

Global Power Shift

Jürgen Rüländ
Maria-Gabriela Manea
Hans Born *Editors*

The Politics of Military Reform

Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria

 Springer

Global Power Shift

Comparative Analysis and Perspectives

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Jürgen Rüländ, Maria-Gabriela Manea,
and Hans Born

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
ALKI	Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia, Indonesia's Archipelagic Sea-Lanes
AU	African Union
Babinsa	Bintara Pembina Desa, Village Territorial Command of Indonesian Armed Forces
Bamus	Badan Musyawarah, Steering Committee of the Indonesian Parliament
BAIS	Badan Intelijen Strategis, Armed Forces Intelligence Agency
BAKIN	Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, State Intelligence Coordinating Agency
Bakorstanas	Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional, Coordinating Agency for National Stability
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BDAT	British Defense Advisory Team
BIA	Badan Intelijen ABRI, ABRI Intelligence Agency
BIN	Badan Intelijen Negara, National Intelligence Agency
BMPIU	Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit
BNPT	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorisme, National Anti-Terrorism Agency
bpd	Barrel per day
BPK	Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, State Auditing Board
Brig. Gen.	Brigadier General
C4ISR	Military capabilities (sea-worthy surface combatant force, anti-submarine warfare capability, amphibious assault ships, long-range combat aircraft, strategic airlift and aerial-refuelling capabilities, surface-to-air missile defense, and command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance)

CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CDD	Centre for Democracy and Development
CDS	Chief of Defense Staff
CGI	Consultative Group in Indonesia
Coker	Christian Boys
CSC	Command Training and Staff College
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DCAF	Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Densus 88	Detasemen Khusus 88, Special Detachment 88
DFID	Department for International Development
DOM	Daerah Operasi Militer, Military Operation Zone
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Council
DPDR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People's Representative Council
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zones
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
FKM	Front Kedaulatan Maluku, Maluku Sovereignty Front
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GBHN	Garis Garis Besar Haluan Negara, Broad State Policy Guidelines
Gen.	General
GNP	Gross National Product
Golkar	Golongan Karya, Party of the Functional Groups
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDR	Indonesian Rupiah
IGSR	Institute of Governance and Social Research
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMET	International Military Education and Training Program
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Imparsial	The Indonesian Human Rights Monitor
ISEAS	Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
ISTF	Internal Security Task Force
IYC	Ijaw Youth Council
JACON	Joint Action Committee of Nigeria
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JTF	Joint Task Force
KILTV	Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land en Volkenkunde
KKR	Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi, Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Kodahan	Komando Daerah Pertahanan, Joint Regional Defense Commands of Indonesian Armed Forces
Kodam	Komando Daerah Military, Regional Military Command of Indonesian Armed Forces
Komnas HAM	Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, Indonesian Human Rights Commission
KontraS	Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan, The Commission for “The Disappeared” and the Victims of Violence
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Force of Indonesian Armed Forces
Kopkamtib	Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Command for Restoring Order and Security of Indonesian Armed Forces
Korem	Komando Resort Militer, Resort Military Command of Indonesian Armed Forces
Kostrad	Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, Strategic Reserve Command of Indonesian Armed Forces
KOTER	Komando Territorial, Territorial Command System of Indonesian Armed Forces
KPK	Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, Corruption Eradication Commission
LBH	Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, Legal Aid Institute
LIPI	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Indonesian Institute of Sciences
LOGOS	Local Government Studies
Lt. Gen.	Lieutenant General
Mabas TNI	Markas Besar, Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters
Maj. Gen.	Major General
MEF	Minimum Essential Force
MEND	Movement of the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MOOTW	Military Operations other than Warfare
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MPOL	Mobile Police (Nigeria)
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly
MPRI	Military Professional Resource International
MSDO	Most Similar Cases Different Outcomes
NABRO	National Assembly Budget and Research Office
NADECO	National Democratic Opposition
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBA	Nigerian Bar Association
NDA	National Defense Academy
NDC	National Defense College
NDPVF	Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Front
NDV	Niger Delta Vigilante

NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NIPSS	National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
NKRI	Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia
NMS	Nigerian Military School
NNSBS	Nigerian Navy Special Boat Seals
NRC	National Redemption Council
NSC	National Security Council
OBR	Ogoni Bill of Rights
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Pacivis-UI	Civil Society Platform, University of Indonesia
Pamswakarsa	Pasukan Pengamanan Masyarakat Swakarsa, Paramilitary Auxiliary Units
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party
PARP	Policy Analysis and Research Project
Pertamina	Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara, National Oil Company
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle
PDP	People’s Democratic Party
PERPRES	Peraturan Presiden, Presidential Regulation
PEPABRI	Persatuan Purnawirawan dan Warakawuri TNI dan POLRI, Retired-military and police officers organization
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party
PP	Peraturan Pemerintah, Government Regulation
PPKN	Kantor Perbandaharan dan Kas Negara, State Treasury Office
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party
PRC	Provisional Ruling Council
Prolegnas	Program Legislasi Nasional, National Legislation Program
POLRI	Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Indonesian National Police
ProPatria WG	Kelompok Kerja Reformasi Sektor Keamanan Indonesia, Indonesia’s Working Group on Security Sector Reform
rtd.	Retired military officer
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Sishankamrata	Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta, Total People’s Defense and Security System
Sishanta	Sistem Pertahanan Semesta, Total Defense System
SNC	Sovereign National Conference
SPDC	Shell Petroleum Development Corporation
SSR	Security Sector Reform

TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
VAB	Véhicule de l'Avant Blindé
UN	United Nations
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WG	Working Group

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Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1

The Politics of Military Reform in Indonesia and Nigeria

Jürgen Rüländ and Maria-Gabriela Manea

The end of the Cold War seemed to dramatically enhance the opportunities for the global expansion of democracy. By the early 1990s, many former allies of the Soviet Union had embarked on fundamental political and economic reforms and Western countries had ended their support of authoritarian regimes in the name of anti-communism. At the same time, Western governments had initiated democracy promotion programs, as did international organizations and transnational civil society advocacy networks (Carothers, 1999; Jetschke, 2010; Schraeder, 2002).

Less than a decade later the hopes for a universal democracy dividend had faded and analysts painted a much bleaker picture. In 1996 Larry Diamond pointedly asked whether the Third Wave was already over (Diamond 1996). By that time the number of so-called electoral democracies, that is, political systems with competitive elections but major flaws of the democratic process, had markedly increased, while the spread of liberal democracies stagnated (Diamond & Plattner, 1996, p. 28). A few years later, Carothers (2002) and Levitsky and Way (2002) even diagnosed that the majority of new democracies had become hybrid political systems, a category “*sui generis*” filling the broad continuum between democracy and autocracy.

Scholarly attention thus shifted to the factors impeding the consolidation of democracy. This shift brought back into view civil-military relations as an increasing number of successful and aborted military coups suggested that the armed forces are a major veto player in the democratization process.¹ Yet these coups do not constitute a fully-fledged reversal of democratization. Rather than succumb

¹ Cases in point are Pakistan and Ivory Cost (1999), Ecuador (2000), Central African Republic (2002), Sao Tomé and Príncipe and Guinea-Bissao (2003), Haiti (2004), Ecuador, Togo, Nepal, Mauritania (2005), Thailand and Fiji (2006), Guinea (2008), Honduras (2009), Niger (2010). See Antony Adolf, Military Coups Make Comeback, <http://news.change.org/stories/military-coups-make-a-comeback> (accessed 18 October 2011).

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to open military incursions into civilian politics, many new democracies have remained halfway houses because the armed forces tenaciously defend the reserved domains they had carved out for themselves under the preceding authoritarian regime(s) (Croissant, Kühn, Chambers, & Wolf, 2010). Hybrid political systems thus often coincide with abandoned or stalemated military reforms. While paying lip service to the new democratic order, the military continues to adhere to anti-liberal ideas and to frame its power aspirations in nationalist rhetoric.

With the insight that democratic consolidation and military reform are inextricably intertwined, thinking on civil-military relations markedly changed. The former concept of civilian control that dominated early theories of civil-military relations (Finer, 1962; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1965) has in the meantime given way to the more ambitious concept of democratic control of the armed forces. This concept emanated from the empirical context of established democracies, especially the U.S., which under Cold War circumstances was concerned with ensuring the subordination of a well funded and powerful military-industrial complex to elected political authority. Beyond the issue of subordination, there was a concrete concern with civilian formulation of defense policy while, at the same time, ensuring that, at the operational level, the military is effective, efficient and accountable (Feaver, 2005). As Bruneau and Matei argue, Western democracies sought to balance internal and international security with freedom at home (Bruneau & Matei, 2008, p. 911).

However, the limitations of this approach are obvious when looking into civil-military issues in the political life of non-Western countries that are in transition from authoritarian to democratic government. The role of the military in the democratic consolidation (Agüero, 1995; Bruneau & MacLeod, 1986; Croissant & Kühn, 2007; Linz & Stephan, 1996; Pion-Berlin, 2001) or “deconsolidation” (Bruneau & Matei, 2008, p. 912; Trinkunas, 2005) brought to the fore the problem of how to reverse military control of the polity into the polity’s control of the armed forces and how to persuade the latter to support democracy. In search of new conceptual tools, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) paradigm emerged as a response to these new challenges and subsequently evolved into the new orthodoxy employed by most Western governments and international organizations in their democracy promotion projects. The British Department for International Development (DFID) and international non-governmental organizations such as the Geneva-based Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) devised SSR as a policy template in their programs supporting the reform of security services in Central and Eastern Europe, in the successor states of the former Soviet Union and in post-conflict and transformation countries worldwide (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003; Cottey, Edmunds, & Forster, 2002a, 2002b; Beeson & Bellamy, 2008, p. 18). The SSR stressed the concept of democratic control that builds upon a comprehensive understanding of security within democratizing states, beyond the establishment of civilian control. The problem with civilian control is that it can also be exerted by unelected civilians or “by only one dominant civilian element in the post-authoritarian transition [which] can reinforce the very manipulability of the armed forces that the regime change aimed to remove” (Mietzner, 2009, p. 5). Moreover, the SSR scope goes

