
The Balkan Wars
from Contemporary Perception
to Historic Memory
Edited by
KATRIN BOECKH
& SABINE RUTAR

The Balkan Wars from Contemporary Perception to Historic Memory

Katrin Boeckh • Sabine Rutar
Editors

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CHAPTER 1

The Balkan Wars from Perception to Remembrance

Katrin Boeckh and Sabine Rutar

The years 2012–13 marked the centennial of the Balkan Wars, which preceded the First World War and "reshaped the map of south-eastern Europe" (*The Economist*, November 9, 2012). In the face of the "memory boom" prompted by these recent centenaries, this volume combines contemporary perceptions and those of historical memory in light of the fact that the Balkan Wars have yet to find their appropriate place within the collective historical memory of twentieth-century warfare in Europe.

In what is called the First Balkan War (October 1912–May 1913), Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria declared war on the Ottoman Empire; in the Second Balkan War (June–August 1913), Bulgaria fought Serbia and Greece over the Ottoman territories they had each just gained. From July onward, Serbia and Greece were supported by Romania, who entered the war hoping to seize the southern Dobruja from Bulgaria. These hopes were realized. Albania was declared an independent state in

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November 1912 and was thus a product of the First Balkan War. The historical region of Macedonia, a main theater of war, consisted mainly of the territories of today's Republic of Macedonia, established in 1991; Pirin Macedonia, today in Bulgaria; and Vardar Macedonia, today in Greece. The Ottoman Empire's loss of most of its European territories in the conflict was a warning sign of its inner weakness; it ceased to exist in 1922, in the aftermath of the First World War, and was succeeded by modern Turkey. As is evident by this enumeration of territorial-political changes, the states existing today in the area can hardly offer a satisfactory framework for exploring the history of the two Balkan Wars, which exerted a more profound impact on the region than even the Great War. And yet, in Southeastern Europe, scholars addressing and researching these first European wars of the twentieth century have mostly adopted a traditional military and/or political history perspective, firmly rooted in the respective national master narratives of the former belligerents. Our volume intends to challenge precisely these master narratives.

Western scholars, on the other hand, if they have paid attention to the two Balkan Wars of 1912–13 at all, have tended to see them as a "prelude" to the Great War; their interpretive frameworks place them merely "in the shadow" of the subsequent global conflagration. Mostly, the Balkans have been treated as a peripheral historical region at the mercy of great-power politics. Such a view allows hardly any room for "sites of memory," let alone "sites of mourning" (Jay Winter) derived from the local experience of the war, perceived from the vantage either of the victors or the defeated.[1]

As an effect of the centennial attention on the wars, a few other new books deserve mention; none, however, focuses much on mnemonic issues. Ottoman/Turkish perspectives on the sociopolitical implications of war and nationalism have been provided in one collectively authored volume,[2] and Eyal Ginio's monograph especially has recently filled a pressing research lacuna.[3] Important comparative insights into the policies of the European great powers during the several small wars preceding the Great War have

[1] A recent corrective to this master narrative has been offered by the authors in Oto Luthar, ed., *The Great War and Memory in Central and South-Eastern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2016); cf. the introduction to the volume by Oto Luthar and Nikolai Vukov, *Beyond a Western-Centric Historical Interpretation of the Great War*, 1–17.

[2] M. Hakan Yavuz, Isa Blumi, eds., *War & Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, and Their Sociopolitical Implications* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013).

[3] Eyal Ginio, *The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath* (London: Hurst, 2016).

been provided by another collective volume,[4] while French and Romanian perspectives are the focus of two French publications.[5] The editors of the present volume, finally, have provided a collective volume in which authors explore the wars in their sociopolitical and sociocultural contexts, placing societal, political, and military actors at the center of attention, entangling events and using microhistorical tools to examine local contexts.[6]

Given the complex and overlapping multiethnic and multinational layers of historical agency, as well as the sheer quantity of settings, of languages involved, and, ultimately, of canonical traditions to be challenged, a collectively written volume represents the proper, if not the only, format to comprehensively examine the topic. In this volume, scholars from all over Europe have offered their expertise from various academic backgrounds and have produced a multifaceted narrative defying any nation-state framework. Their case studies communicate with one another through a common methodological intention of "writing in" these wars into European collective memory beyond the exclusivity of the nation-state perspective, even as they pay tribute to its relevance for the historical memory of the societies directly affected by these wars.

