

War, Demobilization and Memory

The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions

Edited by

Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and
Michael Rowe



War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850

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War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850
Series Standing Order ISBN 978-0-230-54532-8 hardback
978-0-230-54533-5 paperback
(outside North America only)

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The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions

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Editorial matter, introduction and selection © Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Michael Rowe 2016

Individual chapters © Respective authors 2016

Cover © Moritz Daniel Oppenheim 2016

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2016 978–1–137–40648–4

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First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978-1-349-58038-5 ISBN 978-1-137-40649-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-40649-1

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Forrest, Alan. | Hagemann, Karen. | Rowe, Michael, 1970–

Title: War, demobilization and memory: the legacy of war in the era of Atlantic revolutions / Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, Michael Rowe.

Other titles: Legacy of war in the era of Atlantic revolutions

Description: New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, [2016] | Series: War, culture and society, 1750–1850 | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2015025958 | ISBN 9781137406484

Subjects: LCSH: Napoleonic Wars, 1800–1815. | Napoleonic Wars, 1800–1815—Influence. | Revolutions—History—18th century. | Revolutions—History—19th century.

Classification: LCC DC226.3 .F67 2016 | DDC 355.02/1809033—dc23

LC record available at <http://lccn.loc.gov/2015025958>

Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.

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Series Editors' Preface

The century from 1750 to 1850 was a seminal period of change, not just in Europe but across the globe. The political landscape was transformed by a series of revolutions fought in the name of liberty—most notably in the Americas and France, of course, but elsewhere, too: in Holland and Geneva during the eighteenth century and across much of mainland Europe by 1848. Nor was change confined to the European world. New ideas of freedom, equality and human rights were carried to the furthest outposts of empire, to Egypt, India and the Caribbean, which saw the creation in 1801 of the first black republic in Haiti, the former French colony of Saint-Domingue. And in the early part of the nineteenth century they continued to inspire anti-colonial and liberation movements throughout Central and Latin America.

If political and social institutions were transformed by revolution in these years, so, too, was warfare. During the quarter-century of the French Revolutionary Wars, in particular, Europe was faced with the prospect of 'total' war, on a scale unprecedented before the twentieth century. Military hardware, it is true, evolved only gradually, and battles were not necessarily any bloodier than they had been during the Seven Years War. But in other ways these can legitimately be described as the first modern wars, fought by mass armies mobilized by national and patriotic propaganda, leading to the displacement of millions of people throughout Europe and beyond, as soldiers, prisoners of war, civilians and refugees. For those who lived through the period these wars would be a formative experience that shaped the ambitions and the identities of a generation.

The aims of the series are necessarily ambitious. In its various volumes, whether single-authored monographs or themed collections, it seeks to extend the scope of more traditional historiography. It will study warfare during this formative century not just in Europe, but in the Americas, in colonial societies, and across the world. It will analyse the construction of identities and power relations by integrating the principal categories of difference, most notably class and religion, generation and gender, race and ethnicity. It will adopt a multi-faceted approach to the period, and turn to methods of political, cultural, social, military, and gender history, in order to develop a challenging and multidisciplinary analysis. Finally, it will examine elements of comparison and transfer and so tease out the complexities of regional, national and global history.

Rafe Blaufarb, Alan Forrest and Karen Hagemann

Preface and Acknowledgements

With the bicentenaries of several key events of the Wars of Revolution and Liberation between 1775 and 1830 just past or soon approaching, many questions about the legacy and memory of these conflicts remain unanswered. While the wars and revolutions of this period have been studied extensively within their own national or broader regional contexts, relatively little has been done to understand them within a trans-national framework. Even less do we know about the short-term aftermath and long-term legacy of these wars, the problems incurred in demobilization, or their often bitterly contested memories.

