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Russian Bureaucracy and the State

Officialdom From Alexander III to Vladimir Putin

Edited by

Don K. Rowney and Eugene Huskey



Russian Bureaucracy and the State

Also by Don K. Rowney

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PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN RUSSIA

RUSSIAN LAWYERS AND THE SOVIET STATE: The Origins and Development of the Soviet Bar, 1917–1939

Russian Bureaucracy and the State

Officialdom From Alexander III to Vladimir Putin

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

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Preface and Acknowledgements

It has been 30 years since the appearance of the forerunner to this work, *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries*. In the years since its publication, three developments occurred that invited a thorough reassessment of the Russian bureaucracy, past and present. First, new methods in the social sciences, most notably neo-institutionalism, revolutionized the study of organizations. Second, public administration moved beyond its Weberian conceptual roots toward a new understanding of relations among politicians, state employees, and the private sector, embodied in the New Public Management (NPM) and related movements. Finally, and most significantly, Russia experienced a regime transition that has reshaped state-societal relations and the role of the state bureaucracy in public life.

The challenges posed by today's reforms have opened up new perspectives on bureaucratic change in earlier episodes of regime transition in Russian history. In response to these parallel revolutions in methodologies and in the Russian state itself, this volume brings together an international team of scholars who offer empirically rich and conceptually innovative studies of Russian state administration since the late 19th century.

Modern states rely on markets, politics, law, and administration to allocate goods. In Russia, the particular mix of these decision-making mechanisms has been skewed heavily toward administration, whether in the tsarist, Soviet, or post-communist eras. Given the importance of state administration for an understanding of Russian political and economic development, one of the goals of this work is to move the analysis of the state bureaucracy from the fringes of Russian studies to its rightful place among the core concerns of the discipline. Whether in scholarly work on Russia, such as Stephen Solnick's *Stealing the State*, or in the attempts to construct state institutions in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, one finds in recent years a new appreciation of the significance of the machinery of state for governance, political change and economic development.

This volume is not only designed to bring the study of state administration center stage in the Imperial, Soviet and post-communist fields but to provide students of comparative state and bureaucracy analyses of how the organization, personnel, and practices of Russian officialdom relate to bureaucratic norms and behavior elsewhere. The topical chapters that follow focus on the perennial tensions in state administration as they apply to Russia—tensions between center and periphery, formal rules and informal practices, professional and legal versus political loyalties, and a reliance on public or private purveyors of services. Framing these chapters are editors'

introductions to Russian officialdom in each of the three periods under study—tsarist, Soviet, and post-communist. We also provide extended essays in the Introduction and Conclusion that locate the Russian experience in the comparative literature on bureaucracy and the state.

In common with its predecessor, this work is the result of a lengthy intellectual collaboration and exchange that is rare for edited volumes. In this case, however, collaboration has extended to authors from diverse disciplinary and geo-political backgrounds. Conceived at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) 2002 conference in Pittsburgh, this project brought together contributors at several subsequent AAASS conferences and at the International Council for Central and East European Studies Congress in Berlin in July 2005. A concluding conference took place in March 2008 at the CNRS institute, Cultures et sociétés urbaines (CSU) in Paris. We are grateful to our French hosts, Martine Mespoulet and the Director of CSU, Anne-Marie Devreux, for arranging this two-day colloquium.

Numerous individuals and organizations were instrumental in shaping and supporting this project. Our home institutions, Bowling Green State University and Stetson University, provided travel funds and other assistance. The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research supported the work of Eugene Huskey and Alexander Obolonsky during the initial stages of research. The Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, provided a forum in which to discuss research findings. To John Armstrong, Alena Ledeneva, Barbara Lehmbruch, Joel Moses,Walter Pintner, William Tompson, Michael Urban, and Peter Solomon we express our gratitude for helping us to think more clearly about the role of officialdom in Russia.

* * *

Don K. Rowney translated Chapter 10 from the French and Eugene Huskey translated Chapters 12 and 16 from the French and Chapters 17 and 18 from the Russian. Chapter 6, which is a revised and shortened version of a chapter from A. S. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910. A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 126–171, appears by kind permission of Oxford University Press.

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1
Introduction: Russian Officialdom since 1881

Don K. Rowney and Eugene Huskey

This book is about the civil agents, or officialdom, of three states: the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. The study begins with the reign of Emperor Alexander III (1881–94), who succeeded his assassinated father at a moment of new departures for Russian state administration. As we shall see, the increasing size of state service, combined with the demand for state oversight of an increasingly industrialized political economy, requirements for new administrative specializations, and attempts to retrieve state administration from the liberalizing turns of the previous reign, all combined to create an officialdom which struggled to adapt to a changing imperium in a changing world.

The study ends with an analysis of attempted administrative reforms during a somewhat similar era in the life of the Russian state at the beginning of the 21st century, during the presidential administration of Vladimir V. Putin. It aims to detail the institutional and organizational evolution of what we shall call here a 'Russian officialdom'[1] over the past 125 years. Unsurprisingly, the studies created for this book have found both significant continuities and changes. These are documented as endurances and variations across time, geographic space and organizational hierarchies.

