

Pride and Authenticity

Ulrich Steinvorth



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palgrave
macmillan

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ISBN 978-3-319-34116-3 ISBN 978-3-319-34117-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-34117-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016952798

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Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland

Contents

Part I	Proper Pride	1
1	Why Pride? Theses	3
2	The Meaning of the Term Pride	9
3	Pride and Metaphysics	15
4	Augustine on Pride	21
5	Kierkegaard on due Pride	33
Part II	History and Its Challenges	39
6	The Renaissance: Doing Things for Their Own Sake	41
7	Intrinsic Goals	49

8	Passion and Professionalism	59
9	The Bourgeois Revolution and Bourgeois Authenticity	69
10	Rousseau's Authenticity	75
11	Marx, Weber and Mere Subjectivity	81
12	Heidegger's Authenticity	89
13	Authenticity in the Contemporary Discussion	93
14	Authenticity in China	99
15	Rethinking Secularization, Liberalism and Religion	107
Part III	Morality and the Self	117
16	What Is Morality and Moral Theory?	119
17	Shame and Pride	125
18	Korsgaard and Self-Constituters vs. Self-Discoverers	131
19	Kant, Free Will and the Self	141
20	Inheritance Pride, Authenticity and Morality	149

Part IV Prospects of Proper Pride	157
21 Technology and Society	159
22 Problems of the Economy	163
23 Basic Income	169
24 The Shrinking of the Nation State	177
25 Data Processing and Privacy	185
26 Data Processing in Novels	195
27 Competitors in Metaphysics	199
28 Kitsch, Tragedy and Power	207
29 Prospects, Bleak and Less Bleak	217
Instead of a Conclusion	221
Select Bibliography	225
Index	237

Part I

Proper Pride

1

Why Pride? Theses

Pride, I claim, is an emotion that we cannot and should not suppress but instead cultivate in its proper form. Considering parents' behavior toward their children, most people agree with this claim because they want their kids to be proud of, for example, being female if they happen to be born female, of being black if they happen to be black, of being small among the tall, stout among the lean. We expect Americans to be proud of being American and Chinese to be proud of being Chinese. Gays and lesbians teach gays and lesbians to be proud of being gay or lesbian, and though it took some time, most people in the West have learned that this is how it should be.

It is no less clear that pride can become arrogant, pretentious and boastful. There is proper and improper pride, and here the problems start. How can we distinguish proper and improper pride? Is pride evil when there is too much of it, as we may argue using Aristotle's claim that virtue is the middle between the extremes of too much and too little? Or is pride evil from the outset, as Christianity teaches, ranking pride among the deadly sins? How then can we want kids to be proud of the properties that they are born with without their merit? Or do we only want them not to be ashamed of their innate properties and mistake lack of shame

for pride? Yet authenticity is a child of pride, as we need pride in ourselves to want to be true to ourselves. How can authenticity be the ideal of self-loyalty if we are only not ashamed of the properties of our self?

Such problems about pride arouse suspicion that the prevailing ideas of pride are confused when we turn to philosophers. “The social bases of self-esteem” we read in John Rawls’ famous *Theory of Justice*, are “primary social goods” of which we can assume that rational beings “normally prefer more...rather than less.”¹ So Rawls, it seems, judges self-esteem as so good that normally we should prefer more of it rather than less.² Yet pride, like the “passions for power and glory,” only moves “a nobility and lesser aristocracy” who want “to earn their social standing and place in the sun.”³ But isn’t *self-esteem* pride too? The philosopher Donald Davidson in fact dryly remarked, self-esteem is “what is normally called pride.”⁴ So Rawls seems to want to reserve the term *pride* to mean bad pride and the term *self-esteem* to mean proper pride.

Yet is this recommendable? Can’t too much self-respect be bad? Is self-respect proper in any case? If I am born with a timid nature, should I respect my timid nature? Are there universally valid criteria of what we rightly are proud of or should have self-respect for? What do we commit to in proper pride? What is the self referred to in the term *self-esteem*?

