« the world would become a better place.[30]

Yet it is not only Holocaust commemoration that has experienced dramatic growth internationally. The same can be said about the scholarly study of this event, including its aftermath, which has led to the emergence of a truly international and very diverse academic field. This volume is by no means the first scholarly attempt to engage with this subject matter, which has been the focus of a significant body of scholarship. Even though it is neither possible nor necessary to provide a comprehensive overview of recent scholarship on this topic, a few significant historiographical landmarks should be mentioned. Sociologists Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider have written one of the most frequently cited books on this subject, *Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust*, in which they argue that the Holocaust represents the epitome of evil in the context of a »cosmopolitanization« of Holocaust memory.[31] Accordingly, references to the Holocaust mostly serve to criticize human rights violations, while minorities and other groups across the globe have come to identify with Jews as the »archetypical« victims of historical and political injustice. Taking Levy/Sznaider, but also Peter Novick's book on the *Holocaust in American Life*, as a starting point, Jan Eckel and Claudia Moisel have published a collection of mostly European empirical case studies to further investigate the »universalization« of the Holocaust.[32] Their volume includes, for example, chapters on the reception of the Eichmann Trial in Belgium and the Netherlands as well as on the development of Holocaust Remembrance Day in Europe. In their volume *Memory in a Global Age*, Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad attest to the »global career« of Holocaust memory, but aim to explore more broadly the connections between globalization and memory debates.[33] Michael Rothberg's book *Multidirectional Memory* marked another significant contribution to this

30 Ibid.

31 Levy and Sznaider (2001). The English translation was published under the title *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (2006).

32 Eckel and Moisel (2008), and Novick (1999).

33 Assmann and Conrad (2010), p. 8. See also: Conrad (2016), pp. 64 f.

literature.[34] Rothberg has argued, in short, that the memory of the Holocaust and other events, such as slavery and colonialism, are not competitive and mutually exclusive, but rather one should consider »the public sphere as a field of contestation where memories interact productively and in unexpected ways.«[35] Recently, the volume *Marking Evil* by Amos Goldberg and Haim Hazan has offered yet another new approach to the study of Holocaust memory in the global age.[36] Goldberg and Hazan explore how »global« – and not only European or American – Holocaust memory has actually become. However, they mostly concentrate on the discursive dimensions of this subject, for instance by examining Holocaust testimony or its poetic representations; they do not focus on the political level of the implementation and functioning of memorial cultures in historical perspective.[37]

In contrast to many earlier contributions, the present volume integrates an exceptionally large variety of scholarly perspectives on the issue of Holocaust memory in a globalizing world, and all of its essays are original contributions that are solidly based on empirical research. The volume's goal is not only to assess and discuss the development and functioning of Holocaust memory around the globe, but also to specifically focus on the impact of Holocaust memory on relations between the Western and the non-Western world.

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This introductory essay seeks to propose seven perspectives in order to provide a framework for the individual essays of the volume, and also to point to new ways to approach the study of Holocaust memory in a globalizing world. *First* of all, globalization and the changes it has brought about form the preconditions for most of debates and developments that the book examines.[38] The terms »globalization« and »global« serve a dual purpose: on the one hand, they provide the historical context for an increasing worldwide salience of Holocaust memory; on the other hand, they help to define the volume's focus of investigation, a »global« phenomenon, as it were, namely the worldwide proliferation of commemo-

34 Rothberg (2009c).
35 As summarized in Rothberg (2015), p. 213.
36 Goldberg and Hazan (2015).
37 See my review of Goldberg and Hazan (2015), in: Central European History 49, no. 2 (June 2016), pp. 291 ff.
38 See: Conrad (2016).

