Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 5

Alessandro Capone
Ferenc Kiefer
Franco Lo Piparo *Editors*

# Indirect Reports and Pragmatics

## Interdisciplinary Studies

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Volume 5

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*This book is dedicated by Alessandro Capone*
*to his unforgettable teachers Yan Huang*
*and the late James Higginbotham*

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This book is dedicated to the memory of James Higginbotham, teacher, examiner, and friend. His departure from this world was premature, but nevertheless he left us a heritage of ideas which will spur us to continue our explorations in semantics and pragmatics. When he lectured, I often had the following thought "Oh my God, this is another Aristotle." We shall never forget him for the clarity of his ideas and the originality of his thoughts.

Alessandro Capone

# Contents

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# Introduction

**Alessandro Capone, Ferenc Kiefer, and Franco Lo Piparo**

The issue of indirect reports is of considerable theoretical interest, for various reasons. It is of interest to linguists and socio-linguists because its sheds light on linguistic social praxis; it is also of interest to philosophers, because clearly the issue of belief reports and the issue of reports of 'de se' attitudes can be embedded in the issue of indirect reports (see the papers by Capone, Jaszcolt and Cumming & Sharvit in this book). Since philosophy deals (among other things) with the transmission of knowledge, the chapter on indirect reports is clearly one which has to do with the transmission of knowledge (mediated by what another, possibly reliable person, said) and, therefore, has a philosophical core (the issue of opacity being of utmost interest to philosophers).

This book is interdisciplinary: it includes sociolinguists, conversation analysts, formal linguists and also philosophers of language. We are persuaded that interdisciplinarity is a strong point of this book and of research in general – just to remind readers of the genial scholars who applied interdisciplinarity (in linguistics and sociology), we have Chomsky and Goffman (among others). We have also decided – in order to press the interdisciplinary character of this research project – to allow the two sections of the book (The social praxis of indirect reports and indirect reports in the philosophy of language) to interact through a number of connected points.

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Reporting a speech event (an utterance by a speaker, normally) is always a complicated task – we are tempted to say a ‘polyphonic task’ as the voices of the original speaker and the reporter interconnect opening the possibility that one voice comments on the other. The Hearer’s task is therefore quite difficult, as s/he has to separate the two voices and know which portion of the text belongs to one voice or to the other. It is highly possible that pragmatics intervenes in securing an interpretation of indirect reports and in separating roles in this complex and intriguing language game in which voices are superimposed almost inextricably. An indirect report (according to Capone 2012) is essentially a ‘language game’. In that paper Capone stressed polyphony as the essential characteristic of the game. Here, taking up those concepts, we want to emphasize that indirect reports have a dialogic structure (to put things in the words used by Weigand (2015), who is persuaded that language essentially has a dialogic format). Minimally they imply a dialogue between the original speaker and the reporter, but also between the reporter and the Hearer of the report. The reporter, qua Hearer, of course, had an advantage, because he is perceptually conscious of the context (and the physical surroundings) in which the interaction took place and which guided the interpretation of the utterances allowing the hearer to assign referents to pronominals (for example). The Hearer of the indirect report (to be distinguished from the reporter) clearly has a disadvantage, as s/he is not able to have access to the original context of the reported utterance. Thus, NPs have to be prepared for fruition by the Hearer of the report and they must be packaged in such a way that the Hearer of the report need not search for the original context in order to have access to the referents of the NPs used. Reports, in other words, to use an innocent metaphor, look like pre-packaged goods: they require transformations that will facilitate or allow fruition by the Hearer.

In this book there is a lot of emphasis on transformations and on issues such as opacity and transparency. This is more or less the philosophical story on indirect reports. However, in this book there is also a lot of emphasis on indirect reporting as a social practice, that involves constraints on what can be done, on what transformations can be tolerated, and on what contexts must be like to facilitate this social practice (or social practices?).

