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Political and Cultural Reorientation on the Medieval Frontier

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For my parents and for Yue Siew

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Contents

Abbreviations

ADA	'Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis', ed. M. Blöcker-Walter.
APV	'Annales Portugalenses veteres', ed. P. David.
CAI	*Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris*, ed. A. Maya Sánchez.
CCCM	*Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis.*
CMP-A	*Chancelarias Medievais Portuguesas. Documentos de Chancelaria de D. Afonso Henriques,* ed. A. E. Reuter.
DMP	*Documentos Medievais Portugueses, Documentos Régios*, ed. R. P. de Azevedo.
DDS	*Documentos de D. Sancho I (1174–1211)* eds R. P. de Azevedo, A. de Jesus da Costa, and M. R. Pereira.
ES	*España Sagrada,* ed. E. Flórez.
HC	*Historia Compostellana,* ed. E. Falque Rey.
JL	*Regesta Pontificum Romanorum,* eds P. Jaffé, S. Löwenfeld, W. Wattenbach, F. Kaltenbrunner and P. Ewald.
MGH	*Monumenta Germaniae Historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum,* eds G. H. Pertz et al.
MGH SS	MGH *Scriptores in Folio et Quarto.*
PL	*Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina,* ed. J.-P. Migne.
PMH	*Portugaliae Monumenta Historica,* ed. A. Herculano.
PP	*Papsturkunden in Portugal,* ed. C. Erdmann.

Introduction

On 8 August 1064, after a gruelling six-month siege, the Muslim defenders of Coimbra surrendered to forces led by King Fernando I of León-Castile. This strategic riverbank city was to become the Portuguese capital for much of the medieval period, and its capture marked a critical juncture in the long struggle between Christendom and Islam for possession of the Iberian Peninsula – the *Reconquista* – which in Portugal came to an end with the fall of the last Muslim enclaves on the Algarve coast in 1250. The reconquest in Portugal has frequently been subsumed into more general accounts of the reconquest in Spain. Yet during the period between the mid-eleventh and mid-thirteenth century Portugal developed from a small, embattled county under the authority of the neighbouring monarch of León-Castile into an independent kingdom with stable borders that have remained largely unchanged until the present day. The successful prosecution of the reconquest appears to have been intricately interconnected with a process of national formation and the achievement of political independence from Spain. The Portuguese historian Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão thus reflected an opinion commonly held among his compatriots when he insisted: 'Portugal was, above all, a product of the *reconquista*.'[1]

The origins of the reconquest lie in the early decades of the eighth century – when an invading Arab and Berber army brought Islam forcibly into the Iberian Peninsula. The Christian Visigothic defenders were scattered at the decisive battle of Gaudalete River in 711, and the last Visgothic king, Roderick, was assumed killed in the melee. Organised opposition rapidly collapsed, and the remnants of Visigothic society either submitted to Muslim domination or fled into the distant north. These fugitives were eventually rallied by Pelayo, the first king of Asturias, who then confronted the all-conquering Muslim forces on a small hill known as Covadonga. Despite Muslim numerical superiority and the blandishments of Bishop Oppa, who spoke for those Christians willing to accept the domination of the invaders, Pelayo remained resolute.

> [The bishop began] 'My son, I think you are not unaware that all Spain was formerly governed as one realm under the rule of the Goths and outshone all other lands in wisdom and learning. Also, as I said before, the whole of the Goths when gathered together were not strong enough to withstand the onrush of the Ishmailites [i.e. the Muslims]. How will you therefore be able to defend yourself ... ?'
>
> To this Pelayo replied: 'Have you not read in Holy Scripture that the Church of God can become as small as a grain of mustard and can then, by God's grace, be made to grow again even larger?'
>
> The bishop answered: 'Indeed it is so written.'
>
> Pelayo said: 'Then Christ is our hope [that] Spain may be saved and the army of the Gothic people restored.'[2]

This stirring account from the anonymous *Crónica de Alfonso III* was accepted by later historians as a classic statement of the defeated Visigothic people's desire to reclaim their usurped inheritance. The subsequent southern expansion of the kingdom of Asturias could then be represented as a reconquest of lost territory that followed directly from Pelayo's original act of defiance. This connection neatly legitimised military aggression with both a divine mandate and an appeal to natural justice. For generations of Iberian historians the reconquest became the cornerstone of their perception of the past. Ramón Menéndez Pidal followed a long and illustrious historical tradition when he assured his readers: 'The proposal to recover all the soil of the Fatherland, which never ceased to appeal to the mass of people ... had been the united enterprise of all Spain.'[3]

Yet the concept of the reconquest, for all its political and patriotic utility, was more complicated than jingoistic interpretations might suggest. Despite exhaustive efforts by generations of Spanish historians, no physical evidence of the encounter at Covadonga, either archaeological, numismatic or documentary, has been brought to light. There are no eighth-century accounts of the battle, and almost two hundred years of silence lie between the event and the earliest extant descriptions of it. Nor were these tenth-century authors merely disinterested antiquarians. Behind the composition of this epic tale of defiant resistance was a clear agenda: to link their own monarch, Alfonso III of Asturias (866–910), to the long-defunct Visigothic kings. The aim was nothing less than (to borrow Peter Linehan's forceful metaphor) the hijacking of a royal body and the theft of its identification papers![4] Even before the Arab invasions, the Asturias region does not seem to have been considered a part of the Visigothic kingdom; those few who took refuge there had no greater claim to the Visigothic heritage than did the many of their co-religionists who remained on their ancestral lands under Muslim authority. Nor is the uncertain pedigree of the Asturian kings the only factor undermining the traditional construction of the reconquest. For there is something inherently implausible, even contrary to human nature, in the

idea of an implacable sectarian animosity being maintained for centuries. Over time relations appear to have evolved beyond the simple, unremitting hostility attributed to Pelayo. Warfare, when it was waged, had concrete and limited aims. A culture of *convivencia*, or coexistence, gradually prevailed, in which economic, political and cultural links were maintained within an atmosphere of pragmatic tolerance and enlightened self-interest. During the tenth century faith-based antagonism was dwindling and many of the more strident expressions of sectarian fervour appear to have been the politically motivated interpolations of later generations. Certainly in Portugal this seems to have been the case. Large Muslim and Jewish communities lived in relative harmony under Christian rule. Effective relationships were maintained between cultures at all social levels. Only towards the end of the eleventh century is there evidence of resurgent sectarian animosity.[5]

