


ITALIAN AND ITALIAN AMERICAN STUDIES

# THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES AND ITALIAN AMERICANS

The Untold History

SALVATORE J. LAGUMINA



# Italian and Italian American Studies

Series Editor

Stanislao G. Pugliese  
Hofstra University  
Hempstead, New York, USA

This series brings the latest scholarship in Italian and Italian American history, literature, cinema, and cultural studies to a large audience of specialists, general readers, and students. Featuring works on modern Italy (Renaissance to the present) and Italian American culture and society by established scholars as well as new voices, it has been a longstanding force in shaping the evolving fields of Italian and Italian American Studies by re-emphasizing their connection to one another.

More information about this series at  
<http://www.springer.com/series/14835>

Salvatore J. LaGumina

# The Office of Strategic Services and Italian Americans

The Untold History

palgrave  
macmillan

Salvatore J. LaGumina  
Nassau Community College  
Massapequa Park, USA

Italian and Italian American Studies

ISBN 978-3-319-33333-5 ISBN 978-3-319-33334-2 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-33334-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016953718

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Cover illustration: © Everett Collection Historical / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature  
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland

# CONTENTS

|          |   |           |
|----------|---|-----------|
| <b>1</b> | <b>Introduction</b>   | <b>1</b>  |
| <b>2</b> | <b>Intelligence Agency in Embryo</b>  | <b>5</b>  |
|          | <i>Notes</i>  | 12        |
| <b>3</b> | <b>Recruitment and Training Strategies</b>                                      | <b>15</b> |
|          | <i>3.1 Physical and Psychological Testing</i>                                   | 23        |
|          | <i>Notes</i>  | 24        |
| <b>4</b> | <b>Corvo and the Connecticut Connection</b>                                     | <b>27</b> |
|          | <i>Notes</i>  | 37        |
| <b>5</b> | <b>Agents Extraordinaire</b>  | <b>39</b> |
|          | <i>Notes</i>  | 70        |
| <b>6</b> | <b>Operation Husky</b>  | <b>77</b> |
|          | <i>Notes</i>  | 83        |
| <b>7</b> | <b>Conquering the Islands: Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica,<br/>Lipari, Ventotene</b> | <b>87</b> |
|          | <i>7.1 Tarallo Missions: Sicily, Lipari, and Ventotene</i>                      | 94        |
|          | <i>Notes</i>  | 96        |

|           |  |     |
|-----------|--|-----|
| <b>8</b>  | <b>From Salerno to Anzio</b>               | 99  |
|           | <i>Notes</i>                               | 116 |
| <b>9</b>  | <b>Italian Mainland Operational Groups</b> | 119 |
|           | <i>Notes</i>                               | 130 |
| <b>10</b> | <b>OSS and Partisans</b>                   | 133 |
|           | <i>10.1 OSS Partisans Face Danger</i>      | 141 |
|           | <i>Notes</i>                               | 156 |
| <b>11</b> | <b>Conclusion</b>                          | 161 |
|           | <i>Notes</i>                               | 170 |
|           | <b>Glossary</b>                            | 173 |
|           | <b>Bibliography</b>                        | 175 |
|           | <b>Index</b>                               | 181 |

## Introduction

“What did you do during the war?” a frequently heard query in the heady post-World War II years invariably elicited proud martial associations while citing battlefield participation and/or military service. The issue was particularly relevant for Italian Americans, mostly of the first and second generation who were either born in Italy or whose parents were from the country that during the war became the face of the enemy. In this worrisome and apprehensive atmosphere a number of solemn questions arose. Were they loyal to America or to Italy? Would they welcome assignments to fight in Italy? Would they take up arms against Italian relatives? Why are they speaking Italian? (In point of fact against a worrisome atmosphere many Italian-speaking parents refused to speak Italian to their children in their homes.) Why did they listen to Italian-language radio broadcasts? Why do they continue to display the Italian flag? Why do they insist on Italian feast celebrations? Why are they reading Italian-language newspapers? Why should they want to study Italian? Could they be trusted? Did they support the war effort? Did they show their patriotism by volunteering for the armed services? Are they buying war bonds? Are they donating blood?

