How the Interest in Memory Has Influenced Our Understanding of History

THE MEMORY

Phenomenon

IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORICAL WRITING

Patrick H. Hutton



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For Jennifer, Sean, Matthew, Scott, and Jeffrey

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CHAPTER 1

Historiographical Background to the Memory Phenomenon

From the History of an Ancient Idea into the Historiography of a Contemporary Vogue

This book is a reflection on my peregrinations in memory studies, and offers an overview of the remarkable historical interest in the topic of collective memory since the late 1970s. Some 20 years ago I published *History as an Art of Memory* (1993).[1] That book was a study in the history of ideas. I explored the way the ancient art of memory was reinvented in modern times within the context of philology, romantic poetry, depth psychology, and historiography. The English cultural historian Frances Yates served as my intellectual guide. As an early contributor to the study of the relationship between collective memory and history, I sometimes strayed into the middle ground between the two. At the time, some scholars misconstrued my purpose, and claimed that I was eliding them.[2] So let me be clear at the outset about my understanding of their relationship. History and memory share a common curiosity about the past. Though they may at times overlap as perspectives of the present on the past, they are different in their resources and their contributions to culture. History is rational and analytical; memory is emotional and inspirational. Moreover, their

[1] (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1993).

[2] Notably Dominick LaCapra, *History and Memory after Auschwitz* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 23–26, who took a sentimental autobiographical note in my preface to be the thesis of my book, and as such the key to my unconscious intent in writing it.

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appeal to the past is different. History fixes the past in a narrative that aspires to provide a measure of certainty about what the past was like, but always at a critical distance. Memory, by contrast, may at any moment evoke the past in all of its possibilities, importing past into present insofar as that might be imagined. As philosopher Paul Ricoeur remarked, memory is a "little miracle" in its resources for creativity. In this respect, it may inspire the historian, too.[3]

This book, by contrast, is primarily about the historiography of the scholars' inquiry into the relationship between collective memory and the rhetoric of historical conceptualization during the late twentieth century. For historians, the topic of memory appeared to emerge precipitously within the scholarship of the late 1970s.[4] A marginal, somewhat arcane interest within the history of ideas during the 1960s—notably through Frances Yates's highly acclaimed study of the Renaissance art of memory—memory studies by the turn of the twenty-first century had reshaped the research and understanding of cultural history, enriching both its methods and content.[5] Scholarly discourse on the topic of memory quickened during the 1990s as varied approaches converged, gathering force in the volume and array of subject matter in a hyperbolic ascent into what came to be characterized as memory studies by the turn of the twenty-first century. As a new arena of historical investigation that matured rapidly, the phenomenon of memory studies sheds light on the way a field of historiography develops—from bold pioneers blocking out new interpretations, to more discerning specialists who follow, before moving on to appreciative latecomers who take research in new directions as the interpretative insights of the pioneers begin to fade from view. The historiography of memory studies also reveals the way in which initially provocative interpretative forays into a new field of scholarly inquiry are eventually

[3] In this distinction, I follow Paul Ricoeur, *La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli* (Paris: Seuil, 2000), 644. See my essay, "Memory," in the *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, ed. Maryanne Horowitz (Detroit, MI: Thomson/Gale, 2005), 4: 1418–22.

[4] For perspectives on the rise of memory studies, see Kerwin Klein, "On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse," *Representations* 69 (2000), 127–50; Chris Lorenz, "Unstuck in Time. Or, The Sudden Presence of the Past," in *Performing the Past; Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe*,, ed. Karin Tilmins, Frank van Vree and Jay Winter (Amsterdam, Netherlands: University of Amsterdam, 2010), 67–102; Wulf Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies," *History and Theory* 41 (May 2002): 179–197. For an overview of the field, see Geoffrey Cubitt, *History and Memory* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2007); Astrid Erll, *Memory in Culture* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

[5] Yates, *The Art of Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

reassessed and integrated into a larger body of scholarship. By the 2010s, memory studies had become an interdisciplinary venture, loosening its ties to the historiographical movement of the 1970s out of whose matrix it had emerged.