ration and memorialization of the Holocaust.[39] Every country, society, or social group explored in the essays of this book have been influenced by the developments that have made the world a »smaller,« more connected place. An historically unprecedented level of mobility and movement has re-shaped the spheres, spaces, and communities of memory. At the present – and in contrast to past decades – nation-states no longer provide the only, or the central, framework for the formation of memory and identity. Many national myths, such as the notion of Austria as »Hitler's first victim« or France as a nation of resisters, have had to be revised, as they could no longer be insulated against contradiction and questioning narratives from abroad.[40] One of the more recent examples of the shattering of what Tony Judt called »self-serving local illusions« under pressure from abroad is the case of Switzerland.[41] Switzerland's restrictive immigration policies during World War II, denying Jewish refugees a safe haven, as well as economic collaboration with the Nazi regime and the holding of Jewish assets in Swiss banks, were not openly discussed in the Alpine republic before the 1990s. Only significant pressure from abroad, for instance by the World Jewish Congress and the U. S. government under Clinton, propelled Switzerland to face these past misdeeds and provide compensation payments for its victims.[42]

But examples like the Holocaust Museum in Washington and the statements of Maori Leaders in New Zealand show that discourses about the Holocaust have taken a global dimension. This calls for an analysis of the paths, changes, transformations, and modes of transportation, as it were, of Holocaust memory. One needs to look at the people who have crossed borders and have influenced memorial cultures. These include, of course, the migration of survivors of the Holocaust to locations outside of Europe, but also more recent patterns of migration – be they permanent or temporary. The impact of tourism should not be underestimated and, of course, scholars also belong to a highly mobile species, and they have left their own significant imprint on the formation of memorial cultures.[43] But the most significant changes have come about as the

39 See, for example: Gerstenberger and Glasman (2016).

40 Judt (2005), pp. 803-831, and Assmann and Conrad (2010), p. 5. See also: Flacke (2004; 2 vols.), and Knigge and Frei (2002).

41 Judt (2005), pp. 812 f.

42 See, e. g.: Surmann (2012), and Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War (2002) and also Barkan (2000).

43 See, e.g.: the growing body of scholarship on so-called »dark tourism«, for example Foley and Lennon (2000), and the more recent summary by Will Coldwell,

results of mass communication – television, movies, and more recently the Internet – which have created new and much larger audiences, also on a global level. In connection with these changes, one also needs to locate the impact of such processes of communication on individual nation states, the old frameworks, as it were, for debates about memory, and also ask how the effects of globalization on memorial cultures have differed across national borders.

Secondly, so-called »internal globalization« and its consequences on the global boundaries of Holocaust memory need to be considered.[44] Globalization has not led to a synchronization of memorial cultures across borders. The diverse forms of commemoration of January 27 are a good example. If one tries to locate the role and significance of minorities, especially immigrants, in this context, it does not suffice to look at the patterns of migration or the flow of information and knowledge. Instead, the effects of »internal globalization« need to be taken into account, which Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider have described as the »process […] which implies that issues of global concern are able to become part and parcel of everyday local experiences and moral life worlds of an increasing number of people.«[45] If one understands Holocaust memory as an »issue of global concern« this would be a way to make sense of its widespread impact.[46] To add another layer to these considerations, the field of migration history has put forward the concept of transculturalism, which helps to frame and explore the consequences of this constellation. High-tech means of transportation and communication actually enable people, especially immigrants, to live transcultural lives, which means that they can »live in two or more different cultures« at the same time.[47] In doing so, they are able to create numerous linkages between their places of origin and destination. These connections also change the societies with which they are connected, inevitably affecting questions of identity and memorial cultures.

This also means, however, that the resistance in some parts of the world to accepting Holocaust memory as a core value or »moral norm« can impact Western societies. The Arab World may serve as the most

Dark tourism: why murder sites and disaster zones are proving popular, The Guardian, 31 October 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2013/oct/31/dark-tourism-murder-sites-disaster-zones (5 August 2016).

44 Assmann and Conrad (2010), p. 8.

45 As summarized by ibid. See also: Levy and Sznaider (2002), p. 88.

46 Assmann and Conrad (2010), p. 8.

47 Harzig, Hoerder, and Gabaccia (2009), pp. 83 ff.

striking example. Here, the Western »claims to the Holocaust's universality, […] are received […] as a form of Euro-American imperialism in the field of memory.«[48] Such efforts, which are also often seen as attempts to legitimize Israel and its policies, are questioned and rejected in a number of ways. Strategies include drawing explicit parallels between Nazism and Zionism, or invoking the antisemitic trope of a »Jewish conspiracy« that instrumentalizes the Holocaust. In fact, the International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust, commissioned by former Iranian president Mahmud Ahmadinejad in 2006, served not only to question and deny Israel's right to exist, and to provide a forum for Holocaust denial, but it was also an attack on the transatlantic West and its values more generally.[49] The repercussions of such debates on immigrant and minority communities within Western countries thus need to be taken into account. A combination of the methodologies of various subfields, such as memory studies and migration history, could actually lead to new sets of questions and productive ways to address them.

