


France on the World Stage

Nation State Strategies in the Global Era

Edited by Mairi Maclean and Joseph Szarka



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France on the World Stage

Nation State Strategies in the Global Era

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palgrave macmillan



Editorial matter, selection and introduction $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$ Mairi Maclean and Joseph Szarka 2008

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List of Abbreviations

AC!	Agir ensemble contre le chômage
ADEME	Agence de l'environnement et de la maîtrise de l'énergie
ADSL	Asymmetric digital subscriber line (broadband)
AFEP	Association française des entreprises privés
AII	Agence de l'innovation industrielle
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi
AMF	Autorité des marchés financiers
ANP	Advanced Nuclear Power
AOL	America OnLine
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASMCF	Association for the Study of Modern and
	Contemporary France
ATTAC	Association pour la taxation des transactions financières
	et pour l'aide aux citoyens
BEPG	Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
BNP	Banque nationale de Paris
CAC	Cotation assistée en continu
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CEO	Chief executive officer
CERI	Centre d'études et de recherches internationales
CFA	Communauté française d'Afrique
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGP	Commissariat général du plan
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMF	Conseil des marchés financiers
CNPF	Conseil National du Patronat Français
COB	Commission des opérations de bourse
COP	Conference of the Parties
CPNT	Chasse, pêche, nature, traditions
DATAR	Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire
	et à l'action régionale
DFI	Deutsch-Französisches Institut
DGCID	Direction générale de la coopération internationale
	et du développement

EADS	European Aeronautics, Defence and Space Company
EC	European Community
ECB	European Central Bank
Ecofin	Economic and Financial Affairs Council
ECOWAS	Economic Organisation of West African States
EdF	Electricité de France
EDP	Excessive deficit procedure
EEA	European Environment Agency
EG	Economic governance
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
ERM	Exchange Rate Mechanism
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ETS	Emissions Trading Scheme
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FIFA	Fédération internationale de football association
FN	Front National
G7	Group of seven most industrialised nations (USA,
	Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy and Canada)
GAC	General Affairs Council of the EU
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross domestic product
GHG	Greenhouse gas
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFRI	Institut français des relations internationales
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INSEE	Institut national de la statistique et des études
	économiques
IRIS	Institut des relations internationales et
	stratégiques
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
LCI	La chaîne info
LCR	Ligue communiste révolutionnaire
LO	Lutte ouvrière
MATE	Ministère de l'aménagement du territoire et de
	l'environnement

MC	Military Committee (of NATO)			
MEDD	Ministère de l'écologie et du développement durable			
MEDEF	Mouvement des entreprises de France			
MPF	Mouvement pour la France			
MRC	Mouvement républicain et citoyen			
MtCO ₂	Million tonnes of carbon dioxide			
MW	Megawatt			
NAP	National Allocation Plan (under EU ETS)			
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation			
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development			
NGO	Non-governmental organisation			
NRE	Nouvelles Régulations Economiques			
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and			
	Development			
ORTF	Office de radiodiffusion-télévision française			
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe			
PCF	Parti communiste français			
PDG	Président directeur-général			
РКО	Peacekeeping operations			
PSA	Political Studies Association			
RECAMP	Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien			
	de la paix			
RES	Renewable energy sources			
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front			
RPF	Rassemblement pour la France			
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République			
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe			
SEC	Security and Exchange Commission			
SECAM	Séquentiel couleur à mémoire			
SEM	Single European Market			
SGP	Stability and Growth Pact			
SME	Small and medium-sized enterprise			
SOSR	SOS Racisme			
SOX	Sarbanes-Oxley Act			
TCA	Trade and Cooperation Agreement			
TGV	Train à grande vitesse			
TWh	Terawatt hour			
UDF	Union pour la démocratie française			
UK	United Kingdom			
UMP	Union pour un mouvement populaire			
UN	United Nations			

Nations Commission on Human Rights
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Nations Security Council
States of America
of Soviet Socialist Republics
assette recorder
deutscher Ingenieure
Trade Organisation

1 Globalisation and the Nation State: Conceptual Lenses on French Ambitions in a Changing World Order

Mairi Maclean and Joseph Szarka

Introduction

The purpose of this book is to examine the ways in which France's relations with the international community have evolved in a period of accelerating globalisation. It considers the role of the nation state and its capacity for political initiative, examining French strategies to consolidate French influence on the world stage. It questions whether an intermediary country such as France can continue to 'punch above its weight' in a changing world order. Thus, the book considers France both as a passive and an active actor. In other words, as well as assessing the impact of globalisation on France, it addresses French strategies to avert unwelcome outcomes and to deepen global developments by reinforcing French influence and policy preferences around the world.