At least as much as the inhabitants of other states which are called 'urban-industrial', the generations who have lived within the boundaries of the Imperial, Soviet and post-communist Russian states during the late 19th, 20th and early 21st centuries experienced dramatic and unprecedented transformations in their personal and social lives. The boundaries of these states, the largest in the world, were modified by political interventions, war, revolution and even political paralysis. Industrialization and its concomitants—urbanization, mass education and mass politics—changed the lives and life expectations of virtually everyone. On an area of roughly comparable geographic size, the population burgeoned from a little less than 130 million at the beginning of our period of study to more than 286 million by the fall of the Soviet Union, in spite of catastrophes brought on by famine, disease, war and revolution.[2] Today, owing to decline in standards of

living and birth rates, and to the failure of social safety nets, the Russian Federation is experiencing what both journalistic and professional demographic studies have described as population 'freefall'.[3]

Any one of these transformations could challenge the civil administration of any state in the world. All of them together, as their impact accumulated over the last century and a quarter, presented challenges to a Russian officialdom which was often incapable of responding fully and effectively, and which, when responding, did not always do so with the effect and force of other state administrations in urban-industrial societies.

Patterns of endurance and change

The challenges which state administrations have presented to scholars determined to understand and critique them have been especially great during the past 125 years, an era of historically unprecedented growth in the size, scope and complexity of state activity throughout the world. Departing from the ideal view of state bureaucracy as a potentially neutral agent of governments' political power, famously constructed by Max Weber,[4] historians and social scientists continued to develop new paradigms that increasingly recognized the importance of relations among officials and the public and private interests that bear on them. These new paradigms included narratives focusing on politics internal to bureaucracies, the effects of personnel and structural changes, the consequences of technological, economic and demographic changes, war, regime change and revolution.[5]

In turn, these perspectives began to be superseded by the work of students of institutionalist and neo-institutionalist analysis from the mid-20th century onward. These new interpretations re-conceptualized relations between politics and administration within states. This research recognized that state organizations serve as a training ground for many political leaders, that they shape the discourse of politics (especially in regimes in which the state is relatively autonomous), that they provide the political leadership with its means of governance and control, and that they offer services to the population. A given state's public administration is not, in this view, a one-size-fits-all, ideal-typical bureaucracy, interchangeable within any political system. Instead, it is an idiosyncratic network of organizational structures (bureaus), personnel and institutions that shape political, social and economic developments over time and is shaped by them in turn. Of special note for the purposes of this study is the fact that the literature argues that such a network is sometimes better explained through historical institutionalism—i.e. narratives that tell 'how it got that way' by tracing its evolution over time—than by behavioral or structural/functional analyses.[6]

Definitions of state bureaucracy became more complex and inclusive as one moved across this range of scholarship, beginning from the mid-20th

century. Writing at the end of the 1960s, Anthony Downs defined 'bureaucracy' as hierarchical, non-market organizations, choosing, apparently, to exclude in theory such hierarchical administrations as those of large corporations. 'Bureaucrats', the functionaries in bureaucracies, were identified by their hierarchical roles and also by the fact that their work was not compensated directly from the values arising through market exchanges.[7]

In his still widely referenced study, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Downs did not discuss institutions. He used this term only as a synonym for organizations. Across time, however, the concept of 'institution' came to add a significant interpretive dimension to the understanding of bureaucracies and the stricture that bureaucracies (public ones, at least) are non-market organizations became less defensible, as we shall see.[8]

Beginning in the 1980s and continuing up to the present time, the institutional economist, Douglass C. North, and, after him, many scholars, including authors of works focused on Russia, such as Stephen L. Solnick and Stefan Hedlund, attempted to address the widening concern among historians, social scientists and some economists about problems of organizational participants' understanding (cognition) of their institutional and organizational roles and how these might account for differences in what organizations actually do.[9] They were compelled to do this, as North observed, because it is not unusual to find two organizations with very similar resources, structures and organizational objectives achieving quite different, bottom-line, results. This neo-institutionalist approach to organizational study calls attention to the fact that organizations are more than their formal structures (offices, budgets, authorized staff with their training and experience, and formally specified operational goals and responsibilities). They are, in addition, historically shaped and behaviorally governed by their evolved organizational cultures, which North called 'institutions'.[10] These are the sorts of institutional differences, for example, that sometimes doom corporate mergers, which, at their inception, looked very good 'on paper'. As a consequence, this research emphasizes that organizations are more than the aggregation of the formally defined behavior of their participants.