This re-emergence in Iberia of an ideology of confrontation appears to have originated outside the peninsula. Portuguese leaders nevertheless chose to place themselves at the forefront of the resulting clash of cultures, and their efforts paid a handsome dividend in terms of territorial and political gain. Among the most significant of these gains was a papal bull, *Manifestis probatum,* issued on 23 May 1179 by Pope Alexander III (1159–1181). In this bull Pope Alexander formally recognised Afonso Henriques (1128–1185), the ruler and self-proclaimed king of Portugal, as monarch of a sovereign realm. 'You have been an intrepid destroyer of the enemies of the name of Christ and a diligent supporter of the Christian faith,' the pontiff approved, 'leaving to posterity a praiseworthy name and an example to imitate.'[6] The delivery of *Manifestis probatum* marked a climax in the long campaign by the ruling house of Portugal to establish an authority independent of the neighbouring Spanish monarchs. Pope Alexander made clear in his endorsement that a major factor in his support for Afonso's royal pretensions was the Portuguese leader's success as a warrior defending the frontier between Christendom and the Islamic world. What is less apparent, however, is the means by which the Portuguese ruling house was able to translate military success against Muslim forces to the south of Portugal into political independence from the Christian Spanish kingdoms to the east.

A clue to where part of the answer might lie is in the nature of *Manifestis probatum* itself. That Pope Alexander was in a position to determine the status of a Portuguese ruler is a striking demonstration of the pervasive influence European institutions had come to exert in the Iberian Peninsula. In his groundbreaking work *The Making of Europe* Robert Bartlett traced the formation during the medieval period of an aggressively expansive Latin Christian culture. This culture was created when a reform-minded Church, eager to impose ecclesiastic conformity on Christian society, found a convergence of interest with an adventurous, land-hungry and militarily proficient secular society.[7] From the tenth century onwards, pressure from this expansionist Latin Christendom began to be felt throughout the Iberian

Peninsula. Encroaching foreign influence had many manifestations: the direct immigration of individuals and institutions; the development of commercial and social networks; and, perhaps most pervasively, the transfer of ideas and social mores. As a result of this increased communication there gradually emerged among European and Iberian Christians a sense of commonality, of an identity based on shared faith and through it a shared culture. But even as community identities widened to include peoples widely separated geographically, those of alternative faiths were correspondingly excluded. Crucially for the future direction of Portugal, Afonso Henriques personified the cultural dichotomy of his society: for he was the son of an Iberian princess, Infanta Teresa, and an immigrant Latin Christian nobleman, Count Henry of Burgundy. By virtue of this mixed ancestry Afonso – and subsequently the royal dynasty he founded – were well placed to take fullest advantage of the gradual reorientation of Portuguese society from a characteristically pluralistic Iberian culture into the south-western frontier of an uncompromisingly orthodox Latin Christendom.

This book is certainly not the first attempt to assess the impact of the reconquest on the development of Portugal. The debt owed to the body of work already directed towards these critical centuries will be immediately apparent from the footnotes presented. Nevertheless, over a period of time, significant gaps have opened between several different spheres of scholarly interest. Portuguese historians have built up an impressive tradition of research on the early history of their country, yet it is a historiography that is not always easily accessible to the non-Portuguese reader. Moreover, an underlying agenda for much of this scholarly effort has been to trace (and thus to justify) the achievement of political independence from Spain. Traditional Portuguese historiography of the reconquest period has, as Derek Lomax observed, 'preferred to stress the individuality of Portugal as against the rest of the peninsula, and so [has] laid more emphasis on relations with the Leonese and Castilians than with the Muslims.'[8] This focus on the local has similarly tended to marginalise the role of Latin Christian cultural influence during this decisive period in Portuguese history. On the other hand, scholars working outside the Iberian Peninsula have tended to concentrate their attention on Portugal's larger neighbour, Spain. Although this approach is readily explained by factors such as the relative size of the two countries, the similarities in their historical development, and the often arbitrary geographical border between them, there is a danger that the very real distinctiveness of Portuguese development can be obscured.

The purpose of this book, therefore, is twofold. The initial aim is to provide for the Anglophone reader an entry point into a remarkable period in the history of a remarkable country. Yet Portugal did not develop in isolation. A secondary aim of this book is to highlight the pervasive and multifaceted nature of Latin Christian influence in the region during this formative historical phase. Admittedly, this focus on the strengthening links between

Portugal and Europe cannot help but marginalise a number of important internal historical processes – although references in the footnotes should allow those with special interests in these areas to pursue them further. The compensations, however, are many. As Robert Bartlett has observed, 'the expansionary power of [Latin Christian] civilization sprang from its centres, even if it may be seen most starkly at its edges.'[9] While this book is primarily intended as an introduction to the fascinating early history of one small kingdom, it approaches this history by examining the profound and ultimately decisive effects of the very forces that forged Latin Christian Europe as a whole.

1

Portuguese Society in the Eleventh Century: Conquest, Reconquest or *Convivencia*?

Eleventh-century Portuguese society was the product of a unique combination of geography and history. Rugged mountain ranges rising to heights of almost 2,000 meters hedge the region to the east, making direct travel into central Spain difficult and hazardous. This isolation encouraged self-sufficiency and a mistrust of outside interference, characteristics that were embedded more deeply by the passage of time. Prehistoric tribes, Celts, Phoenicians, Romans and Visigoths all left their mark upon the landscape and on the consciousness of its inhabitants. An accumulation of legends, ancient place names and overgrown ruins linked the eleventh-century Portuguese with the distant past. Yet the realities of day-to-day existence during this period were shaped above all by the cataclysmic events of the Arab invasions in 711.[1]

The first dire tidings of the Visigothic defeat at the Guadalete River reached the peoples in the westernmost reaches of the peninsula quickly, and perhaps in the most dramatic of forms. There is a persistent local legend that the body of the slain King Roderick, last of the Visigothic monarchs, was borne in secret to the Portuguese city of Viseu for burial in the church of S. Miguel do Fetal.[2] The armies of the first Muslim invasion force, led by Tāriq b. Ziyād under the authority of Mūsā b. Nusayr, the governor of Africa, initially concentrated their efforts in the Visigothic heartland and did not press their advantage into the west of the peninsula. This respite lasted only three years. In 714, a second Muslim army, commanded by Mūsā b. Nusayr's son 'Abd al-'Azīz, marched westwards in search of further conquests. The unfortunate citizens of Beja, Mértola and Ossónoba (Faro) resisted and their walls were taken by storm, although this may well have been a convenient fiction on the part of the invaders, since under Muslim law a failed defiance allowed the victors to claim the goods and lands of the vanquished. Perhaps these events cowed the peoples of the north into submission, or perhaps the invaders had simply secured sufficient land for their needs in

the fertile south. In any event, treaties were made with northern magnates leaving Christians in possession of their estates, governed under their own law codes and liable only for a special tax levied on all non-Muslims living under Islamic rule.[3]

