Climate Terror

A Critical Geopolitics of Climate Change

Sanjay Chaturvedi
Timothy Doyle

New Security Challenges Series

General Editor: **Stuart Croft**, Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK, and Director of the ESRC's New Security Challenges Programme.

The last decade demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and manifestations, and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences, civil society and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security and environmental security. The topical *New Security Challenges Series* reflects this pressing political and research agenda.

Titles include:

Abdul Haqq Baker
EXTREMISTS IN OUR MIDST
Confronting Terror

Robin Cameron
SUBJECTS OF SECURITY
Domestic Effects of Foreign Policy in the War on Terror

Sharyl Cross, Savo Kentera, R. Craig Nation and Radovan Vukadinovic (*editors*)
SHAPING SOUTH EAST EUROPE'S SECURITY COMMUNITY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Trust, Partnership, Integration

Sanjay Chaturvedi and Timothy Doyle
CLIMATE TERROR
A Critical Geopolitics of Climate Change

Tom Dyson and Theodore Konstadinides
EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EU LAW AND IR THEORY

Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (*editors*)
NATO: THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIPS

Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre
POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS AND PERILS OF SECURITY
Unpacking the Military Strategy of the United Nations

Hakan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (*editors*)
PURSUING STRATEGY
NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi

Hamed El-Said
NEW APPROACHES TO COUNTERING TERRORISM
Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs

Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia
PUBLIC OPINION, TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE

Adrian Gallagher
GENOCIDE AND ITS THREAT TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Kevin Gillan, Jenny Pickerill and Frank Webster
ANTI-WAR ACTIVISM
New Media and Protest in the Information Age

James Gow and Ivan Zverzhanovski
SECURITY, DEMOCRACY AND WAR CRIMES
Security Sector Transformation in Serbia

Toni Haastrup
CHARTING TRANSFORMATION THROUGH SECURITY
Contemporary EU-Africa Relations

Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti and Ben Zyla (*editors*)
NATO BEYOND 9/11
The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance

Climate Terror

A Critical Geopolitics of Climate Change

Sanjay Chaturvedi
Professor of Political Science, Centre for the Study of Geopolitics,
Department of Political Science, Panjab University, India

and

Timothy Doyle
Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of Adelaide;
Distinguished Research Fellow of Indian Ocean Futures at Curtin University;
and Chair of Politics and International Relations at Keele University

In fond memory of Sanjay's younger brother,
Rahul Chaturvedi

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

Preface

In early June 2013, a report for the World Bank by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, entitled '*Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience*' (World Bank Report 2013) was published against the backdrop of extreme monsoons causing havoc in various parts of the Indian Himalayas. The report focuses on what it described as the three 'critical' regions of the world, 'sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia and South Asia'. It examines how impacts on agriculture production, water resources, coastal zone fisheries, and coastal safety are likely to multiply as global warming rises from its present level of 0.8°C up to 1.5°C, 2°C and 4°C, cautioning that as 'temperatures continue to rise, there is an increased risk of critical thresholds being breached. At such "tipping points", elements of human or natural systems – such as crop yields, coral reefs, and savanna grasslands – are pushed beyond critical thresholds, leading to abrupt system changes with negative effects on the goods and services they provide' (ibid.: xxiv).

On 15 June 2013, the Indian Meteorological Department reported the 'good' news of a 'plentiful' monsoon to the nation through extensive media reporting. Within a few days, 'Nature's fury' was unleashed in northern India, especially in the Himalayan states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, turning the hope of a prosperous year into fear of large scale death and destruction, and also affecting thousands of pilgrims. The usual debate ensued between the environmentalists and government agencies over the precise nature of the calamity, with the former calling it 'manmade' and the latter describing it as 'natural'. As heavy monsoon rains destroyed lives (official figures being close to ten thousand), as well as infrastructure and local livelihoods, the long-standing mismatch between a high degree of vulnerability/risk and low levels of capacity/preparedness in one of the most disaster-prone parts of the globe was once again graphically, as well as painfully, exposed. It is worth noting that the above-cited World Bank report, while acknowledging that 'large uncertainty remains about the behavior of the Indian summer monsoon under global warming' (ibid.: 108), had cautioned that 'An abrupt change in the monsoon, for example, toward a drier, lower rainfall state, could precipitate a major crisis in South Asia, as evidenced by the anomalous monsoon of 2002, which

caused the most serious drought in recent times – with rainfall about 209 percent below the long-term normal and food grain production reductions of about 10–15 percent compared to the average of the preceding decade' (ibid.).