Although it is impossible to obtain verifiable figures, it seems that for a staggering number of Italian Americans, apparently much larger than their proportion of the population, the answer to the question was to declare proudly and unabashedly the branch of service—Army, Navy, Marines,

Coast Guard, Merchant Marine, Womens Army Corps (WACS), Women Accepted for For Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), and so on—in which they served. A limited but growing literature in the form of autobiographies, biographies, family and local recollections, and oral histories have recounted the partaking and sacrifices of many ranging from the little known to the more celebrated figures such as Congressional Medal of Honor recipient John Basilone and air ace Don Gentile. Scarcer, however, is knowledge about their role in clandestine activity and espionage. The purpose of this volume is to review the unique involvement and the extraordinary deeds of handpicked Italian Americans who served in covert operations of the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) and who have received only partial and occasionally contentious and misleading attention.

This tome strives to illuminate the contributions made by a selected cohort of Italian Americans in that great and heroic struggle against terrible totalitarian forces which threatened this nation and the world during World War II. It offers for posterity a record of remarkable and astonishing successes, but also of the perils encountered, the sufferings endured, and the martyrdom of the nameless who were recorded in histories of the conflict, in salient published biographies and autobiographies, and in the numerous unpublished oral and written testimonies that continue to unfold the secret history of unheralded brave, vigorous, and once youthful participants.

This is written not only because the events in which OSS Italian Americans were engaged were true, but also because I feel it a duty to bring to light the mundane and heroic sacrifices they endured for freedom's sake. The hazardous adventures and exploits of behind-the-enemy-lines operatives may seem to stretch credulity and a reluctance to believe their decision to place their lives in jeopardy, but it is the undeniable historical record. This work is needed because the "greatest generation" is passing away and a new generation is arising who do not know what the preservation of liberty cost in blood and suffering.

I was young when the events revealed in this work were occurring but as a student of American history I came to learn of the secret war not only from the printed word, but also from the spoken words, the oral authentication, and the private writings of key participants. While teaching at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut, in the 1970s I had the honor and privilege to meet Frank Tarallo, a humble, self-effacing OSS veteran who was my student and who acquainted me with the subject via his firsthand account of the perilous work undertaken by young

men and women volunteers to be part of a new American organization that dealt in stealth, secrecy, and surreptitiousness. The very knowledge of their encounters in often terribly dangerous places—their very magnitude—overpowers me. I have tried to render their struggle worthy to hand down to future generations and trust they will earn the reader's esteem and respect.

While this work rests on a chronological framework for the discussions, projects, and analyses of OSS activities undertaken by Italian Americans, that framework may be punctured at various points to explain a prior historical setting that may be anticipated later.

It is fascinating and indubitably interesting to raise questions that a review of the research reveals, some of which will be offered here. Who was the 21-year-old OSS high school dropout whose pioneering and innovative ideas evoked such interest that many generals and other high-ranking military officials sought him out to confer with him? Who was designated by President Roosevelt to be the OSS linkage between the USA and Great Britain's intelligence service? Who was credited for introducing the James Bond concept? Who was the Italian immigrant who became a star Notre Dame University football player and worked for the OSS to infiltrate enemy lines? Who was the most decorated soldier of World War? Who was the OSS operative who married the beautiful and resourceful 18-year-old partisan woman Walkiria Terradura, whose harassing activities became the bane of German enemy troops? Who was the Italian American from San Francisco whose expertise in Japanese found him on vital OSS missions in the Pacific Theater of war? Who was the journalist/printer who oversaw the printing of tens of thousands of propaganda literature? Who was the OSS officer who played a prominent role in saving much of Italy's works of art? Who was the 24-year-old OSS agent entrusted with the sober responsibility of arranging for the surrender of the Italian dictator and other high Italian military officials? The answers to these intriguing questions and much other information that unfolds demonstrates the remarkable role Italian Americans played in America's intelligence service during a critical period in history.