In framing my study, I address the questions: why so much interest in memory among historians, and why did it emerge in the late twentieth century? I consider them in two contexts: one historical, the other historiographical:

Late Twentieth-Century History: A Crisis of Identity

From a historical perspective, the historians' preoccupation with memory in the late twentieth century may be attributed to anxieties about the breakdown of long-standing collective identities undermined by new historical realities that contributed to their dissolution. In the post-World War II era, particularly by the 1970s, new realities had emerged to undercut the modern historical narrative, indeed to render it irrelevant. Globalizing economic forces challenged the primacy of national identity. A new economy of consumerist desire displaced the older one of human need. The fads of consumerism drove fantasies that blurred the line between real and vicarious identities. The distinction between high and popular culture dissolved in the face of a consumerist culture that promoted an abundance of homogenized material riches for those who could afford them, while relegating the workers who produced them in the far corners of the world to endemic poverty. The long twentieth-century struggle for women's rights and opportunities played into rethinking the nature of gender identity itself by century's end. Most imposing of all was a revolution in technologies of communication whose accelerating pace eclipsed typographic culture. New media altered ways of organizing knowledge, exporting vastly expanding realms of data to readily accessible electronic archives, with far-reaching implications for what and how we remember. Learning in a digital age was transformed, especially for the young, to such a degree that computer scientists speculated about an eventual convergence of biological and artificial intelligence.[6] In a world whose culture

[6] See the prophecy by Ray Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near; When Humans Transcend Biology* (New York: Penguin, 2005), as well as the skeptical critique by Nicholas Carr, *The Shallows; What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains* (New York: Norton, 2011), esp. 175–76.

was being reconfigured in so many ways, historians would begin to rethink the meaning of collective identity in the globalizing culture of the contemporary age. Memory, the seat of such knowledge at all levels of human experience, would rise up to meet their inquiries, inspiring them to think about the past in relation to the present in innovative ways. Over time, collective memory, conspicuously identified with the commemorative rituals of the nation-state, would break free of the constraints of that association to reveal a myriad of particular identities in global settings, mirroring the changing realities of the late twentieth century.

It was not just the unsettled present, but also a past full of haunting memories that troubled historians about the grand narrative of modern history. Old and unresolved problems raised new questions about the historical meaning of the twentieth century in light of the massive death and destruction that it had witnessed. Two world wars, a devastating economic depression in the era between them, the calculated genocide of European Jews, and the American use of the atomic bomb as a weapon of war dispelled any and all notions that the twentieth century had bequeathed to the present age a historically intelligible route toward the making of a better world. The atrocities of the Holocaust, far from receding into the past, loomed larger with the passage of time as an unrequited memory of reality that defied comprehension. What was one to make of sublime evil committed by the Nazi government of a once enlightened nation in a historical age supposedly advancing the human condition? The debates of the "Historians' Dispute" among German scholars during the 1980s underscored their awareness that the old narrative of history was no context in which to interpret the historical meaning of the conscious plan to exterminate a specific group of people solely for its genetic inheritance. These were recognized as crimes against humanity, a past whose meaning had yet to be mastered by historians.[7] The power of trauma to block remembrance became the focus of their scholarly research. As method, the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud, banished with the stalled venture of psychohistory during the 1960s, came to the fore once more in this avenue of scholarship.[8]

[7] For an overview of the dispute, see Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past; History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).

[8] For the bridge between psychohistory and renewed interest in Freud in memory studies, see Saul Friedländer, *History and Psychoanalysis* (1975; New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), esp. 9–42.