Bringing together thirty scholars of Europe, Russia, and North, Central, and South America—from five countries and a variety of institutions—the international conference on ‘War, Demobilization and Memory: The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions’, which took place in London from 30 May to 1 June 2013, revisited the Era of the Atlantic Revolutions. Among other issues, it explored the flow of ideas and material across the Atlantic during and after the wars and revolutions of the period, the cross-cultural dialogues that were created, the various attempts to come to terms with the violence and destruction wrought by warfare on an unprecedented scale, the impact of the demobilization that followed, and the contested memories of these conflicts.

Two years after the conference we are pleased to be able to present some of its findings as a volume of essays, and it is a timely moment to thank everybody who has contributed to this enterprise. First and foremost, thanks are due to the main sponsors of the conference: the Department of History and the Department of War Studies of King’s College London; the College of Arts & Sciences, the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense, the Department of History and the Institute for Arts and Humanities of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and the host of the conference, the UNC Winston House European Study Center in London. We must also thank the two doctoral students who helped us with the conference organization, at King’s College, Mark Edward Hay, and at UNC Chapel Hill, Gregory Mole, and all who took part in the conference, whether as paper presenters, commentators, moderators or participants in the general discussion. They all made an important contribution in helping the authors and editors to produce a more coherent book. Finally, we want to thank our authors for their cooperation in the rewriting of their papers. It has been a pleasure to work with them: indeed, this book can be seen as a shining example of transatlantic teamwork.

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Rafe Blaufarb holds the Ben Weider Eminent Scholar Chair and is Director of the Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution at Florida State University. His research interests are Revolutionary and Napoleonic France and Latin American Independence. His books include *The French Army, 1750–1820: Careers, Talent, Merit* (2002); and *Bonapartists in the Borderlands: French Refugees and Exiles on the Gulf Coast, 1815–1835* (2005). His current research is on property in the French Revolution, the transatlantic

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List of Abbreviations

AAE	Archives des Affaires étrangères, Paris (La Courneuve)
AB	<i>Amts-Blatt der königlich kurmärkischen Regierung</i>
ADBR	Archives Départementales du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg
ADG	Archives Départementales de la Gironde, Bordeaux
AGI	Archivo General de Indias, Seville
AHN	Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid
AHR	<i>American Historical Review</i>
AN	Archives Nationales, Paris (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine)
BN	<i>Berlinische Nachrichten</i>
CAOM	Centre des Archives d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence
CLS	Church of the Latter Day Saints Records, Utah
DB	<i>Deutsche Blätter</i>
DLAR	David Library of the American Revolution
GCR	Grenada Church Records
LRO	Liverpool Record Office
NCSR	The State Records of North Carolina
NHCS	New Hampshire State Archives, Concord, Folder, Loyatism Allegiance, Early Documents, General Court Records, Committee of Safety
NHPL	New Hampshire State Archives, Concord, NH, Petitions to the Legislature
NHSP	New Hampshire State Papers
ÖKA	Österreiches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Kriegsarchiv), Vienna
PSZ	<i>Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii</i>
RGVIA	Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, Moscow
RM	<i>Rheinischer Merkur</i>
SHD	Service Historique de la Défense, Paris (Vincennes)
SP	<i>Schlesisches Provinzialblatt</i>
SPZ	<i>Schlesische Privilegierte Zeitung</i>
SRG	State Registry of Grenada

SRO	Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich
StAHbg	Staatsarchiv Hamburg
StAL	Staatsarchiv Leipzig
TG	<i>Tageblatt der Geschichte</i>
TNA	The National Archives, London
TNA, ADM	The National Archives, London, Admiralty
TNA, AO	The National Archives, London, Audit Office
TNA, CUST	The National Archives, London, Customs
TNA, FO	The National Archives, London, Foreign Office
VZ	<i>Vossische Zeitung</i>
WD	The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington during His Various Campaigns
WSD	Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington, K. G.
ZFeW	<i>Zeitschrift für die elegante Welt</i>
ZVHG	<i>Zeitschrift des Verein für Hamburgische Geschichte</i>