This volume grew out of a conference entitled 'France on the World Stage', organised jointly by the University of the West of England and the University of Bath. It was held at Frenchay, Bristol, under the aegis of the French policy sub-group of the Political Studies Association (PSA), the Association for the Study of Modern and Contemporary France (ASMCF), and the South West Wales and West of England Regional Centre for Contemporary French Studies, and took place on 8 July 2005.

The date is significant since on 7 July 2005, London was the target of a terrorist attack. Four Islamist suicide bombers detonated their home-made bombs in the morning rush-hour, causing carnage in the British capital. Trains approaching the underground stations of Aldgate, Russell Square and Edgware Road were attacked. The bombers had targeted the four corners of the city, North, South, East and West. In the event, the Northern line was spared by its temporary closure, one of the terrorists transferring to a London double-decker bus and blowing it up in Tavistock Square.

The relationship of the so-called '7/7' terrorist attack to the present volume is not just that it coincided with the conference, such that some of the participants, passing through London en route to Bristol, were caught up in the chaos that ensued. (One American professor - who had escaped 9/11, having owned an apartment blocks away from the World Trade Centre - staying overnight near Russell Square, heard the blasts, yet stalwartly made it to the conference the next day on the first train out of Paddington.) The wider relevance of these events lies in the fact that terrorism now spans the globe - just as politics, culture and the environment have also become global in a way which few would have predicted even twenty years ago. Attacks by the supranational terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda over the past ten years have affected no fewer than 26 countries around the world, in locations as far afield as New York, Washington, Bali, Nairobi, Sharm el-Sheikh and, of course, Madrid. Confronted with world-wide terrorist attacks – though often targeted at Western interests – the population looks for protection, action and resolution to the nation state in the first instance. Indeed, not just in security terms, but also in the geopolitical, economic and environmental domains, the nation state remains a central actor in international relations, confounding the predictions of observers who suggested that in the twenty-first century the nation state may have had its day (Beck, 2000; Guéhenno, 1995; Ohmae, 1995, 2005).

Against the background of these multiple dimensions of globalisation, this introductory chapter raises key questions and issues in current debates regarding the role of the nation state and its capacity for initiative in a changing world order. We review some of the most relevant components of the literature on globalisation and path dependencies, seeking to develop conceptual lenses through which to view the two-way interactions between international processes and nation state strategies. We then examine the enduring nature of French ambitions on the world stage, using those lenses to identify continuities and discontinuities in national strategies. In a final section, we provide an overview of this volume, setting out the main themes of the chapters and situating them in relation to our key issues.

Conceptual lenses

The globalisation debate raises major questions related to the will, purpose, opportunity and scope for action of the nation state. Faced by

rapid evolution in the external environment, to what extent are nation states free to choose their strategies? Can congruence be deliberately and deliberatively attained between purpose and opportunity, or is the available scope for action irrevocably dictated by external necessity and internalised habits?

