A COMPANION TO POST-1945 AMERICA

Edited by

Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig

Blackwell Publishing

A Companion to Post-1945 America

BLACKWELL COMPANIONS TO AMERICAN HISTORY

This series provides essential and authoritative overviews of the scholarship that has shaped our present understanding of the American past. Edited by eminent historians, each volume tackles one of the major periods or themes of American history, with individual topics authored by key scholars who have spent considerable time in research on the questions and controversies that have sparked debate in their field of interest. The volumes are accessible for the non-specialist, while also engaging scholars seeking a reference to the historiography or future concerns.

Published

A Companion to the American Revolution
Edited by Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole
A Companion to 19th-Century America
Edited by William L. Barney
A Companion to the American South
Edited by John B. Boles
A Companion to American Indian History
Edited by Philip J. Deloria and Neal Salisbury
A Companion to American Women's History
Edited by Nancy A. Hewitt
A Companion to Post-1945 America
Edited by Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig
A Companion to the Vietnam War
Edited by Marilyn Young and Robert Buzzanco

In preparation

A Companion to Colonial America
Edited by Daniel Vickers
A Companion to 20th-Century America
Edited by Stephen J. Whitfield
A Companion to the American West
Edited by William Deverell
A Companion to American Foreign Relations
Edited by Robert Schulzinger

BLACKWELL COMPANIONS TO HISTORY

Published

A Companion to Western Historical Thought
Edited by Lloyd Kramer and Sarah Maza

In preparation

A Companion to Gender History
Edited by Teresa Meade and Merry E. Weisner-Hanks

BLACKWELL COMPANIONS TO EUROPEAN HISTORY

Published

A Companion to the Worlds of the Renaissance
Edited by Guido Ruggiero
A Companion to Europe Since 1945
Edited by Klaus Larres
A Companion to Europe 1900–1945
Edited by Gordon Martel

In preparation

A Companion to the Reformation World
Edited by R. Po-Chia Hsia

BLACKWELL COMPANIONS TO BRITISH HISTORY

Published

A Companion to Britain in the Later Middle Ages
Edited by S. H. Rigby
A Companion to Stuart Britain
Edited by Barry Coward
A Companion to Eighteenth-Century Britain
Edited by H. T. Dickinson
A Companion to Early Twentieth-Century Britain
Edited by Chris Wrigley

In preparation

A Companion to Roman Britain
Edited by Malcolm Todd
A Companion to Britain in the Early Middle Ages
Edited by Pauline Stafford
A Companion to Tudor Britain
Edited by Robert Tittler and Norman Jones
A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Britain
Edited by Chris Williams
A Companion to Contemporary Britain
Edited by Paul Addison and Harriet Jones

BLACKWELL COMPANIONS TO WORLD HSTORY

In preparation

A Companion to the History of Africa
Edited by Joseph Miller
A Companion to the History of the Middle East
Edited by Youssef M. Choueiri

A COMPANION TO POST-1945 AMERICA

Edited by

Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig

Blackwell Publishing

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5018, USA
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK
550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia
Kurfürstendamm 57, 10707 Berlin, Germany

First published 2002 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for.

ISBN 0-631-22325-8 (hardback)

A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library.

Set in 10 on 12 pt Galliard
by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong
Printed and bound in the United Kingdom
by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

For further information on
Blackwell Publishing, visit our website:
http://www.blackwellpublishing.com

Contents

Illustrations

About the Contributors

Jean-Christophe Agnew is Professor of American Studies and History at Yale University. He is the author of *Worlds Apart: The Market and the Theater in Anglo-American Thought, 1550–1750*, and of a number of articles on the history of market society and consumer culture.

Patrick N. Allitt was born and raised in Britain but studied for the Ph.D. in American History at the University of California, Berkeley. He has been Professor of American History at Emory University since 1988 and is the author of two books, and editor of a third, on religious and intellectual history.

Beth Bailey teaches in the American Studies department at the University of New Mexico, where she is also Regents Lecturer and director of the Feminist Research Institute. Her recent publications include *Sex in the Heartland* and *The Columbia Guide to America in the 1960s.*

Alan Brinkley is Allan Nevins Professor of History at Columbia University. He is the author of *Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression*; *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*; and *Liberalism and its Discontents.* He is presently writing a biography of Henry R. Luce.

Thomas S. Blanton is Director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University. His books include *White House E-Mail: The Top Secret Computer Messages the Reagan–Bush White House Tried to Destroy* (1995), and as co-author, *The Chronology* (1987), *Litigation Under the Federal Open Government Laws* (1993), and *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940* (1998).

David L. Chappell teaches history at the University of Arkansas and is the author of *Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement* (l994) and *A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion, Political Culture, and the Triumph of Civil Rights* (2002). His articles have appeared in the *Journal of American Studies*, *In These Times*, and *World Policy Studies.*

Susan G. Davis is Research Professor of Communications and Library and Information Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. She received her Ph.D. in Folklore and Folklife from the University of Pennsylvania, and has written and taught widely on folk performance and public space, popular culture and the commercial mass media, and tourism.