The authors in this volume throw light on the ways in which, by means of these wars, the metaphor of the Balkans as Europe's "powder keg" was perpetuated, reactivated, and instrumentalized throughout twentieth-century European history, in the "West" and in the "East," up to the Yugoslav wars of dissolution in the 1990s. Besides this rather reductive "memory" of what the Balkan Wars meant, little is known in other world areas about the importance these wars have played in the construction of historical memory and of their perception among the former belligerent states. This volume presents these constructions—in a cohesive manner—to an international readership, and integrates them with the hitherto largely exclusive national master narratives.

The volume strengthens the emerging field examining the enmeshed and comparative histories of Southeastern Europe, represented for example

[4] William Mulligan, Andreas Rose, and Dominik Geppert, eds., *The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[5] Catherine Durandin and Cécile Folschweiller, eds., *Alerte en Europe: la guerre dans les Balkans (1912–1913)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014); Catherine Horel, ed., *Les guerres balkaniques (1912–1913). Conflits, enjeux, mémoires* (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2014).

[6] Katrin Boeckh and Sabine Rutar, eds., *The Balkan Wars 1912–13: Intimations of 20th Century Warfare* (forthcoming).

by the recent three-volume study *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*.[7] The wars and violence of the twentieth century are of pivotal relevance in the current debates on the proper interpretation of twentieth-century European history. Arguably most emblematic in this respect are Timothy Snyder's *Bloodlands* and in particular Christopher Clark's *Sleepwalkers*, which represents an effort to Europeanize, if not globalize, the history—and thereby the memory—of the First World War.[8] Especially with reference to the latter book, our volume works toward an increased inclusion of the Balkans and Turkey into the ongoing debate.

Part I, "War in the Balkans—Towards the End of Empire," reflects on the meaning of the Balkan Wars within the interpretative framework of the end of the imperial era. From the perspective of the Ottoman Empire, both the historical premises and the contemporary relevance of some features of propaganda and mechanisms of "othering" prevalent in the early twentieth century were amply employed to mobilize public opinion in support of the "just cause" against the Ottoman Empire. The construction of the image of the "enemy" and the rhetoric of its dissemination implicitly or explicitly referred back to the *longue durée* anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish discourses of earlier eras, yet only in the face of the First Balkan War did their nurturing amount also to anti-imperialism (Fikret Adanır). Part and parcel of the road "to the end of empire" is the meaning of the violence and the demographic changes triggered by the wars, as these were to become issues perpetuated in the history of twentieth-century warfare in the region, up to the Kosovo war of 1999 (Edvin Pezo). Albania, nonexistent as a state when war broke out, may be regarded as a "historical winner" of the wars. While war was still being waged, Albania was proclaimed independent in 1912. Nevertheless, the borders of the new state as they had been drawn were perceived as insufficient, a "national tragedy" even, because they disregarded the fervent attempts by international

[7] *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*: vol. 1, Roumen Daskalov and Tchavdar Marinov, eds., *National Ideologies and Language Policies* (Leiden: Brill, 2013); vol. 2, Roumen Daskalov and Diana Mishkova, eds., *Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions* (2014); and, in particular, the third volume, Roumen Daskalov and Alexander Vezenkov, eds., *Shared Pasts, Disputed Legacies* (2015), which focuses on core mnemonic threads common to the region, yet *not* on its wars. Cf. also Sabine Rutar, ed., *Beyond the Balkans: Towards an Inclusive History of Southeastern Europe* (Vienna: Lit, 2014).

[8] Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic, 2010); Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Penguin, 2012).

supporters of Albanian statehood to propagate a comprehensive solution for the Albanians (Daut Dauti). Another major thread was—and has in many ways remained—the perceived dichotomy between "the East" and "the West." For example, the Pan-Slavic movement regained momentum in the face of the First Balkan War in terms of the mounting impulses of solidarity directed against the perceived enemies in both the "West" and the "South," the "Turks" (Katrin Boeckh). The chapters in this part thus come full circle in providing insight into issues that remain pivotal to an understanding of contested memories up until today.

