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Executive Politics in Times of Crisis

Edited by
Martin Lodge
and
Kai Wegrich

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1

Introduction: Executive Politics in Times of Crisis

Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich

Who gets what, when and how – this question defines the central concern of political science in general, and of public policy and administration in particular.[1] Why are particular issues on the agenda? How do political 'masters' interact with their bureaucratic 'servants'? How is the delivery of public services designed and operated? How are rules drafted, monitored and enforced – and by whom? How do diversified systems of governing seek to achieve cooperation? What drives institutional design, and what are the implications of performance management and 'pay for performance' systems for responsiveness, competence and productivity in public services?

This catalogue of perennial questions is at the heart of this book. However, this book is not just about reconsidering these questions. This book seeks to introduce a different perspective to these questions – one that emphasizes the importance of *executive politics*. The term *executive politics* has gained widespread currency in recent years, although mostly in the context of US political science. The term combines an interest in the politics of bureaucracy (Carpenter 2001, Lewis 2008, Wood and Waterman 1994) with an interest in the politics of the executive branch, especially the role of political leadership (i.e. the Presidency) (Moe and Howell 1999), and an interest in the ways in which coalitions are made and broken (Laver and Shepsle 1996). In the European context, executive politics brings together those scholars interested in comparative public administration (i.e. in the relationship between politics and administration as well as questions of administrative design) and those interested in comparative government (i.e. in the composition of political executive institutions).

A focus on *executive politics* stresses the importance of the political factor in the research of administrative (or managerial) phenomena.

It emphasizes the importance and considerable potential of political science-oriented research to enhance an advanced understanding of and interest in the administrative factor (or the execution factor, Dunsire 1978). Such interest might include the administrative prerequisites that enable any policy decision to take effect; it might also include issues of organization within the political process (such as issues of legislative or party organization) and the way administrative reform policies are being introduced and managed.

The rationale for considering executive politics during *times of crisis* is partly driven by the contemporary context of financial crisis and subsequent sovereign debt crises in much of the Western world. Such contexts of crisis are said to represent the hour of the executive, when political and bureaucratic careers are made and finished. The financial crisis challenged the capacities of contemporary executive politicians to deal with volatile financial markets, international contagion effects and dissatisfied and mobilized electorates. Furthermore, the financial crisis also challenged the dominance of particular administrative doctrines that had characterized thinking about executive politics, for example in institutional design and regulatory strategies. Demographic change (i.e. ageing societies) and climate change added to this sense of crisis. Both were said to require responses to developing long-term trends (one being more certain than the other) which were seen to contradict more short-term political considerations, especially at a time of budget cuts and stagnant economies.

This combination of financial, climate-related and demographic challenges already poses considerable doubts regarding the capacity of executives. However, the rationale for the *Times of Crisis* sub-title is partly also an intellectual one. On the one hand, the past decade has seen considerable challenges to traditional understandings of national executive politics. For example, academic debates about the spread and application of administrative reform templates (Christensen and Laegreid 2008, Dunleavy et al. 2006, Lodge and Gill 2011, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), about the widespread impression that traditional understandings between politics and administration had come undone (Suleiman 2003) and about whether governing complex social systems was possible under conditions of extensive internationalization, outsourcing and social fragmentation continued. On the other hand, the sense of an intellectual crisis was informed by the perception that political science at large was increasingly disinterested in addressing the administrative factor, while the literature on public administration was accused of failing to sufficiently acknowledge the importance of politics.

By developing key themes that characterize executive politics, the contributions to this volume emphasize the importance of the political in administration and the significance of the administrative in the political. This volume neither intends to provide for a new framework or theory of politics and bureaucracy/administration nor seeks to present a unified methodology for the study of particular phenomena. Rather, it projects executive politics as a commitment to the systematic (and social scientific) study of a field of related political phenomena. This introductory chapter sets out the context that shapes the executive politics field. It locates executive politics within existing debates and explores key themes and questions of enquiry of both the executive politics agenda and the individual contributions in the volume.

