

CASA AMERICANA

US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN SPAIN **Selling Democracy?**

Edited by Francisco Javier Rodríguez Jiménez,
Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, & Nicholas J. Cull



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
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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

In November 2011 we organized an international conference entitled: “US Public Diplomacy & Democratization: From the Spanish Case to the Arab Spring” under the patronage of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies of the George Washington University (GWU). That forum inspired this book. Through discussions with other specialists (Richard Arndt, Evangelos Liaras, Paul Isbell, John Brown, Robert Coonrod, the former Ambassador Cynthia P. Schneider, and serving US diplomats Mary Jeffers and Ambassador Mark Asquino), the conference analyzed experiences of democratic transition including the Portuguese, the Greek, South African, and most recent *Arab spring* cases. The conference inspired us to engage the important question how much influence the *American friend* had exerted in the Spanish case. While that question has often been considered through the lens of hard power, we resolved to look into the *soft power* strategies of US public diplomacy in Spain. The following pages are offered as a case study that may be instructive for the understanding not only Spain but of other cases of transition past, present, and yet to come.

The volume developed over time as we added new scholars to the original line-up. Giles Scott-Smith and Neal M. Rosendorf graciously accepted the challenge and sharpened the global perspective of this book. We thank them and the authors who were part of the project from the beginning: Rosa Pardo Sanz, Pablo León-Aguinaga, and Mark Asquino. Palgrave Macmillan’s series on Global Public Diplomacy was an ideal home for this project. The coeditors want to express their gratitude to Kathy Fitzpatrick and Philip Seib, who believed in the value of this collective enterprise when it was just a vague project and to the experts who screened the first proposal. The efficiency and professional commitment of Sara Doskow, Jeff LaSala, Christian Robinson, and Isabella Yeager from Palgrave greatly relieved our burden as

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Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: Soft Power, Public Diplomacy, and Democratization

NICHOLAS J. CULL AND
FRANCISCO JAVIER RODRÍGUEZ JIMÉNEZ

“Influence can persuade, but power can compel.”

Hans J. Morgenthau, 1948.¹

“Is our power such, that anything we do is a form of intervention?”

Allen Guttman, 1963.²

Among the stories told by the ancient Greek slave and sometime diplomat Aesop is a fable that neatly illuminates the nature of power. In the story the North Wind and the Sun argue as to who was more powerful and resolve to test their strength by competing to remove a cloak from a traveler. The North Wind blew his iciest blast but only succeeded in making the traveler wrap himself more tightly in his cloak, however, when the sun shone the traveler happily removed his cloak. This illustration of the power of friendly persuasion appealed to the ancients and their interpreters down the years. The debate is not theoretical. In our own world international actors regularly face the challenge of ideologically antithetical regimes—for democracies these are typically dictatorships—and wrestle with the best approach to promote change. Today that debate is often couched as a choice between hard and soft power.

These issues were a regular concern of US foreign policy throughout the twentieth century, from Woodrow Wilson’s approach to

revolutionary Mexico down to Bill Clinton's response to the collapse of communism. They remain hardly less moot in the era of the Global War on Terror. Historically, the results of US democracy promotion have been mixed and explanations of the place of the process among America's priorities, contradictory.³ Given the contemporary emphasis on the issue—at the time of writing it—is central to the discussion of approaches to numerous countries including Cuba⁴ and Iran—it is doubly important to understand what has gone before. This anthology of historical research will examine and evaluate one of the most important cases of democratization—that of postwar Spain—and consider the extent to which the United States was able to use the tools of public diplomacy and soft power to contribute to one of the most remarkable examples of a democratic transition. It is of special significance as it opens much of the scholarship of that case to English language audiences for the first time.

Before jumping into the historical overview, it is necessary to give a brief explanation of the concepts used in the analysis.