An interesting point of departure for the book would probably have to be the (rather complicated) relationship between direct and indirect reports. Although this issue was made thematic in one of Capone’s chapters, most papers discuss or touch on this complicated issue. Some new data are offered in this book, starting from Davis’ chapter, which we predict will be very influential in the years to come.

Indirect reports are, indirectly, a way of gaining knowledge through an intermediary (an intermediary knower). If we trust what the reporter said, then we can utilize what the original speaker said and if we trust the original speaker (or believe him trustworthy), we can use that piece of information for the purpose of action (in order to act or to prevent ourselves from acting, in case knowledge makes negative predictions on the consequences of our actions). However, important and useful though an utterance by an original speaker might be, there may be barriers to the fruition of that knowledge by the hearer of the indirect report. If the utterance is reported by using NPs with whom the hearer is not familiar, there is the risk that the hearer will not acquire information but misinformation. Hence the indirect report is a laboratory where information is transformed, making use of whatever information the reporter has about the Hearer. (The indirect report seems to be highly influenced by what the speaker knows about the hearer and seems to connect with whatever files (of knowledge) relate to the hearer). Such transformations have to take into account what the Hearer knows and what she does not know. The reporter has to go beyond egocentricity but must project herself into the shoes of the Hearer, using bits of information coming from previous interactions with the Hearer. Thus if she knows that a certain NP would not convey any information to the Hearer, she would have to change the NP and use a co-referential NP such that it would aid the Hearer have access to the referent. However, there are surely limits to such transformations (Capone 2010a, b), as the original speaker will applaud innocent transformations but not transformations whose ultimate purpose is to put the original speaker in a bad light. (In other words transformations will be tolerated and welcome provided that they do not transform the original speaker's words into a different (more menacing) speech act)).

The testing-bed for a theory of indirect reporting will surely be a theory of non-serious speech (or speech acts) – there is surely the expectation that indirect reports should report the speaker's intentions (albeit not all intentions, but only those that are congruent with the social path of intentionality (that is to say intentions that are licitly conveyed through the speech act in that they are promoted by social intentionality)) and NOT merely the locutionary act. In some contexts, reporting the locutionary act may be (highly and deliberately) misleading, because one gives the impression that a literal intention was transmitted by an utterance, when, instead, the utterance was animated by (and exploited cues and clues to project) a non-literal intention. It may be of considerable use to examine the social practice of indirect reports with reference to a number of contexts, as there are contexts where literal meanings are promoted and contexts, where instead, given the deliberate dissemination of cues and clues, a non-literal interpretation is promoted (thus, it would be snide to report a literal interpretation when this, in fact, was only one step in the direction of a non-literal interpretation). We probably need a Principle of Prudence, inhibiting non-serious speech in contexts where it is possible that the speaker will be reported verbatim despite many indications to the contrary. This will surely be a chapter of societal linguistics, a la Mey (2001). We cannot be more detailed in this Introduction, apart from saying that one direction to explore is the social path of interpretation and, in particular, socio-pragmatics. A number of papers in this volume go into this direction, even if further progress is needed.

Indirect reporting, according to Wieland (2016), involves the following abilities:

An ability to understand and represent the locutionary content of the speech being reported;

An ability to understand and represent the illocutionary content of the speech being reported;

An ability to represent the way in which the original utterance was produced.

An ability to have a theory of mind for both the speaker being reported and for their audience;
An ability to organize the above functions in a kind of narrative structure.

We certainly think that Wieland's description of these abilities is a good way of summing up the content of this book at the general level, although we need to add that indirect reporting is essentially a polyphonic game and we cannot understand it well, unless we concentrate on how different voices can co-exist in the same utterance and interpenetrate one another. Sometimes the relationship between voices is one of commentary, one of judgment, one of distancing or, on the contrary, complicity. Thus, to sum things up, indirect reports are complex actions.

