


palgrave
macmillan

The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660–2000

How Strategic Concerns Shaped
Modern Britain

Edited by
William Mulligan
and
Brendan Simms



The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660–2000

Also by William Mulligan

THE CREATION OF THE MODERN GERMAN ARMY. GENERAL WALTHER
REINHARDT AND THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, 1914–1930

THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Also by Brendan Simms

THE IMPACT OF NAPOLEON

THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN GERMANY

UNFINEST HOUR. BRITAIN AND THE DESTRUCTION OF BOSNIA

THREE VICTORIES AND A DEFEAT. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FIRST BRITISH
EMPIRE

The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660–2000

**How Strategic Concerns Shaped Modern
Britain**

Edited by

William Mulligan

Lecturer in Modern History, University College Dublin

and

Brendan Simms

Professor of the History of International Relations, University of Cambridge

palgrave
macmillan



Editorial matter and selection © William Mulligan and Brendan Simms 2010
All remaining chapters © their respective authors 2010
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2010 978-0-230-57472-4

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2010 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-36547-0 ISBN 978-0-230-28962-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230289628

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The primacy of foreign policy in British history, 1660–2000: how strategic concerns shaped modern Britain / edited by William Mulligan, Brendan Simms.

p. cm.

1. Great Britain—Foreign relations. 2. Geopolitics—Great Britain—History. I. Mulligan, William, 1975– II. Simms, Brendan. DA45.P75 2010 327.41—dc22

2010023944

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10

For Hamish Scott

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

<i>List of Figures and Tables</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	x
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	xi
1 Introduction <i>Brendan Simms and William Mulligan</i>	1
2 Conflicting Visions: Foreign Affairs in Domestic Debate 1660–1689 <i>Gabriel Glickman</i>	15
3 Primacy Contested: Foreign and Domestic Policy in the Reign of William III <i>David Onnekink</i>	32
4 Anglo-Scottish Union and the War of the Spanish Succession <i>Allan I. Macinnes</i>	49
5 The Development of the Executive and Foreign Policy, 1714–1760 <i>Andrew C. Thompson</i>	65
6 European Great Power Politics in British Public Discourse, 1714–1763 <i>Doohwan Ahn and Brendan Simms</i>	79
7 Waging War: The Irish Military Establishment and the British Empire, 1688–1763 <i>Charles Ivar McGrath</i>	102
8 Europe, the American Crisis, and Scottish Evangelism: The Primacy of Foreign Policy in the Kirk? <i>Gideon Mailer</i>	119
9 Debating the Union on Foreign Fields: Ulster Unionism and the Importance of Britain’s ‘Place in the World’, c. 1830–c. 1870 <i>John Bew</i>	137
10 The Enduring Importance of Foreign Policy Dominance in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Politics <i>Adrian Brettle</i>	154

11	Radicalism, Free Trade, and Foreign Policy in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Britain <i>Anthony Howe</i>	167
12	Gladstone and the Primacy of Foreign Policy <i>William Mulligan</i>	181
13	Imagined Spaces: Nation, State, and Territory in the British Colonial Empire, 1860–1914 <i>Duncan Bell</i>	197
14	British Liberal Historians and the Primacy of Internationalism <i>Casper Sylvest</i>	214
15	‘Chief of All Offices’: High Politics, Finance, and Foreign Policy, 1865–1914 <i>T.G. Otte</i>	232
16	The 1910 Elections and the Primacy of Foreign Policy <i>Phillips Payson O’Brien</i>	249
17	Patriotism and the Politics of Foreign Policy, c. 1870–c. 1914 <i>Paul Readman</i>	260
18	The Historiography of Inter-War Politics: Competing Conservative World Views in High Politics, 1924–1929 <i>Richard S. Grayson</i>	277
19	The Primacy of Foreign Policy? Britain in the Second World War <i>David Edgerton</i>	291
20	Britain in Europe? Conservative and Labour Attitudes to European Integration since the Second World War <i>Nicholas Crowson and James McKay</i>	305
21	Foreign Policy in the Labour Party Manifestos, 1945–1997: What Primacy? <i>Antoine Capet</i>	319
	<i>Conclusion</i>	336
	Brendan Simms and William Mulligan	
	<i>Index</i>	340

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

6.1	Titles per decade, 1475–1800	81
6.2	Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 1714–1725	85
6.3	Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 1726–1731	87
6.4	Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 1732–1740	88
6.5	Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 1741–1748	90
6.6	Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 1749–1763	91
6.7	Europe or America, 1714–1763	92
6.8	Empires, 1714–1800	94
6.9	Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 1714–1763	95

Tables

7.1	An account of the regiments on the Irish Establishment that have been employed in England and abroad	110
7.2	Comparative view of the army on the Irish Establishment, 1750–1770, with regiments at home and abroad	110
12.1	Expenditure in millions, 1865–1890	188
12.2	Army, naval, and civil expenditure as % of total government expenditure	189

Acknowledgements

This volume is the result of a conference hosted by the Scottish Centre for War Studies in the University of Glasgow in March 2008. The editors wish to thank the Department of History for its support for the project and especially Margo Hunter and Elaine Monteith for their work in ensuring that the conference ran smoothly. We are particularly grateful to Dr Roddy Neilson for his generous support for the Scottish Centre for War Studies, which enabled this venture to proceed.

The editors are both extremely fortunate to have benefitted from the intellectual generosity of Professor Hamish Scott over the past 15 years. The conference had originally been intended as a (surprise) event in his honour to celebrate his remarkable contribution to the study of British history in its European context. Unfortunately, he had to cancel his attendance at the event as a panel chair because of a family bereavement. We are therefore particularly pleased to be able to dedicate this volume to him as a token of our gratitude.

William Mulligan, Brendan Simms

Notes on Contributors

Doohwan Ahn is completing his doctorate at the University of Cambridge, where he is researching British strategic and economic thought in the early eighteenth century. He has published a number of articles on this theme, including an article in the *History of European Ideas* in 2010.

Duncan Bell is a lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, and a fellow of Christ's College. He is the author of *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (2007) and the editor of a number of books, including *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (2008) and 'Ethics and world politics' (2010).

John Bew is Lecturer in War Studies at King's College London and Deputy Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. He was previously Lecturer in Modern British History at Peterhouse, Cambridge and is the author of *The Glory of being Britons: Civic Unionism in Nineteenth-Century Belfast*.