These are questions worth considering, and considering them led me to write this book. But I was neither able nor willing to proceed systematically. I explored the questions like foreign land, without program and method, but with the thrills of an adventure and the joys of seeing the familiar in a new light. Though pride was homeland for ancient and medieval philosophers it has become foreign for us. Twenty years ago, Richard Taylor, the only recent author to write a book on pride, tried to restore pride as a virtue, but he did not rekindle interest in pride. Maybe his scope was too narrow. True, philosophers should have a focus, but pride needs closer consideration of authenticity and authors such as Augustine and Kierkegaard. Therefore, I roam into history and morality,

¹ Rawls 1999, 123.

² As did Hoffer 1955, sec. 35 http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Eric_Hoffer

³ Rawls 1999, 29n and 47.

⁴ Davidson 1976, 751.

the self and free will, rational theology and technological unemployment, referring to a lot of authors from perhaps confusingly different backgrounds. Pride, as Ludwig Wittgenstein remarked, but referring to a different topic, “compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.”⁵

The most important results of my exploration are two claims. First, proper pride is not a crowing over what I have done but rather a preparation for what I will do. Proper pride is the right emotional response to an obliging endowment we are not responsible for, but want to live up to and be true to. Second, authenticity consists not in self-realization but in doing things for their own sake.

I’ll argue for these claims by (1) analyzing the concepts of pride, self and doing things for their own sake; (2) examining historical facts, in particular facts of the Renaissance interest in doing things for their own sake; (3) looking for the role of pride in motivating morality, metaphysics and rational theology; and (4) considering the interaction between modern technology and pride and arguing that authenticity calls for a society different from the current ones. These four tasks correspond roughly to the four parts of this book.

The investigations will show that the self that we want to be true to in authenticity is not a narrative or conceptual construction as contemporary theorists claim, but an innate property of natural organisms, selected in the process of natural evolution. It provides us with the capacity to intentionally intervene in nature and improve or deteriorate it. Thus, in addition to its claims on proper pride and authenticity, this book makes similarly ambitious claims on the self: that our self is what enables us to intentionally change the world and makes us responsible, punishable or praiseworthy, and of which, with good reasons, we can be both proud and afraid.

Yet there is a third and even more ambitious claim that the book implies. Pride demands crying out the injustice of the world (as we’ll see when we compare kitsch and tragedy), but it cannot tolerate an absurd world either, a world without meaning. To sober unemotional reason, the world we are born into lacks a purpose for us. Freud claimed that science

⁵ As Wittgenstein 1953, vii, said “the very nature of the investigation.”

dealt three blows to narcissistic human self-esteem, by Copernicus, Darwin and Freud himself.⁶ Though Copernicanism was rarely felt to be humiliating, Freud was right that science was perceived as proving that man's position in the universe is unimportant. To the proud, however, our reason and will are evidence that our existence is not marginal⁷; for our having them enables us to the discoveries of Copernicus, Darwin and Freud, and even enables us to both improve and worsen the world. Even the evils of the world are challenges for the proud to use reason and will to improve the world.

I'll not explore the metaphysical implications of this third thesis but argue for a claim that suits it: Doing things for their own sake is the way for rational creatures to make sense of their lives. As our properties are not marginal in the universe, using them by doing things not for some goal beyond our actions but for the actions' sake is important enough to provide meaning in life. I also imply claims that presuppose my third thesis but that I do not explicate in this book: that doing things for their own sake commits to a life of professional passion incompatible with ideas of a universal man who will "hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner"⁸; and that the dangers of "specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart" that Weber warned against⁹ can be reduced in a society of citizens with enough of due pride to participate in its organization.

