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



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*für Daniel und Rawi*

*Sprich nicht immer*
*Von dem laub*
*Windes raub*
*Vom zerschellen*
*Reifer quitten*
*Von den tritten*
*Der vernichter*
*Spät im jahr.*
*Von dem zittern*
*Der libellen*
*In gewittern*
*Und der lichter*
*Deren flimmer*
*Wandelbar.*

Stefan George, *Buch der hängenden Gärten* (1895)

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# Foreword

It is a rare treat to read a book and think to oneself "this is exactly how I would do this kind of study"! It is probably not a coincidence, given my own scholarly background and training, that I quickly came to that conclusion while reading this monograph. I have always had a strong interest in international relations theory, foreign policy analysis, and attempts to integrate the two while maintaining rigorous theoretical and empirical standards. Since I see this same emphasis in Ulrich Krotz's work, it is easy for me to recommend the book. Let me say a few words about why I think this book makes such a useful contribution to the study of foreign policy and international relations.

Krotz starts with a premise that is striking in its simplicity and intuitiveness. He asks: Why do states that are so similar structurally (capabilities, size, regime type, etc.) engage in remarkably different foreign policy behavior? Why is it that France and Germany have very different foreign policy orientations and behavior, despite the fact that they are so similar in so many different dimensions? Sometimes it is easy to forget that most studies assume that structural similarities propel states to act in similar ways. In the quantitative conflict studies literature, for example, military capabilities, the size of the economy, physical geography, and other structural features act as control variables in order to focus on explanatory variables of interest that vary from country to country in these accounts. Even worse, structural realism would have us believe that all states are attempting to perform the same functions under anarchy, thus are likely broadly to engage in the same type of foreign policy behavior (e.g. balancing).[1] More in keeping with a foreign policy orientation to understanding international relations, in this book Krotz argues that the domestic construction of

[1] Waltz 1979. Of course, Waltz always maintained that his was not a theory of foreign policy. However, it certainly has foreign policy implications, and logically there is no reason to separate the two domains of study. See Elman 1996 and Fearon 1998 on this debate within structural realism, and Waltz's response to Elman in Waltz 1996, 54–57. As this book demonstrates, separating international politics from foreign policy choices and behavior has hindered a deeper understanding of why states act as they do with their ultimate systemic consequences.

a state's role, which expresses the collective national self and sense of purpose for the state in international society, is a primary (but not the only) source of foreign policy divergence across otherwise similar states.

The explanatory focus on the historical, domestic construction of national role conceptions (NRC) in this book is well timed given the recent resurgence of role theory in foreign policy analysis. Since Kal J. Holsti introduced the notion of NRCs into the international relations lexicon in the 1970s, the field has seen interest wax and wane, with a resurgence led by Stephen Walker in the 1980s and 1990s, then by others in the current century.[2] After a successful workshop at the 2010 International Studies Association meeting, participants published a special issue of *Foreign Policy Analysis* that has helped spawn a great deal of recent literature.[3] A book series was launched soon thereafter on Role Theory in International Relations.[4] Krotz's work fits very well within the more theoretically and historically informed work in this area. My own book comes closest to this project in terms of the sweep of history being considered. I feel a kindred spirit in Krotz, who works to weave theory through history without attempting to completely "explain" history nor chop it up into bits of data that are no longer meaningful outside their context. This is the craft of the historian, and Krotz's work must rank among the best of those within political science that attempt to develop historically informed explanations of world affairs.

What Krotz has done with the German and French cases is to provide a thorough, historical understanding of the seedbed from which roles grow in the national consciousness and become translated by elites into foreign policy or from which elites can manipulate cultural material to create roles that resonate broadly in society.[5] This provides an excellent platform to advance the literatures on French and German foreign policy (in isolation and comparison), the foreign and security policy of the European Union, as well as International Relations more broadly, given that these are two historical great powers and consistently major players in international politics. For example, Klaus Brummer and I recently looked at the domestic role contestation surrounding the choice of

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[2] Holsti 1970; Walker 1987a; Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011. For an overview of the evolution of foreign policy role theory, see Thies 2010.