The leading experts on 'natural' disasters in India were at pains to point out that three years ago an environmental assessment report by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) had warned of the serious consequences of deforestation and fast multiplying hydropower projects. These were related to flash floods which could result in heavy losses of human lives and property. The report had noted that there were as many as 42 hydropower projects on Bhaghirathi and Alaknanda rivers, with 203 under various stages of construction and sanction, amounting to almost one power project every 5–7 km of the rivers.

The co-authors of this book come from both the 'Minority World' and the 'Majority World', joined together in the hope that this modest attempt will contribute to the mission of provoking a critical intervention by social sciences in the debate on climate change, which, despite growing evidence in favor of early and urgent action, is getting messier and murkier each passing day. At a time when the climate change debate is getting increasingly polarized between the accepters and deniers (despite their steadily declining number), social scientists cannot afford to take a backbench. We are also reminded that on the occasion of the award of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize, the IPCC Chairman had expressed his disappointment over the relative silence of social sciences on climate change.

Let us begin with all emphasis at our command as social scientists that we do strongly acknowledge the force of the climate earth science and evidence furnished by it thus far, primarily through the IPCC reports, in favor of anthropogenic global warming. We also duly accept that global warming will cause wide-ranging, complex and compelling implications for humanity and its highly differentiated masses situated at various stages of uneven development (both material and human), and subjected to diverse political cultures and regimes of governance.

The evidence of global warming is most graphic and compelling in the case of all the Three Poles: the Arctic (French and Scott 2009; Chaturvedi 2012a), the Himalayas and Antarctica (Chaturvedi 2012b) but certainly not exhausted by them. We have burgeoning literature and fast proliferating print and visual media narratives on climate change trying to 'communicate' (though without much success so far) a sense of urgency, bordering on emergency, about the 'dangerous', 'disastrous' and 'catastrophic' consequences of climate change. We are also told by

diverse actors, agencies, think tanks and media outlets dealing with the climate change issues that the worst victims of climate change will be the poor and the marginalized; a prospect worth noting in its own right but hardly a 'discovery' for those who have followed the exclusivist political, economic and cultural geographies of uneven 'development' unleashed by globalization and its more recent neoliberal avatars.

But, for a number of reasons, some of which are stated below, we tend to approach and analyze 'climate change' as comprising, but not confined to, global warming. In other words, we uphold that 'climate change', far from being a moment of rupture or radical departure, is a continuum marked by an ever shifting triad of statecraft and its political economies, nature and power. Climate change is not simply a matter of an abrupt, unprecedented 'global' manifestation of anthropogenic assault on nature in an abstract sense, with undifferentiated geographies of responsibility and accountability. In our view, it is better approached and analyzed as a messy convergence of various strands, paradoxes and dilemmas that have emanated from the reckless economic growth undertaken by the 'minority world' of the affluent and the influential. This has occurred in the context of what Lewis Mumford (1934) so aptly described as 'carboniferous capitalism', feeding into fossil-fuel driven urban civilizations resulting eventually in the 'end of nature', on the one hand, and rise of a 'global risk society' (Beck 2009), on the other.

It is equally important to bear in mind in our view – particularly while debating the 'mitigation' and 'adaptation' strategies for much 'feared' impacts and implications of climate change for different parts of the globe – that climate change is not alone on the post-cold war register of de-territorialized threats and dangers. It has joined an ever-expanding family of 'planetary' threats with allegedly trans-boundary spillover effects, said to be in dire need of a 'global' response and regulation, namely terrorism, epidemics, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the drugs trade, slavery, illegal migrations, etc.

There is no doubt that climate has been changing. But climate is not the only thing that is changing, or changing, for that matter, in complete isolation. To acknowledge this is to underline the importance of critical social science research on climate change. If climate change is about change in the human–nature interface then it is important to acknowledge that the history of the destruction and disappearance of nature in pursuit of primacy and domination, including the colonial chapter, is much longer than the history of global warming. The

histories as well as the geographies of the domination of nature are still unfolding, with serious implications for human-livelihood security, and they must not be marginalized or erased by increasingly alarmist narratives of climate change.

