

Ludwig
Wittgenstein

Philosophical Investigations

The German text, with an English
translation by G. E. M. Anscombe,
P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte

Revised 4th edition by P. M. S. Hacker
and Joachim Schulte

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Editors' and Translators' Acknowledgements for the Fourth Edition

The idea that we should produce a revised translation of Wittgenstein's *Philosophische Untersuchungen* was brought up at what turned out to be one of the last meetings of the Wittgenstein trustees. We and our colleagues — Nicholas Denyer, Anthony Kenny and Anselm Müller — came to the conclusion that it would be best to build on the foundations laid by G. E. M. Anscombe in her translation of Wittgenstein's second great work. The trustees, with the exception of Anthony Kenny, became members of what is now the Wittgenstein editorial advisory committee. This group was joined by David McKitterick, the Librarian of Trinity College, Cambridge, who has been an enthusiastic supporter of our project. We are greatly indebted to him for his help.

We thought that a few months' individual work and three or four weeks together would suffice to complete the task. With that in mind, we applied to the Rockefeller Center at Bellagio on Lake Como for a period of residence to work together, and were granted a stay of four weeks in these beautiful surroundings. But although each of us had spent several months preparing for our meeting, we found that the amount of work still necessary was far greater than anticipated. The shock of discovering that we would be lucky to reach §189 by the end of our stay was mitigated by the generous hospitality offered by the Rockefeller Center in September–October 2006.

It was evident that far more time than originally anticipated was necessary, and we had to ensure that we could meet periodically to discuss the work each of us did independently. In this we were greatly helped by St John's College, Oxford, and the Philosophy Department of the University of Zürich, whose assistance enabled us to have a further four extended meetings. Moreover, in the summer of 2007 the Kalischer family gave us the use of their magnificent home in Berlin, which made it possible for us to spend a fortnight's intense discussions in this *locus amoenus*.

When we had a complete draft, we thought to benefit from responses of Wittgenstein scholars to our revised translation. We applied to the European Translation Centre in Athens for a week's stay in their residence at Lefkes on the island of Paros. Generous financial support was forthcoming from Trinity College, Cambridge, and when it was found that we had failed to allow for the fact that the value of currencies tends to fluctuate, the Faculty of Philosophy of Oxford University and the University of Athens stepped in to help. So, we met for a week at Lefkes to discuss the fruit of our labours with Hanjo Glock, Anthony Kenny, Vassiliki Kindi, Brian McGuinness, Eike von Savigny, Severin Schroeder, Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Stelios Virvidakis. Anthony Kenny's chairmanship of the meetings was exemplary, and we are grateful to him for steering us through the shoals and rapids. We are especially indebted to Vassiliki Kindi, who surpassed herself as organizer, helpmate, contributor to our discussions and friend. These intense and lengthy discussions led to a great number of changes in our revised translation.

In addition, we received long and invaluable lists of specific comments and questions from Brian McGuinness and Eike von Savigny, both before and after the meetings on Paros. Questions on or relevant to our revised translation were raised in correspondence with Hanoeh Ben-Yami, Stewart Candlish, Lars Hertzberg, Wolfgang Kienzler, Grant Luckhardt and Josef Rothhaupt. We also profited from examining specific points discussed in writings by Stewart Candlish, Roland Hall and David Stern.

Patience is a publisher's crowning virtue. We thank Nick Bellorini of Wiley-Blackwell for unstintingly exercising this virtue in our regard. And we are most grateful to Jean van Altena for her copy-editing and invaluable suggestions for improvement.

P. M. S. Hacker
Joachim Schulte

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Editorial Preface to the Fourth Edition and Modified Translation

1. *The previous editions and translation*

The *Philosophical Investigations* was published in 1953, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees, and translated by Anscombe. A second edition was published in 1958, in which minor corrections (misspellings and punctuation) to the German text were made, and a large number of small changes and 28 significant alterations were made to the English text. In 2003, after Anscombe's death, a third, 50-year anniversary edition was published by Nicholas Denyer with a small number of further alterations to the translation that Anscombe had made over the years in her copy of the previously published text. The third edition unfortunately did not follow the pagination of the first two editions.

Anscombe's translation was an impressive achievement. She invented an English equivalent for Wittgenstein's distinctive, often colloquial, style. This was no mean feat. For she had to find not only English analogues of Wittgenstein's stylistic idiosyncracies, but also an English rhythm that would convey the character of Wittgenstein's carefully crafted prose. Her success is indisputable.

Nevertheless, there are errors of different kinds in the first three editions and in the translation. It was because of these that the Wittgenstein editorial advisory committee agreed to the production of a new edition. But, given the excellence of the Anscombe translation, it was resolved that rather than making a completely new one, we should build on Anscombe's achievement and produce a modified translation, rectifying any errors or misjudgements we discerned in hers. It should be emphasized that many of the errors in the Anscombe–Rhees editions could not have been identified in the 1950s, prior to the availability and extensive study of the Wittgenstein *Nachlass*, some crucial items of which did not come to light until decades later.