## Intelligence Agency in Embryo

The genesis of the OSS harkens to that period between the outbreak of World War II (September 1, 1939) and America's entry in the war on December 7, 1941, when it became evident to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his key advisors that conflict was imminent. What had passed for American intelligence operations until the outbreak of hostilities were random efforts that relied on the imperfect operations of rival, incongruent, and sometimes competing government Departments of State, Treasury, Army, and Navy, as well as information obtained from British intelligence sources. In operation since early in the twentieth century, by the beginning of World War II Great Britain's MI5 controlled English national security secret intelligence activities thereby becoming the chief British Security Service initiative responsible for protecting the UK. Its intelligence-gathering skills had become both legendary and the envy of other nations including the USA. If it was to assume a major and decisive role given the exigencies of modern warfare, Americans would have to develop a vastly more cohesive and interrelated intelligence initiative. From the outset of war Great Britain sedulously cultivated all forms of American aid including secret intelligence. To that end, the British opened the innocuous-sounding British Security Coordination (BSC) headquarters in New York City, which, although originally manned by amateurs, was strengthened by professional agents like the celebrated William Stephenson, the master spy code-named "Intrepid" whose exploits inspired

Hollywood to make the James Bond genre. As Stephenson put it, “I had been twenty years in the professional secret-intelligence service when in 1940 London sent me to British Security Coordination headquarters in New York to help maintain that secrecy. BSC had been manned by amateurs, and it was thought my special experience was required there.”<sup>1</sup> In utmost secrecy he then proceeded to draw up a blueprint for an American intelligence operation with detailed tables of organization and specified relationships between various internal offices. By the spring of 1940 it was clear that President Roosevelt was determined that the USA would assist Great Britain and that there should be a firm understanding of cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the British Secret Service.<sup>2</sup> Churchill went out of his way to cultivate OSS chief William Donovan and Ernest Cuneo, the president’s special liaison officer, who was in fact an OSS agent.<sup>3</sup>

Accordingly, it was deemed imperative that the USA create its own information-gathering agency that would undertake covert activities to obtain vital military knowledge about the nation’s enemies. Ever the nimble leader Roosevelt excelled in selecting outstanding personnel to carry out his vision or parenthetically be cast aside if one became a political liability. In July 1941 the president appointed William J. Donovan Coordinator of Information (COI) that in 1942 would transition into the OSS, the super spy organization. The son of a poor Irish Catholic family from Buffalo, New York, who worked his way through law school, Donovan achieved exceptional fame in World War I as he bravely led a battalion of the famed 42nd Division composed primarily of Irish Americans and known as the “fighting Irish” or the “fighting 69th.” For his service he was awarded a Congressional Medal of Honor and in the process acquired the “Wild Bill” appellation. (The 1940 Hollywood film *The Fighting 69th* is based on the exploits of New York City’s 69th Infantry Regiment, headed by battalion commander William Donovan and portrayed by actor George Brent.) In addition to his military fame, Donovan’s immense success as a Wall Street lawyer, his extensive worldwide travels and familiarity with European leaders, and his friendship with President Roosevelt rendered him an outstanding choice to oversee espionage and sabotage operations in Europe and parts of Asia. (Although Roosevelt and Donovan were not very intimate friends and in fact were in opposing political parties—Republican Donovan ran for New York State governor in 1932—they were acquainted with each other. They simultaneously attended Columbia Law School.) It was said that while at

Columbia Roosevelt admired Donovan because of his football prowess. "At a time in American social history when Ivy League football heroes were stars of their generation, Donovan not only was excellent as a runner and in crew but clawed his way into college lore as a quarterback with the Columbia lions. Men who succeeded at Columbia's Baker Field became idolized, and the idolatry often lasted for life—as in the case WJD."<sup>4</sup> That said, from the outset rivalry and contention plagued Donovan and the COI from jealous traditional intelligence departments which brazenly resisted any moves that might duplicate the work of their agencies thereby diminishing their own importance. This produced "turf wars" that found, for example, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover becoming an implacable and bitter foe whose enmity was demonstrated in assigning FBI agents to spy on Donovan throughout the war years. General George V. Strong, of an imperious and cerebral nature, epitomized how intense the opposition of branches of the armed forces could be. As head of G-2, the Army's intelligence arm whose unswerving allegiance was to the professional Army establishment, he had nothing but utter disdain for the OSS which he considered "a band of civilian amateurs that had to be broken up or it would take over his agency." He began to refer to the OSS director as "Wildman Donovan."<sup>5</sup>