Relatively few of the invaders established themselves in the less hospitable regions north of the Mondego River. These hardy settlers were in the main Berber tribesmen, and along with their religion and culture, they carried with them their inherited feuds and ethnic prejudices. In 741 these tensions flared into open conflict when the Berber peoples revolted against the rule of their Arab co-religionists. Al-Andalus, as Muslim Spain came to be known to its inhabitants, was cast into turmoil and the northwestern territory – the al-Gharb – denuded of defenders as the Berber tribesmen marched southwards to eventual defeat at the hands of an Arab-Syrian army. The repression of the Berber peoples in the wake of this defeat, coupled with a major famine in 750, caused many of the survivors to abandon Iberia altogether.[4] They were to be sorely missed by those they left unguarded, for in the mountains of Asturias the descendents of Pelayo had consolidated their strength and were beginning to expand southwards. The *Chronicon Albeldense* records a series of attacks by Pelayo's son-in-law, Alfonso I (739–757), which devastated the Douro region. The towns of Porto, Braga, Chaves and Viseu were sacked and their populations forcibly resettled in Asturian-controlled lands to the north.[5] Florid contemporary descriptions of Alfonso's raids encouraged later commentators to portray the Douro valley during this period as a desolate no-man's land, completely devoid of inhabitants. Although this seems to exaggerate the level of destruction caused, civic centres were apparently laid in ruins; the population declined sharply as a southwards retreat took place; and political authority devolved into the hands of regional aristocracies.[6]

In the decades that followed, Muslim and Christian leaders would both attempt to fill this power vacuum. The Ummayad amir 'Abd al Rahmān II (822–852) ordered the construction of an impressive citadel (which survives to the present day) in the southern city of Mértola. Just how far northwards these troops could have imposed Ummayad authority is uncertain; in any event, the death of 'Abd al Rahmān's in 852 ended the attempt.[7] Initiative inexorably passed to the resurgent Christian forces. The discovery in the 830s of a tomb at Compostela believed to be that of St James the Apostle provided the Christian kingdoms with an enviable heavenly patron; the elevation of Alfonso III three decades later ended a long period of uncertain leadership and offered the firm rule necessary to direct this energy into a new wave of expansionism. In 868, the region between the Minho and the Douro rivers was secured and constituted as the county of 'Portucale' under Vímara Peres (869–873). Among the legacies of the first count of Portucale was the founding of the city that bore his name: Vimaranis – modern day Guimarães. The ancient religious centre of Braga was also occupied and resettled, as was the border town of Chaves to the north, along with Viseu and Lamego

to the south. In 878, a full decade after the re-establishment of Porto, the strategically vital city of Coimbra on the Mondego River was finally secured by Christian forces. This city quickly grew to become the centre of another county under the authority of Hermenegildo Guterres (878–911), and the Mondego River was thus established as the semi-permeable frontier with the Islamic world. During this period authority was further concentrated into the hands of the local aristocratic families, particularly the descendants of Vímara Peres and Hermenegildo Guterres, who guarded their growing prestige jealously.[8]

The final years of the tenth century saw the pendulum of relative strength begin to swing again, this time against the Christians. The Galician seaboard was menaced by the return of an old enemy, when a series of Viking raids struck at the coastal communities. In 966 the bishop of Iria was killed in battle defending the shrine of St James, and for the next half-century the dragon-ships of the North would remain a constant danger. Spanish resistance was undermined by internal divisions among the defenders; revolts by leading magnates, including the counts of both Portucale and Coimbra, squandered military capacity at what was to prove a particularly dangerous time, for to the south a new threat was rising. In order to unify the disparate communities of al-Andalus Muhammad b. Abī ʻĀmir (981–1002) adopted a policy of directing the belligerence of his subjects outward, against the disorganised Christian kingdoms, and his success earned him the cognomen 'al-Mansūr' (the victorious). In a series of extended campaigns, during which the disunity of the defenders often told against them, Christian forces were pushed back over the Douro River and the city of Coimbra was retaken by Muslim forces in 987. Al-Mansūr emphasised his military superiority a decade later by leading an army across the river and blazing a trail of destruction through Galicia to Compostela, where the sanctuary was destroyed and the church bells carried back to Cordoba in triumph.[9] As the tenth century drew to a close over the ashes of Compostela the Christian Spanish may well have wondered whether their patron saint had abandoned them. With the dawning of a new century, however, the pendulum began to swing back in their direction once more.

The eleventh-century Christian resurgence

Military strategy in northern Portugal was to a large extent dictated by the realities of physical geography. Mountains dominate the topography and create a significant barrier to any travel towards the east. The most densely settled areas were (and are) in the coastal zone and along the river valleys that transect the region. These river valleys could constitute formidable barriers to north–south travel and possession of strong points commanding the banks were necessary to establish a defensible frontier. At the end of the tenth century the campaigns of al-Mansūr had forced the Christians back to a tenuous hold on the northern bank of the Douro River; there they consolidated

their strength and awaited an opportunity to return in force to the Mondego valley. This patience was finally rewarded in the middle years of the eleventh century, and the resulting campaign established permanent Christian control over the territorial heartland of the future nation of Portugal.

To the great relief of the battered Spanish forces, their fearsome enemy al-Mansūr breathed his last in 1002. The attempt by 'Abd al-Malik al-Muzaffar, al-Mansūr's able and energetic son, to continue military operations against the Christians ended with his own death in 1008. An unclear line of succession led to a civil war that lasted for over two decades and, when no single leader proved strong enough to restore unity, the caliphate fractured into a number of independent *taifa* states (from the Arabic *taifa* meaning 'banner'). In al-Gharb the largest of these newly emerged states was centred on Badajoz. Initially the smaller territories of Mértola, Silves, Gibraleon, Huelva and Niebla remained autonomous, but in the decades after 1040 these were gradually annexed by Seville, bringing the two most powerful states into direct rivalry.[10] In the Christian North, meanwhile, a strong leader had emerged in the person of King Fernando I of León-Castile (1037–1065). Through a combination of good fortune and military prowess King Fernando was able to unite the fractious Christian communities under his authority. Taking advantage of Muslim disunity Christian forces launched a series of bold military operations against the border strongholds of al-Andalus.