2. *The fourth edition*

The most important editorial change we have made is to drop the division of the book into two parts. What was Part I is now the *Philosophical Investigations*, and what was Part II is now named *Philosophy of Psychology — A Fragment* (which we abbreviate ‘PPF’). We explain our reasons for this alteration in the essay on the history of the text of the *Investigations* below.

A further important change we have introduced is to print the slips that were added by Wittgenstein to the typed text of the *Philosophical Investigations* in boxes in their designated places wherever that is now known, rather than at the foot of the relevant page as *Randbemerkungen*. The rationales for their relocations are given severally in endnotes.

In a couple of places, we have introduced Wittgenstein’s original squiggles or drawings. In §169 a meaningless sequence of typographical symbols was typed into the text as a *substitute* for the ‘arbitrary pothooks and squiggles’ (mentioned in §168) that are evident in *Eine Philosophische Betrachtung*, p. 182. So we have reproduced the latter. Again, PPF §108 benefits from the insertion of the little drawing, printed in *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology I*, §88, which illustrates the remark that different concepts touch and run side by side for a stretch, but one shouldn’t think that all such lines are circles.

Because the new edition is also a modified translation, with some translated sentences longer than hitherto and others shorter, it has not been possible to preserve the identical pagination of the first and second editions. Since the vast majority of English writings on Wittgenstein have made copious references to those editions, we have inserted the pagination of the first two editions in the text between small verticals (e.g. |123|) at the points of page-breaks.

There are some editorial changes in the new edition of what was previously referred to as ‘Part II’. The lost TS 234 was based on MS 144, which consists of loose sheets clipped into a folder.¹ It is not known to what extent the present order of sheets was Wittgenstein’s (the foliation is not in his hand). Most of the remarks collected in this folder come from MSS 137 and 138, that is, from manuscripts that were written between October 1948 and spring 1949 and hence *not* used for the dictation of TSS 229 and 232 (published as *Remarks on the*

¹ All references to Wittgenstein’s Nachlass are to von Wright number, followed by page number or section number (§) or both, as in the Bergen electronic edition. References to Wittgenstein’s published works are by title and either section or page number.

Philosophy of Psychology I and II). A few remarks are taken from these earlier typescripts; some originate in MS 169 (which is contemporary with the later part of MS 137); another few have not been traced to earlier manuscript sources. It is not known whether the typescript used for printing the first edition of ‘Part II’ of the *Investigations* (TS 234) was copied by a typist from MS 144 or dictated to the typist by Wittgenstein. There is evidence that some mistakes were made in the composition of the typescript. It can safely be said that there are at least two points where the order of remarks intended by Wittgenstein and clearly indicated in MS 144 was not respected in TS 234. These errors were pointed out by G. H. von Wright;² they have been rectified here (see PPF §§220–1 and §§235–6).

It is clear that the remarks that were collected together in TS 234, as well as their arrangement, are very uneven. There is every reason to think that Wittgenstein would have made many changes had he continued to work on this material. Some of these changes would have consisted in shifting individual remarks to different positions, in joining separate paragraphs to other ones, and in severing sentences or paragraphs from certain remarks. Other changes would have involved redrafting and correcting sentences that were badly drafted or poorly adjusted to their context (some of these requirements will be pointed out in the endnotes). Readers of *Philosophy of Psychology — A Fragment* will be well advised to bear in mind that what we have there, unlike the *Investigations*, is work in progress.

A prominent feature of the Anscombe–Rhees edition of what they called ‘Part II’ is the subdivision of the text into ‘sections’ numbered i to xiv. The editors’ reasons for inserting these headings were in part external. As von Wright pointed out, in the manuscript ‘each section begins and ends on a sheet of its own’.³ However, as no copy of TS 234 is extant, we know nothing about the external characteristics of this typescript, and accordingly we cannot judge to what extent the criterion mentioned by von Wright may have been relevant to the editors’ decisions. In the case of the earlier sections it is often clear on the basis of the content of the remarks why they were grouped as they are. However, when one turns to section xi, it becomes equally clear that

² G. H. von Wright, ‘The Troubled History of Part II of the *Investigations*’, *Grazer philosophische Studien* 42 (1992), p. 184. Cf. J. Schulte’s *Kritisch-genetische Edition of Philosophische Untersuchungen* (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2001).

³ von Wright, ‘Troubled History’, p. 183.

Wittgenstein or his editors simply abandoned the project of arranging these remarks in an order analogous to that of sections i to x and xii to xiv. In the present edition, we have retained the old section headings, but our principal means of organizing the text and facilitating reference to passages from it is a simple numbering of individual remarks along the lines of Wittgenstein's own system in the *Investigations*. This method has the additional advantage of forestalling doubts about whether a paragraph beginning on a new page belongs to the same remark as the last paragraph on the previous page — a difficulty encountered on several pages of former editions.