Erika Doss is Professor of Art History in the Department of Fine Arts, University of Colorado, and specializes in twentieth-century American art. She is the author of *Benton, Pollock, and the Politics of Modernism: From Regionalism to Abstract Expressionism* (1991); *Spirit Poles and Flying Pigs: Public Art and Cultural Democracy in American Communities* (1995); *Elvis Culture: Fans, Faith, and Image* (1999); *Looking at Life Magazine* (editor, 2001); and the forthcoming *Twentieth-Century American Art* (2002).

Susan J. Douglas is Catherine Neafie Kellogg Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Michigan. She is the author of *Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899–1922*; *Where the Girls Are: Growing Up Female with the Mass Media*; and *Listening In: Radio and the American Imagination*. She is completing a book on the changing representations of motherhood in the mass media since 1970.

Mary L. Dudziak teaches law and history at the University of Southern California Law School. She received her J. D. and Ph.D. in American Studies from Yale University. She is the author of *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (2000).

Carolyn Eisenberg is Professor of US History and American Foreign Policy at Hofstra University. She is the author of *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–49*. Her book received the Stuart L. Bernath Prize for the Historians of Foreign Relations and the 1996 Herbert Hoover Book Award.

James T. Fisher is a cultural historian of religion and ethnicity in the United States. He is the author of *The Catholic Counterculture in America, 1933–1962* (1989); *Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley, 1927–1961* (1997); and *Catholics in America* (2000).

Joshua B. Freeman is Professor of History at Queens College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York, and co-editor of *International Labor and Working-Class History*. His books include *In Transit: The Transport Workers Union in New York City, 1933–1966* and *Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since World War II*.

Kevin Gaines teaches in the history department and the Center for Afro-American and African Studies at the University of Michigan. He is writing a book on African American and Caribbean expatriates in Ghana and the intersection between the US black freedom movement, the decolonization of Africa, and the Cold War.

Linda Gordon teaches history at New York University. Her most recent book is *The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction*. A completely revised and updated version of her history of birth control was due to be reissued in 2002.

Van Gosse received his Ph.D. from Rutgers, New Brunswick. He has taught at Wellesley and Trinity, and currently is at Franklin and Marshall. He has also worked as a Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) organizer, director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, and organizing director of Peace Action. He is writing a history of black politics and Black Power.

Greg Grandin worked with the Guatemalan Truth Commission and is an Assistant Professor of History at New York University. His book, *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation*, won the Latin American Studies Association's Bryce Wood Award. He is also the editor of *Denagado en su Totalidad*, a collection of United States declassified documents published in Guatemala.

David Hunt is a Professor of History at the University of Massachusetts at Boston, where he has been teaching and writing about the Vietnam War since 1969. His most recent publication is "Grunts and Historians: Recent Representations of Vietnam Veterans," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 32/4 (2000): 61–70.

Matthew Frye Jacobson is Professor of American Studies, History, and African American Studies at Yale. He is the author of *Barbarian Virtues: The U.S. Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad* (2000); *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (1998); and *Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States* (1995).

Richard H. King is Professor of American Intellectual History at the University of Nottingham, UK. He is the author most recently of *Civil Rights and the Idea of Freedom* (1992), and is completing an intellectual history of the ideas of race and culture between 1940 and 1975.

Stephen Lassonde teaches history at Yale University. He is associate editor of the *International Encyclopedia of the History of Childhood*, and author of *Learning to Forget: Schooling and Family Life in New Haven's Working Class, 1870–1940*. He is currently collaborating with Linda Mayes on a history of child development during the 1950s and 1960s.

Nelson Lichtenstein is the author of *State of the Union: A Century of American Labor*; *Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit*; and other books. He is writing a history of post-World War II politics and political economy in the United States. He teaches history at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Melani McAlister is at the American Studies department at George Washington University in Washington, DC, where she teaches courses on globalization, cultural theory, and US cultural history. She is the author of *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000*.

Nancy MacLean is Associate Professor of History and African American Studies at Northwestern University. The author of *Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan* (1994), she is now writing a history of affirmative action in employment, entitled *The Work of Inclusion: Contesting Racial and Gender Inequality on the Job in Modern America*.

James I. Matray is Professor of History at New Mexico State University. His research focuses on US foreign relations during and after World War II, with emphasis on Korea and Japan. Matray's publications include *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950*; *Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction, and Disarmament*; and *Japan's Emergence as a Global Power*.

Elaine Tyler May, Professor of American Studies and History at the University of Minnesota, is the author of *Great Expectations: Marriage and Divorce in Post-Victorian America* (1980); *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (1988, 1999); *Pushing the Limits: American Women, 1940–1961* (1994); and *Barren in the Promised Land: Childless Americans and the Pursuit of Happiness* (1997).