One of the linguistic phenomena closely related to indirect speech is what has been called Quotative Inversion. Quotative Inversion occurs in English when a quote, i.e. a passage of reported direct speech, immediately precedes or encloses a reporting clause and it affects the order of subject and main verb within the reporting clause. Pragmatic accounts of Quotative Inversion are often grounded in particular assumptions about the narrative force of such constructions. Clearly, they have also to do with topic and focus hence with information structure. They are also related to foregrounding and back grounding, i.e. to fundamental discourse organizing principles.

Quotative Inversion may bring to the fore the differences, if any, between the reporting clause in sentence-initial position and sentence-final position (Kiefer 2016). Though any manner of speaking verb can be used to introduce a report, the choice of verbs is not arbitrary. In sentence-final position verbs can be used as reporting verbs which are not lexically (semantically) manner of speaking verbs but which acquire such an interpretation via pragmatically conditioned metaphorical transfer. This transfer may be considered to be an extension of what Recanati calls pragmatic modulation (Recanati 2010).

Before closing this introduction, we would like to express a regret. Despite the fact that many of the contributors come from different nationalities, this is clearly not a book on cross-linguistic analysis of indirect reports. It would be nice if, in a second volume, we could advance towards a cross-linguistic and cross-cultural analysis of indirect reports. Such a book would offer further materials allowing us to systematize our societal considerations by putting them to the test and modifying them, if needed.

Nevertheless, we hope that this book will allow the authors to interact and use the information which has been made available to them while the book was in progress. We assume that some interaction has already occurred, because we made all the papers available to the authors (of this volume) as soon they were written. This looked like a genuinely cooperative process. We hope to see the results of this collaborative project in the future and we hope that a new book will come out of this – possibly with some other authors. Our research looks like infinite process and at present we are only able to see the tip of the iceberg. We should not be discouraged, nevertheless.

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# Part I
# The (Social) Praxis of Indirect Reports

# Indirect Reporting in Bilingual Language Production

**Istvan Kecskes**

## 1 Introduction

Indirect reporting has been one of the most discussed topics in the linguistic-philosophical pragmatics line of research. Both linguists and philosophers have been analyzing the logical and inferential structure of indirect reports, the relation between the original utterance and the report, felicity conditions of indirect reports, the role of semantic and pragmatic factors in shaping and interpreting indirect reports and similar issues based on examples and data created by the researchers usually in the English language, heavily relying on thought experiments and introspective data to make their points (e.g. Capone 2010; Cappelen and Lepore 2004; Davidson 1968; Wieland 2010). This is necessary for them to explore and understand the underlying processes of this complex phenomenon.

Indirect reporting just like any other processes in language use is based on conventions of language and conventions of usage (e.g. Morgan 1978; Searle 1979). Its logical and inferential structure can be investigated and analyzed because speakers who use indirect reporting basically rely on the same or similar speech conventions within the English language. *But what will happen if the language users are not native speakers of English and they cannot rely on those language conventions and usage conventions?* How will people go about formulating indirect reports and interpreting them when they can't count on, or have limited access to those commonalities, conventions, standards and norms and in a sense, they are expected to create, co-construct them in the communicative process or their mindset is influenced by the conventions of two languages? This is the question that this paper intends to explore. In order to do so it will follow a path that differs from what

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is common in the relevant literature about indirect reports. The difference is mainly in three things. First, the study analyzes natural language use by speakers who can speak more than one language. Second, it is argued that emergent situational salience plays a decisive role in what speakers actually report from the original message, and how they shape the reported message. Third, instead of relying on introspective data and data resulting from thought experiments as indirect report studies have been doing this paper uses production data generated by bilingual subjects. This looks like a necessary step because recently several researchers have questioned the reliability of data heavily dependent on the linguist's own linguistic intuition (e.g. Dąbrowska 2010; Kertész and Rákosi 2012). Besides, research on indirect reporting has focused mainly on the English language, more specifically, language hypothetically produced by native speakers of English.