3. *The German text*

The most important source for the German text of *Philosophische Untersuchungen* printed here is the first edition of the book (1953). This was based on one of three copies of the typescript of the *Investigations* and on what was apparently the sole copy (the missing TS 234) of what became 'Part II' of the book.⁴ As far as we know, the text of the 1953 edition is on the whole very reliable.

Work on Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* led to the critical edition (2001) of the currently extant typescripts of the earlier drafts of the *Philosophical Investigations*, as well as of the manuscript (MS 144) on which Part II was based. In this critical-genetic edition, many passages were elucidated by quotations from earlier manuscript versions of relevant remarks. In the light of this edition and additional work on the *Nachlass*, we have prepared a German text which differs from that of the first three editions in various respects. We have corrected a few obvious misprints like 'Wage' (§§142, 182, 259) in place of 'Waage' (often but by no means always misspelled by Wittgenstein); 'wir' in place of 'wie' (§282), and 'Sinneneindrücke' in place of 'Sinneseindrücke' (§486). A few oddities could be clarified by consulting the manuscripts. For example, in §433 the correct version reads, not 'in welchem Zeichen', but 'in welchen Zeichen'; and in §441 the unintelligible 'daß wir . . . Wunschäußerungen von uns machen' should read 'daß wir . . . Wunschäußerungen machen'

⁴ The typescripts from which the book was printed were lost sometime after publication. The third copy of the *Untersuchungen* proper came to light only in 1993. The few points where it deviates from the published text and/or the other extant copy of the typescript are described in J. Schulte's critical-genetic edition.

(Wittgenstein forgot to cross out part of the variant formulation ‘Wunschäußerungen von uns geben’). In TS 227(a), one of the two surviving typescripts, Wittgenstein crossed out the ‘k’ in ‘keinen’ in §85(b), thus changing the sentence from ‘der Wegweiser lässt doch keinen Zweifel offen’ (‘the signpost does after all leave no room for doubt’) to ‘der Wegweiser lässt doch einen Zweifel offen’ (‘the signpost does after all leave room for doubt’). This, in the context, makes much better sense. Similarly, ‘Gesichtseindruck’ (‘visual impression’) in PPF §231 is a misprint for ‘Gesichtsausdruck’ (‘facial expression’), as is evident from MS 138, 6b. So too in PPF §306 ‘beim innerlichen Rechnen’ (‘when we made internal calculations’, according to Anscombe’s translation) is almost certainly meant to be ‘beim innerlichen Reden’ (‘when we speak to ourselves silently’) on the model of MS 144, 92.

We have made no attempt to normalize Wittgenstein’s characteristic use of commas; the only exceptions are two or three passages where we omitted a particularly distracting comma after the last item of a long list. An example is PPF §93: ‘daß die Verben “glauben”, “wünschen”, “wollen”, alle die grammatischen Formen aufweisen’; the comma before ‘alle’ has been dropped in our edition. We have, however, standardized his dots signifying ‘and so on’, reducing them to three, without any closing full stop when they occur at the end of a sentence.

In the typescripts as well as in the previous editions of the *Untersuchungen* there are many occurrences of forms like ‘etc.’ where a closing full stop follows an abbreviation. We have decided to print only one full stop in such cases. There are a number of sentences where a closing full stop or question mark is missing. In such cases we have supplied the missing sign. In the case of complete quoted sentences we print the last quotation mark after the closing punctuation mark. This is in conformity with Wittgenstein’s normal practice.

A few common expressions have been standardized in the light of Wittgenstein’s usual practice in his manuscripts. These are: ‘gar nicht’, ‘gar nichts’ in place of ‘garnicht’, ‘garnichts’; ‘inwiefern’ in place of ‘in wiefern’; ‘derselbe’ in place of ‘der selbe’; ‘so daß’ in place of ‘sodaß’; ‘statt dessen’ in place of ‘stattdessen’. In accordance with German typographical practice, we have spaced ‘z. B.’, ‘d. h.’, ‘u. s. w.’, etc.

We have capitalized nominalized forms where Wittgenstein forgot to do so. In such cases, however, we have exercised our judgement and proceeded with discretion, restricting modifications of the text to particularly clear and distracting cases where, for example, only one out of several nominalized words in the same sentence is spelled without a capital letter.

4. *The modified translation*

Anscombe's translation is now more than 50 years old, and English has moved on apace. Some of her orthographic conventions have become definitely archaic, such as her spelling of 'connexion' and 'shew'. These we have replaced by contemporary orthographic conventions. We have also favoured colloquial compression, as in 'I'm', 'I'll', 'he'd', 'we'd', 'isn't', 'aren't', 'won't' and 'wouldn't', rather more than Anscombe, in order to bring out the conversational tone of the writing. She was meticulous in her use of 'shall' and 'will', and 'should' and 'would', but time has eroded these distinctions, and we have tried to conform to current usage.