Part II, "European Eyes on the Balkans—Reassuring the Self," focuses on the image of the "powder keg," so successfully reanimated during the Yugoslav wars of dissolution in the 1990s. Since Edward Said and Maria Todorova skillfully displayed the persistent images of the "other,"[9] the negative alter ego of the West (in Todorova's words), serving to reassure the Western self of its "superiority," comparatively little has been done to empirically diversify the persistent stereotypes framed by keywords like "backwardness" and even "savagery." As the authors in this part make quite clear, a key motif of the gaze toward the "other" in the Balkans was, precisely, self-assurance. The means for such self-assurance was based on the information that journalists on—or near—the war provided to a broader audience in Europe and all over the world. They became the wars' first interpreters. Generally, information on the conflicts in the Balkans in 1912–13 was generated by the print media: journalists collected information as far as war censorship allowed them to. In fact, their impressions from the theaters of war were often based on second- or even thirdhand pieces of information. Objectivity, even if aspired to, was hard to come by, and reporters as well as those offering other testimonies often took a firm, opinionated stand and confirmed their own convictions in their writings and statements. Leon Trotsky, writing for the newspaper *Kievskaya mysl'*, criticized the militant capitalist system in his sketches from the Balkan capitals, while at the same time, the Austrian economist Otto Neurath was interested in furthering his theories on the usefulness of war-economy schemes even for times of peace (Günther Sandner). Irish journalists recognized the war as a model for the Irish fight for independence and sought to make use of the Balkan crisis for their own political goals (Florian Keisinger). Organs of the French press, depending on their ideological outlook, oscillated between leftist

[9] Edward Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin, 1995); Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, first edition 1997).

republican and rightist anti-modernist interpretations of nationalism in their comments on the war events, views that were heavily influenced by contemporaneous French political flashpoints, like the Dreyfus Affair and the "Eastern Question," with its differing geopolitical interpretations of French interests (Nicolas Pitsos). Many Croatian intellectuals and especially the politically active youth were incited to voice new expressions of national euphoria in the face of the Serbian and Montenegrin armies' successes. Croatian public figures, at that time, acted within the Hungarian domain of Austro-Hungary. The war in the Balkans strengthened their opposition to the Dualist Monarchy and inspired an ever-more militant attitude within the youth movement, whose members perceived in it a more generally valid model for the solution of the South Slav question (Stjepan Matković). Thus, as the chapters to this part reveal, the commonalities with the situation of the belligerents was what modeled and motivated perceptions, whether these common interests concerned the striving for independence, the quest for geopolitical influence, nationalist affinities, or anti-imperial politics.

Part III, "Memories of Victory and Defeat—Constructing the Nation," draws the line through time up to the present, scrutinizing the construction of historical memory of the wars in various settings. With the exception of the Ottoman Empire, all belligerents succeeded in considerably extending their state territories—the crucial reason why, in Southeastern Europe, the memory of the Balkan Wars has been more important than that of the First World War. As to the political and public remembrance of the Balkan Wars, a huge dynamic is discernable: monuments were erected to praise war heroes and military leaders; a cult of masculinity was enforced, which extinguished from public memory moments of "weakness"; war victims were erased from that discourse, as nobody even so much as mentions the dead, the injured, the widows, or the material costs of the wars.

In Southeastern Europe, the construction of the historical memory of the Balkan Wars throughout the twentieth century hovered around ideas of heroism and victimhood, aiming at solidifying the nation-state. The Balkan Wars inflicted a traumatic territorial loss for the Ottoman Empire. This trauma survived in the republic, strengthened Turkish nationalism and made it more aggressive. Also, it buried the last dreams of Ottomanism, in the sense of a cohabitation between communities that were tied together in terms of their loyalty to the Ottoman state. Remembrance went from the suppression of lost lands and military defeat alike by a state that wished to erase any trace of the imperial legacy to the emergence, during the 1990s, of a new form of Ottomanism, in the sense that the various unspoken memories

of the defeat and the loss of European Turkey were finally expressed, on the one hand, and the way to a reimagination of the *Pax Ottomanica* in the Balkans could now be paved, on the other. Unfortunately, given the recent passing of the author commissioned to write the "Ottoman memory chapter," Vangelis Kechriotis, and with such short notice, we were unable to find an author who could take over his task.

A detailed stroll through Bulgarian historiography testifies to how the defeat of that country in the Second Balkan War was turned into a heroic tragedy that alienated Bulgaria from the other Balkan states. To compensate for the loss of Macedonia after the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria would join strategic alliances with those powers that promised Macedonia to Bulgaria: in the First World War, with the Central Powers; in the Second, with the Axis powers. Thus, one could say, Bulgaria lost its Second Balkan War twice more in the two world wars (Svetlozar Eldarov, Bisser Petrov).

