

# Wittgenstein in Cambridge



Wittgenstein in Cambridge  
Letters and Documents 1911–1951

*Edited by Brian McGuinness*

Editorial material and organization © 1995, 2008 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

BLACKWELL PUBLISHING

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK

550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia

The right of Brian McGuinness to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks, or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book.

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

Some material used in this book appeared previously in *Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore* (Blackwell Publishers 1974) and *Cambridge Letters* (Blackwell Publishers 1995).

First published 1995

This edition published 2008 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

1 2008

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889–1951.

Wittgenstein in Cambridge: letters and documents, 1911–1951 / edited by Brian McGuinness. – 4th ed.  
p. cm.

Rev. ed. of: Cambridge letters. 1995.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

ISBN 978-1-4051-4701-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889–1951 –

Correspondence. 2. Philosophers – England – Cambridge – Correspondence. 3. Cambridge

(England) – Intellectual life – 20th century. I. McGuinness, Brian. II. Wittgenstein, Ludwig,

1889–1951. Cambridge letters. III. Title.

B3376.W564A4 2008

192–dc22

[B]

2007024714

A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library.

Set in 10.5/13pt Minion

by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong

Printed and bound in Singapore

by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd

The publisher's policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid-free and elementary chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards.

For further information on

Blackwell Publishing, visit our website at

[www.blackwellpublishing.com](http://www.blackwellpublishing.com)

# CONTENTS

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| Acknowledgements                             | vi        |
| Introduction                                 | 1         |
| List of Letters and Documents                | 15        |
| <b>Letters</b>                               | <b>29</b> |
| Bibliography                                 | 481       |
| Index of Correspondents and Document Sources | 490       |
| Index  | 492       |

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For permission to use copyright material in text and notes the editor is indebted to Trinity College, Cambridge, for all writings of Wittgenstein himself and for other College material; to the Keeper of the Cambridge University Archives for extracts from official correspondence, minutes, and files; to the Bertrand Russell Archives of McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario; to the Library of King's College, Cambridge, for all Keynes material; to Mr Timothy Moore; to Mrs Jane Burch and the University of Pittsburgh Library (Special Collections) for Ramsey material; to Professor Pierangelo Garegnani for the letters and notes of Piero Sraffa; to Mrs Elisabeth von Wright; to Mrs Peggy Rush Rhees (also for the letters of Yorick Smythies) and to Mrs Ruth Malcolm.

In the case of other correspondents, represented by a letter or two here and there, it has not always been possible, despite considerable efforts, to find the holders of the copyright – this is true of Alice Ambrose, Nicholas Bachtin and J. Taylor, for instance. For letters from R. B. Braithwaite and Sir John Clapham I owe thanks to King's College, Cambridge; from H. S. M. Coxeter, to Mrs Susan Coxeter Thomas; from L. Goodstein, to Mrs Sophia Singer; from Sir Raymond Priestley, to Mr John Hubert; from T. Redpath, to Mrs Sarah and Miss Ophelia Redpath; from C. L. Stevenson, to Mrs Nora L. Stevenson; from G. and K. Thomson, to Professor M. Alexiou; from W. H. Watson, to Professor Emeritus Peter Watson and Dr Kenneth Watson; from J. Wisdom, to Mr T. Wisdom. The Society of Authors as Literary representative of the Estate of Julian Bell kindly gave permission for the reprinting of the verse epistle by him; Mr Michael Ignatieff and Chatto & Windus for that of a paragraph from his and their *Isaiah Berlin* (republished by permission of the Random House Group Ltd); Professor Béla Bollobás and Cambridge University Press for that of an extract from *Littlewood's Miscellany*; Mrs Mary Midgley for extracts from a book review written by her as Mary Scrutton; and the Editor of *Mind* for that of the exchange between Wittgenstein and Braithwaite. Letters sent to me in the course of my research I have ventured to print without separate acknowledgement but with implicit gratitude.

The letters from Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell are in the Humanities Research Center of the University of Texas at Austin. Letters addressed to Charles Stevenson by Wittgenstein himself and by Alice Ambrose are in the Library of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. These libraries and their staff have been generous in providing access and allowing copies to be taken. The same applies to the libraries where the bulk of the material here used is to be found – Trinity College Library, the Manuscript section of Cambridge University Library (where Moore's voluminous correspondence is preserved), the Austrian National Library in Vienna (where much of the correspondence previously in private hands is now being collected), and for miscellaneous purposes the Modern Manuscripts Reading Room of the Bodleian Library, Oxford. All thanks is owed to these. Colleagues from Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Professors David Bakhurst and E. J. (Ted) Bond made available to me at short notice the latter's transcription of Wittgenstein's letters to W. H. Watson, of whose existence I became aware only at the last moment. A special role has been played by the Brenner Archive of Innsbruck University, which holds some originals, but is alone, as far as I know, in having attempted to hold copies and transcripts of all correspondence from and to Wittgenstein. This has fructified in the production of a complete *Briefwechsel* (complete so far as possible) in the InteLex Past Masters series on CD-ROM or a subscription website. The commentary and most of the supporting material is as yet in German only. New material, such as the Sraffa correspondence and other letters that make their first appearance in the present volume, is to be added in due course. The resources of the Archive have been freely made available to me and I thank particularly Professor Johann Holzner, the director, and Professor Allan Janik, responsible for Wittgenstein projects there, who has been an invaluable colleague in the study of the philosopher's life and background for well over thirty years.

The idea of this book is owed to Dr D. McKitterick, the Librarian of Trinity, whom I thank for his support throughout. The College Archivist, Mr Jonathan Smith, has involved himself in the project as if it were one of his own. A like devotion I have found in Miss Jacky Cox, the University's Deputy Archivist, who swiftly answered questions and saw to it that material was available for me, often with hints as to content. She did the same earlier when she was Keeper of Modern Archives at King's College. Stepping over from the Wittgenstein world into that of Sraffa, I have much profited from collaboration with its inhabitants, particularly Professors Heinz Kurz of Graz and Nerio Naldi of Rome (La Sapienza). Professor Arthur Gibson of Roehampton and Cambridge, who is familiar with both worlds, obliged me by consulting documents at the shortest of notice. In the preparation of the material for the press I have been much assisted by, nay totally dependent on, Miss Anna Coda Nunzianta of Siena, who has worked with me now for several years without flagging either in rigour of standards or in energy. *Mille grazie* to her and to numerous friends, too many to be named, who have resolved many problems. Latest but not least among my helpers have been Valery Rose and Jacqueline Harvey, the copy-editors provided by my publisher, who have learned to live with and finally tied up this protean project.

Brian McGuinness

Siena, June 2007



# INTRODUCTION

The present volume contains correspondence and documents illustrating the part that Cambridge, his friends there and its institutions, played in the philosophical, professional, and general intellectual life of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Naturally the great events or the private concerns that conditioned those sides of his life must also be touched on – the two wars, the annexation of Austria, his position or need for a position, his health, and the like.

It differs considerably from the previous volume, *Cambridge Letters*, which I edited with the late Georg Henrik von Wright (Blackwell, 1995). That was designed to contain what survived of the correspondence between Wittgenstein and the chief of his Cambridge friends, by which was meant those who could fairly be regarded as his equals or even mentors rather than disciples – Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, J. M. Keynes, and later Frank Ramsey and (represented by a single but important letter) Piero Sraffa. Now the place of Sraffa in the collection has indeed been considerably enlarged, since a large number of letters from Wittgenstein to him and some memoranda written for Wittgenstein by him have come to light (or onto the market). These enable us to form rather more than a speculative idea of the conversations to which Wittgenstein ascribed much of the inspiration of his *Philosophical Investigations*. They also throw much light on the reactions of Wittgenstein to the annexation of his native Austria and the coming of the war, events which, by a concatenation of circumstances, almost constrained him to remain a philosopher.