Neo-institutionalism, then, goes well beyond Weberian and mid-20th century organizational and behavioral studies and joins itself to the evolving interpretations of those who see state administrations as networks of principals (bosses) and agents who are acting both on the state's behalf and in their own interests. In doing this, the scholarship emphasizes that effecting change in organizations may, for example, involve much more than changing organizational structures, laws and formal work rules. It also involves changing the motivational environments of the nominal bosses (principals), the capacity of independent (non-state) organizations to enforce norms of behavior on both bosses and their subordinates (agents), the transparency of public administrations' work environments and, perhaps above

all, the personnel themselves. These are not trivial tasks, in the view of this scholarship.[11]

These complex and kaleidoscopically changing analyses of public administration have recently taken on a much more vigorous and organized character in the form of the New Public Management movement. Interpreted in a rapidly growing body of scholarship and, importantly, aggressively fostered by influential non-governmental organizations such as the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, reform schemes for public administration which explicitly aim to integrate the public into policy making and to ensure public transparency in the execution of policy have become common, if not always successful, in some industrial-urban countries.[12]

Initially introduced in Anglo-Saxon countries, the New Public Management aims to redefine relations between the state and the public, its 'clients' who are conceived as a market. The role of the public in policy formation is recognized (in principle, at least) just as the role of the client, or consumer, is recognized (in principle) in creating new products and shaping marketing strategies for private enterprise. In addition, officials' status and behavior are seen as more closely connected with the roles of actors in the private sector than previously. In our judgment it is important that it was in the wake of the emerging New Public Management movement that the USSR and Russia experienced the regime transitions that began to realign economic and political organizations and institutions in the 1980s.

Partly in response to the re-conceptualizations of bureaucratic theory summarized above, since the appearance of the original version of *Russian Officialdom* in 1980 a major realignment between the state and markets developed in the Anglo-American world. Where neo-liberal approaches began to dominate economic thought and practice, partisans of the New Public Management and related movements initiated changes in state administration.[13] Because the rise of these robust challenges to earlier economic and political paradigms in the West accompanied the decline and fall of communist regimes in the East, neo-liberalism and the New Public Management exerted a considerable pull on governments trying to negotiate late-communist and post-communist transitions.[14] The off-the-shelf solutions developed in the West held an attraction for some in societies where state-dominated approaches to economics and public administration had been discredited, or, at the very least, called into question. Enhancing the attractiveness of radical market approaches to economics and public administration were monetary and membership incentives offered by international financial organizations and by individual Western states. Thus, the sequencing of the neo-liberal initiatives in the West and the post-communist transitions in the East interacted in ways that shaped the debate over Russian state administration after the end of the Soviet era in 1991.

While the international context into which post-communist Russia emerged clearly influenced its development, it was not the only factor shaping outcomes for post-communist officialdom. Resistance to reform, and especially neo-liberal reform, drew energy from several sources. Besides the obvious institutional, ideational and personnel legacies from the Soviet era, these included politicians and many academic specialists who continued to see the state as the key agent of change and control during the transition and therefore did not wish to dismantle its traditional roles and institutions as neo-liberals wished to do. This is a perspective, or institutional culture, which, as we shall see, has deep roots in the history of the three 'Russian' states under examination here.

Even Western scholars have questioned the appropriateness of exporting the New Public Management to Russia and other post-communist states. In the words of Ezra Suleiman:

> If today's consolidated democracies can come to regard the state bureaucracy as being largely superfluous, does it follow that a fledgling democratic state, fresh out of the shackles of authoritarian rule, can dispense with the need for a professional, or at least a largely competent, bureaucracy?[15]

Whereas in the West the privatization and decentralization of state functions was a conscious—if not always widely understood or supported—policy of state, in Russia and some other post-communist regimes it has resulted from poorly conceived political intrusion, corruption and a desperate attempt by some executive agencies to survive in an era of underfunded budgets (owing to the availability of special funds to support 'reform' and to the possibility of garnering income from private sources). The Russian case, therefore, is among those posing the most fundamental questions about the universality of neo-liberal approaches to state administration.

Of central interest to our study, finally, is the fact that, whether inspired by Weberian, institutionalist, or New Public Management principles, reform movements in Russian state administration have generally failed by the standards set early on, and nearly always have followed their own unique paths. This book has been explicitly structured to interrogate this 'irreformability' of Russian state administration from an interdisciplinary perspective by focusing on the independence of political elites, the vulnerabilities of officialdom to political intrusion, intra-administrative competition, endemic corruption, the ambiguities of identity among participants in state administration and the endurance and variability of these characteristics across time.

Endurances

One can readily identify patterns which appear to have endured even across the most dramatic and comprehensive moments of crisis and transformation such as the two World Wars, acquisition of 'Super Power' status and, of course, the Bolshevik and post-communist regime changes. The following list is not meant to be exhaustive, but illustrative.

Most obviously, perhaps, the ministerial governance system has survived for centuries in Russia and is thriving today. As the first version of *Russian Officialdom* showed, the Russian choice, dating from at least the 17th century, has been a ministerial governance system in which elite, powerful executives (including monarchs) presided over more specialized administrative entities (ministry, commissariat, *kollegia, prikaz*).[16] The size and number of these entities varied over time depending upon state objectives and such factors as novel technologies, educational resources, the social and demographic character of the governed, and the nature of perceived challenges from abroad.[17]