On a more basic level, we can further distinguish how Holocaust memory culture has shaped the attitudes of the majority of a society towards minorities, and how minorities have engaged with the memorial culture of the respective majority. The perspective of majority or mainstream societies constitutes the *third* angle of investigation. In Western Europe, Holocaust memory has clearly shaped policies and attitudes towards minorities and immigrants. Indeed, the process of European integration itself can be seen as a response to the Second World War and the Holocaust, which has made inner-European migration a comparetively uncomplicated process.[50] »Holocaust consciousness,« more generally, has served to create widespread awareness of, and political action against, racism, xenophobia, and antisemitism. On an international level, the legacies of the Holocaust, at least as a rhetorical device, have served to protect the lives of minorities, notably during the NATO campaign against Serbia to protect Kosovo Albanians in 1999. Not only in Germany, the slogan »Never Again« has served to legitimize this »humanitarian« intervention, which was not sanctioned by the United Nations.[51] As the examples of Rwanda and more recently Darfur have shown, however, Americans and

48 Assmann and Conrad (2010), p. 9; see also: Assmann (2010), pp. 98 f.

49 Nazila Fathi, Holocaust Deniers and Skeptics Gather in Iran, New York Times, 11 December 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/world/middleeast/ 11cnd-iran.html?_r=0 (5 August 2016). See also: Assmann (2010), p. 113.

50 See: Kübler (2012), p. 28.

51 See: Steinweis (2005).

Europeans are much more reluctant to protect the lives of minorities outside the boundaries of their geographic spheres of influence, despite the fact that these genocides were also discussed in the context of, and with clear references to, the Holocaust.

Yet as Nancy Foner and Richard Alba have demonstrated, the indirect institutional reactions or consequences of Holocaust memory have not necessarily enhanced the standing of *all* minorities and immigrants in Western European societies. This applies specifically to Muslims, the largest ethno-religious group of immigrants in most of postwar Western Europe. While similar statements could be made about France or the Netherlands, the case of Germany makes this ambiguous *indirect* effect of Holocaust memory abundantly clear. For example, Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union have received much more support from German government authorities with regard to immigration rights, legal status, and religious activities than have immigrants from Turkey. The contemporary problems of the Turkish immigrants do not, despite their large numbers, receive the kind of attention that Jewish immigrants have received in Germany.[52] Holocaust memory has also not benefitted the Roma, a core victim group of Nazi extermination policies, in European societies, and they are still massively discriminated against in many countries.[53]

The earlier references to Tariana Turia and her claims about the »Maori Holocaust« lead us to the *fourth* perspective, the reactions of minorities to the majority society's Holocaust memorial culture in the discursive and public spheres. The examples of Turia and other Maori voices illustrate the referencing and the appropriation of the fate of the Jews during the Holocaust as a means to make a certain point to the mainstream society – rightly assuming that it will understand this message. Taken from a completely different context, a very intriguing case can be made about Kosovo Albanians. Not only has the »West« – or the members of NATO in this case – perceived their victimization at the hands of Serbia through the lens of the Holocaust, but Kosovo Albanians themselves have actively relied on parallels and analogies to the fate of European Jews during the Holocaust in constructing a national identity for the Republic of Kosovo after its declaration of independence in 2008.[54] Indeed, identifying themselves as the »Jews« of former Yugoslavia has

52 Alba and Foner (2010).

53 See, e. g.: Knesebeck (2011).

54 Boguslaw (2011).

not only helped them come to terms with their own suffering,[55] but it has also worked towards mobilizing Western sympathies as well as suppressing debates and memories of war crimes committed by the Kosovan army. As such, scholars should always look at several angles when considering such cases of self-identification with the victims of the Holocaust. It has not only been a strategy utilized to raise awareness and sympathies abroad, but also a tool employed to come to terms with one's own history of violence and victimization.

