


Titoism, Self-Determination, Nationalism, Cultural Memory

VOLUME TWO, TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA, STORIES UNTOLD

Edited by Gorana Ognjenović & Jasna Jozelić



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Gorana Ognjenović • Jasna Jozelić
Editors

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Volume Two, Tito's Yugoslavia, Stories Untold

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To my parents, Faketa Ćurčić Jozelić and Krunoslav Jozelić, who taught me that justice is the essence of humanity. They taught me to follow the belief that “unity and brotherhood” and “equality for all” are not just political paroles but a way of living.

THE UNIQUENESS AND NON-UNIQUENESS OF JOSIP BROZ TITO—A FOREWORD

This volume, ably assembled by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, tells the story of the man who led socialist Yugoslavia for three-and-a-half decades and of his collaborators in constructing a system that was not entirely “of the East,” while clearly not “of the West” either. The range of topics covered in this volume is impressive, ranging from the Tito regime’s controlling destinies of the internees from Yugoslavia in Nazi camps in Norway after World War II to the annual Tito birthday celebrations, to Partisan films, to more traditional but no less interesting subjects, such as non-alignment, brotherhood and unity, and the suppression of the multi-party system immediately after World War II. And, as these chapters show, socialist Yugoslavia had some unique features.

Josip Broz Tito was and remains unique in some politically telling ways. First, he is the only Eastern European Communist leader of the immediate post-World War II generation who continues to command a certain amount of adulation in parts of what once was socialist Yugoslavia. Whether one thinks of Hungary’s Mátyás Rákosi or Poland’s Bolesław Bierut or Albania’s Enver Hoxha, or any of the other Communists who came to power in Central and SouthEastern Europe at the end of World War II, none of them attracts particular interest, let alone a following. Yet in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, Tito is still remembered with respect—at least in some circles. Croatia’s capital city even boasts a public square named after the longtime Yugoslav president, while in Serbia, in late 2009, Tito’s grandson, Josip Joška Broz, was elected head of a newly forming Communist Party. In Bosnia, one may find Café

Tito in downtown Sarajevo, and Tito mugs, adorned with his likeness, continue to be on sale, alongside other Tito paraphernalia.

Tito was unique in a second respect. Where the Communists holding leadership positions in the Soviet bloc based their claim to legitimacy on the promise of economic equality and full employment, commitment to a full welfare state (anti-capitalism), and proletarian internationalism (translated as subservience to the Soviet Union), Tito and his immediate successors based their claims on an entirely different triad. Two of the elements of this triad—self-management and non-alignment—were devised specifically to legitimize Yugoslavia’s independent path, eventually accepted by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1955. Self-management, or so the Yugoslav Communists proclaimed at their Seventh Congress in 1958, was no less than a higher stage of socialism that the Soviets had achieved, while non-alignment provided a rationale for the repudiation of proletarian internationalism. To these, the Yugoslavs added the concept of brotherhood and unity, in effect a claim to inter-ethnic harmony. Tito himself would claim, in 1979, that the Yugoslav “national question” had been solved *in principle*, and, by “in principle” he meant that it had not yet been solved *in practice*.

What is striking about the legitimizing schemes of both the Soviet bloc states and socialist Yugoslavia is that neither scheme referred to political succession as such and, as Guglielmo Ferrero noted more than 70 years ago,¹ agreement on the rules and procedures of political succession is central to achieving political legitimacy. Thus, dynastic monarchies, whether absolute or constitutional, have justified succession by the rule of primogeniture, or some variation thereof. Systems of representative government have justified political succession by professing to honor the rule that the candidate or political party that gains the greatest number of votes is entitled to take the reins of government. Both of these schemes are open to subversion—by imposters (such as the two False Dimitrys in early seventeenth-century Russia) in the case of dynastic succession and by electoral fraud in the case of representative systems. But what they have in common—the justification and the disqualification of voters of incumbency according to a rule of succession—distinguishes both of them from Communist systems. The latter, whether explicitly (as in the case of Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin or Romania’s Nicolae Ceaușescu) or implicitly, ultimately laid claim to office on the basis of their superior understanding of the principles of governance—*de facto* appealing to a principle reminiscent, up to a point, of Plato’s *Republic*.