A second continuity is the dependence of officialdom on political will for resources, status and scope of authority. This may not seem unusual to the reader. After all, state administrators are normally constitutionally obliged to implement the legal policies of political power in even the most democratic states. The difference in Russia, historically, has been that political power has almost never answered to public will, whether at the local, regional or national level. By the same token, state officialdom in Russia has, almost without exception, always been just that—the servant of the state, not of citizenry or the public. In Russia, neither legislation nor state organizations of the highest levels have ever enjoined officials, either formally or informally, to serve the *public*. Service to the state—the *gosudarstvennaia sluzhba* of the tsarist and post-communist eras or the *partiinyi-sovetskyi apparat* of the Soviet era—has, instead, been the prevailing norm. As we shall see in later chapters, there have been modest exceptions to this rule during the last two generations of the imperial state and in the late Soviet and post-Soviet regimes, but these moments have been limited in their scope and generally threatened by reassertion of central state control. Throughout the period covered by this study, state administrative organizations, and more importantly, state officials, have been open to political intervention and manipulation. Operational independence from changing political regimes, envisioned by Weber as essential to bureaucrats' capacity to respond to policy changes evenhandedly and within the bounds both of professional competence and constitutional limitations, has never held sway in Russia.

A third enduring characteristic in Russian state administration has been the centrist territorial administration model. This has been a system that, since early modern times, extended across highly diverse regions and highly diverse, ethno-linguistic and cultural communities—one state intending to

govern many different societies. This centrist pattern, enhanced by the legal establishment of serfdom in the 17th century, was reinforced in the 19th and 20th centuries by large-scale policies for social control which aimed to monitor and limit changes in habitation and movement across territories by using devices such as internal passports and required registration with law enforcement agencies.

State administration's willingness and capacity to mobilize large-scale administrative methodologies for intervention into civil society and the national economy constitute another, related, continuity—at least in modern times. While the histories of some state administrations suggest that such programs have been comparatively rare, often owing to the dispersal of investment, development and managerial authority among non-state enterprises, Russian history indicates that such large-scale methods have been common for the Russian state apparatus. During the period under consideration here, they included the programs intended to limit and manage population transfer mentioned above; repeated, large-scale state interventions into peasant affairs after land reform and massive infrastructure development programs that were demanded by the huge areas within state boundaries during industrialization. These last included most of the construction and management of enormous railway, telegraph and electrical networks across the vast territories of the three states in the second half of the 19th century and during the entire 20th century; of course, they also include the infrastructures that were demanded by forced industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture during the era of the planned economy. Each of these programs has carried with it a correspondingly strong set of consequences for ministerial structures and functions.[18]

A final endurance has been official corruption. Historically, this has been a costly and destabilizing system of compensation for state action. It has taken numerous forms in the history of Russian officialdom and it has endured throughout the period under examination here.[19]

Changes/discontinuities

Changes or discontinuities came in several forms. Again, without attempting to be comprehensive, we indicate some of the most significant forms, each of which can be seen to have changed both organizational and institutional characteristics across the 125 years under study here.

Ideologies

The argument that the tsarist and Soviet states sought legitimacy and authority through ideals, symbols and systems of thought introduced and sponsored from on high is not new.[20] One encounters it frequently in the memoirs of high state officials from the 18th century to the end of the Old Regime, at which point the mobilizing role of symbols and ideals employed

by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began to achieve exemplary, world-class status in an era when many states were discovering the power of propagandized ideologies. While the ideologies, which combined religious faith with commitment to empire and the politics of autocracy, did not disappear during the Revolution of 1917 and ensuing civil war, they seem to have lost any justifying or driving force within state administration.[21] Similarly, the images and ideologies rooted in class-consciousness and Communist Party claims for monopolistic leadership authority and legitimacy were the guiding values of the Soviet state apparatus. After Stalin's death in 1953, however, they began to attenuate and then lose their force in the 1970s and 1980s. Stephen Solnick, among others, has written a persuasive narrative detailing the organizational and material consequences of the administrative hierarchy's increasing paralysis in the wake of lost values, the rapid onset of which he characterized as a political and organizational 'bank run'.[22]

Structures and personnel

What about officialdom—its principals and agents—and state organizations themselves? Surely the huge economic and socio-political transformations visited upon Russia during the 125 years under examination cannot have left personnel and organizational structures intact. The short answer, of course, is that significant change did occur. The most obvious changes occurred in organizational structures—the numbers of ministries (or commissariats), their specializations, the superior structures to which they were nominally responsible, the number and nature of their connections with the public. This was owing, first, to the fact that supreme, central political authorities could alter structures more predictably than they could change or supplement personnel.[23] However, it was also owing to dramatic changes in administrative agendas, the imperial economy, technology and demography already much in evidence before the end of the Old Regime. As we shall see, each of these dynamic factors forced changes in the number, scope and size of imperial ministries and Soviet commissariats as well as in regional and local agents and agencies. Among the most dramatic of these were two in the post-revolutionary era. First, there were changes in the connections between administrative agencies and higher political authorities occasioned by the Leninist/Stalinist strategy of 'dual administration', which interleaved, in detail, positions and personnel of the Communist Party with those of state administration.[24] Second, there were structural changes demanded by the insertion of state and party agencies into the national economy during the 1920s and 1930s, a process so universal and pervasive in its scope that one writer has described it as 'society becomes bureaucracy.'[25]

