

POLICY-MAKING IN A TRANSFORMATIVE STATE

THE CASE OF QATAR

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Policy-Making in a Transformative State

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The journey for this book began many years ago in seminars, lectures, and discussions organized through the Public Policy in Islam Program of Qatar Faculty Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University. A key, recurring issue was the application of current models of policy analysis to the uniqueness of Qatar's policy-making processes and its grand passions formalized in the Qatar National Vision, "transforming Qatar into an advanced country by 2030." The country is grappling with standard policy challenges (e.g., health, education, and economic development) but in very special circumstances. And yet there is almost no sustained scholarly attention or analysis of these challenges. To date, the work on Qatar has been preoccupied with its foreign policies and its oil and gas economy. We decided to remedy that by focusing on the policy process in Qatar, its internal dynamics and tensions, and its results and prospects. We decided on a theme of Qatar as a *transformative state*, a policy-making system that combines the features of a Gulf monarchy: a modern governance machinery, unrivalled resources, and remarkable ambition.

From the very beginning of the project, we decided that we would do our best to enlist Qatari as well as non-Qatari contributions. For a variety of reasons, much of the scholarship on the Gulf region has been written by outsiders, and we wanted to balance that with an "internal perspective" from analysts who have been, in some cases, directly engaged in policy development or who work and live in Qatar. Additionally, we held two authors workshops in Qatar to encourage cross-fertilization and strengthen the book's thematic focus.

Apart from chapter authors, we have significantly benefited from the work of graduate students of Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Public Policy in Islam Program. We are grateful to Sara Al Mohannadi, Sultan Al Kuwari, Abdulla Al Shaiba, and Haya Burshaid, who acted as theme leaders and helped develop the initial thematic scaffolding for the book. Jennifer Spence at Carleton University also aided invaluably in organizing and editing the bibliography.

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We commenced this book with the intention of showcasing the "uniqueness" of Qatar, but readers will acknowledge that Qatar as a transformative state is not only about the special nature of the Qatari experience. We believe that there is a lot to learn from the Qatari experience about transformational policy-making, and this experience brings valuable lessons for the region and other developing countries.

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List of Abbreviations

ABET	Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology
AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
ALESCO	Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization
AR-DRGs	Australian Refined Diagnosis Related Groups
CCQ	Community College of Qatar
CEDAW	The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Company
CPO	Central Planning Organization
DIAC	Dubai International Academic City
DNV	Dubai Knowledge Village
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
EU	European Union
FIFA	Federation of International Football Association
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSDP	General Secretariat for Development Planning
HBKU	Hamad Bin Khalifa University
HEI	Higher Education Institute
HMC	Hamad Medical Complex
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
isQua	International Society for Quality in Healthcare
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MMUP	Ministry of Municipalities and Urban Planning
MOE	Ministry of Education

MPH	Ministry of Public Health
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHA	National Health Authority
NHIC	National Health Insurance Company
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
PBM	Pharmaceutical Benefit Management
PDP	Physical Development Plan
PDQL	Petroleum Development Qatar Limited
PSE	Post-Secondary Education
QCB	Qatar Central Bank
QCBDR	Qatar Central Bank Deposit Rate
QCHP	Qatar Council for Healthcare Practitioners
QF	Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community
QHFMP	Qatar Healthcare Facilities Master Plan
QIA	Qatar Investment Authority
QIF	Qatar Investment Fund
QMA	Qatar Monetary Agency
QNDS	Qatar National Development Strategy
QNFSP	Qatar National Food Security Program
QNMHS	Qatar National Mental Health Strategy
QNV 2030	Qatar National Vision 2030
QP	Qatar Petroleum
QR	Qatari Riyal
QU	Qatar University
SCH	Supreme Council of Health
SEC	Supreme Council on Education
SWF	Sovereign Wealth Fund
THE	Total Healthcare Expenditure
UAE	United Arab Emirates
WECG	World's Economic Center of Gravity
WEF	Water Energy Food
WGI	World Governance Indicators
WHO	World Health Organization
ZLB	Zero Lower Bound