Late Twentieth-Century Historiography: A Crisis of Metanarrative

From a historiographical perspective, the memory phenomenon in late twentieth-century historiography may be construed as the first serious effort to assess the relationship between memory and history. For much of the nineteenth century, historians, like their readers, thought little about their differences, and tended to conflate them in their excursions into the past. They aspired not only to explain the realities of those times but also to convey to their readers some feeling for its imagination. The public came to value the study of history not only for intellectual edification but also for emotional empathy. Long after their work has been superseded by more exacting scholarship, well-known historians such as Jules Michelet and Benedetto Croce continued to be admired for their capacity to evoke the passion in the pageant of the past. Memory and history were thought to cooperate in the quest to approach the impossible dream of bringing the past to life once again. Sympathy for this interplay of memory and history would surface once more in memory studies toward the turn of the twenty-first century, this time from a critical rather than a naive perspective.

The professionalization of historical scholarship of the late nineteenth century, however, put its accent on their opposition. Memory and history were understood to operate in tandem. History offered itself as the official form of memory. It claimed to provide a rigorously critical interpretation of the remembered past, chastening collective memory by deflating its exaggerations and excising its misconceptions. It prided itself on its accuracy, objectivity, dispassion, and critical distance from the past. It confirmed that claim by its appeal to method and to evidence. Historical scholarship was regarded as a high responsibility because it corrects the misperceptions of memory, and so lends stability to human understanding of the past. In its best analyses, history in its modern scholarly guise offered a perspective on the past based on reliable certainties, and so was characterized as a particular kind of science. As French historian Jacques Le Goff put it, "Memory is the raw material of history." History begins where memory ends. Its authority depends on the historicist proposition that there is an underlying temporal foundation in which all past experience is grounded. The timeline of history serves as the essential frame of reference for a universal "science of time."[9]

[9] Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), xi, 214.

By the late 1970s, though, this simple formula for explaining memory's subordination to history had come to be recognized as inadequate. It is in this context that historian Pierre Nora published his *Lieux de mémoire* (1984–1992), an ambitious collaborative study of the mnemonic sources of the French national identity as they had sprung forth since the Middle Ages. The standard narrative of modern French history that had served for more than a century as the framework for historical scholarship had lost its power of appeal for practicing historians. Meanwhile, the interest in collective memory was surging, notably in studies of commemorative practices.[10] Such scholarship revealed that there were many ways in which memory and history were intertwined. Following the initiative launched by Nora and his colleagues, three principal lines of inquiry into the puzzles of memory's relationship to history came to the fore during the crucial decade of the 1980s, not only in France but throughout Europe and North America: the politics of commemorative practices; the cultural implications of the transition from oral to literate cultures; the disabling effects of trauma on historical understanding, with particular emphasis upon the Holocaust of European Jews during World War II. These pathways would guide directions of historical scholarship on the memory phenomenon until the turn of the twenty-first century.

Symptomatic of the crisis that precipitated the memory phenomenon was the breakdown of the "grand narrative" of modern history, a proposition advanced by French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard in a book about the "postmodern condition."[11] Lyotard argued that the narrative of the rise of Western Civilization as the vehicle of reform in the name of the modern imperative of progress, both economically (as greater and more equitably distributed prosperity) and morally (as civic purpose and responsibility) had lost its conceptual power to frame historical understanding. The paradigm for such writing had been born of the European Enlightenment and confirmed by the vast institutional upheaval ushered in by the French Revolution. These intellectual and political forces fostered expectations of the modernizing role of the emerging nation-state, while showcasing the bourgeoisie as the entrepreneurial elite that would drive the new urban industrial economy, reshape politics around

[10] Exemplary is John R. Gillis, ed., *Commemorations; The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[11] Jean-François Lyotard, *La Condition postmoderne* (Paris; Editions de minuit, 1979), 29–35.

ideological imperatives, and refashion the high culture of science, the arts, and literature. Its bias would engender class struggle and imperialist ventures abroad. By the late nineteenth century, Europe had colonized much of Africa and Asia, politically and culturally. Libertarian in its conceptualization, the grand narrative was democratic in its moral intentions. It spoke to the beliefs and to the needs of the left-of-center statesmen of nineteenth-century Europe and America.