Part I

Rethinking the Legacy of Conflict in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions

1

Introduction: War, Demobilization and Memory in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions

Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Michael Rowe

The picture that appears on the cover of this book, Moritz Daniel Oppenheim's *The Return of the Volunteer from the Wars of Liberation to his Family still living in Accordance with the Old Customs*, may seem a strange choice for a volume that purports to speak to war, demobilization and memory in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions—starting in the 1770s and ending in the 1830s. The German-Jewish painter Oppenheim, born in 1800 in the Hessian town of Hanau, was too young to volunteer for the Wars of 1813–1815, the final struggle to liberate Germany and Europe from Napoleonic rule. But in this painting, which dates from 1833–1834, Oppenheim invoked the memory of these wars. He referred to the participation of young Jewish volunteers in what he saw as a fight for liberation *and* liberty.¹ His painting portrays the return of one of these victorious fighters after demobilization to the warmth of his family. Like many other Jewish families that had allowed their sons to participate in these 'people's wars', they had hoped to become part of the German people as a result of their patriotic support for the war. The Jewish volunteers also expected to get equal citizenship rights after the wars—as was promised by kings and princes—because they had done their military duty as men and protected family, home and country.²

Though for us today the painting seems to have little that is revolutionary about it, for Oppenheim's contemporaries it clearly spoke to the national myths of the uprising of the German people against Napoleon and their struggle for liberation, liberty and national unity. The painting is especially interesting for our subject because it represents broken promises in a dual sense: both the hopes of the population at large for German unification and greater political liberty and the hopes of the Jewish community for their own emancipation were crushed in the period of postwar restoration. For both reasons, the painting seems to have enjoyed considerable popularity in its time, as the many reproductions indicate.³

Oppenheim, who was the first academically trained Jewish painter in Germany, did not create a heroic history painting in the traditional sense of the term. National governments commissioned paintings that focused on

events of high-political and military importance to hang in their national galleries and public buildings. Thus the US Capitol is decorated with John Trumbull's 1820 painting *Surrender of Lord Cornwallis*, commemorating a key moment of American pride in the Wars of Independence, and the Palace of Westminster with Daniel Maclise's 1861 painting of *The Meeting of Wellington and Blücher after the Battle of Waterloo*. Windsor Castle is endowed with an entire Chamber in memory of the battle and Allied military heroes, whilst the Winter Palace in Saint Petersburg boasts its Military Gallery containing the portraits of hundreds of generals who fought in the 'Patriotic War' of 1812. Napoleon, most famously, turned to the finest artists of the day—Jacques Louis David, Antoine-Jean Gros and Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres—to provide heroic images of his victories and portraits that would capture the imagination of a continent.⁴

Art remained a political weapon even after the guns fell silent, recording victories and emphasizing the martial qualities of nations. Almost unavoidably these were highly gendered images, highlighting the role of warriors and kings. Women were generally absent from such paintings, or were relegated to domestic scenes. Oppenheim's *The Return of the Volunteer* is very different, revealing subtly changing sensibilities about war and depicting soldiers and civilians, women as well as men, and people of every generation from the youngest to the oldest. It places emphasis on the idea of inclusion, on status that is related to ability and aspiration rather than to the old order of estates. It suggests the emergence of new nations bound together by the principle of citizenship, and equates that citizenship with the performance of military service.⁵ It has left the world of the eighteenth century far behind.

Oppenheim's painting was a product of Germany in the period of the *Vormärz*. Painted in the years after the July Revolution of 1830 in France and the German Hambach Festival of May 1832, where thousands had demonstrated for national unity and liberty at Hambach Castle in present-day Rhineland-Palatinate, it expresses universal aspirations, too. On the one hand it represents the hope for more political rights and equal citizenship as recognition of the military service that many soldiers, especially volunteers and militias, had shared during the Era of Atlantic Revolutions. On the other hand it embodies the desire of soldiers everywhere to return to their families and the relief of their loved-ones upon their homecoming. It was a moment that had kept men going in the midst of terrible deprivations, and only accentuated the plight of those who emerged from the conflict with nowhere to go to, whose families had been killed, whose homes had been destroyed, and whose prospects had been ruined in the fighting.

