Sophie Wulk

The Role and Relevance of Higher Education Policy in EU External Relations

An Analysis of the Transmissive, Transformative and Transactional Qualities of University Institutions and Programmes

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Vorwort

Gleich zu Beginn formuliert Sophie Wulk die These, die eine neue, weithin sichtbare Schneise in die zerfurchte Forschungslandschaft schlägt. Die EU vergrößert ihre strukturelle Macht in Europa und in der Welt in erheblichem und wachsendem Maße durch erfolgreiche *educational policies*. Der Begriff der strukturellen Macht wird für die Analyse des Erziehungs- und Universitätssystems fruchtbar gemacht. Er ergänzt die Begriffe des symbolischen Kapitals und der kulturellen Hegemonie, deren Einseitigkeit zugleich überwunden wird.

Überdies legt die Autorin erstmals eine umfassende Analyse der Bedeutung der Erziehungs- und Hochschulpolitik für die Außenpolitik der Europäischen Union vor. Dabei zeigt sich, dass der beachtliche und wachsende Einfluss transnationaler (europäischer *und* globaler) Bildungspolitik auf die immer reflexiver werdende Bildungspolitik der einzelnen Nationalstaaten (in Europa und darüber hinaus) viel weiter zurück reicht als gängig angenommen wird. Gleichzeitig ist die vielfältig programmierte EU-Bildungspolitik zu einem wesentlichen Element des mehrschichtigen und global ausgreifenden Sicherheits- und Erweiterungsgürtels der EU geworden.

Hier kommt der Begriff der strukturellen Macht ins Spiel. Durch Bildungspolitik können Regierungen „substantial power and control over the population" ausüben, die sich in Gramsci's Terminologie *kultureller Hegemonie* gut analysieren lässt: „Education and training, is certainly not an act of pure altruism." (205f). Das gilt insbesondere auch in kolonialen und imperialen Zusammenhängen. Die menschenrechtliche und demokratische Rhetorik der EU kann vor diesem Hintergrund unschwer als ideologischer Schleier imperialer Interessenpolitik durchschaut werden. Damit aber wäre der Begriff *struktureller Macht* aber nur unzureichend analysiert, denn die *Macht* der Bildung besteht nicht nur in Kontrolle, Disziplinierung und Begrenzung, sondern in der gleichzeitigen *Ermöglichung individueller und kollektiver Emanzipation* (207).

Um diese doppelte Rolle strukturelle Bildungsmacht als Beschränkung und Ermöglichung emanzipatorischer Praxis kategorial anmessen zu bestimmen verbindet Wulk die strategischen Konfliktpositionen der Hegemonie und Gegen-Hegemonie auf eine ebenso überraschende wie einleuchtende Weise mit der Habermasschen Unterscheidung von strategischem und kommunikativem Handeln. Damit überwindet sie die instrumentelle *bias* der Hegemonietheorie, ohne indes auf deren deskriptive und explanative

Funktion verzichten zu müssen. Sie kann also beides erstmals in einer Theorie vereinen und damit beide Teilstücke stärken. Überdies kombiniert sie das der Internationalen Politik entnommene Konzept des „transactionalism" (Deutsch), das der Idee der *Sicherheitsgemeinschaft* zugrunde liegt, mit dem Begriff der „communicative action" (Habermas), der die Idee einer nicht kolonialisierten Lebenswelt trägt, um die kommunikativen Netzwerke horizontaler Beziehungen zwischen Universitäten und Universitätsangehörigen verschiedenster Länder und Weltregionen zu untersuchen. Erst in diesem Netz von Begriffen und Theorien findet der Begriff struktureller Macht eine implizite Definition, die der Komplexität die Sache angemessen ist.

