

The Carter Administration & the Fall of Iran's Pahlavi Dynasty

US-Iran Relations on the Brink of the 1979 Revolution

JAVIER GIL GUERRERO

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Javier Gil Guerrero

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THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE FALL OF IRAN'S PAHLAVI DYNASTY

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To my parents, sisters, and brothers

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Contents

List of Tables ix

Abbreviations Used in Citations xi

American, British, and Iranian Actors xiii

Introduction xvii

Acknowledgments xxvii

1 Between Idealism and Realism: Carter's Foreign Policy 1

2 A Failed Atatürk: The Shah and Iran in 1977 13

3 Human Rights and Arms Exports 31

4 Weeping and Toasting 49

5 Khomeini's Shadow 59

6 The Match and the Wood: The Road to Revolution 71

7 The Revolution 95

8 Losing the Initiative: The Paralysis in Washington and Tehran 113

9 Thinking the Unthinkable 133

10 End of an Era: The Triumph of the Revolution 159

Epilogue 189

Notes 199

Sources and Bibliography 245

Index 253

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List of Tables

3.1	Iranian Military Equipment Purchased upon Carter's Arrival	41
3.2	United States Military Assistance to Iran	43
3.3	US Defense Department Personnel in Iran as of May 31, 1977	44
9.1	Dependence on Iranian Oil in 1978	135

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Abbreviations Used in Citations

ADST	Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
AFPBD	American Foreign Policy Basic Documents
CMES	Center for Middle Eastern Studies
CREST	CIA Records Search Tool
DNSA	Digital National Security Archive
DSB	Department of State Bulletin
DUSED	Documents from the US Espionage Den
FAOHP	Foreign Affairs Oral History Project
FIS	Foundation for Iranian Studies
IOHP	Iranian Oral History Project
JCPL	Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum
MHSL	Minnesota Historical Society Library
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
OHIC	Oral History Collection
PPJC	Public Papers of Jimmy Carter

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American, British, and Iranian Actors

Americans

David Aaron, Deputy National Security Advisor to the President (1977–1981)
Alfred Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs (1974–78)
Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury (1977–79)
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense (1977–81)
Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to the President (1977–81)
Jimmy Carter, President of the United States (1977–81)
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State (1977–81)
Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights (1977–81)
Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary of Defense (1977–81)
Philip Gast, Chief of the Military Assistance Group in Iran (1977–79)
Richard Helms, US Ambassador to Iran (1973–1977)
Robert Huyser, Special Military Envoy to Iran (1979)
Hamilton Jordan, President's Advisor and Chief of Staff (1979–80)
George Lambrakis, Political Counselor, US Embassy Tehran (1976–79)
David McGaffey, US Consul General in Isfahan (1978–79)
Michael Metrinko, US Consul General in Tabriz (1976–79)
Jack Miklos, Deputy Chief of Mission in Tehran (1974–78)
Walter Mondale, Vice President of the United States (1977–81)
Charles Naas, Deputy Chief of Mission (1978–80)
David Newsom, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (1978–81)
Henry Precht, State Department's Iran Desk Officer (1978–79)
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs (1978–81)
James Schlesinger, Secretary of Energy (1977–79)

Richard Secord, Air Force Chief of the Military Assistance Group in Iran (1977–78)
Gary Sick, National Security Council Staffer, Iran Specialist (1977–1981)
William H. Sullivan, US Ambassador to Iran (1977–80)
Victor Tomseth, US Consul General in Shiraz (1976–79)
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA (1977–81)
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State (1977–80)

BRITISH

Desmond Harney, Morgan Grenfell's representative in Iran (1974–79)
Anthony Parsons, British Ambassador to Iran (1974–79)

IRANIANS

(Royalists)

Amir Khosrow Afshar, Foreign Minister (1978–79)
Asadollah Alam, Royal Court Minister (1967–77)
Ali Amini, Prime Minister of Iran (1961–62)
Jamshid Amouzegar, Prime Minister of Iran (1977–78)
Hushang Ansary, Director of the National Iranian Oil Company (1977–78)
Gholam Reza Azhari, Prime Minister of Iran (1978–79)
Shapour Bakhtiar, Prime Minister of Iran (1979)
Manucher Farmanfarmaian, Iranian Ambassador to Venezuela, 1972–1979
Manouchehr Ganji, Minister of Education (1976–78)
Abbas Gharabaghi, Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces (1979)
Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran (1965–77) and Royal Court Minister (1977–78)
Ehsan Naraghi, Iranian Sociologist
Gholam Ali Oveisi, Military Governor of Tehran (1978–79)
Farah Pahlavi, Empress of Iran (1967–79)
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran (1941–79)
Parviz C. Radji, Iranian Ambassador to the United Kingdom (1976–79)
Jafar Sharif-Emami, Prime Minister of Iran (1978)
Hassan Toufanian, Vice Minister of War (1975–78)
Ardeshir Zahedi, Iranian Ambassador to the United States (1973–79)