Fifth, not only the transmission of discourses about historical events, but also the movements of peoples are of crucial concern for the context of this volume. This panorama would be incomplete without bringing migration and the processes connected with it into the equation. Obviously this is a fairly broad and complex issue, which is why a number of brief observations and questions will have to suffice. Older theories of migration have described a kind of circular pattern of immigration, according to which new immigrants and their descendants go through several stages, namely *contact – competition – accommodation – assimilation*, until they are fully absorbed into their society of destination.[56] As part of these processes, they also become integrated into a new community of memory while losing their old identities and connections to varying degrees. Such assumptions have been challenged by the aforementioned theories about globalization and transculturalism. In order to understand the connection between migration and memory, one needs to closely examine the ways in which immigrants, for whom the Holocaust is not a common heritage, are confronted with Holocaust memory in Western societies and how they have responded. Naturally, such processes have played out differently according to the national or ethnic background of the immigrants and the context in which they have settled.

In Germany, such questions have been addressed, for example, in political education and in the multicultural or globalized classrooms of the school system,[57] but it is quite difficult to fully assess the results. Opinion polls have been inconclusive. When the German weekly *Die Zeit*, for example, conducted a survey in 2010 among Turkish citizens living in Germany and German citizens of Turkish ancestry, the results were contradictory. While about 50 % stated that all people residing in Germany, regardless of origin and citizenship, should engage with the history of

55 Ibid., p. 18.
56 See, e. g.: Hahn (2012), pp. 34 ff.
57 See, e. g.: Kühner (2008), pp. 52-65.

the Holocaust, 68 % stated that they knew very little or hardly anything about this history. Interestingly enough, 60 % thought that Germany did *not* provide a model of how to deal with a criminal past.[58] These conflicting results call for more research and perhaps for alternative methods of analysis.[59] Immigrants, of course, have not only been exposed to Holocaust memorial cultures, but also bring their own memories of migration and sometimes persecution, victimization, and war to their countries of destination. In some cases, they have been exposed to, or influenced by, forms of engagement with the Holocaust and World War II in their home countries.[60] Obviously, this can include a very wide spectrum of collective memories concerning victimization, occupation, or collaboration. As mentioned earlier, discursive cultures and political debates in their countries of origin that are not connected to specific *memories* of World War II are also part and parcel of this constellation.

One factor that has received quite a bit of scholarly attention, for example, is the disproportionally large degree of antisemitism and disinterest in the history of the Holocaust, or even Holocaust denial, among Muslims in Europe, especially in Germany, France, and the UK.[61] While this certainly does not apply to a majority of Europe's Muslim population, one does need to consider that such positions are at times actively propagated by Islamist groups and their media outlets from abroad. Yet one also cannot ignore the fact that such attitudes must generally be seen against the backdrop of the Arab-Israeli conflict. To make a complex situation even more complicated, one also needs to ask how immigrants have related their own experiences of discrimination and exclusion to what they know about the persecution of the Jews during the Third Reich. In this context, the aforementioned survey stated that 80 % of German Turks think their situation cannot be compared to the Jews under Nazi Germany. But this also means that a significant minority, about one fifth, of the community does not rule out drawing this parallel. All these

58 Bernd Ulrich, Özlem Topcu, and Heinrich Wefing, Geteilte Erinnerung: Deutschtürken und der Holocaust, Zeit Online, 21 January 2010, http://www.zeit.de/2010/04/Editorial-Umfrage/komplettansicht (22 July 2016).

59 See, e. g.: the announcement for the 2016 Dachauer Symposium zur Zeitgeschichte, Geschichte von gestern für Deutsche von morgen? Die Erfahrung des Nationalsozialismus und historisch-politisches Lernen in der (Post-)Migrationsgesellschaft, http://www.dachauer-symposium.de (5 August 2016). See also the chapter by Arnd Bauerkämper in this volume.