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CHAPTER 1

Policy-Making in a Transformative State: The Case of Qatar

M. Evren Tok, Lolwah R.M. Alkhater, and Leslie A. Pal

Qatar, a tiny sheikhdom on the Gulf, has drawn—often deliberately—international interest far out of proportion to its size, in part because of its intriguing contradictions. With a national citizenry of only around 300,000 out of a total population of 2.3 million (most of whom are foreign workers), it has the world's highest per capita GDP, the third largest reserves of natural gas, and is the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Despite its hydrocarbon wealth, it has a national vision to transform the country into a knowledge economy by 2030, and it has engaged in projects, partnerships, and events that reach far beyond natural gas exports. Qatar bid (unsuccessfully) for both the 2016 and the 2020 Summer Olympics, and it bid for and won the FIFA World Cup for 2022. FIFA and economic diversification are behind an estimated $220 billion infrastructure investment program that has made Doha, the capital city, a giant construction zone. Under its brand as a Western ally, Qatar has become

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home to the forward headquarters of the U.S. Central Command, as well as several American military bases, including the largest prepositioning base outside the continental United States (Blanchard 2014). And yet, with approximately 12,000 personnel, Qatar's armed forces are the second smallest in the Middle East, just slightly ahead of Bahrain. At the same time, it has been a significant supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region after the Arab Spring.

Qatar's first modern boys school was opened in 1948 (Al-Kobaisi 1979), but it now has an "Education City" that hosts branches of Texas A&M University, Weill Cornell Medical College, Carnegie Mellon University, Northwestern University, and HEC (Hautes Études Commerciale) Paris, among other institutions. Like its neighbor, Saudi Arabia, it practices the more conservative Wahhabist version of Sunni Islam, but women have greater freedoms, occupying some leadership positions in various government and non-governmental organizations. Doha is an unremitting construction zone, with sparkling office towers, modern hospitals, and sports arenas rising from the sand. In formal terms it is a constitutional monarchy, but in reality all key decisions are made by the ruling Al-Thani family. Parliamentary elections have been promised but repeatedly postponed, and political freedoms are carefully constrained. Nonetheless, Qatar evinces none of the instability that afflicts nearby Yemen or Bahrain. Despite being a hereditary sheikhdom, it ranks quite high on the standard governance indicators (e.g., the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators) and funds the largely independent news organization, Al Jazeera.

Qatar has been the object of analysis as part of studies of the Middle East and the Gulf (Davidson 2012, 2011; Kadhim 2013; Kamrava 2011; Nugée and Subacchi 2008; Peterson 1988; Potter 2009), and as a focus of study in itself (Crystal 1995; Fromherz 2012; Gray 2013; Kamrava 2013c; Mitchell 2013). This prevailing work on Qatar has relied on two broad lenses. We discuss them in more detail below, but for the moment, they can be summarized simply as the political economy of oil (including its economic and political effects) and international relations/regional studies. The two overlap of course, but the first focuses on the "resource curse" and "rentier state" effects of reliance on vast amounts of oil and gas, while the second is about the external push for power and security by an otherwise small state.

This book draws on these approaches, but its focus and contribution are different. We explore in detail how public policy is made in Qatar, within the context of what we will call a *transformative* state. If we simply assume

that Qatar is an autocracy, ruled completely by the Al-Thani family, the answer to the policy-making question is also quite simple: policy is what the Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani says it is. As the chapters in this book will show, the real answer is more complicated, and indeed other analysts have tried to come to grips with the nuances of the Qatari reality by using qualified descriptions of the system such as "late rentier," "pluralized autocracy," "tribal democracy," or "soft authoritarian." Most importantly, for our analysis, Qatar is deliberately engaged in a rapid process of societal transformation. That process has its contradictions and tensions, particularly with regards to achieving a balance between Islam, social traditions, and modernity. But it also has a specific policy dynamic of generating ideas and institutions, developing policy and program designs, and implementation and coordination.