Crossing nationalizing lines, the reiteration of religious motifs in remembering the Balkan Wars—and both World Wars—clearly reveals the analogous ways that mnemonic master narratives have been constructed, yet in a fashion that has insisted on mutual exclusivity and that over time has become more nationalized, militarized, even secularized (Stefan Rohdewald). In the realm of history education, the contents of textbooks show how authorities wish a certain event to be memorialized. The significance of the Balkan Wars for strengthening national consciousness in Serbia is traceable from the immediate postwar years through today—representing a century of quests for a myth-building collective remembrance (Dubravka Stojanović). In the Republic of Macedonia the task arguably has been most complex, as today's state does not geographically correspond to the historical region of Macedonia at the time of the Balkan Wars, which stretched into today's Greece and Bulgaria. The complexity has not been eased by the various contestations directed toward Macedonia by its present neighboring states, down to its very name and, thereby, its existence. And in fact, the partition of that historical geographic Macedonia and the "catastrophic" consequences for the "Macedonian people" have remained the core topoi of Macedonian historiography, strengthening an ethnocentric and nationalist myth of victimization of ethnic Macedonians (Petar Todorov). And finally, the scarce and superficial attention paid to the Balkan Wars in Western historiographies is the neglectful counterpart to the overemphasis given to them in local societies. Interestingly, Western historiography has perceived the Balkan Wars nearly exclusively in terms of its military actions. The focus on war atrocities was renewed in the face of the

Yugoslav wars of dissolution, all too often erroneously labeled the "new" Balkan wars (Eugene Michail). The story, thus, once more comes full circle.

In this vein, we chose for the cover image of our book one of Robert Delauney's "Circular Forms," painted in 1912, the year of the outbreak of war. Not only was Delaunay's style dubbed "Orphism," after Orpheus, who according to legend was born in Thrace—a core theater of the Balkan Wars—with the myth around him combining Oriental influences with, precisely, Thracian, or Balkan, ones. More importantly, Delaunay's painting symbolizes a moment of fragile harmony in the chaos of the modern world. Given that the Balkan Wars were, in Europe, the first major violent act in the demise of what was to become "the world of yesterday," in the words of Stefan Zweig,[10] Delaunay's visual metaphor proves intriguing. His "Circular Forms" "hover indeterminately between the abstraction of their form and the referentiality of that same form in light of their titles (i.e. Sun, Moon, and Sun and Moon) … treading the fine line between abstraction and its resistance." The French word for painting, "tableau," in its modernist conception, implied the internalization of "'bizarre dissonances' and the greater speed of modern life through an increased emphasis on material flatness," of which Delauney proves to be an apt representative.[11]

After the end of the military actions in 1913, no period of peace followed in the Balkans. On the contrary, while the new state borders were drawn, guerilla fighting continued, with informal military groups terrorizing the civilian population and expelling those whom they called "non-natives" from their respective newly gained territories. On the state level, the Balkan governments introduced propaganda campaigns accusing the other former belligerents of having committed war crimes. Alas, the large number of pamphlets, reports, and leaflets documenting the atrocities committed during *and* after the wars by all sides involved did not reach the diplomats of the great powers, whose decisions about the future of the former Ottoman territories reckoned only with their own interests.[12]

With a ground of disinformation prepared in this way, the dissonances in the official memories of the Balkan Wars abounded—not least between

[10] Stefan Zweig, *Die Welt von gestern. Erinnerungen eines Europäers* (Berlin: Insel, 2013 [orig. 1942]). First published in English translation as Stefan Zweig, *The World of Yesterday: Memories of a European* (New York: Viking, 1943).

[11] Gordon Hughes, *Resisting Abstraction: Robert Delaunay and Vision in the Face of Modernism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 97ff.

[12] Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 365–70.

Western and Eastern Europe. While Western Europe forgot about the Balkan Wars shortly after their end, in Eastern Europe, and especially among the belligerents, their memory is of constitutional and ongoing importance for the respective nation-states, and encompasses a quest for a harmonious representation, a remembrance without contestation. And while the Western audience has not even been willing to differentiate between the First and the Second Balkan War and their different alliances, Bulgarian historians characterized the Second Balkan War as the "inter-alliance war," whereas Turkish historians often enough spoke only of "the" Balkan war, showing no reference whatsoever to the intra-Balkan conflict that ensued—fragmentation on varying levels, thus.