(Opposition)

Abbas Amir-Entezam, member of the National Front
Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Advisor to Khomeini in Paris
Mehdi Bazargan, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government (1979)
Mohammad Behesti, member of Khomeini's underground movement in Iran
Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, close aide to Khomeini during his exile in Paris
Ruhollah Khomeini, Supreme Leader of Iran (1979–89)
Nasser Minatchi, opposition leader
Hussein-Ali Montazeri, member of the dissidence, imprisoned 1974–78
Karim Sanjabi, General Secretary of the National Front
Ali Shariati, intellectual considered the ideologue of the Islamic Revolution
Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, leader of the moderate religious opposition
Mahmood Taleqani, Founder of Iran Freedom Movement and member of Khomeini's Revolutionary Council
Ibrahim Yazdi, Khomeini's spokesperson in Paris

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Introduction

During his stay at a New York hospital in 1979, former ambassador Richard Helms and his wife Cynthia paid their last visit to the defrocked Shah of Iran. With bitterness, the monarch kept asking them why the United States had abandoned him, asking, "Why did you want to destroy what we had?" He seemed certain that the Carter administration had played no minor role in his overthrow. He hinted on repeated occasions that the revolution had been the disastrous result of Carter's desire to replace the Pahlavi monarchy with a democratic government that would be more palatable to Washington. He wondered why Carter repeatedly reassured him of America's support if he didn't mean it. Confined to his hospital bed, depressed, and gravely ill, the Shah kept confronting them with the question, "Why did you do it?" The Helms' silence prompted him to respond with something that smacked of his sense of betrayal: "The real difficulty was caused by too precipitate liberalization," he mused. Carter pressured him, he thought, to establish a democratic republic in Iran in which the Shah would be stripped of most of his power. He complied and started with the liberalization reforms, but despite the resulting chaos and violence, Carter did not keep his word and ultimately abandoned him. "The changes were genuine on my part. But Iran is not ready for Western-style democracy."[1]

Few Americans had as much insight into Iranian affairs as Richard Helms, who had served as director of the CIA between 1966 and 1973 and as ambassador to Iran between 1973 and 1977. During those years, Helms carried out sensitive negotiations with the Shah that often bypassed the State Department and kept many Washington officials in the dark.[2]

Cynthia Helms's account of their last meeting with the Shah is no innocent or impartial recollection. Beginning with the Shah being forced into exile in January 1979 and especially after the hostage crisis that began on November 4, 1979, Washington officials, politicians, and policy makers became engulfed in a blame game about who lost Iran. Given his tenure as ambassador to Iran during the Nixon and

Ford presidencies, Helms, like many other officials from those administrations (first and foremost Henry Kissinger), was ready to blame Jimmy Carter. Following this narrative, the Carter administration, in line with the new and radical democratic majority in Congress, irresponsibly altered Washington's policy toward Tehran and shook the strategic alliance by continuously second-guessing the Shah and pressuring his regime on human rights, arms exports, and liberalization. At a time when the Shah most needed the United States to confront the rising unrest and opposition in Iran, Carter hesitated, offering confusing and weak support to the Shah. As the situation deteriorated, Carter's mixed signals and lack of a firm policy emboldened the Iranian opposition while undercutting the Shah's authority. The implicit conclusion of this narrative is that both President Nixon and President Ford would never have allowed mistrust to cloud relations between Washington and Tehran and would have decisively backed the Shah against revolutionary forces, preempting his ousting and the chaos that ensued.