In grappling with this, it is important to understand the starting point. Qatar became independent in 1971, after being a British protectorate since 1916. On the economic side, its key reservoir of natural gas, the North Field, was only discovered in 1971 and then took 20 years to develop, with the first export of LNG to Japan in 1997. As an oil producer, Qatar had been a minor player. Its unprecedented gas revenues began to build only in the mid-2000s, and even then Qatar had to make strategic decisions on other gas liquids development, creation of production facilities, and shipping capacity and markets. On the governmental side, its first ministry—the Ministry of Education—was founded in 1957, and a recognizable ministerial structure of government only emerged in the 1960s. Its current constitution came into force in 2005. In short—and we could multiply the examples—the economic, social, and political development of Qatar has been extraordinarily rapid, gathering intensity since the 2000s, once significant LNG revenues began to roll in. Managing that development is a major challenge.

The Qatar National Vision 2030, published in 2008, has the goal of "transforming Qatar into an advanced country by 2030." Fostering achievements in health, education, transportation, and other services, as well as expanding and transforming the economy, requires drawing on the most advanced ideas and human resources and transferring and adapting those ideas (and sometimes the people who have them). It requires designing policies and programs and then developing the institutional mechanisms and processes of implementation. And when that transformation is occurring in all sectors simultaneously, it also requires macro-policy and program oversight and strategic direction. Getting these governance institutions right is no easy task, even with almost limitless financial

resources: "The reality was that it was taking much longer to develop the institutions and administrative capacities of a modern state than it had taken to build an internationally competitive hydrocarbon industry" (Ibrahim & Harrigan 2012: 3).

In other words, this book is less about "tiny state vs. big ambitions" or "autocracy vs. democracy" than it is about the state's capacity to design and implement a comprehensive, rapid transformation and transition to an advanced state and society. As such, each chapter of this book breaks new ground in exploring a key policy area, the specific policy institutions and processes that drive it, as well as preliminary results. Together, they provide a unique portrait of Qatar, with pointillist detail on issues and mechanisms of transformation, as well as the conflicts and tensions that accompany them.

A summary of the chapters follows below, but we first provide some background on Qatar for readers unfamiliar with it, as well as the key lenses that have been used to date to come to grips with this unusual country. In the book's conclusion, we will return to these themes and, in particular, to the "uniqueness" of Qatar. Is there anything that we can generally learn from Qatar about transformational policy-making ? Is it a pure case, a unique outlier, or does its experience have lessons for the region and other developing transforming states? With the plunge in 2015 of oil and gas prices, and a possible plateauing of those prices at around $50/barrel, how will Qatar handle the current and future costs of its transformation?

Historical Background

The modern history[1] of Qatar begins in 1868 with the resolution of hostilities between the tribes in Qatar and Bahrain. That resolution was in the form of a peace treaty brokered by the British, which recognized the Al-Thani family as the ruler of the Qatar peninsula. Ottoman interest in the region led to an agreement in 1876, giving the Qataris the protection of a small Ottoman garrison. The Ottomans, fearing British attack during World War I, withdrew the garrison in 1915, and in 1916 Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al-Thani signed a protectorate agreement with the British that lasted until Qatar's independence in 1971 (for the text of the 1868 and 1916 treaties, see Zahlan 1979). The immediate effect of the agreement was to affirm Al-Thani as the ruler of Qatar (Kéchichian 2008: 186), but it also gave the country an extended period of peace and stability, most importantly, as oil and gas began to be developed in the 1950s.

Up to the 1930s, the economy had revolved almost completely around pearls and some fishing. The Depression and the Japanese development of cultured pearls devastated the Qatari economy, leading to almost two decades of destitution. Oil exploration in the immediate region started in the 1920s, and the first Qatari production concession was signed in 1935 with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (which had had an exploration concession since 1926), which then formed the Petroleum Development Qatar Limited (PDQL) (Crystal 1995: 145–47). Oil was discovered in 1939, but large-scale production and export did not begin until 1949 (Kéchichian 2008: 189). It "came as a godsend and marked the beginning of the transformation from a tribal society to a recognizable political entity that would become increasingly modern" (Bahry 2013: 252).