[3] For the introduction to the special issue, see Thies and Breuning 2012.

[4] Recent books include Walker, Malici, and Schafer 2011; Thies 2013; Walker 2014.

[5] See the contributions to Hudson 1997.

the faithful ally role in the early Federal Republic of Germany.[6] While our focus was on the proximate sources of domestic contestation—bureaucratic politics, government and opposition dynamics, coalition governments, and so on, Krotz's book helps to place the entire debate over Germany's postwar role in historical context. The roles we found to be subject to debate revolved almost exclusively around some form of ally—either faithful ally or recalcitrant ally with the West, or more minor support for the Eastern ally role and even less for that of the neutral role. Krotz's work explains the delimitation of the debate in the early Federal Republic to some type of alliance, which Brummer and Thies then document in more detail. The core components of German national roles, which he labels as "never on our own," "legal framing and regularized conduct," and "military force only as last resort," as well as the meaning carried by the "stability," "predictability," and "reliability" terminology produced a situation in which alliance of some form was a very likely outcome.

Krotz notes in this book that roles help to comprise identity, but this aspect is understandably not completely theorized nor empirically examined in the present project. The relationship of roles to state or national identity is still outstanding. As has been noted, role theory and constructivism have much to offer each other.[7] Conceptually, roles are properties of both agents and structures, so they offer a nice analytical entry point to the agent-structure debate. Unfortunately, most versions of social constructivism are still very structural; even newer agent-oriented varieties seem to lack an understanding of how identity produces any kind of effects in the political world.[8] Krotz, too, links his approach to social constructivism, and in doing so, brings added richness to that tradition because he goes beyond constitution to think about causality associated with identities. In fact, he proposes three mechanisms to link roles to interests and policies: prescription, proscription, and one of process or style of foreign policy-making. He persuasively ties roles through these mechanisms to milieu goals, alliance choices, nuclear deterrence forces, the overall force structure, the definition of military missions and deployments, the arms industry, and arms exports. This causally oriented approach to constructivism that infuses identity via roles into the analysis of French and German foreign policy orientations, choices, and behaviors

[6] Brummer and Thies forthcoming.
[7] Thies 2010; Thies and Breuning 2012.
[8] Wehner and Thies 2014.

helps to draw together agent and structure, hence, foreign policy and international politics, in a much richer way than most contemporary constructivist work.

Beyond the obvious contribution in reconnecting foreign policy and international relations, this book also treats seriously both traditions. It situates its argument vis-à-vis the major theoretical currents in international relations theory, as well as its meta-theoretical debates. It also promotes a comparative approach to foreign policy analysis. Much like role theory's use in foreign policy, comparative foreign policy is a tradition that has waxed and waned since the 1960s.[9] The high point may have been the 1987 publication of the edited volume *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, though the generation of academics who followed in their mentors' footsteps has attempted to keep this tradition alive in scholarly work and textbooks.[10] Krotz's work stands as another substantial and lasting scholarly addition to the work in comparative foreign policy.

Obviously, there is much to commend about this book. I hope you will enjoy its thought-provoking arguments and evidence as much as I have. This book offers a way to understand foreign policy and international relations that is historically informed, theoretically rich, and comparative in its methodological approach. I look forward to seeing the future research that emanates from this excellent contribution to the literature.

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*Tempe, Arizona*

[9] Rosenau 1968.
[10] Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau 1987; Breuning 2007; Kaarbo 2012; Beasley, Kaarbo, Lantis, and Snarr 2012.

# Preface and Acknowledgments

In certain ways, this book is an attempt to make sense of some aspects of the country in which I grew up, and of the neighboring one, just a short drive across the Rhine. As a child I always looked forward with excitement to the trips to Strasbourg with my parents—adventures of diving into a different language and world where things looked different, without really being alien. I recall many voyages into beautiful Alsace—*le beau jardin Alsace*, as Louis XIV supposedly commented in 1681 when annexing it to France—and then, later, the travels beyond that delightful strip on the Rhine's western shores.