This close entanglement of the political, social and personal was true of all the conflicts during the Era of Atlantic Revolutions: wars about empire and global hegemony as well as wars of liberation and decolonization. During this era the Atlantic became a highway for exchange not only of peoples and commodities but also of ideas and cultural practices. Improving literacy and

the spread of the printed word meant that the public in both Europe and the Americas was made aware of events from across the ocean and the new ideas of fraternity, liberty and unity. For the new forms of mass struggle that characterize this era, patriotic-national propaganda attempted to mobilize soldiers and civilians, men and women, rich and poor, free and enslaved alike. This was most clearly seen in the American, French and Haitian Revolutions and in the Wars of Liberation in Spanish America.⁶

It is not the purpose of this volume to examine the processes of military, political and cultural mobilization for revolution and war—here many important studies have already been published.⁷ Instead, it focuses on the much less explored theme of the military, economic, political, social and cultural demobilization after these conflicts, not only by states but also by local communities and individuals, and examines the long-term legacy of these conflicts and their collective memories, because the transition from war to peace was a huge challenge for all the states and societies involved. In the following pages we will first reflect on the specific character of war and postwar in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions, and then discuss the agenda of the book in more detail and explore the different areas of demobilization and collective memory construction.

Rethinking war and postwar

The decades between the 1770s and 1830s were scarred by war throughout the Atlantic world. The period began with the American Revolutionary Wars (1775–1783) (see Map 1.1), included the French Revolution (1789–1799) and its Wars (1792–1799) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) (see Map 1.2), the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) and the conflicts in the Caribbean, and ended with the Spanish American Wars of Independence (1808–1833) (see Map 1.3). The Americas and Europe were part of an Atlantic world which shared a collective identity shaped by the twin forces of revolution and war. Earlier periods had, of course, been marked by lengthy periods of warfare, including such global conflicts as the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) and the Seven Years War (1754–1763), the second of which had actually broken out in the Americas. But it is the linking of war and revolution that makes the half-century between the 1770s and 1830s distinctive, with its huge concentration of wars and the resultant dislocation which demobilization incurred.

Wars in these years were of unprecedented scale and extent, requiring a massive mobilization of men for the military. Mass armies were deployed, composed of conscripts, militias and volunteers, as well as long-service professionals. As revolutionary and conservative regimes alike used armies of increasing size across Europe and the Americas, the conduct of warfare was transformed, too. This was not so much through the introduction of new weaponry, which largely remained unaltered, but by the new demands of

mass armies. These demands also imposed new burdens on the economy and society, which in turn transformed the political, social and gender orders on both sides of the Atlantic. Soldiers and civilians of all classes, races, and ethnicities—men and women—were mobilized for war with a greater intensity than ever before. Extensive financial and material support by civilians through taxes and tributes, requisitions and quartering, outfitting soldiers, medical care and war charity was badly needed by all war powers. Without these varied forms of civilian war support mass warfare on this scale would not have been possible. To mobilize this support, coercion alone was not enough. Even conservative governments used intensive patriotic-national propaganda that addressed civilians and soldiers alike. Often it promised soldiers—regardless of race—personal freedom and political rights in return for military service. When necessary, the armed forces on all sides admitted to their ranks groups of men that had previously been marginalized, including, in some instances, slaves.⁸

The global scale of warfare, the extent to which the wars of the era included civil society, and the close entanglement of war, politics and culture have led some historians of the period, among them David A. Bell and Jean-Yves Guomar, to suggest that these were wars of a quite different kind from previous conflicts, to the extent that they should be thought of as the first instances in history of ‘total war’—war that affected all classes of society, independent of their ethnicity, gender or race, and necessitated massive economic and cultural resources.⁹