The influx of foreign workers and the overnight creation of an oil extraction industry in what had been a sleepy, impoverished tribal society led to predictable turbulence. Frequent strikes led PDQL in 1955 to give preferential hiring to Qatari nationals, which was followed in 1956 by the proclamation by the Sheikh to regulate non-Qatari owned businesses, and ultimately, by a series of labor laws starting in the 1960s, the establishment of preferential hiring for Qataris (Crystal 1995: 145). Unrest was evident in the ruling family as well. Ruling families in the region are more like clans or tribes, with loose hierarchy and often unclear rules of succession. The Al-Thanis began to compete internally over economic resources generated by the boom in the 1950s, leading eventually to what Herb calls a "dynastic monarchy" in which most of the key positions of state are held by family members (Herb 1999: 109–26).

Even though, under the 1916 treaty, Qatar was a protectorate of Britain (along with the other "trucial states," the sheikhdoms that became the UAE along with Oman and Bahrain), the British had little political impact and even less interest in Qatar, believing that its oil reserves were insignificant. A succession crisis in 1948, coupled with dissension in the extended Al-Thani family over claims to oil revenues and allowances, was resolved when Ali bin Abdallah became Sheikh in 1949 and agreed to the appointment of a British Political Officer and Advisor to Qatar. The crisis gave the British the leverage to "impose advisors and set in place an administrative structure" on what was virtually a bureaucratic "blank slate" (Crystal 1995: 121). A police force, infrastructure, and social services were gradually built during the 1950s.

Another succession crisis occurred in 1960, again largely because of internecine family struggles over revenue distribution, and Ali abdicated

in favor of his son, Ahmad. This violated the 1949 succession agreement that had stated that Khalifa bin Hamad, Ali's nephew, would be Heir Apparent. Ahmad faced the regime's most severe test to date in 1963, with an uprising by a "National Unity Front" consisting of oil workers (who called a strike), disgruntled family members, and Arab nationalists. The uprising was put down, but Ahmad was himself overthrown by Khalifa in a peaceful coup in 1972, shortly after the country became independent in 1971. Khalifa launched a series of major budgetary and social policy reforms that "poured large amounts of money into education, health care, and other programs that would benefit the less wealthy Qatari" (Crystal 1995: 157). He also launched economic diversification initiatives (e.g., fertilizers and steel production) that largely failed (Nafi 1983), though the development of gas reserves and LNG export was later to become the backbone of Qatar's immense wealth. The state government structure was streamlined with independence, going from thirty-three departments to ten ministries, and Khalifa put members of his side of the family in charge. Writing in 1995, Crystal's judgment was that the result was state expansion (with government employment being essentially a form of welfare) and a "nearly uncontrolled bureaucracy."

In 1995, Khalifa was in turn deposed by his son, now The Father Emir His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani and at the time the Heir Apparent. The chapters in this book explore different aspects of policy development under Hamad, but his signature contributions to Qatar's policy landscape have been limited liberalization and democratization, constitutional reform, and the Qatar National Vision to transform Qatar into a knowledge economy by 2030. Hamad has been called "perhaps the country's most energetic and transformative leader" (Kamrava 2013c: 105) and the most astute in managing the intra-familial disputes that have afflicted all of the Gulf monarchies (Herb 1999: 109–26). In 2013, Hamad abdicated in favor of his son Tamim, the Heir Apparent. This was surprising not only because it was the first normalized succession after two coups, but because Hamad was relatively young at 61, and Tamim was only 33. The Gulf monarchial pattern is closer to the octogenarian model of Saudi Arabia, which underwent its own succession in 2015 from King Abdullah to his "younger" half-brother, King Salman, who was 79 at time. It is also known for more turbulent and unpredictable successions, to which Qatar itself had been prey.

Contemporary Context and Constitution

This section provides some basic facts and figures about Qatar that will set the context for more detailed treatments in subsequent chapters. A key point for readers unfamiliar with the Gulf is that the states in the region vary significantly, and sometimes dramatically. The six Gulf monarchies have distinct historical trajectories, institutions, and demographic and resource mixes, and to treat them simply as monochromatic monarchies is misleading. One key distinction, for example, is in the distribution and extent of oil and gas reserves (Krane 2013). Qatar is not even an oil state in the strict sense any longer, since it has carved out its niche in LNG. Though all the states are Islamic, the mix of Sunni and Shi'a varies, with Qatar and Saudi Arabia being largely Sunni (the more conservative, Wahhabist version). Yemen has a significant Shi'a minority, while Bahrain has a majority Shi'a population with a Sunni monarchy. At the same time, many countries in the region do share similar challenges—food and water security, sizeable expatriate workforces, rapidly growing populations, geopolitical tensions, and conflicts in the region. Qatar therefore has both unique characteristics as well as ones that it shares with other Gulf states.