Adrian Brettle is a PhD candidate at the University of Virginia, where he held an Archibald Craig fellowship in order to study the American Civil War and the nineteenth-century US South. His proposed dissertation is titled 'Confederate expansionist ambitions during the American Civil War, 1861–5.' He has published articles on nineteenth-century British political history and is currently teaching courses on British and European history.

David Edgerton is Hans Rausing Professor at Imperial College London. Among his books are *England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation* (1991), *Warfare State: Britain 1920–1970* (2005), and *The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900* (2007).

Antoine Capet, FRHistS, is Head of British Studies at the University of Rouen (France). After submitting his *Doctorat d'État* on the British governing classes and social reform, 1931–1951 (published 1991), he continued to concentrate his research on social questions in 1940s Britain. His most recent publication is an edited book, *The Representation of Working People in Britain and France: New Perspectives* (2009). He has been Editor of the 'Britain since 1914' section of the Royal Historical Society Bibliography since 2001 and he sits on the International Board of *Twentieth Century British History*.

Nicholas Crowson is Reader in Contemporary British at the University of Birmingham where he has been teaching since 1997. He has published

widely on aspects of the Conservative party including *The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945* (2006), *The Longman Companion to the Conservative Party* (2001), and *Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European Dictators 1934–40* (1997). He is currently an editor of the journal *Contemporary British History* and was elected a fellow of the Royal Historical Society in 1999.

Gabriel Glickman is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at Hertford College, Oxford. His first book, *The English Catholic Community, 1688–1745. Politics, Culture and Ideology* was published in 2009.

Richard S. Grayson is Head of Politics and Senior Lecturer in British and Irish Politics at Goldsmiths, University of London. He has published two books and several articles on inter-war British foreign policy, with his third monograph, *Belfast Boys* (2009), examining West Belfast's role in the First World War.

Anthony Howe is Professor of Modern History at the University of East Anglia. His books include *Free Trade and Liberal England* (1997) and with Simon Morgan, he has edited *Rethinking Nineteenth-Century Liberalism: Richard Cobden Bicentenary Essays* (2006). He is the editor of *The Letters of Richard Cobden*, vol. 1: 1815–1847 (2007) and vol. 2. 1848–1853 (2010).

Charles Ivar McGrath is a lecturer in the School of History and Archives at UCD. He is the author of *The Making of the Eighteenth-Century Irish Constitution: Government, Parliament and the Revenue, 1692–1714* (2000), and editor (with Michael Brown and Thomas Power) of *Converts and Conversion in Ireland, 1650–1850* (2005) (with Chris Fauske) of *Money, Power, and Print: Interdisciplinary Studies on the Financial Revolution in the British Isles* (2008), and (with James Kelly and John McCafferty) of *People, Politics and Power: Essays on Irish History 1660–1850 in Honour of James I. McGuire* (2009). He has published articles in *English Historical Review*, *Irish Historical Studies*, *Eighteenth-Century Ireland*, and *Parliamentary History*, as well as essays and contributions in various edited collections and reference works.

Allan I. Macinnes is Professor of Early Modern History at the University of Strathclyde. He has written extensively on British state formation in the seventeenth century and on Jacobitism in the eighteenth century. His current research is focused on Identity and Mobility from Jacobitism to Empire.

Gideon Mailer is a Title A fellow at St. John's College, and an affiliated lecturer in the Faculty of History, University of Cambridge.

James McKay is a post-doctoral research fellow at the University of Birmingham, and research officer on the Leverhulme-funded NGOs in Britain project (www.ngo.bham.ac.uk<<http://www.ngo.bham.ac.uk/>>). Prior to this, he was Project Officer on the Database of Archives of

UK Non-Governmental Organisations since 1945 (www.dango.bham.ac.uk <<http://www.dango.bham.ac.uk/>>). Awarded his PhD in 2006, he has co-edited two books on the history of NGOs and the role of the voluntary sector in the twentieth century. He has also published book chapters and articles on British political history and NGOs in contemporary Britain.

William Mulligan is a lecturer in modern history at University College Dublin. He is the author of *The Making of the Modern German Army: General Walther Reinhardt and the Weimar Republic* (2005) and *The Origins of the First World War* (2010).

Phillips Payson O'Brien is the director of the Scottish Centre for War Studies and a senior lecturer in history at the University of Glasgow. He has written and edited a number of works on Anglo-American politics and foreign affairs between the origins of the First World War and the end of the Second World War. Among them are: *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy 1900–1936* (1998); 'The Titan Refreshed, Imperial Overstretch and the British Navy before the First World War' (*Past and Present*, 2001); and *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* (2004). He is presently working on a book on Anglo-American power and the outcome of the Second World War.

David Onnekink is Assistant Professor at the Universities of Leiden and Utrecht. He is mainly interested in Early Modern International Relations. He has recently edited a volume of essays on *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713* (2009), and is currently finishing a monograph on the ideological dimension of early modern Dutch foreign policy.

T.G. Otte, MA, PhD, is Senior Lecturer in diplomatic history at the University of East Anglia. His most recent two books are *The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894–1905* (2007) and *The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854–1946* (2009).

Paul Readman is Senior Lecturer in Modern British History, King's College London. He is the author of *Land and Nation in England: Patriotism, National Identity and the Politics of Land, 1880–1914* (2008) and (as editor, with Matthew Cragoe), *The Land Question in Britain, 1750–1950* (2010), as well as articles in journals including *Past & Present*, *English Historical Review*, and *Historical Journal*.

Brendan Simms is Professor of the history of international relations at the University of Cambridge. He has written widely on international history and his books include *The impact of Napoleon* (1997), *The struggle for mastery in Germany* (1998), *Unfinest Hour* (2001), and *Three Victories and a Defeat* (2007).

Casper Sylvest is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark. He is the author of *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880–1930: Making Progress?* (2009)

as well as a series of articles on the history international thought. His work has appeared in *Review of International Studies*, *Modern Intellectual History*, *The British Yearbook of International Law*, *International Relations*, and *International Studies Quarterly*.

Andrew C. Thompson is a college lecturer in History at Queens' College, Cambridge. He is the author of a number of works on eighteenth-century diplomacy and politics, including *Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest* (2006). His biography of George II will be published in 2011.