The dataset used in this paper consists of indirect reports produced by bilinguals whose L1 is English (9 subjects) and whose L1 is not English (12 subjects) but another language (Cantonese, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, Russian, Kurdish, Tibetian and Japanese). All subjects are bilinguals but there are major differences between their bilingualism. The English Native Speaker group has English as their L1 and their second language is Spanish (6), Italian (2) and German (1). Although they had a minimum of 4 years in their L2 their bilingualism is heavily dominated by their L1 and their language processing is very similar to that of native speakers. The Non-Native Speaker group represents a more balanced bilingualism because each subject has studied English for at least 8 years, spent a minimum of 1 year in the US and used both languages regularly. These facts will be very important when we compare their language production.

## 2 Understanding Indirect Reporting

Before discussing the research questions and methodology I need to clarify how indirect reporting is understood in this paper. I will not review the literature in details but focus only on those issues that have immediate relevance to the content of this paper and nature of data.

*What do we do when we use indirect reports?*

Through indirect reporting we usually share information with another party about what someone else has said. We can do this in two ways. We preserve the integrity of the original message by formally marking the boundaries between the main message and the embedded reported message, or we eliminate the boundaries by focusing on the information content and constructing our report the way we find it appropriate taking into account *one, some or none* of the following factors: actual situational context, illocutionary force of original message, evaluative load of original message and reportee/s. In indirect speech, the structure and content of the reported clause also depends on whether the speaker is reporting a statement, a question, request or a command. An indirect report regularly presents a less detailed summary of what was said.

This paper supports the view that indirect reports always have to report the minimal propositional content of the original utterance (see Cappelen and Lepore 2004; Borg 2004; Wieland, chapter "Reporting practices and reported entities", this volume). It does not matter what the communicative goals of the reporter are, and how much s/he takes into account the conditions described above, the indirect utterance can be considered a felicitous report only if minimal propositional content is preserved in the reporting.

Looking at indirect reporting as an ability, the act of reporting the speech of others comprises the interplay of cognitive, linguistic and pragmatic factors (see Cummings 2015). Depending on the way and form of reporting used, the speaker is expected to be able to produce utterances which contain embedded clauses, use a variety of lexical devices and employ into national, emphatic and other tools that represent prosodic features of another person's speech. These are, however, only the linguistic resources a speaker is supposed to be able to use. Beyond this, there are a number of complex cognitive and pragmatic skills that underpin indirect reporting. A speaker has to be able to remember what another person said and how it was said. Relying on verbal memory s/he should be capable of recalling not only the explicit content and prosodic features of a linguistic utterance, but also any implied meaning triggered by that utterance. The person who utters 'Bob said to me angrily, "Oh, what a good guy you are!" seems to have captured the sarcastic intent with which Bob produced his utterance. These implied or pragmatic meanings can only be recovered through complicated processes of reasoning that involve, amongst other things, theory of mind skills.

*Why do we use indirect reports?*

There appear to be two reasons. One of them is cognitive load. If we want to produce a direct report we need to make more cognitive effort than in the case of indirect report because we must recall the original message almost word by word from memory. We can either quote the message word by word (A) or make tense and indexical changes (B) so as to adjust the report to the current context. For instance:

(1)
A. Peter said: "I will go and visit you when I finish my lecture."
B. Peter said that he would visit me when he finished his lecture.
C. Peter told me that he would visit me after finishing his lecture.

Each option requires significant cognitive effort but on a different scale. This issue is especially important in our case where one group of subjects are not native speakers of English (NS) and the other group speaks English as a second language. According to second language acquisition studies indirect reporting is one of the most challenging tasks for second language users (e.g. Barbieri and Eckhardt 2007; McCarthy 1998).