As shown by Judith Shapiro (2001: 7) Mao's 'war on nature' during the Cultural Revolution was not the beginning, but a chapter in the longstanding history of 'exhausting the earth': 'a powerful national drive toward expansion, mastery, and resource exploitation, fueled by population growth and new technologies.' The point we are making in this book is somewhat paradoxical. No doubt the sooner the implications of global warming are acknowledged with a sense of urgency, the better for all, especially for the millions on the margins of affluence. But it is neither helpful nor desirable to downplay the fact that, as Bill Mckibben (2006: 148) points out, 'We live at a radical, unrealistic moment. We live at the end of nature ... when the most basic elements of our lives are changing.' Will 'climate' entirely displace and replace 'nature'? One of the reasons why climate change deserves immediate attention relates to another downplayed fact that climate change is now being seen as the ultimate symbol of a 'green identity' even (rather especially) in those countries where ecological irrationalities and injustices are deeply entrenched in the dominant practices of the political economy of statecraft and governance.

The word 'climate terror' is gaining increasing salience in the official and media pronouncements and can also be found on the websites of some of the think tanks. In some cases it has not only replaced the word 'fear' but also re-introduced the metaphors such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). We wonder why. Some analysts would argue that geographical politics of fear, despite its seductive appeal in the face of highly complex geographies of transitions and transformations, does not seem to be working both for the 'Right' and the 'Left'. If so, then, we need to explore, in this case, the nature of this 'failure', and identify reasons behind the decline in the rhetorical utility of metaphors such as catastrophe and apocalypse. Or could it be that despite growing lamentation over the 'business as usual' attitude and approach to climate change, what we are witnessing is a rise of a new coalition geopolitics around a nascent but influential 'climate terror industry'. While lending most vociferous support for climate change mitigation and adaptation in order to save both the body and soul of the future citizen, this industry is not shy of seeking new business opportunities in the 'day after tomorrow'. Is the deployment of

terror vocabulary to address climate change accidental or a part of refurbished designs and technologies of control, regulation and domination in a neo-liberal, post-political globalized world marked by profound asymmetries in terms of economic growth and development?

We argue and illustrate in this study that climate terror (an ensemble of various geographies of fear framed, flagged and deployed by various actors and agencies – state and non-state – in pursuit of their respective interests and agendas) is fast turning, at the same time, into a largely conservative grand-strategy deployed by faltering sovereign states, at various stages of a neo-liberal embrace, to discipline and regulate various faultlines in statecraft.

In the context of the complex and dynamic political geography of climate change, the processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, operating in conjunction, do not so much question the system of sovereign spaces as they reproduce it. Climate as a geopolitical space, therefore, is constantly moving *in* and *out* of physical-material geography. The imaginative geographies of climate change are always in the making, and intermittently assume territorial or nonterritorial forms depending upon the strategic convenience of the actors and their agendas concerned. In this new rhetorical map of the earth, the undifferentiated mass of humanity is imaginatively framed as integral to 'global soul' and cast within the shadow of a global enemy – climate – which is said to affect all (with the poor and the marginalized as the worst victims) but can only be interpreted and understood by a scientific and economic elite.

Post-colonial, post-partition South Asia (one of the most 'disaster-prone' regions in the world) is no exception to the global trend toward increasing de/re-territorialization as well as securitization of climate 'spaces'. For example, one of the most alarmist ways in which climate change is folded into a discourse of fear in support of various domestic and foreign policy agendas within Bangladesh and its neighbor India, is by referencing the 'problem' of *millions* of 'climate migrants' and 'climate refugees' – a 'problem' which then demands a geopolitical response.

The geopolitics of climate change in the foreseeable future will continue to oscillate between various imaginative geographies of fear and counter-imaginative geographies of hope, depending upon their ideological moorings and power-political agendas. It is worthwhile to explore the prospects for the latter and the role they could possibly play in approaching the issue of climate induced displacements from

the angle of human security and human rights of the socially disadvantaged, dispossessed and displaced in this part of global South. This in turn would demand a relentless interrogation of the complex geography behind the politics of fear and the ways in which various parts of the globe, especially in global South, are *implicated in* and at the same time *induced by* doomy Malthusian scenarios of climate catastrophism.

Acknowledgments

Each of us owes individual and combined debts of gratitude.

Sanjay would like to thank Arun Grover, Vice Chancellor, Panjab University, Chandigarh, for his support and inspiration throughout the sabbatical he availed for this book writing. He would also like to thank his colleagues in the Department of Political Science for their encouragement and his research scholars for their valuable research assistance. A very special thanks to India China Institute (ICI), The New School New York (where Sanjay was a Third Cohort Fellow during for 2010–2012), especially its Director, Ashok Gurung, for extending full support to this book project. Particular thanks are extended to Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, Shikui Dong, Sze Ping Lo, Nidhi Srivinas and Victoria Marshal for sharing their knowledge and insights on issues related to environmental sustainability. Thanks also to Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (CRG), especially Ranabir Samaddar, Paula Banerjee, Samir Das and Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury.