In other ways, this book has also been a way to say goodbye to the old Federal Republic and its proud western neighbor. From the first sketches in the late 1990s of what has ultimately become this monograph, as the research progressed and the manuscript took shape, it slowly became clear to me that this project also served this unexpected purpose. Living and writing in the United States for many years, interrupted by periods of research and teaching in Tuscany and England, I came to realize that this project additionally has been a way to think back and to bid farewell to the Germany and France of my childhood and adolescence. In 1990, not only did East Germany, the DDR, disappear, but also West Germany, the old *Bundesrepublik*. And for better or worse, France today, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, continues to move away from the France of Mitterrand or Chirac, not to mention the France of de Gaulle.

Despite great similarities—such as wealth, democratic stability, and the ever-present Cold War shadow of nuclear annihilation or conventional disaster on either side of the Rhine—there were also notable differences, clear to even the casual observer from either side of the border. These differences included the markedly different feel of history in the presence of daily life; the clearly dissimilar attitudes toward the past, which parts of it mattered most, and what they meant; the different normalities of how the French and the Germans viewed themselves, their countries, and their nations as a whole; and their distinctly different foreign policy postures. Only later, as a graduate student in the United States, was I equipped with the conceptual and theoretical tools to think coherently—while still comparatively—about such similarities and differences among states in general, and

between these two main inheritors of Charlemagne's Frankish empire in particular.

The relevance of the core question that emerged from such comparisons and that motivated this book still stands: Why do states, similar in many ways—of about the same size, resources, and capabilities, approximately equally wealthy and equipped with equally democratic political systems, frequently plagued by similar domestic problems, and placed roughly within the same international contexts—diverge so widely in their views of their proper role and purpose in the world, as well as in their basic orientations in foreign policy, security, and defense? The question has lost nothing of its basic significance for the study of comparative foreign policy, and international relations more generally, as the Cold War decades increasingly fade into the past, and as the post-Cold War era apparently passes into an emergent new kind of post-post-Cold War twenty-first-century global politics.

This book sets out to answer this question for France and Germany from the late 1950s—once both countries had politically and socially consolidated after the war—into the second decade of the twenty-first century. It holds that a particular kind of historical domestic construction, closely tied to dominant interpretations of the meaning and implications of select aspects of national history, plays a key role in explaining what has set France and Germany apart in their basic foreign policy and security orientations. It also shows that the main elements of these respective historical constructions, while evolving unevenly within the two countries since the 1990s, have continued to guide French and German stances in security and defense—and that they remain at the core of persisting differences in French and German foreign policy, security, and defense attitudes in contemporary international affairs.

In its investigations, conceptualizations, and arguments, this book aims to do equal justice to French and German foreign policy, security, and defense affairs over the extended period of time that is the focus here, and to the empirical social sciences of international relations and political science in which it is rooted. It aspires at once to a theoretically informed historical explanation, and to a historically guided theoretical analysis. It seeks to integrate in fruitful and illuminating ways history, theory, and comparison.

The first sketches of what is now this book date back to a chapter of my Cornell dissertation, which I handed in and defended what seems now to be a terrifyingly long time ago. As a free-standing endeavor, this project was initially drafted while I was a James Bryant Conant Fellow at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard

University, and developed while I was teaching in the international relations graduate programme at Oxford, and, subsequently, a Marie Curie Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute. The project fully took shape during a most valuable year as a visiting research scholar at Princeton University. It found completion, finally, when I returned to Harvard, this time at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, and then, once again, to the European University Institute. I thank all of these institutions for their very generous support and for providing offices, research assistants, paychecks, and robust working environments.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to thank those friends and colleagues who, in manifold ways, have supported this research project over the many years of its gestation. For comments on earlier drafts or portions of this text, I thank Rawi Abdelal, Lisbeth Aggestam, Vít Beneš, Klaus Brummer, Matthew Evangelista, Gunther Hellmann, Jacques Hymans, Nik Hynek, Peter Katzenstein, Richard Maher, Hanns Maull, Jonas Pontusson, Joachim Schild, Björn Seibert, Henry Shue, and Stefan Seidendorf. Various sections of this book benefited from an article jointly written with James C. Sperling, who read and commented on the entire manuscript. I am happy to acknowledge having gained much from Jim's knowledge and abilities of presentations. Marc DeVore read large parts of this book's penultimate draft and offered many valuable comments and suggestions. Dariuš Zifonun, in addition to commenting on an early outline of this project, on various occasions has helped me to gain crucial access to library and other resources while in Germany. Anonymous reviewers provided extremely erudite comments and useful suggestions, which helped to prepare the final draft.