Option A is the most cognitively demanding one because here the reporter recalls the exact words of the speaker. Option B appears to be less cognitively demanding solution because it allows the reporter to make indexical changes to adjust the content to the actual situational context. In option C the reporter adapts the message to suit his needs. He can change lexical items and sentence structures as he wishes. As far as non-native speakers (NNS) are concerned this is supposed to be the easiest option for them. They are less constrained by semantic and linguistic requirements so they can focus on how to express content. This is where most of the reporter's subjectivity can be detected.

The second reason why indirect reports are used in conversation is preference of the reporter. S/he may not want the audience to know about every detail in the original message, or s/he wishes to avoid some unpleasant details, connotation or expressions used in the original utterance, or simply s/he wants to be less verbose than the original message is. In the case of non-native speakers preference can heavily be affected by proficiency issues as well. For instance, here are some of the variations that our subjects used when reporting A.

(2)
A. Amy: – Don't even think about lying to me.
E1.[1] Amy demanded that you don't lie to her.
E2. Amy said to not even think about lying to her.
xxx
CA. Amy demands the truth.
CH4. Amy said she had already know my tricks.

E1 and E2 are native speakers of English. Both preferred to use indirect reporting with adjusted structures and indexicals. It is interesting that the Cantonese and Mandarin speakers selected to keep the content but change wording significantly. This is a very common thing in the group of NNSs as will be discussed later.

*What do current theories say about indirect reports?*

Current research seems to agree that indirect reports cannot be analysed properly without consideration of pragmatic factors. Although indirect reports usually have important semantic properties, their formulation is heavily affected by the peculiarities of actual communicative situations that are neither systematic nor generalizable. Cappelen and Lepore (1997:289) summarized this approach the following way:

– Indirect reports are basically pragmatic in nature. Reporters aim to convey information about a particular act in a particular context C to a particular audience situated in a different context C*.
– There is a same say-relation between the original utterance and the indirect report. However, the nature of this relation can be revealed only in part by applying semantic analysis.

[1]Reporters in the dataset are referred to by capital letters and numbers. Capital letters denote first language of the reporter. If there is more than one speaker of the same L1 numbers are used to refer to them. E stands for English, CA refers to Cantonese, CH to Mandarin Chinese, K means Korean, J stands for Japanese, R means Russian and KU refers to Kurdish.

– Indirect reports share some solid, not necessarily context-sensitive semantic features. However, they also have pragmatic properties that are neither systematic nor generalizable.

Capone (2010) and Wieland (2013) referred to the fact that instead of presupposing a same-say relation between the original utterance and the indirect report we should assume that there existsa pragmatic equivalency relation between them, and this relationship results from some kind of metarepresentation that can be analyzed. Wieland (2013) argued that given the varieties of indirect reports they are not expected to represent the propositional content of the original utterance in its entirety or without alteration. Capone (2010) claimed that pragmatic equivalency can be explained by using Mey's (2001:218) theory of pragmemes which refers to an instantiated pragmatic act.

There is no doubt about the fact that in the case of indirect reports the content of the original message of the speaker can be considered an invariant, and its instantiations of that content in the indirect reports are the possible situational variants. For instance, the following six utterances by a NSs of English from the dataset can all be considered as possible variants of utterance A.

(3) A. Andy: – How are you doing?
E1. Andy wanted to know how we are doing.
E2. Andy is greeting someone.
E3. Andy wants to know how you are doing.
E4. Andy asked how I was doing.
E5. Andy is greeting someone.
E6. Andy wonders how I've been.

This is in line not only with Mey's (2001, 2006) way of thinking about pragmatic acts but also with Geis's view of speech acts, according to which there are broad mappings (or correlations) between sentence types and illocutionary forces (or types of illocutionary force). The appeal to the context serves to determine the specific meaning accruing to the situated use of a literal speech act (Geis 1995). In order to explain those broad correlations Kecskes (2008, 2010, 2013) put forward the dynamic model of meaning (DMM) in which *coresense* represents the invariant pragmatic function or content while *consense*(s) (contextual sense) are the possible instantiations of that invariant. In this approach the minimal propositional content can be considered as coresense while the actual indirect reports are representatives of consenses. For instance (see Kecskes 2010:2894):

Pragmeme: [inviting someone to take a seat]
Practs (pragmatic acts): Why don't you sit down?; Please take a seat; Sit down, please, etc.