Public Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Other Concepts

The term *public diplomacy* refers to the mechanisms used by an international actor—whether a government, international organization, nongovernmental organization (NGO), or even an individual—to advance their foreign policy by engaging foreign publics. These efforts to “understand, inform, engage, and influence foreign audiences”⁵ have historically included information campaigns, personal contacts, and cultural/exchange programs abroad. The term emerged in the mid-1960s and was coined by a former US diplomat named Edmund Gullion.⁶ Its practice required a radical rethinking of foreign policy practice. Traditional diplomacy had always been directed at other governments and their agents and tended to require absolute secrecy, but public diplomacy is by its nature open and requires a greater degree of transparency to flourish.⁷

Public diplomacy began in Gullion's mind as a euphemism for propaganda and for some observers has never lost that pejorative taint.⁸ However, public diplomacy as a practice has evolved beyond its origins. The Dutch scholar Jan Melissen notes:

Public diplomacy is similar to propaganda in that it tries to persuade people what to think, but it is fundamentally different from

it in the sense that public diplomacy also listens to what people have to say.⁹

One can go further and note that historically propaganda has typically been deployed for a fixed end, over a short period of time, with a high level of intensity. The main objective is to obtain an immediate benefit. It is not seen as a way to comprehend or engage with a target group, but simply to convince. When propagandists listen, they listen only to target their messages more effectively. Public diplomacy is (or should be) different. While its practitioners seek to export culture or information, they are also open to receiving culture and information from others by way of exchange. Public diplomacy does not always know the end of its policy: its objective might be to discover what its foreign policy ought to be, an exercise that has no parallel in propaganda. It is easier to make these distinctions in theory than in practice: the line separating the two can become thin especially in the minds of those paying the bill, who in the US at least historically have shown little interest in learning from others. Frank Stanton, an American media executive and advocate for the reform of public diplomacy, stated matters succinctly when he complained in 1968: “Congress wants propaganda.”¹⁰

The convenience of the single-term public diplomacy conceals the multiple divisions within its practice. In the first instance public diplomacy may be segmented by time between (1) short-term daily (or even “real-time” instant) communication, (2) medium-term strategic communication, and (3) long-term exchanges and intercultural relations.¹¹ One of the present coauthors has argued that in its classic form public diplomacy can be divided into five core elements: (1) listening (tracking foreign public opinions), (2) advocacy of a specific policy, (3) cultural diplomacy, (4) exchange diplomacy, and (5) international broadcasting. These elements work over different periods of time: listening, advocacy, and broadcasting being short term; culture being medium term; and exchange working in the long term.¹² To complicate matters further, each of these elements has a different source of credibility and requires a different kind of infrastructure. Historically, the different elements of a country’s public diplomacy have found co-location difficult and work best when mutually insulated by clear firewalls or even housed in separate agencies as has generally been the case in European public diplomacy.

In recent years the practice and study of public diplomacy has been inextricably linked to the concept of *soft power* coined by Joseph Nye,

meaning an actor's ability to make progress in world affairs by means of cultural or political attraction rather than resorting to military or economic coercion. In terms of the famous metaphor of the child motivating a donkey with either a carrot or a stick, military pressure is the stick and the economic leverage of bribes is the carrot. Both are hard power, hinging on the capacity of the actor (in this case the child) to muster actual resources. For the metaphor to extend to the realm of soft power, the child would have to be able to motivate the donkey by repeating a stirring story of how happy donkeys are on his or her farm—singing a song about how any donkey on his farm gets to feel like an Arabian thoroughbred or showing the donkey a movie with the same message. Of course, the metaphor breaks down, but why should a metaphor which fits farm animals extend to human beings with their unique capacity to analyze and imagine alternate futures? In the real world actors need mechanisms to communicate their soft power virtues to international audiences. Those mechanisms require real resources but those resources are not the sole determinant of their effectiveness that hinges on the appeal of the culture and values that they communicate. Public diplomacy provides the mechanism by which international actors communicate their culture and values to an international audience.

Nye believes that any given country may possess greater or lesser reserves of soft power, depending on the attractiveness of its political system and behavioral rules, its economic system, its education, its artistic representations, its cuisine, or even its sport. The British Council develops the concept on its website:

A country's soft power is its ability to make friends and influence people not through military might, but through its most attractive assets, notably culture, education, language and values. In short, it's the things that make people love a country rather than fear it, things that are often the products of people, institutions and brands rather than governments.¹³

Soft power has limitations. It is not a magic wand for the conduct of international affairs. No international actor can function exclusively by charming the citizens of the world. Nye himself concedes that soft power is difficult to quantify and handle.¹⁴ The results depend on the reactions of foreign audiences that are often slow to emerge, and are usually prone to rapid variations, not always motivated by logic.¹⁵ For this reason the British scholar Ali Fisher has written of soft power and

public diplomacy in terms of their generating a general atmosphere of favorable understanding, which can exert an indirect influence over certain future events by shortening “the odds of certain behaviors or events occurring.”¹⁶ Finally, it is worth recalling that soft power resources are easily lost. Nye has noted how readily the incautious application of hard power erodes even the most established reserves of soft power. The stories of torture at Guantanamo Bay and pictures of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq eradicated years of patient accumulation of soft power by US diplomats.¹⁷