In the changes we have introduced to the first 107 remarks of the *Investigations*, we have paid careful attention to Wittgenstein's responses to Rush Rhees's translation of 1938–9 (TS 226). Wittgenstein went over Rhees's often imperfect draft carefully, together with Yorick Smythies, and he made numerous changes and corrections on the typescript by hand. To be sure, he was not a native English speaker, and not all of his corrections are improvements. But where he changed a translation that was subsequently used also by Anscombe, his proposal always merits close attention. Moreover, many of the changes he introduced make his intentions at that time (1939) clear, and the fact that he did *not* change some of Rhees's translation where it differs importantly in meaning from Anscombe's is always noteworthy.

Some of the substantive changes we have introduced into the translation are systematic. Anscombe had a marked preference for minimizing the use of the third-person impersonal pronoun 'one', often translating Wittgenstein's use of the German word *man* by the second-person pronoun 'you'. This made the text appear to be more of a conversation with the reader than it actually is. We have throughout respected Wittgenstein's choice of pronominal form. Anscombe translated *seltsam* and *merkwürdig* by 'queer'. We have translated *seltsam* by 'odd', 'strange' or 'curious', and *merkwürdig* by 'remarkable', 'strange', 'curious' or 'extraordinary'. Wittgenstein's use of *Erklärung* ('explanation') and *Definition* ('definition') was not always respected in Anscombe's translation, but we have kept to Wittgenstein's choice of words. So too, his choice of *Sinn* in some contexts and *Bedeutung* in others was not observed in the translation, but we have abided by Wittgenstein's preferences. Hence, where he speaks of "primäre" und "sekundäre" Bedeutung' (PPF §276; p. 216(d) in the first two editions), we have translated "primary" and "secondary" meaning' rather than Anscombe's "primary" and

“secondary” sense’. Anscombe was not consistent in her translation of *Gebrauch*, *Verwendung* and *Anwendung*. We have translated *Gebrauch* by ‘use’, *Verwendung* by ‘use’ or ‘employment’, and *Anwendung* by ‘application’. ‘Use’ also does service for *benützen*. In general, however, we have not allowed ourselves to be hidebound by the multiple occurrence of the same German word or phrase in different contexts. It by no means requires always translating by the same English expression, but rather depends on the exigencies of the context and the author’s intention. So, for example, we have translated *Praxis der Sprache* in *Investigations* §21 by ‘linguistic practice’ rather than by the more ponderous ‘practice of the language’, and *Praxis des Spiels* in §54(b) as ‘the way the game is played’, because this is how Wittgenstein wanted it translated.

Some German words that Wittgenstein employs are problematic for any translator. So, for example, his use of *Satz* has no obvious English equivalent, and choices have to be made between ‘sentence’, ‘proposition’, and even ‘remark’. So, for example, in *Investigations* §§134–5 the German has *Satz* throughout, but it would be infelicitous to translate the word by ‘sentence’ in all its occurrences here. In many cases, we have gone along with Anscombe’s choice between ‘sentence’ and ‘proposition’, but not in all. For example, in §105(a) Wittgenstein wrote ‘Wenn wir glauben, jene Ordnung, das Ideal, in der wirklichen Sprache finden zu müssen, werden wir nun mit dem unzufrieden, was man im gewöhnlichen Leben “Satz”, “Wort”, “Zeichen” nennt.’ Anscombe translated the latter clause by ‘We become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called “propositions”, “words”, “signs”.’ But Wittgenstein here is focusing on linguistic *signs* (as is evident from the subsequent paragraph (‘And we rack our brains over the nature of the *real sign*’) — so we have opted for ‘sentence’ here. Again, in §§395–6, it is clearly the *sentence*, not the proposition, that is supposedly guaranteed its sense by the imagination. And in §554, Wittgenstein is talking about applying the operation of negation to *sentences*.

Similar recurrent difficulties arise with the translation of *Seele*, since it cannot always be correctly rendered by ‘soul’. Anscombe was clearly aware of the problem, and in many remarks rightly opted for ‘mind’ as a correct translation of *Seele* (e.g. §§6, 37, 188, 196, 357, 358, 648, 651, 652), and usually translated *Zustand der Seele* correctly as ‘state of mind’. However, in some remarks she questionably opted for ‘soul’. For example, in §283(d): ‘And can one say of the stone that it has a *Seele* and *that* is what has the pain? What has a *Seele*, or pain, to do with a stone?’ — what is at issue is *mind*, not *soul*, and the problems of mind and body, not of the soul and the body. Similarly, in the final

paragraph of this remark: ‘For one has to say it of a body, or, if you like of a *Seele* which some body *has*. And how can a body *have* a *Seele*’, it is clear that the discussion concerns *mind* and body. So too, in §§357, 391, 424, 454, and PPF §76. By contrast, in PPF §§23–6 it is primarily the soul that is under discussion, because §23 opens with the observation that ‘religion teaches that the soul can exist when the body has disintegrated’. However, §24 requires some indication that ‘mind’ or ‘soul’ are equally apt.