The Sraffa material by itself would have been an invaluable completion of the earlier volume, but, with the encouragement of the Librarian of Trinity College, Cambridge (Dr David McKitterick) and my understanding publisher (I have been with Blackwell now for more than forty years) I decided to change the conception of the book by including letters that show something of Wittgenstein's relations with followers, pupils, friends, or younger colleagues. In principle I confine myself to the intellectual sphere, leaving aside more private and intimate correspondence with Cambridge friends, which indeed hardly exists in bulk and is mostly (entirely in the case of Francis Skinner) written to, not by, Wittgenstein. Even when there is a reply

by Wittgenstein it usually throws light on the problems of the other party. Complete consistency is almost impossible and one or two admonitory letters have escaped this self-denying ordinance. A complete Wittgenstein correspondence (I am one of the editors) is available in the Past Masters series of IntelLex on CD-ROM and Internet, which will be brought up to date from time to time. (As yet the notes and surrounding material are solely in German.)

The new material in this book is almost entirely from Wittgenstein's second Cambridge period, beginning in 1929, and, after an initial attempt to convert to seriousness the young scions of Bloomsbury, shows him dealing with more earnest and mature students of philosophy, and then as the thirties went on, the pupils or followers, notably Rush Rhees, Norman Malcolm, and von Wright himself, whose correspondence and friendship accompanied him to his deathbed.<sup>1</sup> The individual letters from Russell, Keynes and Moore are still printed in full, though I now omit notes fixing or requesting an appointment. In other cases I have here allowed myself to excerpt letters to Wittgenstein, leaving out material of ephemeral interest. His own letters are always left in their entirety.

Another major change and addition to the volume is that I have now included minutes of meetings and discussions that Wittgenstein attended or led and also documents concerning his official status from time to time. Will future generations know the joy of archives? It is touching to think of the young secretaries of the Trinity Mathematical Society writing their proceedings and Wittgenstein's words into those leather-bound volumes before going off to calculate the effect of tides off the invasion coast of France. Jacky Cox, Deputy Archivist of Cambridge University, previously Modern Archivist of King's, and Jonathan Smith, Archivist of Trinity, not only procured me access to such treasures but were kind enough to share their enthusiasm with me.

No more than previous collections of their letters is this book meant as a first introduction to Wittgenstein and his circle nor an encyclopaedia of his acquaintance. But its publication will be justified if it conveys a picture of the almost cyclical pattern of his life and work: periods devoted to interchange with others alternating with retirement to condense the ideas he drew from and wanted to contribute to that very interchange. All his development, that is all his life, is characterized by contrast and inner conflict. The evidence of his letters, as of his contemporaries, shows him in turn shy and affectionate, fierce and censorious, happy to collaborate and sure of his own judgement. Many quarrels and nearly as many reconciliations are documented. His struggles to publish the *Tractatus* can be followed, his apparent retreat from the intellectual world, his being wooed back to philosophy by Keynes and Ramsey, later and repeated plans of his to leave philosophy, all in the end reversed. He was often on the point of producing something for publication and then chased some new ideal of perfection or some new topic suggested by others in discussion or by his own

<sup>1</sup> Not represented in the present collection is the correspondence, I think still extant, with M. O'C. (Con) Drury, one of his closest friends for the longest time. Their friendship and exchange of ideas are described in M. O'C. Drury, *The Danger of Words and Writings on Wittgenstein* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996).

wide-ranging, almost desultory, reading. It was in these ways that he came to certainty (thanks to Moore and Malcolm) and to colours (picking up a book of Goethe's on his last visit to Vienna). In the end many shipwrecks of books in draft were left for his friends to refloat. Events as well as some attraction, despite a distrust often expressed, brought him back repeatedly to Cambridge. It was as important to him as his solitudes.

Wittgenstein first came to see Russell, then a lecturer at Cambridge, on 18 October 1911<sup>2</sup> and seems to have stayed until Christmas, though he was still registered as studying at the University of Manchester for that autumn. He was admitted as a member of Cambridge University and of Trinity College on 1 February 1912. His status was at first that of an undergraduate. At the beginning of June the Degree Committee of the Special Board for Moral Science admitted him as an Advanced Student to a Course of Research and "asked Mr. Bertrand Russell to be kind enough to act as the Director and Supervisor of the Student".<sup>3</sup> Wittgenstein attended lectures by G. E. Moore, not yet Professor, and also had some supervision, which both men found frustrating, from the logician W. E. Johnson. Wittgenstein was in residence during all three terms in the year 1912 and during the Lent and Easter Terms of 1913. The greater part of the academic year 1913–14 he spent in Norway, thinking and writing on his own. In April G. E. Moore visited him there. Wittgenstein had returned to Austria for the summer and in August 1914, immediately after the outbreak of the war, he volunteered for the Austro-Hungarian Army.

Coming to Cambridge had proved one of the great changes in his life. He had to make a choice, agonizing for him, between his gifts as an aircraft engineer and those as a thinker. Russell helped him to make the choice we know of, but largely by bringing him into a group where he could make free use of his intellect. To be surrounded by Moore, Keynes, the Stracheys, and even the younger Apostles (then practically the Cambridge branch of Bloomsbury) was a new experience for him. His family background was one of wealth and high culture but not intellectual to the degree cultivated in this new environment. He brought with him, it is true, a brisk and practical knowledge of science, which made him impatient with vapourings, but it is fair to say that the intellectual discussion of everything, with a pleasure taken in the discussion as well as in the result, was (from all that we know) new to him. He came to Cambridge (like St Augustine to Carthage) and it marked him for life, which indeed he ended there. *Hinc lucem et pocula sacra* is one of that University's mottos: there he found the blend of problems and techniques that suited him. Of course he was Austrian (or, as he and Russell put it, German), and many aspects of English life irritated him, but the construct of the Austro-Hungarian intellectual sits uneasily upon him, if we consider most of his life.

By his happy choice of Russell as a teacher (and Russell's quick perception), Wittgenstein found himself within months of his arrival a member of this elite, a group who took their own social position for granted (as, I think, Wittgenstein too

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell of that date.

<sup>3</sup> Letter of 5 June 1912 from J. N. Keynes (father of J. M. Keynes and University Registrar) to Dr W. M. Fletcher, Tutor at Trinity College.

always did) but were very conscious of the superiority of their ideals to those of worldly success, which, they thought, was preached at Oxford. They had their Bible in Moore's *Principia Ethica* (it is interesting that *Principia Mathematica* is named after that, and not the other way round) but now thought (according to Russell) of a life of retirement among fine shades and nice feelings. The younger ones also tended to be in love with one another. We have references to discussions with older members of the circle: Wittgenstein maintaining that mathematics would improve people's taste because taste comes of thinking honestly. They were all against him. And perhaps this was typical. At all events he attempted to resign from the Society itself (the Apostles), thinking that the younger members "had not yet made their toilets. And the process, though necessary was indecent." (He was to resume membership, as a senior member, much later.)

What were his objections to them, apart from the immaturity of the young? He was critical of Moore's *Principia*, of its style for one thing ("Unclear things don't get a bit clearer by being repeated") but also of its content: of its attempt to *describe* the nature of the good. Wittgenstein wanted nothing but honesty, nothing but to be (as Russell forced him to say) a creature of impulse. His impulses being strong but never shameful, principles and such things seemed to him nonsense. The brittle arguments of the Society, where the paradoxical or the scandalous would be defended for sheer love of argument, seemed to him intolerable. And there was another thing: all, even the older members, lacked what he called reverence: even Russell (whom, at that period, he still respected) was so philistine as to appreciate the advantages of their age as opposed to previous ones. D. H. Lawrence, who had a consciously Nietzschean attitude to the world, was to feel uncomfortable with Bloomsbury for similar reasons.