The difference between Mey's pragmeme theory and Kecskes' dynamic model of meaning is that while Mey puts the emphasis on the interactional situation and considers semantics as secondary, Kecskes gives equal importance to encoded semantics of utterance and the role of interactional context in which it is used (see discussion on the issue in Kecskes 2010). Mey says the following about pragmatic acts: "The theory of pragmatic acts does not explain human language use starting from the words uttered by a single, idealized speaker. Instead, it focuses on the interactional situation in which both speakers and hearers realize their aims. The explanatory movement is from the outside in, one could say, rather than from the inside out: instead of starting with what is said, and looking for what the words could mean, the situation where the words fit, is invoked to explain what can be (and is actually being) said (Mey 2006:542)." The problem with this definition is that it emphasizes that the explanatory movement should go from the outside in. Kecskes (2010) argued that the explanatory movement in any pragmatic theory should go in both directions: from the outside in (actual situational context → prior context encoded in utterances used) and from the inside out (prior context encoded inutterances used → actual situational context). This has special importance in the language production and interpretation of non-native speakers whose starting point is usually the compositional (literal) meaning of the utterance rather than the actual situational meaning (e.g. Abel 2003; Bortfeld 2002, 2003; Cieślicka 2004, 2006; Kecskes 2007). Based on those findings we can hypothesize that when reporting someone else's utterance non-native speakers in most cases first analyze the semantic content of the utterance and then will come up with a possible variant for its instantiation in the actual situational context. What exactly the wording is going to be depends on several factors, which will be discussed below.

## 3 Role of Emergent Situational Salience in Indirect Reporting

In his socio-cognitive approach Kecskes (2010, 2013) argued that while fitting words into actual situational contexts speakers are driven not only by the intent that the hearer recognize what is meant as intended by the speaker (cooperation),[2] but also by speaker individual salience that affects production subconsciously (egocentrism).[3] Both cooperation and egocentrism are part of human rationality. However, the two factors affect the communicative process in a varying degree. The interplay of these social (recipient design) and individual (salience) factors shapes the communicative process and utterance production. The *important role*

[2] "Cooperation" is used here in the Gricean sense according to which cooperation is part of human rationality.

[3] "Egocentrism" in the SCA refers to attention-bias that is the result of prior experience of individuals. It means that interlocutors activate and bring up the most salient information to the needed attentional level in the construction (by the speaker) and comprehension (by the hearer) of the communication. In this sense there is nothing negative about egocentrism (Kecskes 2010, 2013).

*of emergent situational salience in indirect reporting* can be demonstrated through those examples in our dataset where reporters did not care much about how precisely they conveyed the content of the original message. Rather they focused on what was most salient for them in that message. In those cases the reporters (both NSs and NNSs) generally used a more condensed way of report focusing on the content of the original message and reporting what they found most salient in it. For instance:

(4)
Molly: – I do not want to tell you what I think about Tom.
E2. Molly has a secret.
E. Molly has no comment about Tom.

CA. Molly does not want to tell her opinion of Tom.
CH5. Molly refused to talk about Tom.

Salience plays a special role in indirect reporting because it appears to be the main driving force in shaping the indirect report. As a semiotic notion, salience refers to the relative importance or prominence of signs. The relative salience of a particular sign when considered in the context of others helps an individual to quickly rank large amounts of information by importance and thus give attention to that which is most important. In psychology, attention represents the process that enables organisms to select, among different sources of information, those that will receive cognitive processing. Information is selected according to its saliency. Thus, salience denotes a feature of an object (both contextual and subjective) whereas attention is a process. In pragmatics when we speak about salient information we mean given information that the speaker assumes should be in central place for the hearer when the speaker produces the utterance. It is the most probable out of all possible.