In the case of *Empfindung* the German noun has a much wider application than the English ‘sensation’. In many contexts, the translation ‘sensation’ is unproblematic. But in some cases the use of the German *Empfindung* is perfectly natural, while ‘sensation’ would be quite mistaken. So, for example, in §151 ‘Vielleicht hatte er eine *Empfindung*, die man “das ist leicht” nennen kann’ is to be rendered ‘. . . what may be called the feeling [not “the sensation”] “that’s easy!”’. So too, in §160, one can speak of reading something with the *feeling* of saying something one has learnt by heart, but not with the *sensation* of saying something one has learnt by heart. §§272–5 are very problematic in this respect, for ‘*Empfindung von Rot*’ is neither ‘sensation of red’ (where is this sensation? — in the eye?) nor ‘feeling of red’. Since Wittgenstein switched from ‘*Rotempfindung*’ in §272 and §273 to ‘*Farbeindruck*’ and ‘*visueller Eindruck*’ in §§275–7, we have translated ‘*Empfindung von Rot*’ as ‘visual impression of red’ in §§272–3 and ‘colour impression’ in §274. Similarly, in §312, where Wittgenstein speaks of *Gesichtsempfindung*, we have changed Anscombe’s ‘visual sensation’ (visual sensations are, for example, sensations of glare when blinded by strong light) to ‘visual impression’. In §400 *Empfindung* presents yet another difficulty: what the idealist has discovered in speaking of the *visual room* ‘was a new way of speaking, a new comparison, and one could even say, a new *Empfindung*’ — here neither ‘sensation’ or ‘feeling’ nor ‘impression’ will do. We have opted for ‘experience’ as the closest approximation, but perhaps what Wittgenstein had in mind was ‘a new sensibility’. Similar systematic difficulties attend the German use of ‘*wollen*’ and its relation to ‘*Wille*’ (especially in §§611–19). Anscombe chose to translate the verb in these contexts uniformly by ‘to will’ and its cognates, which is highly artificial as well as misleading. There is no easy solution to the problem, but we have used ‘to want’ and its derivatives where possible, and sometimes (as in §611) both. So too, *Vorstellung* and its cognates present formidable difficulties for the translator, which we have sometimes resolved differently from Anscombe, e.g. §§300–1, 389, 402.

Occasional Anglicisms crept into Wittgenstein's German. At one point, Anscombe failed to notice his (mis)use of *Meinung* to signify 'meaning (something)', translating §639 as 'One would like to say that *an opinion* develops' (which is perfectly accurate) instead of '... that meaning something develops' (which is surely what Wittgenstein meant (see MS 129, 166f.)).

Three recurrent errors run through Anscombe's translation. First, she commonly mistranslated *manch(er, -e, -es)*: for example, as 'much of the use of (§7)' rather than 'certain uses', 'much else besides' (§21) rather than 'some other things', 'many ways' (§73) rather than 'various ways', 'a good deal that you will not say' (§79(d)) rather than 'some things you won't say', 'many mathematical proofs' (§517) instead of 'some mathematical proofs', and so on. Second, she apparently misunderstood the usage of *wohl*, taking it to be more categorical than it is. So, for example, she translated 'Aber es wird wohl auch der Ton ...' (§21) as 'No doubt the tone ...' where we prefer 'But probably the tone ...'; she translated 'Ähnlich dachte sich wohl Frege die "Annahme"' (boxed note after §22) as 'This will be how Frege thought of the "assumption"' instead of 'It may well be that this is how ...', 'der wohl nur beim Philosophieren vorkommt' (§38) as 'which doubtless only occurs when doing philosophy', instead of 'which may well occur only when ...'; and so on. Finally, there are occasions where the use of the German definite article *der* (*die, das*) should not be translated by a definite, but by an *indefinite* article. For example, it is mistaken to translate 'so nenne ich sie deswegen nicht den Befehl, mich anzustarren etc. ...' as 'I don't on that account call it *the* order to stare ...' rather than '... an order to stare' (§498). Again, the slogan quoted in §560 should not run 'The meaning of a word is what is explained by *the* explanation of its meaning' but rather: 'The meaning of a word is what *an* explanation of its meaning explains'. And so on. Since in German the indefinite article and the number word 'one' are homonyms (*ein*) Wittgenstein tended to italicize *ein* when he meant 'one' as opposed to 'a'. Anscombe preserved these italics in translation, but in English such italicization is unnecessary.

Wittgenstein's punctuation was often idiosyncratic. It is, of course, impossible to transfer into English the elaborate punctuation conventions of German, let alone all of Wittgenstein's idiosyncratic additions to it. Anscombe was sparing with her use of punctuation. But Wittgenstein explicitly noted his own preference for heavy punctuation, in order to slow the reader down (MS 136, 128)⁵, so we have been a

⁵ See Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 2nd edn (Blackwell Oxford, 1980), p. 68.