The literature on path dependency indicates that whilst adaptive capacity is not permanently moulded, it is significantly constrained by past decisions. The notion of path dependency stresses that choices entail consequences, enacted over the long term through a variety of chain reactions. Once made, decisions cannot be undone and the repertoire of future options is altered. As a concept, path dependency owes much to the work of North (1990: 6), who explained how 'informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct ... not only connect the past with the present and the future, but provide us with a key to explaining the path of historical change'. North pointed to important lock-in effects occurring in national political and business systems, influenced by the timing of industrialisation (Fligstein and Freeland, 1995; Pedersen and Thomsen, 1997), as a result of which sub-optimal structures endure over long periods, even when a potentially superior alternative arises. In this way, historically derived perceptions persist, reflecting 'the complexities of deciphering a complex environment with the available mental constructs – ideas, theories, and ideologies' (North, 1990: 96). Systems become self-reinforcing (to a degree), as regulation fosters particular institutional structures which, in turn, strengthen existing patterns of regulation. This perspective indicates that actors involved in rule-making at the *international* level still remain substantially embedded in national cultures and environments, from which they extend their behaviours and strategies into the global domain (Djelic and Quack, 2003a). Change is not precluded, of course. For example, no predetermination acts to ensure that a 'particular economy - usually defined as being a national one – is fated to continue along its path' (Crouch, 2005: 3). Rather, path dependence tends to encourage incremental change within institutions and organisations (North, 1990) - unless, of course, a change, or even a revolution, is compelled by a crisis. Yet when change does occur, some elements of the 'new' may recast continuity in subtly altered ways.

The concept of path dependence not only helps explain the manner in which change occurs or fails to occur, but also draws attention to varying conceptualisations of the dependent variable 'change'. The conceptual lenses through which we view our object of study inevitably alter our perceptions. A commitment to identifying the effects of path dependence may diminish the capacity to recognise discontinuity in the object of study. Conversely, the vocation to implement change and enact a *rupture* (a break) which is regularly voiced by premiers across both sides of the Channel – currently Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy – may mask path continuities, deliberately or by omission. Thus, the ways in which the notion of path dependence is used – whether and how to stress continuity or discontinuity – constitutes a major alternative in terms of the conceptual lenses used to scrutinise the object of study.

Given the core themes of this volume, a concern with 'nation state strategies' over and against a preoccupation with 'globalisation processes' provides the other major alternative in terms of conceptual lenses. Depending on which set of lenses we don, our vision changes markedly. Globalisation may perhaps be the word which best encapsulates the changing landscape of the new millennium (Lyth and Trischler, 2004). It is often considered as the 'big idea' of our times (Held et al., 2000: 1). Although close to cliché, it may nevertheless capture the essence and lived experience of a 'new' epoch. For Beck (2000: 1), it involves an 'escape from the categories of the national [sic] state'. While the nation state once determined the contours of society, in his view the 'world society' has emerged with globalisation. This 'global cosmopolitan society' (Giddens, 1999) undermines the integrity, role and action of the nation state, since 'a multiplicity of social circles, communication networks, market relations and lifestyles, none of them specific to any particular loyalty, now cut across the boundaries of the national state' (Beck, 2000: 4).

Yet the demise of the nation state has long been predicted. Daniel Bell (1987) considered it too small to solve the big problems, yet too big for the small problems. These sentiments were echoed by Kenichi Ohmae (1990, 1995), who recently claimed that a new world is assuming shape and form 'from the ashes of yesterday's nation-based economic world' (Ohmae, 2005: 1), in which success depends on action on the world stage. This 'hyperglobalist' perspective (Held et al., 2000: 3) regards economic globalisation as constituting a new era in human history in which the nation state is irrelevant, dysfunctional or counter-productive. According to Ohmae (1995: 5), traditional nation states have become 'unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy', a view shared by Strange (1996: 4), who argued that 'the impersonal forces of world markets... are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong'. This observation was substantiated by Sklair (2002)

who established that in 2001 four of the world's 10 biggest economic entities in terms of turnover were not countries but transnational corporations: behind the USA, Germany, the UK, Italy, Japan and France came US giants Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Wal-Mart and Exxon Mobil. Sklair ascertained that whilst fewer than 60 countries in 2001 had a gross domestic product (GDP) of \$20 billion or more, as many as 245 companies were listed in the *Fortune* Global 500 as having greater annual revenues. With such unparalleled resources, transnational corporations can play fast and loose with their ties and obligations to local communities and environments (Beck, 2000).