Empirisch wird gezeigt, wie die strategisch orientierte Hegemoniepolitik der EU kommunikative Gegen-Hegemonien erzeugt, die sich der strategischen Verfügbarkeit durch instrumentelle Außenpolitik entzieht. Ausgerechnet Hypokrisie wird, wie schon John Elster gezeigt hat, zu einem Musterfall zivilisierender Macht, weil sie beim Wort genommen und gegen die falsche Absicht gewendet werden kann. Auf der andern Seite wird die hegemoniale Entwicklung der EU-Bildungspolitik realistisch erfasst und als Ausdruck intergouvernmentaler Macht, die mit den Mitteln des *soft-law regimes* die formell schwache Bildungspolitik der transnationalen Institutionen des öffentlichen Europäischen Rechts ebenso umgeht wie die formell starken Institutionen des nationalen Verfassungsrechts der Gliedstaaten.

Hauke Brunkhorst

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List of Abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific Countries
CCP	Common Commercial Policy
CCT	Common Commercial Tariff
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CRE	Conférence des Recteurs Européens
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CU	Customs Union
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG COMM	Directorate-General Communication
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General Development Cooperation (EuropeAid)
DG EAC	Directorate-General Education, Audiovisual, Culture
DG ENLARG	Directorate-General Enlargement
DG	Directorate-General
EACEA	Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency
EAEC	European Atomic Energy Community
EaP	Eastern Partnership
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECTS	European Credit Transfer System
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDF	European Development Fund
EEA	European Economic Association
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Agreement
EHEA	European Higher Education Area
EIDHR	European Instrument for Development and Human Rights
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ERASMUS	European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESF	European Social Fund

List of Abbreviations

EU	European Union
EUA	European University Association
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HERE	Higher Education Reform Experts
ICI	Industrialized Countries Instrument
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
JP	Joint Projects
LLP	Lifelong Learning Programme
MEDA	Mésures d'accompagnement financières et techniques (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership)
MFA	Macro-Financial Assistance
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
NPE	Normative Power Europe
NSCI	Nuclear Safety Co-operation Instrument
OCT	Overseas Countries and Territories
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PHARE	Poland Hungary Aid for Restructuring of the Economies
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
SM	Structural Measures
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TEMPUS	Trans-European Mobility Scheme for University Studies
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
WEU	Western European Union

Introduction

>»The concrete engagement of the European Union in the world […] is inspired by our desire to avoid the same mistakes being made again. […] As a successful example of peaceful reconciliation based on economic integration, we contribute to developing new forms of cooperation built on exchange of ideas, innovation and research. Science and culture are at the very core of the European openness: they enrich us as individuals and they create bonds beyond borders. […] My message today is: you can count on our efforts to fight for lasting peace, freedom and justice in Europe and in the world. Over the past sixty years, the European project has shown that it is possible for peoples and nations to come together across borders. […] Here today, our hope, our commitment, is that, with all women and men of good will, the European Union will help the world come together« (European Union 2012o).

Acknowledged as a successful project in creating lasting peace and mutual confidence among its Member States, the European Union (EU) received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. In their acceptance speech the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso refer not only to the domestic impact of European integration but stress in addition the role of the EU in today's world. They underline that the experiences of European union provide the EU with the right and, foremost, the responsibility to drive forward similar processes on a global level (European Union 2012o).

The speakers underline that the values of peace, human rights, and equality guide the Union's engagement in other parts of the world along »principles of global solidarity and global responsibility«. Therefore, in the words of Barroso, the EU should be considered »a powerful inspiration for many around the world« (ibid). The Commission President underlines that the EU represents only a first step in the future organisation of the world. For this view, the federalist and cosmopolitan ideas are »one of the most important contributions that the European Union can bring to a global order in the making« (ibid).

This speech, like many other official documents issued by the EU, in particular by the European Commission, are united by the common message that in times of growing global interdependencies and changes in global power dynamics, the EU carries a substantial global responsibility. Moreover, its agents strive for the EU to become an influential actor in its own right who collectively speaks for the Member States and is acknowledged

as an important actor on the world stage -domestically, as well as abroad. Not only from an economic or political perspective, but also in terms of education and research, the EU has therefore set itself the lofty goal of becoming one of the leading global powers of the 21st century, the latest policy incarnation of which arose with the Lisbon Strategy of 2000. The European Council then defined the strategic objective for the European Union as that »to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world« (European Council 2000).