Changes to the compliment of officialdom itself, the '*sostav*' of state administration, were more complicated, controversial and less certain of outcome. Under the Old Regime the incorporation of officials demanded

by changes in local government, urbanization and industrialization entailed an acceleration of the displacement of traditional noble elites in some areas of state administration and the insertion of agents with novel expertise and sometimes unwelcome political agendas. Inevitably, criticism and controversy ensued.[26] As well, or better, known are the controversies and uncertainties occasioned by the inclusion of 'bourgeois specialists', often holdovers from the Old Regime, in the ranks of post-revolutionary state administration in the 1920s.[27] Finally, throughout the Soviet era, conflict endured between the values and agendas of social, life and physical scientists and their administrative and political bosses.[28]

A further dimension of personnel adaptation underlies the reconstruction of state service throughout the entire era of our survey here, but it has only come explicitly to the fore since the advent of *perestroika* in the 1980s. This is the problem of bureaucratic professionalization as addressed by several essays in this collection.[29] As we shall see in the discussion that follows on the change in legal networks intended to define and control officialdom, the objective of creating a professional civil service in Russia is one of long standing, dating to the early 18th century. Specifying the objective, however, has always been fraught with difficulty.

What is the meaning of 'professionalization' in this case? As we suggested earlier in this essay, the facile answers, rooted in Weberian idealism, which liberal democracies mobilized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, have never been seriously advanced in Russia, but the question has been given new urgency by the commitment of academics and some political elites in today's Russia to the construction of an administrative service that is capable of applying the laws of the land as well as obeying them.

Law

Another important universe of change affecting—or intended to affect—Russian officialdom throughout its modern history is to be found in the networks of legislation, decrees and rules designed by higher political authorities to define, control and sometimes protect and privilege participants in state service. One can identify at least three major eras of transformation in this history that are relevant to the time frame of our narratives.

The first era, although reaching its climax at the end of the empire, began in the first quarter of the 18th century when Peter the Great and the Imperial Ruling Senate attempted to define state service with precision and to demand details regarding service careers. Specifically, the creation of the Table of Ranks in 1722, and legislation subsequently based on it, were early attempts to establish a professionally defined, corporate body of state officials separate from the social class of hereditary, landowning nobility [*dvorianstvo*] with whom service of all kinds had previously been identified.[30] This policy continued to be reflected in a massive body of legislation that remained,

theoretically at least, in force until 1917. These statutes were synthesized into a single *Code of Administration of the State and Provinces*, the third part of which was an *Ustav o sluzhbe*, or *Statute on Service*, which appeared in several editions between 1842 and 1917. The 19th and early 20th century *Ustavy o sluzhbe* referenced thousands of individual pieces of legislation and regulation that were specifically intended to define and control the behavior of state officials.[31]

A second major change in the legislative environment of service came immediately after the Revolution of 1917, when the Soviet state set out to ensure its own withering away by turning Russian officialdom into the compliant agents of the Communist Party and a workforce that was indistinguishable from any other in Soviet society. Political leadership attempted to achieve this objective, in part, through the device of inserting Communist Party officials into all levels of all state administrations. This policy of dual administration was accompanied by the system of *nomenklatura*, introduced formally in 1923.[32] *Nomenklatura* was meant to guarantee that the party apparatus vetted the incumbents of a huge list of state offices. The Marxist ambition to, as it were, 'wither the state away' was also supported, in part, by obliterating all titles and distinctions previously attaching to offices and officials and by abandoning the accumulated mass of legislation on state service.[33] The program, meant to facilitate the withering away of the state, was gradually reversed when Bolshevik leadership began, instead, to use state organizations as instruments of economic and social reconstruction under the New Economic Policy (1921–8), and then during the construction of a centrally planned economy and mass agricultural collectivization in the late 1920s and 1930s. Rather than constructing a unified body of law defining state administration and administrators, however, this approach usually imbedded administrative law within other legislation: for example, labor, civil, property and criminal law.[34] These policies required the reconstruction of labor and civil law and were formulated into codes which began to appear in the early 1920s, culminating in the constitution of 1936.

A third transformational period began in the late Soviet era when political authorities once again launched policies intended to define state service as such, to establish norms of administrative behavior and to create a new network of legislation which aimed to control it.[35] This effort continued into the post-Soviet era when attempts were made to strengthen state capacities such as taxation and regulatory oversight in the wake of the collapse and abandonment of the planned economy and the opening of Russian society and its economy to international investment and market competition. As several essays in this study show, this process of re-conceptualizing both Russian officialdom itself and the laws that define and control official behavior is far from complete. Its direction, moreover, is far from certain.

Themes and arguments

In the light of a consideration of these continuities and changes, and within the context of the interpretive scholarship described above, we identify several general themes and perspectives in the essays that follow. First, note that measured, rationally conceived and broadly agreed reform agendas have been rare in the history of Russian state administration. Instead, political interventions into ministerial behavior in order to achieve specific political objectives have been more common, as chapters below by Mespoulet, Rey and Gimpelson et al. show. In the absence of independent, homegrown movements for reform (such as the New Public Management movement in the United States and Western Europe) Russian state administration has been vulnerable to imported strategies of reform that are overly dependent upon assumptions about the beneficial effect of changes to formal laws and work-place rules.