It seems that Peter Katzenstein, in his eternal and imperturbable optimism, always knew that this project ultimately would find closure irrespective of the too many twists and turns along its way. I felt his gracious and generous support on many occasions. I am therefore all the more pleased to see the fully developed version of what is perhaps a protracted outgrowth of a small part of a long dissertation that he once supervised. John Ikenberry invited me to spend a year at the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies (PIIRS), which proved very important to advancing this manuscript, while working on another book at the same time. Andrew Moravcsik not only made this year in Princeton intellectually stimulating in many ways, but also contributed to giving it more than a touch of cultivation. At the Weatherhead Center at Harvard, Karl Kaiser, Steven Bloomfield, Michelle Eureka, and Tom Murphy, among numerous others, helped to make this stay not

only productive but also enjoyable. I thank Brigid Laffan for creating a pleasant and stimulating environment for research and writing at the Robert Schuman Centre, where I completed the typescript of this monograph. A debt of gratitude also goes to Cameron Thies and Jim Sperling, who generously and without hesitation offered to contribute a foreword and an afterword, respectively. I am proud to have them as part of this project. To Masha Hedberg, I owe much, not only for unwavering support and patience. Her generosity, I still think, too often is too bountiful.

At Palgrave Macmillan, Steven Kennedy, Stephen Wenham, Alexandra Webster, Christina Brian, Julia Willan, Harriet Barker, Hannah Kašpar, and Eleanor Davey-Corrigan made working together on this book project a pleasure and deserve special gratitude. They not only organized a review process of the book proposal at admirable velocity, but have been extremely generous in granting additional time for completing this typescript when it was really needed.

Part of this book was written on a beautiful estate in Brandenburg where, some 130 years earlier, Theodor Fontane had visited. It is possible that most of Chapter 3 was written in a room where Fontane had stayed and written. I want to thank the present owner of this delightful place an hour outside Berlin for hosting me and for re-teaching me the meaning of the German word *Sommerfrische*.

Furthermore, I am grateful to a variety of libraries and archives in France, Germany, England, and the United States. Special thanks go to the Franco-German Institute (DFI) in Ludwigsburg. Without its library and collections, and its excellent staff, the research for this monograph would have been a great deal more difficult or perhaps impossible. For valuable research assistance over this project's long gestation, I thank Danilo Di Mauro, Xavier Froidevaux, Sonja Fücker, Alan Johnson, Katharina Meißner, Bérénice Manac'h, and Katharina Wolf. I once again especially thank Joanna Ardizzone for continued research help. Her competence, professionalism, and friendliness indeed do set standards. For splendid editorial help over many years, too often on short notice and under time pressure, I thank Sarah Tarrow.

The Institute for Qualitative Research Methods (IQRM), then still in Arizona, proved very helpful for honing this book's research design and the presentation of its arguments and findings. The Institute's organizers, not least Colin Elman and Andrew Bennett, among others, deserve great praise for establishing and managing this intensive and truly inspiring two-week workshop.

A very early sketch of this research was presented at the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco, 30 August to 2 September 2001, and appeared under a different title as Working Paper No. 02.1 of the Program for the Study of Germany and Europe (PSGE) at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University. Some excerpts of this book's penultimate draft were presented at the "ISA Catalytic Research Workshop" on role theory and foreign policy at the International Studies Association's 54th Annual Convention in San Francisco in April 2013. I thank the organizers of this stimulating workshop, Paul Kowert and Stephen Walker, for the invitation and opportunity, as well as the participants for a range of valuable comments. Work on this monograph benefited from the Commission of the European Union through Marie Curie Fellowship MEIF-CT-2003-501292 as well as the generous support of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation in Köln.