Within twentieth-century European historiography, however, this foundational narrative of the rise of modern civilization under the aegis of the nation-state had come to be rivaled by alternative metanarratives—that of Marxism among left-wing scholars for its political commitments and that of the Annales movement among more erudite historians devoted to widening the sphere of archival research.[12] Both of these historiographical movements turned to social, economic, and cultural topics that conventional historians had once ignored, and they emphasized the hidden power of the impersonal workings of historical forces relentlessly imposing the past upon the present. Marxism had gained force in late nineteenth-century Europe as a fighting philosophy for the labor movement.[13] After World War I, it had been co-opted by Soviet Bolshevism to become a shibboleth for the omnicompetent state in the Soviet Union, a rationale for its policies for the better part of the twentieth century. Meanwhile Marxism as a critical philosophy of history continued to fascinate Western European intellectuals.[14] It may have lost the allure of its Metahistorical claims. But it continued to exercise an enduring appeal as a philosophy of praxis, an investigative tool in the service of consciousness raising, for it professed to illuminate the deep economic structures of historical reality hidden beneath political and cultural illusions. Marxism in this guise had taken on new life after World War II, thanks to the role of Communists in the resistance movements that fought fascism across Europe. It held a particular mystique for French intellectuals coming of age in the postwar

[12] Philip Daileader and Philip Whalen, "Introduction: The Professionalization of the French Historical Profession," *French Historians 1900–2000*, ed. Daileader and Whalen (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), xix–xxiv; Guy Bourdé and Hervé Martin, *Les Ecoles historiques* (Paris: Seuil, 1983), 245–306.

[13] George Lichtheim, *Marxism; An Historical and Critical Study* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 216–17,222–33.

[14] Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century; From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1997), 85–94.

era.[15] In academic circles, it exercised significant influence among historians of the French Revolution and the historiographical tradition that followed from it. In addition to providing an explanation of the role of powerful economic forces underpinning historical change, it offered a direction of moral intention for building a more just and egalitarian society, according to Georges Lefebvre, its most venerated scholar.[16] By the 1970s, however, the Marxist theory of history had grown stale in its reiteration, and many of these intellectuals expressed disenchantment with its constraining paradigm of interpretation, not to mention the waning of their enthusiasm for Communist politics. As historian François Furet, himself a former adherent of the French Communist Party, remarked, it had become impossible to disassociate Marxism in the twentieth century from its embodiment in Soviet communism.[17] In confessional style, some repudiated their youthful allegiance to the Party and more generally the determinism implicit in Marxist theory.[18]

In postwar Germany, too, scholarly enthusiasm for the Marxist-inspired Frankfurt school of social criticism, launched by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno during the interwar years, was waning by the 1970s. While abandoning Marx's teleological theory of history, scholars in this tradition had remained committed to his method, based on the kind of rational critical analysis that he had pioneered.[19] For English scholar Paul Connerton, the Frankfurt style pursuit of the "dialectics of enlightenment" as a historical perspective had lost touch with the new social realities of the late twentieth century. Its leading philosophers, he argued, had sacrificed practical insight to "an enveloping orgy of abstractions" of diminishing

[15] George Lichtheim, *Marxism in Modern France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 80–89; François Furet, *Lies, Passions, and Illusions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 34–35.

[16] Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), 217–20.

[17] François Furet, *Le Passé d'une illusion* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995), 7–13.

[18] Mona Ozouf, Jacques Revel, and Pierre Rosanvallon, eds. *Histoire de la Révolution et la révolution dans l'histoire*: *entretiens avec François Furet* (Paris: AREHESS, 1994), 4–8; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Paris/Montpellier; P.C.-P.S.U., 1945–1963* (Paris: Gallimard, 1982).

[19] Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination; A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), 253–80; idem, *Marxism and Totality; The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 1–20.

appeal to a scholarly following.[20] While finding their way into other intellectual movements, some disenchanted Marxists, nonetheless, maintained a sentimental attachment to its heritage. Philosophical celebrity Jacques Derrida, as late as the 1990s, made a belated case for the afterlife of a "ghostly Marxism."[21] In his way, he was mourning the passing of a philosophy that had animated the youth of his generation. Marxism had always augured the future in interpreting the past, but its reading of that past was now sliding into irrelevance.