Owing to deeply entrenched institutional behavior, this phenomenon is also reflected in the approach within the Russian academic community to research on state administration. The literature in the Russian language on contemporary state administration remains heavily oriented toward legal approaches. It is hesitant to move beyond formal rules to informal practices and behavior or to examine the linkages between state administration and its social, political and economic contexts. In the Soviet era, most writing on the bureaucracy appeared in works on administrative law, which were often little more than restatements of relevant legislation.[36] This perspective is still prevalent today in many Russian-language treatises in the field and in the two leading journals of Russian state administration, *Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba* and *Chinovnik*.[37]

Owing to its openness to exceptionally powerful and arbitrary political influences across the 20th century, Russian state administration has been unable to establish transparent and equitable institutions of recruitment, internal advancement, dismissal and compensation.[38] While, as described above, the tsarist legal system, in place until the early 20th century, sought to impose formal regulations, which would require the application of a rule-based system for recruitment, advancement and other organizational procedures in state administration, in practice it too was vexed by problems of transparency and equitable enforcement. The Soviet system, owing to its highly centralized structure, the pervasive presence of Communist Party members and the secretiveness of the *nomenklatura*, was even less transparent and more arbitrary. The question for the 21st century is whether the post-Soviet regime has the political will and organizational resources to overcome these institutionalized behaviors and achieve the enforcement of impersonal and uniform standards. Essays by Barabashev et al., Gill, Heinzen, Huskey and Obolonsky address both the history of this system and whether post-Soviet Russia has a capable solution in hand.

A closely related problem arises from the fact that the state has been unable to maintain uniform standards of recruitment, advancement and compensation for its officialdom across the entire geography of the Empire, the USSR or the Russian Federation. This phenomenon is obviously linked with and dependent upon long-enduring patterns of the centralized administrative control of diverse ethno-linguistic regions, described in essays by Morrison, Velychenko and Woodworth. The formal objective of centralist administration is, clearly, to achieve uniform standards of conformity to policy; however, the realities of the enormous social, political and economic diversity of the regions in question and of the frequently ad hoc measures adopted to cope with this diversity have resulted (especially at the turn of the 20th century and, again, in the final decades of that century) in widely varying rates of political, social and economic development. This circumstance is addressed several times, in the analyses presented by Barabashev et al., Huskey, Lefevre, Morrison, Rowney, Velychenko and Woodworth.

Note that these perspectives call for careful study of the axis that runs from communities of political elites to the offices and bureaus of central, regional and local administrators. They demand investigation both into the continuing intrusion of arbitrary political (and, by extension, economic) power into administrative behavior and development. As a mentor and source of political appointees, moreover, senior political authority's incapacity to establish ethical codes of conduct and transparency has not only facilitated political intervention but also enabled its sibling, corruption. Several chapters of this study address this problem of the political-administrative axis. These include the essays by Barabashev et al., Heinzen, Huskey, Mespoulet, Orlovsky and Rey.

Note, in addition, that in spite of the proposition that impetus for administrative reconstruction has not come, in 20th century Russia, from within the Russian political intelligentsia, critically important—and not entirely uncommon—episodes of the history of Russian (Soviet) state administration oblige us to conclude that there *were* cycles of decay and productive reconstruction across the time frame of this study. Certainly, some portions of the history of scientific, educational and military-industrial administration illustrate this point vividly. While many segments of the national economy during the 20th century were insulated from Western standards of achievement by state policies of autarchy, Russian science and military-industrial administration, on the whole, were not. These state administrations nevertheless competed, by many standards, quite successfully on an international scale. Chapters contributed by Lefèvre and Rey address this point.

Summary

This work is designed, therefore, to contribute to the larger debate on the role of the bureaucracy in modern states as well as to provide an assessment of Russian state administration during the last century and a quarter.

The following chapters will demonstrate that, owing to the institutional and organizational history of its past 125 years, the evolving condition of Russian officialdom offers numerous insights into the meaning and viability of contemporary views of state administration—especially under conditions of regime change and reform. In order to achieve its ambitious objectives, this study benefits from the contributions of demographers, historians, legal specialists, political scientists and sociologists from several countries in Eurasia, North America and Western Europe whose focal interests are on Russia, the USSR and the post-Soviet successor states.

The book consists of three chronologically based sections, each of which is preceded by an editorial introduction. Although the emphasis of the authors writing on each period varies, readers will find similar themes examined in the Imperial, Soviet and post-communist eras. As indicated earlier, these include the structure of formal and informal incentives for bureaucratic behavior; the social composition of officialdom and its systems of training, selection and placement; the lines of bureaucratic authority and communication within the capital and between the center and periphery; and the ways in which the bureaucracy adapts to economic, technological, political and social change. In a concluding chapter, the editors revisit these themes in an essay that considers the continuities and discontinuities across the Imperial, Soviet and post-communist eras in the light of the book's findings and the relationship between the Russian experience and the patterns of bureaucratic development and behavior that characterize post-communist societies.