Tim wishes to express his gratitude and good wishes to colleagues and students of politics and international relations at the University of Adelaide in Australia, and at Keele University in the United Kingdom who contributed to, and took his courses on, Global Environmental Politics, Global South and International Political Economy. Particular thanks are accorded to Doug McEachern, Stoifan Darley, Jessica Hodgens, Brian Doherty, Sherilyn MacGregor, Adela Alfonsi, Phil Catney, John Vogler, Andy Dobson, Steve Quilley, Bulent Gokay, Andy Lockhart, Hayley Stevenson, Mohamed Salih and Barry Ryan. In more recent times, the support from Graham Seal of the Australia-Asia-Pacific Institute at Curtin University has been truly valued. Thanks also to Tim's colleagues in the Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre at the University of Adelaide.

On a more personal note, Sanjay would also like to thank his wonderful family, especially his parents Shri Dinesh Chaturvedi, Smt. Indrani Chaturvedi and Shri Priyavrat Sharma for their blessings and guidance, wife Veena for her unconditional love and care, most adorable children Pranshu, Sukriti, Pranjal and Sameeha for their emotional support, and brotherly friend Manbir Singh for his invaluable affections. Tim would like to equally extend his love and warm appreciation to his parents,

us were part of the original team forming the Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG), and this friendship continues to bear remarkable fruit.

For Adela Alfonsi of the University of Adelaide, our appreciation cannot sufficiently be expressed in the form of a simple acknowledgment. Her editorial support, administrative muscle, and intellectual rigor, provided at just the right times, have been instrumental to this project's completion.

To Georgia Lawrence-Doyle, thanks also for the outstanding work in this book's early research phase.

We are truly beholden to the Editor of Palgrave *New Security Challenges Series*, Stuart Croft, Warwick University, for his initial interest and support of this book-length research project. We are also grateful to our wonderful colleagues at Palgrave Macmillan, Ellie Davey-Corrigan, Commissioning Editor for International Relations, and Hannah Kašpar and Emily Russell for their thorough and timely editorial advice and assistance. Thanks also to Alexandra Webster who originally commissioned this book project for Palgrave Macmillan.

We would like to acknowledge that significant parts of this book draw upon the research of a much larger three-year project entitled 'Building an Indian Ocean Region' (DP120101166), which is funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Projects Scheme for funding 2012/2015.

1

An Introduction: A Critical Geopolitics of 'Climate Fear/Terror': Roots, Routes and Rhetoric

Introduction

On the 'doomsday clock' of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, which intends to caution 'how close humanity is to catastrophic destruction', 'climate change' joins the other two alarmist categories, namely 'nuclear,' and 'biosecurity'. At the same time, there is a grudging acknowledgement of the fact, at least by some, that the geopolitics of fear, deployed at diverse sites by different agencies – individually and/or collectively – in pursuit of various interests and agendas, has failed to yield the desired results, including a change in public and private behavior and for that matter the ushering in of radical social movements (Lilley 2012). On the contrary, it appears to have resulted in 'catastrophe fatigue, the paralyzing effects of fear, the pairing of overwhelmingly bleak analysis *with inadequate solutions, and a misunderstanding of the process of politicization*' (ibid.:16; emphasis added). Could this be the reason that some of these multifaceted discourses of fear – that somehow remain open to political contestation and interrogation – are now being scaled up and upgraded by various regulatory agencies and alliances to the discourse of 'climate terror'? This discourse can only have counter-terror as its Other in order to completely erase the hope (the Other of fear) of re-ordering and regulating spaces and societies allegedly more vulnerable to climate change and its threat-multiplying effects. Is climate terror an apparatus of govern-mentality that aims at erasing not only the collective memories of historically perpetuated environmental injustices by the powers that be, but also hopes to contain growing resistance in various parts of the globe (especially the global North) against the emerging architecture of domination and dependencies? Of course,

the separation between North and South is a useful category, marking out the affluent lives of the minority versus those of the less affluent majority. But, like any border (as mentioned in the preface of this book), it is drawn subjectively and imperfectly to demarcate territories (Doyle and Chaturvedi 2010).

As pointed out by Eddie Yuen (2012: 37), 'The prevalence of fear-based catastrophism reveals the depth of acceptance of the assumption of rational choice theory in both natural and social sciences. The assumption of a certain kind of instrumental rationality undergirds the delusional belief that if only people could understand the scientific facts, they will change their behavior and trust the experts.' This entails putting a heavy gloss over a set of deeply political and politicizing questions at a time when the lure of the post-political is gaining traction but not without inviting a micro geopolitics of resistance.