If in exploring pride we hit upon so various and even deep metaphysical issues, do we hit upon them haphazardly? Is it my accidental subjective interest that leads us, or is there more to it? In a closing remark that stands for a conclusion, I show why it's not haphazard, pointing to a parallel with hermeneutic philosophy that this book (and its author), having an analytic background, finds to be quite strange.

⁶ Freud, "Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse," in *Imago* Bd. 5, 1917, 1–7.

⁷ Weinberg expressed the idea of man's marginality in the universe by his famous word that "the more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it seems pointless" (1977, 132). For comments, see Steinworth 2013, Chap. 15; Russell 1918, 47f; Kutschera 1990, 261ff; Tetens 2015, 50.

⁸ Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, tr. Dutt and Magill, Pt. 1, A, sec. *Private property and communism*.

⁹ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 182; *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* I, 204.

Who is interested in exploring pride? Pride is a topic in psychology, theology and pedagogy and, in addition, draws the interest of all devotees of the humanities: historians, political and social theorists, anthropologists, literary critics; whoever is interested in the puzzles and paradoxes of human life. As a result of my positive theses, some cherished views on the self and authenticity will prove to be illusions. So this book will be of interest to the field of philosophy as well as to philosophers, and can be used in philosophy classes too.

2

The Meaning of the Term Pride

What do I understand by *pride*? The same as you? The same as non-English authors whose words are translated as *pride*? English *pride* is not the same as Latin *superbia* and Greek *hubris* or (to take Aristotle's word for proper pride) *megalopsuchia*. Different languages have different conceptual nets. Even phenomena as simple as colors are differently parsed; how much so then will be the more complex phenomena of emotions. Yet there is overlapping enough to justify comparisons.¹ Some theorists claim that emotions can be identified with a number of physiological patterns that human organisms show in response to their surroundings. This claim finds support in a fact that Darwin pointed to: there are typical expressions found in all human societies for the best known emotions, such as blushing for shame, dancing and laughing for joy, trembling body and clenched fists for anger, head hanging for sadness and head and body held erect for pride.²

To explain the ordinary use of *pride* I refer to dictionaries. In its ordinary use, *pride* has a pejorative, a neutral and an appreciative meaning.

¹ Cp. e.g. Cairns 1993, on the concepts of shame, in particular p. 14.

² Darwin 1872. Cp. Harald Wallbott, "Bodily Expression and Emotion," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 28, 1998, 879–96; Paul Ekman, "Facial Expression and Emotion," *American Psychologist* 48, 1993, 384–92; Cairns 1993, 7ff.

Thus, the *Oxford English Dictionary* states the pejorative meaning: “A high, esp. an excessively high, opinion of one’s own worth or importance which gives rise to a feeling or attitude of superiority over others; inordinate self-esteem. In this sense the first of the seven deadly or capital sins”; the neutral meaning: “The feeling of satisfaction, pleasure, or elation derived from some action, ability, possession, etc., which one believes does one credit”; and the appreciative one: “A consciousness of what befits, is due to, or is worthy of oneself or one’s position; self-respect; self-esteem, esp. of a legitimate or healthy kind or degree.”

In addition to these explanations, we have to state that pride is a *feeling* and more specifically an *emotion*, or *passion* (as emotions have formerly been called). But it is also a *disposition*, that is, a character trait or quality that *predisposes* the proud to the emotion of pride. *Emotions*, such as anger, envy, wrath, fear and shame, differ from other kinds of *feelings*, such as pain, hunger, feeling hot or cold, and from *moods*, such as being ill-humored or good-humored, by having a *reason* known to those experiencing the emotion.³ No emotion is without a *reason* or *object*, while *feelings* or *sensations* such as pain and hunger have *causes* but not reasons. *Moods* may have, in addition to causes, *reasons* too, but only *diffuse ones*, *not necessarily known* to those who are in the mood. Emotions are *cognitive*; they cognize or give us something to know about the object that is the reason for the emotion. Yet they do not inform us about their objects or reasons neutrally, but evaluate them. Fear recognizes its object as bad or negative; and pride as good or positive. Emotions are *evaluative*. Let us sum up these explanations of the term *pride*. Like all emotions or passions, pride⁴