Notes

1. After the title of another book on the same topic, *Russian Officialdom. The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, Walter McKenzie Pintner and Don Karl Rowney, eds (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
2. Russian Empire data: Tsentral'nyi Statisticheskii Komitet, *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g. Naselenie Rossiiskoi Imperii po perepisi 1897 g. po guberniam* (St. Petersburg: Central Statistical Committee, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1897), Issue 1, 29; USSR data: Gosudarstvennyi Komitet SSSR po Statistike, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia, 1989 g.* (Moscow: Goskomstat SSSR, 1991–3), 1. *Chislennost i razmeshchenie naseleniia SSSR* in *1989 USSR Population Census [computer file]* (Minneapolis, MN: Eastview, 1996).
3. Graeme Smith, *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 24 April 2006: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060421.w0422russia/BNStory/RussiaShrinks/home; Julie DaVanzo, *Dire Demographics. Population Trends in the Russian Federation* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). We recognize, of course, that the territory of post-communist Russia is considerably smaller than that of Imperial Russia or the Soviet Union.
4. Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 214–21, 224–8.
5. John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite. A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York: Praeger, 1959); Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite*

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Reinhard Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry. Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization* (New York: Harper, 1956); Peter M. Blau, 'Co-operation and Competition in a Bureaucracy,' *American Journal of Sociology*, 59 (May 1954): 530–45; T. P. Korzhikhina, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i ego uchrezhdeniia. Noiabr' 1917 g.—dekabr' 1991 g.* (Moscow: Russian State Humanities University 1995); Rolf Torstendahl, *Bureaucratization in Northwestern Europe, 1880–1985. Domination and Governance* (New York: Routledge, 1991); George Yaney, 'Bureaucracy and Freedom: N. M. Korkunov's Theory of the State,' *American Historical Review*, 71 (January 1966): 468–86; Yaney, *The Systematization of Russian Government* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973); Robert Presthus, *The Organizational Society: An Analysis and a Theory* (New York: Knopf, 1962); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon with the collaboration of Harold Guetzkow, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

6. For example, Steven L. Solnick, *Stealing the State. Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule*, Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson, eds (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), especially Part III; Don K. Rowney, 'Narrating the Russian Revolution: Institutionalism and Continuity across Regime Change,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 47 (January 2005): 79–105; for work on the related topic of path dependence in institutions and politics, see Paul Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,' *American Political Science Review*, 94 (June 2000): 251–67; Pierson, *Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Paul A David, 'Why are Institutions the "Carriers of History"? Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions.' *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics*, 5 (December 1994): 205–220; Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, 'Order and Time in Institutional Study: A Brief for the Historical Approach,' in *Political Science in History. Research Programs and Political Traditions*, James Farr, John S. Dryzek and Stephen T. Leonard, eds (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 296–31; Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State. The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1928* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
7. Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1967); March and Simon, *Organizations*.
8. The contrast of 'public' and 'private' (or market-driven) bureaucracies is in Marshall W. Meyer, 'The Growth of Public and Private Bureaucracies,' *Theory and Society*, 16 (1987): 215–35; also Torstendahl, *Bureaucratization in Northwestern Europe*, 79–123.
9. Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Solnick, *Stealing the State*; Stefan Hedlund, *Russian Path Dependence* (London: Routledge, 2005); also see the discussion of 'personalistic' and paternalistic norms in Chapter 8 of this volume by Gill.
10. Douglass C. North, 'Institutions, Economic Growth and Freedom: An Historical Introduction,' in *Freedom, Democracy and Economic Welfare*, M. Walker, ed. (Vancouver, 1988), 3–25 and North, 'Institutions,' *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5 (Winter 1991): 97–112.
11. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 125–30; Solnick, *Stealing the State*.