Instead, Carter's policy toward the Shah's Iran underwent three different stages that further undermined America's interests in the country: (1) Carter tried first to reform the Shah's regime; (2) when those reforms helped unleash the Iranian opposition, Carter then tried to save the Shah; (3) when it became clear that the Shah would not survive, Carter then attempted to replace the Shah with a moderate government. Yet, the problem was that in all the three stages Carter repeatedly refused to commit the resources and determination necessary to achieve those goals. As Professor Simon Sefarty has explained, Carter's inability to make a firm decision "made the administration move from one worst option to another."[3]

The management of the Iranian crisis was doomed by a cavalcade of errors attributable to Carter's management style: excessive caution, improvisation, ambivalence, failure to pay undivided attention until it was too late, mistrust of American officials on the ground, and inability to reign among the disputes that plagued his cabinet. The result was the downfall of the Shah and an Iran that was no longer the bulwark of America's interests in the region or a reliable barrier to Soviet expansion.

The alternative narrative, which has gained strength in recent years with the publication of works like those of Andrew Scott Cooper, largely puts the blame on Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford while absolving Carter. Focusing on the behind-the-scenes deals between the Shah and the two republican administrations, this narrative hinges on the catastrophic results that massive arms exports to Iran had on oil prices, inflation, and, ultimately, the Iranian and American economies. The

premise is that the Shah, with Kissinger's reinforcement, tried to bite off more than he could chew in terms of weapons imports, resulting in devastating reverberations that undermined Iran's economic stability and created a breeding ground for shattered expectations and discontent among Iranians that were later exploited by the opposition.

This explanation basically argues that once the Nixon Doctrine was established and it became imperative to arm the Shah so that he could act as the policeman of the Persian Gulf on behalf of the United States, Iran was flooded with costly American-made weapons. The Nixon Doctrine's Twin Pillars Policy was based on the notion that Iran and Saudi Arabia had to guarantee the stability of the Persian Gulf and the free flow of oil while putting Soviet aggression at bay. If Iran played the role of policeman in the Gulf, the United States would be spared from significant military involvement in the region. Under Nixon and Kissinger's guidance, the Shah was effectively given carte blanche to build an army that fulfilled the role America envisioned for Iran in the Gulf.

Iran was soon accused of buying unreasonable quantities of military hardware that did not respond to the country's needs. But Kissinger defended the Shah's avid consumption and even encouraged it, following the rationale that it would help the American arms industry at a time when the United States was cutting its military budget. Moreover, Kissinger presented the military sales program as a positive process in the American balance of payments vis-à-vis Iran. Kissinger gave the rationale that, with the large amounts of oil that the United States imported from Iran, the export of weapons to Iran could recycle those dollars and balance trade between the two countries. Yet, in order to pay for Iran's ever-growing appetite for arms purchases, the Shah felt compelled in time to press for price increases in the oil market, putting him at odds with Washington. Meanwhile, emboldened by the Nixon and Ford administrations, the American arms industries and the Pentagon kept raising the price of the weapons and systems.

A vicious cycle unfolded in which Washington and Tehran traded accusations of overcharging and mischief. Finally, with the American economy suffering from rising oil prices and bitterly resented by the Shah because of his hawkish attitude on the issue, the Ford administration decided to punish Iran by tacitly agreeing with Saudi Arabia to boost its oil production, flooding the market and driving down prices. This came after the reshuffle of Ford's cabinet (which resulted in a weakened position for Kissinger and a stronger position for Treasury Secretary William E. Simon, who as fiercely opposed to the Shah's policies and Kissinger's dealings with him). As a result, Iran

lost billions of dollars in oil revenue, forcing Tehran to rely on loans and carry out deep spending cuts.[4] Oil prices were key to the Pahlavi monarchy's stability and the mix of continued inflation, dwindling oil revenues, and higher unemployment created a perfect storm that paralyzed Iran's economy.

It is often overlooked, however, that, even without the economic crisis, the Shah was already in trouble. Indeed, his modernization policies clashed with the most conservative elements of Iranian society and his lack of political reform upset reformist Iranians, regardless of whether or not they stood to benefit from an economic boom. As Richard Helms predicted in 1975, the conflict between "rapid economic growth and modernization vis-à-vis a still autocratic rule" was a source of distress and uncertainty regarding Iran's stability and future. He foresaw, given unanimous historical precedents, that the Shah would be forced to either loosen his grip on power or face growing unrest.[5]