Still, between them the members of this group set him on the way to writing his first and in some ways his greatest work. He was to repair Russell's logic; he was to deal with Keynes's probability in two or three paragraphs; he was to show that ethics, Moore's field, did not consist of propositions at all. And perhaps this is what they wanted from him: they "looked to him for the next big step in philosophy", as Russell told Wittgenstein's sister; and after the war they were happy (as C. D. Broad put it) "to dance to the highly syncopated pipings of Herr Wittgenstein's flute". There were other ways too that they helped him – their very acceptance of him was a boon. And among them "He gained from Heaven, 'twas all he wished, a friend", one in their circle, though not totally of it, to whom he dedicated that same work.

The original *Abhandlung*, whose completion he announced to Russell in 1915, was the product of this Cambridge period, but the additions he made to it in 1916–18 (the passages on God, freedom, and the mystical) issued rather from the next two phases in his life. Tolstoy's religion had taken hold of him in the war and the circle of young disciples of Kraus and Loos whom he met in Olmütz acted as midwives to the utterance of what he had previously and, as he thought, necessarily left unsaid.<sup>4</sup> Russell was shocked by the mysticism that thus entered in, while as for religion the

<sup>4</sup> For the Olmütz circle see Paul Engelmann, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir*, ed. Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), and my *Young Ludwig* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 246ff.

least hint of it was enough to exile one from the drawing rooms of Bloomsbury. “We have lost Tom”, was Virginia Woolf’s comment on T. S. Eliot’s conversion.

The book, apart from this, as he thought, extraneous element, ravished Russell. It came from the prison camp at Cassino in Italy, where Wittgenstein spent most of his captivity after the Austro-Hungarian surrender of November 1918, remaining until August 1919. He had with him a completed typescript of what Moore was to call the *Tractatus*. The intermediacy of Keynes brought it safely to England.

In December 1919, and thus not long after his release from captivity, Wittgenstein was able to meet Russell at The Hague (it was evidently necessary to go to a country which had been neutral) where the two friends had an impassioned discussion of the work (letters 65–76). On his return to England, Russell wrote an introduction to it (of which Wittgenstein did not approve) and was in other ways instrumental in ensuring its publication both in Germany and in England (letters 88–96). The two met again at Innsbruck in 1922 (see notes to 95). It turned out to be a somewhat sour encounter, after which their friendship was never restored to what it had been before, though there are at first a couple of amiable letters (96–7).

These were the years in which Wittgenstein relinquished his whole fortune to his family and withdrew from philosophy to become a teacher in elementary schools in more or less remote villages in Lower Austria (1920–6), but this did not mean a complete break in his relations with Cambridge. Early in 1923 he wrote to Keynes seeking renewed contact (letter 98). The letter remained unanswered for a whole year, but in the mean time (in September 1923) a young friend of Keynes’s from Cambridge, the brilliant mathematician and philosopher, Frank Ramsey, who had translated the *Tractatus* for C. K. Ogden, came to see Wittgenstein at Puchberg am Schneeberg. He seems to have stayed there for at least two weeks and to have had long discussions daily with Wittgenstein, who explained the *Tractatus* to him. One result of these talks was a number of corrections made both to the German text and to the English version, most of which were incorporated in the second impression of 1933.<sup>5</sup> No doubt Ramsey’s reports were what stirred Keynes to generous efforts to secure Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge (see letters 111, 112, and 115). There is evidence that in the autumn of 1923 Wittgenstein himself was contemplating the possibility of giving up his job as a teacher and coming to Cambridge to complete his work for a degree. But a year later he declined Keynes’s invitation, explaining his reasons both to Keynes himself and to Ramsey, who was once again on a visit to Austria.

In August 1925, however, Wittgenstein did visit England, stayed with Keynes and met Ramsey and other friends. Keynes helped him to pay for this trip (letters 110–11). This came about with all the interlacing of intellectual and personal life characteristic of Bloomsbury. Keynes was newly married to the lovable but eccentric Lydia Lopokova: indeed these days were to have been their honeymoon. Ramsey was on the eve of his marriage but had to leave his bride and come down to Sussex so that Wittgenstein would have someone to talk to. Geoffrey Keynes and his wife were

<sup>5</sup> See C. Lewy, “A Note on the Text of the *Tractatus*”, *Mind* 76 (1967), 417–23, and letters 99, 107 and 152.

invited to make up the party, and Virginia and Leonard Woolf came over from their house nearby. We know the sort of thing that went on from other occasions – Lydia’s boutades taken literally by the Bloomsburyites; Wittgenstein discontented when, instead of his being allowed to prevail in an argument, the subject was blithely changed; Wittgenstein’s long walks with Ramsey, which gave them an opportunity to quarrel about psychoanalysis. (The quarrel is attested, the subject probable.) At all events a return to Cambridge and philosophy was deferred.

Two more avatars, each worthy of a separate narration, intervened: the building of the Kundmanngasse house (in some sense a return to the preoccupations of the Olmütz circle) interspersed with the modest beginnings of discussion with selected members of the Vienna Circle.<sup>6</sup> But for reasons which we can easily conjecture Vienna was not a place for his work: he would only be a wealthy amateur, except that he had given away all his money; and so might seem a hanger-on in his own family. Cambridge it must be and thither he returned in the first days of 1929, the Cambridge of Frances Cornford and “the men going to lecture with the wind in their gowns”. He was welcome there as much because he had been known earlier in his vulnerable youth as because he had now a name in the learned world. This old acquaintance preserved him (particularly at Trinity) from occasional censure.<sup>7</sup>

“God has arrived,” wrote Keynes to Lydia, and indeed Wittgenstein dominated their lives at first, staying in a college guest room at King’s, and then with Ramsey (their quarrel forgotten), in both cases for longer than was really decent. They parked him with Maurice Dobb, a mentor of the young and left-wing Apostles of the day, where he resumed the life of sixteen years earlier, surprising himself by the ease with which he did so. His quarrel with Moore too was effortlessly overcome – it was a period, of hope perhaps, when Wittgenstein’s personal charm was not overshadowed by his demands as much on others as on himself.

Formally speaking he was readmitted to Trinity and the university on 18 January 1929: so soon was the idea that he had come only for a holiday abandoned. He kept residence during the Lent and Easter Terms, proceeding to the PhD degree on 18 June, the *Tractatus* being accepted as a thesis. Ramsey was formally his supervisor and Moore and Russell his examiners. He was in residence (now in the house of Mrs Quiggin in Grantchester Road) for the three terms of 1929–30 and the Michaelmas Term 1930. During the academic year 1929–30 he was paid a small sum in respect of

<sup>6</sup> For first-hand accounts see Herbert Feigl, “The Wiener Kreis in America”, in *Perspectives in American History*, vol. II (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 639, and Karl Menger, *Reminiscences of the Vienna Circle*, ed. B. McGuinness, L. Golland, and A. Sklar (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer, 1994), *passim*. Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, conversations recorded by F. Waismann, ed. B. F. McGuinness, trans. with J. Schulte (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) (German edition, *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, ed. B. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967)) contains a general account as well as later conversations.

<sup>7</sup> One distinguished classicist wrote to me, “He seemed to ignore that a Fellowship involved as well as privileges some few duties.” But Littlewood, Hardy and others close to the Council (“High Trinity”) were prepared to make allowances.

lectures on philosophical logic given at the invitation of the Moral Science Faculty Board. This was converted into a Faculty Lecturership in October 1930, and continued on the same basis in the following years. He was elected a Fellow of Trinity College under Title B on 5 December 1930, and at first given rooms in Bishop's Hostel. He was later to return to his old undergraduate rooms at the top of a tower in Whewell's Court.<sup>8</sup> After a prolongation the fellowship eventually expired at the end of the academic year 1935–6, when his Faculty Lecturership also came to an end.