Annales scholarship was another story in the search for an alternative to the metanarratives of national history. It, too, aspired to a broadly conceived overview, a "total" history that traced the storylines of economic, social, and environmental forces while downplaying politics.[22] Its leading historians offered a sophisticated theory of deep structures of history, whose forms changed according to a tempo of time that was slow, sometimes practically immobile.[23] While repudiating the notion of the teleological unfolding of patterns of history, Annalistes, nonetheless, based their research on quantitative techniques calculated to reveal the determining power of vast impersonal historical forces, whose influence was fully revealed only when the serial patterns of the past were considered *à la longue durée*. The Annales movement acquired prestige among historians everywhere for the widening horizons of scholarship that it opened for research.[24] But after three generations of work within this scholarly tradition, the Annales paradigm, too, had lost the fervor of the movement's founders in the 1920s. The ambitions of the Annalistes had exceeded their conceptual reach toward synthesis based on empirical findings. The lodestar governing their pursuits in the agenda set by the movement's founders had grown dim amidst the pluralism of well-researched, discrete studies carried out in its name. What unity it possessed by the 1980s resided in the network of its most

[20] Paul Connerton, *The Tragedy of Enlightenment; An Essay on the Frankfurt School* (Cambridge,, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 134.

[21] Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx* (London: Routledge, 1994), 13–18.

[22] For the viewpoints of pioneers of the Annales movement, see the collections of essays by Lucien Febvre, *Combats pour l'histoire* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992); Fernand Braudel, *Ecrits sur l'histoire* (Paris; Flammarion, 1969).

[23] Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, "L'Histoire immobile," *Le Territoire de l'historien* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 2: 7–34.

[24] For an overview, François Dosse, *L'Histoire en miettes: Des "Annales" à la "nouvelle histoire"* (Paris: La Découverte, 1987), 212–59; Stuart Clark, ed., *The Annales School: Critical Assessments* (London: Routledge, 1999).

prestigious scholars rather than an agenda for investigation. Indicative was the retreat of some of its leading scholars into more personalized accounts of their path into history, a phenomenon labeled *égo-histoire* by the 1980s.[25]

The paradox was that in the midst of the breakup of the grand narrative, all sorts of new approaches to history were presenting themselves, each begging for a narrative of its own. In this respect, the decade of the 1960s might be regarded as a golden age of historiography for the new directions of historical research pursued by a younger generation of scholars in Europe and America. That decade witnessed an explosion of new subject matter: women's history, global history, post-colonial history, historical psychology, African-American history, as well as histories of an array of minority groups.[26] This pluralistic turn in historiography is hardly surprising. All of these topics called for a reexamination of the past in light of the way the culture, and more specifically the newly conceived notion of a culture of politics, was being refashioned in the present age.[27]

New historical interests, together with old and unrequited memories, thus contributed to the reorientation of the historians' perspective in emerging networks of historical scholarship around the globe during the 1970s. Whereas historians had once favored continuity between past and present, now they remarked upon disruptions between them; whereas they had previously looked forward with great expectations of the future, now they looked back upon the failures of the near past of the twentieth century. The task, then, was not so much to revise standard narratives, as historians who came of age during the 1960s counseled, but rather to discard them so as to look once more at the memories that had initially inspired them.[28] Deeper than particular attempts at metanarrative was an emerging skepticism about the historical determinism that they implied. Furet expressed the sentiment well. If one reviews twentieth-century history, he

[25] Pierre Nora, ed., *Essais d'égo histoire*. Paris: Gallimard, 1987.

[26] A perspective on the 1960s as a golden age of historiography is found in the essays contributed to Felix Gilbert and Stephen Graubard, eds., *Historical Studies Today* (New York: Norton, 1972).

[27] The Cold War was still a framework for defining the history of the post-World War II era; but its framework of interpreting new historical forces, especially those of a social and cultural nature, seemed limited. Among younger scholars, diplomatic history was coming to be considered a backwater of historical scholarship during the 1970s. See Charles S. Maier, "Making Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in *The Past Before Us*, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 355–56.