David S. Painter, Department of History and Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, is the author of *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1954* (1986), and *The Cold War: An International History* (1999), as well as co-editor (with Melvyn P. Leffler) of *Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (1994).

Roy Rosenzweig is College of Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of History and Director of the Center for History and New Media at George Mason University. He is the author, co-author, and co-editor of a number of books, including *The Presence of the Past: Popular Uses of History in American Life*.

Ellen Schrecker is Professor of History at Yeshiva University. She has written extensively about McCarthyism, including *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities* (1986) and *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (1998). She is currently revising *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents* and co-editing a collection of essays on the Cold War.

Robert O. Self is Assistant Professor of History and a fellow in the Michigan Society of Fellows at the University of Michigan. His first book, to be published in 2003, deals with race, class, and the geographies of urban political culture in California after 1945. His next project focuses on gender politics and cultures of masculinity in the postwar American city.

Thomas J. Sugrue is Bicentennial Class of 1940 Professor of History and Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. His publications include *The Origins of the Urban Crisis*, which won the Bancroft Prize, and *W. E. B. DuBois, Race, and the City*. He is currently writing books on civil rights in the urban North and on the history of America in the twentieth century.

Allen Tullos is Associate Professor of American Studies at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. He is website coordinator of *americanroutes.com* and editor of the quarterly journal, *Southern Changes.*

Ian Tyrrell is a Professor in the School of History, University of New South Wales, in Sydney, Australia, and currently is Head of School. He is author, among other books, of *True Gardens of the Gods: Californian–Australian Environmental Reform, 1860–1930* (1999).

J. Samuel Walker is historian of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He is the author or co-author of four books on the history of nuclear energy and has published articles on the subject in *Diplomatic History*, *Isis*, *JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association*, *Pacific Historical Review*, *Technology and Culture*, and other journals.

Robert E. Weems, Jr. is a Professor of History at the University of Missouri-Columbia. His publications include *Black Business in the Black Metropolis: The Chicago Metropolitan Assurance Company, 1925–1985* (1996); *Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in the Twentieth Century* (1998); and *The African-American Experience: An Historiographical and Bibliographical Guide* (2001), co-edited with Arvarh E. Strickland.

Jon Wiener teaches American history at the University of California, Irvine, and is a contributing editor to the *Nation*. He has also written for the *New York Times Magazine*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *New Republic*, as well as the *American Historical Review* and *Past and Present*. His most recent book is *Gimme Some Truth: The John Lennon FBI Files.*

Robert Westbrook teaches American history at the University of Rochester. He is the author of *John Dewey and American Democracy* (1991), as well as a wide range of articles dissecting modern American political culture.

Julian E. Zelizer is Associate Professor of History and Public Policy at State University of New York, Albany. He is the author of *Taxing America: Wilbur D. Mills, Congress, and the State, 1945–1975*, winner of the 1998 D. B. Hardeman Prize and the 2000 Ellis Hawley Prize. He is completing a history of congressional reform between World War II and 2000. Additionally, he is editing the *Reader's Companion to the American Congress.*

Introduction

Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig

The title of this Blackwell Companion – *Post-1945 America* – says a good deal about the difficulties that beset anyone looking to encapsulate the past half-century of American history. The period is still unnamed and unplaced in the broad genealogy of the American past. At least, that is the impression one takes from the titles of many of the surveys that have thus far been published: *The Unfinished Journey*, *Moving On*, *Grand Expectations*, and, simplest of all, *More* (Chafe, 1998; Moss, 1994; Patterson, 1996; Collins, 2000). If the period is still "busy being born," perhaps that is because no one yet dares to write its epitaph. We know, or think we know, when the period began, which is to say on or around the dropping of the first atomic bomb on August 6, 1945. But we are not so certain when, or even whether, it has ended.

Some historians might point to the mid-1970s as an appropriate milestone or tombstone for the "postwar era"; Watergate, the oil crisis, and the defeat in Vietnam all marking the end of what Henry Luce had heralded in 1941 as the American Century. Others would no doubt choose 1989 or 1991 – the years of communism's collapse – to designate the end of the twentieth century, if not the end of history itself. Still others would identify September 11, 2001 as the point at which "everything changed." But even the most recent divisions leave the awkward remainder of our current moment. It is as if, having outlived our own historical obituary, we find ourselves belated and not much else: post-Cold War, yes, but postcolonial, postindustrial, and postmodern as well. Our title, then, is more than a convenient placeholder, for "*Post-*1945" captures the compound sense of our last half-century as a sequence of aftermaths: a series of almost compulsive reckonings with a world made *before* 1945. On the one hand, we are awash in books, films, and memorials on the Good War and the Greatest Generation; on the other, we behold a concerted effort to dismantle the so-called "safety nets" woven by that same generation – from Social Security to Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaties.