60 Cornelißen (2010).

61 See, e. g.: Gryglewski (2013), and Jikeli (2013).

factors need to be taken into account when we try to answer questions about how immigrants have adjusted to and altered memorial cultures of Western societies. Yet while these points show that there is a very wide spectrum of minority reactions to the memorial cultures of the majority, one of the most pressing question for future research is whether these reactions have impacted and changed the majorities' memorial cultures. The recent arrival of large numbers of new refugees, many from Syria, and the intention to integrate them in Germany, and elsewhere, underscores the necessity of research on this specific aspect of integration.

Some of these factors may indeed be difficult to explore, at least for historians, considering the kind of sources they commonly rely on. One issue, however, lends itself to historical analysis – namely the policies of institutions and organizations in charge of preserving and shaping the memory of the Holocaust. The *sixth* perspective suggests that we look at how these institutions have addressed and responded to minorities. Many outreach programs aimed at immigrants, especially young people, have been sponsored by the institutions that have taken responsibility for the former Nazi concentration camps. For example, the Concentration Camp Memorial Neuengamme near Hamburg, in cooperation with a number of other institutions, recently offered a seminar series entitled »How does history concern me?« This seminar focused above all on teaching about the history of National Socialism and the local sites connected to this history.[62] Clearly, such a project aimed at integrating immigrants into the Federal Republic's community of memory. To cite a different example, the aforementioned International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance makes the protection of minorities in contemporary societies one of the primary lessons to be learned from teaching the Holocaust. As one of the reasons in favor of supporting Holocaust education, the Alliance states the following in its teaching guidelines: »It helps students develop an awareness of the value of diversity in a pluralistic society and encourages sensitivity to the positions of minorities.«[63]

As a third and final example, the Holocaust Museum in Washington has been making a fairly strong effort to reach out to a number of minority groups in the United States, particularly African Americans. It was certainly no coincidence that another speaker at the aforementioned

62 Seminarreihe: Was hat Geschichte mit mir zu tun?, 11 September 2012, http://lernen-aus-der-geschichte.de/Teilnehmen-und-Vernetzen/content/10697 (22 July 2016).

63 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. Educate: Why Teach About the Holocaust, http://www.holocaustremembrance.com/node/315 (22 July 2016).

ceremony with Bill Clinton was Rebecca Dupas, an African American poet and high school teacher, who was at the time in charge of the museum's outreach programs to high schools. Introduced as someone who had not »inherited« but »chosen« »the legacies of the Holocaust,« her speech drew a clear parallel between the historical significance of Martin Luther King and Holocaust survivor and author Elie Wiesel in the contemporary United States. Dupas did not mention the centuries of inequality and racism that African Americans have faced in her country, but maintained that it was the Holocaust that provided high school students with the »lesson of a life time.«[64] This statement not only offers a striking example of the »externalization of evil«[65] – i. e. the tendency to draw »lessons« from events that were not part of American history – but is also a clear indicator of efforts to integrate a minority group with its own history of oppression, slavery, and inequality into American Holocaust memory culture. This is, however, only one side of the story, as there has been opposition by African Americans against such endeavors. They have argued, for example, that it actually distracts attention away from racism and slavery.[66]

Nevertheless, these three examples illustrate that the efforts to integrate minorities into the Holocaust memorial culture of the majority have actually accelerated the processes of the universalization of the Holocaust. In order to make the Holocaust a *relevant* point of reference for those minority groups who do not see themselves in a direct continuity of the events of World War II, it has had to be framed in more and more universal terms, connecting this history with pressing questions to which minorities can relate. These include, for example, human rights violations or the experiences of discrimination of minorities in Western societies. It is certainly no coincidence that the seminar series of the Concentration Camp Memorial in Neuengamme began with a presentation by a representative of Amnesty International, who talked about precisely such issues.

The *seventh* and last perspective also has to do with institutions, but it takes a different angle by looking at the conflicts that have accompanied

64 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, U. S. Holocaust Museum 20th Anniversary Tribute (Video), 29 April 2013, http://www.c-span.org/video/?312271-1/us-holocaust-museum-20th-anniversary-tribute (22 July 2016).

65 See, e. g.: Detlef Junker, Die Amerikanisierung des Holocaust, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 September 2000.