Intelligence arms of the armed forces were hampered by a long and potentially deleterious tradition that precluded meaningful cooperation between the services. Albeit a degree of collaboration was finally established between the Army's Military Intelligence Division (MID) and the Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), it was not until 1945 that they created an effective joint intelligence committee. "Although MID was willing to work with its Navy counterpart, it regarded cooperation with other players in the intelligence arena with distaste. Both military services distrusted the civilians especially those in Donovan's organization." The rivalry, furthermore, did not abate after COI was phased out in favor of the OSS which now saw a rapid increase in its budget and in the number of agents under its control as well as a heavy augmentation of military personnel (detachments). Notwithstanding that Donovan himself ultimately received promotion to a general's rank, the MID never allowed OSS analysts access to high-grade Communications Intelligence (COMINT).<sup>6</sup> The opposition succeeded in confining the scope of OSS by specifically excluding its activity in domestic affairs as well as the entire western hemisphere. Although rivalry persisted on a departmental level, it was attenuated on the battlefield as noted by historian John Patrick

Finnegan. "Army commanders in Europe found the OSS a useful organization. In fact, the Army personnel provided the bulk of OSS strength."<sup>7</sup>

Donovan was not to be deterred; he met the challenge of staffing his new OSS agency by tapping into people he knew best: prestigious bankers, lawyers, industrialists, conservative academics, and their contacts. He thus produced an OSS personnel roster top-heavy with representation from Ivy League and the "Seven Sisters" colleges. With at least 42 members of its Class of 1943 engaged in the OSS, Yale University is a conspicuous example; appropriately it remained for a Yale historian to provide an absorbing account of the espionage-attraction phenomenon: faculty members who adjusted their research to assist in military intelligence; the connection of faculty, students, and close familial relationships that led to a large recruitment of Yale graduates into the OSS.<sup>8</sup>

The Yale/OSS connection was plain throughout operations in Italy in the person of Donald Downes who had a varied intelligence career and who was named to direct OSS personnel assigned to the Fifth Army. Lacking experience in Italy, Downes relied heavily on Vincent Scamporino and also collaborated with Irving Goff in a plan to enlist Italian prisoners of war to infiltrate behind enemy lines in order to obtain information. But Downes had problems of fitting in and clashed with other OSS colleagues leading to his departure from the spy organization in order to write spy novels, some of which became films.<sup>9</sup> Far from dilettantism, the extraordinary attraction of academicians is ascribed to the natural outcome of the university setting where there exists "a wide-ranging curiosity, a somewhat child-like desire to collect experiences and to see places, to know because knowing in itself is fun: that is, a number of people ideally suited for the rather unconventional life of an intelligence service, and in particular, of the Office of Strategic Services in World War II."<sup>10</sup>

The inevitable consequence of elitism reflected in this privileged and affluent background in the ranks of the spy organization was to incur harsh censure as critics labeled the ensemble with such choice disparaging terms as "dilettante diplomats" and "amateur detectives"; however, it was far from a complete, fair, or accurate portrait especially when it came to recruitment designed to penetrate Italy. Under Donovan's guidance the OSS leadership sought out not only highly intelligent and motivated enlistees with a college background but also other non-college resourceful individuals who possessed innate linguistic and cultural understanding about the customs and traditions of lands targeted for invasion and who were also eager to participate. Donovan recognized that one of the

blessings of the US melting pot configuration was that it was home to a citizenry that virtually no other country possessed—a reservoir of people who traveled extensively and spoke many languages, natural advantages to personnel designated to operate effectively in Italy and an asset that gave the USA a distinct advantage over Great Britain in this regard. To implement the native language fluency concept the OSS created a Foreign Nationalities Branch (FNB) that focused its attention on foreign nationals and ethnic groups within the USA.<sup>11</sup>