Ford's slap in the Shah's face did not only curb his hawkish posture and ambitions, as Washington hoped, but effectively crippled his regime with devastating effects. "At home we claim to have brought Iran to the verge of a Great Civilization," as Court Minister Asadollah Alam lamented, "yet the country is constantly hit by power cuts and we can't even guarantee water and power supplies in the capital."[6] While Alam blamed those problems on the government's incompetence, which was led by his rival Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, Iranians increasingly pointed to the government's incompetence and corruption, as well as to that of the Shah. The monarchy began to be questioned and the consequences were dire. The Shah's lack of political reform and the concentration of power in his figure led many liberals and moderate Iranians, who might otherwise have rallied to support him, to embrace the opposition and, ultimately, Khomeini. By 1977, the Shah became a discredited dictator detached from his people and a pawn in American interests. This narrative concluded with Carter largely inheriting the situation, and there was little he could do to reverse the damage done by Ford's realignment with Saudi Arabia and the machinery of arms exports set in motion by Nixon. By the time Carter came to office, the mechanism that ultimately brought the Shah down was already set in motion and he did not have the time or means to correct it.

This *democratic* narrative, as opposed to the *republican* one, largely casts Jimmy Carter as having had a secondary role in the Iranian revolutionary process that culminated during his presidency. Carter is portrayed as an unaware victim of mischievous dealings that took place

during previous administrations. While the importance of the Nixon Doctrine has been well documented, including its poor management of relations with Iran, which resulted in an unacceptable inflationary and economic burden due to arms imports and risky gambles with oil prices, Carter's importance cannot be completely dismissed. If Ford's dealings with Saudi authorities on oil exports severely compromised the Shah's stance, Carter's actions finished the job. The Shah was still standing after Ford's economic slight, but he could barely stand up after Carter's political slight. Only by taking into account the combination of both of these slights can the revolutionary process be satisfactorily explained (Iranian domestic, political, and religious developments aside). Whereas historians have made use of newly declassified documents to delve into the Nixon and Ford period, the part that corresponds to Carter has not been reevaluated. The aim of this book is to follow up on recent studies regarding Nixon's and Ford's presidencies and the Shah's Iran and provide an updated, documented, and balanced account of the Carter administration's foreign policy and the Shah's Iran.

What role did Carter play in the Shah's downfall? To his credit, Carter, and many officials in Washington, was mostly unaware of the devastating effects that the Saudis had in flooding the oil markets and the burden that military sales represented in Iran. While many recognized that Iran was going through a period of economic turbulence, nobody foresaw the extent of the crisis and its political ramifications. Thus, the pressure that the Carter administration put on the Shah regarding human rights and political liberalization was based on a mistaken assessment of Iran's stability. Most likely, had the Carter administration been fully aware of Iran's troubles (including the Shah's deteriorating medical condition), that pressure would have been milder and more restrained.

In the midst of the economic and political crisis, Jimmy Carter's role constituted a new factor that altered the course of events. As Professor Milani observed, Carter's "candidacy, his human rights policy, his occasional acerbic comments as a candidate about the Shah's undemocratic rule, and the growing Western media coverage of torture and censorship in Iran suddenly invigorated the long-dormant Iranian opposition."[7] As Alam cautioned the Shah, Carter could turn out to be "an even greater ass" than President Ford, whom they blamed for Iran's economic malaise.[8]

"Who knows what sort of calamity he may unleash on the world," lamented Alam, "He's no more than an ignorant peasant boy."[9] As time passed, the Shah grew convinced that Carter might prove to have

"Kennedy-type pretentions" and force him into more liberalization. A President Carter would mean more pressure to reform and accountability.[10] With this deep-rooted assumption in mind, the Shah did not hesitate to tell his advisors on repeated occasions that he rather preferred to see Ford reelected.[11]

Iranian diplomats and government officials, in addition to the opposition, watched the election and the presidential debates closely; any mention of Iran in the debates drew their attention and prompted many interpretations.[12] This obsession with the United States and its next president was related to the magnified sense that many Iranians had of America's impact in their country. After the coup that deposed Prime Minister Mosaddeq in 1953, many thought of Washington as the man behind the curtain (in fact, the Shah was often dubbed "the American king" by the opposition). In the Iranian imaginary, there was nothing America could not do or undo in Iran. Many Iranians did not doubt Khomeini's 1977 claim that the United States had developed a secret plan to establish American colonies on the outskirts of major Iranian cities.[13]