The population in early 2016 was 2.3 million, with a severe imbalance of 75 % male, though that is completely an artifact of the largely male expatriate labor force. As a measure of the rocketing growth of the population, in 2010 the census counted only 1,670,389, with a 33 % increase in only four years. If we go back further in time, the pace of population change is even more striking. In 1940, after the Depression and the collapse of the pearl fishery, the entire population of Qatar was estimated at 16,000. In the 1930s, there might have been only one South Asian expat living in Doha, a barber from Balushistan (Fromherz 2012: 11).

Qatar's constitution, which became law in 2004, was ratified in a referendum in 2003; however, there were only 150,000 "nationals" (citizens), and of those only 71,400 were eligible to vote (Kamrava 2013c: 124). It has also had five elections (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015) to the Central Municipal Council (29 members). The 2011 elections had 35,000 eligible voters. Uniquely for the Gulf, women were permitted to vote as well (Lambert 2011). The most recent election was held on May 13, 2015. Of the 29 seats, three were filled by acclamation, and so 26 were contested. Five women ran, and two were elected for the Council's fifth term, 2015–2019. This time, however, there were only 21,014 registered voters, of which only 14,509 voted.

The Constitution declares that Qatar's "religion is Islam and Shari'a law shall be a main source of its legislations (sic). Its political system is democratic" (Art. 1). It is notable that the document refers to Shari'a as "a" source, and not "the" source—a change that was made from the provisional draft to the one voted in the referendum. Another key feature is a clause on succession, given the trouble that it had caused in Qatari history and that of other Gulf monarchies (Kéchichian 2008). Article 8 states: "The rule of the State is hereditary in the family of Al-Thani and in the line of the male descendants of Hamad Bin Khalifa Bin Hamad Bin Abdullah Bin Jassim. The rule shall be inherited by the son named as Heir Apparent by the Emir. In the case that there is no such son, the prerogatives of rule shall pass to the member of the family named by the Emir as Heir Apparent." Supporting this article is one that establishes a "Council of the Ruling Family" (Art. 14), which, upon the demise or incapacity of the Emir, meets to declare the vacancy and the Heir Apparent as Emir. This concentration of the "rule of the State" in the Al-Thani family has its ambiguous complements in article 59, which states that the "people are the source of power," and in article 60, which states that the system of government is "based on the separation of powers."

Executive authority is vested in the Emir (Art. 62), and he is the head of state (Art. 64), the Commander in Chief (Art. 65), and the representative of the state in international affairs (Art. 66). His list of powers (Art. 67) includes setting the policy agenda for the Council of Ministers, ratifying legislation, presiding over the Council of Ministers, appointing and terminating the service of civil servants and military personnel, and establishing the organization of government (ministries and other bodies). He can declare martial law (Art. 69), and in exceptional cases issue decrees that have the force of law (Art. 70). The Prime Minister is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Emir (Art. 72). Ministers in the Council of Ministers are nominated by the Prime Minister but appointed by the Emir (Art. 73). They do not necessarily have to sit in the legislature, but they are accountable to it (Art. 111). The list of powers of the Council of Ministers (Art. 121) includes the usual cabinet functions: proposal of draft laws and decrees to the legislature, proposals on the organization of government and the financial and administrative system in the government, budgets, and oversight of international relations. However, members of the Council are collectively and individually "responsible before the Emir" (Art. 123).[2] When the new Emir announced his cabinet on June 26, 2013, it consisted of 20 ministers. One was a woman (the third

in Qatari history). The Prime Minister and Interior Minister was, and remains, Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa Al-Thani.