To say that I thank Daniel Schiffbauer and Rawi Abdelal for decades of friendship would be correct. But it would entirely miss the point. More to the heart of the matter, my entire conception of friendship, in all its diversity, transformations, and endurance, has been shaped in major ways by these two strong yet only in some ways similar characters. Daniel I met in my early teenage years when a certain tall goalkeeper quickly became friends with an unusually gifted midfield strategist. With Rawi I first crossed paths during our early days in graduate school when a foreign student needed a ride to a departmental gathering. There were times over the years when I too often felt I knew too much about Job and Sisyphus at once. We are lucky that some of our friendships remain impervious to any such matters. Daniel and Rawi are friends of that kind. This book is for them.

*Ulrich Krotz*
*San Domenico di Fiesole, Florence, Italy*
*April 2015*

# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| CDU | Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) |
| Cema | Chef d'état-major des armeés (Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| COM | Collectivités d'outre-mer (Overseas Collectivities) |
| CSDP | Common Security and Defence Policy |
| CSCE | Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| CSU | Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) |
| DDR | Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic, or "East Germany") |
| DGA | Délégation générale pour l'armement (General Armament Delegation) |
| DM | Deutsche Mark |
| DOM | Départements d'outre-mer (Overseas Departments) |
| EADS | European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Community |
| EDC | European Defence Community |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GDR | German Democratic Republic |
| GNP | Gross National Product |
| Hot/HOT | Haut-Subsonique Optiquement Téléguidé d'un Tube (High-Subsonic, Optically Teleguided, Tube-Fired) (Teleguided = Radio- or Remote-Controlled) |
| IFOR | Implementation Force (NATO operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina) |
| IS | Islamic State |
| ISIL | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |
| ISIS | Islamic State of Iraq and Syria |
| Milan | Missile d'infanterie léger antichar (Light Infantry Anti-Tank Missile) |
| MLF | Multilateral Force |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NPG | Nuclear Planning Group |

| | |
|---|---|
| NPT | Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty |
| NRC | National Role Conception |
| OCCAR | Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d'armement (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation) |
| OIF | Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (International Organization of Francophone Countries) |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| SACEUR | Supreme Allied Commander for Europe |
| SIPRI | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |
| SIRE NATDAT | Simulation of International Relations for Europe National Data (*Annual Data on 9 Economic and Military Characteristics of 78 Nations 1948–1983*) |
| SPD | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party) |
| TOM | Territoires d'outre-mer (Overseas Territories) |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNO | United Nations Organization |
| UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force |

# Introduction

France and Germany have much in common. Both are wealthy and industrial or post-industrial; both have belonged to the world's leading economies. After World War II, both France and Germany experienced decisive political consolidation. With the political systems of the Fifth Republic in France and the Federal Republic in West Germany in place, both became stable democracies.[1] Similarly, soon after the war, both enjoyed decades of rapid economic growth and an enormous rise in living standards and per capita income—the *trente glorieuses* in France, and the *Wirtschaftswunder* in Germany. Later, especially from the 1970s, both suffered similar economic and social problems that included decaying industries such as coal and steel, oil and energy crises, and rising unemployment. From the 1950s onwards, both France and Germany have become increasingly enmeshed in European integration. Until the collapse of the Berlin Wall, both countries found themselves deeply entangled in the Cold War, US–Soviet competition and the East–West conflict, and the very real and palpable specter of total nuclear annihilation. And since the 1990s both countries have ridden the wave of globalization.

[1] This book does not cover the foreign policy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) or "East Germany." Whether and to what degree the East German regime, situated in the Soviet sphere of influence and embraced by the Warsaw Pact straitjacket, could or could not lead its own foreign policy might be an interesting discussion in which, however, this book does not engage. Until German unification in October 1990, this book focuses on the Federal Republic of Germany, "West Germany," in its analyses and comparisons with France. From 1990, after the East German socialist regime had collapsed and East Germany had acceded to the Western Federal Republic, this book refers to the foreign policy of united Germany.