66 See, e. g.: Flanzbaum (1999), pp. 1-17, as well as the chapter by Clarence Taylor in this volume.

the growth and the changes in Western Holocaust memorial cultures. As Jewish Holocaust survivors and Jewish interest groups or organizations have – at least outside of Germany – been at the forefront establishing institutions that deal with Holocaust memory, these conflicts are very often connected to the relationship between the Jewish and the non-Jewish portions of the population. In addition to the controversy in New Zealand, one could easily find a number of examples for such conflicts, such as an episode that took place in 1977 in the city of Philadelphia. That year, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, an NGO advocating the rights of Jews and fighting antisemitism, managed to convince the local board of education to make the teaching of the Holocaust a mandatory component of high school curricula. This decision led to fierce and openly antisemitic reactions from American citizens of German descent, an old and very well established group in Philadelphia. The latter feared that Holocaust education could block out knowledge of the positive contributions of German immigrants to US society, as well as lead to widespread anti-German sentiment. German Americans even reached out to West German diplomats and government authorities, who then subsequently opposed and even tried to impede a Holocaust-centered memorial culture in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s.[67]

This case is particularly intriguing because self-identified *Germans* in the United States struggled as a minority with an evolving Holocaust memorial culture. However, one can examine such a constellation maybe even more clearly by looking at a debate that took place only a few years ago and approximately 2,000 kilometers northwest of Philadelphia, in Winnipeg. This city of 600,000, located in central Canada, may seem an unlikely place for a debate about Holocaust memory, but the opposite is true. Winnipeg saw a long and multilayered controversy about the content of the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, which opened in late 2014 and became Canada's sixth national museum.[68] This museum was envisioned and initiated in the late 1990s by Izzy Asper, a Jewish businessman, as a human rights museum with heavy emphasis on the Holocaust. Its mission changed significantly when the Canadian government took over the project in 2007, mainly to secure the funding and the operational costs of this fairly large enterprise. Nevertheless, the museum still depends to a large extent on private donations. With the government's

67 Eder (2016), pp. 17-28.

68 For a detailed account of the museum's founding history see: Chatterley (2015), pp. 189-211.

involvement, the institution, however, became dedicated not only to the promotion of human rights and the teaching of ethics, but also to the state's policies of »diversity, inclusiveness, and multiculturalism.«[69] In addition to several galleries dedicated to human rights in history and in the present, as well as a Holocaust gallery (which is located at the narrative and physical center of the museum), it also includes a gallery on »Indigenous Perspectives« and a gallery dedicated to mass atrocities, officially called »Breaking the Silence.«[70]

And it was precisely this gallery – not so much the question of Canadian or colonial crimes against indigenous peoples – that caused this institution a lot of trouble. This gallery was supposed to portray all four genocides officially recognized by the Canadian government in addition to the Holocaust – namely the Armenian Genocide, Rwanda, Srebrenica, and the Holodomor, the man-made »Great Famine« of 1932/33 that killed about three million Ukrainians. This plan set off a debate in which two minorities, namely Jewish and Ukrainian Canadians, not only compared their own respective histories of victimization, but also argued about which atrocity was best suited to educate contemporary and future generations of Canadians about human rights.

Representatives of Canada's Ukrainian minority of 1.3 million – the world's third largest Ukrainian population – campaigned for several years to give the »Great Famine« the same extensive treatment as the Holocaust in the museum. They argued that it could be used as »a lens through which to teach an important aspect of the human-rights story, about how a dictatorial state can use food, a basic human right, to control and destroy people.«[71] Yet the strategies of Ukrainian interest groups did not only include making such rational points, but also directly attacked Canada's Jewish community, comparing, for example, the claim for the centrality and uniqueness of the Holocaust in the museum to Stalin's anti-Ukrainian policies. Jewish groups referred to the »uniqueness« argument, but also maintained that the museum was originally conceived as a Holocaust museum, which had helped to secure funding from the Canadian Jewish community. Debates about the comparability of the crimes of the Soviet and Nazi regimes thus do not only take place in former Eastern Europe and the historical profession, but also in places where Europeans have settled and migrant community leaders have been

69 Williams (2011), p. 4.

70 Galleries, Canadian Museum of Human Rights, https://humanrights.ca/galleries (22 July 2016).

71 As quoted in Williams (2011), p. 4.

making the commemoration of their suffering a key aspect of their identity politics.[72] It speaks volumes about the status of Canada's First Nations that they were virtually absent from the debate about which memory to enshrine in the museum.