Can we say that 'climate terror' is the accumulated, collective outcome of steadily proliferating fears, with each fear serving to endow its anticipatory regimes with 'expertise' and 'clinical authority'? What kind of language, imaginaries and metaphors are being deployed to frame and communicate climate change, by whom and why? What is the politics behind the written geographies of climate change, and how and why are largely Afro-Asian places and people being framed and implicated in various *geographies* of catastrophe and fear? What are the implications that these discourses carry for understanding climate change and choosing 'appropriate' policy options and responses? What minimum ethical principles related to equity are needed to ensure that the impacts of policies to address climate change are perceived as equitable by key stakeholders (Giddens 2008: 4) and do not result in further marginalization of the much less fortunate losers of corporation globalization?

Structure of the book and its order of exposition

In Chapter 1 of the book, our key engagement focusing the rhetoric of 'climate terror' is pitched at a number of theoretical perspectives that inform 'critical geopolitics' essentially as a relentless interrogation of the politics and even depoliticizing politics of domination. While being 'critical', we do not dismiss state-centric classical geopolitics out of hand since we believe that nation-states, irrespective of their geo-economic and geopolitical locations, continue to matter a good deal in international geopolitical economy. For example, low-lying Bangladesh and Maldives are 'vulnerable', not only because of their vulnerable

physical geographies, but also because of their geopolitical location in the global South.

In this chapter then, we provide a brief historical overview of the engagement of both classical and critical geopolitics with categories of 'geography', 'nature' and 'environment' and their interplay with state-craft. In addition, we argue for expanding the nature and scope of critical geopolitics through engagement with various 'critical' perspectives (in contrast with conventional wisdoms) of social sciences and humanities; as well as convergent critical perspectives around the notions of space, scale and power.

In Chapter 2, we investigate the anxieties, uncertainties and denials associated with both the construction and broadcasting of climate 'Science' and the politics of knowledge. In this vein, we research the relationship between climate science and the politics of fear, looking at the categories of control and the hegemony of the natural sciences; the science and power of climate change paradigms and mythologies; and diverse cultural understandings found in indigenous knowledge. In this vein, we briefly touch upon controversies over the melting of Himalayan glaciers and pre-Copenhagen East Anglia.

Additionally, we trace the changing discourses of early environmental movements which often directly challenged 'Enlightenment Science' and its myths of progress-at-all-costs, to more recent green movements which have become 'ecologically modernized', now advocating concepts such as sustainable development and win-win-win political games. The notions of ecological modernization, sustainable development and the scientific knowledge which inform them, we argue, stand co-opted and depoliticized, with the zero-sum games of the finite, hard-earthers now replaced with *Plasticine Anthropocene* understandings of the Earth as infinitely malleable.

One key argument informing this work is the concept of the post-political, and in Chapters 3 and 4, we discuss the relationships between the post-political and the discourses of neo-liberal globalization. In Chapter 3, after introducing the post-political at some length, we focus on *climate territories* with their marginalized geographies inherent in post-political constructions of geopolitics, leading us to a discussion of Climate and the Anthropocene (exploring the 'boundless' nature of climate change) and critically argue against what we contend is the construction of a '*Global Soul*' for 'Global South' by Northern elites. Finally, in this light, we study space, scale and the politics of making/unmaking places, and in the latter pages we utilize the case of India to illuminate our purposes.

Chapter 4 moves to Climate 'Markets', for it is within neo-liberal tropes about climate change that the concept of a post-political, post-material geopolitical reality is most usually found. In specific terms, we endeavor to expose the emergence of neoliberal green economics, providing examples and differences between ETS systems versus carbon taxes (the role of states versus market driven schemes). Of course, climate change has become so omniscient that other economic ideologies and approaches have also responded to its call (not just the neo-liberals), and we seek to provide examples of mercantilist and more classically liberal approaches to climate economics. We strongly argue, however, that climate change emerges from a conservative, right-wing morality, so its relationship with right-wing economic doctrine (in all its forms) is hardly surprising.

Chapters 5 and 6 move to the world of securities and securitization. In Chapter 5, we focus on *climate borders*: securitization, flows, migration and refugees. In this analysis we cast our critical gaze on the construction of the climate 'terrorist'; climate cores and peripheries; mobility and circulations; and investigate the realist and/or neo-Hobbesian literature on climate 'wars' and conflicts. For much of this chapter, however, our focus is largely on the *climate refugee*, and in this manner, we concentrate on displacements and migrations, using a detailed Bangladeshi case study to ground our theoretical musings.