1

Introduction

Brendan Simms and William Mulligan

Like so much in British history and historiography, the concept of the 'primacy of foreign policy' is a German import.¹ In its original prescriptive form, it was a demand for the strict subordination of all domestic matters to the external demands of the European state system.² The descriptive use of the term, on the other hand, notes rather than celebrates the salience of foreign policy concerns in the politics and internal development of the state.³ 'The degree of independence', the doyen of modern historiography Leopold von Ranke wrote, 'determines a state's position in the world, and requires that the state mobilize all its inner resources for the goal of self-preservation. This is its supreme law.'⁴ This approach was subsequently elaborated at some length by the constitutional and administrative historian Otto Hintze. 'As a result of constant rivalry and competition between themselves', he wrote, 'individual states find themselves forced into a continuous intensification and rationalisation of their administrative apparatus'.⁵ The entire narrative of modern Prusso-German history from the state-building of the Great Elector and Frederick William I, the preventive wars of Frederick the Great, through the Prussian reform period and the era of unification to the origins of the First World War, was thus explained with reference to the extreme foreign-political exposure of a state sandwiched between more powerful predators in the centre of Europe.

In the early 1960s, however, Fritz Fischer famously argued that the German decision for war in 1914 had been not only a voluntarist act of aggression, but also motivated by a desire to distract from social and political crises at home.⁶ Not long after, Hans-Ulrich Wehler's short but seminal and undoubtedly brilliant study *Das deutsche Kaiserreich*, first set out a programmatic 'primacy of domestic policy' – *Primat der Innenpolitik* – in which German foreign policy was seen as effectively subservient to the domestic aims and problems of the German elites.⁷ By the end of the 1970s, observers had begun to speak of a 'New Orthodoxy' from which the spectre of foreign policy had been largely banished.⁸ Since then, however, as the co-authors of this volume tried to show several years ago,⁹ there has been a renaissance

of the primacy of foreign policy in the study of German history.¹⁰ In short, the 'primacy of foreign policy' has undergone something of a Renaissance in German history. It therefore seems appropriate to explore whether the 'primacy of foreign policy' has anything to tell us about British history.

*

'Knowledge of the secondary literature', the German medieval historian Hermann Heimpel liked to say, 'guards against new discoveries'.¹¹ The editors of this volume therefore begin by stressing that they do not propose to re-invent the wheel. There is no shortage of studies on British foreign policy, and certainly no lack of work on British society, culture, and politics. Most treatments of Britain's relations with Europe and the wider world, for example, those of Hamish Scott, Jeremy Black, and John Charmley, take the domestic context in which policy was formed into account.¹² There has also been important research done on the impact of war and foreign policy on English or British domestic politics. It is a theme which runs through recent work by David Trim, Jonathan Scott, Tony Claydon, and Jonathan Parry, to name but some.¹³ Nor have students of British society, state formation, and political thought neglected the broader European and global context. One thinks for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of Peter Dickson's study on the 'financial revolution', John Brewer's seminal study of the 'fiscal-military state',¹⁴ and Istvan Hont's magisterial *Jealousy of trade*,¹⁵ the studies by Bob Harris and M. John Cardwell on the role of foreign policy in the growing British public sphere, and Stephen Conway's extensive oeuvre on the connection between war, foreign policy, and state formation in mid- to late-eighteenth-century Britain.¹⁶ Historians such as Allan Macinnes, Tom Bartlett, and Patrick Geoghegan have shown how the constitutional architecture of the British state has been shaped by the imperatives of war.¹⁷ Geoffrey Hicks has recently examined the impact of European politics on Conservative party politics in the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁸ Frank Trentmann notes the impact of imperial rivalry and foreign policy on civil society,¹⁹ while K. W. Mitchison shows how the rising German threat across the North Sea forced governments to ramp up the mobilisation of domestic manpower.²⁰ Imperial competition before 1914, as Christian Wipperfürth, Paul Ward, and earlier G. R. Searle argued, affected a wide range of domestic social and political issues from education to radical politics.²¹ Harriet Jones was able to claim in a recent essay that 'a wide range of contemporary British historians working on entirely different subjects have come to see the Cold War as a dominant theme, despite the fact that it was strictly limited as a military conflict.'²² As if to reflect this new emphasis, the most recent North American Conference on British Studies included a range of papers and roundtables on the external context to British history.²³

By and large, however, the two spheres have been considered in isolation, or at any rate, the impact of foreign policy on domestic affairs has not been explored systematically, or systematically enough, in the way that an earlier generation of German historians did for Prussia, or historians of the Cold War have done for America.²⁴ This is especially true for the modern period. Back in 1988 Steve and Michael Smith noted that 'it is striking that relatively few works on British politics include explicit treatment of foreign policy issues, even though many of the processes and issues they present have important international origins.'²⁵ Theo Hoppen, in his contribution to the *Oxford History of Britain*, considers foreign and imperial policy in isolated chapters, downplaying the relationship between foreign and domestic political contexts.²⁶ Likewise, Martin Pugh hives foreign policy into chapters at the end of each section in his study of modern Britain, though he does not ignore its impact on British domestic politics and identities.²⁷ On the other hand, Keith Robbins' history of modern Britain starts each section with a chapter on foreign policy. Although he notes that 'wars and rumours of wars dominated the experience of men born in the 1880s' and that the wars of the twentieth century shattered 'normality', he does not offer a sustained account of the impact of foreign policy on domestic issues.²⁸ Others downplay the significance of foreign policy in their introductory remark only to find that it elbows its way back to the forefront of their narrative. Take Peter Clarke's elegant history of twentieth-century Britain, *Hope and Glory*, as an example. He begins by explaining that histories of British decline in the twentieth century concentrate on foreign and imperial history, 'now often regarded as old-fashioned'. He makes a strong case for a wider view of history, incorporating research from social and cultural history. Yet, he argues, that in the late 1930s 'British politics were about... foreign policy.' Britain's international financial position, the strains of occupying Germany after 1945, and the Korean War placed severe limitations on the post-war Labour governments' welfare and economic reforms. In the 1950s, the 'make-or-break issue of Eden's premiership lay in foreign affairs.' By the late 1980s 'Britain's relations with the European Community formed the submerged reef on which the Thatcher government foundered in successive ministerial crises.'²⁹

As with the early modern period, students of state formation pay closest attention to the pressures the international system exercised on domestic affairs. Although Philip Harling stresses the rise of the welfare state in the twentieth century, he notes that the pressures of the international system and war spurred greater state intervention and spending from the late nineteenth century onwards.³⁰ James Cronin argues that the two world wars swept away much of the resistance to the expansion of the state, as survival legitimised high levels of state expenditure.³¹

The purpose of this volume, therefore, is to explore the usefulness of the 'primacy of foreign policy' as a tool for understanding the broad thrust of British history since the late seventeenth century. It will be a study not of

foreign policy itself, but of the way in which the internal development of the British Isles was substantially driven by considerations of grand strategy. The ultimate aim of this project is therefore much more than just the 'additive' inclusion of the external context to the understanding of British history, welcome though that would often be. Ultimately, the intent is to provide a substitutive framework which will enable us to look at that history in a completely different light. A brief preliminary sketch of an alternative narrative of British history will therefore be attempted in the 'Conclusion'.