Further, whilst the rapid pace of technology diffusion and industrial development has resolved the economic problems of at least some parts of the world, it has also created an unprecedented escalation in the levels of environmental hazards. Infamous disasters, which do not respect national boundaries – including the devastating nuclear accident at the Chernobyl power plant in the Ukraine in 1986, the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska in 1987, and the explosion at the chemical plant in Bhopal in 1984 – have given rise to notions of a 'risk society' (Beck, 1992) or 'vulnerable society' (Theys, 1987), terms which are evocative of the new scale and enormity of the threats (Szarka, 2002: 157). Global climate disruption has emerged as the largest and most alarming of this new category of environmental threat, one which dwarfs the nation state and inevitably requires an internationally coordinated response.

However, more sceptical commentators question whether globalisation truly amounts to anything new (Held et al., 2000). Djelic and Quack (2003b: 302) suggest that globalisation is a 'contested and discontinued process' which shares 'quite a few similarities with earlier periods of internationalisation of economic activity'. According to Hirst and Thompson (1996), globalisation has acquired a chimerical quality, with the weight of evidence pointing not to a global integrated market but merely to heightened levels of internationalisation. Others, however, whom Held et al. (2000) define as 'transformationalists', view globalisation as a transforming force of unprecedented strength and reach, reshaping economies, societies, institutions and ultimately giving rise to a new world order dominated by the network society (Castells, 1996). Yet this does not mean that global homogeneity is a foregone conclusion. On the contrary, persistent divergence remains a possibility, even in the face of strong isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), as long-standing cultural patterns reassert themselves, such that the processes of global convergence are challenged and disrupted by deep-rooted structural continuities expressed in national legal, institutional, political and intellectual practices.

French ambitions in a changing world order

Among the industrialised nations, France is perhaps the country to have experienced the greatest difficulty in coping with globalisation, or which has at any rate agonised most loudly over it.¹ Hostile reactions have led to the creation of an anti-globalisation movement which, through the activities of the Association pour la taxation des transactions financières et pour l'aide aux citoyens (ATTAC), has transformed itself into a movement promoting alternondialisation and seeking alternatives to neo-liberal economic globalisation.² Gordon and Meunier (2001: 8–11) listed four reasons why globalisation poses particular problems for France: it challenges a tradition of state-centred capitalism; threatens national culture and identity; calls into question the founding principles and values of the French Republic; and reduces France's international stature. This last-mentioned challenge highlights the French dilemma: despite recent expressions of hostility, stubborn resistance or simply disorientation, France has historically been a pioneer of internationalisation yet, having lost momentum in the recent period, struggles to recapture the initiative.

French history reveals a long tradition of leadership, and at times dominance, in military and economic power projection, in international diplomacy, in the dissemination of cultural practices and political ideas, and in the diffusion of 'universal' values. This legacy has produced a specific form of path dependency. In the late twentieth century, the Gaullist ambition to perpetuate national *grandeur* (greatness) produced a tension between a long-standing will to international leadership and the reality of diminishing national influence on the world stage. Internationalisation, and latterly globalisation, have exposed France's position as an 'intermediary' power some way behind the Cold War superpowers of yesteryear, the USA and the USSR, and the emerging powers of today's 'new world order', such as China. Thus, the spectre of national decline has, for some time now, haunted political debate in France.

One of its recent manifestations is a spate of publications on 'declinology'. Examples include *La France qui tombe* ('France in free-fall') by Nicolas Bavarez (2003); *La France est-elle encore une grande puissance*? ('Is France still a great power?') by Pascal Boniface (1998); *Adieu* à la France qui s'en va ('Farewell to France departing') by Jean-Marie Rouart (2003); and *L'Arrogance française* ('French Arrogance') by Romain Gubert and Emmanuel Saint-Martin (2003). These titles pinpoint sites of national anxiety and insecurity, weaving a narrative of national economic vulnerability and fading international prestige, accompanied by loss of national identity and compensatory, overweening ambition.