Chapter 6 takes this discussion on security one step forward and reifies a theme which has developed right throughout the work: the close connection between geo-securities and geo-economics. Post September 11, and post the 2007–8 financial crisis, in a geopolitical sense, financial limitations continue to justify neo-liberal responses to global security. The Earth (or the Climate) is now increasingly seen by global elites as little more than a collective of post-political citizen/consumers of the core, whose interests to trade in marketplaces need more amorphous and less permanent forms of 'protection' (provided by nation-states in the past) from those dwelling in the *black holes* of market periphery. This chapter looks at the manner in which climate security has been militarized. Case studies of the United States military, and its 'green defense' projects are provided in a new and powerful geo-economic/geo-security region/non-region now referred to as the *Indo-Pacific*.

In the penultimate chapter, Chapter 7, we extend our thoughts beyond the domain of governments and corporations. We ask the question: how have social movements, non-government organizations, unions and churches responded to the climate change phenomenon? In particular, we provide some explanations as to how more 'emancipatory' groups and

networks have responded to concepts such as climate justice and climate debt; how these groups who, in spite of also being co-opted by the might of climate change dogma, have attempted to use this global *climate moment* for more democratic purposes. Although we provide brief cases from both Church groups and the Union movement, we concentrate on how green movements themselves have been impacted upon, and for much of the chapter, we offer an analysis of the largest global green organization: Friends of the Earth International, with branches in over 70 countries, in the global North and South.

In Chapter 8, we conclude with our understandings of *climate futures*. We provide an overview of climate diplomacy, and investigate notions of common but differentiated responsibilities, respective capabilities and global governance. We also touch upon the geographical politics behind climate engineering.

We revisit notions of power, knowledge and technology and, in the end, advocate the resistance of artificial climate futures. This discussion leads us to one of our final questions: Can climate, as a set of discourses, be utilized for emancipatory ends or, ultimately, is the climate story, regardless of its diverse intentions, a discourse now captured by the affluent North to control the development of the global South? In short, has the emancipatory moment now passed or is there still hope for the re-emergence of subaltern perspectives on climate futures?

Toward a critical geopolitics of anthropocene, global warming and climate change

What emerged during the 1980s within the sub-discipline of political geography was a new approach called 'critical geopolitics' with the overall objective of liberating geographical knowledge(s) from the old and the new imperial geopolitics of domination. In the words of one of the leading proponents of critical approaches, 'The focus of critical geopolitics is on exposing the plays of power involved in grand geopolitical schemes' (Ó Tuathail 1992: 439). It is aimed at relentless interrogation of the 'power of certain national security elites to represent the nature and dilemmas of international politics in particular ways. These representational practices of national security intellectuals generate particular "scripts" of international politics concerning places, peoples and issues. Such scripts are part of the make-up by which hegemony is deployed in international systems' (ibid.: 438).

As pointed out by John Agnew (2010: 569), 'The hegemonic calculus of the past 200 years has involved the imposition of a set of normative

rules and practical constraints on states and other actors, reflecting the uneven distribution of global power and a common "script" of world politics thereby written more in some places than in others. Though this script has had powerful continuities to its core themes, it has also involved important shifts over time with the rise and fall of dominant actors who have brought different conceptions and practices to bear within it.' Agnew points out that so far most of the scholarship in critical geopolitics has engaged with contemporary United States and the European colonial powers, 'often as if they were the sole active forces in world politics toying with the docile masses in the rest of the world' (ibid.).

We have been conscious of, and inspired by, the insights offered by one of the leading proponents of critical geopolitics, Simon Dalby. According to Dalby, geographical knowledges have been used and abused in the past for the purposes of so-called 'discovery', enclosures and expropriation during the colonial times and will continue to serve various imperial impulses and neo-colonial projects in various parts of the globe. Matthew Sparke's (2005, 2007) insistence on geographers using a 'post-foundational ethic as our guiding principle and collectively challenge the taken for grantedness of these practices', points out Dalby, could be used to question and critique 'the violence and transformations we have unloosed in the biosphere' (Dalby 2010: 280).