The ambivalence with which we look back upon the odyssey of the past fifty years is likewise visible in the titles of the historical surveys that have appeared in the interim: *A Troubled Journey*, *A Troubled Feast*, *Affluence and Anxiety*, *Present Tense*, to name just a few (Siegel, 1984; Leuchtenburg, 1973; Degler, 1968; Schaller et al., 1992). To be sure, these phrases bespeak something more than the mixed judgment of the historians who use them; they also evoke the conflicting emotions that Americans of the time experienced toward their new, global hegemony. A source of pride at one moment could in the blink of an eye feel like a hostage relationship. Vietnam,

the oil embargo, and the Iranian embassy crisis were of course the most dramatic instances of that hostage-anxiety, while the strident Ramboism of foreign policy and popular culture in the Reagan–Bush years supplied the most conspicuous campaigns to redeem, if not erase, these humiliations. In one way or another, Americans were struggling to come to terms with what Tom Engelhardt (1995) has called the "end of victory culture."

Yet one could argue that Ramboism turned the knife in these wounds far more than it healed them. As a result, Americans in search of historical consolation in the 1990s found themselves looking past Vietnam, past Korea, to the unambiguously successful sacrifices of World War II. Steven Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* (1998) was the quintessential expression of this *fin-de-siècle* nostalgia, for its pitch-perfect reproduction of every formula of the classic combat film barely concealed the fact that its narrative energies were drawn almost entirely from the post-Vietnam missing-in-action story. Irony thus shadowed even this effort to push our nostalgia for victory culture to a politically "safer" place *before* 1945. How could one "save" Private Ryan, after all, without rescuing the same post-1945 triumphalist rationale that had so confidently and complacently dispatched eighteen-year-olds to Vietnam in the first place? How could one save Private Ryan, in other words, without also forgetting a good deal of postwar history – not just the Vietnam War, but also Korea and the red scare era of the 1940s and 1950s.

It is hardly a surprise, then, that scholars have stepped into the half-century gap between the beginning and end of victory culture in order to write history in place of nostalgia. Nostalgia-buffs steep the object of their desire in a warm, sepia bath of wistful, or camp, affection. (On pervasive nostalgia for the postwar period, see, for example, Lambrose, 1988.) Historians, in contrast, are more apt to wrestle with their subject, and never more so than in the narratives of post-1945 America, where many so often find their own autobiographies – their own memories – intersecting the chronicle of headlined events. For this very reason, traditionalists have dismissed "contemporary history" as mere journalism, the "first draft" for a more rigorously researched and sober-sided *history*. Yet given the enormous variety of documents available over the past fifty years – from opinion polls and television scripts to e-mail and Oval office tapes – and given the gradual declassification of many critical documents, it seems pointless to wait for yet more dust to settle when the true challenge is to make historical sense of the blooming, buzzing confusion of evidence. Road maps are in order, if only to be able to glimpse our destination.

So the "unfinished journey" is an especially appropriate description for a volume that, like this one, focuses on the *historiography* of the postwar even more than on its history. Even if we grant that the key events of the postwar era have already unfolded, we can hardly say the same thing for the key historical works that will ultimately characterize – and name – the period. Still, if there is anything we have discovered in the process of editing this volume, it is that the work historians have produced on the post-1945 period has been far more impressive than the traditionalists would have predicted. The "first draft," if that is what it is, looks pretty good.

And pretty comprehensive as well. In the 1970s, when the two of us were in graduate school, it would have been impossible to come up with a comprehensive exam reading list of books on the post-1945 period, at least one written by professional historians. Except perhaps for diplomatic history, where debates over the origins of

the Cold War were already raging, there was simply no historiography to assign. A quarter-century later, the problem has been reversed: it is now virtually impossible for a single person to master the full historical literature on the era. A glance at the bibliographies to the essays in this volume will quickly confirm this claim. Surely no other period in US history has produced such an explosion of scholarship as this one has over the past two decades alone. Surely no other field has emerged so rapidly.

To take stock of this burgeoning historical literature, even as it continues to roll off the presses, is the daunting task that our authors have undertaken here. Necessarily, then, their essays and this volume must be offered as provisional and unfinished – a work in progress. While we might all wish for a more suitably meditative distance on the period, we have reason enough to take stock, in Lionel Trilling's phrase, in "the middle of the journey." At the very least, those who will be writing and reading the histories of the next two decades will need to assess in what ways and how well the terrain has already been charted. And though we do not claim this volume to be the definitive Michelin Guide to the historiography of the postwar era, we do see it as, well, a useful companion – a kind of "Lonely Planet" for the more adventurous traveler.

In keeping with that spirit of adventure, we have made this volume a wide-ranging exploration. We have included essays extending across economic, social, political, cultural, intellectual, and diplomatic history. Moreover, the essays themselves are panoramic. There are gaps, to be sure. Some reflect the uneven development of the historical literature; others simply could not fit into a volume even as long as this one. And in a few cases – political economy, science and technology, the United States and Africa, Native Americans, and the welfare state – the essays could not be completed in enough time to be included here. Historiography, like history, has its deadlines, and we did not want to delay publication of a volume that already offered both broad and timely coverage of the era.