Executive politics – The word and the field

Executive politics builds on a considerable intellectual legacy. We define executive politics as a field of study that is interested in the politics of political–administrative relations and the role of governmental organization in the formulation and execution of political programmes. Such a wide-ranging definition includes the formal and informal rules and conventions that characterize the relationship between elected and non-elected public officials, aspects of institutional design (of organizations and rules), the operation or execution of these design choices and the study of the consequences of these choices in terms of outputs and outcomes (including issues of compliance). Executive politics is therefore not just about the executive branch or about a state-centric focus. It takes into consideration diverse governing arrangements that shape policy (such as polycentric, network and regulatory space-influenced analysis).

As a field of study, executive politics builds on two distinct research traditions. One tradition is the field of *comparative government*. This particular field is interested in the executive branch, and in particular in the exercise of political leadership. Classic concerns have focused on the power of prime ministers, presidents and chancellors within particular institutional contexts. Standard interests, for example, have related to the 'presidentialization' of the role of prime ministers in parliamentary democracies (Poguntke and Webb 2005) and the way in which 'core executives' co-ordinate (or not) decisions (Rhodes 1995, Smith 1999). Elsewhere, an interest in the politics of bureaucracy has focused on the power of presidents to control bureaucracy, often in competition with legislative actors.

The other tradition is the field of *comparative public administration* (including the more recent interest in *public management*). A core interest here has been in the organization of the executive government, in particular the machinery of government. This includes considerable attention to the rise and fall of administrative reform ideas and doctrines, such as 'New Public Management' (NPM) or the more recent 'post-NPM'. Apart from diagnosing cross-national reform trends, much attention has been paid to explaining cross-national variation. Furthermore, considerable attention has been paid to the design of particular administrative bodies, such as regulatory agencies, and to the way in which different states seek to control public services (see Hood et al. 2004).

As noted, executive politics builds on these two traditions and their overlapping concerns. Three particular areas of overlapping interest can be identified:

(i) *The politics–administration relationship*. One of the core traditional interests in political science has been the relationship between politics and administration. As the work by Aberbach and colleagues (and subsequent work) has shown (1981), there are no straightforward distinctions between the political and the administrative (despite continuing differences in terms of legitimization). National political systems generate different patterns of politics and administration. However, the interdependency of politics and administration means that activities are closely connected. Of course, differences in terms of recruitment and legitimization exist (as diagnosed by Max Weber) and are enshrined in rules (such as the Germanic differentiation between political *politische Beamte* and supposedly non-political, neutral *Fachbeamte*). Elsewhere, boundaries between political and public servant spheres might be said to be blurred, such as in Japan where senior civil servants sometimes enter party politics. The *Public Service Bargains* perspective has highlighted the formal and informal institutions that shape strategic interactions between politicians, bureaucrats and the wider political system (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, Hood and Lodge 2006). How issues of reward, competency and loyalty are formalized and understood is of fundamental political significance, especially in terms of the various administrative reform initiatives that have been associated with NPM and post-NPM.[2] Indeed, decades of reforms are said to have led to the rediscovery of bureaucracy (Olsen 2006), defined as a set of rules and a distinct organizational setting apart from the private sector.

(ii) *The politics of the executive and the bureaucracy*. Among the key contributions to the politics of bureaucracy are textbooks by Guy Peters (now in the sixth edition, 2009) and Edward Page (1992). The latter in particular highlighted how political constitutional rules (e.g. electoral systems, allocation of responsibilities between levels of government, interest-group universe and suchlike) shape institutional varieties of politics–administration relationships. Similarly, the historical growth of administrative organization within national political systems points to distinct political patterns, driven by emerging states' increasing centralization and their need to organize and administer tax collection and the military (Mayntz 1985: 17–32; see also Silberman (1993), who pointed to diverse path dependencies generated through key choices during so-called critical junctures, especially regarding the recruitment of senior public servants). The notion of credible commitment has similarly shaped ideas regarding institutional design, especially in relation to delegation to regulatory agencies (Levy and Spiller 1994). Here, the focus has been on addressing time inconsistency problems caused by distinct political system characteristics (i.e. the risk of governments seeking to reverse an earlier decision at a future point in time). Furthermore, the literature on control over bureaucracy has developed along various tracks, ranging from an interest in police patrols, fire alarms and deck-stacking devices to a concern with different control modes on the lines of grid-group cultural theory (Hood 1996, 1998) and an interest in national patterns (Page and Wright 1999, 2007). Similarly, the proliferation of regulatory agencies across the globe has raised issues of tensions between a new type of administrative autonomy and accountability and (political) control. Finally, the literature on the 'core executive' (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990, Rhodes 1995) has pointed to the relational and fluid power that characterizes the politics 'at the top', which cannot be accounted for by static variants of 'prime ministerial government', 'cabinet government' and 'departmentalism'. Instead, core executive studies focus on co-ordination, the way in which exchange relationships are characterized by locational structural power, and the way in which a 'core executive' approach can be developed comparatively. Similarly, the work on coalition formation and breakdown offers a number of (mostly heuristic) insights into political strategies (Laver and Shepsle 1996).