Discussions with Ramsey were a joy – “They're like some energetic sport and are conducted, I think, in a good spirit. There is something erotic and chivalrous about them. They educate me into a degree of courage in thinking.” He then reflects on his ability or inability to pursue “science” (*Wissenschaft*, a word he later avoided) on his own.<sup>9</sup> The topics of the discussions (cut short by Ramsey's illness and death within a year) can be surmised – visual space, the foundations, if any, of physics and mathematics, and the like, but they are of a technical nature. It was a rigorous return to philosophy. Not for nothing does he later mention how much he owed to Ramsey's “forcible and unerring criticism”,<sup>10</sup> though, as we shall see, he needed something further to set him on a new path.

Another token of his remaining within the Bloomsbury connexion of his earlier Cambridge years was Wittgenstein's formal return to the Society (the Apostles) and his interest in the literary, dramatic, and musical activities of the young, above all the privileged young – “all those Wykehamists”, as Leavis scornfully described them (“all those Julian Bells” was Wittgenstein's own phrase). He took Dadie Rylands round the College garden explaining how Shakespeare should be produced. He analysed the symbols in the poems of William Empson's circle. He criticized John Hare's (the later Lord Listowel's) singing and commented on the paintings of Julian Trevelyan.

Something – more than one thing probably – changed him. His views were perhaps not given the attention they deserved. Rylands smiled at the advice that was given, Julian Bell wrote a poetic epistle, addressed to Braithwaite, protesting against the cultural hegemony claimed by Wittgenstein. John Cornford's scorn for his teachers may have been in part directed against, for it was apparently resented by, Wittgenstein.<sup>11</sup> He did not differ from them politically, for he remained resolutely left-wing in his sympathies. He did not oppose his great friend Skinner's idea of going to the Spanish

<sup>8</sup> This seems to have corresponded to a romantic ideal of his: he sought lodgings in the clock tower that was the principal feature of Olmütz and in his observation post as an artillery officer he had felt like a prince in an enchanted castle.

<sup>9</sup> “Ich gehe in der Wissenschaft nur gern [*I believe nur ungern was meant*] allein spazieren” (MS 105, p. 4 (15 Feb. 1929)). On this puzzling passage and the influence of Ramsey in general see my “Wittgenstein and Ramsey”, in M. C. Galavotti (ed.), *Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), pp. 19–28.

<sup>10</sup> Foreword to *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. ix (“dieser stets kraftvollen und sicheren Kritik”).

<sup>11</sup> Jaakko Hintikka told me that he heard Wittgenstein (in 1949–50) emphasize how mistaken John Cornford had been in thinking that he had nothing to learn from his teachers.

Civil War: three of the four Cambridge men killed in that war were pupils of his<sup>12</sup> and the fourth was John Cornford, the pupil *manqué* mentioned above. Yet Wittgenstein began to find friends and disciples in less privileged and more earnest circles, who were primarily intent on personal improvement: King, Lee, and Townsend, who have published their notes on his lectures; the circle round Skinner; and particularly Drury, Smythies, and Rhees, who remained close to him till the end. Each group is worthy of description, but none is remotely to be thought of in connexion with Bloomsbury. They were prepared, however, for the difficult task of discipleship: it meant that they had to get the essential things right and yet be prepared to disagree with Wittgenstein, but above all they could not play with ideas, or indeed with much else. A particular part is played in the present volume by a number of maturer students, whose later letters describe their attempts to put into practice the lessons they had learnt from or with Wittgenstein. W. H. Watson, who shared and fed Wittgenstein's taste for the nonsense – the absurdities of would-be philosopher scientists like Jeans and Eddington – perhaps qualifies in his *On Understanding Physics* as one of the best spokesmen Wittgenstein could have had. Later Alister Watson, perhaps the only one of the charmed circle of young Apostles to remain with him, contributed in somewhat the same way presentations of Wittgensteinian ideas on the foundations (or lack of foundations) of mathematics.

In obedience to a social law that I have observed in operation at Oxford (no doubt it is a particular form of a universal tendency) a special group of his friends, with whom he felt most at home, were, like himself, foreigners, who (more than was necessary but not more than was natural) failed to fit easily into the cosy world of the colleges. Piccoli, the Professor of Italian, was one example; Bachtin (Nicholas, brother of Mikhail), a linguist, a poet, and a serial exile, was, slightly later, another. But the chief figure of this kind was undoubtedly Piero Sraffa, a protégé (soon to become an equal) whom Keynes had brought from Mussolini's Italy. Wittgenstein was confronted with willpower equal to his own. Sraffa had already published a groundbreaking article, comparable in some ways to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and was now addressing, according to Amartya Sen, “foundational economic issues of general social and political interest (some of which have been discussed for over two hundred years)”.<sup>13</sup> Sen adds that it would be surprising if Sraffa had not had a philosophical position of his own, and one that went beyond “the rather limited boundaries of positivist or representational reasoning commonly invoked in contemporary mainstream economics”. What this position was (it was of course not avowed as a philosophical one) can be

<sup>12</sup> Julian Bell himself, David Guest (both of whom had Marxist objections to Wittgenstein's teaching) and Ivor Hickman, whose few letters to Wittgenstein show a healthy independence alongside esteem and affection. In an obituary notice (*Christ's College Magazine*, 1939) C. P. Snow, then a Fellow, describes him as “exuberantly fond of abstract thought” on the meaning of meaning and the like. Probably his death was the occasion of a disagreement with Drury over the nature of a “future life” (R. Rhees, *Recollections of Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 132).

<sup>13</sup> Amartya Sen, “Sraffa, Wittgenstein, and Gramsci”, *Journal of Economic Literature* 41 (2003), 1240–55.

seen or sensed in the interchanges adumbrated (in some cases spelt out) in the present collection.<sup>14</sup>

And there were many such discussions: the two met, usually weekly, and had almost an agenda, not so much topics to be covered but errors of thinking about the most ordinary matters (political events or whatever suggested itself), to be identified for future avoidance not just popular misconceptions, *pseudodoxia epidemica* so to speak, but errors that they found in their own thinking. Sometimes there was direct discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The anecdote of the Neapolitan gesture has become famous – “What is the grammar of that?” asked Sraffa. Looking back, when he was making a determined effort to write the definitive account of his changed view,<sup>15</sup> Wittgenstein sees this question of Sraffa's as one of two axe strokes against his previous doctrine of the crystal character of logic.<sup>16</sup> Sraffa had shown him that he had to accept as a sign something for which he could not give the rules and grammar.

He associates this immediately with the realization that there was no essence of language, no realm of meaning to be tapped into. We should abandon the pneumatic theory of thought,<sup>17</sup> the idea that behind our understanding and meaning there was some structure (something concrete, a word actually used by Wittgenstein in this context) that we could perhaps only glimpse but on which we depended for our thoughts or utterances to have sense.<sup>18</sup> This substructure or skeleton now vanished. He describes the theory also as one that supposes that sense is something that we give life to, like a child, and it then has a life of its own, which we can only follow and examine. Not so with sense or understanding, for it is only our continued activity that gives life to sense or language. An epigrammatical summary of this appears already in his Brown Book (1934–5).