The first step in our exercise will be to establish the relative hierarchy of foreign and domestic policy, and the relationship between them in a given period or context. Which – to adapt Lenin's famous question – drives what? Are we dealing with an objective or a subjective primacy of foreign policy: are we simply saying that the protagonists made their history within a commanding international context, whether they were aware of it or not? Was foreign policy, to borrow Michael Bentley's terminology,³² the 'centre of attention' at home? Are we making the more ambitious claim that the actors were making their own history fully conscious that it was part of a much broader canvas? More particularly, we need to ask: which bits are driven by what? For it is not enough to demonstrate that security or expansion were the principal preoccupations: the implications of this for society, economy, the development of national institutions, and political culture, amongst other issues, need to be assessed. Did strategic pressures arrest or stimulate the growth of participatory politics in Britain? Did they increase the penalties on domestic dissenters, or did they open the way for a more inclusive polity in the long run? To what extent was the formation of the British Isles, the distinctive constitutional architecture tying together England, Scotland, and Ireland driven by strategic considerations? Was the primacy of foreign policy a constant, or did it ebb and flow over time? To what extent have previous generations of historians of British domestic politics taken the foreign policy context into account? All the while, we need to be on our guard for solipsism and source mining. We will therefore need to pause from time to time to ask ourselves the question: is the division between the domestic and foreign spheres always clear or even useful?

*

This book cannot, of course, do more than make a start. That said, the individual chapters do cover a broad chronological sweep, beginning with the Restoration and ending in 1997 with Labour's election victory. The thematic range is broad too. Political history, with the contributions by David Onnekink, John Bew, Adrian Brett, William Mulligan, Nicholas Crowson, and James McKay, is well represented, but there are also chapters by Gabriel Glickman, Doohwan Ahn, and Brendan Simms on the public

sphere, by Andrew C. Thompson on administrative history, a historiographical chapter by David Edgerton, and intellectual history by Duncan Bell and Casper Sylvest. Electoral politics are treated by Phil O'Brien and Antoine Capet. Gideon Mailer and Paul Readman examine debates over religious and national identity. Allan Macinnes and Anthony Howe consider the question of political economy, while Ivar McGrath examines the relationship between constitutional development, finance, and war in eighteenth-century Ireland. There are important chronological gaps, such as the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. Some major themes in social, political, and economic history received less attention than we would have liked. After all, changing perceptions of gender roles and the rise of the welfare state owed much to the pressures of two world wars, while the tax system was the most significant link between foreign and domestic politics for centuries, following the financial revolution after 1688.³³

Many of the chapters show that despite recent work, there are still large historiographical gaps in our understanding of the impact on foreign policy on British domestic history. Gabriel Glickman, for example, shows that the link is noted for the late seventeenth century, but misconstrued. David Onnekink reminds us how traditional views of the Glorious Revolution and even some recent accounts (pp. 33–5) have neglected the crucial external dimension. Andrew C. Thompson notes how the (still) dominant Whig interpretation of British administrative history has missed the centrality of foreign policy in the development of the cabinet. For the early nineteenth century, John Bew notes that the foreign-political context to the Irish question has been largely ignored by historians (pp. 138–9), and while the Crimean War has of course bulked large in most accounts of mid-nineteenth-century British history, Adrian Brettle shows that in the 1850s foreign policy accounted for the fall of every single Prime Minister. William Mulligan laments the tendency of historians of late-nineteenth-century Britain to study international relations in isolation and to ignore their impact on domestic issues.

There are also large remaining gaps in the study of twentieth-century Britain. Thus Paul Readman's study of Edwardian patriotism regrets that foreign policy has been studied 'as if hermetically sealed off from other aspects of history' (p. 260). David Edgerton argues that even our understanding of appeasement and the Second World War has suffered from 'an implicit domestic primacy thesis', which stresses the 'welfare' over the 'warfare state'.

Almost all of the contributors stress the importance, and even the primacy, of foreign affairs during their period. Gideon Mailer notes that the Committee of Estates in Burgh was more concerned with the question of foreign alliances in the 1640s than suppressing domestic rebellion by Roman Catholics (pp. 121–2). David Onnekink remarks that William III was 'obsessed' with foreign policy. Andrew C. Thompson observes that in the early eighteenth century the Secretary of State for the Northern or

Southern Departments often took on the role of chief minister; this did not automatically fall to the First Lord of the Treasury. William Mulligan shows that even in the late-nineteenth century (p. 185) radicals spoke of foreign policy as ‘much the most interesting province of cabinet work’. Likewise, Thomas Otte, quoting the Liberal Prime Minister Lord Rosebery, speaks of the Foreign Office as ‘the chief of all the offices’.

This centrality did not recede much in the twentieth century. Foreign policy and war were clearly to the fore during both world wars, but these themes also had a profound effect on British politics during the inter-war and post-war periods. Thus Richard Grayson’s chapter shows that Europe and the Empire dominated Liberal politics during the 1920s, not only the leadership but also the grass roots. After 1945, people could turn away from the ‘strategy of survival’ to the ‘arts of life’, but as Capet, Crowson, and McKay show, foreign policy remained an important party political and electoral concern.³⁴

There were many reasons why Britons attached such importance to foreign affairs. The most obvious was physical survival: diplomatic or military misjudgements might result in loss of sovereignty, liberty, and, in extreme cases, even of their own lives. As one late-nineteenth-century radical remarked ‘in home politics, if we make a mistake we find it out and correct it; if we regret reforms one year, we pass them the next. But mistakes in foreign policy rarely admit of corrections and often involve evils reaching into the future’ (Mulligan, p. 186). There was also widespread domestic feeling that England or Britain’s role in Europe and the world mattered. Thus Gabriel Glickman shows that Restoration politics were dominated by a concern for England’s ‘reputation’. Towards the end of the volume, Capet’s chapter notes that Labour’s 1950 manifesto claimed that under Tory rule in the 1930s, the ‘prestige of Britain sank to its lowest ebb for a century or more’ (p. 322).