> This is especially important in the circumstances of *our* increasingly artificial existence in the urbanized world of the Anthropocene where we are collectively remaking our fate in ways that render traditional notions of a separate nature or an external environment untenable premises for discussing the earth as humanity's home ... Linking the spatial and natural themes in the discipline puts the most basic questions of politics at the heart of geographical considerations. Are *we* then to understand ourselves as on earth, squabbling over control of discrete territories and threatening massive violence to our putative rivals in other sovereign spaces, or are we to understand our fate as increasingly a matter of reorganizing a dynamic biosphere in which *we* all dwell? (ibid.; emphasis added)

From an ethical-normative standpoint, the authors of this book, with a 'political science' background, are inclined to be a part of *WE* that Dalby is alluding to as a critical geographer. Yet we feel slightly uncomfortable with a universalized notion of 'we' (while aspiring toward that state of collective socio-spatial consciousness) and would therefore like

to introduce in this study critical geopolitical perspectives *on* and *from* the global South.

We do agree with Matt Sparke's contention that geographical grounds of fear and hope need to be critically examined, if only for the reason that these 'two are huge swirling compulsions with enormous implications for the lives and deaths of every living thing on the planet. False hopes and groundless fears can be of dreadful deadly consequences. And yet justified fears when combined with sensible hopes can open new possibilities and thereby help mobilize change for the better' (Sparke 2007: 338). He goes on to explain:

> We can usefully come to terms with the *double vision of fear and hope* through recourse to arguments about geopolitical scripting and geoeconomic 'enframing'. Critical investigations of the imaginative geographies produced by geopolitics and geoeconomics help us to understand how the fears and hopes of those who promoted the war were both groundless and yet at the same time ground changing. (ibid.: 339)

Sparke's insistence 'that geopolitics and geoeconomics are better understood as *geostrategic discourses*' (ibid.) appears to be quite relevant in the case of the climate change metanarrative. Various geopolitical and geoeconomic strands of the narrative are unfolding – and in some cases in a rather overlapping manner – at various sites, including: national defense-security establishments, ministries and departments dealing with earth sciences and environment; corporation-government partnerships engaged in carbon trading of increasingly territorialized carbon sinks (Lovbrand and Stripple 2006); religious groups; trade unions; nuclear as well as fossil-fuel industries; environmental NGOs with new climate change portfolios; and insurance companies, to name just a few.

Even though the issues raised by Sparke pertain to the Iraq war and not to the geoeconomic framings and geopolitical scripts of climate change, they are helpful in understanding the contradictory double vision of American discourses on climate change. The following official statement released on the eve of President Obama's pronouncement of national climate action policy through a short video addressed to the citizens of the United States resonates this double vision, anchored in rather multiple oscillating reasonings, quite graphically.

> I'll lay out my vision for where I believe we need to go – a national plan to reduce carbon pollution, prepare our country for the impacts

of climate change, and lead global efforts to fight it. This is a serious challenge – but it's one uniquely suited to America's strength. We'll need scientists to design new fuels, and farmers to grow them. We'll need engineers to devise new sources of energy, and businesses to make and sell them. We'll need workers to build the foundation for a clean energy economy. And we'll need all of us, as citizens, to do our part to preserve God's creation for future generations – our forests and waterways, our croplands and snowcapped peaks. There's no single step that can reverse the effects of climate change. But when it comes to the world we leave our children, we owe it to them to do what we can. So I hope you'll share this message with your friends. Because this is a challenge that affects everyone – and we all have a stake in solving it together. (cited in Chris Good 2013)

In the deployment of geopolitics of fear, 'imaginative geographies' play an important role. According to Derek Gregory (2004: 17) 'Imaginative geographies imply, 'Representations of other places – of peoples and landscapes, cultures and 'natures' – that articulate the desires, fantasies and fears of their authors and the grids of power between them and their "Others"'. Gregory's critical engagement with a 'colonial present' shows how contemporary geopolitical discourses of fear and enmity have both roots and routes in imperialism (ibid.). It is equally useful to note that many imaginative geographies of imperial Orientalism, systematically critiqued by Edward Said, were refurbished and deployed in order to both stage and legitimize the 'War on Terror' (ibid.). With the help of global media or what some scholars have termed as the CNN effect (Gilboa 2005), 'the geopolitical scripts about despotic, hate-filled Orientals served to provide the fear-filled justification for treating whole communities as if they lay outside the bounds of humanity' (Sparke 2007: 343).

We will argue and illustrate in later sections of this book that the ascendance of climate terror discourse, and the ways in which imaginative geographies, linking the consequences of climate change to various facets of the war on terror, are being manufactured by various military-security think tanks. They reinforce the emphasis placed by Allan Pred (2007) on the performative aspect of the geopolitics of fear. Taking note of various opinion polls is no doubt helpful in some ways, but is not enough since it conceals 'how the enunciation of fear became a performance of sovereignty and governmentality at the same time but in different places' (Sparke 2007: 343).