If Sraffa made him feel like a tree stripped of its branches, Sraffa in the end found their conversations too much – “I won't be bullied by you, Wittgenstein,” Smythies (who, you might say, had been bullied by both) heard him say. Sraffa resembled Wittgenstein even in some of the methods and aims of his scientific work. He too could use their common friends Ramsey and Alister Watson to help him with the mathematics he needed, but he took strictly what he needed from them.

About this time (see letters **190–1** and notes) it seems to have been Wittgenstein's general plan, often modified by circumstances, to publish his results, if possible, and

<sup>14</sup> See in particular the exchange of letters and memoranda from 1934 (**169–75**).

<sup>15</sup> In a rough notebook (MS 157b) contemporary with 1936–7 MS 142, which is the basis of the opening part of *Philosophical Investigations*. The notebook is echoed in many of the passages about the nature of philosophy in *Ph. Inv.* §§89–133.

<sup>16</sup> The other was the idea of family resemblance, which he implies he got from Spengler. That too militated against the assumption of essences.

<sup>17</sup> Misrepresented in the English of *Ph. Inv.* §109 as “the conception of thought as a gaseous medium”. *Pneuma*, with its connotation of something that gives life is certainly not gas. (Wittgenstein himself says that the word “ethereal” would be better.)

<sup>18</sup> In a recent article Joachim Schulte has brought out well how Wittgenstein's idea of *pneuma* is indebted to that of Spengler, whom he was reading about the time of his first conversations with Sraffa (“The Pneumatic Conception of Thought”, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 71 (2006), 39–55). In Spengler the notion is typical of the *magical* way of thinking.

to leave academic life, at any rate as far as England was concerned. In September 1935 he visited the Soviet Union with the idea of starting a new life there and in early 1938 he thought of taking up the study of medicine, perhaps in Ireland. In between, with no post, he spent the remainder of 1936 (after the expiry of his fellowship) and much of 1937 in his cabin in Norway, preparing his book for publication and meditating on what he saw as his own shortcomings. One upshot of the latter preoccupation was a series of confessions which he made to family and friends at the beginning of 1937, while the former activity did eventually lead to his offering an early version of *Philosophical Investigations* to the Cambridge University Press, though it is not clear that it was complete and he had difficulty finding a good translator. He had not always been whole-hearted about publication, since, for a period at the beginning of 1938, he appears (see letter 215) to have contemplated placing his papers in Trinity College Library for possible publication after his death (which is more or less what did in the end happen).

The annexation of Austria in March 1938 altered Wittgenstein's preoccupations, perhaps decisively. He had to consider his own situation, whether to change his nationality and if so what new nationality to seek, and, a related problem, what to do to help his family, threatened with racial persecution. He had also to find an occupation. The letters show how he resolved these problems with the help and advice of Keynes and Sraffa. In fact he set in train an application for British naturalization, which took almost exactly a year in coming. Also he resumed his previous teaching activities, to a select group on some occasions in Lent Term 1938, more regularly, though still gratis, in the Easter Term. No position as Faculty Lecturer was now available and, though some payment was made for the academic year 1938–9, he was told that such payments could not be guaranteed beyond that period.

In early 1939 Wittgenstein applied for the Professorship of Philosophy (to be vacated by Moore in October) and was elected, again having sought the help and advice of Keynes, though in truth little assistance was needed. In October he took up the chair and was re-elected at Trinity, this time to a Professorial Fellowship. He remained in office, with leave, at first for war work then for writing, during 1943 and 1944. He resumed his professorial duties in January 1945 and continued to discharge them until the summer of 1947: Michaelmas Term of that year was a period of sabbatical leave and he formally resigned his Fellowship and Professorship at the end of the calendar year. Extracts from the University Archives which give details of all these changes are included in the present volume.

During most of his time at Cambridge (for the qualification, see letter 199) Wittgenstein was much interested in the activities of the philosophical discussion society there, the Moral Science Club, and it is frequently referred to in the letters. He it was who first proposed, in 1912, the election of a standing Chairman to guide the discussions. This office was distinct from that of President in a way I have been unable to fathom. For a long period the Chairman was Moore, but at the end Wittgenstein largely succeeded him in this role as well as in the Chair of Philosophy. Wittgenstein followed the proceedings of the Club with almost as much intensity as he devoted to the organization of his own lectures or classes. A number of extracts from the minutes are included in the present volume as also (a recent find) minutes

of the of the Trinity Mathematical Society for the two meetings at which Wittgenstein spoke.

After resigning as Professor, Wittgenstein continued to work on philosophy in Ireland and during visits to the United States or even Vienna. He also moved between Oxford and Cambridge. The variety of his reading and interests, and the effect on his work of his illness can be followed in letters to von Wright (now his successor), Rush Rhees, and Norman Malcolm. These often overlap and so have been included selectively. The fatal nature of his illness pronounced itself in the course of 1949 and he died at Cambridge in April 1951, working to the end.

Wittgenstein usually kept letters of any importance or interest that he received. This was probably true even before the First World War, for it is hard to imagine Wittgenstein destroying Russell's letters, for example. But anything from that period is probably irremediably lost. A collection of letters he received from the period of the First World War and the early 1920s was discovered comparatively recently in the house of a dependent of the family. They were saved from destruction only by the quick perceptions of Frau Charlotte Eder of Vienna. For a later part of the 1920s, while he was still living in Austria, he made the house of his friend, Ludwig Hänsel, his centre and left a number of letters there for safe keeping. These two collections are now mostly in the Austrian National Library in Vienna and the Brenner Archive in Innsbruck. Finally, a considerable collection, now somewhat dispersed, of letters that Wittgenstein had received in Cambridge in the 1930s and 1940s was among his papers at the time of his death.

In the case of some friends and perhaps all family members he kept every letter, but in other cases only a letter or two, perhaps a particularly characteristic one as a kind of memento. This was natural in the case of Cambridge friends and colleagues, where the correspondence mostly served to make arrangements to meet, while the relationship was essentially conducted face to face. The two letters from Moore printed here are probably all of his that Wittgenstein kept, and we could include as many as nine from Keynes only because the latter often kept carbon copies of letters dispatched. Sraffa's important letter was a singleton in Wittgenstein's bundles. The other memoranda or notes from Sraffa were preserved in Sraffa's own papers, though obviously written to be read by Wittgenstein.<sup>19</sup>

On the other side, Russell and Keynes kept nearly all papers of any interest. The same was true of Sraffa, though as stated his collection suffered in his last years, and it cannot be safely regarded as restored to completeness. Of Moore it may fairly be said that he hoarded every scrap. Thus as well as all the letters and brief communications printed here, there is a mass of Christmas and Easter cards from Wittgenstein. It is of some interest to note that while from Vienna Wittgenstein would send chaste cards with Biedermeier views of the Josefsplatz or the like – the sort of thing his sisters would order from a Kohlmarkt stationer in boxes – his English cards were chosen especially for the banality of the illustrations and of the accompanying verses, as for example:

<sup>19</sup> They were not known at the time of *Cambridge Letters* (1995).

If wishes count, you'll surely have  
 Life's blessings rich and true  
 For I am wishing from my heart  
 Such good things all for you.

These were not the cards usually exchanged at Cambridge, but (it is legitimate to suppose) the clumsy sincerity of a different level of English life was more acceptable to him; and, as for taste, he was chiefly concerned to avoid the half and half.<sup>20</sup> Other correspondents' letters from Wittgenstein are in various collections, von Wright's and Malcolm's are in Trinity College Library, Rhees's in the Austrian National Library in Vienna. Wittgenstein's letters to W. H. Watson were discovered at the last moment (for this publication) in the Library of Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. Some of the letters to Russell (also one from him) and fragments from letters to Keynes and Ramsey are in German. They are so printed but an English version is provided. I am responsible for these translations and for occasional other ones, including that of the poem referred to in letter 291.