little more liberal in our use of commas than Anscombe. On the other hand, we have reduced his frequent use of colons before quoted sentences and replaced his colons by commas. We have respected Wittgenstein's use of short and long dashes, but wherever possible, have avoided following a comma or semi-colon by a dash — which looks uncommonly ugly, preferring to delete one or the other. In some cases, however, we have replaced a pair of short dashes by commas. As in the German text, we have standardized his 'dots of laziness', but in conformity with English convention have added one as a full stop when they occur at the end of a sentence. We have accepted his practice of using double quotation marks to begin a quotation, with single quotation marks for quotes within quotes. He also used single quotation marks as scare-quotes, and this too we have accepted. Wittgenstein wrote before the days of systematic and methodical differentiation of the use from the mention of a word or phrase by quotation marks (which became uniform in the second half of the twentieth century). His use, and lack of use, of quotation marks is not always systematic. We have for the most part abided by it, since it is usually perfectly clear. But in a couple of places it renders a passage almost unintelligible, and there we have changed it (e.g. §458, see endnote). We have by and large not followed his practice of employing both question mark and exclamation mark at the end of an interrogative sentence that is surprising or especially emphatic. For reasons that should be obvious from case to case, we have sometimes added italics and sometimes removed italics from Anscombe's translation.

There are various quotations, references and allusions in Wittgenstein's text. These we have attempted to identify. But, not wanting to clutter up his text with footnotes, we have relegated these identifications to the endnotes. It is there too that we have explained, where we could, the import of Wittgenstein's occasional double-bracketed notes to himself. Our primary use of endnotes, however, is to explain our differences with Anscombe's translation, where they do not speak for themselves. All endnotes are indicated by a marginal asterisk adjacent to the relevant remark or paragraph within a remark.

The Text of the *Philosophische Untersuchungen*

In his Preface, dated January 1945 (prior to the composition of the final draft of the *Investigations* in 1945–6), Wittgenstein wrote that the book consists of the precipitate of his work over the previous sixteen years. He had returned to Cambridge, and to philosophy, in January 1929. His first attempt to compose a book which would present his new thoughts was *The Big Typescript* (TS 213), a 768-page untitled typescript, with an eight-page annotated table of contents, dictated in 1933. This was based on his MSS Volumes I–X (MSS 105–114) written between 1929 and 1932. No sooner was the dictation completed than Wittgenstein started to amend it extensively, first by manuscript additions written on the typescript, and then by attempts at rewriting the material in fresh manuscripts. The first revision (‘Umarbeitung’) is in MSS Volumes X and XI (MSS 114 and 115) written in late 1933 and early 1934. This too was unsatisfactory, and Wittgenstein immediately embarked on a second revision (the ‘Zweite Umarbeitung’) in MS 140 (known as the ‘Grosses Format’). However, after writing 39 pages of this, he abandoned it too. Thereafter, *The Big Typescript* was used primarily as a store from which remarks could be selected for use elsewhere.

The second attempt at composing a book took place in Norway in the autumn of 1936. In the academic year of 1934–5 in Cambridge, Wittgenstein had dictated the *Brown Book* to Alice Ambrose and Francis Skinner. In August 1936, he travelled to Norway with the intention of continuing his philosophical work in solitude in his small house in Skjolden. At the end of August, he began translating the English text of the *Brown Book* into German in MS 115 (Volume XI), pp. 118–292, under the title ‘Philosophische Untersuchungen, Versuch einer Umarbeitung’ (‘Philosophical Investigations, Attempted Revision’), revising it as he was going along. But in early November he gave up,

writing on page 292 of the MS volume ‘This whole “attempted revision” from page 118 to here is WORTHLESS.’

He immediately began a new endeavour in MS 142 — the first, pre-war, version of the *Philosophical Investigations*, which corresponds roughly to §§1–189(a) of the published book. This is a 167-page manuscript, written as consecutive paragraphed prose, with the title *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (*Philosophical Investigations*). It was compiled during two separate periods. Pages 1–76 were probably written between early November and early December 1936, after which Wittgenstein left Norway to spend Christmas with his family in Vienna. Pages 77–167 were presumably composed after his return to Skjolden between February and May 1937, when he left Skjolden for Britain. This manuscript material was typed in two instalments later in 1937, producing the 137-page typescript TS 220.

Wittgenstein returned to Skjolden in mid-August 1937 and began working on the continuation of TS 220. At this stage, the continuation of his reflections beyond §189 was intended to pursue questions in the philosophy of mathematics pertaining to inference, proof and calculation, and logical compulsion. So the initial discussion of following rules, which is common both to this Early Draft and to the final version of the *Investigations*, was designed to support an investigation into logical and mathematical necessity. The upshot of his work on the sequel to TS 220 was the dictation in 1938 of TS 221, a typescript that corresponds, in a different arrangement (see below), to Part I of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. It was with the conjunction of TS 220 and 221¹ that Wittgenstein approached the Syndics of Cambridge University Press in the late summer of 1938 with the intention of publishing it in a bilingual edition under the title ‘Philosophical Remarks’. However, by October 1938, Wittgenstein was already having qualms about publication and expressing hesitation about it to the Syndics.

Sometime between late 1939 and 1943, Wittgenstein revised the Early Draft. One of the typescripts of TS 220 was extensively revised by hand (TS 239).² TS 221 was reworked, cut up and re-arranged. The subsequently dictated typescript, TS 222, has been printed as Part I of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. It was with these revised

¹ The conjunction of the two typescripts has been published as the ‘Frühfassung’ (‘Early Draft’) in *Philosophische Untersuchungen, Kritisch-genetische Edition*, ed. Joachim Schulte (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2001).