Foreign policy also served as a vehicle for the articulation and export of domestic ideology and values. Mailer remarks on how the Scottish Covenanters of the 1640s wanted to contain the Habsburgs by spreading their Covenant to mainland Europe. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Glickman, Thompson, Ahn, and Simms show, England and Britain promoted – or was supposed to be promoting – the twin causes of Protestantism and the Ancient Constitution. As Gideon Mailer shows, many Scotsmen saw the Union with England in 1707 as a chance to project the Protestant – and especially the Presbyterian – cause beyond their own borders (pp. 124–5). In the nineteenth century, Britons became exercised with spreading constitutional government. John Bew notes the support of early nineteenth-century Ulster Unionists for the Greeks and constitutionalism (p. 142) and the way in which the Union enabled Irishmen of all stripes better to promote their humanitarian values abroad, especially anti-slavery. Adrian Brettle notes similar tendencies for the mid-century; it was left to Peel to remark wryly, if incorrectly, that one could not spread liberty by dictating to other countries (pp. 161). Likewise, Readman observes that the

liberal language of patriotism in the 1870s castigated Disraeli for abandoning British values in the interest of containing Russia (pp. 262). Caspar Sylvest is making the same point for the world of political thought when he remarks on how British intellectuals wanted to transfer the characteristics of British domestic politics to the international sphere. All this was by no means just international do-goodery: just as early modern Britons felt that their own liberties would be safer if those of the continent were, so did a later generation feel that British liberalism was most secure in a liberal world.

As a result of all this, foreign policy was a crucial factor in domestic political polarisation and high politics. As Glickman and Onnekink show in their chapters, the divide between Whigs and Tories largely originated in a disagreement about what England's role in Europe should be. Simms and Ahn note that the rise and fall of most eighteenth-century ministries was primarily caused by events in the European state system – the Treaty of Utrecht, the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War – and debates about how they were to be interpreted. Brettell makes the same point for the mid-nineteenth century, when governments came and left office on the basis of their handling of the Crimean War, Italian unification, war with China, the military budget, and other strategic issues. Mulligan argues that foreign policy brought down at least two administrations later in the century, as Gladstone's stance on naval policy and Home Rule allegedly weakened Britain's standing in the world (p. 190). Party leaders were acutely aware of the links between their domestic prospects and Britain's standing in the world. In 1886, for example, Salisbury responded to Russia's moves in Bulgaria by saying that the loss of Constantinople 'would be the ruin of our party and a heavy blow to the country'. Readman also notes that in the 1898 by-election, the Liberal imperialists exploited Conservative difficulties over the Far East.³⁵

Throughout the twentieth century, foreign policy issues remained at the forefront of popular and high politics. During the January 1910 election, O'Brien argues that Conservatives instrumentalised the navy in order to secure their base, an early instance of 'dog-whistle' politics. Towards the end of the Cold War, Labour's position on nuclear disarmament had disastrous electoral repercussions, as Capet's contribution shows. The dynamics of internal party politics, Crowson and McKay contend, were shaped by Britain's relationship with the European Community, while it was no accident that Europe (the abbreviation for this complex relationship) prompted a slew of resignations from Thatcher's cabinet.

It should come as no surprise to find that foreign policy not only periodically dominated the public sphere, but also hastened its emergence. Glickman's late-seventeenth-century pamphleteers were primarily concerned with the problem of Universal Monarchy and how to contain Louis XIV. Ahn and Simms show that foreign-political concerns, and especially European ones, loomed large in public debate in the first 60 years or

so of the eighteenth century. Strategic debates remained central to public debate in the modern era. In the late nineteenth century, Bell argues, arguments for the unification of the British colonial empire through Imperial Federation ‘embodied a claim... about the existence (or potentiality) of an ocean-transcending public’ (p. 206). Creating a single public sphere in which the security of the union could be debated had contributed substantially to reinforcing the bonds with Scotland (though not with Ireland); a unified imperial public sphere would, they hoped, do the same for the Empire.

There was widespread agreement that the defence of Britain’s interests abroad both required unity at home, and would help to heal domestic rifts. Thus Glickman shows that the Tories hoped to rally support behind the crown through a dynamic imperial posture overseas, rather than pursuing a divisive Whig policy of engagement in Europe. Brettle highlights the common mid-nineteenth-century belief, which goes back to Canning, that a successful foreign policy could only be waged by a popular government. In 1891, Lord Salisbury demanded ‘the banishment of party feeling from... external affairs’.

Failure to pull together at home, it was feared, would lead to defeat and humiliation abroad. Thus Mailer notes how the Scotch Covenanters of the 1640s believed that the advance of European Counter-Reformation forces was attributable to their own divisions (p. 123), just as their late-eighteenth-century counterparts explained the losing war with the American colonists with the supposed triumph of ‘effeminacy’ in British society (pp. 126–8). Nearly a hundred years later, William Mulligan observes the same ‘moral panic’ argument in radical critiques blaming ‘unmanliness’ at home for British military shortcomings during the Crimean War. The same could be said of the ‘national efficiency’ debate following the fiascos at the start of the Boer War. But this demand or hope was more often honoured in the breach than in the observance as many of the chapters on the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries contend.

The primacy of foreign policy also had some more tangible effects on British domestic structures. One of these was the growth of a bureaucracy, partly to fund foreign policy and partly to execute it. The outlines of the resulting ‘fiscal-military state’ are of course well known,³⁶ but the chapters in this volume add many missing dimensions. Glickman, for example, notes the Tory demand for a more effective diplomatic apparatus to cope with external challenges (p. 15–6). Onnekink shows that William III sought the involvement of parliament in his foreign policy (p. 37), and the way in which the emergence of a modest standing army was driven by concerns for the European balance of power (p. 40–1). Andrew C. Thompson notes how the cabinet was largely a creation of Britain’s ‘geopolitical engagement’ in Europe (p. 68–9). McGrath finds that similar military pressures shaped the Irish political dispensation in the eighteenth century. The early modern British state, in other words, was a state forged in the crucible of its foreign policy necessities and ambitions.