In the far west of the peninsula the groundwork for this crucial campaign had already been laid. Gonçalo Trastamires, the head of a powerful local aristocratic family, took advantage of a chance opportunity to capture the town of Montemor-o-Velho in 1034. Four years later he consolidated this success by securing nearby Avenoso.[11] As discord among the Muslims deepened, King Fernando committed royal forces in a concerted effort to extend his influence further into the south. This advance began in 1057 with the capture of Seia and then Lamego, the last Muslim-held city in the Douro valley. The following summer Christian forces began their advance to the Mondego with the reduction of Viseu in July 1058. This victory was particularly satisfying for King Fernando because his grandfather, Alfonso V of León (999–1028), had been killed by a chance arrow while attacking the same city three decades earlier. Having exacted his belated revenge, Fernando returned to oversee operations in the eastern marches of his kingdom, leaving the task of securing the countryside around Viseu to local forces. However, by 1064, the king was back in the west undertaking a six-month siege that ended with the negotiated surrender of Coimbra early in July. The capture of the city was a decisive strategic success, particularly with the benefit of hindsight. Though Muslim raiding parties might occasionally cross the Mondego River, possession of the northern bank had passed to the Christians and the process of resettling the captured territory could begin afresh.[12]

Fernando moved quickly to consolidate his newly captured territory. Authority in Coimbra was granted to Sisnando Davides, a man whose

remarkable career had more than prepared him for this delicate task. Sisnando was born in the Coimbra region, possibly at Montemor-o-Velho, and as a child he suffered the misfortune of being captured by a Muslim raiding party from Seville. Despite this inauspicious beginning, and his choice to remain faithful to the Christian religion, Sisnando was able to reach high office in Seville – an example indeed of the culture of religious tolerance that prevailed in the Muslim *taifa* states. A disagreement of unknown cause with the rulers of the city eventually urged Sisnando northwards in search of new opportunities. He was warmly welcomed by Fernando of León-Castile, who immediately recognised Sisnando's special qualifications. For even though Sisnando had continued to profess the faith of his birth, he was one of the many Christians who through close association with Islamic society had adopted the culture and language of the Arabs. Members of this peculiarly Iberian cultural subgroup were known in Christian society as 'Mozarabs', from the Arabic term *musta'rab* or *musta'rib* (one who claims to be an Arab).[13] There was already a sizeable Mozarabic community in Coimbra, and Fernando no doubt hoped to encourage their loyalty by appointing Sisnando to rule over them. At the same time, because Sisnando was something of an outsider among the local aristocracy, his appointment was less likely to strengthen the hands of jealous noble families in resisting royal authority. Finally, Sisnando's knowledge and familiarity with Muslim society made him an ideal royal representative to develop relations with the *taifa* rulers that went beyond simple belligerence. Sisnando would soon be called upon to demonstrate all his political and diplomatic skills.[14]

One short year after the capture of Coimbra the long period of Christian military success came to a sudden end with the unexpected death of King Fernando on 24 June 1065. Spanish unity dissolved almost immediately as, in accordance with both Iberian tradition and the king's last wishes, the realm and its assets were divided among his heirs. The king's two daughters, Urraca and Elvira, received the cities of Zamora and Toro, respectively. The eldest of his sons, Sancho II (1065–1072), inherited the Castilian component of his father's territories along with a lucrative financial tribute paid to the royal treasury by the Muslim city of Zaragoza. The second son, Alfonso VI (1065–1109), received what was potentially the richest of the inheritances: the royal lands of León along with the annual gold tribute from Toledo. An awkward amalgam consisting of the territories of Galicia and Portucale, combined with the newly captured lands between the Douro and Mondego rivers, and the financial tribute paid by Muslim Badajoz, became the kingdom assigned to the youngest of Fernando's sons, Garcia II (1065–1073).[15] King Garcia was probably in his early twenties at the time of his accession and the policies he adopted reflect a certain youthful impetuousness. His reign, though a tumultuous and ultimately unsuccessful one, nevertheless did have important long-term ramifications for the future development of Portugal.[16]

Only a handful of charters survive from King Garcia's royal chancery, but the story they tell is a revealing one. The young king inherited an unstable realm dominated by an entrenched local nobility. During his father's reign great efforts had been made to curb the influence of these noble houses through the appointment in the region of royal agents such as Sisnando Davides.[17] Garcia, however, adopted a more direct approach. On 24 March 1066 the king summoned together the dignitaries of his realm to witness the formal humiliation of one of their number: the Portuguese nobleman Garcia Monnioniz, governor of Anegia (modern Arouca). The unfortunate nobleman and his wife were forced to sign an oddly sinister document in which they testified that it was not through fear of punishment or death, but rather with great joy, that they signed over their ancestral lands to the king. Both husband and wife were then exiled to Castile. While King Garcia's justification for this precipitous act of royal autocracy went unrecorded, the reaction of the local aristocracy to such an attack on their ancient rights and privileges can be easily imagined. Such misgivings were no doubt intensified when Garcia used the confiscated territory to enrich his own followers. On 4 January 1068 the title of governor and a portion of the land seized from Garcia Monnioniz were granted to Munio Venegas; and on 16 May 1070, a similar substantial grant was made to another royal favourite, Afonso Ramires, in return for unspecified services.[18] Meanwhile, King Garcia complemented this direct assault on aristocratic autonomy with a more subtle policy of royal intervention in the affairs of the realm through the installation of sympathetic church officials.