Tito was unique in yet a third respect, namely in erecting a system of collective leadership that was supposed to take charge after his death. The widespread slogan in summer 1980—“after Tito, Tito”—already suggested that the system hung on the symbolic power of a leader who was no longer among the living. The brief era of collective leadership in the post-Stalin USSR is not comparable for two reasons. First, the eight members of the Yugoslav collective presidency represented the eight federal units comprising the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia and were organized as a formal body. The post-Stalin collective leadership in the Soviet Union was not a formal body, even though it was made up of the strongest members of the Politburo, and, with the exception of Anastas Mikoyan, consisted entirely of Russians. And second, the chairmanship of the Yugoslav collective presidency rotated each year—in a system that lasted for a decade. In the Soviet case, by contrast, Khrushchev immediately took the post of First Secretary for himself, while Georgi Malenkov occupied the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers until he was replaced in 1955 by Nikolai Bulganin who, in turn, had to surrender the post three years later to Khrushchev. And finally, Tito was more generous than other Communist leaders in allowing various associations to function outside party control. These included a music guild for young people, a technical council, film clubs, and mountain-climbing associations.

To be sure, there are also ways in which Tito was *not* unique. To begin with, in Yugoslavia as elsewhere in the Communist world, the Communist Party exercised a monopoly of power and did not permit other parties to compete in the political arena. Second, as elsewhere, the system that Tito and his associates set up involved systematic efforts to penetrate or influence the churches—whether (as in the early days) through the establishment of regime-friendly priests’ associations or through the recruitment of clergy as informers.² Third, one may recall the brutal way in which Tito dealt with political opposition in the early years, first driving non-Communist politicians such as Milan Grol and Dragoljub Jovanović from power and then rounding up pro-Stalin Communists after June 1948, and sending them to Goli Otok (Bare Island), the notorious prison camp. Fourth, Tito established a system of control over and censorship of the media and publishing, which was typical of Communist countries. And fifth, the cult of the leadership was itself a typical feature in the Communist world, even if the details differed from country to country.³

Many commentators have stated that Tito was larger than life. Thus, in Chap. 5 for this two-volume book, Latinka Perović quotes Serb novelist

Dobrica Ćosić describing Tito as having “an unusual, impressive personality” and of exuding “strength, health, manly beauty, simplicity, and superiority.” Fitzroy Maclean, who met Tito during the Partisan War (or, the People’s Liberation War, as it was officially termed), would later recall the Yugoslav leader’s “never-failing sense of humor; his unashamed delight in minor pleasures of life; a natural diffidence in human relationships, giving way to a natural friendliness...; a violent temper...; a considerateness and generosity constantly made manifest in small ways; [and] a surprising readiness to see both sides of a question.”⁴ Above all, there was the strength of his personality, so that David Binder could comment, in the film *Tito and the Power of Resistance* (1978), that, upon entering a room, Tito’s presence would fill the entire space.

Tito displayed a firm determination to win at politics, and a readiness to resort to ruthless means to do so. This ruthlessness was clearly shown in the speedy suppression of the re-emergent multiparty system at the end of World War II, as Zdenko Radelić shows, as well as in the treatment of suspected Soviet sympathizers—Cominformists as recorded in Tvrtko Jakovina’s contribution to this set. And when Fidel Castro tried to divert the Non-Aligned Movement into a “progressive,” that is, pro-Soviet, direction, Tito traveled to Havana, at the age of 88, in order to do battle with the Cuban leader and keep the movement equidistant between the blocs. Although as Zachary Irwin notes, “the aspirations of the [non-aligned] movement could not prevent serious conflict among its members,” it remained symbolically and perhaps also politically important for more than two decades—until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 demonstrated the impotence of that movement in the face of military muscle.

Tito and his coterie had come to power as a result of their victory in 1944–1945, and they made the most of the Partisan myth in an effort to legitimize their rule. This entailed silence about Partisan atrocities, as well as about atrocities committed by Chetniks who crossed over to Partisan ranks. But the Partisan myth also involved active propaganda and here, as Chap. 3 by Jurica Pavičić shows, the genre of Partisan films played a vital role, even spawning subgenres such as Partisan thrillers, Partisan comedies, Partisan spy films, and of course Partisan epics, such as the 1973 film, *Sutjeska*, in which Richard Burton, who had played the role of Leon Trotsky in a film released just the previous year, was cast as Tito.