The legislative authority in Qatar is the Shura Council Council (Art. 76). It is to consist of 45 members, 30 of whom are to be elected and 15 to be appointed by the Emir. Elections to the legislature are to be established in law, but they have been postponed repeatedly. The Council is to be elected for four-year terms, though the Emir has the power to dissolve it and call new elections (Art. 104). Article 106 has a double veto provision: the Emir may veto draft legislation and return it, but if passed by two-thirds of the Council, he must ratify and promulgate it. However, he may nonetheless, even with a two-thirds vote, indefinitely suspend the legislation for the "higher interests of the country."

The amending procedure may be launched by the Emir or one-third of the Shura Council, and if accepted by a majority of the Council, it can be passed after debate by a two-thirds vote. The Emir, however, must approve of the amendment for it to go into force, and moreover, amendments cannot be made to the constitutional provisions on the rule of state, inheritance, or the functions of the Emir. It is not clear whether this is pertinent to the amendment procedure, but the Emir also has the right (Art. 75) to "seek public opinion" through referenda.

Western constitutions and constitutional law are today overwhelmingly viewed through the prism of human or individual rights. The Qatar Constitution refers (in its English translation) to "rights" twenty times, but the substantive list of rights (or protections, even if the term "rights" is not used) are found in Part 3: Public Rights and Duties. The key provisions that would be expected in a modern constitution are all there: equality of citizens in rights and duties (Art. 34); equality of "all persons" before the law and without discrimination "whatsoever" on "grounds of sex, race, language or religion" (Art. 35); protection against unlawful arrest or detention (Art. 36); protection of privacy (Art. 37); the right to elect and be elected (Art. 42); the right of assembly (Art. 44) and of association (Art. 45); freedom of expression (Art. 48); freedom of religion (Art. 50).

However, in all important cases, these rights are constitutionally qualified by the phrase "in accordance with the conditions and circumstances set forth in law." To take freedom of the press as an example, the 1979 law on Publications and Publishing requires all press publications to have a license, makes it a criminal offense to criticize the personality of the Emir,[3] or any material that could "endanger the internal and external

Date	Event
1868	The British broker a peace treaty between Qatari and Bahrain rulers that recognizes Sheikh Muhammed bin Al-Thani as the legitimate ruler of Qatar.
1871	Sheikh Jassim bin Muhammed Al-Thani signs an agreement with the Ottomans, who place a small garrison in Doha.
1915	Ottomans leave Qatar, fearing attack by the British during World War I.
1916	Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al-Thani signs protectorate agreement with the British. This lasted until independence in 1971.
1928	First official court (as opposed to simply the Sheikh holding hearings) established – Islamic Law Court.
1935	First concession signed with Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which then formed the Petroleum Qatar Development Limited
1946	First hospital established – Rumailah – headed by British doctor
1949	Arrival of a British officer who was to organize security and police. Followed by the arrival of a British "advisor" to the Sheikh, who helped establish departments (police, customs, land registry, water, electricity, postal service.
1949	First boy's (1949) school established. Led to creation in 1957 of a

Fig. 1.1 Qatar Time Line

1955 1957	Ministry of Education. This was the first ministry in the history of Qatar. This was followed in the 1960s by the development of other ministries.
1963	Uprising and demonstration by "United National Front" – Qatari nationalists and Baathists.
1964	Sheikh Ahmad Al-Thani establishes an unelected Advisory Council (*Majlis al-Shura*), representing different branches of the ruling family.
1970	First constitution introduced – the "Basic Law." It established a cabinet, with the Crown Prince as Prime Minister.
3 September 1971	The British protectorate ends, and Qatar becomes independent country.
22 February 1972	Sheikh Khalifa Al-Thani stages bloodless coup over his uncle, Sheikh Ahmad, who had ruled since the abdication of his father Ali in 1960.
1976	Oil industry nationalized and brought under the Qatar National Petroleum Company.
27 June 1995	Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani stages bloodless coup over his father, Sheikh Khalifa. Launches a major series of reforms.
1995	Establishing Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development followed by opening the Education City branch campuses of world-class universities like Weil Cornell, Carnegie Mellon and many others mainly between 2001 and 2005, although VCU Qatar was established much earlier in 1998, while both HEC-Paris and UCL