One of the main reasons for the East–West gap in perceptions is the differing meanings of the Great War. In Western Europe it has come to be perceived as *the* original catastrophe of the twentieth century; that is, beyond the collapse of the imperial "world of yesterday," this conflagration bore within it the seeds of revenge and further destruction. But in Eastern Europe, the Great War cemented the status quo ante that had resulted from the Balkan Wars. Thus here, the "preluding" regional wars, rather than the subsequent global conflagration, have been perceived as defining the threshold of national histories. To be sure, one aspect is common to all historiographies, in East and West alike: there has been hardly any scholarly debate that has been profound and pluri-dimensional; on one side, nation-building efforts dictated the historiographic pursuits, while on the other there was simply a lack of interest to do anything other than affirm stereotypes. Be that as it may, the Balkan states—whether victorious or not—claimed a unique "copyright" on the Balkan Wars. In these wars, it was they who were the leading actors on the battlefields. They had formed a Balkan league, and they had decided to go to war against the Ottomans. Not so in the First World War, where instead they were drawn into becoming the smaller partners of the so-called great powers—there was much less acquisitory potential here.

PART I

War in the Balkans: Towards the End of Empire

CHAPTER 2

Ethnonationalism, Irredentism, and Empire

Fikret Adanır

This chapter aims to highlight the historical premises and the contemporary relevance of some features of propaganda and mechanisms of "othering" prevalent in the early twentieth century that were amply employed to mobilize public opinion in support of the "just cause" of the young Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire. The focus is on the image of the "enemy," how its construction and rhetoric of dissemination relied to a large extent on the anti-Islamic/anti-Turkish discourses stemming from much earlier periods. For example, the offensive of 1912 was officially proclaimed by the allied monarchs to be a "Holy War to free our brethren" (in the Montenegrin text), a war of "the Cross against the Crescent" (in the Bulgarian text), a struggle against a "medieval system of feudal exploitation" (in the Serbian text), and a "crusade of progress, civilization, and liberty against Asian conquerors" (in the Greek text).[1] The Balkan War thus was conceived and propagated as a crusade both in the sense of a Christian remedial enterprise and of an effort to demonstrate the

[1] German translations of the declarations of war, including that by the Ottoman Empire, are available in Andreas Hemberger, *Illustrierte Geschichte des Balkankrieges 1912/13*, vol. I (Wien, Leipzig: Hartleben, 1914), 42–48.

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superiority of European civilization. What is striking in comparison is that the text of the Sultan's declaration of war merely stressed the Ottoman citizens' duty to defend their common homeland, abstaining from attributing any religious meaning to the unfolding conflict.[2] This difference reflects a third, less noticed element of the conflict in the Balkans, namely, the conceived disparity between the ethnically and confessionally homogenized national society on the one hand and the religious and/or ethnocultural plurality to be observed in an empire on the other. Whereas the Balkan states were bent on emancipating the "brethren" still under Ottoman domination and justified to that end a quasi-imperial expansionism that was to generate a fierce rivalry among themselves, the Sultan's government was engaged since the middle of the nineteenth century and especially after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 in a process of political integration. Thus it "relied on the assumption that the different religious and ethnic groups inhabiting the Ottoman state could be united under the vague ideology of a secular multi-ethnic Ottoman nationality."[3]

I

The vocabulary of national liberation of the nineteenth century was reintroduced on the eve of the First Balkan War. It was asserted that the Ottoman Empire was "a country with no future, 'a corpse on its deathbed,' 'Europe's ulcer,' and the Turks were 'Asiatic barbarians.'"[4] A manifesto publicized on the occasion of a mass gathering in Sofia at the end of July, 1912, demanded,

[2] Ibid.

[3] Eyal Ginio, "Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream," *War in History*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2005), 156–77, here 158. Interestingly, the general conscription introduced in 1909 allowed the Christians to perform their oath of loyalty on the Bible, the Jews on the Pentateuch, and the Muslims on the Koran. The result was a precarious equilibrium to be safeguarded vigilantly, the more so as some non-Muslims were unwilling to serve under the crescent as their banner. See Fikret Adanır, "Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–1913," in Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman Naimark, eds., *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 113–25.

[4] Yura Konstantinova, "Allies and Enemies: The Balkan Peoples in the Bulgarian Political Propaganda during the Balkan Wars," *Études balkaniques*, vol. 47, no. 1 (2011), 109–48, here 111.