Hence, the EU seeks to legitimise its growing international role and relevance by referring to the strength of a united EU with regards to its global competitiveness, which ensures employment and growth. This discourse is directed primarily at domestic audiences. Further -and this type of argumentation is utilised both 'at home' and abroad as justification for its international ambitions -agents of the EU refer to the success of the European integration project as leading to peace, prosperity and stability on the European continent. The aim is thus to present the EU as a role model for the rest of the world. Moreover, in order to further enhance its visibility and recognition as a credible international actor the EU has started to duplicate select instruments, institutions and diplomatic structures of [other] nation states (Bátora 2005).

The EU has actively engaged in cultivating its image and to presenting itself as a valuable alternative actor in world politics that takes human rights, democracy and the rule of law seriously, and which prefers to engage in multilateral negotiations. The ensuing discourse generates a self-image of the EU as a 'force for good' which is legitimised so as to export its values and standards to other parts of the world. These normative depictions of self are at the core of many policy documents and communications. They serve as a means of discursive legitimisation of the EU's role in the world both at home and abroad.

However, many critical voices underline that the EU might have created inner peace but that beyond its territory, the EU and in particular the Member States care too much for their economic interests and too little for peace or reconciliation beyond its territory. From arms trading to the export of heavily subsidised agricultural products; from deals with energy-rich countries and the silent support of dictatorships to heavy border protection, the EU and hence its Member States act in a self-interested manner, with the primary objective of making profits and preserving inner stability, prosperity and security.

The primary lack of credibility of the EU's international image as 'force for good' derives from the inconsistencies between its rhetoric and reality, primarily the result of the intergovernmental nature of its foreign policy. Member States strive to meet and garner their individual interests and benefits first. Different national interests make a united voice in political affairs therefore highly difficult to achieve. A joint effort is only visible if no national interests are threatened.

Diverging views and interests of Member States have meant that the EU's strength as a foreign policy unit remains rather modest, which prefers to opt for incentive over sanctions -based measures, and resorts to normative rhetoric instead the often required assertiveness to act. Thus, rhetoric triumphs practice: »EU external activity is highly discursive: aspirational, declaratory and full of positioning statements« (Rosamond, 2005, pp.470).

Despite these inconsistencies and the impediments to act as a collective actor in traditional foreign policy, i.e. security and defence, the EU does have certain instruments at hand with which to exert influence internationally. What does unite the Member States is their dependence on the smooth functioning of the internal market, which guarantees their socio-economic well-being. This has led to the creation of dense global networks of trade. As a consequence, and in line with the dynamics that have driven the European regional integration process itself, these increasing economic interdependences beyond its borders tend to make military confrontation an unfavoured option. Threats of physical violence would harm (commercial) relationships, thereby impeding trade flows and altering mobility, exchange and communication streams, which by extension threaten domestic security, stability and prosperity. It is thus the economic interest and the desire for domestic well-being which unites the Member States in their engagement beyond EU borders.

Hence, preferred forms of influence in third countries are those which encourage exchange and cooperation between public and private actors and the building of networks. This does not imply that these approaches are necessarily less coercive, since economic asymmetries can also be used as a bargaining power. The power and influence the EU *can* exert derives however in large parts from its common interests as determined above, as well as its immense collective economic weight and market gravitas whose trading power results from the market-integration of Member States. The desire to build a common market made it necessary for the Member States to hand over competences to the supranational level also in the field of external trade. Hence, domestic demands for a unitary market led to spillovers which had consequences for relations with third countries.