There is no shortage of voices endorsing hard power at the expense of soft. Think of Stalin’s famous dismissal of the influence of the Vatican: “The Pope? How many divisions does he have?”¹⁸ Machiavelli—a favorite source for advocates of hard power—was actually more circumspect, warning that a prince must work tirelessly every day to be loved by his subjects but need not do anything at all to be hated, and that while it is easier to make oneself feared than loved, the efficacy of the former approach diminishes over time.¹⁹ In addition, it goes without saying that the strategy of fear is harder to implement in a modern democratic environment where brutalities and excesses of power are so readily relayed by social media.

The reality is that hard and soft power are not mutually exclusive and function best in concert: the concept that Nye dubbed “smart power” and that was much used during Hillary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State.²⁰ This interdependence is not new. Historically, it is the deficiencies of hard power that have compelled international actors to embrace soft power in the first place, as Jan Melissen has observed:

Most successful public diplomacy initiatives were born out of necessity. They were reactive and not the product of forward-looking foreign services caring about relationships with foreign audiences as a new challenge in diplomatic practice.²¹

A significant example of this reactive public diplomacy sits at the heart of the case considered in this book. When in 1959 President Eisenhower embraced General Franco, he provoked the hostility in the minds of anti-Franco Spaniards. Many questioned how the same America that presented itself as a champion of democracy could ally with a violent dictator. As we shall see in the following chapters, Washington deployed numerous soft-power initiatives in Spain in an attempt to explain that contradiction, and if possible resolve it by promoting democratization.

External Influence on the Spanish Transition

The near-unanimous appreciation of the specialists in highlighting the relevance of internal factors as opposed to those stemming from the international context, in accounting for Spain's Transition to democracy, has led to the exclusion of these international factors from the debate. (Manuel Redero, 1994)²²

A transition of such magnitude does not occur in complete isolation (...) although the transition took place in Spain, it was helped along and driven forward by external forces. (Frances Lannon, 2005)²³

Initially, historians examining the transformation of the Franco dictatorship into a democratic system focuses on the domestic political process and suggested that external factors played only an indirect and marginal role.²⁴ Since the mid-1990s, this view has been revised in the light of studies paying more attention to the external aspects/influences that might have undermined the legitimacy of the Franco regime.²⁵ The first steps on this new historiographical path were dominated by the emphasis on military hard power concerns, including the geopolitical competition on the Mediterranean coast during the early 1970s and impact of *détente*.²⁶ Many scholars have neglected the soft power factors of external ideology and culture. This anthology aims to help remedy that by answering two core questions: To what extent did the various US Public diplomacy campaigns deployed in Spain during the Franco dictatorship contribute to the process of democratization? If not a principal driver, can those soft power effects be understood as a kind of “fertilizer for democracy” preparing the ground in which the domestic experiment with democracy could flourish?

While previous publications have focused on the involvement of the US government in the Spanish transition during the period 1975–1978, this book adopts a longer-term approach, beginning with the end of World War II. Given that the fruits of public diplomacy often ripen slowly, it is misleading to evaluate its efficacy by examining only a short period of time. Those who have adopted the short-term perspective, or who focused their attention on the military aspects of the Spain/US relationship, have concluded: “The United States’ main concern with regard to Spain in the early 1970s was the defense of their [U.S.] geostrategic interests (...) the promotion of democracy was a secondary aspect—an important one, but a secondary one nevertheless.” Trying to contextualize the American position more fairly, they assert, however, that European governments also failed to place

democratization before stability in Spain, and much less before their own national interests.²⁷

European influence in Spain makes an interesting counterpoint to that of the United States. The influence of the Common Market countries as they were at the time was not exercised directly; instead, it was typically exercised through political parties or foundations.²⁸ The change in direction came in the wake of the revolutionary events in Portugal in April 1974. European and American diplomats feared a repetition in Madrid of the events in Lisbon, which seems to bear out Melissen's idea of "reactive public diplomacy." The role of Europe in promoting Spanish democracy has received more scholarly attention. Key questions include whether Brussels served as a magnet and encouragement for the anti-Franco forces? Whether the European democracies became a concave mirror, which magnified the blemishes on the face of the Franco dictatorship by comparison? Whether European prosperity attracted the people of Spain toward change? We can also ask if Europe's effort to promote political liberalization in Spain surpassed that of the United States? Such questions still require further research.²⁹