> War for a free and independent Bulgaria against the barbaric Asiatic Turkey! … The entire Christian world is outraged by the bloody regime of Turkey … We are summoned by Europe's conscience to throw away the Asiatic barbarity out of the lands of the Peninsula. Now is the chance to accomplish this great feat of liberation, civilization and humanism.[5]

Once the hostilities commenced, the Orthodox Church hurried to stress the crusade character of the struggle. As one member of the Bulgarian Holy Synod pointed out, this war "'for the realization of God's justice' was waged by 'the sword brought by Christ the Savior' against 'the infidels' crescent of oppression and blood,' in the name of 'the triumph of justice, peace and the life-giving cross' and 'raising the cross in the place of the crescent.'"[6] Indeed, in November, 1912, as the Bulgarian army approached the Çatalca position, the last line of defense before the Ottoman capital, Tsar Ferdinand and his subjects became virtually possessed by the prospect of a triumphant entry into Tsarigrad (Constantinople), Christianity's centuries-old object of yearning. Chromolithographs distributed to the troops "showed a ghostly Constantine XI, the last Byzantine emperor, guiding the Balkan kings 'toward St. Sophia in the distance.'"[7] It is no wonder that Prince Constantine of Greece, the victorious commander-in-chief of the Greek army in 1912, whom many considered worthy of enthronement as Constantine XII (and thus the legitimate successor to the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI), published the part of his correspondence dealing with the war in the Balkans under the heading of "The Crusade 1912–13."[8]

An equally important aspect of the Balkan allies' war propaganda was the belief that they fought as the avant-garde of European civilization

[5] Eadem, "Political Propaganda in Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars," *Études balkaniques*, vol. 47, nos. 2–3 (2011), 79–116, here 83–84.

[6] Ibid., 95–96. The Christian holy war rhetoric ignored the fact that the Ottoman army of 1912 comprised a high percentage of Christian recruits who carried on their headgear not a crescent but a cross. See Otto Keßler, *Der Balkanbrand 1912/13: Militär-geschichtliche Darstellung des Krieges gegen die Türken* (Leipzig: Reflektor-Verlag, 1913), 54.

[7] Stephen Constant Foxy, *Ferdinand, 1861–1948, Tsar of Bulgaria* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1979), 259, as quoted in Adam Knobler, "Holy Wars, Empires, and the Portability of the Past: The Modern Uses of Medieval Crusades," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 48, no. 2 (2006), 293–325, here 319.

[8] [Constantine of Greece], *A King's Private Letters. Being Letters Written by King Constantine of Greece to Paola Princess of Saxe-Weimar during the Years 1912 to 1923* (London: Eveleigh Nash & Grayson, 1925), 27–135.

against Asian barbarians. Obviously, such a mindset was not a product of Balkan social milieus alone but also a reflection of stereotypes of "Oriental" peoples pervasive in Western culture. A popular account of the causes of the Ottoman defeat concluded that in European Turkey, "organized, efficient work, which means culture" was lacking, a result of the fact that "the Turks atone a historical guilt, the roots of which lie in the psyche of their prophet."[9] A more "scholarly" study published by a university press in the United States started with the blanket statement that "[t]he expulsion of the Turks from Europe was long ago written in the book of fate. There was nothing uncertain about it except the date and the agency of destiny."[10] A Frenchman who toured the region in 1912–13 as secretary general of "l'Office central des nationalités" and correspondent for the newspapers *La Dépêche*, *L'Indépendance Belge*, and the *Manchester Guardian* construed, after interviews with the Muslim mayor of Greek-occupied Salonica and the local mufti in May, 1913, that the Turks "are dreamers, people unfit for modern civilization, the workings of which appear to them as too complicated."[11] Even Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, the distinguished president of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, did not hesitate to confess that once the hostilities had started, "we could only wish for the triumph of four young allied peoples in shaking off the domination of the Sultans of Constantinople, in the interest of the Turks and perhaps of Europe herself."[12]

This benign attitude drew upon a rhetoric that somehow anticipated Huntington's Clash of Civilizations discourse.[13] It had evolved in the course of centuries, and its chief reference was to Western Christian cultural tradition, as expressed clearly in the following passage:

[9] Alfred Meyer, *Der Balkankrieg 1912/13: Unter Benutzung zuverlässiger Quellen kulturgeschichtlich und militärisch dargestellt*, part 1 (Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1913), 11–12.