The resulting exclusive authority in trade coupled with the economic weight of the single market has increasingly come to be used to serve political interests. International agreements which are motivated by the ambition to conclude trade deals cover a broad array of policy areas, setting up various sector-based cooperation schemes, and tying (for example) market access and financial contributions to 'conditionalities' relating to democracy, human rights or the rule of law. This underlines that these agreements serve more than plain commercial interests. In that regard it is important to stress that at times conditionality clauses are not always observed too strictly, in particular if Member States see a particular self-interest-driven necessity to continue trade despite their violation. However, whether these policies and instruments are effective is another issue, and although not of less significance, are secondary to the work at hand. What is important to stress here is the fact that the EU indeed includes such issues into its agreements with third countries launching cooperation in many other related policy fields through which influence into the respective third country is sought. The argument of the work at hand is that through establishing cooperation agreements with third countries which cover a broad range of policy fields, and which are backed by the legitimising discourse of the Lisbon strategy, the European Union seeks to exert a substantial degree of influence beyond its borders.

In sum, rhetorically, the EU presents itself with a particularly relevant international role which is inherently political. It claims to stand for universal values and the responsibility to defend them. On the ground however, finding consensus on common foreign policy strategy appears near-impossible. Hence, what is left at the EU level is using its collective economic weight as leverage with which to influence other's actions and behaviour. This has translated into international agreements with a vast number of countries and regions which include cooperation on multiple levels and in various sectors.

Such a sector-based approach seeks to encourage the export of European rules and standards to third countries and regions within a specific policy field. Hence, the underlying ambition here can be defined as 'Europeanisation beyond Europe' (Schimmelfennig 2009). Sector-based approaches can also contribute to the overall visibility and presence of the EU beyond its borders, they could thus in principle raise the EU's soft power capacities (Nye 2004). Sector-based cooperation targets multiple levels of society by setting up programmes and actions addressing not only the relevant government officials but also civil society, stakeholders and opinion leaders, as

well as the population-segment relevant to the particular policy field or initiative. Sector-based external relations also seek alliance and network-building between experts, stakeholders and governmental authorities across borders within a specific policy field. From a medium or long-term perspective, such cooperation schemes then could potentially be used to induce structural changes in third countries by affecting the institutions involved and eventually spilling up to the levels of policy and [possibly] polity (Schimmefennig 2009). By attempting to shape the rules, standards, practices and values through such measures in an increasing number of countries or regions and by seeking to establish their 'rightfulness' through the measures employed, the EU aims to enhance its global structural power. In line with Susan Strange, structural power is understood as the power to determine what is perceived as 'normal' in terms of social order and practices (Strange 1994). The multisector approach to external relations allows the EU to use multiple ways to gain influence in third countries, to enhance its external governance capacities (Lavenex 2004).

When looking at the substance of these international agreements, it is apparent that these cover, depending on the country or region in question, issues such as transport, health, social issues, agriculture or migration. All of them include the clauses relating to environment, energy, culture, training and education, and here in particular *higher* education (European Commission 2014). The latter policy field appears to be quite particular and is of critical relevance for this work. The reasons for this perspective will be explained below.

In contrast to other policy fields in which external consultants are largely hired to realise third-country projects, in the higher education sector it is local universities and their staff who represent the main actors. These have agreed to cooperate on a voluntary basis, attracted, amongst others, by financial incentives. Programmes and actions in the field of higher education are to most parts based on a peer-to-peer and thus horizontal interaction.

One could argue that this might be similar in all settings that target civil society in the broadest sense (e.g. youth or training programmes as well as business cooperation), and this might indeed be the case at times. However, what makes cooperation on the university level special is that the [academic] actors involved are not only embedded in their respective societies, but in general also enjoy a respectable reputation within them. Alongside policy dialogue, it is institutions of higher education and their professors who enable cooperation within the EU's international higher education pol-

icy framework. Academia's prominent role in society and the relative autonomy it enjoys from governmental authorities thus makes it a unique actor in the foreign policy initiatives.

Measures in the field of higher education targeting third countries exist also independently of international agreements. The European External Action Service (EEAS), which in principle represents the diplomatic service of the EU, seems to have also found education to be a suitable channel of influence, a role it emphasised clearly. On its homepage there is no other policy field outside the explicit external relations and trade realm mentioned than education and in particular higher education policy (European Union 2013n).