Given the evolving state of the historical scholarship, it is not surprising that the maps offered in the thirty-four chapters that make up this guide differ greatly in cartographic strategy, not to mention the level of detail. The essays on political history – the Cold War, the Vietnam War, McCarthyism, the New Left, and civil rights, for example – address subfields rich in bibliography and steeped in controversy. In those cases, the essays resemble the more traditional historiographical review one is likely to find, say, on the Civil War or Reconstruction periods. In other essays – music and leisure and tourism, for example – the literature may be large without having coalesced around particular debates. Those authors provide something more like a bibliographic essay, surveying and cataloguing what has been written thus far. And in yet other essays – environmentalism and the visual arts, for instance – the authors are reporting on areas where the historical literature is only now emerging. The authors of such essays are more likely to devote their attention to the key events and themes of the period, effectively offering their own preliminary sketch of what the field or subfield is shaping up to be.

That is not to say that the new fields are the most "unfinished" ones. Take the Cold War essays, for example. Their topics may boast the oldest intellectual genealogies of the whole volume, but as the contributions of Ellen Schrecker, Greg Grandin, Carolyn Eisenberg, and David Painter and Thomas Blanton make clear, the ongoing and hotly debated process of document declassification – especially the US ones –

makes any definitive claim that "we now know" the history of the post-1945 era a dubious assumption at best. There are more than a few interpretive surprises in store for the reader of this companion.

Diverse as the topics and approaches may be, there are still some common themes that emerge from the essays as a whole. Not surprisingly, many authors still insist upon the key interpretive touchstones – especially the Cold War and the turbulent events summarized in the phrase "the Sixties." But if these landmarks survive, historians have found new ways to navigate around and through them, and of the first measures of distance to fall in the new historiography has been the decade-marker itself. If historians continue to write of the 1960s, for example, it is of a "decade" that begins in the mid-1950s and lingers into the mid-1970s. Here, perhaps, the intersection between history and autobiography is most visible, and more than one of our contributors reflects on the degree to which his or her field was itself generated, or regenerated, by the civil rights and liberation movements of the time. History "from the bottom up" has had its impact upon the last two decades of post-1945 historiography.

Yet pathbreaking as this work has been, we have nonetheless been struck by the persistence of older conventions and protocols of historical writing. The topics may be post-1945, but the approaches are rarely, if ever, poststructuralist, and you will find few contributors careening around the linguistic, or even culturalist, turn. Nor has there been much in the way of interdisciplinary exploration, as Julian Zelizer points out. True, this absence may be an artifact of our own editorial choices, but we suspect that it reflects as well the evidentiary burdens and methodological rigors felt by historians seeking to blaze new trails and, of course, to persuade skeptical colleagues. So, where we might have expected to announce the marriage of history and cultural studies in the post-1945 period, we can at this point report little more than the first, tentative engagement.

We have ourselves relied on relatively conventional organizational devices to place the thirty-four chapters in this volume into four roughly equal sections. Part I surveys "Society and Culture" in the postwar period; it includes chapters on family and demography, cities, religion, leisure and tourism, mass media, popular music, the visual arts, and social thought. Part II takes up social change and social movements in the post-World War II period, with chapters on political culture, immigrants and ethnicity, workers and unions, African Americans and civil rights, women and the women's movement, sexuality and movements for sexual liberation, the New Left, conservatism and environmentalism.

Part III surveys politics and foreign policy, including articles on political power, McCarthyism, and the Supreme Court, as well as key topics in American foreign relations – the origins of the Cold War in Europe, the United States and its relations with Latin America and Asia, the Vietnam War, the end of the Cold War, and the debates about nuclear weapons, nuclear fear, and nuclear power. The final section takes an entirely different approach. We wanted to devote some attention to particular works of importance – books that some scholars would regard as "essential reading." We asked eight scholars to offer reflections on a book that has shaped their thinking about the recent history of the United States. We thought that this would be an interesting way to focus attention on a set of books of lasting importance and an opportunity to comment on the significance (and limits) of a key book. We

especially encouraged contributors to think about less obvious works and works by nonacademic historians. Significantly, six of the eight authors chose works that are more than fifteen years old (four of them more than twenty years old), a sign that while the field is mostly young and changing, a canon has already begun to form.

We are grateful to our thirty-six authors for their willingness to undertake this difficult and time-consuming assignment, for their responsiveness to our comments, for their adherence to a tight schedule, and, not least of all, for the very fine essays that they have written. We also greatly appreciate the help and support of Ken Provencher and Susan Rabinowitz at Blackwell. We are also indebted to Brigitte Lee for her careful and cheerful work on the copyediting and proofreading and to Jim O'Brien for his superb index. Our immediate families – Rita Rack, Winnie Agnew, and Deborah Kaplan – have cheerfully tolerated incessant interruptions caused by this project and have offered crucial advice and support, as have our many old friends in the Memorial Day picnic crowd. We also thank a number of scholars – especially Jennifer Brier, Philip Deloria, Gary Gerstle, Nancy Hewitt, Nelson Lichtenstein, James Sparrow, John Summers, Robert Westbrook, Shane White – who supplied helpful suggestions on potential authors and other matters. We have learned an enormous amount from our conversations with them and with our contributors, and we have learned even more from the essays that fill this volume. These essays have been our companions for some time now, and we are delighted to make them yours as well.