The term ‘total war’ has been contested, of course, not least by historians of twentieth-century warfare. But there is no doubting the scale of these conflicts or the overarching ambition of the powers engaged in them. They were fought over continents and across oceans, involving India and the Orient as well as the Atlantic world. They were characterized by their maximalist war aims and by the huge systemic changes which they brought about. Wars were now fought to change social and political regimes and to free colonized peoples from the rule of multinational empires; they involved mass armies, armed populations and civilians, and already crossed the lines between ‘front’ and ‘homeland’. The civilian population became a target long before the two World Wars, as the siege of a number of cities—including Boston (1775), Breslau (1806), Saragossa (1809), Moscow (1812), Hamburg (1813–1814) and Washington (1814)—and the destruction of thousands of towns and villages indicate.¹⁰ War atrocities are also no invention of the twentieth century. They were quite common in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions, as several new studies have shown.¹¹ The civilian population was already being targeted, too, by economic blockades like the Continental System (1806–1814), declared by Napoleon with the Berlin Decree in November 1806 in response to the naval blockade of the French coasts enacted by the British government in May of the same year.¹²

As a result, the wars of this era fused the military and civilian worlds more closely than in previous generations: Oppenheim's image is unmistakably one of war fought in the period from the 1780s to 1830s, and would have been barely conceivable earlier, even during the 1750s. War now involved massive social and political changes: it helped forge larger states across Europe and beyond, states which extended their polity at the expense of those alternative structures which they had previously stood alongside: clerical states, city republics, composite monarchies, mercantilist-oceanic empires. These were increasingly sacrificed to the rise of more powerful territorial and nation states, united under a single ruler and establishing their undisputed monopoly of military force. The old order of corporate privilege was, often contemptuously, swept aside.¹³

These were transnational trends, which many see as exerting a global impact, yet they were not found everywhere in equal measure: by the very fact of European settlement and colonization, they were heavily concentrated in the Atlantic world. In recent years there has been some reappraisal of the term, both as a geographical entity and as a distinct political culture, as the Atlantic world has come to be understood as a region of commercial exchange and cultural transfer. European empires remain, of course, at its heart, since, in territorial terms, they spanned the Atlantic, and much of the dynamic of revolution and war was shaped by them, or followed in the wake of commercial shipping. Cultural and philosophical ideas, political and economic ideologies also spanned the Atlantic, so that a revolutionary movement on one side of the ocean soon impacted on those who lived on the other shore.

It was in large measure a European world, in cultural terms, with European liberalism, European commercialism, and European religious faiths at its core. But it was a space where the various European cultures came into contact, and often conflict, with other cultures and other races, and where, as a result of the European slave trade with the United States, the Caribbean, and Spanish and Portuguese South America, African cultures and traditions also came into play.¹⁴ It was the space where these conflicts were most densely concentrated. But it was not, of course, the only place where cultures clashed or where recognizably new technologies were applied to war. In China the great armies of the Qing dynasty were undone by the superior western cannon their soldiers faced. In India the period was marked by the modernization of weaponry that followed the introduction of gunpowder.¹⁵ In large parts of Africa the slave trade led Europeans to intervene in internal African wars, with the spread of guns and weaponry which that implied. And with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, European Great Power politics were once again introduced into the eastern Mediterranean, where they helped to undermine the military pretensions of the Ottoman Empire. What happened in the Atlantic was only part of a wider global crisis that followed the decline of the old Asian regimes on the one hand and the American

and French Revolutions on the other. If these years saw the British burn Washington, it was not the only political centre to fall to invading armies. So, around the globe, did Cairo, Moscow, Paris, Jogjakarta and Delhi.¹⁶