Measures in the field of education have been employed initially merely domestically, the most famous being probably the ERASMUS programme. Soon these measures were extended to other parts of the world. Nowadays, a substantial number of programmes in the field are in place whereas none of these is restricted only to participants from the countries forming the internal market. Whether one looks at ERASMUS, the Jean Monnet Programme, TEMPUS or ERASMUS Mundus, *all* reach beyond the external borders of the EU. This has not changed with the newly established Erasmus+ programme which has been set up for the period 2014-2020 and subsumes the above-mentioned programmes (European Union 2014). As it appears, the European Union is responsible for an increasing number of programmes in tertiary education. Despite the fact that these programmes are gaining a substantial international dimension, their potential relevance as political instruments has not been subject to any detailed academic inquiry.

Taking into consideration all the points being made above, this work claims that higher education programmes, targeting important domestic stakeholders and key institutions represent instruments with which EU policy makers seek to export European norms, values and standards, to build a global and sustainable network of allies and to enhance its global visibility and presence as a valid polity to eventually enhance its influence and governance capacities in third countries and on the global stage.

Hence, the research at hand starts from the general assumption that EU policy entrepreneurs seek to establish an internationally influential position for the EU and that higher education is used for certain ends in that regard. In particular members of the European Commission try to enhance the EU's power position and room for manoeuvre at home (in the inter-institutional balance) as well as abroad (towards third countries, regions and in international organisations) as this is the Commission's underlying mandate.

The understanding of power here refers to the ability to influence others in their choices, interests and perspectives. It refers to a scenario in which »A getting B to do something B would otherwise not do" (Dahl in Berenskoetter, 2007, pp.3). The concept of power in the political context is thus inherently relational. In line with Barnett and Duvall: »power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate« (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, pp.42). This makes power both a capability and an effect which relies on significant others who recognize the power dimension. In order to understand the power relations in a specific case, one has to understand the social relationship, and to identify the positions of the entities in question vis-à-vis each other.

The fact that power refers to accomplishing one's will does not necessarily mean that one has to work against and suppress others: »A can influence B in various ways« (Heywood, 2002, pp.11). The notion of power is not restricted to 'power over' but thus can also imply 'power to' or 'empowerment' (ibid). More broadly speaking, power can thus be conceived as the ability to make a difference (Berenskoetter, 2007, pp.13). One should not forget that also consensus is an expression of power and that also the absence of conflicting interests does not necessarily indicate the absence of power. Main sources of power are thus persuasion, socialisation, conditionality and coercion (force or the threat of force). In general, influence can be exerted by shaping identities and interests, structures and relationships. The relevant question to detect power dimensions in relationships is thus how and with which mechanisms can agents influence the behaviour, but also the interests and identities of others? (Lukes, 2007, pp.97)

This book follows thus a very broad definition of power, as opposed to the more explicit coercive notion of power. Military force is not the only source of power available to authorities. Power as the ability to influence depends on material resources, on the ability to exert coercive force, but depends also on the degree of credibility and legitimacy. Here, one has to further distinguish between financial incentives to comply, market access, or the desire to be as successful as and to be able to compete globally. Rules of the game and structures, norms can be appealing to a certain degree as well; this again implies a certain power relation.

Generally the term politics then relates to an activity »[…] through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live« (Heywood, 2002, pp.4). Conflict and cooperation are at the heart of the concept and in order to come to a solution, there is the need to work with others. Politics thus represents a process of conflict resolution, where rival views

and competing interests are reconciled. Hence, politics can be referred to as »the making, preserving, and amending of social rules« (ibid, pp.4).

The questions which are then relevant also in the context of foreign policy are who is involved in these processes, and who has the capabilities to influence others decisively? Further, what are the underlying motivations and concrete objectives and how and with which means are these processes triggered? Further, a question is in how far the outcome is in line with the objectives anticipated?