The Contributions to This Book

Giles Scott-Smith's chapter two covers the period from the 1950s to the end of the Cold War with a flash-forward to the Arab Spring of 2011, and considers the role of democracy promotion within US foreign policy. Scott-Smith examines the highs, lows, and contradictions of that process, not the least being its incompatibility with America's recurring tendency to isolationism. The author wonders whether or not the means and strategies to promote democracy deployed by the State of the Department all over the globe have been consistently democratic. Put differently: did the American self-perception of being a Messianic forerunner of democracy clash with the unembellished reality of a superpower ready to work with a repressive dictatorship, as in the case of Spain? Were the short-term anomalies always absorbed by the long-term narrative? Scott-Smith argues that while the United States presented itself as a beacon of freedom, it was not always seen that way by those at the receiving end of that beacon's light. The Spanish case also raises the issue of anti-Americanism rife on both in the right and the left of the political spectrum, which challenged the successful delivery of US public diplomacy's messages. Scott-Smith also reflects

the degree of autonomy and relative importance of public diplomacy within the US foreign policy machinery, all of which serves as a necessary background to the particularities of the Spanish case.

Rosa Pardo (in chapter three) enlarges the framework by probing the way in which United States communicated with Portugal and Spain during the Cold War. Both Iberian dictatorships were anchored in similar ideological roots of Catholicism and anticommunism, but there were significant dissimilarities too. From the very beginning, the special–historical connection between Portugal and Great Britain set the case apart from Spain with the hostility between Madrid and London caused by the Gibraltar issue. World War II played out differently for the two countries. Franco’s proclivity toward the Axis was not matched by Salazar. This and the strategic value of the Portuguese islands of Azores insured that the Portuguese dictatorship received a more benevolent treatment than the Spanish one. Portugal joined North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, while Spain had to wait until 1986; Portugal benefited from the *Marshall Plan* and expanded its international alliances through bilateral engagement with France; and West Germany in exchange for a German airbase in Beja (1963). Spain signed a military pact with United States in 1953, but it was by Executive Agreement only and not approved by Congress as a Treaty until 1976. Pardo’s essay addresses the question: Did the US government prioritize strategic factors over ideological considerations, such as consistency in defending democratic values in other Western European countries or the other way around?

Lorenzo Delgado’s chapter (number four) discusses how US public diplomacy tried to solve the difficult equation of justifying an alliance between the main democracy of the world and a dictatorship forged in a bloody civil war. Franco’s political longevity allowed plenty of opportunities for the United States to adjust its approach to the Spanish tyrant. At first the United States prioritized engagement with the ruling classes, who controlled the country and sustained the dictatorship. In the mid-1960s, a more balanced strategy emerged, shifting the approach to the emerging middle classes and opposition sectors, students and trades unions, but without alienating the Franco establishment. Delgado explains how this new outlook was easier to imagine than its implementation, especially during an era of widespread global public revulsion against the US conduct of the Vietnam War. In these circumstances, the hope of winning popular acceptance in Spain was relegated to second place behind the need to preserve the advantageous terms access to US military bases in the country.

During the final stages of Franco regime, Washington relied on policy of calculated ambiguity: “to avoid involvement, while maintaining sufficient flexibility to protect our interests.”³⁰ This political balancing act sought to maintain cordial relations with Francoist elites, without distancing the United States too much from opposition, and by doing so prepare for the political change that time (and Franco’s advanced age) would inevitably bring. Delgado concludes that, in the short term at least, this public diplomacy failed. Anti-Franco Spaniards read America’s light touch as a lack of commitment to the restoration of democracy in Spain.