The Iranian political calculus disproportionately reacted to the possibility that the Carter administration had doubts about the Shah or felt uncomfortable with him. The idea that the United States had somehow abandoned the Shah made him vulnerable while emboldening the opposition. Iranian's scrutinized American diplomats and interpreted any misstep as a new sign of Carter's displeasure with the Shah.[14] In truth, Carter wanted the Shah not only to fight communism and secure oil shipping routes through the Persian Gulf, but also to fight poverty, injustice, and inequality in Iran. Otherwise, the Carter administration thought that the Shah would never secure a strong and stable rule in Iran and the United States would be accused of supporting a ruthless dictator. In order to avoid shortsighted policy that risked turning Iranians against the Shah and the United States, Carter pressed the Shah to liberalize in hopes that such measures would lead to a broadening of his popular support. Yet, Carter's policy was taken as a confirmation that Washington might not be ready to stand behind the Shah with force. The opposition believed that the moment represented a chance to confront the regime. Khomeini did not just ride the wave of economic crisis and political and religious discontent; rather, he also undoubtedly counted on the notion that Carter would fail to act decisively to save the Shah.

Trying to ingratiate himself with the newly elected Carter, the Shah took the first step and opened a process of liberalization that resulted in the release of political prisoners from jail and the loosening of his

grip on the opposition. With a push from Washington to pursue a liberalizing agenda and impelled by criticism of Iran's human rights record, the Shah allowed the opposition a degree of freedom of movement and expression not seen since the times of Mosaddeq. The fact that this happened at a time when discontent over catastrophic economic conditions was on the upswing only fueled the opposition's backing and leadership.

When the revolts started in January 1978, the Shah's response was puzzling and included violent suppression of demonstrations and imposition of curfews, combined with more political concessions. The Shah's appeasement initiatives failed to convince the opposition and his repressive measures fueled hatred toward the Shah. Waiting for Washington's guidance, the Shah was neither too soft nor too hard in his management of the crisis, but, as time passed, the Shah's options narrowed. Meanwhile, he received conflicting signals and messages from Washington,[15] which was due in part to a lack of coordination between the White House, the State Department, and Ambassador Sullivan, as well as to the lack of a coherent approach to the growing Iranian unrest. No policy received the unanimous backing of the different officials involved and leadership was lacking since Carter was obsessively focused on the Camp David negotiations. The White House did not pay serious attention to the deteriorating Iranian situation until it was too late. For many officials in Washington, especially in the State Department, no Iranian emergency existed until it became so acute that there was little room to maneuver.

But even when Carter finally addressed the mounting unrest in Iran, he failed to present the Shah with the reassurances he needed. Instead, at best, he offered ambiguous support of cracking down on the opposition and pressed him to proceed with the liberalization process. The Shah's vacillation and dissension inside the Carter administration proved to be a fatal combination. Ultimately, Khomeini's forces galvanized the opposition, sidelining its more moderate elements and rejecting any compromise with the regime. In the face of the Shah and Carter's paralysis, the Iranian opposition snowballed, growing steadily larger and more radical.

Like in 1953, the Shah proved to be a weak leader in the face of crisis; but this time, instead of President Eisenhower, he had to rely on the timorous stance of Carter, who, boxed in by his public condemnations of the CIA and covert operations abroad, was not ready to bail him out as Eisenhower had done before. Carter also knew too well that, after several scandals and the Vietnam War, Americans would not tolerate another foreign venture to save a regime they barely

identified with. Without Washington's explicit backing, the Shah did not want to carry out a violent suppression of the opposition. All he needed was the assurance that Carter would share the blame for his risky course and eventually intervene if things got out of control. Yet, Carter would have none of it, resulting in more half-hearted reforms and sporadic episodes of violence that only served to buy time and postpone the inevitable.

In the end, the Shah was not the only one who suffered from the revolutionary victory in Iran. In time, the country turned into an intractable source of problems for Carter, which severely undermined his chances of reelection. Khomeini's confrontational stance, the radical anti-Americanism of revolutionary Iran, and the hostage ordeal were all unexpected consequences of the Shah's downfall and proved too much to bear. "My political future," as Carter lamented before losing the election to Ronald Reagan, "might well be determined by irrational people on the other side of the world over whom I had no control."[16]

This book is a study of Carter's foreign policy, his personality, and that of the Shah, as well as other figures like Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ambassador William Sullivan, and Ayatollah Khomeini, among others. Although the focus is on the political and diplomatic aspect of the revolution, mainly from the Carter administration's point of view, considerable attention is devoted to religious, economic, and social factors. The Iranian chessboard in the months leading up to the revolution's triumph offers valuable insight into post-Vietnam foreign policy mechanisms in the United States, the sources of radical Islam, the struggle for democracy and accountable regimes in the Middle East, as well as America's inability to grasp the implications of the events unfolding in the region.