After 1815, the impact of strategic concerns on domestic affairs was transformed for several decades. Howe's chapter demonstrates that critics of what we now call the 'fiscal-military state' believed that the extended engagement of their fathers and grandfathers with the European state system had imported corruption and profligacy into British society. They therefore sought to minimise that involvement, and to erect what Philip Harling and Peter Mandler term the 'laissez-faire state' in order to protect virtue at home. This stance was shaken by the Crimean War, and it did not outlast the shock of German unification in 1870–1871. Many now agreed that British society would have to be brought into line to cope with the new challenges. The fiscal-military state dismantled after 1815, Mulligan argues, now had to be reconstructed. He quotes one radical as saying that foreign policy 'is by far the most important element of practical statesmanship. It makes budgets, regulates finance and taxation' (p. 186). Likewise, Readman notes that Joseph Chamberlain's conception of tariff reform was a measure to unify the empire to meet external threats, particularly from Germany: 'I am a fiscal reformer mainly because I am an imperialist', he said (p. 264). O'Brien reminds us that the controversial tax increases and reforms of Lloyd George's 1909 budget were introduced to pay for new Dreadnoughts to contain the Kaiser. During the First and Second World Wars, of course, British society was geared almost completely to meeting external challenges, resulting in what Edgerton calls the 'warfare state' of the 1940s. The numbers employed by and the amount of money spent on the military remained a sizeable proportion of British government activity throughout the twentieth century.

Britons were divided, however, on whether the demands of foreign policy required more or less domestic freedom. Here the balance between parliamentary and monarchical, and later executive authority, was central. In the 1690s, as David Onnekink shows, William III leant towards the otherwise obnoxious Tories, because their emphasis on the royal prerogative was helpful to his campaign against Louis XIV (p. 38). Two hundred years later, Readman quotes Lord Rosebery calling for 'continuity in foreign administration', so that other states would know that they were 'dealing not with a ministry, possibly fleeting, and possibly transient', but with a 'great, powerful and united nation' (p. 266). Conservative MP Harry Crookshank's notion that foreign policy should be a matter for 'the few' echoed Rosebery's comment about the importance of continuity and stability in the formation of foreign policy.

At the same time, the primacy of foreign policy could be used as argument for greater domestic political participation, reform, and religious toleration. Glickman notes that the Lord Treasurer Clifford wanted to extend toleration to Roman Catholics the better to mobilise them in support of English foreign policy. William III, as Onnekink reminds us, pursued the same policy towards Protestant dissenters (p. 36–7). The relaxation of the penal laws restricting Irish Catholic rights was, in part, a result of the need to raise troops to preserve fight in Europe and around the globe. In Gladstone's

time, Mulligan observes, many radicals argued that the franchise should be widened in order to make Britain more unified at home and consequently more formidable abroad.

Strategic imperatives also left an enduring mark on British constitutional arrangements. As early as the 1640s, Mailer tells us, Scottish Covenanters had sought close and permanent links with England, the more effectively to help the 'Protestant cause' in Europe, especially the Palatines (p. 123). By the early eighteenth century most Scots thought their religious and political best safeguarded against the absolutist pretensions of the Stuarts and their continental backers by throwing their lot in with the English. From London's perspective, Macinnes shows, the Anglo-Scottish Act of Union in 1707 was designed to secure England's northern border against French subversion through a Jacobite comeback, and to lock Scotland economically and militarily into the war effort against Louis XIV during the War of the Spanish Succession. So anxious was London to secure this assistance that it granted the Scots very generous terms on financial matters, the law, education, and the scale of Scottish representation at Westminster. McGrath shows the enormous contribution made by eighteenth-century Ireland, in terms of finance and manpower, to the expansion of British power and the consequences of this contribution for Anglo-Irish relations. Nearly a hundred years after union between Scotland and England, the same strategic imperative manifested itself again, when Britain entered into an Act of Union with Ireland in 1800–1801 designed to deny France the 'back door' to England, and to mobilise Irish resources for the war against Napoleon. As Bew shows, this argument for union had traction with many northern Irish Protestants, including some who had been radicals in the 1790s. They believed that early nineteenth-century Europe was too dangerous a place for a small nation such as Ireland to survive on its own. As Castlereagh put it, it was 'absurd and romantick to imagine that we can exist for any length of time as a separate and independent state' (p. 141). Foreign policy, more so than Protestantism and commerce, helped to weld the Atlantic archipelago together.

The great constitutional debates of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries were also very much informed by strategic considerations. As Mulligan shows, one of the strongest arguments against Home Rule was the fact that it would weaken the coherence of the United Kingdom at the very moment when other major European states were embarked on a round of unifications and territorial expansion. It would also expose England directly to foreign attack: Goschen warned against 'a separate nation planted on our flanks' (p. 190). Likewise, Bell reminds us, Imperial Federation was very much a response to the new geopolitical challenges of the late nineteenth century: German unification, Russian expansionism, and the rise of the United States. Similarly, Grayson tells us that Leo Amery favoured a strengthening of imperial bonds to ward off the threat of European war, though he

was contradicted by Austen Chamberlain who did not want to see British diplomacy encumbered by the need to consult with the Dominions (p. 287).

To be sure, many of the contributors to this volume are sceptical about the notion of a *primacy* of foreign policy. John Bew, Allan Macinnes, Tony Howe, Paul Readman, Duncan Bell, Phillips O' Brien, Caspar Sylvest, T. G. Otte, Richard Grayson, Antoine Capet, Nicholas Crowson and James McKay all register various reservations about the concept. It is striking that, with one exception, all of these authors deal with the later periods, where the emergence of mass politics and the 'social' question seems to push strategic concerns to one side. They point out that over the past 150 years or so Britons have generally been more interested in domestic reform, taxation, employment, labour relations, law and order, and education, than in foreign policy and war. Moreover, some of the contributors wonder whether foreign and domestic policy can usefully be separated. Following Paul Kennedy, Readman speaks of a 'dynamic interaction' between the two (p. 269), and Bell also questions the idea of a binary distinction, arguing that the 'dynamics between "domestic" and "foreign" were mutually reinforcing' (p. 198).