This extensive scale of warfare was experienced by contemporaries on both sides of the Atlantic as something new and challenging and it left an enduring mark in collective memory. Part of the contemporary perception of living in a 'time of upheaval and change' was not only the regional scale and intensity of the conflicts but also their diversity and complexity. New subjects became historical agents in these conflicts: workers and women, indigenous people and slaves, people of unknown regions. And this, too, would be important in the memories which these years created and the processes of identity formation they imposed. Indeed, one could plausibly argue that not only were new national identities crafted in this period against their respective 'others', but also that the notions of 'Europe' and 'the West' were very much the product of these years. Both were constructed against perceived others: the 'barbaric East' and the 'savages' in the colonies. They included the sense that the 'Western hemisphere' was united by ideas and values as well as by commercial interest, a world of constant interchange as merchants, planters and government officials passed seamlessly from one part of the globe to another.¹⁷

This new thinking was reflected in and fostered by international politics. It was in this period that many of the fundamental treaties were signed that shaped the Atlantic world as we know it, establishing, amongst other outcomes, the independence of the United States, the loss of France's first Atlantic empire, the creation in Haiti of the world's first black republic, and the succession of independence movements that ended Spanish domination in much of Central and South America. Revolution, too, was transnational, with its roots in trade and the economy.¹⁸ The 'sinews of government', as Bailey Stone remarks, 'are its finances', and in the last years of the Ancien Régime in France, war, royal absolutism and the fiscal crisis were very closely entangled.¹⁹ If the colonial struggles of these years left Britain as the dominant global power, they also had a unique role in forging a new territorial order that had particular resonance in the Americas. The War of 1812 was a key moment in the emergence of modern Canada and its future coexistence with the United States, while the years from around 1808 until the 1820s saw the arrival of a clutch of new states in South America, polities born of Napoleon's invasion of Spain and often brought into existence with the aid of European soldiers and European arms. Their emergence into statehood was often accompanied by violent struggle that generated powerful images and memories. These would subsequently be an inspiration to others, not least to peoples seeking liberation from colonial suzerainty. The Age of Atlantic Revolutions was also the first age of decolonization.²⁰

Whilst recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of the transatlantic dimension in the history of this period, and has foregrounded the

new character of warfare and its far reaching consequences, little has been said about the short- and long-term legacy of these large-scale conflicts. This is quite astonishing. The concept of 'postwar', which now appears widely in studies of the 'age of the two World Wars', has not been commonly applied to the period between the 1770s and 1830s. With this volume we want to change this. We hope to foster further research on the many postwars of the Era of Atlantic Revolutions, especially the military, economic, political and cultural demobilizations after the mass wars of this period, together with their long-term aftermath and their commemoration and memory.

Such an approach will provide us with new insights into how wars influence the economy, society, culture and politics long after combat ceases. The challenges that both Europeans and Americans eventually confronted, after the wars in the era of Atlantic Revolutions had ended, were unprecedented, not least because of the vast scale of the conflicts themselves. States and societies were ill-prepared to deal with the consequences of a style of warfare that was arguably now 'total'. One obvious problem was the need to de-mobilize mass armies and navies, and to re-integrate large numbers of ordinary combatants into civilian life. Beyond this, they had to deal with the economic consequences of warfare: the destruction of towns and villages, of fields and forests. Especially painful was the re-adjustment of the Atlantic economy following the dismantling of blockades and counter-blockades, the collapse of mercantilism and the abolition of the slave trade by several of the leading slaving nations. It was in this unpropitious context that communities and families needed to accommodate unprecedented numbers of physically and psychologically scarred veterans. Similar processes took place in the cultural sphere, which had been militarized during wartime through the celebration of heroism and martial virtues. Culture and the arts, which had been widely used as an instrument of war mobilization, had to adapt to an environment in which large-scale armed conflict was at an end and where bellicose rhetoric was no longer prized. This cultural aspect of demobilization cannot be detached from political and social issues. Rather, it had an integral role to play, as culture influenced narratives and memories, which were themselves contested by groups struggling to find a more advantageous social and political position in the new postwar order.