REFERENCES

Chafe, William H.: *The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Collins, Robert M.: *More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Degler, Carl: *Affluence and Anxiety* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1968).

Engelhardt, Tom: *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation* (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

Lambrose, R. J.: "Rebel Without His Clothes," *Radical History Review*, 42 (1988): 195–6.

Leuchtenburg, William E.: *A Troubled Feast: American Society Since 1945* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).

Moss, George Donelson: *Moving On: The American People Since 1945* (Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1994).

Patterson, James T.: *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Schaller, Michael, Scharff, Virginia, and Schulzinger, Robert D.: *Present Tense: The United States Since 1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992).

Siegel, Frederick F.: *Troubled Journey: From Pearl Harbor to Ronald Reagan* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984).

PART I

Society and Culture

CHAPTER ONE

Family and Demography in Postwar America: A Hazard of New Fortunes?

STEPHEN LASSONDE

Since the mid-1960s the proportion of children living in two-parent households has declined for all groups in the United States, a trend that has elicited responses – popular and scholarly – ranging from consternation to mild satisfaction. While the ill-fated "Moynihan Report" (US Department of Labor, 1965) promoted single-parent headship as the chief cause of "family breakdown" among African Americans, the subsequent decline of two-parent households among whites has provoked more generalized concern about the health of family life in the United States. As long as single-parent headship was linked exclusively to the "disorganization" of a group as patently oppressed as African Americans and the cause of their immiseration could be hung on slavery and Jim Crow, single-parenthood could be regarded as a remote, if malformed, adaptation to the harsh conditions imposed by the evils and ignorance of generations past. At the close of the twentieth century, however, it became increasingly difficult to dismiss as a cultural perversion a social change of such magnitude: by the late 1990s, more than a quarter of all white children were being raised in the home of one parent, and divorce was the leading cause of this trend.

Other, "worrisome," developments had contributed to the rise in single-parent households, namely, the spreading acceptance of premarital sex, the consequent increase of teen pregnancy and illegitimate births among white females, and from an unanticipated source – growing numbers of women who were choosing to conceive and raise children outside of wedlock. Still more trends added to the list of concerns over the status of marriage and family life: a birth rate barely at replacement level; a historically high ratio of adults who have never married; and increasing numbers of couples who choose to cohabit rather than marry. These developments were all the more striking since family life during the two decades after the war had witnessed a seeming return to more tradition-bound patterns of marriage and childrearing. Politicians, policymakers, and some social scientists pointed to these trends with alarm. They declared the end of the family, the decay of the social fabric.

I would like to thank the editors, Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig, for their helpful comments on, and close reading of, several earlier drafts of this essay, as well as John Modell and Matthew Broder for their many excellent and timely suggestions.

Historians, more circumspect in their assessments, disagree about the meaning of these changes and even how much change has occurred. Some decry the family's "decline" and argue that the function, form, and feeling of family life have altered irrevocably since World War II. Others have drawn attention to the fact that divorce has replaced death as the primary cause of single-parent headship, the resurgence of "blended families," and step-parenting (Smith, 1995; Ruggles, 1994). Households, moreover, include fewer extended kin and unrelated individuals than at any time in the past (Ruggles and Goeken, 1992). As a site for reproduction, child nurture, and the pooling of economic resources, some historians argue, the family has demonstrated tremendous elasticity in its ability to accommodate changing economic and social relations. Compared with the social and behavioral sciences, however, the historical literature on family life in the postwar period is relatively thin and uneven. Whereas interpersonal and social relations have been key concerns of the behavioral and social sciences for more than a century, historians have been latecomers to the widening discourse on family life in the United States and did not fully turn to the study of family and kinship until the late 1960s. Contemporary historical study of family life was initiated by Philippe Ariès in 1960, but the earliest full-length studies of family and kinship in the United States did not appear until a decade later (Demos, 1970; Greven, 1970). Elemental questions about household structure, life span and cycle, inheritance practices, the functioning of family groups bound together by common (if not mutual) economic and emotional interests, and a host of other concerns that filled people's daily lives from cradle to grave absorbed the attentions of this first wave of scholars in family history. These historians must have felt themselves at the very heart of the movement to compose a comprehensive "history of everyday life" that was ascendant in the early 1970s.