The importance of salience in language processing was highlighted in Giora's graded salience hypothesis (Giora 1997, 2003). The main claim of the graded salience hypothesis (GSH) is that salient information is superior to less salient information and often (Giora 2003:15), though not always, to unstored information, such as novel information or information inferable from context (see Giora 2003: 10–11; Peleg et al. 2001). As a consequence, salient meanings of lexical units (e.g., conventional, frequent, familiar, or prototypical meanings) are processed automatically, irrespective of contextual information and strength of bias. Although context (actual situational context) effects may be fast, they run in parallel with lexical processes and initially do not interact with them (Giora 2003:24).

According to the GSH hypothesis, in language processing, both salient information and contextual knowledge run in parallel, and salient information may not be filtered out even when it is contextually inappropriate. This claim basically questions context-dependency, which is one of the main tenets of current pragmatic theories. While salience, according to the GSH, mainly concerns the storage of knowledge as a function of degree of familiarity, frequency, prototypicality, and conventionality, salience in the socio-cognitive approach (SCA) refers to the contingent effect of salient knowledge as a result of the attentional processing of communication in a particular situation, which facilitates or hampers the expression of intention and the subsequent achievement of communicative effects.

The socio-cognitive approach incorporates the graded salience hypothesis to a significant extent, but it does not accept all of its tenets. GSH basically is hearer-centered, while SCA focuses on both production and comprehension. The focus of GSH is on linguistic salience, specifically meaning salience. It deals with lexical processing, whereas SCA's concern is both lexical (linguistic) salience and perceptual salience. While GSH uses "context" in the sense of actual situational context, SCA emphasizes the difference and interplay between prior context encoded in lexical items and actual situational context. This is especially important in the case of indirect reports where a minimal propositional content should be preserved in the indirect utterance otherwise the report can't be considered a felicitous report (see Cappelen and Lepore 2004; Borg 2004).

Another significant difference between GSH and SCA is that the GSH emphasizes the importance of stored information, while SCA considers salience to be both a stored (inherent salience and collective salience) and an emergent entity (actual situational salience). According to the GSH (Giora 2003:15), for information to be salient—to be foremost on a person's mind—it needs to undergo consolidation, that is, to be stored or coded in the mental lexicon, which usually happens as conventionalization. Stored information is superior to unstored information, such as novel information or information inferable from the context: While salient information is highly accessible, non-salient information requires strongly supportive contextual information to become as accessible as salient information is. At this point Giora seems to equate salient information with consolidated/stored information and nonsalient information with unstored information. This is somewhat questionable because it considers salience as a relatively static entity that changes mainly diachronically. According to Giora, in order for something to be salient, it should be stored in the memory. What is ranked as "most salient meaning" at the present moment may die off after only a few decades. An example of such diachronical change is the word "gay," whose most salient meaning in the '50s of the past century was "joyful"; nowadays, this meaning would rank below that of "homosexual." Salient information can be "disconsolidated" when its salience dies off and the information in question ends up as less salient or non-salient. So the problem with Giora's approach is that it acknowledges mainly diachronic change, and does talk less about synchronic change. In contrast, SCA emphasizes that salience is in a continual state of change not only diachronically but synchronically as well (emergent situational salience) as a result of the interplay of linguistic salience and perceptual salience. *This emergent situational salience is that drives the formulation of indirect report.* What the reporter will find most salient in the original message will basically determine how the message will be reported. Wieland (chapter "Reporting practices and reported entities", this volume) expressed a similar idea arguing that in answer to the question of what speakers take themselves to be reporting in an indirect report, one possibility is that they take themselves to be reporting whatever is salient from the earlier context, including linguistic and para-linguistic events.