Pablo León-Aguinaga’s contribution (chapter five) examines the messages of democracy promotion and democratization deployed by US public diplomats in Spain during and immediately after the Franco dictatorship. León-Aguinaga argues that even if democratization was not the foremost American objective, the promotion of democracy remained a significant theme of US engagement with the Spanish public. American messages fell, like a persistent drizzle, onto the Spanish political scene, eulogizing rights, elections, free political parties, and debate in an attempt to saturate Spanish public (following the idea of public diplomacy acting as a “fertilizer for democracy”) with a sense of what a political system should be, even without explicitly pointing out Franco’s obscuring of such a system. We may ask why greater importance was not given to those messages? Why did the US take a low profile? Or stepping back from the Spanish case, why was US public diplomacy so seldom prioritized within the US foreign policy apparatus? It was not until the death of Franco and the arrival of the Carter administration that the United States Information Agency’s messages were more openly committed with the democratization in Spain. León-Aguinaga points to a watershed memo in October 1977 which emphasized the need to “give serious support to the democratization process in Spain, while stressing the viability of American pluralistic society by highlighting U.S. Political, social and economic achievements.”³¹

One of the challenges facing the United States through the post-war period was Europe’s resistance to the spread of US culture, often labelled as cultural anti-Americanism. USIA and the Cultural Bureau of the Department of State responded by promoting American Studies in European classrooms. Francisco J. Rodríguez’s chapter (number six) examines that “Cultural Cold War mission” in Spain, analyzing initiatives including work to promote a “balanced” view of the US History, Poetry, Art, or Literature in their own right rather than as a byproduct of British Culture or low-quality imitations of European

cultural achievements. Rodríguez directs attention to English teaching and American Studies programs within the Spanish university system, mainly funded by the Fulbright Commission and the US–Spanish Non–Military Agreements of 1970: the two main channels by which American Studies were promoted among Spanish citizens. American Studies in Spain emerge as a soft-power maneuver designed both to produce greater sympathy toward US leadership and to reduce the anti-Americanism of the Spanish people, which was one of the most intense rejections of the United States anywhere in Europe.

When rethinking the impact of public diplomacy on postwar Spain, it makes sense to also consider the question of the Franco regime's own use of public diplomacy and soft power. Neal Rosendorf's illuminating essay (chapter seven) explores how the dictator tried to engage with international audiences to counter the legacy of his "dangerous friendship" with Hitler and Mussolini. His objective was to sell the idea that his was merely an authoritarian regime and not a totalitarian one. Franco promoted a narrative of modernization and economic growth. He relied on three pillars: tourism, filmmaking, and public relations. Rosendorf's analysis contests the notion that Spain emerged with a new modern image fully formed in the late 1980s. Spain's national rebranding effort did not begin from scratch with Franco's death. It began in the immediate aftermath of World War II and ran through the end of the 1960s, with its apotheosis the very expensive and highly successful Spanish pavilion at the New York World's Fair of 1964–1965.

Public diplomacy is built from personal relationships so it is fitting that the final chapter is a personal reflection on US public diplomacy in Spain by a distinguished practitioner, Ambassador Mark Asquino. Asquino began as a visiting lecturer in 1975 in Spain but went on to serve as director of the US Cultural Center/Washington Irving Library (1982–1984) and then as US Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer (1984–1986) in Madrid. His memoir is frank on the objectives of US cultural engagement, including prompting young Spaniards to develop the critical thinking skills on which any successful democracy depends. His recollections affirm the value of some of the best-known elements of US public diplomacy including the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) and music diplomacy.

The conclusion by Lorenzo Delgado (chapter nine) looks back over the essays, reviewing the geopolitical priorities of the US foreign policy in Spain and role of public diplomacy. He considers especially the impact of the stark inconsistency between US government rhetoric and US government action in Spain. Delgado questions whether

public diplomacy can reconcile the contractions of this. It is plain that US democratization efforts were uneven and suffered many ups and downs. The ambiguity of the US foreign policy was maintained until the end of the Franco regime. The centrality of the strategic factor and collaboration with the dictatorship undermined the consistency and credibility of the American democratic message. As to the ultimate issue of whether or not the US promotion of democracy was a determinant factor in Spain's change, a comprehensive answer would require comparison with the French, German, or CEE efforts in this regard. This volume chooses to leave the issue open.

What does this collection mean for US diplomacy today? One message is that it is clear from these essays that elements of public diplomacy are impactful forms of soft power, especially leader programs and educational initiatives. Secondly, it is evident that the democratic ideas on which the United States is founded are inherently powerful and attractive and serve to build expectations of American behavior; however, the ideas in their raw form don't come with caveat about strategic priorities that leaves the United States vulnerable to falling short of its own standards (as was the case with the race question in this period). Thirdly, it is obvious that American inconsistency (or hypocrisy) in democratization is a significant problem. There was a cost to the US image in Spain and beyond when the country failed to support democratization in Spain and simply supported General Franco. This might be imagined as negative soft power—behavior that not only fails to attract but actively repels. Democratization emerges as an activity that by its nature recommends the best methods for its perpetuation. As peace is hard to secure by war, so democracy, whether in the Spain of the 1970s or the Middle East of today, is best advanced by discussion and not dictation.