12. Michael Barzelay, *The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, *National, International and Transnational Constructions of New Public Management* (Stockholm: Stockholm Center for Organizational Research, 2000); Nick Manning and Neil Parison, *International Public Administration Reform: Implications for the Russian Federation* (Washington: World Bank, 2003).
13. See, for example, Manning and Parison, *International Public Administration Reform*, 12–30 and 45–8 and, for the relevant economic agenda, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members, *Russia Programme, 2001* (Paris: OECD, 2001).
14. Ezra N. Suleiman, *Dismantling Democratic States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 279–304; Manning and Parison, *International Public Administration Reform*; OECD, *Russia Programme*.
15. Suleiman, *Dismantling Democratic States*, 279.
16. Robert O. Crummey, 'The Origins of the Noble Official: The Boyar Elite, 1613–1689'; Robert D. Givens, 'Eighteenth-Century Nobiliary Career Patterns and Provincial Government'; Bruce W. Menning, 'The Emergence of a Military-Administrative Elite in the Don Cossack Lands' in *Russian Officialdom*, ed. Pintner and Rowney, 46–75, 106–29, 130–61, respectively.
17. This list of variables is suggested by a reading of Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), which offers a detailed explanation of their nature and relevance—even though his analysis excludes Russia. For a summary of the legal evolution of these entities in Russia from the 18th century to the present, see T. G. Arkhipova, M. F. Rumiantseva, A. S. Senin, *Istoriia gosudarstvennoi sluzhby v Rossii. XVIII–XX veka. Uchebnoe posobie* (Moscow: Russian State Humanities University, 2001); a more general survey across the same period is P. E. Shepelev, *Chinovnyi mir Rossii XVIII-nachalo XX v.* (St. Petersburg: 'Iskusstvo-SPB', 1999).
18. For example, Paul R. Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 22–75, 126–52, 183–212; Don K. Rowney, 'The Scope, Authority, and Personnel of the New Industrial Commissariats, 1928–1936,' in *Social Dimensions of Soviet Industrialization*, William G. Rosenberg and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, eds (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 124–45.
19. See Chapter 11 in this book by James Heinzen and, more generally, *Bribery and* Blat *in Russia: Negotiating Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s*, ed. Stephen Lovell, Alena Ledeneva, and Andrei Rogachevskii (New York: St. Martin's, 2000).
20. M. M. Shevchenko, *Konets odnogo velichiia: vlast', obrazovanie i pechatnoe slovo v Imperatorskoi Rossii na poroge Osvoboditelnykh reform* (Moscow: Tri kvadrata, 2003); Alexander V. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–55* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959); Orlando Figes and Boris Kolonitskii, *Interpreting the Russian Revolution. The Language and Symbols of 1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). For a study that focuses specifically on the ideals of 'administrative culture,' 1870–1917, see Anna-Liisa Heusala, *The Transitions of Local Administration Culture in Russia* (Saarijärvi: Kikimora, 2005).
21. Figes and Kolonitsky, *Interpreting the Russian Revolution*, 9–29; Heusala, *Transitions*, 117–64.
22. Solnick, *Stealing the State*, 218–40; Heusala, *Transitions*, 234–305.
23. Rowney, 'Narrating the Russian Revolution'; Rowney, 'Industrial Commissariats.'

24. See the chapters in this book by Gill, Mespoulet, and Orlovsky.
25. Heusalla, 117–31; Gregory, *Political Economy of Stalinism*, 49–75, 126–52. Note, too, the full title of the original *Russian Officialdom: 'The Bureaucratization of Russian Society'*.
26. See Chapter 3 by Rowney.
27. Matthew J. Payne, *Stalin's Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 39–125; Kendall E. Bailes, *Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917–1941* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
28. See Chapter 10 below by Martine Mespoulet; Loren R. Graham, *What Have We Learned about Science and Technology from the Russian Experience?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
29. See Chapters 14 and 15, below, by Gimpelson et al. and Huskey, respectively.
30. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, First Series (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1830–39), 24 January 1722, no. 284; James Hassel, 'Implementation of the Russian Table of Ranks during the Eighteenth Century,' *Slavic Review*, 29, no. 2 (1970): 283–95; M. F. Rumiantseva, 'State Service in the Period of the Rise of the Russian Empire' in Arkhipova et al., *Istoriia gosudarstvennoi sluzhby*, 15–98 and Shepelev, *Chinovnyi mir*, 131–45.
31. *Svod uchrezhdenii gosudarstvennykh i gubernskikh. Chast' tretiia. Ustavy o sluzhbe grazhdanskoi* (St. Petersburg: Imperial Chancellery, 1842) which synthesizes more than 3,000 pieces of legislation from the mid-18th century until the year of its publication, 1842.
32. Heusala, *Transitions*, 145; also Gill's discussion below.
33. *Dekrety Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii. I. Ot oktiabrskogo perevorota do rospuska uchreditel'nogo sobraniia*, 'Dekret ob unichtozhenii soslovnykh i grazhdanskikh chinov, 23 (10) noiabria, 1917,' no. 28 (Moscow: Partiinoe izdatel'stvo, 1933), 68–9.
34. John N. Hazard, William E. Butler and Peter B. Maggs, *The Soviet Legal System: Fundamental Principles and Historical Commentary*, third edition (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1977), 183–240; Chapter 2 on 'Self-administration', 15–34; Chapter 15 on 'Cooperatives as Supplementary Agencies', 278–96.
35. For example, *Sbornik normativnykih aktov po sovetskomu administrativnomu pravu. [Po sostoianiiu na 1 noiabria 1963 g.]* (Moscow: Higher School, 1964); *Sbornik zakonodatel'nykh i normativnykh aktov ob administrativnoi otvetstvennosti* (Moscow: Juridical Literature, 1971); *Sbornik normativnykh aktov po administrativnoi deiatel'nosti organov vnytrennykh del* (Moscow: Chief Administration of Internal Affairs of Moscow City Executive Administration, 1985); a general analysis of the evolution of Soviet labor law, including modifications in the 1970s, is Chantal Kourilsky, 'La nouvelle legislation du travail en U.R.S.S.' *Annuaire de legislation française et etrangère*, nouvelle série, 21 (1972): 11–35.
36. For example, M. I. Piskotin, *Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoe upravlenie* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984).
37. A. P. Alekhin, Iu. M. Kozlov and A. A. Karmolitskii, *Administrativnoe pravo Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow: TEIS, 1995).
38. For recent studies of these phenomena that span, in the first case, most of the twentieth century, and, in the second, the history of the state from the tenth century, see Karl W. Ryavec, *Russian Bureaucracy: Power and Pathology* (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003); Hedlund, *Russian Path Dependence*.

Part I
Late Tsarist Officialdom