The OSS accordingly was made up of a specially designated group of people including famous college football players like Notre Dame's heralded Joe Savoldi, baseball great Moe Berg, leading Hollywood directors and actors John Ford, Sterling Hayden, and Douglas Fairbanks Jr., future New York Yankees president Michael Burke, John Ringling North, owner of the Barnum and Bailey Circus, Quentin Roosevelt, grandson of former President Theodore Roosevelt, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., noted historian, and Julia Child, destined to become a leading chef, author, and television personality. The spy organization also enlisted a group of mature European anti-fascists and young men and women of various national strains including a significant number with Italian and Sicilian background, in the conviction that their heritage enabled them to be inconspicuous in critical operations designed to defeat Italy and thus inflict a severe blow to the Axis powers. Many were civilians in their 50s who were too old for the draft and normally would not be regarded as physically competent to endure the bodily rigors expected in combat. It is estimated that throughout the course of the war the OSS consisted of 20,000 to 30,000 people some of whom were brought into field operations, while most served in unspectacular but necessary background support positions collecting and analyzing potentially pertinent data such as ethnic newspapers, journals, newsletters, casualty lists of enemy nations, maps and photographs of military bases, and traffic flow in major harbors. Unpretentious, toned-down research and analysis rather than spying behind enemy lines accounted for the bulk of OSS personnel. Most agents were of the so-called Chairborne Division collecting, sifting, and summarizing intelligence.<sup>12</sup>

The story of a number of Italian and Italian Americans who were recruited, trained, and deployed in this secretive and often dangerous activity is what follows. The OSS was divided into a number of branches, each of which was responsible for a specific function while in particular situations personnel from one branch assisted other branches. These branches, including Secret Intelligence (SI), Special Operations (SO),

Research and Analysis (R&A), Morale Operations (MO), and Operation Groups (OG), were subdivisions in which Italian Americans played important and in some instances indispensable roles. In MO Italian American agents, for instance, were essential contributors that encompassed the MO unit operating in Rome where they effectively employed psychological means to attack enemy political unity by an imaginative recreation and issuance of false dispatches designed to deceive the enemy. They were particularly adept in the use of “Black propaganda” which purported to emanate from a bona fide source, but in reality originated from other than a true one that served to fool the enemy repeatedly. This misinformation activity was a covert operation without any responsibility to disclose its sources; it stood ready and willing to play all kinds of nasty tricks to deceive the enemy—the kinds of artifices that generally were considered illegitimate and immoral for a reasonable government.

As factors in SI (Secret Intelligence) which was considered the primary intelligence source, OSS agents worked in neutral and enemy-occupied territory seeking out important information via infiltration to ascertain levels of enemy strengths and vulnerabilities which they shared with other Allied intelligence agencies. Their SO branch directed agents operating behind enemy lines to establish contact with and cultivate the support of underground guerilla forces supplying them with communications, money, and provisions, while dozens of OG semi-military units operating under code names were trained to work with local resistance forces to launch swift raids and carry out other guerrilla operations in conjunction with Allied theater commander directives designed to harass and disrupt enemy lines.<sup>13</sup>

Additionally, the OSS created special units that focused on specific objectives. For instance, there was a Special Assistants Division (SAD) that gave its attention to producing drugs for OSS operatives including the suicide tablet, while the Camouflage Division (CD) developed disguised, seemingly ordinary objects that masked hidden explosives. A special OSS unit which dealt with the important matter of saving European art treasures had representatives on the Committee for the Protection of European Cultural Material and played a vital role in saving priceless Italian works of art. The FNB was another OSS unit concentrated on gathering intelligence from foreign-language material circulating in the country. This organizational activity was in response to the realization that the nation housed 18 million people of foreign birth and that millions of them, including 600,000

of Italian ancestry, were not American citizens but enemy aliens—a situation that constituted a potential for either danger or good. Properly developed it could be a major positive source of information. To collect, study, and scrutinize foreign-language ethnic newspapers, pamphlets, and newsletters could be a valuable source of information—it would be the work of 50 OSS operatives, mainly academicians, who focused on large urban centers which housed large concentrations of ethnic groups. The multiple activities of the OSS indicated an intelligence agency that was disposed to tap into virtually any fathomable source of information. Informed observers concluded, “Without a doubt, the fact that the OSS had integrated the country’s scholarly intelligentsia into its operations contributed to its modernity of an office that made the slogan ‘Knowledge is power’ one of its leading axioms.”<sup>14</sup>