All that said, those chapters still contribute to rescuing the primacy of foreign policy from historiographical oblivion. Thus Bew stresses that we see 'foreign affairs seep[ing] into areas of debate where one might otherwise presume the primacy of domestic policy' (p. 140). Howe demonstrates how the early nineteenth-century radicals who wanted to retreat from European engagement were ultimately frustrated in their desire to shrink the state by the Russian threat and various cross-channel invasion scares. Mulligan shows that while Gladstone started with a strong bias towards domestic affairs, the state of Europe soon forced strategic matters to the top of the agenda. Finally, Sylvest tells us that while British liberal intellectuals began by rejecting German ideas of the primacy of foreign policy, they ended by realising that the survival of British freedoms forced them too to make the international scene their first priority (p. 226–7).

*

Let us return to Heimpel's warning, with which we began. It is far too early to propose an over-arching alternative model for history with the 'primacy of foreign policy' as the organising principle. There is nothing more hazardous than parachuting into an established field from above, or at least from outside. There is a danger that as at Dieppe in 1942, we find that the defences are stronger than we expected. Thanks to faulty intelligence, we may find an army of existing scholars in occupation, which has already reconnoitred the ground in question. On the other hand, we may, in our haste, encourage like-minded historians, oppressed by various orthodoxies, to break cover and declare themselves in favour of the primacy of foreign policy before we are in a position to help them. So: this is not an invasion; no occupation will

be attempted as yet. Rather, this volume is a raid, designed to probe enemy defences. If the lie of the land looks promising, the main effort will follow later.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the historiographical fortunes of the primacy of foreign policy see B. Simms (1997) *The Impact of Napoleon. Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Executive, 1797–1806* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 2–8.
2. H. Oncken (1918) 'Über die Zusammenhänge zwischen äußerer und innerer Politik', *Vorträge der Gehe Stiftung zu Dresden* (Dresden and Leipzig), p. 16; Mommsen, cited in B. Faulenbach (1980) *Ideologie des deutschen Weges. Die deutsche Geschichte in der Historiographie zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: Beck), p. 25.
3. L. von Ranke (1950) 'A dialogue on politics', in T. von Laue (ed.) *Leopold von Ranke. The Formative Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 172. The other seminal text is Leopold von Ranke's (1981) essay on 'The great powers', in R. Wines (ed.) *Leopold von Ranke. The Secret of World History. Selected Writings on the Art and Science of History* (New York: Fordham University Press), pp. 121–155.
4. Ranke, 'A dialogue on politics', p. 169.
5. O. Hintze (1962) 'Weltgeschichtliche Bedingungen der Repräsentativverfassung', in O. Hintze (ed.) *Staat und Verfassung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte*, G. Oestreich (ed.) (Göttingen). See also in the same collection the articles 'Staatenbildung und Verfassungsentwicklung. Eine historisch-politische Studie', esp. pp. 34–35 and 'Machtpolitik und Regierungsverfassung', esp. pp. 425–426. A selection of Hintze's most important work can be found in F. Gilbert (ed.) (1975) *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
6. F. Fischer (1961) *Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18* (Düsseldorf: Droste); (1969) *Krieg der Illusionen. Die deutsche Politik 1911 bis 1914* (Düsseldorf: Droste).
7. H.-U. Wehler (1973) *Das deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871–1918* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht).
8. M. Hochedlinger (1998) 'Die Frühneuzeitforschung und die "Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen"'. Oder: Was ist aus dem "Primat der Aussenpolitik" geworden?' in *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, CVI, 167–179.
9. See William Mulligan and Brendan Simms (2003) Special issue of *German History*, XXIII, especially Brendan Simms, 'The return of the primacy of foreign policy', pp. 275–291.
10. K. Hildebrand (1995) *Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt), pp. 5, 35, 169, 197, 865, 876, 881 *et passim*. See also the very perceptive review by J. Angelow (1996) *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, LV, 230–234; H.-U. Wehler (1996) 'Moderne Politikgeschichte? Oder: Willkommen im Kreis der Neorankeaner vor 1914', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, XXII, 257–266, here: pp. 257–259, 264. See also the critique in S. Berger (1996) *The Search for Normality. National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany Since 1800* (Oxford: Berghahn), pp. 114–115. H. Scott (2001) *The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756–1775* (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press); P. Wilson (1995) *War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). B. Simms (1998) *The Struggle for Mastery in Germany, 1779–1850* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1–6; for an intelligent critique see the Wehlerite review by P. Nolte (2002) *Bulletin: German Historical Institute London*, XXIV (2), 77–83; Simms, *Impact of Napoleon*, pp. 2–28 for methodology. T. C. W. Blanning (2002) *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture. Old Regime Europe, 1660–1789* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 3; B. Simms (1999) 'Reform in Britain and Prussia, 1797–1815: (Confessional) Fiscal-Military State and Military-Agrarian Complex', in T. C. W. Blanning and P. Wende (eds) *Reform in Great Britain and Germany, 1750–1850* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. pp. 82–83.