Elected eventually as “president without termination of mandate”—rather than merely “president for life”—Tito seemed larger than life even in death. After lingering for four months between life and death in the Ljubljana Medical Centre, Tito succumbed on 4 May 1980. His funeral, rehearsed and re-rehearsed for weeks on end, was staged as a mass spectacle, with representatives from 128 countries, including 31 presidents, 22 prime ministers, 4 kings, 6 princes, and 47 foreign ministers. Hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs lined the streets of Belgrade to watch the funeral procession, while Yugoslavs in Dubrovnik, Split, and elsewhere huddled wherever there was a television, in order to witness the end of an era. For weeks after the funeral, Yugoslavs gathered at railway stations and other public places to sing the patriotic song “Jugoslavijo” and the old Partisan song “Comrade Tito, we pledge to you that we shall not deviate from your path.” As time would tell, it took less than a decade for certain Yugoslavs in high places precisely to deviate from Tito’s path and to set the country on the road to fragmentation, collapse, and war.

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NOTES

1. Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Principles of Power: The Great Political Crises of History* (New York: Arno Press, 1972 [original publication, 1942]).
2. For details, see Sabrina P. Ramet, ed., *Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, in production).
3. Concerning leadership cults in Eastern Europe, see Balazs Apor, J.C. Behrends, P. Jones, and E.A. Rees, eds., *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004).
4. Fitzroy Maclean, “Tito: A Study,” in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 28, no. 2 (January 1950), p. 241.

TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA *STORIES UNTOLD* PREFACE

As the disintegration of Tito's Yugoslavia into its successor states proceeded, the power also decentralized and therefore a lot of information, previously unknown became available to the public. Today, it is possible to search in archives for documents, earlier unknown information, that can result in further developing of the knowledge about Tito's Yugoslavia. As a result, a more detailed and nuanced picture of what Yugoslavia was all about is slowly emerging throughout the academic research literature. After reading most of the literature published on the theme, we came to a conclusion that this volume needs to be organized in order to meet some mishaps and flaws in already existing descriptions, followed by a serious lack of detail and nuance in certain aspects of the descriptions already made. Examples are some important details were still untold, some aspects of the narrative were selectively told, and some descriptions of what we knew about whom we were and what in the end happened, were simply wrong. Our aim by producing this volume is to challenge decades of some superficial and selective rhetoric that came from different sides/political interests, foreign as well as domestic. In other words, our contributions are meant to fill in some of those black holes that unfortunately got to see the daylight and lived long and prosperous lives determining the idea of what Tito's Yugoslavia was, longer than should have been the case. What we are hoping to achieve is a more detailed picture that might surprise those who thought they knew it all, as well as we are hoping to inspire others to read more about this historically social experiment that against all odds actually did exist and prospered for a while, in the midst of the spiderwebs of the global political chaos that even today does not seem to

be on its way to reach equilibrium of global peace that is actually practically possible.

Why is the study of *Tito's Yugoslavia* relevant today?

Neither the rise nor the fall of Tito's Yugoslavia occurred in a political vacuum.

In the end for various reasons it vanished more or less overnight in one of the worst bloodsheds ever seen in Europe. A bloodshed that, despite all international expectations and demands, seems not to be easy to either forget or forgive, especially in those areas of the formal Republic devastated by the conflict. All reconciliation studies show that the process of healing needs honesty about crimes committed and systematic positive action, which would provide conditions necessary for wounds to heal, of which, unfortunately, there is not much to be seen as yet.

Since Tito's Yugoslavia physically no longer exists, one would think that the task of retrospectively reflecting on it as a phenomenon would be easier, but, as we all know, appearances can be deceiving.

In these two volumes, we take up a series of questions that deeply affected the politics, which belonged to the core definition of the political dialectics between the former Yugoslav republics. These questions and answers we present have a key role in understanding the art of fine balancing between the Communist (revolutionary) totalitarian regime and socialist republic as its antidote. The result of which was pulling a great number of population as active participants into Tito's idealist project. The fact that "we" (as citizens of Yugoslavia) at some point actually surpassed the republic borders. This is why repeating some of these questions in the light of the newly gained information based on documented facts are of great importance for the Yugoslav successor states in their current state of political independence from one another.