The warren of unadorned offices in an unspectacular Washington, DC, building that housed the intelligence agency belied the important work of OSS personnel. Far from screaming headlines, unequipped with lethal weapons and outside of the limelight, OSS employees labored at gathering vital intelligence.

Inside, the ancient corridors creaked and the tiny boxlike offices, crammed with filing cabinets and crackling typewriters and paper-littered desks, might have resembled a small town law firm on a busy afternoon. The occupants were as unromantic in their surroundings; elderly analysts, economists in shirt sleeves, research experts perspiring over columns of statistics...

A far cry from the headlines, the clash and thunder of battle. Yet these obscure buildings were a battlefield: the strangest and perhaps the most crucial battlefield of World War II.<sup>15</sup>

To carry out its objectives the OSS recruited regional experts to apply their knowledge and creative skills as factors in recalling additional resources and knowledge as needed. High value was placed on the ability of OSS members to leverage a multitude of personal and professional networks to achieve operational success. Such connections with business leaders, social elites, university academics, and other professionals enabled OSS administrators to recruit the appropriate personnel for the accumulation of intelligence. The OSS also expected agents assigned to overseas duty to influence networks within their areas of operation to work against the Nazi occupying forces and fascist enemy in Italy.

## NOTES

1. William Stephenson, *Man Called Intrepid: The Incredible WWII Narrative of The Hero Whose Spy Network and Secret Diplomacy Changed the Course of History*, Lyons Press, 2009, xvii.
2. Stephenson, *Intrepid*, 79–80.
3. Stephenson, *Intrepid*, 166, 167.
4. Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last American Hero: Wild Bill Donovan*, Times Books, New York, 1982, 21.
5. Douglas Waller, *The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage*, Free Press, New York, 2012, 117.
6. John Patrick Finnegan, *Military Intelligence*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, n.d., 63.
7. Finnegan, *Military Intelligence*, 92.
8. Robin W. Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961*, Yale University Press, 1996, 14. Winks recounts the OSS attraction to Yale as a place where they believed in a kind of elitism expressed in individualization, in belief of the virtue of doing one’s work well, in the value of the work being done—precisely characteristics sought by OSS.
9. Max Corvo, *The OSS in Italy, 1942–1945*, Praeger, New York, Westport, 1990, 99.
10. Robin Winks elaborates on the checkered but fascinating career of Downes. Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961*, 162–230.
11. *Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, 1942–1945*, U.S. Office of Strategic Services.
12. Jeremy Crampton, “Arthur Robinson and the Creation of America’s First Spy Agency,” *Georgia State University Magazine*, cites the OSS Map Division as an example wherein dozens of anonymous OSS employees working quietly behind closed doors in Washington, DC, helped win the war simply by making sense of the data and putting it on maps that were easier to understand. They produced specialty or thematic maps that were used at Allied Conferences between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin.
13. John Whiteclay Chambers II, *OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II*, National Parks, Washington, DC, 2008, 36. The current SOF (Special Operations Forces) community has similar requirements wherein future SOF warriors are expected to

- have the same level of expertise as the OSS warrior. See also Richard Cutler, *Counterspy*, Brassey's, 1970, for information on double agents.
14. Christof Mauch, *The Shadow War Against Hitler: The Covert Operations of America's Wartime Secret Intelligence Service*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003, 18. See also 14, 15, for information on various OSS activities.
  15. Corey Ford and Alastair MacBain, *Cloak and Dagger*, Random House, New York, 1946, 4–5.