Wittgenstein's English of the earlier years was not always idiomatic, and his spelling, whether in English or in German, was never entirely sure. My policy as an editor has been not to interfere with grammar and idiom at all. Spelling and occasionally punctuation has been corrected when it was necessary to avoid misunderstanding, but has frequently been left in its idiosyncratic form, to give an impression of the informality of one or another letter. This applies both to Wittgenstein and to his correspondents. It is sometimes interesting that their minor lapses show their unfamiliarity with, or indifference to, the English or German name or concept involved. Wittgenstein departs from English practice more frequently when he is, or has been, away from England or is excited or is writing to Sraffa. Words, parts of words, or numbers in square brackets are editorial insertions or conjectures.

A characteristic of Wittgenstein's style is his use of underlining to give emphasis to words and phrases. Words once underlined are here printed in *italics*; words twice underlined, in SMALL CAPITALS; words thrice underlined, in NORMAL CAPITALS; and words four times underlined in NORMAL CAPITALS UNDERLINED.

Letters and documents are arranged in chronological order, or what is taken to be such, and are numbered accordingly for purposes of reference, using the style 123 in continuous text. The list of correspondents and sources of documents (with letter numbers) at the end of the book permits a particular correspondence or other relationship to be followed.

<sup>20</sup> T. Redpath, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Student's Memoir* (London: Duckworth, 1990), pp. 94–5, in the course of making a similar observation, says that Wittgenstein was avoiding “the aesthetic”. In a letter to Malcolm Wittgenstein insists on “soupiness” (see 416).

# LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS



# LIST OF LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS

1912

1. To B. Russell, [11.6.1912]
2. To B. Russell, 22.6.1912
3. To B. Russell, 1.7.1912
4. To B. Russell, [Summer 1912]
5. To B. Russell, 16.8.1912
6. To B. Russell, [Summer 1912]
7. From the Minutes of the Moral Science Club, 29.11.1912
8. To B. Russell, 26.12.1912

1913

9. To J. M. Keynes, 3.1.1913
10. To B. Russell, 6.1.1913
11. To B. Russell, January 1913
12. To B. Russell, 21.1.1913
13. To B. Russell, 25.3.1913
14. To B. Russell, [June 1913]
15. To J. M. Keynes, 22.6.1913
16. To J. M. Keynes, 16.7.1913
17. To B. Russell, 22.7.1913
18. To B. Russell, [Summer 1913]
19. To B. Russell, [Summer 1913]
20. To B. Russell, [1913]
21. To B. Russell, 5.9.1913
22. To B. Russell, 20.9.1913
23. To B. Russell, 17.[10].1913

24. To G. E. Moore, [23.10.1913]
25. To B. Russell, 29.10.1913
26. To B. Russell, [November 1913]
27. To B. Russell, [November 1913]
28. To B. Russell, [November 1913]
29. To G. E. Moore, 19.11.1913
30. To B. Russell, [November or December 1913]
31. To G. E. Moore, [December 1913]
32. To B. Russell, 15.12.1913
33. To B. Russell, [Christmas 1913]

## 1914

34. To B. Russell, [January 1914]
35. To G. E. Moore, [30.1.1914]
36. To B. Russell, [February 1914]
37. To G. E. Moore, 18.2.1914
38. To B. Russell, 3.3.1914
39. To G. E. Moore, 5.3.1914
40. To G. E. Moore, [March 1914]
41. To G. E. Moore, 7.5.1914
42. To B. Russell, [June 1914]
43. To G. E. Moore, 3.7.1914
44. To B. Russell, [Christmas 1914]

## 1915

45. To J. M. Keynes, [4.1.1915]
46. From J. M. Keynes, 10.1.1915
47. To J. M. Keynes, [25.1.1915]
48. From B. Russell, 5.2.1915
49. From B. Russell, 10.5.1915
50. To B. Russell, 22.5.1915
51. To B. Russell, 22.10.1915
52. From B. Russell, 25.11.1915

## 1919

53. To B. Russell, 9.2.1919
54. From B. Russell, 3.3.1919
55. To B. Russell, 10.3.1919
56. To B. Russell, 13.3.1919

57. From J. M. Keynes, 13.5.1919
58. To J. M. Keynes, 12.6.1919
59. To B. Russell, 12.6.1919
60. From B. Russell, 21.6.1919
61. From J. M. Keynes, 28.6.1919
62. From B. Russell, 13.8.1919
63. To B. Russell, 19.8.1919
64. To B. Russell, 30.8.1919
65. From B. Russell, 8.9.1919
66. From B. Russell, 12.9.1919
67. To B. Russell, 6.10.1919
68. From B. Russell, 14.10.1919
69. To B. Russell, 1.11.1919
70. From B. Russell, 13.11.1919
71. To B. Russell, 21.11.1919
72. From B. Russell, 24.11.1919
73. To B. Russell, 27.11.1919
74. From B. Russell, 27.11.1919
75. From B. Russell, [December 1919]

## 1920

76. To B. Russell, 8.1.1920
77. To B. Russell, 19.1.1920
78. From B. Russell, 2.2.1920
79. To B. Russell, 19.3.1920
80. From B. Russell, 19.3.1920
81. To B. Russell, 9.4.1920
82. To B. Russell, 6.5.1920
83. From B. Russell, 1.7.1920
84. To B. Russell, 7.7.1920
85. To B. Russell, 6.8.1920
86. To B. Russell, 20.9.1920

## 1921

87. From B. Russell, 11.2.1921
88. From B. Russell, 3.6.1921
89. To B. Russell, 23.10.1921
90. From B. Russell, 5.11.1921
91. To B. Russell, 28.11.1921
92. From B. Russell, 24.12.1921

## 1922

93. From B. Russell, 7.2.1922
94. To B. Russell, [1922]
95. From B. Russell, [9.5.1922]
96. To B. Russell, [November or December 1922]

## 1923

97. To B. Russell, 7.4.1923
98. To J. M. Keynes, [April 1923]
99. To F. P. Ramsey, [1923]
100. From F. P. Ramsey, 15.10.1923
101. From F. P. Ramsey, 11.11.1923
102. From F. P. Ramsey, 27.12.1923

## 1924

103. From F. P. Ramsey, 20.2.1924
104. From F. P. Ramsey to J. M. Keynes, 24.3.1924
105. From J. M. Keynes, 29.3.1924
106. To J. M. Keynes, 4.7.1924
107. From F. P. Ramsey, 15.9.1924
108. From J. M. Keynes, 27.12.1924

## 1925

109. To J. M. Keynes, 8.7.1925
110. To J. M. Keynes, [July or August 1925]
111. To J. M. Keynes, 7.8.1925
112. To J. M. Keynes, 18.10.1925