(iii) *The politics of governance and policy.* One further core interest in executive politics is in how governments seek to influence the behaviour of society (through steering) and in how public services

are designed and operated. Studies are interested in the utilization of different types of policy instruments, as well as in the dynamics within particular domains and fields, such as budgetary, regulatory and welfare state politics. Especially, the emergence of the word governance has had considerable implications for executive politics. On the one hand, the interest in non-hierarchical modes of governing has shifted attention away from traditional bureaucratic and political exercises of power towards mediation and power-sharing (although such practices go back to at least the Treaty of Westphalia, see Lehmbruch (1998)). On the other hand, a growing interest in the tactics of government has been linked to wider discussions regarding the capabilities of the state to steer societal actors (especially in the context of the so-called hollow state). Debates regarding steering, in turn, relate to the study of different modes of governance (such as 'hierarchy, markets and association') and how collaboration can be orchestrated as a way to regulate or deliver public services and other economic activities.

These three interrelated fields are by no means meant to be an exclusive or exhaustive set of executive politics-related interests. They link concerns that have been at the heart of the literature in a number of subfields in political science, ranging from comparative politics to public policy and administration to the contemporary interest in public management. Nevertheless, there has been a growing perception that the fields of general political science and those of public administration, policy and management have been drifting apart. For example, one prominent (US-based) observer, Kenneth Meier, noted that the longstanding interrelated interest in political science and public administration was at risk of becoming extinct (Meier 2007, see also Jones 2003). Political science is arguably mostly interested in the study of the responsiveness of electoral institutions, whether this relates to electoral and legislative behaviour and the way in which electoral institutions interact with (or seek to control) other, usually non-electoral/majoritarian institutions. The lack of interest in the administrative factor might be said to lie in the emphasis within political science towards measurability and replicable observability. Such kind of research orientation is facilitated by the measurement of roll-call votes, electoral surveys and suchlike, but such research methodologies may have greater difficulties in dealing with the intricate implicit assumptions that underpin the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats at all levels.

However, public administration can similarly be accused of paying insufficient attention to the political factor. For example, contemporary work on comparative administrative reforms (or public management reform) is usually conceptualized as a process that is shaped by national, historically grown trajectories. Different political settings, unsurprisingly, generate different reform patterns (Knill 1999). Countries are classified according to their diagnosed reform activism. However, such a perspective is problematic, as it pictures reform as a 'reform race' between countries. However, administrative and policy reforms across countries and within countries do not start from the same position, do not 'compete' in the same arena and do not share a similar 'finishing line'. Thus, existing accounts tend to concentrate on the institutional opportunities for reform, while neglecting the political and bureaucratic motives that might inform reform intentions. While we know a considerable amount about reforms during particular political eras, we know far less about the particular political rationale why some reform initiatives were promoted and others neglected at different points in time.

Similarly, the study of performance management has been populated by a substantial number of studies interested in varieties of measured performance, individual and organizational responses to such incentive systems and the likely consequences of performance measurement. Less is known about the political motives that encourage explicit performance management systems. They appear, at first sight, to signal a political interest to show direct accountability for results. However, over time, these performance management systems are likely to turn into blame magnets, either because of a lack of measured progress or because of accusations of gaming and extensive manipulation.