In these two volumes, by *Tito's Yugoslavia* we mean the time period of the country's existence (1945–1990). Therefore, essays will not in the same degree refer to Tito's person as a key answer to the countries rule as

such. Essays in various degrees refer to Tito's persona as the key ruler of the country in its totalitarian and the consequent socialist edition.

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Introduction

Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

A single point that everyone can agree upon is that during its existence Tito's Yugoslavia represented many different things to many different people around the globe. For example, in 1999, Tito was classified by *Time* magazine, 19 years after his death, as one of the '100 Most Important People of the Twentieth Century'. Titoism as a cultural phenomenon in Yugoslavia was already in motion during the 1950s. It was a cultural phenomenon well combined with the public Communist ideology that was systematically presented as 'savior' and therefore had a monopolistic position as official ideology and culture. In the beginning, this combination was necessary for the recovery of the newly born nation, as an ideological glue for patching up the rifle holes in common memory so that the country could be built from the ruins. As World War II and revolutionary totalitarianism increasingly became distant memories slowly fading away, the cult was only growing in size and intensity. Titoism as a cult was a complex issue. First, Tito was a leader of the anti-fascist movement that resulted in liberation of the country. After the war, he quickly became a symbol of an absolute authority (politically, military, and symbolically) by becoming general secretary of the Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije and

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the country's lifelong president and army marshal/commandant. The symbolism employed in the development of the cult was clearly a result of a process (during and after the war, and many years after), rather than a marketing strategy.

On some levels the classical cult phenomenon resembled any other cult in North Korea or the USSR. Since 1957, Tito's official birthday was celebrated as Youth Day. The relay race was organized for the first time in 1945 and many millions of people took part in it. The relay race took place every year, where a baton was carried with a birthday pledge to Josip Broz Tito, ostensibly from all the young people of Yugoslavia. Almost all the cities had his name on the main streets and squares and even some cities were named after him. Many of his residences were built around Yugoslavia, even though they were never his private property. In his birth town of Kumrovec a monument was raised and his house was turned into a museum, a place that became an obligatory destination for all followers of his personal cult.

On other levels, its development did not even have anything to do with Tito's personal interference, an example being the Yugoslavian film industry¹, which lived a life of its own and contributed primarily to the glorification of the revolutionary period and Tito only as a secondary motif. The glorification of the 'revolutionary spirit' and 'new nation' and the 'way it supposedly came about' was served in Hollywood style: a series of movies that the younger generations were exposed to on every front, at home, in schools, and so on. This was a part of an official ideology and culture. Even though Tito was fascinated by Hollywood films and stars, movies, and everything American, the films created as part of the Yugoslav filmography were not a part of the conscious political plan of building and supporting the personal cult.

The cult developed further during the 1960s and as the years went by and society's needs changed, the cult also shifted its role. During the 1960s it was all about smoke and mirrors for the purpose of patching up the black holes once each nation started heading in its own direction as the crisis in 1962 had shown. Officially, the character of the state changed through the amendment to the constitution in 1971, where the union of state republics 'discusses' important issues. The leadership becomes a group affair, even though Tito kept his position (awaiting his natural departure). The whole transition was masked by the Titoism as a cult, as a strategy for 'saving face'.²

The ideological core of Titoism was not Tito. Only the conceptual base for the performance act of Titoism was Tito. The ideological core or the backbone of Titoism, which enabled him to recruit for his cause so many individuals across the social classes, ethnic groups, and nations, was built much earlier than when Tito's Yugoslavia came into being. It was the idea of national self-determination (including succession). The idea that was taken over from Lenin and Stalin and developed and adapted for the making of Tito's Yugoslavia was 'revolutionary self-determination' resembling heavily a 'democratic political right' of the individual and nation, followed on the ideological level by 'Titoism' as a historical phenomenon or an institution.³ It was one of the revolutionary promises that Tito kept and delivered in a final edition of the constitution in 1974. This was nonetheless a concept that demonstrates the historical continuity of these collective human rights in the state-building aspirations of the Yugoslav and other nations and ethnic groups represented in this territory. Being the backbone of Yugoslavia, it was the same concept that played the key role for later breaking of Tito's Yugoslavia as we knew it. It was nevertheless an ideological concept that very well reflected Tito's personal conviction and faithfulness to the idea of national equality. The formula of federal organization was supposed to settle the national question and the survival of the Yugoslav state.