And yet, for some half-century since the two countries stabilized politically and socially in the aftermath of World War II, France and Germany have often displayed critical differences in their definitions of national interests and in their foreign policy attitudes in general. Between the late 1950s and the second half of the 1990s, neither country's basic foreign policy orientation suffered fundamental ruptures—irrespective of internal and external commonalities or changes in government, party composition of governments or governmental coalitions, or individual leadership.[2] Over the same period and beyond, the directions of the two states' foreign policies, as well as their general foreign policy, security, and defense stances, have also significantly, or, in many respects, fundamentally, differed from one another. From the mid- or late 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and Germany's second unification, into the twenty-first century's second decade, each state's foreign and security policies evolved and underwent adjustments of different sorts and degrees. Yet, significant divergence in basic attitudes and orientations in foreign policy and security affairs have continued to persist.

Whereas France and Germany have come to provide the standard example of reconciliation between two formerly warring states, "Franco-German military cooperation in the postwar period," one veteran observer finds, "seems to have taken place *despite* important differences in perspective between the two countries, not because of a fundamental rapprochement of views. . . . [A]t both public and elite levels French and German attitudes toward security and defense were highly divergent."[3] And irrespective and in spite of the highly institutionalized bilateral relationship between France and Germany, and their joint role in European integration and regional politics at large, differences between French and German strategic postures, foreign policy attitudes, and security stances have often remained strikingly pronounced.[4] Along the same lines, a lifelong commentator on Franco-German affairs wonders whether French and Germans speak the same (political) language: "It sometimes would seem as if they were not living in the same world. Their reference systems are far from being identical, the modes of

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[2] For various accounts of the basic French and German foreign policy continuity during this period, see, for example, Hoffmann 1964; Schweigler 1985; Gordon 1993; Le Gloannec 1997; David 1998; Sauder 1995; Hoffmann 2000.

[3] Gordon 1995, 11, 9 (emphasis added).

[4] On Franco-German relations and the Franco-German relationship, bilaterally or within Europe, note Simonian 1985; Friend 1990; Haglund 1991; Mazzucelli 1997; Webber 1999; Friend 2001; Krotz and Schild 2013.

thought, the methods and the postures find the same wavelength only with difficulty."[5]

Why do states so similar in many respects often part ways in their goals and actions? Why do states similar in size, resources, and capabilities, with comparable domestic assets and problems, and equally enmeshed in regional or global economic and political affairs significantly differ over extended periods of time in their basic orientations and actions across most or all of the major domains in foreign policy, security, and defense? What explains this divergence? Why such variation?

This book argues that a particular type of historical domestic construction—views of the collective self and the proper role and purpose of one's state in the international arena—explains such divergence and accounts for significant differences between French and German foreign policies over extended periods of time. Such historically rooted and domestically anchored views of self and purpose are central elements of national role conceptions (NRCs). Their dissimilar historical domestic constructions inform divergent, often incompatible and conflicting French and German interests and policies in security, defense, and armament. The markedly differing main elements of their historically rooted domestic constructions also help to explain the overall stability in both French and German foreign and security policies, notably during much of the second half of the twentieth century, and set the stage for both the continuities and the adjustments in French and German foreign policy attitudes during the first decades of the twenty-first century. In analyzing and explaining the formation of national interests and of foreign and security policies, this book stresses the importance of history and, in particular, of dominant domestic interpretations of its meaning and political implications.

Historical domestic constructions as key aspects of national role conceptions encapsulate "what we want and what we do as a result of who we think we are, want to be, and should be." As character profiles that shape certain interests and policies, historical constructions affect what states want and do, and what they do not want and do not do. Shaped by history and history's dominant interpretations, and frequently deeply rooted, the substance or content of historically rooted constructions cannot be reduced to domestic economic or societal

[5] Picht 1993/94. All translations in this book from French and German into English are my own.

interests or ideologies, nor do they derive straightforwardly from the structure of the international system.[6] Such historical domestic constructions of self, role, and purpose have distinctive elements or core components. They are embedded in characteristic sets of political vocabulary shared and reproduced by the foreign policy elite and often, though to different degrees, domestic society at large. And typically they have particular historical reference points. These domestically held aspects of national role and purpose are one component of nation-state identity and one specific factor in the formation of national interests and foreign policies.