But what explains this diagnosed separation between political science and public administration? Why is it that in the field of wider political science there is only a limited interest in the administrative factor? Equally, why is it that the fields of public administration, public policy and, more recently, public management have tried to separate themselves from political concerns? It is well established that public administration has considerable form when it comes to denying its inherent political character. For example, the first editorial of *Public Administration* (of 1923) noted that its future contents would be concerned with the machinery of government that transposed political choices, but not with why and how particular political decisions had been taken. Equally, the 1887 classic by Woodrow Wilson noted the ease (and importance) of focusing on the scientific study of the

business of government that could be seen as separate from the world of politics (Wilson 1887). Indeed, as Roberts (1994) has shown, the establishment of the public administration discipline in the United States involved an explicit denial of its inherent political nature. Similarly, the field of development administration (see Gulrajani and Moloney 2012, Subramaniam 2000) has been accused of seeking to appear apolitical and technocratic by focusing on reform initiatives rather than on the underlying political dynamics. Indeed, in many ways the appeal of schools of government and policy-oriented executive courses is that they appear to deliver technocratic expertise and development without addressing wider politically significant questions (i.e. the legitimacy of political rule). Indeed, supposedly neutral instruments hide inherent political value conflicts. For example, one argumentative device to appeal for wide-ranging support has been to point to the supposedly technocratic nature of particular instruments (see Douglas (1997) for an argument relating to risk assessment).

Executive politics is therefore about maintaining a healthy interest in core overlapping research interests. As noted, executive politics represents a commitment towards the systematic research of core substantive questions that relate to the politics of the executive and the politics of executing political choices. The following section extends our discussion of key themes in executive politics, pointing also to the core areas of interest in this volume.

Developing the executive politics perspective

This book seeks to explore the value added in an executive politics-informed perspective by focusing on perennial questions that have shaped the traditional interest in the relationships between politics and administration, the politics of bureaucracy and governance. This volume therefore explores key themes and considers whether traditional accounts and explanations offer insights into the way in which particular crises are being responded to and/or how existing accounts are stretched by new developments and phenomena.

Part I, 'Doctrines and Contemporary Trends', focuses on cross-cutting themes that have been at the heart of executive politics, but deserve reconsideration. One key theme has been the issue of administrative reform. However, as suggested by Philippe Bezes (Chapter 4), the considerable literature on the acceptance of various reform doctrines, especially particular versions of managerialism (such as agencification or performance pay), has paid insufficient attention to the changing

nature of politics and, in particular, to electoral competition. The phenomena of politicization, with particular reference to the United States, is analysed by David Lewis (Chapter 3). This chapter highlights how innovative research methods can be utilized to generate insights that fundamentally reshape our views about the politics of appointment, especially in the US context. Lewis (also Lewis 2008) notes that such processes matter for performance and emerge as an outcome of institutional politics and not necessarily partisan preferences. Templates regarding administrative reform have also been a traditional feature in the context of transition and developing countries. As noted by Nilima Gulrajani (Chapter 5), development administration has suffered from the kind of weaknesses diagnosed above. Administration is presented as an apolitical recipe that however fails to sufficiently connect with the realities of politics in the context of lesser developed countries. Equally, in the case of Central and East European countries, there have been continuing demands for a Weberianization of bureaucracy. This has gone hand in hand with a growing receptiveness towards ideas usually associated with NPM. Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, Will Lowe and Christian van Stolk (Chapter 6) point to the surprising enthusiasm, as expressed in survey responses, for managerialist ideas among contemporary bureaucratic elites across transition countries.

More broadly, politicization has been used as a broad term that links to appointment, promotion and changing understandings between the kinds of competencies and loyalties that politicians expect from their civil servants. It raises issues about whether 'politicization' represents an interest in the responsiveness of bureaucracies to their masters or whether it represents an impediment of the exercise of neutral competence and bureaucratic expertise. Changing political demands on civil servants, however, only represent one challenge to traditional understandings about loyalty within systems of executive government. As noted by Kutsal Yesilkagit (Chapter 2), the rise of transnational networks of executive agencies (and, more broadly, international working groups within the European Union and other international organizational contexts) poses fundamental challenges to the way in which the study of executive politics accommodates these various loyalties and diversified policy-making settings (Wessels 1997).