Clearly, France has experienced great difficulty in coming to terms with a decline in status from its former pre-eminence as a leading military and colonial power, to being a nation of the second rank (Hoffmann, 1987; Kuisel. 1981). On the eve of the First World War, the French Empire spanned some 11,755,000 square kilometres, with a population of 41.1 million living outside France. It embraced a plethora of colonies across several continents: Asia (India, Indo-China, Kwangchou-Wan), Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, Congo, West Africa and the Sahara, Réunion, Madagascar, Mayotte Comoro Isles, and the Somalia Coast), Latin America (Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, St Pierre et Miquelon) and the Pacific (Tahiti and islands, New Caledonia). Yet in 1940 this great imperial power was defeated in a matter of weeks by an invading German army, its alleged state-of-the-art fortifications, the Maginot Line, easily breached. In the recent period, France's cultural prestige also declined, as French eminence in literature and the arts diminished in *rayonnement* – in its radiance for the wider world (Rouart, 2003). France has found it hard to accept the diminished role offered to it by the post-war world. It is against this background of decline in international standing that General de Gaulle's obsession with grandeur and national prestige must be viewed (Maclean, 2002). Thus, the underlying question raised by the 'declinology' debate is the capacity of France as a nation to adapt to successive changes in the world order. In other words, what is the national capability to put aside out-dated and failing strategies, to develop new patterns of behaviour, and to forge a new role?

In practice, French political leaders have sought to find a compromise position that is more ambitious than simply acquiescing to externally imposed constraints, and more modest than the traditional search for *grandeur*. In the language of the Chirac presidency (1995– 2007), this was described as an effort to *maîtriser la mondialisation*: although this expression has sometimes been misconstrued as a wish to roll back globalisation – surely an impossible task worthy of Canute – a more appropriate translation is to 'domesticate' or merely 'manage' globalisation. Indeed, part of the French approach has been communicative, seeking to make globalisation more comprehensible and more acceptable, as exemplified by former Prime Minister Jospin's call for 'globalisation with a human face' (Jospin, 2002: 10). But France has also developed substantive strategies to cope with and adapt to a changing world order. Key amongst these has been the preference to orchestrate a multipolar world order, a preference consistently followed in foreign policy-making under President Chirac (Boniface, 2007: 32). This involves setting behavioural 'rules' (Védrine, 2001: 14) – namely new forms of regulation – within international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Such rule-making is conceived as the antidote to neo-liberal laissez-faire, and translates *la mondialisation maîtrisée* into practice. Within this multipolar order, the European Union (EU) – as the 'natural' extension and continuation of French ambitions – constitutes a leading pole and a major institutional venue for cross-border rule-making. France has thus made a major commitment to fuelling the motor of European integration. Yet these ambitions point to France representing a singular case in international relations.

A major impediment to French preferences for a multipolar order has been the USA acting as global hegemon. Wallerstein (1984) defined a hegemonic situation as one where 'power is so unbalanced that one power can largely impose its rules and wishes in the economic, political, military, diplomatic and even cultural arenas'. In the 1960s, American hegemony was already actively resisted by de Gaulle, who viewed US financial pre-eminence as tantamount to slavery (Maclean, 2002; Rueff, 1972). Since the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the USSR in the 1990s, the world is increasingly dominated by one superpower (Huntington, 1999), with the USA behaving more and more as if in a unipolar world (Patrick, 2001; Young, 2001) on issues as wide-ranging as world security and climate change, raising concomitant threats of financial imperialism and intellectual colonialism. By the 1990s, this unipolar world entailed a context where, for the French, globalisation was often synonymous with Americanisation, stirring the desire to preserve national difference and cultural diversity. Evidencing clear foreign policy continuity with the Gaullist period, Hubert Védrine, French Foreign Minister between 1997 and 2002, sternly declared that 'the very weight [of the Americans] carried them towards hegemonism, and the idea they have of their mission is unilateralism. And that is unacceptable'.³ This tradition of outspoken criticism has given France a reputation as a difficult negotiating partner for the USA (Cogan, 2003).