² It has been published in the critical-genetic edition as the ‘Bearbeitete Frühfassung’ (‘Reworked Early Draft’).

typescripts that Wittgenstein again approached the Syndics of the Press in September 1943, proposing publication of a book with the title *Philosophical Investigations*, to be printed together with a new impression of the *Tractatus*. The idea of juxtaposing these two texts, as he explained later in the Preface to the *Investigations*, had occurred to him in the course of re-reading the *Tractatus* together with a friend (probably Nicholas Bachtin). For it seemed to him that his new philosophical ideas could be seen in the right light only by contrast with his old ones. The Syndics agreed to the proposal in January 1944, but by then Wittgenstein had already moved on to something else.

His next attempt was embodied in a 195-page typescript (which no longer exists as a separate typescript, but which has been reconstructed by G. H. von Wright) consisting of 300 (mis)numbered remarks (303 being the correct number) corresponding roughly to *Investigations* §§1–421. It was for this typescript that Wittgenstein wrote the Preface to the *Investigations* dated January 1945. This so called Intermediate Draft³ consists of the reworked draft of TS 220 (i.e. TS 239), corresponding to *Investigations* §§1–189(a), together with eight pages from TS 221, corresponding to §§189(b)–197, followed by new material, written in 1944, that corresponds roughly to half the remarks in *Investigations* §§198–421. It was at this stage that Wittgenstein apparently abandoned the idea of a logico-mathematical sequel to the early draft of §§1–189, resolving instead to continue the remarks on following rules with the discussion of a private language, thought, imagination, and so forth — in short, the material we are now familiar with from the final version. The mathematical project was, it seems, deferred for a second book, with the subsequently proposed tentative title of ‘Beginning Mathematics’ (see MS 169, 36v).

Still not satisfied with what he had done, Wittgenstein turned in mid-1945 to selecting further materials for this first volume,⁴ i.e. the *Investigations*, from his manuscript volumes MSS 115–119 and MSS 129–30, some from pre-war sources (MSS 115–17 and 119) and the rest from 1944–5 (the final part of MS 116 and MSS 129–30). From these he dictated a typescript he entitled ‘Bemerkungen I’ (MS 228), which consists of 698 numbered remarks, some 400 of which he then incorporated

³ Published in the critical-genetic edition as the ‘Zwischenfassung’ (‘Intermediate Draft’).

⁴ See letter to Rhees 13 June 1945 (letter no. 328 in B. F. McGuinness (ed.), *Wittgenstein in Cambridge — Letters and Documents 1911–51* (Blackwell, Oxford, 2008), p. 377).

into the final draft of the *Investigations*. The latter (TS 227) was probably dictated in the course of the academic year 1945–6. The Intermediate Draft had been 195 pages long; the final typescript is 324 pages long.

The final typescript contains no remarks the manuscript sources of which post-date June 1945. But Wittgenstein made minor handwritten alterations to the typescript over the next few years. He also added the slips that were cut from typescripts or scribbled on notes, which were probably meant to be taken into account in further revisions of the text. On some he indicated their intended location. These notes, mostly printed in previous editions at the bottom of a given page⁵ and referred to as *Randbemerkungen*, are printed in this edition in boxes placed, wherever possible, in their designated location.

The task of publishing the *Philosophical Investigations* fell to two of Wittgenstein's three literary executors, Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees. Three typescripts of the *Investigations* were found among Wittgenstein's papers after his death in April 1951. His manuscript modifications to one of the carbon copies were transcribed by various hands into the other two copies, and the original corrected copy was sent to the publisher Basil Blackwell, who produced the first edition from it in 1953. Unfortunately, sometime after publication, the original corrected copy was lost.

Among Wittgenstein's papers, the editors found a typescript based on manuscript MS 144. This was a collection of 372 unnumbered remarks selected mostly from manuscripts written between May 1946 and May 1949. Anscombe and Rhees decided that this typescript was part of the same book as the 693 numbered remarks which they called 'Part I'. Indeed, in the editorial note to their edition, they remarked that 'If Wittgenstein had published his work himself, he would have suppressed a good deal of what is in the last 30 pages or so of Part I and worked what is in Part II, with further material, into its place.' Accordingly, they published the typescript of MS 144 (TS 234) as Part II of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Unfortunately, that typescript, from which the text was printed, has been lost.

⁵ There are two exceptions. One is the boxed remark after §108, consisting of three paragraphs. In the Anscombe–Rhees editions these were incorporated in §108 as paragraphs (b)–(d). The other is the boxed remark after §133, previously printed as §133(d) without indicating that it is an added slip cut from TS 228, §140.