The museum retained its original plan to put the Holocaust at the center of its narrative, but it continues to officially insist that it wants neither to *compare* the suffering of different groups, nor to *commemorate* the victims of the genocides portrayed in the museum. Instead, the museum's aim is to teach ethics, portraying the Holocaust as the »archetypical collapse of democracy into genocide from which human rights lessons can be drawn.«[73] The aim of promoting universal lessons for present-day Canada, however, has diminished the value of the institution for the political leaders of the different immigrant groups, and also for the circle of potential donors, who are clearly more interested in the commemorative aspect of the museum. During the construction, this led to a decrease in donations and hence a delay in the completion of the project. The example of the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, however, reveals the interpretative as well as the practical problems that emerge when the desire to commemorate atrocities of particular interest to one minority group comes into conflict with the desire to promote universal lessons from these events.

This controversy raises yet another question. The Canadian museum does not, despite the central place the Holocaust holds in this concept, make an attempt to portray or explain this event in its historical entirety. Rather, it focuses on ethical and human rights questions that emerge from the Holocaust, such as the role of so-called bystander nations like Canada. While such a normative approach is highly problematic in and of itself – and anyone who has ever visited the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles will be able to attest to the ahistorical and almost inevitably superficial nature of such endeavors – this decision indeed makes one wonder about how such controversies affect the popular understanding of actual historical events.

Of course, the broader meanings of historical events are always in flux, and it would be naïve to assume that the Holocaust would be excluded from interpretative modifications. But one certainly needs to be mindful of the limited knowledge that will be conveyed to future generations of

72 Moses (2012), p. 217. On historical politics of the Ukrainian diaspora see: Rossolinski-Liebe (2014), pp. 397-430.

73 Moses (2012), pp. 232 f. See also: ibid., p. 217.

Canadians if they are confronted with the history of the Holocaust only in terms of its significance for the history of human rights. As such, historians should consider what actually happens to the »Holocaust narrative« – its terminology, iconography, and imagery – when it travels, gets appropriated, politicized, and maybe even abused outside of its original historical context. There are clear indicators that the transformation of Holocaust memory over the past decades has led to distortions of historical understanding of the events before 1945.[74]

Indeed historians need to ask themselves not only whether the historical specificity of the events leading to the extermination of almost six million European Jews is being pushed more and more into the background, at least in public forms of engagement with this history. Historians must also ask if Western audiences at large have reached a point of saturation. In the United States, some scholars have complained rather worriedly in the recent past about a growing »Holocaust fatigue.«[75] And Alvin H. Rosenfeld has warned his readers, for example, that the increasing »dissemination« of the Holocaust in the public sphere, its »use as a metaphor for victimization in general« or as a backdrop for movies and TV series will eventually trivialize and vulgarize »a catastrophic history.«[76]

In the end, efforts to integrate increasingly diverse populations into Western Holocaust-centered memory cultures will probably have a similar, if unintended, effect. In Germany and maybe Austria, such changes would not occur hastily, as these countries do have a special historical responsibility. But as debates about the Canadian museum or Bill Clinton's reflections about the »virus« of intolerance show, new forms of engagement with the Holocaust may very well lead to increasingly abstract and watered down interpretations and representations of this calamitous event.[77]

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The essays collected in this book take up several of the perspectives and questions outlined above, while also adding new points of view and new empirical evidence to the discussion. They are organized according to their geographic distance to Germany, the largest successor state of the Third Reich. As such, the volume first explores, broadly speaking, the

74 See, e. g.: Rosenfeld (2011).
75 Schweber (2006), pp. 44-50.
76 Rosenfeld (2011), pp. 10 f., and cf. Snyder (2015).
77 See: Judt with Snyder (2012), pp. 277-283.