In the course of this work, the concepts of 'foreign policy' and 'external relations' will be used interchangeably. These concepts both seek to refer to what Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) have defined foreign policy: »We define foreign policy as that area of politics which is directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behavior of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals« (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan, 2008, pp.19). The argument here is that although these terms might have slightly different connotations, in principle they both refer to the set of strategies, ambitions and measures to exert influence beyond own borders. The argument here is that external relations are never 'politics-' free. External relations describe activities as political as actions falling under the term foreign policy and thus there is no difference detected that would be of importance for the research at hand. Hence the understanding of politics here follows a broad definition of the term.

Foreign policy here is not restricted to the traditional understanding of the term. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan's approach allows for a much broader perspective on foreign policy, which will be followed throughout this research, and which is of particular interest when analyzing the EU who is limited with regards to classical foreign policy of security and defence. The view is shared that a mere focus on CFSP falls short of grasping the many instruments employed in the external relations realm and thus is insufficient to tackle the multilevel and multisector foreign policy approach of the EU (ibid). EU foreign policy here refers to the policies only of the EU and not its Member States.

All in all, considering the Union's particular characteristics, its normative discourse and its political objectives in the realm of external relations, as elaborated above, an investment into programmes in the field of higher education appears to be a particularly attractive instrument to influence third countries, and to establish, maintain and extend relations beyond borders.

Considering the high salience of primary and secondary education for Member States, as representing an integral part of their welfare strategies, most programmes of the EU concern higher, i.e. tertiary education. In the

course of this work, terms, education policy and higher education policy are thus used interchangeably. In principle, also the term education policy then refers in the first place to initiatives in the field of tertiary education as the EU has most of its programmes and actions falling into this level of education.

Two issues are driving the research at hand. The first refers to the fact that basically there exists no scholarly literature which has considered the EU as an entity that uses measures in the field of higher education as an instrument for broader foreign political objectives. Second, confirming this as a fact, the subsequent question refers to the enquiry in how far universities and their academic staff, looking at their purpose, role and position in societies and for governments, as well as their inherent dynamics, contribute to overall political ambitions. Which qualities do universities have and which consequences does that have for the foreign political goals that motivate international higher education policy? The main understanding is that the roles assigned to universities for and in societies are those of a transmitter and transformer. They thus serve as institutions which transmit existing values, norms and rules and diffuse existing knowledge to upcoming generations. Further, universities are also a site for knowledge production. As places of vital deliberation and reflexivity they serve as a means to continuously transform societies in order to assure their continuity and progress. This thus describes their transformative dimension.

A third quality which requires consideration, in particular when dealing with inter-university and cross-border cooperation, is that such measures have a decisive transactionalist quality. According to Karl W. Deutsch (1957), 'transactionalism', refers to the impact of communication and exchange across borders between peoples. He considers such 'transactions' as an essential mechanism to ensure peaceful relations. Considering that cooperation in the field of higher education enables communication, deliberation and exchange across borders and between the people, the transactionalist dimension appears to be of particular value in the framework of this study.

Hence, this work will deal in particular with the transmissive, transformative and transactionalist qualities of international higher education policy in order to identify the role and relevance of international higher education measures for the EU's relations with third countries.

In order to shed light on the approach guiding this research and the structure of the work at hand, first of all it will be necessary to look at the existing albeit limited scholarly debate in this field. Thus the following literature review provides a brief synopsis of the research conducted in this area of

inquiry in order to identify more concretely the existing research gaps. Building on the overview provided the details of the planned inquiry will then be illustrated in the next step.