1. is cognitive and evaluative,
2. the evaluation of what it is cognitive of is positive (in contrast to shame),
3. its object, that which (like shame) it cognizes and evaluates, is the self and its properties, or something the proud identifies with,

³ Hume distinguishes some feelings as *direct passions* from *indirect passions* (such as pride) as “emotions and attitudes that can be explained, Hume thinks, only by their causal relations to beliefs” (Davidson 1976, 744).

⁴ Cp. Lyons 1980; de Sousa 1987.

4. provides a specific feeling of satisfaction because it evaluates its object positively,
5. is a way to become conscious of one's value and moral status of dignity,
6. like shame, envy, love and pity, is not only an emotion but a disposition to be in the emotion.

Now pride and other emotions such as shame, envy, pity and love can be considered a *vice* or a *virtue* because, as Aristotle argued,⁵ virtues and vices are *dispositions* to feelings and corresponding actions that education (by others and by oneself) can more or less control. When and how the disposition turns into the feeling or action it predisposes to depends more or less on humans; hence, pride and similar passions are something that either the individual or her social milieu is responsible for and therefore can be morally qualified as a vice or virtue.

How are we to decide when Richard Taylor claims the word is incorrectly used? He says:

The word "pride" has come to be used so loosely that it has virtually lost the overwhelmingly important meaning it once had. It has degenerated to little more than an exhortation. We are told to *be proud*, of this, that, or the other—indeed, of everything. The downtrodden are urged to be proud, likewise the forsaken, the ignorant, the weak, as if these conditions might themselves be sources of pride. But when everyone is expected to be proud of everything, then there really is nothing left to be proud of, nor can a truly proud person be distinguished from anyone else.⁶

Are we really "told to *be proud*...of everything"? I agree this would be too loose a use of the word. But Taylor is right to assume that we are told to be proud of everything we are *born with* or *cannot change*. This, however, can be understood as an encouragement to make the best of the properties we cannot change, which is certainly a wise exhortation. As Taylor calls his ideas on pride "elitist" he can be understood to claim that just as not everyone can be the best, not everyone can be proud.⁷ This claim is

⁵ *Nicomachean Ethics* 2, 1106 b16–1107 a32.

⁶ Richard Taylor 1996, 23.

⁷ Richard Taylor 1996, 15.

false, for every normal human can find some talent and use it so as to be rightly proud of it. Moreover, it was pagan Stoics, not Christians as Taylor assumes, that introduced the ideas that allow everyone to be proud. For the Stoics ascribed reason and the power of choice to all people and considered this property a reason for pride and an obligation to behave the way suitable to creatures gifted with reason and choice.⁸

Taylor is also mistaken in claiming that because “Christians...declared each and every human being...to be a creature of God, to be in some sense God’s very *image*,” “it of course follows that no one can be any better a person than any other.”⁹ Christians consider humans to be God’s image because humans participate in the divine properties of reason and will and presuppose that people can use these abilities in very different and in good and evil ways.

Despite his errors, Taylor gives fine examples that prove pride to be about having reason and free will. Here is one:

So the story is told of Diogenes the Cynic that one day, as he was lying outside his tub, which was his shelter, enjoying the sunshine, Alexander the Great rode up on his horse and announced: “I am Alexander, the great king,” to which Diogenes, without moving or rising to salute, responded; “And I am Diogenes, the dog.” The exchange continued: “Well, are you not afraid of me?” “Are you good or bad?” “Good, of course.” “And why should anyone fear that which is good?” Now Alexander was so struck by the aptness of this observation that he exclaimed: “Ask anything you want of me, and you shall have it!” To which Diogenes responded: “Then kindly step out of my sunlight.”¹⁰

What makes Diogenes a paradigm of pride is not that he is proud of what he has done; this is Alexander’s pride, even though Alexander has certainly been proud not only of his achievements but of having been born a prince. Diogenes demonstrates the pride of being a human who, whether born a prince or a beggar, has the same abilities as any other human of reasoning and choosing after deliberation and in this way to achieve things

⁸ Cp. below Chaps. 19 and 20.