The importance of informal institutional aspects within given formal structures has also driven the growing work on the organizational behaviour of administrative units. In particular, the view that organizational autonomy can be best explained by focusing on how organizations (and organizational leaders) seek to develop their reputation in

order to protect and develop an agency's profile has been one of the key growth industries in recent thinking about bureaucracy (Carpenter 2010, Maor 2011). The themes of reputation and blame avoidance address both political science and public administration-related interests in tracing how political interests have an impact on administrative features, such as agency design or communicative and policy strategies (see Hood 2010).

As noted by Sharon Gilad (Chapter 9), reputational concerns are not just important for the study of agency leadership, they also illuminate the way in which agencies enact particular practices. Reputational concerns are critical in understanding different executive strategies, and they therefore also influence the politics of policy instrument choice (see Lodge and Wegrich, Chapter 7). It has been widely argued that the past decades have seen broad changes away from redistribution towards regulation and audit (Power 1997) and discipline-oriented policy approaches (Majone 1997, Moran 2003, Roberts 2010). Such broad changes in approach are said to also influence the overall policy instrument mix, with a shift away from direct production and finance-based tools towards more indirect instruments based on information and authority. Again, such instrument mixes have direct implications for relationships within the executive and the way political choices are being executed.

One key instrument of the state – the budget – has arguably witnessed considerable attention across public administration and political science literatures. For example, the interest in the budgetary behaviour of public agencies has given rise to considerable interest in the bureau-shaping model of bureaucratic behaviour (Dunleavy 1991, James 2003). As with all instruments of the state, the operation of executive politics depends on the way in which political authority is legitimized and therefore performed. As Aaron Wildavsky noted some time ago (Wildavsky 1988), incrementalism in budgetary politics required a particular societal consensus (that then was reflected in partisan legislative politics). Once this consensus had broken down, the old ways of incremental budgetary politics were no longer viable. Philipp Krause (Chapter 8) highlights how the study and practice of budgeting has developed over time, especially in the context of changing political climates.

Part II of this volume considers the direct context of crises. This volume regards *crises* as a key factor shaping contemporary executive politics. Of course, the word crisis (in singular and plural form) has gained such widespread currency that it can be accused of lacking analytical mileage. We define crisis as a fundamental questioning or

challenging of key taken-for-granted assumptions, and it is unquestionably the case that key aspects of executive politics are confronted with crises. One key factor, as noted already, has been the sovereign debt crisis that emerged as a result of the government debt mountains largely created by the need to bail out financial markets. Despite the repeated search for an intergovernmental response to the financial crisis that could be perceived as a viable solution for more than a few days, the financial crisis also exposed numerous public services to financial cutbacks. In addition, the financial crisis challenged long-cherished beliefs in market-based problem-solving. Such fundamental challenges provoke questions as to whether the ongoing financial crisis and the related Euro-zone woes had a transformative effect on the way in which core executives conducted their business (see Parrado, Chapter 11). Indeed, crises of an acute kind represent particular challenges for executive leaders at all levels of government, as noted by Arjen Boin and Paul 't Hart (Chapter 10; also Boin et al. 2005, 2008).

The perception of crises engulfing contemporary executives also relates to less acute and immediate developments, namely demographic and environmental change. These long-term challenges represent not just potential cost drivers affecting public budgets in the future but also considerable demands on how public services should and could be provided in the future. Such long-term challenges represent a particular problem for co-ordination exercises within systems of executive government, as they represent wicked issues where relatively uncertain future benefits needs to be weighed against relatively certain short-term costs (see Fleischer and Hustedt, Chapter 14).