Nowhere is French opposition to American projects more evident than in relation to the invasion of Iraq. When, following the attacks on the World Trade Centre of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush called for coalition partners to join the USA in the so-called 'war on terror', France and Britain chose to follow different paths. Prime Minister Blair promised, apparently unconditionally, to stand 'shoulder to shoulder' with the Americans, first in Afghanistan, then more problematically in Iraq. Bush sought 'regime change', based on claims that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein continued to stockpile weapons of mass destruction – although UN weapons inspectors could find none. In stark contrast, French political leaders were more circumspect. Védrine criticised the USA for acting 'unilaterally, without consulting others, taking decisions based on its own view of the world and its own interests...refusing any multilateral negotiation that could limit their decision-making, sovereignty and freedom of action'.⁴ Following the passing of UN resolution 1441 in November 2002, unanimously agreed by the Security Council, which offered Iraq 'a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations' (UN Security Council, 2002), Chirac declared himself willing in February 2003 to veto a second UN resolution, which would have sanctioned war against Iraq.

President Chirac galvanised international opposition against rushing into war, enlisting the support of Germany, other non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Russia. In the view of Gubert and Saint-Martin (2003: 11), the impression created by France in the spring of 2003 was that of 'a small country inflicting lessons of morality on the Empire' and constituted a prime example of French arrogance. In response, the USA and its immediate allies (foremost of which was the UK) decided that a second resolution was unnecessary, resolution 1441 being deemed to give all necessary authority to proceed with a war which critics have since branded as illegal. Once France refused to join the coalition in the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration dismissed France as 'old Europe' – as opposed to the 'new Europe' formed by East European countries – subsequently deciding to 'forgive Moscow, ignore Berlin and punish Paris' (Gubert and Saint-Martin, 2003: 10). French goods encountered a public boycott in the USA, with 'French fries' being renamed as 'freedom fries'! France was even castigated as part of what the American Fox News Channel termed the 'axis of weasels' (Panchadsaram, 2004), echoing the expression 'axis of evil' used by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address to describe Iraq, Iran and North Korea as sponsors of terrorism. This episode constituted a low point in the history of France-US relations. Yet it is marked by two ironies. One is that subsequent events proved France right regarding the non-existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the likelihood that invasion would increase, rather than decrease, terrorist activities. The other, as pointed out by Boniface (2007: 71-2), is that France not only gained nothing from formulating the correct analysis, but has quietly been forced to side with the American-led 'war on terror'.

Frustrated ambitions related to reining in the US hegemon and the perverse outcomes of the failed Iraq adventure sharply illustrate the constraints impacting on France as nation state playing the role, in the Gaullist tradition, of an 'independent' actor on the world stage. Here, continuity is evidenced in the dogged pursuit of a variant of Gaullist foreign policy, yet discontinuity is displayed in the acceptance of the need to develop strategic alliances. The most evident manifestation of this incomplete struggle to moderate historical reflexes in favour of new learned behaviours, and so overcome *inherited* path dependency, lies in France's strategy towards Europe. As Jean Monnet (1976) expressed it, men may come and go, but the institutions they bequeath are more powerful, being able to shape and inform policy and events over long periods of time. In practice, designing Europe's institutional architecture is tantamount to *bequeathing* new elements of path dependency to future generations.

France learned to conceive of Europe as a means of extending French influence, recognising that French and European interests shared much common ground. Through playing a leading role in the European Community (EC), France discovered that it could transcend national limitations and enjoy an amplified role on the world stage, thus retaining more control over its own destiny than geopolitical and historical considerations alone would logically have permitted (Maclean and Howorth, 1992). As Hoffmann (1987: 49–50) noted, while the objectives of welfare, prosperity, security and independence were deemed by French political elites to be no longer achievable 'through national action and at the level of the nation', nevertheless these 'might still be reachable at the level of Europe'. President Mitterrand famously summed up France's European ambitions in his New Year's Eve address to the nation in 1988, 'France is our homeland, but Europe is our future' (Guyomarch et al., 1998: 1).

A key founding member of the Community, France was particularly active when the initial rules of the game were being shaped. Over the years, French influence in the EU has been arguably greater than that of any other member state. The lasting imprint of national French institutions and structures on the make-up and management of the EU is exemplified most clearly by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). A French invention designed to solve the problems of financing French farming, the CAP has survived in its essence, despite significant reforms, since it was conceived by de Gaulle in the 1960s. It is illustrated too by Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a project driven by the French