Ecclesiastical authority in the newly established kingdom of Galicia-Portugal was complicated by the ambitions of several leading churchmen. Bishop Vistuario of Lugo saw in the arrival of the new king an opportunity for the preferment of his church and became a frequent attendee at Garcia's court. Did he aspire to the archbishop's mitre as metropolitan of the kingdom? If so, his ambitions would have brought him into direct competition with the equally ambitious Bishop Cresconio of Iria, whose responsibilities encompassed the increasingly popular (and thus wealthy) pilgrimage site at Compostela. However, King Garcia appeared to have an agenda of his own. Ostensibly responding to a pious request from the two rival bishops, the king supported the re-establishment of the ancient and illustrious see of Braga. A local man, Bishop Pedro (1071–1091), was given authority over the church that, prior to the Arab invasion, had been the metropolitan of the ecclesiastical province of Galicia.[19] Nor was this the end of the young king's enthusiasm for church reconstruction: he also drew up plans to install new bishops in Lamego and Túy. While Garcia's ecclesiastical initiatives may well have contained an element of personal piety, there were also concrete benefits to be gained. Newly installed bishops were in effect royal agents, expected to intervene in local affairs at the king's behest. At the same time, the lands required to support the new benefices was sequestered in large

part from the local families themselves – thus, not only did the aristocratic houses find themselves with unwanted ecclesiastics forced upon them, but they were also obliged to pay for their upkeep. Passions rose across the kingdom, ultimately with tragic consequences, for in 1069, Bishop Cresconio of Iria's successor, Bishop Gudestes (1068–1069), was murdered by his own uncle.[20] If the unfortunate bishop was the first victim of the growing opposition to Garcia's style of leadership, as seems highly probable, he was certainly not to be the last.

Even as Bishop Pedro was taking up his new responsibilities at Braga, aristocratic disenchantment reached a point of crisis. One of the leading local magnates, Count Nuno Mendes of Portucale, rose in revolt against royal authority. Fully aware of the danger posed by this rebellion, King Garcia moved with alacrity and caught Count Nuno unprepared at Penderosa, north of Braga, in February 1071. Royal troops scattered the rebel forces and Nuno Mendes, the last male descendant of Vímara Peres, founder of Portucale, was killed in the rout.[21] Yet King Garcia was granted little leisure to savour his military triumph. The rise of domestic turmoil within the kingdom had attracted opportunistic attention from beyond its borders; and while the sequence of event is uncertain, it seems most likely that King Alfonso of León, whose territory bordered that of Garcia, struck the first blow.[22] In the absence of strong local support, Garcia was forced to retreat before his brother's invading forces. Meanwhile, King Sancho of Castile, carefully watching events from a distance, decided he could not allow Alfonso unchallenged occupation of Galicia-Portugal, and so launched an attack of his own. The elder brothers met at the battle of Golpejera in June 1072, from which Sancho emerged victorious. The defeated Alfonso of León was first imprisoned in Burgos and subsequently exiled to Muslim Toledo. Sancho followed up his success at Golpejera with an invasion of Galicia-Portugal that ended with Garcia being captured near Santarém and then banished to Seville.

Fortune, however, had another twist in store, and Garcia's exile in Muslim lands proved to be a short one. Only a few of months after his arrival messengers reached Seville bearing the sensational news that King Sancho had been assassinated outside the walls of Zamora while attempting to force obedience on his sister, Urraca. Sensing an opportunity to restore his position, Garcia enlisted the aid of the ruler of Seville, al-Mu'tamid, and then hurried northwards to press his ancestral claims. But the young king was already too late. His elder brother Alfonso had reached the kingdom first and moved quickly to secure their joint inheritance. He had no interest in sharing power. Aided, it would seem, by their formidable sister Urraca, Alfonso lured the trusting Garcia to a prearranged meeting place on the pretext of seeking a negotiated settlement, then promptly ordered him arrested. The hapless younger brother was subsequently confined to the castle of Luna. Though relatively well treated during his long imprisonment, the former king was

forced to wear chains until his death almost two decades later. According to legend, on his deathbed Garcia refused his elder brother's offer to have the manacles removed, and so was buried still wearing them. His tumultuous life and unhappy fate would subsequently make King Garcia a favourite subject for poets and balladeers. Meanwhile, however, the short-lived kingdom of Galicia-Portugal was absorbed into a reunited León-Castile.[23]

Although King Garcia has never been numbered among the Portuguese monarchs, his reign did have important long-term repercussions for the region. Garcia's most obvious legacy was in the ecclesiastical initiatives that had provoked such strong local unrest. The reconstruction of Braga created another node in the pattern of ecclesiastical tension in western Iberia, and over time the ambitious churchmen of the ancient metropolitan were to play a key role in the development of Portugal. Garcia's rule also highlighted the difficulty any central authority faced in countering the influence of the local aristocracy. Entrenched interests might be shaken, as with the death of Count Nuno Mendes; yet new power arrangements were constantly being formed. Thus Sisnando Davides, who held authority in Coimbra throughout Garcia's reign, had married Nuno Mendes' daughter Loba Aurovelido and integrated into local aristocratic circles. Sisnando's success, moreover, highlighted another aspect of eleventh-century Portuguese society: its pragmatism towards cultural difference. The count of Coimbra's Mozarabic heritage appears to have presented no barriers to his advancement up the aristocratic ranks. Similarly too, sectarian issues played little part in Garcia's dealings with external powers. The young king maintained effective relations with the Muslim *taifas* to the degree that, despite the rising turmoil in the kingdom, he never faced attack from the south. In fact, as his position deteriorated, Garcia may well have sought aid from the *taifa* rulers. His eventual capture near Santarém, deep in Muslim territory, certainly suggests some form of collusion had taken place; and following Sancho's death, Garcia seems to have won the support of al-Mu'tamid in his failed bid to regain the throne. In the final analysis, Garcia's pragmatic policies towards the Muslims, in common with his attempts to harness the power of the Church and the local nobility, proved insufficient to bring political stability to his realm. Nevertheless, these strategies were not inherently flawed. From his gilded royal prison, Garcia may well have taken some cold comfort in the knowledge that his elder brother Alfonso pursued many of the same policies in the region with far greater success.

The triumph of political pragmatism under Alfonso VI (1072–1085)

By the beginning of 1073 Portugal had come under the control of Alfonso VI, king of the reunited realm of León-Castile. This formidable monarch would continue to exercise undisputed suzerainty over the region until

his death in 1109. During Alfonso's reign the pragmatic approach to cross-cultural relations adopted by earlier monarchs came to full fruition. The Leonese king displayed an unusual ability to consider alternative cultural perspectives – both Christian and non-Christian – and this characteristic would underpin his most important long-term legacies in Portugal. During the long southern expansion significant numbers of Jewish and Muslim people had been overtaken by the tides of war and incorporated into Spanish society. The western regions of the peninsula, in common with many other areas under Alfonso's control, developed a cultural pluralism in which large Jewish and Muslim communities coexisted relatively peacefully under Christian authority. In Portugal, however, the delicate task of ruling this multicultural society was complicated by the presence of an unusually large concentration of Mozarabic Christians.