(*continued*)

	branch campuses were founded later in 2011. Qatar Foundation also hosts many other research- and education-related institutions such as Qatar National Library and Qatar National Research Fund, the main research catalyst in the country, and community development initiatives such as Awsaj Academy for kids with learning challenges, and cultural initiatives such as Qatar Philharmonic Orchestra.
February 1996	Sheikh Khalifa (the father of Sheikh Hamad) fails in a counter-coup to take back the government. Turned back.
16 November 1998	Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani announces that he would like a new constitution to replace the "temporary" one, with an elected Parliament of men and women. Appoints a 32-member committee to draft new constitution. Presented in 2002, voted on in referendum in 2003, signed by Emir in 2004 and proclaimed in 2005.
1998	Establishing the Supreme Council for Family Affairs as the first Supreme Council in Qatar. This institution is unique in two ways; it is the first specialized institution with a mandate to design family policies, and it is the first entity outside the traditional bureaucratic setting (i.e. not a member of the Council of Ministers, yet reports directly to the Emir) to have policy-making authority. This authority was reinforced by the fact that it was headed by the current Emir Shaikh Tamim (then the Heir Apparent) with the Father Emir's (then the Emir) wife Shaikha Moza bint Nasser as his deputy. This arrangement aimed to get around

(*continued*)

	the old bureaucracy with a more effective organization. The idea was replicated later on in many other sectors like Education, Health, ICT, Economy and the Judiciary system, but each of these Supreme Councils went through a different trajectory.
8 March 1999	First elections held for municipal government council where both men and women could vote and run. First time in GCC. No women elected. Council elections were held again in 2003 and 2007
2003	Referendum on new constitution
2003	RAND establishes an office in Qatar in partnership with Qatar
	Foundation to play a significant role in advising on many policies. RAND-Qatar Policy Institute was closed down in 2013
2004	Introduction of new "independent schools" based on RAND advice ("Education for a New Era")
June 2005	New constitution takes effect, though with the important absence of the elected Shura Council
2008	Supreme Constitutional Court appointed.
1 November 2011	Sheikh Hamad announces first general election to be held in 2013. Postponed.
25 June 2013	Sheikh Tamim becomes Emir after the abdication of his father, Sheikh Hamad.

security of the State," be "prejudicial to the heads of states or disruptive to the bilateral relationships with Sister Arab and friendly countries," contain any "ridicule of or contempt toward any of the religions or their doctrines" or materials "prejudicial to ethics," and finally, and most comprehensively, any "material which the Minister of Information requests the editor-in-chief or proprietor of the press publication not be published." Another example is freedom of association. The 2004 Law on Private Associations and Foundations requires all such organizations to be registered by the Ministry of Social Affairs, in itself not unusual since even the most democratic countries require some regulation of charities, foundations, and professional associations, but the law also bans political parties and trade unions (Law No. 12, 2004, on Organizing Associations, and Private Organizations). It is also important to recognize that laws and rights apply differently to nationals (citizens) and foreigners. According to the Nationality Law (Law No. 38, 2005, On the Acquisition of Qatari Nationality), a Qatari national is someone who was a resident in the country as of 1930 or has descendants traced through the father that were residents. Qatari citizenship is defined restrictively and narrowly, due to the huge proportion of expats in the population and to the extraordinary benefits that come with Qatari citizenship (Babar 2014).

Legislation routinely distinguishes between nationals and foreigners, most notoriously in the *kafala* or sponsorship system, used throughout the Gulf states, whereby employers are responsible for the visa and legal status of their workers, including the granting of exit visas should they wish to leave the country (for a particularly personalized portrait of the system, see Beydoun and Baum 2012).

Unsurprisingly, in light of these constitutional provisions, assessments of governance in Qatar have been critical, though somewhat mixed (Rosman-Stollman 2009; also see Chapter 2 for more detail). Freedom House rates Qatar as "unfree." The World Bank, on the other hand, in its Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), measures governance on six dimensions (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption). Figure 1.2 shows that Qatar ranks, as we would expect, low on the first, but well above the sixtieth percentile on the others. In comparison with the MENA region, Fig. 1.3 shows a dramatic superiority on all dimensions except voice and accountability. But even here, by the standards of the region, there have been limited elections, a relatively benign and light-handed security apparatus, relatively free access to international