11. As quoted in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 January 2001.
12. H. M. Scott (1990) *British Foreign Policy in the Age of the American Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon); J. Black (2000) *A System of Ambition? British Foreign Policy, 1660–1793*, 2nd edn (Stroud: Sutton); J. Charmley (1999) *Splendid Isolation? Britain and the Balance of Power, 1874–1914* (London: Hodder & Stoughton).
13. D. Trim (1999) 'The context of war and violence in sixteenth-century English society', *Journal of Early Modern History*, III, 233–255; idem (2008) 'Calvinist internationalism and the shaping of Jacobean foreign policy', in T. Wilks (ed.) *Prince Henry Revived. Image and Exemplarity in Early Modern England* (London: Southampton Solent), pp. 239–258; J. Scott (2000) *England's Troubles. Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); T. Claydon (2007) *Europe and the Making of England, 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); J. Parry (2006) *The Politics of Patriotism. English Liberalism, National Identity, and Europe, 1830–1886* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); J. Winter (1986) *The Great War and the British People* (London: Macmillan).
14. See J. Brewer (1989) *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688–1783* (London: Unwin & Hyman).
15. I. Hont (2005) *Jealousy of Trade. International Competition and the Nation State in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge MA: Harvard), pp. 6, 11, 15–17, 53, 79, 81, 87 *et passim*.
16. E.g. B. Harris (2002) *Politics and the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 7–9, 15–16 *et passim*; M. J. Cardwell (2004) *Arts and Arms. Literature, Politics and Patriotism During the Seven Years War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 2, 13, 22 *et passim*; and S. Conway (2006) *War, State and Society in Mid-eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
17. A. Macinnes (2007) *Union and Empire. The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); T. Bartlett (1992) *The Fall and Rise of the Irish Nation: the Catholic Question, 1690–1830* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan); P. Geoghegan (1999) *The Irish Act of Union. A Study in High Politics, 1798–1801* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan).
18. G. Hicks (2007) *Peace, War and Party Politics. The Conservatives and Europe, 1846–59* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
19. F. Trentmann (2003) 'Introduction', in id. (ed.) *Paradoxes of Civil Society. New Perspectives on Modern German and British Society* (Oxford: Berghahn), pp. 34–39.
20. K. W. Mitchinson (2005) *Defending Albion. Britain's Home Army, 1908–1919* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
21. C. Wipperfuert (2004) *Von der Souveränität zur Angst. Britische Aussenpolitik und Sozialökonomie im Zeitalter des Imperliasmus* (Stuttgart: Steiner); P. Ward (1998)

- Red Flag and Union Jack. Englishness, Patriotism, and the British Left, 1881–1924* (Woodbridge: Boydell), pp. 51–70, 103–118; G. R. Searle (1970) *The Quest for National Efficiency. A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell).
22. H. Jones (2005) ‘The impact of the Cold War’, in P. Addison, H. Jones (eds) *A Companion to Contemporary Britain, 1939–2000* (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 24; P. Deery (1999) ‘“The Secret Battalion”: Communism in Britain During the Cold War’, *Contemporary British History*, XIII, 1–28; R. Toye (2000) ‘The Labour Party’s external economic policy in the 1940s’, *Historical Journal*, XLIII, 189–215.
 23. The North American Conference on British Studies, Cincinnati, 3–5 October 2008 included papers on ‘Labour and the politics of internationalism, 1900–1914’ (Edward McNeilly), a panel on ‘Jacobethan England and international religio-politics: three cases for a narrow channel’, and most relevantly for this volume ‘The dilemmas and domestic imprint of foreign policy, 1603–1660’.
 24. M. Bentley (2001) makes this point in *Lord Salisbury’s World. Conservative Environments in Late Victorian Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 251.
 25. S. Smith and M. Smith (1988) ‘The analytical background’, in M. Smith, S. Smith and B. White (eds) *British Foreign Policy. Tradition, Change and Transformation* (London: Unwin Hyman), p. 8.
 26. K. T. Hoppen (1998) *The Mid-Victorian Generation, 1846–1886* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
 27. M. Pugh (1994) *British Political and Social History, 1870–1992* (London: Arnold), pp. 93, 117, 326, 333.
 28. K. Robbins (1994) *The Eclipse of a Great Power. Modern Britain, 1870–1992* (London: Longman), p. 88.
 29. P. Clarke (1996) *Hope and Glory. Britain, 1900–1990* (London: Allen Lane), pp. 3, 184, 228–246, 256–263, 392–404.
 30. P. Harling (2001) *The Modern British State. An Historical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity), pp. 113, 134–135, 155–157.
 31. J. Cronin (1991) *The Politics of State Expansion. War, State, and Society in Twentieth Century Britain* (London: Routledge), p. 14.
 32. See M. Bentley (1984) *Politics without Democracy. Great Britain, 1815–1914. Perception and Preoccupation in British Government* (London: Fontana), pp. 13–14.
 33. M. Daunton (1999) *Trusting Leviathan. The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); idem (2002) *Just Taxes. The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914–1979* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); D. Fraser (2009) *The Evolution of the British Welfare State. A History of Social Policy since the Industrial Revolution* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); P. Levine and S. Grayzel (eds) (2009) *Gender, Labour, War, and Empire. Essays on Modern Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
 34. K. O. Morgan (1992) *The People’s Peace. British History, 1945–1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 157.
 35. See also T. G. Otte (2006) ‘“Avenge England’s dishonour”: By-elections, parliament, and the politics of foreign policy in 1898’, *English Historical Review*, CXXI, 385–428.
 36. Brewer, *Sinews*, pp. 137, 141 *et passim*.

2

Conflicting Visions: Foreign Affairs in Domestic Debate 1660–1689

Gabriel Glickman

In a succession of works written within the reigns of the later Stuart monarchs, the poet John Dryden surveyed the prospects for the three kingdoms of the British Isles under the restored Stuart monarchy. The strength of the throne, he believed, would be reflected in the performance of the nation overseas, when expansion in world trade, the decline of Spain, and an increase in colonial competition had opened up a new space to reshape the global landscape.¹ At stake, he suggested, were ‘the greater half of the globe, the commerce of nations and the riches of the universe’.² After several decades of neglect, scholarly re-examinations have started to re-engage with the themes of Restoration poetry and polemic, revealing the way in which political commentary in late Stuart Britain was framed inside an international context. Historians have begun to depict seventeenth-century Englishmen mediating between contested loyalties towards compatriots, fellow Protestants and Europeans, theorising over questions of empire and speaking of the wider world in terms of liberty, religion, legitimate monarchy, and arbitrary government: the language of their own political community.³ Restoration debate started to bristle with references to Britain as a potential great power, with domestic policy judged according to the needs and obligations of the state overseas. With a conception expressed by one Stuart diplomat that it was the ‘duty of every subject’ to be aware of ‘the affaires of war and peace’, the idea of a ‘patriot’ was shifting from the image of a man who defended the liberties of his countrymen at home to one devoted to the service of his nation abroad.⁴

Debate over British foreign policy after 1660 was animated at once by the awareness of new possibilities and a profound sense of dissatisfaction. Set against the high aspirations voiced by Dryden, the three decades following the Restoration are perceived to have produced a notably inglorious period for the monarchy in the conduct of foreign affairs. The Stuarts were unable to develop the diplomatic and bureaucratic apparatus to bring a long-term conception of the national interest into the workings of their embassies abroad. The failure to fund or develop the government departments dealing with