The Jewish presence in Iberia stretched back into antiquity. Under the rule of the Visigothic kings Jewish communities suffered significant persecution, and so had considerable justification for welcoming the eighth-century Arab invasions. The Muslim rulers of al-Andalus granted the Jewish minority the protected status of *dhimmī* or 'people of the book' (in common with the Christian minority) and allowed them a measure of self-government under their own religious laws. Individuals pursued artistic and literary excellence, or filled high administrative office in Muslim cities.[24] Later, as the Spanish kings forced the frontier southwards, many Jewish communities fell under their control and were able to retain significant rights. Senior clergymen outside the peninsula viewed this situation with some disapproval, and in 1081, Pope Gregory VII (1073–1085) admonished Alfonso against allowing Jews any authority over Christians. The repetition of such papal injunctions suggests that secular powers were slow to obey.[25] Similar conditions seem to have prevailed in Portugal, with Jews appearing as merchants and property owners in major cities. In Coimbra, for example, a prosperous Jewish quarter had developed and one of its residents was in a position to sell to Afonso Henriques the land on which the royal monastery of Santa Cruz was subsequently built.[26]

The situation for Muslims under Christian authority in many ways paralleled that of the Jews.[27] The Muslim minority was known to their Christian rulers as 'Mudejars', from the Arabic *al-mudajjan* (those allowed to remain) and there was a certain rough irony in this designation. It referred not only to those Muslims who elected to remain on their land after it had come under Christian control, but also to those unfortunates captured and enslaved during military operations.[28] The latter were in all likelihood the more numerous. With Muslim legal scholars arguing that the duty of the faithful was to withdraw rather than submit, the majority of those wealthy enough to relocate to Muslim-held areas generally did so. Those who stayed appear to have been predominantly agricultural workers and the urban poor.[29] Nevertheless, when gathered in sufficient numbers, these people

could usually obtain rights of self-jurisdiction along with freedom of worship. Rodrigo Diaz, 'the Cid', provides a famous example of the powers of collective bargaining. When the Cid captured Valencia in June 1094 he sought to reassure the anxious citizens with the following observation:

> God has bounteously given me Valencia and I rule it. If I conduct myself justly here and put affairs in order, God will leave me in possession of the city; but if I do wrong here by injustice or out of pride, I know that He will take it from me. From today, let each one go to his estate ... and resume ownership of it as the law of the Moors requires ... .[30]

Rodrigo made no reference to a religious or historical mandate of any kind. Instead he based his claims on his own ability and the expectation that God would grant justice on strictly non-doctrinal lines. In Portugal too, documents record the presence of significant minorities within frontier towns, and efforts were made to formalise relations between different cultural groups. Thus, a charter granted by Afonso VI to the border town of Santarém in 1095 includes measures to regulate interaction between Christians, Muslims and Jews. Such measures remained an important feature of Portuguese town charters and royal initiatives to protect minority groups continued throughout the eleventh and the twelfth century.[31]

While the positions of Jews and Muslims under Christian rule were in many ways similar, a third significant minority group, the Mozarabic Christians, could not be so easily categorised or contained. Many Mozarabs were the descendents of those Visigoths who had remained on their land after the Arab invasions and accepted Muslim authority; others, such as Sisnando Davides, were northerners who had for various reasons been brought up within Islamic society. In all cases, however, even as these people had adopted the manners and language of their Muslim overlords, they clung tenaciously to the religion of their forefathers.[32] These religious forms, sometimes rather misleadingly termed the 'Mozarabic rite', were in reality a slightly archaic variant of the same Visigothic rites adhered to by the Christian Spanish. In fact the characteristic that most differentiated the religious practices of the Mozarabs from those of their northern co-religionists was the depth of the Mozarabic attachment to traditional religious forms, since these rituals had sustained their culture while under Muslim domination and continued to constitute their only defence against ethnic disintegration. Nor was their piety in any way unorthodox. In 1068 Pope Alexander had been asked to confirm the suitability of Mozarabic religious practice and, after examining their texts, had done so.[33]

Ironically, however, the very orthodoxy of the Mozarabic faith in many ways highlighted their equivocal position, even within Christian society. The name 'Mozarab' is in itself indicative of the ambivalent attitudes many northern Spanish held towards members of this cultural subgroup. Although

the word was probably derived from the Arabic *musta'rab* or *musta'rib*, (one who claims to be Arab), this was not a term the Muslims used themselves. Instead, it was employed by Spanish Christians to define a branch of their co-religionists in cultural terms.[34] It was a label denoting difference rather than commonality, for in the socially fluid Iberian kingdoms a shared Christian faith was not enough in itself to ensure sympathy between culturally diverse peoples. The Spanish seem to have had little expectation that Mozarabs living in Muslim lands might constitute a potential fifth column. Instead the opposite seems to be the case; and in 1064 the Mozarabs of recently captured Coimbra were accused of secretly preferring Islamic rule to that of King Fernando. Even into the mid-twelfth century the Spanish made scant effort during military operations to discriminate between Muslims and Mozarabs among their enemies. Individuals from either faith who were unfortunate enough to be seized by northern raiding parties apparently received much the same rough treatment.[35] For more than any other group in Iberian society, the Mozarabs demonstrate both the pervasiveness and the practical limits of pragmatic coexistence. In Christian society they were categorised not by their religious beliefs but by their cultural accoutrements; the Muslims saw past their appearance to focus on their faith. Thus, defined as they were by their difference, the Mozarabs could live in both worlds, or in neither; their political orientation was essentially a matter of circumstance or indeed personal choice. Nevertheless, they were not excluded from either society and could be accepted as loyal subjects on both sides of the frontier.

Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, it was among the Mozarabs that the most definite statements of what might be called an ideology of reconquest were to be found. Despite their unique position between the Christian and Muslim worlds, the Mozarabic peoples had lost most in the Arab invasions. As a cultural group they maintained an awareness of the past and their literature betrays a strong sense of historical grievance.[36] Yet perhaps the most striking statement of the Mozarabic attitude towards the righting of ancient wrongs was in fact penned by a Muslim, 'Abd Allāh of Granada, and attributed to none other than Sisnando Davides. In a description of an embassy sent by Alfonso of León-Castile, 'Abd Allāh recalled Sisnando adding to his king's message a warning of his own.