And indeed the wars of the Era of Atlantic Revolutions would leave a powerful memory, marked by emotive *lieux de mémoire*. For the United States the year 1789, with the Bill of Rights and the election of George Washington as the country's first president, would mark the beginning of a new era. In France the year 1789 would also have this function, while the countries France invaded had their own heroic dates to celebrate: 1798 for Ireland, 1808 for Spain, 1812 for Russia, or 1813 for Germany. The potency of these memories can be seen in public celebrations like Bastille Day (14 July) in France, in street names, and in monuments like Nelson's Column and Trafalgar Square in London, or the Butte du Lion at Waterloo, a Dutch

memorial to the part played by the young Prince of Orange. In Moscow the Tsar ordered the construction of a huge cathedral in honor of Christ the Saviour as a memorial to the sacrifices of the Russian people in Napoleon's wars. In Leipzig a hundred years after the Battle of the Nations in 1813, a huge monument was erected to celebrate a victory hailed as the triumph of German nationalism. Yet, unlike in the Americas, it would be difficult to claim that these years lie at the root of Europe's modern state system. At best they could be remembered as the time when many European nations were born.²¹

The legacy of war, demobilizing and memory

This book has three main aims. It first examines how the processes of immediate military, economic, social and cultural demobilization were managed, not only by states but by local communities and individuals, all facing up to the major challenges that had to be overcome if a return was to be made to a peaceful and civil society. But there were much wider challenges for the postwar world, and the second aim of the book is to analyze these. It asks, how could the long-term economic, social and cultural legacy be resolved? How should the lasting political fall-out of the wars be addressed? Can we talk of a discrete postwar generation here, or, indeed, a recognizable postwar politics?²² And thirdly, there is the question of the memories which the wars left behind and which, for some, scarred that entire generation. How were the wars remembered in different regions, different nations and different social, racial and ethnic groups? Who shaped these memories, and how were they used and turned to political advantage? Why did some of these uses endure while others rapidly faded? Was there, indeed, a critical difference between 'winners' and 'losers' in the ways they appropriated the memory of a period that for many conjured up images of pain and humiliation? Did it matter that a campaign had been won or lost?²³

These questions are deliberately examined in a comparative transatlantic context, with one overarching issue in mind: what similarities and differences can we identify in the ways in which postwar societies on both sides of the Atlantic approached the problems of military, economic, social and cultural demobilization, and addressed their corollary, the construction of memory? This complex approach does much to establish the book's originality. It also leads us to give some thought to the longer-term legacies of war on the Atlantic world. What were the most important transnational legacies—and did these affect both sides of the Atlantic in equal measure? Or was it the case that for many in Europe and the Americas this was not principally an age of revolution, but an age of fracture, of paradoxes and ambiguities? Was it perceived as an age that united the Atlantic world or as a period that left this world increasingly split as Continental Europe turned away from the Atlantic, looking more to itself, to the Levant, to Asia

and to Africa, and leaving Britain as the only unashamedly Atlantic power in Europe? Perhaps contemporaries recognized the parallelism of both developments? After around 1830 (with France's colonization of Algeria) Europe's second age of colonization would privilege Asia, the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. The nineteenth century heralded a new era when colonial wars—still largely involving the traditional colonial powers—would be fought in India, the Middle East and Africa, and later also the Far East.²⁴ The Atlantic world of the late eighteenth century was visibly giving way to the global world of the nineteenth and its culture of militarism and imperialism.