A. Literature review and objectives of inquiry

Scholars seem to agree that in general, international higher education measures are employed in order to cultivate attraction and to shape the frames of meaning in third countries in order to enhance international standing and influence. This has been dealt with in the academic literature to some degree. For example Nancy Snow analysed the 'Fulbright Program' of the United States (Snow 1992; 2008) and Giles Scott-Smith studied the 'EU Visitors' Programme' which allows US policy makers to gain experience and knowledge on EU institutions (Scott-Smith 2005; 2008). Concerning existing empirical analyses, the role of exchange programmes appears thus to be in the centre of attention. In general, most academic inquiries in this regard have focused on particular case studies. This is the case also for Rasmus Bertelsen (2007), Rasmus Bertelsen and Steffen Møller (2010) as well as Jospeh Nye (2004) who have all looked at the soft power dimensions of certain universities in international settings.

Giles Scott-Smith has identified exchanges as a suitable form of public diplomacy also in the EU context (Scott-Smith 2005; 2008). Steffen Bay Rasmussen on the other hand focused on the role of public diplomacy as a complementary approach to traditional foreign politics, analysing the messages and practices of the EU in that regard, and touching thus also the role of higher education therein (Rasmussen 2010).

As the term already indicates, public diplomacy has as its target foreign public opinion. With the help of such measures governmental agents intend to build, maintain and strengthen relationships with foreign publics, to spread knowledge and to raise sympathy for their own understandings. Public diplomacy thus can be defined as

> »[…] the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural and educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment […] that will enable target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of the advocate country's foreign policy objectives« (McClellan, 2004, pp.23-24).

Hence, with such measures the respective policy-makers seek to directly exert influence over foreign governments by targeting the population at large.

Public diplomacy does not necessarily address entire populations. Instead, efforts that fall under this category generally seek to address those societal strata that are most likely to influence their country's political course, and who thus have a particular multiplier function in the respective society (Scott-Smith, 2005, pp.767). Hence, public diplomacy has at its primary aim to socialize and to diffuse norms amongst the functional elite (Rasmussen, 2010, pp.21-25): »[One] need not address broad swathes of populations. Rather the key is to specifically trap leaders or decision makers [...] since it is they whose submission translates into policy and behaviours« (Mattern, 2005, pp.611).

The ambition underlying public diplomacy efforts is to influence the frames of meaning of the addressees in order to shift their ideas, values and interests. Politics from this perspective is thus not about mere objective facts but also takes into account that it matters how these facts are actually interpreted: »Political influence is thus achieved by articulating a certain meaning of a concept that others then adopt, making it a socially constructed truth« (Rasmussen, 2010, pp.265). In the eyes of Rasmussen public diplomacy should thus be understood as an approach that seeks to influence the structural environment in which actors define themselves and their interests. This indicates that actually, public diplomacy is not a means to merely influence the self images abroad. It also seeks to influence priorities, interests and values of others (ibid, pp.267).

By looking closely at the dynamics on which public diplomacy relies, one can detect easily that such dynamics are inherent to university education. They sum up to processes such as coalition building, the provision of information and knowledge, socialisation and norms diffusion (Bertelsen, 2007, pp.5). Thus, the special role of universities in the context of public diplomacy and its adequacy as a strategy to exert soft power comes as no great surprise.

Considering the role of universities in societies representing institutions of high reputation and responsible for driving processes of change, they appear to be a quite suitable channel for public diplomacy purposes. However not only the academic staff seems to be a particularly crucial group which can steer society and influence governments, also the students are important targets. They represent the future functional elite which, after graduation, will be dispersed across various policy fields. Hence they are vital for the building of sustainable networks and channels of influence. Along with creating awareness and support for one's position, public diplomacy supports the building of networks and valuable contacts and functions as a tool for

coalition building as well as a means to »gain access into the politics of the other« (Scott-Smith, 2005, pp.771).

However, one has to take into consideration that actually, if it comes to measures that encourage university cooperation across borders, it is questionable in how far the term 'public diplomacy' still applies. Although the initiators of such measures are government authorities, the actual actors are no longer the governments but universities, i.e. their staff engaging in a horizontal fashion in cooperating with partner institutions. Hence, under such circumstances the term refers no longer to a form of official diplomacy. Rather the 'act of diplomacy' is delegated to be executed by public institutions, hence universities or institutions of higher education amongst equals. Still, the term has been commonly employed in the scholarly literature to refer to international programmes such as educational exchanges as has been shown above. Moreover, the term also increasingly gains ground in political discourse, also in the EU context when referring to the multiple international higher education programmes such as TEMPUS for example which is clearly dominated by institutional cooperation logics (European Union, 2011f, pp.43).