Tito's authenticity as an ideological leader, his true belief in one nation, was obvious in every speech or public address, where he always had plans for the entire nation on equal grounds. This willingness to see everyone as equals was demonstrated in his decision in 1971, when for the first time Bosnian Muslims/Bošnjaks were allowed to declare themselves as a nation and not only a religious group. In addition, autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which existed from 1945, was finalized by 1973 through amendments to the constitution as an independence on the level of the republics.

One of the effects that such intense transformation or modernization of what Yugoslavia was before World War II to Tito's Yugoslavia from 1945, had its price. Modernization demanded much flexibility and futuristic vision that not everyone around Tito was either able or willing to accept or follow. The reluctance was clearly stated in their support of the idea of a unitary and centralized socialist state as the only possible Yugoslavia, against the market economy and confederation format of Yugoslavia that was embodied in the constitution from 1974.⁴ The approach was taken by individuals whose relationship toward communism was a substitute for their relationship towards religion: the ideals were clean but they were betrayed.

The source of disagreement was formulated in 1951 when the focus was turned to the mismatch between revolutionary ideals and post-revolutionary reality/developments that some define as the crisis of the (Serbian) nation.

Due to either inability or unwillingness to follow the speed of developments of Tito's Yugoslavia and its tremendous social, political, and economic transition within a relatively short time, a parallel political dimension was slowly developing: a remedy for a crisis, a form of existential security, was searched for in the past. A remedy or a new definition of what progress should have been and an interpretation of the crisis of (Serbian) nation represented was spread through literature as one of many effective methods. Soon after, the project became a collective project, an institution, a networking system, where nationalism became the key notion. The redefinition included the new understanding of Tito's Yugoslavia, which in the new interpretation was seen as a negative episode of the history of Serbia, an era of demise of the great Serbian nation. Soon after Tito's death, a speech made at the Kosovo celebration in 1981, confirmed that with Tito's demise, the Titoism had left the premises as well. The 'de-titoisation' that followed envisioned Tito as the greatest enemy of the Serbian people. With the demise of Brionic Tito, Brionic Yugoslavia, and Brionic socialism, according to them the war was inevitable for the purpose of re-establishing the old/new order of things.⁵

Was the demise of Tito's Yugoslavia the result of the Serbian nationalists program only?

Not quite. First, in 1990 Slovenia declared its return to Kardelj's interpretation of self-determination in its constitution, including the right to succession, as an enduring, integral, and inalienable right, reasserting the Slovenian national project.⁶ That same year, Franjo Tudjman, the newly elected president of Croatia, used the principal of national self-determination for doubting Tito's most important accomplishment: the Yugoslavian federation. Tudjman stressed the fact that the Croats never abandoned the principles of *Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije* and that Croats are only reaffirming the right of the nation to self-determination, resurrecting also their own national project. Soon after the Serb minority in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina followed their example and demanded their right to self-determination by expelling all non-Serb population from their occupied areas and proclaiming their 'National Assembly of the Serb Republic' a state. The international community on the other hand decided to ignore the principle of self-determination as the concept underlying the

state independence of Croatia and Slovenia. Instead it concluded that the Yugoslav state collapsed and that the disassociation of its federal units was thus possible.

Even though Tito's Yugoslavia did not stand its final test of time, the recent findings prove that one cannot say the same when it comes to Titoism as a culture.

Just when everyone thought that Tito's Yugoslavia at best was all over and long forgotten and only remembered as the worst thing that ever happened to any of the nations, nostalgia kicked in.