Lost or sidestepped in the effort, however, was a similar accounting for changes in African American family life since World War II. There is no shortage of theory, speculation, and empirical analysis by social scientists of African American family life since 1945, but there remains little scholarship written by historians; and even what little historiography there is displays preoccupations quite remote from those of social scientists concerned with African American families in the same period. The social sciences are "problem"-driven disciplines, which may explain why their attentions have remained riveted to African American group life during the second half of the twentieth century. As social problems are identified in political discourse they become the object of sociological curiosity – and no less the object of scrutiny by economists, political scientists, and even anthropologists. The federal government and philanthropic foundations have an interest in funding such studies because they hold out the promise of a cure for perceived social "ills." As a consequence, most of what histories we have of black families since World War II have been composed by social scientists trying to explain what had transpired before the Moynihan Report or the alleged emergence of a black "underclass" twenty years later, and how each crisis framed current understandings of African American family life.

Two factors, I think, amplify the noticeable silence of historians in this area. First, to those who continued to pursue lines of inquiry established at the renascence of social history in the 1960s, the experience of African American families seemed to follow a different historical trajectory from that of the dominant culture in postwar America and thus to require a different narrative framework and different questions.

Second, the Moynihan Report cast a long shadow across the young field of family history. The Moynihan Report had provoked a storm of protest so devastating that less than a year after its circulation, the issues raised by the report were pronounced "dead" (Rainwater and Yancey, 1967, p. 481). Criticism ranged from ideological objections to quarrels with the methodology and presentation of the data.

Moynihan characterized the black family as a "tangle of pathology" (US Department of Labor, 1965, p. 30). While acknowledging the contribution of white Americans' racism to inequalities between whites and blacks, Moynihan concluded nonetheless that it was the "weakness of family structure" among African Americans that accounted for the many problems that prevented blacks from gaining an equal footing in American social and economic life. Drawing upon E. Franklin Frazier's research on the African American family in the 1920s and 1930s and Stanley Elkins's historical analysis of slavery, Moynihan explained the legacy of the black family's "weakness" as a product of African enslavement, which had broken the family's back, established women at its head, and trapped generations of children in a cycle of poverty, disorganization, and dysfunction, uninterrupted since emancipation (US Department of Labor, 1965, p. 17; Frazier, 1940; Elkins, 1959).

To a much greater degree than perhaps has been appreciated, historians have actively avoided study of black families in the postwar period precisely because they were at a loss to explain what appeared to be a deepening of the very trends identified and condemned by Moynihan. Given the degree of criticism provoked by the report, it was clear that it was politically hazardous to undertake such a study (Rainwater and Yancey, 1967). But what is more, family historians faced an intellectual *cul-de-sac* in studying African American family life. The questions they asked presumed too much about how intimate relations are (or ought to be) configured – between husbands and wives and parents and children in particular – to be able to think about other ways that people might conduct caring, committed relationships that counted as "family" and were infused with meaning and purpose over time.

The absence of a historiography of contemporary African American family and kinship represents a grave shortcoming in any effort to comprehend the variety of family life since World War II. Nonetheless, it is a period full of drama – drama heightened by the confluence of attitudes and behaviors that yielded its most remarkable feature, the "baby boom." The baby boom between 1945 and 1964 was an extraordinary demographic event, not because the birth rate climbed to unprecedented levels – it did not. The birth rate at the beginning of the century surpassed the highest level achieved during the baby boom at its peak. Rather, it was the coalescence of a sustained, elevated birth rate with other demographic features and a reinforcing ideology of pronatalism that made the era distinctive.

During the peak years of the baby boom, social theorist Talcott Parsons argued that the isolated nuclear family represented an ideal social "adaptation" to the conditions of modern life. Parents and their dependent children, living in a dwelling apart from their own families of orientation, economically independent, and subsisting "from the occupational earnings of the husband-father," he observed, was the " 'normal' arrangement" in American society (Parsons and Bales, 1955, p. 10). Moreover, since the roles of the conjugal pair were specialized by temperament, biology, and aptitude, parents, it was proposed, operated most effectively when they worked together as the family's "leadership element" while clearly dividing the tasks to which

their different natures inclined them. Complementary to the father-husband's instrumentalist function as family task leader was the mother's "expressive," nurturing role – a role cemented by the "bearing and early nurturing of children" (Parsons and Bales, 1955, p. 23). Unencumbered by responsibilities for the education and care of the sick, disabled, and aged, the modern, nuclear family, according to Parsons, had one primary purpose: the socialization of its children.

Although the nuclear family took root as a widespread social ideal after World War II, its components were in evidence well before mid-century. "Companionate marriage," the notion that men and women formed an egalitarian partnership in marriage based on friendship, mutual respect, and a breadwinner/homemaker division of labor in the family, was popularized in American cinema and other media by the mid-1920s (E. May, 1980; L. May, 1980). The passage of federal prohibitions against child labor, as well as the enforcement of compulsory school attendance laws throughout the nation, sent the family wage economy into permanent decline by the onset of the Great Depression. This meant that children, rather than contributing labor or income to their households, were to be the beneficiaries of mother's attention – the objects of both affection and vigilant, conscientious correction (Zelizer, 1985; Lassonde, 1998). Simultaneously, Social Security enhanced the possibility of independence for elderly Americans after 1940 (Ruggles, 1994). It was not until after World War II, however, that a majority of Americans began to realize the ideals projected by popular culture and underwritten by the Wagner and Social Security Acts during the New Deal administration. After World War II this legislation, aided by the GI Bill, the expansion of home loans through the Federal Housing Administration, and a wave of unprecedented prosperity, expedited the rise of the isolated nuclear family and subsidized the prodigious birth rate.