beyond the military organization, also including peace support operation forces, paramilitaries, intelligence agencies, justice and law-enforcement institutions (police), civilian structures that manage them, legislatures, representatives of civil society, expert communities and media (Hänggi, 2003, p. 10). The SSR paradigm essentially re-defines security, linking it to wider political, economic, social and cultural transformations under democratic consolidation and expands the range of legitimate actors (from security actors and government to societal actors, legislatures, media and experts) influencing policy-making in this field (Bruneau & Matei, 2008, p. 913). Establishing democratic control is then the result of concerted action of a wider range of state and non-state institutions with the legitimacy to decide over and/or influence the security sector.

The SSR paradigm and especially the policy projects conducted under its auspices have often been criticized as “normative” (Mietzner, 2009, p. 7) and Western-centric. The normative element derives from the implicit ambition of the SSR paradigm to provide (uniform) standards against which the progress of military reform can be assessed. Although we share this critique, we nevertheless embed our study in the SSR literature, albeit in a modified form. We believe that, despite its Eurocentric origins, perhaps the most significant value of the SSR paradigm consists in its dual theoretical foundation in the field of civil-military relations as well as the democratization-transformation literature. We find the governance perspective championed by the SSR paradigm analytically useful because it transcends the classical focus on the executive level shared by the majority of civil-military studies and also includes a broad array of societal actors central to democratic consolidation. Such a holistic analytical lens is particularly conducive to capturing the historical, cultural and structural-institutional factors shaping civil-military relations and influencing processes of democratization in non-Western contexts. It enables the contributors to this volume to show how uniquely security governance can be played out within each newly democratizing country and how diverse civil-military relations may be, even between countries that share structural similarities and are homogeneously labeled as developing, post-colonial, Southern, “Third Wave” new democracies.

We also decided not to treat the whole gamut of security agencies covered by SSR in this volume but to focus our analysis on one particular agent, the military. While the broader SSR paradigm may indeed allow the design of a more holistic and systematic reform agenda, it blurs the centrality of the military to the success of democratic transitions. The armed forces are still the most important actor in the security field with sizeable influence on almost all other security dimensions. The military usually has its own intelligence apparatus and active or former military officers serve in civilian intelligence agencies. The armed forces also frequently have a major hand in the organization, training and deployment of paramilitary troops and militias. Even after the separation of the police from the armed forces, a reform considered fundamental in the SSR literature, the military often remains formally or informally responsible for a wide range of internal security functions which may greatly impact on police actions. Likewise, more than any other security agency, the military’s handwriting is visible in defense doctrines and national

security strategies. Finally, after regime change dozens of retired military officers join political parties and participate in the civilian policy-making process as legislators or cabinet members. In short, we believe that military reform in democratizing states involves more than intra-military institutional dynamics and military-executive relations. It has to be addressed in relation to the dynamics and actors of democratization and the analysis has to “thickly” contextualize the research variables in each particular study.

Why Indonesia and Nigeria?

At center stage of this volume are the politics of military reform in Indonesia and Nigeria, two major Third Wave democracies. To compare military reform in a Southeast Asian and a West African country may at first glance look odd. It seems to contradict Lijphart’s advice to structure small-N comparisons around a culturally homogenous set of cases, drawn mainly from a region or sub-region (Lijphart, 1971). Yet, most non-Western regions hardly share so many commonalities as to consider them homogeneous units. Cross-regional comparisons, with cases selected carefully, thus do not deliver less relevant insights for generating new hypotheses and theory-building.

Indonesia and Nigeria have been selected as cases on the basis of a Most Similar Cases Different Outcomes (MSDO) design (Berg-Schlosser, 1999). Both countries share a number of salient structural similarities which qualify the two cases for MSDO. Both countries underwent regime change at virtually the same time in 1998, in both cases regime change was “pacted” (that is, a compromise between exponents of the *ancien régime* and reformists), both are presidential political systems, both have an entrenched military sector with strong corporate interests, both are resource-rich countries and both are multiethnic societies with Islam and Christianity as the two major religious denominations.² That Indonesia and Nigeria are also major regional powers with potential influence on their neighbors further qualifies them as “most important cases” (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2010). The degree to which rising regional powers control their militaries may allow us to make projections on their future behavior in an international order characterized by major power shifts, which – as power transition theory posits (Kugler, Lemke & Tammen, 2000) – increase the danger of wars. Variance exists regarding the dependent variable, that is, the outcome of military reform, which is more advanced in Indonesia than in Nigeria. The chapters of this volume will thus search for the factors accountable for the variation in outcome and identify in detail the main actors and key issues in military reform.

² However, with 88% of the population compared to only about 10% for Christianity, Islam is clearly the dominant religion in Indonesia. In Nigeria, Islam (51%) and Christianity (48%) have an almost equal share of the population.