These different crises encourage a reconsideration of the claim that the state has been hollowed out (Rhodes 1995) by processes of internationalization/Europeanization, privatization and outsourcing, as well as by growing collaborative management at the local level. Such ideas are closely linked to governance debates and their interest in the way in which actual governing is not characterized by exercises of hierarchy but by more fluid relationships (where resource dependencies do not necessarily reflect organizational hierarchy). Policy-making works through sub-governments or policy networks, with only a few issues attracting high political attention. It also implies an emphasis on mediation and negotiation rather than on hierarchical direction. The notion of hollowing out has been widely debated (as noted by Matthews, Chapter 12), and the immediate response to the financial crisis suggested that the hollowed-out state was able to quickly fill in (as suggested by Matthews and Parrado, Chapters 11 and 12). Furthermore, as pointed out by

Matthews (Chapter 12), observers have noted considerable reserve powers that were state-specific, for example the state's unique position in framing debates. However, whether the financial crisis offers an example of executive politics being able to show its remaining muscle or whether it is 'one crisis too far' as financial sectors remain 'too big to fail' remained an open question at the time of writing.

One of the unintended consequences of contemporary tendencies towards the hollowed-out state that relies on regulation in particular to steer internationalized markets and social domains is, according to some observers, the growing political attractiveness of staging high-visibility events or large-scale projects (Moran 2003). However, as Will Jennings notes (Chapter 13), a comparative study of mega-projects throughout the second half of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century across different developed country settings reveals similar patterns that seem common across time and political systems.

This volume explores key themes that shape executive politics. As noted, it is not driven by a single methodological or theoretical perspective. However, contributions to this volume share a commitment towards systematic social scientific research that is sensitive to substantive and contextual factors. Executive politics is therefore open to different theoretical approaches. For example, political economy-related approaches that explore the (changing) role of the finance ministry in budgeting (Hallerberg et al. 2009, Wehner 2010) are as likely to make a contribution to executive politics as ethnographic studies of everyday life in government that rely on interpretative approaches (Rhodes 2011). What is distinct about executive politics is not its theoretical backbone or its particular methodology. Instead, what is distinct is its focus on the intersection of politics and administration under the highly complex conditions of governance in the early twenty-first century. Hence, the title of this volume: *Executive Politics in Times of Crisis*.

Conclusion

The purpose of this volume is to further the contribution of 'executive politics' to the study of political science and public administration. It combines a range of perspectives and authors that explore key themes and concerns. The chapters that follow are committed to the idea that the administrative factor is an integral part of politics and of the process of governing society, while political science-focused questions and politics are fundamental to advancing our understanding of the design

and operation of the administrative factor. *Executive politics* seeks to bridge the emerging gap between political science and public administration scholarship – and thereby also to enhance the mutual understanding regarding the importance of organization in politics. We explore the significance of executive politics for wider discussions about the future of the state in the concluding chapter (Chapter 15).

Notes

1. The question is generally attributed to Harold Laswell's seminal 1936 book on *Politics: Who Gets What, When and How*.
2. This would also include an interest in public service motivations and the idea of the 'psychological contract' that informs employment relations (Rousseau 1996).

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Part I

Doctrines and Contemporary Trends

2

The Internationalization of National Bureaucracy: The Impact on Relationships between Politicians and Bureaucrats

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Introduction

Some of humankind's most pressing problems are globalized problems. Wars, famine and abysmal socio-economic inequalities between and within countries cause international migration streams to flow from poor to developed countries. The causes and consequences of climate change require responses that national states cannot deliver by themselves. Two decades ago governments in the Western world liberalized their financial markets. There is a growing interdependence between national states as we witness the rise of new modes of global governance. Inter- and nongovernmental organizations, international public-private forms of networked governance, and transgovernmental networks of regulators, judges and policy-makers – all kinds of modes of global governance have emerged that now span the entire globe (Drezner 2007, Keohane 2001, Koppell 2010, Mattli and Woods 2009, Slaughter 2004). And, of course, there is the European Union (EU), which is the most powerful and integrated international multi-level governance regime (Hooghe and Marks 2001).