> Al-Andalus originally belonged to the Christians. Then they were defeated by the Arabs and driven to the most inhospitable region, Galicia. Now that they are strong and capable, the Christians desire to recover what they have lost ... .[37]

Nevertheless Sisnando, like all Mozarabs, was deeply inured to Arabic culture; indeed his attempt to justify the expansionism of his co-religionists in historical terms is indicative of the close connections that still bound

him to the Muslim world in which he had grown up, for his implication is that the Spanish were impelled not by sectarian animosity, but by the demands of natural justice. The aim of his reconquest was not necessarily to expel the Muslims from Spain, rather it was to impose Christian rule over them. Thus, Sisnando's position could be seen to be simply an inversion of the cultural *convivencia* he had experienced during his time in Muslim service.

Culturally Arabic and yet faithful to their traditional forms of Christianity, the Mozarabs constituted a unique social subgroup. By the eleventh century a great number of Mozarabs had migrated to the north or been enveloped as the frontier moved southwards. There were numerous Mozarabic communities across Christian Spain, particularly in urban areas; but for a variety of reasons, there was an unusual concentration of these communities in Portugal. The westernmost regions of the peninsula had great cultural resonance for the traditionally minded Mozarabs. Braga, a religious centre which could trace its history back to ancient times, was associated with such ecclesiastical luminaries as Paulus Orosius in the fourth century and St Martin of Braga 200 years later. Until 1085 Braga was also the only ancient metropolitan city under Christian control. In Portugal too, Mozarabs could find political and ecclesiastical leaders who shared their cultural leanings. Both Count Sisnando Davides and Bishop Paternus of Coimbra (1092–1098) were Mozarabs, while Bishop Pedro of Braga had strong sympathy for the ancient forms of worship the Arabised Christian community favoured.[38] By the middle of the eleventh century, the Coimbra region had become something of a Mozarabic stronghold and this was reflected as a strong local sense of the past, a respect for tradition, but most of all a deep conservatism in matters of religious practice. At the same time, the Mozarabic community also had much to contribute to Christian society as a whole, including a close familiarity with the Muslim world and an ability to operate effectively across cultural barriers. During the early reign of Alfonso of León-Castile, such qualities were highly valued and could be the key to considerable individual advancement.

The ambitions of the Leonese monarch extended far beyond the sovereignty of his own multicultural kingdom. In an exchange of letters with al-Mu'tamid of Seville, Alfonso is purported to have styled himself 'the emperor of the two religions'. This title was intended to infer influence, even authority over the fractious Muslim states to the south. While the veracity of these letters has been difficult to establish with certainty, the attitudes of inclusiveness implicit in them also underpinned the Leonese monarch's wider relationships with Muslim al-Andalus.[39] For Alfonso, in common with other Spanish Christian leaders of his time, had come to recognise that coexistence with the Muslim *taifa* states could yield far richer results than anything that might be gained through a policy of unremitting belligerence. In the chaotic world that emerged following the

break-up of the caliphate and the emergence of the mutually suspicious *taifa* states a complicated network of cross-cultural diplomatic relations had developed, linking rival states in cooperation or rivalry. Issues of religious orientation were frequently ignored as rulers on both sides of the highly permeable frontier struck bargains and made alliances on the basis of practical gain.

Throughout the eleventh century and indeed well into the twelfth-century diplomacy – albeit diplomacy backed by force – was the premier tool of Iberian statecraft. Treaties between Christian and Muslim rulers were common, with perhaps the most famous of these agreements being the mutual defence pact negotiated by al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza and Fernando of León-Castile in 1062. King Ramiro I of Aragon (1035–1063) paid dearly for underestimating the strength of Fernando's resolve when, less than a year after this agreement was concluded, he launched a disastrous attack on the Zaragozan stronghold of Graus. The Leonese king fulfilled his obligations under the terms of the treaty and sent five hundred knights to support his Muslim ally. The strengthened garrison routed the attacking Aragonese army and King Ramiro himself was slain.[40] Nor was this military alliance unusual: the texts of other agreements have survived to provide striking illustrations of *convivencia* in action. A pact signed in April 1069 by Sancho IV of Navarra (1054–1076) and al-Muqtadir, for example, bound Sancho to support his ally against all enemies, be they Christians or Muslims; and this close relationship was renewed in May 1073. Other less vaunted individuals struck similar deals, with the best known of these being Rodrigo Díaz, 'the Cid'. During an eventful career (including a presence at Ramiro's fatal denouement at Graus in 1062) Rodrigo served several *taifa* rulers as a mercenary commander. The victories he won on their behalf, over both Christian and Muslim opponents, merely served to increase his stature among his own co-religionists.[41]

The creation of military treaties between members of different faiths presupposed a degree of mutual respect, and such agreements could sometimes be sealed with the closest of bonds. Thus, Alfonso cemented an alliance with al-Mu'tamid of Seville by entering into official concubinage with the Muslim ruler's daughter-in-law, Princess Zaida. Far from being considered in any way unsuitable, this relationship became grist for romantic literature and a son from the union, Sancho, was later considered the primary contender for the throne of León-Castile.[42] A reputation for fair dealing among the Muslims was an asset highly prized by Christian rulers. Consequently, despite the Cid's proven military prowess, he was exiled because he contravened Alfonso's agreements with al-Muqtadir by launching unauthorised attacks against Zaragozan territory.[43] Some years later, 'Abd Allāh of Granada recalled Alfonso's eagerness to ensure a businesslike atmosphere prevailed. 'God forbid,' the Leonese monarch supposedly exclaimed, 'that people should say that a man as great as I among the

Christians came to you, equally great among your kind, and then betrayed you.'[44] In the volatile climate of Spanish politics rival leaders struck deals where they could, and such arrangements were firmly based in political expediency. This is nowhere more evident than in the evolution of the gold tributes, known as *parias*, exacted by the Christian kings from the *taifa* rulers.