The performative aspect of a geopolitics of fear needs further scrutiny in order to expose the violence (both epistemic and structural)

that often accompanies various technologies of control, supported by a curious mix of persuasion and coercion, directed at remaking and reordering the real so that it fits into the imagined. Later in this book, in our analysis of the rhetoric and reality of climate change-induced displacements and migrations, we will show how the most 'vulnerable' in various parts of the world, especially the global South, are being discursively transformed into the most 'dangerous'.

Susan Roberts, Anna Secor and Matthew Sparke (2003: 886) draw attention to 'a more widespread form of *neoliberal geopolitics* implicated in the war-making.' What we find in this geopolitical world vision is the 'neoliberal idealism about the virtues of free markets, openness, and global economic integration' linked to 'an extreme form of American unilateralism' (ibid.). Furthermore, in contrast to the 'ideological geo-politics' of the Cold War era (Agnew 1998), where danger was perceived as 'something that should be contained at a disconnected distance', today it is the disconnection from the US lead globalization project that is understood to represent dangers of various kinds. In Chapter 6, we return to a detailed discussion of how a neoliberal geopolitical response appears to insist on *enforcing* reconnection, in the context of highly uneven geographies of globalization, through a hybrid strategy of persuasion and coercion (Sparke 2013).

Geopolitics of climate fear: sites and sights

The key concern here is with the fear-inducing narratives constructed and used by policy makers and politicians in pursuit of their so-called 'national interests' and related foreign policy-diplomatic agendas. These can be found in the speeches delivered and/or statements made by the politicians, including for example those posted as a matter of routine on the official websites of the ministries of 'foreign' or 'external' affairs. The key challenge here is to discern and deconstruct the 'practical geopolitical reasoning' in a foreign policy discourse (see Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992); ' ... reasoning by means of consensual and unremarkable assumptions about places and their particular identities' (ibid.: 96). For example, through the 2002 State of the Union address, former US president George W. Bush could evoke the imaginative geographies of an 'axis of evil' by naming Iran, Iraq, and North Korea in conjunction with their alleged 'terrorist allies'.

The scenarios and spectacles outlined by practical geopolitics, often with the help of certain metaphors (e.g. 'rogue' states, 'domino effects'), are not always explicit or alarmist. The accumulative effect of repetitive utterances, however, need to be carefully mapped because 'the power

of practical geopolitics is in its banality. Geopolitical ideas often appear so ordinary as to be invisible ... The repetition of geopolitical ideas within the practical performance of politics serves to naturalize certain categorizations of the world: for example, developed/less developed, core/periphery, or simply "us" and "them". These phrases may seem innocuous, but they are affirming particular political perspectives and legitimizing foreign policy decisions' (Painter and Jeffrey 2009: 208). In our analysis of the geopolitics of climate change we would be deploying critical geopolitical perspectives in order to expose what John Agnew describes as 'the techniques of concealment and spatial fixing associated with the dual geopolitical disciplining and intellectual naturalization of the world political map' (Agnew 2010: 570).

The manner in which masses are being socialized into dominant representations of other places and peoples (positive or negative) through media, cinema, cartoons, books and magazines is the subject matter of popular geopolitics. As the political geographer Joanne Sharp (2000: 31) puts it, 'hegemony is constructed not only through political ideologies but also, more immediately, through detailed scripting of some of the most ordinary and mundane aspects of everyday life.' Sharp (ibid.) has shown how, during the Cold War era, various contributions to the *Reader's Digest* highly exaggerated the 'red' threat from the Soviet Union, called by the former U.S. president Ronald Regan the 'evil empire'.

In our view, critical geopolitics needs to pay a far more serious and systematic attention to how imaginative geographies, anchored in fear, are deployed at the service of objectification, embodiment and instrumentalization of abstract risks, threats and dangers. The strategies deployed to objectify and embody abstractions through evidence deserve scrutiny. These imaginative, imagined, ideational, and emotional geographies in some cases (as demonstrated in Chapter 5) could be far more complex and compelling than the material geographies.

Critical geopolitical perspectives on mapping risks further reveal that discourses framing local and distant dangers in neo-Malthusian terms are often anchored in geographically vague and imprecise reformulations in spatial terms. In geopolitical terms, then, 'the environmental challenges of the 21st century represent a dialectic of territorialization and deterritorialization, a mixture of spatial fixity and unfixity. It is here, though, that things start to get really interesting and complicated' (Castree 2003: 427). Ecological degradation or climate change is a problem frequently attributed to the 'over-populated' global 'South'. What is very much in vogue here is the geopolitical impulse that divides the