Next to framing measures in the field of higher education with foreign political purposes as efforts of public diplomacy, others have concentrated on the soft power dimension of universities and international cooperation programmes in higher education, as mentioned above. Whereas Joseph Nye stresses the role of American universities in transmitting culture and values to international exchange students, others have published small and specific discussion papers on the soft power of French universities in the Middle East or American Missionary universities in China (Nye 2004; Bertelsen 2007, Bertelsen/Moller 2010; Parsons/Platt 1990).

According to Nye's concept of 'soft power', international influence can be stimulated through attractiveness. A system or entity which is perceived positively and which is regarded as a role model or an arrangement one wishes to be part of, can more easily influence those attracted than the one which has less appeal. Soft power then follows the logic, »if I can get you to want what I want, then I do not have to make you do it« (Nye, 2004, pp.37).

Thus, soft power shifts preferences and political agendas (Nye, 2004, pp.39), thereby relying principally on psychological mechanisms: »Conscience controlling and discursive power is at the core of soft power with their ability to shape subjects' perceptions of interest, norms and values« (Bertelsen, 2007, pp.4). Even the realist Hans Morgenthau recognized that creating and sustaining forms of cultural affinity amongst foreign publics

represents a potent form of power: »The power of a nation, then, depends not only upon the skill of its diplomacy and the strength of its armed forces but also upon the attractiveness for other nations of its political philosophy, political institutions, and political policies« (Morgenthau in Scott-Smith, 2008, pp.55).

In this context one has to bear in mind that attractiveness requires visibility. Others need to be aware of one's qualities, since »[…] regardless of how 'good' one's values and how consistent one's record at pursuing them, unless others know about it, no power can be derived« (Mattern, 2005, pp.593). Therefore one can argue in line with Jan Melissen (2005) that the two concepts, public diplomacy and soft power indeed relate. For Melissen, public diplomacy represents a means by which the attractiveness of a country's norms and values can be sponsored. Measures that seek to enhance the soft power of an actor can thus be said to fall under the category of public diplomacy (Melissen, 2005, pp.5). The basic requirement to nurture soft power is to be visible and credible in the eyes of the other. Public diplomacy subsumes attempts to reach such a state.

Jones (2010) is concerned with the role of higher education in EU-Asia relations (Jones 2010). He argues that such forms of influence-seeking represent a suitable instrument for the European Union in external relations for reasons of its limited legal capabilities, the lack of resources and in combination with its self-construction as normative power. He refers to such measures as instruments of soft power.

As a parallel research agenda, the role of international research collaboration as part of foreign policy has been subject to academic scrutiny. Tim Flink (2009) as well as the work of both of Tim Flink and Ulrich Schreiterer (2009a; 2009b) provide an account of 'science diplomacy' and a typology of the efforts made in this regard. They differentiate between 'science in diplomacy', 'diplomacy for science' and 'science for diplomacy'. 'Science in diplomacy' refers to the 'soft power' dimension of international science policies. International cooperation in this field is politically motivated to serve as an 'intercultural bridge', for example if the relations between two countries are conflict-laden (Flink, 2009, pp. 70). Research and Technology, it is argued here, represent a suitable means not only to ensure access to the country in question but also as a way to diffuse political values and standards, i.e. 'rules of the game' (Flink, 2009, pp.75). The term 'diplomacy for science' in contrast assigns diplomatic measures the objective to encourage international cooperation in science (ibid, pp.68). Last, the concept 'science for diplomacy' then refers to the instrumentalisation of research for political or social ends. Hence, research activities serve to tackle global and