⁹ Richard Taylor 1996, 31.

¹⁰ Richard Taylor 1996, 121.

no less valuable than whatever a king might achieve. The “aptness” of his words, his repartee, is something “to stand out among the multitude,” as Taylor says, but it is not this talent that makes his behavior proud but the emotional response to the value of human reason and will that everyone has. We may imagine a wordless Diogenes remaining as unimpressed by the shining appearance of Alexander as the quick-witted Diogenes and yet showing the same pride of properties that enable everyone to decide themselves on their life rather than being led by an Alexander.

Diogenes was a Stoic model. Contradicting Aristotle,¹¹ the Stoics taught that *all* humans have the full powers of intellect and will that they can and should be proud enough to use. They had the experience that people do not essentially differ in their intelligence and will and valued these powers so much that they felt obliged to live according to them. They used the term *pride* in the first place as an exhortation: to live up to one’s talents. Yet if we live up to our talents, we are also true to ourselves, which means we are authentic. Authenticity didn’t arise only in modern times, as some recent authors claim. The idea of authenticity is as old as the idea of properties that the owners should be proud of and feel obliged to be true to.

¹¹ Aristotle, *Politics* I, 1252 b7 und 1254 b21; Plato in the *Republic* ascribes full reason only to the philosophers, though this may be understood as an effect of education rather than nature.

3

Pride and Metaphysics

Pride does get some attention. The Canadian rock band Sum 41 sang that “we’re all to blame, we’ve gone too far, from pride to shame.” It is recognized that “without a sense of pride, one might not achieve or continue to strive for excellence.”¹ Along with its contrast, shame, pride draws attention from psychologists.² Eric Hoffer praised it.³ International relations study it as a factor that, along with honor and prestige, influences and explains politics.⁴ Some authors even ask what has become of pride. The novelist Michel Houellebecq, wondering at the Christian idea that “the only true sin is the sin of pride,” makes a narrator ask “Where, in me, was...pride?”⁵

¹ Dyson 2006, 1.

² Nathanson 1992.

³ Holler 1955.

⁴ Examples are Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics*, Ithaca: Cornell UP 1996; Jerome D. Frank, “The Role of Pride,” in Ralph K. White, ed., *Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War*, New York: New York UP, 1986, 220–6; Barry O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1999.

⁵ Houellebecq 2006, 55.

Statistically, use of the word has increased since 2000.⁶ All the same, pride is not “in.”

History shows us a varying interest in pride. In ancient thought, pride was a favorite topic because it meant much. The Stoics found in pride, without always calling it pride, something they discovered to be more important than life.⁷ Like Diogenes the Cynic, Epictetus the Stoic opposed the power of tyrants by the absolute power of man to prefer death to prostration. He was perhaps the first to understand that pride refers us to something absolute or sacred. Renaissance thinkers took up the Stoic idea that having reason obliges to pride. Pico, Erasmus, Machiavelli and Descartes added another quality common to humans as a reason for pride: free will.