## 1927

113. To F. P. Ramsey, 2.7.1927
114. From F. P. Ramsey, [July–August 1927]
115. To J. M. Keynes, [Summer 1927]

## 1928

116. To J. M. Keynes, [1928]

- Gans (Ganz), A., 231  
 Geach, G. E. M., *see* Anscombe  
 Geach, P. T., 101, 340, 419  
 generality, generalization, 30, 62–3, 115, 125, 131, 176  
 Gilpatrick, C., 422, 432  
 Goethe, J. W. von, 3, 2, 5, 34, 416–18  
 Gollancz, V., 337  
 Goodstein, L., 166, 295  
 grammar, 129  
 Grimm, The Brothers, 380, 387, 423  
 Gröger, E., 51  
 Guest, D., 8, 126  
 Gwatkin, F. A. S., 219
- Haldane, J. B. S., 147  
 Hamann, J. G., 436  
 Hänsel, L., 11, 109, 197, 223, 250, 435  
 Hardy, G. H., 6, 28, 37, 104, 142, 155, 202, 243, 265, 289–90  
 Hare, J., 7  
 Heath, A. C., 288, 310  
 Hebel, J. P., 34  
 Hegel, F., 436  
 Heidegger, M., 436  
 Herrick, R., 126  
 Hertz, H., 143, 152, 246, 358  
 Hickman, I., 8, 126  
 Hijab, W., 355, 358, 367, 417  
 Hilbert, D., 102, 176  
 Hintikka, J., 7  
 Hitler, A., 263  
 Hoehstetter (Hochstetter), 176  
 Husserl, E., 420
- identity, 23–6, 28, 30–2, 62, 101–3, 113–14  
 incomplete symbol, 3, 27  
 indefinables, 17, 26; *see also* logic  
 individuals, existence of, 62–3, 113–14; *see also* facts and things  
 induction, 62, 103  
 inference, 3, 4, 25  
 infinity, 30, 32, 125, 129; *see also* axioms  
 Inge, W. R. Dean, 147  
 Inman, J., 145  
 insanity, *see* madness  
 intuition, 175
- James, W., 2, 75, 317  
 Jeans, J., 8, 148, 151, 154, 310  
 Joad, C. E. M., 266  
 Johnson, Dr S., 279, 336, 338  
 Johnson, W. E., 3, 15, 31, 35, 37, 39, 44–7, 51–2, 56, 67, 98, 103–4, 106, 111–12  
 Jolley, B., 69–70, 72–3, 92  
 judgement, Bertrand Russell's theory of, 14, 17; *see also* belief, thought
- Kafka, F., 218  
 Kant, I., 95, 101, 162  
 Kapitsa, P. L., 145  
 Kegan Paul (publishers), 90, 92, 96, 97, 100, 157, 160  
 Keller, G., 34, 305  
 Keynes, G., 5  
 Keynes, J. M., 1–6, 8, 10–12, 37, 56, 59, 78, 99–103, 113–14, 139, 200, 209, 211, 217–18, 222, 240, 270, 275, 336  
 Keynes, J. N., 3  
 Kierkegaard, S., 75, 314, 380  
 King, J., 8  
 Koder, R., 99, 204, 415  
 Kraus, K., 4  
 Kreisel, G., 162, 321, 391, 405
- Lawrence, D. H., 4, 435  
 Lazerowitz, M., 188, 376  
 Leavis, F. R., 7, 126  
 Lee, H. D. P., 8, 136, 145, 153–4, 156, 254  
 Lessing, G. E., 94–5  
 Lewy, C., 5, 99, 107, 160, 231, 246–7, 267, 277, 285, 308, 317  
 Lichtenberg, G. C., 20, 211  
 Littlewood, J. E., 6, 28, 128–9, 134, 155, 202  
 Lloyd George D., 146  
 Lodge, Sir O., 143, 147–8  
 logic, 1, 2, 4, 10, 13, 17, 18, 25, 28, 30, 32–4, 37, 39–41, 48, 53–6, 62–3, 129, 133, 143, 148, 316, 320–1; *see also* propositions of logic  
   indefinables of, 17  
 logical constants, 2, 4–6, 13; *see also* logic  
 logical positivism, 227, 364, 405, 435–6  
 Loos, A., 4  
 Lopokova, L., 5–6, 111

- Lotze, H., 420  
 Lowes Dickinson, G., 147
- Macdonald, M., 316  
 Mace, C. A., 375  
 Mach, E., 11, 341  
 MacLennan, R. D., 163, 168  
 madness, 3, 5, 30, 33–4, 75, 99, 126, 383, 388, 392  
 “mags”, detective magazines, 271, 274, 284, 334–6, 340, 345, 350, 382, 388; *see also* detective stories  
 Maisky, I. M., 190–3  
 Malcolm, (Mrs) L., 380, 385, 387, 390, 393, 396–7, 400, 404, 406, 408, 411, 413–14, 416, 420–2, 429, 432, 436  
 Malcolm, N., 2–3, 11–12, 4, 235, 272, 290–1, 321, 329, 353–4, 371, 376, 394, 398, 418, 430  
 Malleson, Lady C., 56  
 manuscripts, Wittgenstein’s, 8, 23, 25–6, 28, 30, 41, 44, 50–1, 57, 59, 64, 69, 88–9, 94, 127–8, 143–4, 150, 156, 168, 183, 204, 212, 231, 310, 392, 436; *see also* typescripts  
 Marhenke, P., 247  
 Marx, K., 436  
 mathematics, 28, 62, 67, 107, 125, 129, 150–1, 155, 176, 188, 229, 240, 268  
   foundations of, 7, 102–3, 132, 177, 277, 304  
 Maxwell, J. C., 152  
 McKitterick, D., 1,  
 McTaggart, J. M. E., 9  
 meaning  
   and use, 245–6, 290  
   have no, *see* nonsense  
   x by y, 342  
 medicine, medical studies, 126, 190, 192, 214, 307, 312, 369, 426  
 Melville, H., 435  
 Mendelssohn, F., 331  
 Menger, K., 100  
 Meyer, C. F., 291  
 Milton, J., 126  
 Montgomery, General B., 389  
 Mooney, L., 413, 416, 429, 433, 438  
 Moore, Dr, 365  
 Moore, Mrs D., 164, 188, 202, 212, 291, 317, 353  
 Moore, G. E., 1–6, 10–11, 1, 7, 25, 30, 33, 42, 44, 46–7, 49–50, 59–60, 99, 102–4, 118, 126, 128–9, 151, 153, 156, 162, 167, 176, 186, 189–90, 198, 213, 230–1, 238–9, 245, 247, 259, 267, 273–4, 277, 308–9, 317, 329, 339–40, 342, 354, 363, 385, 388, 393, 397, 429, 436, 438  
 Moore, T., 285, 290, 292, 331–2  
 “Moore’s paradox”, 316, 339, 342  
 Moral Science Club, 10, 7, 31, 120–1, 189, 199, 236, 238, 245–7, 267, 273, 285, 287, 290, 297, 316, 319–20, 327, 339, 342, 344, 355–6, 357–9  
 Morgan, Rev. W., 328–9, 349  
 Mörike, E., 34  
 Morrell, Lady O., 3, 2, 17, 33, 36  
 Mozart, W. A., 5, 34, 126, 275, 417  
 Murdoch, I., 369  
 Muscio, B., 31, 39  
 music, 1–3, 5, 26, 32, 34, 40, 87, 126, 176, 182, 275, 287, 331–2, 407, 415, 417  
 Myers, C. S., 2  
 mysticism, 75, 126, 148
- name, *see* proper name  
 national character, 170–1, 320  
 naturalization, 10, 216, 218–19, 222, 236, 249, 280  
 Nelson, J. O., 416, 433  
 Nestroy, J. N., 250  
 Newman, J. H., 320  
 Newman, M. H. A., 188, 268  
 Newton, I., 132, 358, 439  
 Nicholas, T., 215  
 nonsense, have no meaning, 19, 26, 113–14, 129, 144, 238  
   Wittgenstein’s Collection of, 140, 142–3, 146, 148, 153, 162, 265, 282, 389, 428  
 Norman, Mr and Mrs, 176  
 Nourse, Dr, 300  
 number, 56, 62, 101, 132, 155, 246
- Ogden, C. K., 5, 62, 90, 92–3, 95, 97–9, 101, 103, 107