There is no written evidence in Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* or correspondence to suggest that MS 144 was intended to collect together materials that would be incorporated into the *Philosophical Investigations*. Nor is there any indication that he intended to suppress 'a good deal of what is in the last thirty pages or so of Part I'. One question that arises in this connection is the date when he might have made this remark to Anscombe and Rhees. G. H. von Wright, the third of Wittgenstein's literary executors, conjectured that it was probably when they visited Wittgenstein in Dublin in December 1948.⁶ At that time a major part of what was collected in MS 144 had been written in much more extensive manuscript volumes (MS 137 and MS 138). But neither MS 144 nor, of course, the subsequent typescript TS 234, had been compiled. It may well have been that at this stage Wittgenstein contemplated revising the last 30 pages of his book, and intended to use some of the large amount of material that he had written since 1946 in the process. But he never carried out any such intentions, and we do not know whether he continued to intend to change the book in this radical way. What we do know is that he compiled MS 144 and dictated it to, or had it typed by, a typist in late June and early July 1949. It may well be that this was done at least in part in order to show his friend Norman Malcolm his current work in philosophy of psychology when he visited Malcolm at Cornell in late July 1949. We also know that when he visited Malcolm he said that

if he had the money he thought he would have his book (TS 227, the typescript of the *Investigations*) mimeographed and distributed among his friends. He said that it was not in a completely finished state, but that he did not think that he could give the final polish to it in his lifetime. The plan would have the merit that he could put in parentheses after a remark, expressions of dissatisfaction, like 'This is not quite right' or 'This is fishy'. He would like to put his book into the hands of his friends, but to take it to a publisher right then was out of the question.⁷

This remark, made in the late summer of 1949, certainly does not suggest plans for the radical rewriting and extension of the last 30 pages (approximately 170 remarks) of the book.

⁶ See G. H. von Wright, 'The Troubled History of Part II of the *Investigations*', *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 42 (1992), p. 186. He added: 'For all I have been able to ascertain, Wittgenstein did not talk about his plans to the future editors of the *Investigations* after he had left Dublin in 1949' (p. 187).

⁷ N. Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein — A Memoir*, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984), p. 75.

Whatever Wittgenstein's final intentions were, the fact is that the closest he ever came to completing the *Philosophical Investigations* is the current text consisting of §§1–693. It is, we believe, this text that should be known as Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. What has hitherto been called '*Philosophical Investigations*, Part II' was a rearranged set of remarks written between 1946 and 1949 dealing chiefly with questions in what Wittgenstein called 'philosophy of psychology'. We have named it *Philosophy of Psychology — A Fragment*. This is, in effect, a reconstruction of the lost typescript 234, based on MS 144 and the printed version in the previous editions of the *Investigations*.

Philosophische Untersuchungen

Philosophical Investigations

Überhaupt hat der Fortschritt das an sich, daß er viel größer aussieht als er wirklich ist.

The trouble about progress is that it always looks much greater than it really is.

Nestroy

Vorwort

In dem Folgenden veröffentliche ich Gedanken, den Niederschlag philosophischer Untersuchungen, die mich in den letzten 16 Jahren beschäftigt haben. Sie betreffen viele Gegenstände: Den Begriff der Bedeutung, des Verstehens, des Satzes, der Logik, die Grundlagen der Mathematik, die Bewußtseinszustände und Anderes. Ich habe diese Gedanken alle als *Bemerkungen*, kurze Absätze, niedergeschrieben. Manchmal in längeren Ketten, über den gleichen Gegenstand, manchmal in raschem Wechsel von einem Gebiet zum andern überspringend. — Meine Absicht war es von Anfang, alles dies einmal in einem Buche zusammenzufassen, von dessen Form ich mir zu verschiedenen Zeiten verschiedene Vorstellungen machte. Wesentlich aber schien es mir, daß darin die Gedanken von einem Gegenstand zum andern in einer natürlichen und lückenlosen Folge fortschreiten sollten.

Nach manchen mißglückten Versuchen, meine Ergebnisse zu einem solchen Ganzen zusammenzuschweißen, sah ich ein, daß mir dies nie gelingen würde. Daß das Beste, was ich schreiben konnte, immer nur philosophische Bemerkungen bleiben würden; daß meine Gedanken bald erlahmten, wenn ich versuchte, sie, gegen ihre natürliche Neigung, in *einer* Richtung weiterzuzwingen. — Und dies hing freilich mit der Natur der Untersuchung selbst zusammen. Sie nämlich zwingt uns, ein weites Gedankengebiet, kreuz und quer, nach allen Richtungen hin zu durchreisen. — Die philosophischen Bemerkungen dieses Buches sind gleichsam eine Menge von Landschaftsskizzen, die auf diesen langen und verwickelten Fahrten entstanden sind.

Die gleichen Punkte, oder beinahe die gleichen, wurden stets von neuem von verschiedenen Richtungen her berührt und immer neue Bilder entworfen. Eine Unzahl dieser war verzeichnet, oder uncharakteristisch, mit allen Mängeln eines schwachen Zeichners behaftet. Und wenn man diese ausschied, blieb eine Anzahl halbwegser übrig, die nun so angeordnet,