Yet the Renaissance changed the mindset of only a small part of the population. It made pride an ideal for the learned and elites rather than for lower classes.⁸ English eighteenth-century society took an interest in passions and sentiments, including pride, liberating them from the verdict of being a nuisance to human life and society. Most famously, Bernard Mandeville explicitly mentioned pride as a “private vice” that is a “public benefit”: “Fraud, Luxury, and Pride must live;/Whilst we the Benefits receive.”⁹ However, this interest, taken up by Hume, did not develop into investigating the role of pride in history and society, let alone into reevaluating pride. Pride rose again in esteem in the nineteenth century. Schopenhauer¹⁰ distinguished pride from “its worst enemy, vanity,” as based on the “unshakable conviction of one’s preponderant virtues,” and criticized “national pride” as a cheap substitute for people who lack the

⁶ www.google.com/search?q=+pride&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a shows a small rise of mentions of the term *pride* since 2000, after a constant fall until that time. Hume’s remarks on pride in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book Two, Part 1, prevented academic interest in pride from dying. Cp., e.g., Davidson 1980, 277–90 (first publ. 1976); Páll S. Árdal, “Hume and Davidson on Pride,” *Hume Studies* 15, 1989, 387–94.

⁷ Cp. Robert LeFevre, “The Stoic Virtues,” *Rampart Journal of Individualist Thought*, vol. 1, 1, March 1965, 1–15. <http://fair-use.org/rampart-journal/1965/03/the-stoic-virtues>; Brooke 2012; Sorabji 2006; and below Chap. 18f.

⁸ Cp. Robert LeFevre, “The Stoic Virtues,” *Rampart Journal of Individualist Thought*, vol. 1, 1, March 1965, 1–15; Brooke 2012; Sorabji 2006; and below Chap. 18f.

⁹ *Private Vices, Publick Benefits*. For a critical edition see *The Fable of the Bees*, Oxford 1924, ²1957.

¹⁰ Schopenhauer 1976, 65f, my transl.

virtues they might be proud of. The labor movement told workers to be proud of being proletarians, and Nietzsche advocated a master morality that exalted the pride of warriors. Yet Schopenhauer did not fit in with rising nationalism; the labor movement couldn't stop most workers from emulating the bourgeoisie, while the blonde beast that Nietzsche sometimes used as a model of pride was unacceptably fascist.

The changeful history of the concept and idea of pride indicates that there is something irritating in pride. In the current net of values and normative concepts, pride is located as a property and value not for people living in the present, but for "a nobility and lesser aristocracy" (to quote Rawls) who suffer from nostalgia for times gone by. It is true, pride is rooted in ways of thinking and feeling odd and alien to currently dominating ways, but in the end this may prove the currently dominating ways to be odd and devious. There is an affinity between pride and the idea of liberty that hints at qualities of pride eclipsed in the light of present preferences. Pride and the will to be free of the rule of other people make us bellicose and ungracious; both are incompatible with Christian love, bourgeois utility and the current need of peace. Hence, isn't this the reason why Christians such as Augustine, bourgeoisie such as Hobbes¹¹ and current authors who know the destructivity of wars agree in rejecting pride? However, Christians, bourgeoisie and contemporaries embrace liberty, despite its aristocratic heritage and its potential bellicosity. They declare liberty a universal right rather than only a right of aristocrats or a chosen people. Why did they not also declare pride, in its proper form, a universal virtue?

It is obvious enough, though, that pride does not suit the present way of life. Even an interest in *understanding* pride is met with wonder. Pride is an object of folk psychology. A philosopher writing on pride is expected to be soon bogged down in concepts soaked in ignorance. In fact, when probing into pride we'll soon hit upon a value hierarchy incompatible with modern ideas. Thus, pride is often symbolized by the lion and the eagle. These animals are honored as representing the power of nature in its most striking form that the proud want to participate in. Lion and eagle contrast with a worm or pig at the bottom of the value hierarchy that pride entails.

¹¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan* Chap. 15; 1968, 211f.