America's failure in Iran, the demise of the Shah's power, and the advent of a revolutionary regime not only altered Iran's path, but also that of the Middle East and American foreign policy. The Iranian Revolution combines several interrelated themes, including the struggle between secularists and Islamists, the breakup of an authoritarian regime and its people, and the revolt against Westernization and America's influence in the midst of the Cold War. Khomeini and his followers regarded their cause as both a struggle for Islam and a fight against imperialism. Accordingly, inspiration for the Iranian Revolution can be traced to both radical Islam and Marxist and anticolonial ideas, some of which were ironically borrowed from the same Western ideas they sought to combat.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran found broad support among Muslims in the region, and especially among young people, thanks

to its message that mixed faith, anti-imperialism, and social justice. The Iranian model provided an answer to the yearning for a third way in the Cold War that was neither capitalist nor communist. The Western colonial administrators were gone, but many Muslims still felt that they had to overthrow the local dictators that operated on the West's behalf and the Iranian Revolution was a catalyst for this sentiment. The overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of an Islamic republic eventually inspired a generation. As Professor Benjamin Barber noted, by siding against autocracy in Iran and fighting foreign imperialism, after 1977, the new Islamist wave developed a better record as enemies of despots in the Middle East than the secular Muslims that the West supported. Although the Islamists never created genuine democratic systems, their record against corrupt leaders and authoritarian systems has mostly remained intact.[17]

America's debacle in Iran and the geopolitical earthquake that brought down the Shah in favor of Khomeini's Islamic republic has driven world affairs in the region ever since 1979. Its reverberations can still be felt today, as America's longstanding enmity with revolutionary Iran continues and a policy of containment and covert operations remains in place. The Iranian Revolution heralded transformative sectarian wars, conflicts, and revolutions that transformed the region and the world. It helped revive the Sunni–Shia divide and altered the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. The Iranian Revolution is a tale of a loss, including the loss of America's main proxy agent in the region and the crumbling of the Nixon Doctrine. Since 1979, Washington has repeatedly tried to adapt and adjust to this fact with disastrous results more often than not.

Some recent books on Carter's role in the Iranian Revolution have been written with an eye on the present and used as a weapon against successive democratic administrations.[18] By underscoring and magnifying Carter's failures, these books try to indict a "liberal worldview" and serve as ammunition against Democrats in Washington's political feud. Certainly, recounting the events that led to the Shah's exile and Khomeini's triumphant return uncovers a tale of policy failure that still resonates with the policy dilemmas America faces in the Middle East. Yet, it is imperative, in the light of newly declassified documents, to provide a rigorous and impassioned retelling of those events without using them as a political tool for the present. This book is an attempt to provide a comprehensive, nonpartisan, and systematic research on the impact that Carter's policies had during the Iranian Revolution in light of recently available archival resources.

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Chapter 1

Between Idealism and Realism: Carter's Foreign Policy

Carter became president at a moment in America's history in which voters had lost much of their confidence in elected officials. It was also a time in which many Americans felt that the United States had reached its limits and that the power and welfare enjoyed in the previous decades had come to an end. There was little confidence in the things the future might bring. Carter shared the feeling that America lived in an age of limits and that détente was the best way to conduct relations with the Soviet Union.[1] Moscow could not be defeated, but rather must be contained.

Carter's worldview corresponded to one in which the United States could not pretend to be able to solve all problems and, in recognizing its limits, had to seek partnership from its allies in Europe, Latin America, and Asia to deal with world crises. Cooperation, he thought, was not just a pragmatic way to solve the problem of America's limits, but also a moral way to run foreign policy. One of Carter's main objectives was to show the world a different America and put an end to practices from the Nixon and Kissinger era.[2] Regarding the Cold War, Carter advocated that global confrontation had to be substituted with global interdependence, downplaying the rivalry between Moscow and Washington while focusing on problems that affected their mutual interests and that could be worked on together.[3] Zbigniew Brzezinski echoed Carter's intentions when he criticized Kissinger's style as "covert, manipulative, deceptive . . . more generally oriented toward preserving the status quo than reforming it."[4] For the newcomers at the State Department, the white whale they intended to