The amnesia and selective memory enforced by the contemporary nation (successor) states is increasingly challenged by a new form of fashion statement based on clothes that previously were a part of compulsory apparel (i.e. pioneer and military uniforms); a new form of cultural nostalgia for Tito's Yugoslavia as a form of criticism of the current state of affairs.⁷ Nonetheless, Tito as a cult⁸ figure is experiencing a second renaissance through fashion choices; an increasing use of memorabilia and sales of souvenirs such as t-shirts with the message, '*Tito come back, we forgive you everything*'. This post-socialist nostalgia in its sentimental and emancipatory aspect, and global retro-aesthetics are the 'untold stories' from those times as they appear and develop here and now, in post-Yugoslav and post-socialist transition: a past in contemporary political discourses is actually worn. The current political and economic situation in the successor states and the new rise of the right wing extremism within them leads the people to make association to the revolutionary period of Tito's Yugoslavia.

Kumrovec, as the birthplace of Tito, was a part of the Titoist ideological message communicated as a complex yet very direct message that had become an annual pilgrimage for all those who are mourning its demise. The groups of individuals who visit Kumrovec are only growing in numbers each year. It used to be a must destination for all Titoists during the existence of Tito's Yugoslavia. Kumrovec was one of the important carriers of Tito's legitimacy: it highlighted that he was one of the people, that he was of peasant origin. In the 1990s Kumrovec was the forbidden socialist anti-national symbol with all the stigma attached to it⁹ moved underground throughout Croatia, became *terra incognita*: memories were stored deep down in the freezer of history, never to be released in public again.¹⁰

Today, even though Kumrovec to a certain extent still bears the stigma of the symbolic 'cradle' of the former socialist ideology, its reputation

seems to be on a rebound. In May 2014 the latest celebration of Tito's birthday climaxed to a whole new level. The organization, choreography, and the structure of the event, as well as diverse practices of the participants, largely resembled the previous celebrations. Several thousands of visitors from various parts of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, and so on, came together to reminisce together over 'the good old times'. The mainstream politicians, the representatives of local and county government climbed the stage in Kumrovec and in front of the sign 'The Day of Youth—the Day of Joy', they addressed the participants by highlighting Tito's merits and the need to look up to his anti-fascist ideals in times of hardship. For the first time the local authorities officially acknowledged that people keep coming to Kumrovec, whether the political elites regard it as a forbidden place or not. They come to Kumrovec to express their nostalgia, to create continuity between their past and their present, to criticize their current circumstances and the power relations, or just to have fun with their old comrades and enjoy the picturesque scenery. In Kumrovec they tell and re-enact the stories rarely told in the public spheres of today's Croatia.

But if we are to speak of aspects of Tito's ideology that were invented 'before their time', there is no better candidate than 'brotherhood and unity',¹¹ despite the fact that it never was either completely true or existing on all levels of the Yugoslav nation.

This concept is the only one that outlived its purpose within the borders of former Yugoslavia only to regain its reapplication on the European level: the concept 'brotherhood and unity' a futuristic social vision, projecting already then what will be happening now.

These days, all this seems rather bittersweet, when all the Yugoslav successor states are so keen on entering the European Union (EU), for which recognizing the rights of others is one of the entry conditions. It feels almost as a self-irony brought about by the increasing need on the EU level to reassess the multicultural ideology and its mechanisms that existed in the region, and, at least for awhile, used to unite different ethnic, religious, and cultural groups. Not the least because even though the peoples today reside in the successor states, the multicultural ideology is a basic part of the identity and daily practice that never changed, despite the conflicts during the 1990s and multiple horrific crimes of ethnic cleansing in all its parts. Understanding former multicultural attempts is crucial for adopting a new type of multiculturalism in postwar ex-Yugoslav countries that are mainly still in the process of transition. At the same time analyz-

ing multicultural experiences from the Balkan history in their complexity, especially the ongoing practice of denouncing the distinction between religion and ethnicity and what it has to say for multiculturalism of the modern nation-states, in the light of the recent developments in Ukraine, seem to be of increased relevance. Understanding this form of politicization of religion done by religious organizations that currently function as a political organization in its complexity appear to be some of the most fertile ways of developing the new contemporary multicultural ideologies and enterprises for the purpose of their realization in new as well as in the same old environments. What ‘brotherhood and unity’ once was in the case of Yugoslavia, is what ‘multiculturalism’ represents today in the case of its successor states: after all we have come around ‘full circle’.