[10] Jacob Gould Schurman, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1914), 3.

[11] Jean Pélissier, *Dix mois de guerre dans les Balkans: oct. 1912–août 1913* (Paris: Perrin, 1914), 229.

[12] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, DC: The Endowment, 1914), 1.

[13] See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (1993), 22–49; idem, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Gideon Rose et al., eds., *The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate* (New York: Foreign Affairs Books, sec. ed., 2010).

> We ourselves, products of a western civilization established by the Catholic Church—whose national renascence was engendered by the Protestant Reformation—whose national development has been inspired by subsequent religious revivals, can scarcely realize the disadvantage to the growth of a community whose progressive forces get no inspiration from Protestantism and whose conservative forces are not firmly founded in Catholicity.[14]

Here one can detect, along with a covert censure of the role the Greek Orthodox Church played in Balkan history, also an echo of sympathetic Westerners' profound disillusionment in face of the Second Balkan War, a bloody conflict that was perceived as outright fratricide prompted by jealousies about who would get the largest share of the spoils. However, the International Commission, which had identified "the weakness and want of foresight of Turkey" as the fundamental cause of the war of 1912,[15] was astonishingly convinced of Ottoman culpability also in the war that broke out among the victorious allies in 1913. Its reasoning was that it was Ottoman weakness that had made it possible for the Balkan states to achieve such a spectacular success, so much so that "the change was too abrupt. It produced the deplorable results we are to study under the aspect of the 'excesses' committed by the different nationalities."[16] Thus it also transpires that an inquiry into the conduct of the war was deemed necessary only after it was realized that "the second war was … a war of religion, of reprisals, of race, a war of one people against another, of man against man and brother against brother."[17]

In retrospect, it becomes clear that members of the elites associated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace considered ethno-religious and cultural diversity—following the *zeitgeist*—a circumstance unbecoming to a modern polity and held a strong central government with a homogeneous national society to be a precondition for successful state-building. In their view, the Ottoman conquerors of the late medieval period had planted the seeds of systemic corruption in society as they established a decentralized political order—even though this order might have provided for agreeable conditions for the subject peoples organized

[14] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Nationalism and War in the Near East (By a Diplomatist)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915), 22.

[15] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission*, 49.

[16] Ibid., 50.

[17] Ibid., 16.

in religious communities. Thus the awesome verdict that "[t]he decadence of the Turk dates from the day when Constantinople was taken and not destroyed"[18] can be read as a misdirected castigation of the Ottoman *millet* system.[19] It is remarkable that the pluralist Ottoman system was criticized in a similar vein even in respect to the disintegration of Yugoslavia at the close of the twentieth century:

> [T]he Ottoman system, with its separation of subject peoples on a confessional rather than territorial basis while granting considerable local autonomy, inhibited the homogenization through assimilation to a homogenic language and culture that was creating larger proto-national and national communities in other parts of Europe.[20]

Against this background, the forced migrations that accompanied or followed the Balkan Wars appear as phenomena correlative to the formation of nation-states. Indeed, the author of the Carnegie Endowment's second volume, quoted previously, pointed out that the "expulsion of human beings out of a determined region" was a logical consequence of the Balkan Wars. A Balkan state that had succeeded "in extending its political frontier" would certainly try to render the conquered territory ethnically and politically homogeneous: "It 'exterminates' other nationalities within the new frontier until the line is co-terminous with its own nationality."[21]

[18] Ibid., 40. For exhaustive critiques of the Carnegie Endowment's approach to the phenomenon of war in the Balkans, see Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, updated ed., 2009), *passim*; Lene Hansen, "Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and the 'Third' Balkan War," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no. 3 (2000), 345–62; Dietmar Müller, "Die Balkankriege und der Carnegie-Bericht. Historiographie und völkerrechtliche Bedeutung", in Der "Carnegie Report on the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars 1912/13". Wirkungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte im Völkerrecht und der Historiographie, ed. by Dietmar Müller and Stefan Troebst (=Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung, vol. 24, no. 6, 2014), 7–24.

[19] On the *millet* system, see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, 2 vols. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982).

[20] Dennison Rusinow, "The Ottoman Legacy in Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Civil War," in L. Carl Brown, ed., *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 78–99, here 81.

[21] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, 284.