Notes

1. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.
2. Allen Guttman, *American Neutrality and the Spanish Civil War*, Boston: Heath and Company, 1963, p. vi.
3. Scholars have debated the degree of altruism in the US commitment to democratic enlargement. See, for example, the contradictory positions of Tony Smith and Walter LaFeber in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), *Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century,"* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 50–51 and p. 154. See also Colin Cavell, *Exporting "Made-in-America" Democracy: The National Endowment for Democracy & U.S. Foreign Policy*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002.

4. Although a hard power line has prevailed, there have been some attempts to bridge the gap in between Cuba and United States through soft power initiatives, such as USAID's attempt to promote political change by arranging for young American Latino "volunteers" to travel to the island to seek out and engage with Cuban counterparts. "EE. UU. envió a Cuba a jóvenes latinos para promover un cambio en la isla," *El País*, August 4, 2014. Some other efforts by civil society and scientists in "Scientists strive to boost US–Cuban collaboration," *Nature*, July 23, 2009, vol. 460, available at <http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090722/full/460447a.html>. See also Marifeli Pérez-Stable, "The United States and Cuba since 2000," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro (ed.), *Contemporary U.S.–Latin American Relations: Cooperation or Conflict in the 21st Century?*, New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 44–63. Peter Bakerdec, "U.S. to Restore Full Relations With Cuba," *The New York Times*, December 17, 2014.
5. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-brown/public-diplomacy-out-for_b_788931.html (accessed May 25, 2012).
6. On the origins of the term, see Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase," April 18, 2006, available online at http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/060418_public_diplomacy_before_gullion_the_evolution_of_a_phrase. For a historical introduction to the concept see Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616 (2008B), pp. 31–54; on its incorporation into academic production see Gregory Bruce, "Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 616/1 (2008), pp. 274–290.
7. Victor Oviacionayi Iyanmu, "Diplomacia pública en la bibliografía actual," *Ámbitos*, no. 11–12 (2004), p. 220.
8. Antonio Niño, "Uso y abuso de las relaciones culturales en la política internacional," *Ayer*, no. 73 (2009), pp. 25–61.
9. Jan Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, New York: Palgrave, 2005, p. 18.
10. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (WHCF Oversize Attachment 3615) Task Force on Communication Policy, E. Gullion (Murrow Center, Fletcher School) to D. Cater (White House), May 9, 1968 with "Outline of May 6 Advisory Commission Luncheon Discussion."
11. Joseph Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, pp. 107–109.
12. Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," p. 31.
13. <http://www.britishcouncil.org/about/contribution-uk-soft-power> (accessed September 15, 2013).
14. Joseph Nye, *Soft Power*, pp. 99–125.
15. The literature on the volatility of public opinions is broad. Pioneering works include: Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, New York: Macmillan, 1922; Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963; James Reston, *The Artillery of the Press. Its Influence on American Foreign Policy*, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966. Salustiano del Campo, *La opinión*