NOTES

1. Jurica Pavičić, *Titoist Cathedrals: The Rise and Fall of Partisan Film*, see this volume.
2. Sergej Flere, *Da li je Titova država bila totalitarna?*, Političke perspektive Časopis za istraživanje politike Originalni naučni rad UDC 316.334.3:321(497.1) 316.46:929 Tito, p. 10.
3. Albert Bing—*Titoism and National Self-determination*.
4. Latinka Perović—*Dobrica Ćosić and Josip Broz Tito*, see this volume.
5. Sonja Biserko—*Yugoslavia’s Implosion: The Fatal Attraction of Serbian Nationalism*, The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2012.
6. Albert Bing *Titoism and Self-determination*, see this volume.
7. See also Arne Johan Vetlesen, *Nostalgia as Critique*, *Dictum The Critical View*, no 2 (2005).
8. Mitja Velikonja—“*Yugo vintage?*” *Preserving and Creating Memory Through Clothing*, see this volume.
9. Nevena S. Alempijević and Kirsti Hjemdahl,—*Kumrovec: Tito’s Birthday Party in the 21st Century*, see this volume.
10. Bet-El, Ilana, “Unimagined Communities: The Power of Memory and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia”, in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Presence of the Past*, edited by Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 206–222.
11. Nena Močnik—*Brotherhood and Unity Goes Multiculturalism*, see this volume.

Yugoslavia's Authentic Socialism as a Pursuit of 'Absolute Modernity'

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We shall focus on the impact and consequences of Tito's split from the Cominform by considering Tito's development of the socialist ideal. We believe that the Tito-Stalin split reinforced the goal of a form of Yugoslav communism that was pursued differently after 1948. One initial goal consisted of creating a form of Communist Party pluralism, resulting from broader ideological consequences of the split.

We believe that Yugoslavia attempted to create and implement a version of 'authentic socialism' distinct from that of the USSR. Five main characteristics of Yugoslav's 'authentic socialism' express the main differences between the Yugoslav's 'authentic socialism' and the Soviet/Eastern bloc's 'real-socialism'.

- (a) Self-management socialism: social instead of private ownership, workers alone were in charge of decision-making about production and distribution of goods and profits (decentralisation) through the workers union;

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- (b) The politics of the non-aligned that resulted in an international recognition and the alternative form of power position that resulted;
- (c) Multi- (Communist) party system;
- (d) Country's open borders;
- (e) Western culture's (all of its aspects) influence on the ordinary people's lives: film, music, fashion, arts, and sciences...

We consider it self-evident that the historical and political events that brought Yugoslavia to this extraordinary position within the Communist world were dramatic and unexpected, even for those who had no choice but to actively participate in them.

THE INITIAL ROAD SIGNS

At the end of World War II, Yugoslavia enjoyed the prestige of its victorious resistance against fascism, and a positive global reputation. Even though Yugoslavia was never able to draw the postwar map of Europe, the country managed to advance its goals despite the fact that these objectives often clashed with those of 'higher powers'. Yugoslavia's battle for its 'authentic socialism' falls under the category of these goals.

As a part of its domestic policies, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its leader, Josip Broz Tito, pursued their goals on two levels simultaneously. On one hand, they communicated propaganda through strong and well-organised communication channels of the forces fighting the Peoples Liberation War. On the other hand, they led battles for the final liberation from Fascist occupation. As a result of this parallel strategy against fascism and the majority of participants of Peoples Liberation Movement supported the idea of a federal Yugoslavia and abolition of the monarchy.¹

Already then, Tito's leadership style demonstrated a consistent and broadly based revolutionary spirit. This leadership spirit, combined with his leftist and independent style of decision-making and creative improvisations, had irritated Tito's greatest role model, Stalin. The problem was that Stalin, in exchange for his 'support' and 'inclusion' of little Yugoslavia in the Eastern bloc expected a total submission of the Yugoslav people to his rule, a submission identical to the Eastern bloc countries that followed Stalin either freely or less so.²

At the end of the war, the Peoples Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was established (29 November 1945). At this point the attribute 'socialist'