[28] See the discerning discussion by world historian William McNeil, *Mythhistory and Other Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 3–42.

contended, it is its visible personalities and its historical contingencies that explain the course of events, not some hidden mechanism to be revealed by the cognoscenti.[29] Historians were returning from their fascination with *la longue durée* to reevaluate the past within the present, giving greater attention to historical contingencies that had altered the anticipated course of history. This turn provided an opening for the recall of neglected historical experience, and as such was a point of entry for the reevaluation of the relationship between memory and history.

The Memory Phenomenon in Relation to Postmodern Historiography

A deeper philosophical proposition about the nature of history was also at issue. The search for synthesis in a grand metanarrative had been based upon the long-standing theory of historicism, by which a timeline of human experience was understood to serve as the unifying ground of historical interpretation.[30] If the notion of history as the storyline of the rise of the West had lost its meaning for the present age, so too had faith that the relationship between past and present could be explained in terms of a backbone narrative emerging out of the depths of time. There had been too much displacement, destruction, and death in the wars and economic crises of the twentieth century to contend that somehow all of these disruptive forces might be adapted to a framework of history as an ongoing and uplifting journey.[31] Too many unanticipated misfortunes had intervened to permit the plotting of modern history as a saga from recognizable beginnings toward an expectant end. Having discarded the historicist narrative of modern history, historians asked: how might they begin to reassess the historical meaning of the present age?

Some scholars answered the question in political terms. They saw the denouement of a half century of ideological rivalry, orchestrated by the superpower USA and the Soviet Union, as the apparent triumph of liberal democracy over its collectivist rival. New and sometimes strange

[29] François Furet, *Le Passé d'une illusion*, 773–809; idem, *Lies, Passions, and Illusions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 34, 39–42.

[30] Georg G. Iggers, "Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 56 (1995), 142–51.

[31] For the scope of the destructions of the world wars of the twentieth century, see Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent; Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Random House, 1998), 212–13.

prophecies about the future of history were voiced in the wake of the revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the conclusion of the Cold War. Historians Francis Fukuyama and Lutz Niethammer advanced the notion that humankind had arrived at the "end" of history and was entering a "posthistorical" age. Both meant to be provocative rather than literal in these proclamations. We have asked too much of the idea of history, they contended, and it is better to appreciate modern history with more modest expectations about what the future holds. Both argued that what we have called history since its professionalization in the late nineteenth century was in fact the story of the bourgeoisie in its efforts to refashion civilization in its own image through the instrument of the nation-state. Both prophesied the coming of a time of greater political harmony, metaphorically a biblical "peaceable kingdom" in which the struggles of the modern age would give way to the managerial solutions of another about to come. To be fair, Fukuyama was making a philosophical as much as a historical argument. He saw our times as one in which liberal democracy had come to be recognized as a moral imperative beyond which humankind cannot go in pursuit of the good society.[32] Niethammer was resurrecting forgotten nineteenth-century theorists who had forecast the coming of planned societies.[33] From our perspective in the deeply troubled early decades of the twenty-first century, the future these theorists envisioned seems utopian, their commentary of value more as critique than expectation.

The discourse of Fukuyama and Niethammer about the end of modernity prepared the way for rethinking contemporary historiography in light of an emerging discussion about "postmodern" culture. This term "postmodern" has no settled definition, for it has meant many things to many scholars over the course of the late twentieth century. It emerged as a neologism among art historians as early as the 1950s. Art historian Charles Jencks explains how artists disassembled the architectural structures of modernity into their component parts and then reassembled them in incongruent, surprising, and often provocative ways.[34] Later in the century, the term was taken up by literary critics and eventually by

[32] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1993), xi.
[33] Lutz Niethammer, *Posthistoire; Has History Come to an End?* (London: Verso, 1992), 7–19.
[34] Charles Jencks, *What is Post-Modernism?* (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1996), 29–40.