Probing into pride entangles us in metaphysical ideas, ideas about the meaning of life. Metaphysics in the sense of a theory about meaning in life is often considered irrational or unfit for the academy. Yet discussion of value hierarchies unlike the currently prevailing one may be just what we need today. In any case, theorizing about the meaning of facts can be as rational as theorizing about the facts themselves, as has been increasingly recognized.¹² Empirical theories are true not if they are based on irrefutable empirical data. Rather, they are considered to be most likely true if they fit the data better than competing theories but will be dropped when another theory proves to fit the data better. The better a theory brings order to a mass of data, the more rational it is to accept it. The data are not only *empirical* evidence; they can also be moral intuitions, explicated by moral theory, and intuitions about what is meaningful, explicated by metaphysics. Metaphysical theories compete no less for rational recognition than empirical theories, and there are similar differences between them in fitting *their* data. Or can we seriously believe that what Plato implies about meaning in life is as arbitrary and unworthy of discussion as what Hitler implies?¹³

Some theorists maintain a difference between the rationality of the humanities, including metaphysics, and that of science. They reserve to science the rationality of universal validity, while assigning to the humanities a rationality of interpretation of facts that cannot attain universal validity. They spot the difference in a *hermeneutic circle* that they say only the humanities are exposed to. The hermeneutic circle consists in the dilemma that to theorize about an item we need to understand its context or the whole that it is a part of, and to understand the context we need to understand the item.¹⁴ This dilemma is thought to rule out for

¹² In particular since Metz 2013. Cp. also Floridi 2011, 358, who states: “Metaphysical questions are intrinsically open to put it bluntly, they are a matter of informed exchange of rational arguments”; and Henrich 1986.

¹³ Cp. below Chap. 6; Steinworth 2010 and 2013, Chaps. 8 and 13. Henrich 1986 too defends the fallibility of metaphysics. Vattimo 2004, claims that “truth is born in consent and from consent.” True, but therefore not “grounded in arbitrary acts of will” (p. xxvif) but in *rational* consent, consent reached by comparing competing theories and their pros and cons.

¹⁴ For a hermeneutic philosopher, cp. Vattimi 1997; the analytic philosophy referred to is represented by Otto Neurath and other analytic philosophers who understood philosophy as a science and rejected metaphysics as nonsense.

the humanities the strict rationality possible in science, as only science can distinguish between hypothetical facts and an auxiliary background knowledge of laws of nature that allows for theorizing about the item. Yet as Wolfgang Stegmüller has shown, pointing to similar arguments by Karl Popper and Nelson Goodman, science is no less exposed to the hermeneutic circle. The difference is only that the scientist is used to finding a way to solve the concrete dilemma of understanding her item, while the scholar of the humanities, as far as he believes in the hermeneutic circle, is inclined to mistakenly believe in its insolvability.¹⁵

No more than the humanities can science rely on finding facts without presupposing interpretations. The most acceptable theory can be found out only in comparing the details and concrete arguments of competing theories, whether the theories are physical, metaphysical or on another subject. Physicists use empirical data or observational intuitions to confirm or refute their theories, moral theorists use moral intuitions, and metaphysicians use metaphysical intuitions to check their theories and to refute competitors. Metaphysical intuitions are provisional certainties about what provides life with meaning.¹⁶ Rationality is not a quality of logical deductibility from some infallible data but of an always fallible judgment on competing theories. Fallibility is the mark and the price of rationality.

To sum up my prefatory remarks, pride is a topic alien to the currently prevailing zeitgeist, and just for this reason, a challenge. Yet, I have talked about pride only in the abstract. This is why I'll turn to the Renaissance, as this age will give us a more detailed picture of the historical effects appreciation of pride can cause. But first, we should look at the deeper and deeply ambivalent sides of pride and its child, authenticity. They bestow both guilt and greatness on man, as Augustine implied; both despair and bliss, as Kierkegaard said.

¹⁵ Stegmüller 1988. Fodor 2000 show that cognitive science is exposed to a hermeneutic circle too. He does not use the term, but that of context and essential properties, and refers to the analog "frame problem" (24, 42).

¹⁶ Camus 1942, 73, saying "Je tiens quelques évidences dont je ne peux me détacher," describes the data metaphysics has to use just as physics uses observational evidences.