- pública española y la política exterior*, Madrid: Tecnos, 1992. More recently, Maxwell McCombs, *Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004; Joel Davidson, *Armchair Warriors: Private Citizens, Popular Press, and the Rise of American Power*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008.
16. Ali Fisher, *Collaborative Public Diplomacy: How Transnational Networks Influenced American Studies in Europe*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013, p. 17.
 17. Interview with Joseph Nye, by Francisco J. Rodríguez, Cambridge, MA, December 12, 2012.
 18. The remark is quoted in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Vol. 1: The Gathering Storm*, London: Cassels, 1948, p. 105.
 19. Leonardo Carvajal, “Morgenthau: ¿El Maquiavelo de la política internacional?” *Observatorio de Análisis de los Sistemas Internacionales*, 12 (2007), pp. 253–269; Quentin Skinner, *Machiavelli: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
 20. The concept was first articulated in the 2007 “Smart Power” report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) co-chaired by Nye and available online at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf
 21. Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, p. 9.
 22. Manuel Redero, “La transición a la democracia en España,” *Ayer*, no. 15 (1994), pp. 12–13. The original text is: “La casi unánime apreciación de los especialistas en resaltar la relevancia de los factores internos sobre los del contexto internacional en la explicación del tránsito a la democracia en España, ha llevado a la exclusión de estos últimos.”
 23. Frances Lannon, preface to *Los socialistas europeos y la transición española (1959–1977)*, by Pilar Ortuño, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2005, pp. 13–14. The original text is: “Una transición de esta magnitud no sucede en completo aislamiento (...) aunque la transición se hizo en España, se ayudó e impulsó desde el exterior.”
 24. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, vol. I, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986; Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996.
 25. In spite of this, certain authors have recently criticized the fact that external factors of the Spanish Transition are still not viewed as meriting the necessary attention from the experts—Manuel Ortiz Heras, “La Transición, ¿un asunto doméstico por excelencia?... Pero exportable,” in Óscar Martín and Manuel Ortiz, *Claves Internacionales en la Transición Española*, Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2010, p. 14. Among the pioneering studies in that new historiographical direction are: Charles Powell, “La dimension exterior de la transición española,” *Afers Internacionals*, 26 (1993), pp. 1–29. Juan Carlos Pereira, “Transición y política exterior: el nuevo reto de la historiografía española,” *Ayer*, no. 42 (2001), pp. 97–123; Nuno Teixeira (ed.), *The International Politics of Democratization. Comparative Perspectives*, London: Routledge, 2008; Loughlin, John, Frank Hendriks, and Anders Lidström, (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe. Oxford Handbooks in Politics and International Relations*, Oxford,

- New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; Encarnación Lemus, *Estados Unidos y la Transición española. Entre la Revolución de los Claveles y la Marcha Verde*, Madrid: Sílex, 2011. Charles, *El amigo americano. España y Estados Unidos: de la dictadura a la democracia*, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2011. Some of the few publications which adopt a fuller chronological perspective include: Morten R. Heiberg, "A Long and Winding Road: An International Perspective on the Fall and Rise of Democracy in Spain in the 20th Century," in *European Self-Reflection between Politics and Religion, the Crisis of Europe in the Twentieth century*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 80–92. A more detailed state of the art can be found in Damián González, "Actores y factores internacionales en el cambio político español," in *Claves Internacionales*, pp. 39–64.
26. Montserrat Huguet, "España y el Mediterráneo en los años setenta," *Historia del Presente*, no. 6 (2005), pp. 110–111.
 27. The original quote is "la principal preocupación de Estados Unidos con respecto a España a principios de los años setenta era la protección de los intereses geoestratégicos (...) la promoción de la democracia quedaba como un asunto secundario, importante, pero secundario." Damián González, "Actores y factores," pp. 41–46 and 50.
 28. Antonio Sánchez, *El Amigo Alemán: el SPD y el PSOE de la dictadura a la democracia*, Barcelona: RBA, 2012; Pilar Ortuño, *Los socialistas europeos*.
 29. Fernando Guirao and Víctor Gavín, "La dimensione internazionale della transizione politica spagnola, 1969–1982. Quale ruolo giocarono la Comunità europea e gli Stati Uniti," in Mario del Pero, Victor Gavín, Fernando Guirao, and Antonio Varsori (eds.), *Democrazie. L'Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature*, Milan: Mondadori, 2010, pp. 173–264; Fernando Guirao, "The European Community's Role in Promoting Democracy in Franco's Spain, 1970–1975," in Jan Van der Harst (ed.), *Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969–1975*, Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2007, pp. 163–193. Charles Powell, "The Long Road to Europe: Spain and the European Community, 1957–1986," in Joaquín Roy and María Lorca-Susino, María (eds.), *Spain in the European Union: The First Twenty-Five Years (1986–2011)*, Miami-Florida European Union Center/Jean Monnet Chair, 2011, pp. 21–44. Pamela Radcliff, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain. Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960–78*, New York: Palgrave, 2011. Giulia Quaggio, *La Cultura en Transición (Reconciliación y política cultural en España, 1976–1986)*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2014.
 30. "Annual U.S. Policy Assessment," November 21, 1970. NARA, RG 59, SNF-PD 1970–73, Spain, Box 2599.
 31. "USIA. Country Plan for Spain for FY 1978," October 17, 1977, RG 306, Country Plans and Data Papers FY 1978, Box 1.