Global governance entails the delegation of administrative capacities and rule-making authorities from national states to international organizations and regimes. International organizations have become new venues where national states deliberate and decide on policy problems that require an international response. The emergence of global governance organizations and regimes, however, has, unsurprisingly, affected

the position of national states. By contrast, global networks and international networks have profound influences on the policy-making processes within policy sectors such as environmental and financial market regulation. The administrative networks that come with many international organizations (e.g. the Basel Committee, International Telecommunication Union, International Civil Aviation Organization) extract substantial amounts of the administrative and policy-making resources from national ministries and other national agencies (Raustiala 2002, Slaughter 2004). The EU is the most demanding organization in this respect: it not only extracts national administrative resources for staffing the myriads of expert and comitology committees, working groups and task forces but also lays a huge claim on the time and attention of national executive politicians. Ministers of the member states meet their colleagues at least once a month in Council meetings; when there is a crisis they may even meet each other at least once a week.

The internationalization of national bureaucracies is the integration of (parts of) the national bureaucracy or administrative systems into international policy-making structures. Students of Europeanization study how European integration affects the structure, culture and functioning of national administrative systems (Geuijen et al. 2008, Harmsen 1999, Jordan 2001, 2003, Knill 2001, Lægreid et al. 2004, Mastenbroek and Princen 2010, Trondal and Veggeland 2003). Despite this burgeoning literature, little has been said about the possible effects of internationalization or Europeanization on the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats forms the heart of the national state and the linchpin for understanding power relationships in democratic and authoritarian regimes since Max Weber's writings on bureaucracy (Aberbach et al. 1981, Armstrong 1973, Hansen and Ejersbo 2002, 't Hart and Wille 2006, Heclo 1978, Hood and Lodge 2006, Page 1985, Page and Wright 1999, Peters 1988, Suleiman 1984, Svara 2001). The ultimate question pertaining to bureaucracy is how to control it and prevent a *Beamtenherrschaft*. Without any effective rule exercised, a bureaucracy will serve its own interests. This explains the quest of Weber and others for a 'neutral bureaucracy'. During the course of decades of political research, this Weberian ideal-type was 'updated' several times. But the dominant models of political–bureaucratic relationships have not quite well incorporated how the growth of global governance arrangement will affect this relationship.

This chapter's main task is to explore the effects of internationalization on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, and it

asks how well prevailing models and theories of political–bureaucratic relationships are capable of incorporating the impact of internationalization. This endeavour will be guided by three goals. The first goal is to describe the process of internationalization and the emerging forms of global governance. The second goal is to assess the main prevailing theories and models of political–bureaucratic relationships in the context of internationalization. The third goal is to define new puzzles and a research agenda.

Theories and models of political–bureaucratic relationships

In this section I present three of the most important models and theories of political–bureaucratic relationships: Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman's 'Images'; Peters' 'Models of Interaction'; and Hood and Lodge's 'Public Service Bargains' (PSBs). These three models represent the most important conceptual, analytical and comparative approaches to the study of political and bureaucratic relationships. They offer therefore the best starting points to assess the impact of a general trend such as internationalization (other accounts include Armstrong 1973, Campbell and Wilson 1995, 't Hart and Wille 2006, Page and Wright 1999, Peters and Pierre 2001, Suleiman 1984).

All three theories of political–bureaucratic relationships share a common reference to Weber's ideal-type of bureaucracy and reflect upon it. Therefore we need to have a closer look at Weber's view of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy stands for that form of rule whereby formal rules and procedures dictate the behaviour of officials and the outcomes of their decisions. During the course of European political history, bureaucracy became the early modern period's rulers' main instrument to check upon their vassals and machinery for controlling modes of economic production and surplus extraction (Anderson 1974). But with the decay of absolutism and the rise of popular challenges to kings and monarchs, public control of bureaucracies gradually but sometimes through shocks shifted to the hands of a new class of rulers: elected politicians. And here lay Weber's main concern: that the changing mechanisms of control on the bureaucracy would give way to an unchecked rule of bureaucrats. Only two conditions could prevent this: the institutionalization of strong parliaments staffed by professional politicians with popular mandates that would effectively check and curb the power of the bureaucracy, and the existence and enforcement of formal rules and procedures that rendered the behaviour of bureaucrats and the organization of the bureaucracy neutral. The imprint of Weber on the study