The wealth of Iberia was concentrated in the south, in the sophisticated urban culture of al-Andalus; the mountainous north, on the other hand, produced skilled and restless warriors. This disparity presented clear opportunities for an enterprising Christian ruler. King Fernando first demanded the payment of *paria* tribute from Seville, Zaragoza and Toledo in 1062. These tributes were then paid fairly regularly for over twenty years, enhanced from 1074 by the imposition of similar obligations on Granada, and represented a huge financial resource for the Christian kings. The Zaragozan *paria* alone has been calculated at somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 gold dinars per annum. 'Abd Allāh of Granada ruefully recalled that to secure the friendship of Alfonso VI in 1074 he was forced to pay a lump sum of 30,000 dinars in advance and promise the Leonese king a further 10,000 annually.[45] It was nothing less than protection money and as such bought security from attack. With hindsight later authors would read into Alfonso's actions a long-term strategy of economic warfare – yet there is a thin line between extortion and taxation. While these huge payments certainly allowed the Spanish monarchs who controlled them to field large, professional armies, they also dictated the uses to which such forces could be put. The Christian kings guarded their revenues jealously, mounting campaigns not to capture territory, but to menace defaulters into payment. Moreover great care was taken to ensure that these sources of income remained financially viable, a policy that often included strengthening chosen *taifas* against both Christian and Muslim incursion.[46]

What then was Alfonso's idea of reconquest? Rather than being impelled by the burning desire to reclaim ancient ancestral lands in the name of Christendom, Alfonso's intention was simply to control the wealth these lands produced. His campaign to achieve this control was careful, slow and wherever possible non-violent. In his remarkable autobiography 'Abd Allāh of Grenada recalled the Leonese king quite candidly expounding on his overall strategy and the objectives he hoped to secure.

> The best plan, indeed the only plan, is to threaten one with the other and take their money all the time until their cities are impoverished and weakened. When they are weakened they will surrender to me and become mine of their own accord.[47]

This was a policy of pragmatic *convivencia* in which the aim was not to kill or even to banish the enemy, but instead to subject them to royal authority.

While this pragmatism had much in common with the reconquest as envisaged by Sisnando Davides, it was closer in spirit to the Cid's recognition of Muslim rights at Valencia. Alfonso seldom looked to the Visigothic past for justification, rather he simply eschewed overt sectarian or cultural animosities to embrace practical reality. This was a policy of tolerant *Realpolitik* and it reached a triumphant climax in 1085.

The city of Toledo, on the northern bank of the Tagus River, was an ancient, populous and wealthy urban centre. Alfonso knew the city well, having been sent there as an exile during the 1070s. The Muslim ruler of the city, al-Ma'mūn, had been instrumental in the young king's triumphant return to power and had in all likelihood extracted an oath of future solidarity from Alfonso in return for this support. When al-Ma'mūn was subsequently poisoned at Cordoba in 1075, his son, al-Qādir, inherited authority in Toledo, but demonstrated little capacity for effective rule. During al-Qādir's troubled reign Alfonso was forced to intervene to maintain his old ally's dynasty in power, and to do so more effectively the Leonese monarch gradually took control of the fortresses surrounding the city – always with al-Qādir compliance. When al-Qādir was finally driven from Toledo by a popular uprising, Alfonso moved against the city itself. Resistance was virtually nonexistent: after a short siege the citizens capitulated and received generous terms.[48] Any who wished to leave were allowed to take their moveable goods; those choosing to stay would retain possession of their property, their customary laws and freedom of religion. Separate agreements were reached with the Muslim, Jewish and Mozarabic communities under which the Great Mosque was to remain under Muslim control, the Jews kept their synagogue and the Mozarabs were guaranteed continued authority over churches they had previously held in the city.

The capture of Toledo was the most significant territorial gain made by Alfonso during a long, eventful reign and was a direct result of royal policies of pragmatic engagement with the Muslim world. In a move calculated to reassure the inhabitants of the multicultural city Alfonso chose Sisnando Davides, the Mozarabic governor of Coimbra, to rule in Toledo.[49] This appointment elevated the count of Coimbra into the highest level of royal politics – a remarkable rise for the former child-prisoner, and a position he owed primarily to his ability to operate effectively across cultural boundaries. Certainly he brought these qualities to his new office in Toledo. Both Christian and Muslim authors described Sisnando as a highly efficient governor whose moderation and even-handed approach to all members of the city's diverse population brought calm in the aftermath of the Spanish takeover, and indeed won many converts to Christianity from the Muslim and Jewish communities. Yet even as Sisnando worked to establish an effective government based on the accommodation of cultural difference, the principles of pluralism he sought to champion were decisively challenged from an unexpected quarter. For almost as soon as a relative tranquillity

had fallen over the city, Christian authorities seized the Great Mosque and, in direct defiance of the surrender terms, consecrated it as a cathedral.

The breach of faith appears to have been the result of a conspiracy between Bernard of Sedirac, the newly appointed bishop of Toledo (1086–1124/1125), and Alfonso's second wife, Queen Constance of Burgundy. Acting in concert, the bishop and queen overrode Sisnando's objections and, without waiting to consult the absent King Alfonso, ordered the seizure and consecration of the mosque. When news of this act of bad faith broke in the royal court the enraged king swept back to Toledo intent, it was later believed, on burning both bishop and queen alive in punishment for their actions. Alfonso's precipitous response to the besmirching of his good name in the Islamic world was only prevented by the intercession of an embassy from the Muslim community of Toledo. On bended knees the wronged Muslims convinced the king to take no action, for they prudently foresaw that any backlash of popular anger would inevitably fall on them.[50] For a time an uneasy peace was restored within the city, but the Jewish, Muslim and Mozarabic communities would have had strong cause to wonder whether the cultural tolerance that they had been promised was already beginning to evaporate.

During the early decades of his reign Alfonso of León-Castile had pursued a pragmatic strategy in his dealings with his own subjects and also in his relations with rival Iberian rulers. One striking result of this approach was the creation of a culture of pluralism within his realm, much to the benefit of those who were capable of operating effectively across social and political frontiers. It was a multicultural world and a time when individuals such as Sisnando Davides could rise rapidly. Yet events in the wake of the capture of Toledo highlighted another side to Alfonso's policy of social inclusion. The Spanish monarch was deeply attracted to the developing culture of Latin Christendom, and under his patronage the pace of cultural exchange quickened. An ironic consequence of Alfonso's social eclecticism was the translocation into Spain of an alternative ethos that was fundamentally intolerant of cultural diversity. Bishop Bernard and Queen Constance can be seen as exemplars of the Latin Christian world and their actions in Toledo reflected the attitudes of cultural exclusivity developing beyond the Pyrenees. The consecration of the Great Mosque was the first substantial Spanish victory for these attitudes of exclusivity over the more moderate policies of Iberian *Realpolitik*. It was a victory, moreover, which was not an isolated incident, but rather a critical point in an ongoing process of Latin cultural permeation of Iberia. Few regions of the peninsula were to be more deeply affected than the western coastal zone. Sisnando Davides was only one of many Portuguese who were to find this growing Latin Christian cultural influence both unwelcome and deeply unsettling.