For the two large Carolingian heirs, profound historical and social forces have helped to shape the significant disparities between their domestically dominant views on their nations' proper role and purpose in the world. From the split of Charlemagne's empire, through the initial emergence of French and German political entities, all through the eighteenth, nineteenth, and first half of the twentieth century, the French and the Germans have undergone deeply dissimilar national historical experiences. From their large and disparate sets of historical raw materials, in the aftermath of World War II, each chose selectively and characteristically as to which parts and aspects mattered most. And they came to hold very dissimilar dominant interpretations of what these respective historical experiences meant and implied.

Subsequently, between the late 1950s and the second half of the 1990s, the main aspects of the two countries' historical domestic constructions grew to be quite robust and durable. If they were contested, it was along their fringes, not at their cores. Infrequent deeper contestation came only from isolated political outsiders and proved neither viable nor successful. Since the second half of the 1990s, some of the main elements of French and German historical domestic construction have evolved to differing degrees, and with varying implications for the range of French and German foreign and security policies. However, rather than framing such adjustments in dramatizing dichotomies such as "transformation *or* endurance," this book holds that an empirically more accurate way to grasp such historically bounded evolution is to think of it as change within continuity, and continuity within change.

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[6] On economic and societal pressures and interests at the domestic level, see especially Moravcsik 1997; Moravcsik 1998. On domestic, including political party, ideology and foreign policy, see Snyder 1991; Hofmann 2013. On the link between the structure of the international system and foreign policy, see Elman 1996; Rose 1998; Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro 2009.

To be clear, the book does *not* claim that domestic historical constructions are the only factor of foreign policy—either specifically for France and Germany, or generally across states, political domains, or time. Nor does it postulate that for the two states and time slices under consideration here, historical domestic constructions necessarily represent the single most important variable for each specific outcome or domain that this book covers, especially in Chapters 5 to 8. Such monocausal, single-variable claims, at least in subject areas as complex and contingent as foreign policy, security, and defense orientations over extended periods, seem silly to begin with. Indeed, since the beginnings of systematic inquiry into the sources and determinants of foreign policy, scholars have identified an encompassing set of manifold factors, forces, and variables.[7]

This book, however, *does* hold that (1) the sharply distinct historically rooted domestic constructions of proper role and purpose have critically shaped France and Germany's divergent goals and policies across the major areas of foreign, security, and defense policy—ranging from world order goals and nuclear deterrence policies to military deployment and arms export policies—especially between the late 1950s and the second half of the 1990s. Their dissimilar historical domestic constructions illuminate, make comprehensible, and account for the key differences between basic French and German attitudes and orientations in security and defense over these decades.

(2) This book also contends that the main ingredients of their domestic historical constructions of the preceding decades, while evolving unevenly, and for different reasons since the mid- or late 1990s, have

[7] These factors, forces, and variables are of widely different types and sorts, and are located at different levels of analysis. The political importance, and thus explanatory relevance of each may factor, may vary widely across states, specific foreign policy domains, or across time. Among various others, these have included diverse kinds of material or non-material constraints and opportunities at the global or regional international level; features of a state's domestic political system; domestic economic structures that shape particular national interests and foreign policies; ideology; bureaucracies and bureaucratic structures; the quality of diplomacy; or the personalities or inclinations of individual political leaders. Among the most influential classic and best recent works discussing the numerous factors of foreign policy, or highlighting the importance of specific variables for particular research questions or political contexts, are Waltz 1959; Wolfers 1962; Hoffmann 1966; Waltz 1967; Hoffmann 1968; Allison 1969; Rosenau 1974a; Katzenstein 1978; Byman and Pollack 2001; Hill 2003; Hellmann, Baumann, and Wagner 2006; Breuning 2007; Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2008; Alden and Aran 2011; Beasley, Kaarbo, Lantis, and Snarr 2012.