- Ostwald, W., 82, 90–4  
 “Other Minds”, 273, 295
- Pattison, G., 203, 218, 226
- Paul, G., 231, 347
- Perry, R. B., 52
- philosophy, 4, 7, 9, 60, 63, 86–7, 99, 123,  
 127, 147–8, 156, 158, 182, 198, 238,  
 246, 283–4, 308, 320, 355, 357–8,  
 370, 382, 398, 400, 403, 405,  
 422, 439  
   history of, 140, 165
- physics, 7, 30, 140, 148, 152, 213, 268
- physiognomy, 170–2
- Piccoli, R., 8
- Pinsent, D. H., 5, 21, 30, 33, 43, 46, 51–2,  
 79, 85, 105
- Planck, M., 154
- Plato, 266
- poetry, 2, 34, 291–2
- poles of a proposition, 26–8, 30
- Pope, A., 126, 336
- Popper, K. R., 246, 355–6, 358, 365
- Postgate, J. P., 97
- Prescott, W. H., 380
- Price, H. H., 243, 299, 359
- Priestley, R. E., 117–18, 142, 178, 180,  
 294
- Prince, D. T., 245–6
- probability, 287, 320  
   JMK’s book, 58, 61, 105  
   question solved in the *Tractatus*, 58, 62
- proper name, 11, 26, 113
- propositions  
   analysis of, theory of, 11, 17, 26–7, 62–3  
   atomic, 6, 62  
   elementary, 28, 30, 62–3  
   molecular, 25  
   non-logical, substantial, 30, 62  
   of logic, 2, 28, 30, 62  
   primitive, 19, 25, 28  
   subject–predicate, 6, 11  
   see also poles of a proposition
- psychic research and phenomena, 143, 148
- psychoanalysis, 101, 103, 148, 343
- psychology, 2, 3, 63  
   and logic, 143, 148, 316, 339  
   Gestalt psychology, 348
- publication plans, 9–10, 22, 30, 51–3, 55–6,  
 59, 64, 66–8, 73, 75–8, 84, 88, 90,  
 92–3, 96, 125, 142–3, 146–7, 156–7,  
 158, 160, 180, 190, 196–78, 205, 215,  
 227, 231, 235, 263, 270, 310, 318,  
 330, 334, 369, 422  
   attitude towards publication, 10, 147, 158,  
   198, 213, 251, 316, 351, 364, 379, 422
- Racine, J., 126
- Ramsey, F. P., 1–2, 5–7, 9, 12, 62, 92, 111,  
 125, 129, 132, 155, 157, 160
- real variables, abolished, 17
- Reclam publishing house, 77–8, 82, 84
- Redpath, T., 231, 236, 238, 245–6, 248
- relations, 5, 11, 14, 30
- religion, religious writings, 75, 94, 115, 126,  
 143, 148, 184, 214, 266, 279, 314,  
 336, 338, 370, 396, 435
- Respinger, M., 140, 149
- Rhees, R., 2, 8, 11–12, 3, 201–2, 205–6, 212,  
 239–40, 246, 249, 274, 308–9, 312,  
 314–15, 334–7, 350–1, 380, 394–5,  
 406, 417, 426
- Rhine, J. B., 428
- Richards, R. B. (Ben), 42, 369, 390, 393, 399,  
 426–7, 430
- Ritchie, A. D., 97
- Rockefeller Foundation, 422, 426, 432
- Rollins, C. D., 393
- Rommel, Field Marshall E., 431, 435–7
- Russell, B., 1–6, 10, 12, 24, 29, 31, 37, 43,  
 46–7, 57–8, 61, 99–104, 114, 127,  
 132–4, 156, 195, 243, 266, 268, 282,  
 291, 317, 329, 355, 359, 369, 380
- Russell, L. J., 243
- Russia, 83, 115, 185, 190–3, 195–6, 261, 268
- Rylands, D., 7, 126
- Ryle, G., 204, 236, 365, 420–1, 435–6
- Ryle, J., 294–5
- Salzer, F., 275
- Sayers, D., 388
- Schilpp, P., 291, 316, 339, 355
- Schlick, M., 113–14, 127, 147, 150, 231, 409
- Schrenck Notzing, A. von, 100
- Schubert, F., 332–3, 405
- Schubert, H. (mathematician), 101

- Schulte, J., 9
- Schumann, R. and C., 332, 417
- science, 126  
     and intuition, 174  
     and philosophy, 148, 150  
     and religion, 154
- Scott, R. F., 117
- Scrutton, M., 436
- self-contradictory, 28
- self-evident, 267–8
- Sen, A., 8
- sense-data, 11, 25, 44, 246, 259
- Shackleton, E., 117
- Shah, K. J., 340, 390
- showing (expressing), 63
- Sidgwick (Sedgwick), H., 37
- signs  
     relation to things, 5  
     system of, 30; *see also* symbolism
- Sjögren, A., 42, 272, 328
- Sjögren, Frau M., 69, 71, 73, 77
- Skinner, F., 1, 7–8, 166, 171, 176, 180, 182–3, 196, 200, 204–5, 211–12, 215, 231, 272, 277, 279, 284, 288, 293–4, 380
- Smuts, General, 143
- Smythies, Y., 8–9, 231, 240, 246, 253, 270–1, 274, 277, 284, 289, 293, 304, 308–9, 320–1, 330, 338, 340, 342–3, 350, 366, 370, 380, 385, 388, 392, 403–4, 415, 420, 428–9, 432–3, 435, 438
- Snow, C. P., 8
- Society, The, “The Apostles”, 3–4, 6–8, 37, 119, 126, 229
- Socrates, 6, 11, 267
- solipsism, 273
- Sorley, W. R., 117
- space  
     and possibility, 129  
     and time relative, 34
- Spengler, O., 9, 64, 249, 427
- Sraffa, P., 1, 8–12, 219, 229, 266–7, 270, 275
- Stevenson, C. L., 166, 176, 178, 316
- Stockert, M. von, 115, 204, 328
- Stonborough, J. J., 249, 328
- Stonborough, M., 102–3, 115, 127, 204, 220, 235, 275, 280, 375
- Stonborough, T. S., 102
- Strachey, L., 3, 246
- Sullivan, J. W. N., 140
- symbolism, 8, 11, 26, 63; *see also* incomplete symbol, signs
- taste, 171–2
- tautology, 28, 30, 32, 35, 49, 62, 113–14
- Taylor, J. C., 176, 228
- Temple, G., 155
- Thomson, G., 205
- thought, 62, 63; *see also* belief, judgement
- Thouless, R., 266, 294, 299, 304, 317, 321
- time, philosophical problems of, 34, 49, 246, 268, 344, 358
- Tolstoy, L., 4, 6, 75, 329–30, 335, 337
- Toulmin, S., 355, 436
- Tovey, D. F., 5
- Townsend, R., 8, 151, 156
- Toynbee, A. J., 428
- Trevelyan, G. M., 56, 59, 282
- Trevelyan, J., 7
- Trinity College, Cambridge, 3, 6–7, 10, 85, 122–3, 127–9, 133–5, 137, 152, 188, 201, 213, 215, 237, 278, 282, 372, 439
- truth, 28, 141  
     theory of, 56  
     truth-functions, 26–7
- Turing, A. M., 413
- types, theory of, 11, 21–3, 63, 103
- typescripts, 23, 28, 59, 68, 127–9, 197, 205, 235, 239–41, 366, 393–4, 407  
     the Big Typescript, 183, 197–8
- typing of lectures, notes and manuscripts, 23, 26, 127, 166–7, 176, 182, 235, 239, 366, 376, 393, 405, 407
- Ursell, H. D., 155
- variables, *see* apparent variables; real variables
- Verification Principle, 204, 238, 436
- Vienna Opera House, 100
- Vinogradoff, S., 191–2
- vivisection, 139
- Voltaire, 126
- Volterra, V., 150
- Waismann, F., 113, 127, 147, 150, 213, 215, 231, 409, 435–6
- Warburg, F. J., 157