David A. Bell opens the volume with a provocative essay in which he suggests that it is in the Atlantic world of these years, and most specifically in the shadow of the American and French revolutions, that modern militarism was born. 'Perhaps', he argues, 'the most common forms of modern militarism had their origins in the Age of Democratic Revolutions and Revolutionary Wars, and are symbiotically related to the revolutionary regimes that emerged in this period'.²⁵ It is certainly the case that in the American, French and Haitian revolutions a much larger percentage of young men were compelled to bear arms and that, especially in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, armies reached a size that consumed resources on a scale not previously known. One extreme example is Napoleon's Russian Campaign in 1812: The Grande Armée numbered 380,000 soldiers from 13 conquered and allied European states and 300,000 men of French departments. Only 120,000 of them survived.²⁶

Military service, citizenship and masculinity were linked in the propaganda, not only of France and Prussia, but also of most other belligerent powers. Soldiering was now presented as a duty of male citizens, or, alternatively, as the precondition for gaining equal political citizenship rights.²⁷ The new mass armies rapidly acquired a high degree of professionalism, too, as the officers became increasingly specialized and their aspirations became focused on promotion and command. But how much evidence is there that the culture of societies was becoming more militaristic? In France the revolutionaries tried to maintain the primacy of the political, aware of the risks of a politicized army and of officers with political ambitions of their own. They ended up, of course, with Napoleon. In some political contexts army officers did play a leading role in revolutionary movements, whether in the Italy of the 1820s and 1830s or in South America in the years after 1820. Even in England, John Bew finds that a government honed in war could be more effective when it came to managing the problems of the postwar world. But this does not necessarily imply that these countries were becoming more militarized, only that the knowledge and skills gained in war could easily be switched to other, more pacific purposes.

For sure, the military leaderships in most countries involved in war were not quickly ready to step back from the limelight once peace returned. They expected their share of recognition and influence. But they were generally

prepared to act within the confines of the political arena, to accept the constraints of civil governance, and to resist the temptation to seize power, militarily. More challenging was the integration of the many returning professional soldiers, militiamen and volunteers into civil society. They brought their military habits, and with them their often traumatic experiences, their scars of war, back to their families, villages and hometowns. They too, expected recognition for their military service and hoped to benefit from the political freedoms which their governments and army leaders had promised in their war propaganda.

Peace-making, occupation and military demobilization

The first thematic section, on peace-making, occupation and military demobilization, focuses on the very different circumstances in which wars ended and on the impact which the large-scale demobilization of armies had on societies at large and on individual soldiers and officers. Just as in the wars themselves, there is often a glaring discrepancy between the discourse of peace-making and the reality of what subsequently happened, which often fell short of the ideals that were held out to the soldiers. Janet M. Hartley's discussion of Russia after the Napoleonic Era is a telling case-in-point. Russia had, of course, a particular problem, in that those demobilized were in many cases serfs, and the agrarian infrastructure to which they could hope to return was notoriously underdeveloped. Tsar Alexander I dreamed of a much bolder solution, one that would integrate the army into the social fabric of Russia through the establishment of military colonies, which had first been set up in 1810 in western Russia. They involved one battalion and 4,000 state peasants (most of whom perished), but the outbreak of war in 1812 prevented their development. Now, with the war over, they were conceived of on a far greater scale in a bid, as Alexander I stated in the preamble to the decree which established the colonies, to make the soldiers' service 'less burdensome'. Hartley shows that, far from the colonies helping to ease the financial burden on the state, they cost a vast amount of money to set up and maintain. The reason for this was that the colonies were intended to do far more—to modernize agriculture, improve standards of life, and, in the process, to create new types of 'citizen' for the state.²⁸

Perhaps predictably, this all turned out to be somewhat utopian, and the best intentions were to prove illusory. Similarly, Christine Haynes sees in postwar France the imposition of an Allied army of occupation after 1815 as being planned with some sensitivity, passing rapidly from the initial military invasion to a peace-keeping force. This occupation was, however, perceived quite differently by many people in the occupied territories of France who had to carry the burden. It did not help that the invasion was termed an 'Occupation of Guarantee', commissioned with the supervision of the demobilization of the troops who had served Napoleon in the Hundred Days. Wellington was determined to avoid unnecessary acts