Other, associated trends were not firmly established until the middle of the 1950s. Historically high marriage rates and lower ages at marriage, a lower age of entry into motherhood, an increased rate of conception within the first year of marriage, a preference for larger families, a significant rise in homeownership, as well as increased consumer spending and debt all combined to create a distinctive commitment to what John Modell has called the era's "family-building ethos": the belief that the height of personal satisfaction was to be found not just in marriage itself but equally in childrearing (Modell, 1989; May, 1988; Cherlin, 1981; Jackson, 1985). Almost as soon as these trends merged, however, they began to unravel. By the late 1950s, key ingredients of the "family-building" ethos – the stay-at-home mother and marital longevity – were challenged by the increased workforce participation of mothers with young children and the renewed climb of the divorce rate (Davis, 1984; Cherlin, 1981; Easterlin, 1980). While the gender roles prescribed by "family building" continued powerfully to shape women's and men's ambitions, sense of duty to others, and relations to one another for a generation, "family building" began to lose its luster as the decade wore on and the relentlessness of raising so many children, so close together in age, and in so solitary a fashion, took its toll on this resanctified arrangement of coupling, reproduction, and childrearing.

Women who strained under the gendered division of labor approvingly depicted in the mass media and modeled on Parsons's isolated nuclear family – working, divorced, and unwed mothers – appeared to threaten the healthy operation of the family. By infringing on the adult male's role as "family task leader," they were con-

sidered deviant and condemned for modeling deviance for their children. In 1963 Betty Friedan voiced the deep, if quiet, discontent that later blossomed into the women's movement. Feminists ultimately rejected the political economy of marriage, reproduction, and the stereotyped family roles cast by the Parsonian model and popular culture. In response to its suffocating narrowness, they called for a broader conception of the forms and functions of family and household.

In 1974 support for this perspective came from Carol B. Stack's ethnography of black working-class Chicago, *All Our Kin*, the first sustained scholarly response to the Moynihan Report. No one until Stack had taken on Moynihan's chief assumption, that the fluidity of familial relations among African Americans and especially the pragmatic substitution of adults to perform "parental" obligations were fundamentally "dysfunctional." For this reason, *All Our Kin* was a pivotal study. Rather than catalogue the relative extent of two-parent households in the black community, Stack showed how African Americans had developed "fictive kin" to satisfy the range of functions that parents fulfill in European American families. She not only interrogated the presumption of the nuclear family model but challenged the normative necessity of male headship and authority. In effect, Stack equipped students of African American family life with a new lens through which to view the function and meaning of family and kinship and simultaneously licensed feminist critics to deconstruct contemporary family history from their own vantage point, by toppling the myth of male authority (Rapp, Ross, and Bridenthal, 1979; Collier, Rosaldo, and Yanigisako, 1992). This is not to say that historians had failed to address the issue of male authority in the family sphere before; this had been a central focus of women's historians and theorists since the founding of women's history as a subfield of social history during the 1960s. Rather, it was not until after Stack that feminist historians of family life examined changes in family structure, operation, and ideology in the postwar years. Stack paved the way for a critical evaluation of patriarchy and the maintenance of the nuclear family ideal during this period.

Christopher Lasch, one of the first scholars to assess the state of postwar family life from a historical perspective, published two widely read books on the family in the space of two years: *Haven in a Heartless World* (1977) and *The Culture of Narcissism* (1978). The first was an extended critique of family sociology and the rise of therapeutic solutions to the perceived decline of male authority in the twentieth century. The second disparaged the "attack on the nuclear family" and the arrogation of the family's right to educate and socialize its children. The theme that united these two works was the assertion that American culture is the worse for the decline of male authority – a decline set into motion decades earlier, to be sure, but precipitated by the feminist critique of the nuclear family.

Social trends extending back to the dawn of industrialism had ripened by the 1920s and 1930s, Lasch wrote, but had begun to rot by the middle of the twentieth century. By the 1950s most of the family's functions had been stripped away. Care for the infirm and aged, education, moral instruction, its economic function, all of these had been overtaken by other institutions. More disturbing in Lasch's estimation, however, were the many incursions into the sole remaining purpose of the family as the seat of human intimacy. Increasingly, from the 1920s forward, psychologists and psychiatrists – experts in infant care, childrearing, marital relations, sibling rivalry, and sexuality – began to impose their own notions of correctness upon every aspect of

family relations. The result, by the mid-1950s according to Lasch, was the widespread adoption of "permissive" parenting and the complete absence of the patriarch-father, whose role as family leader was so critical to the Parsonian conception of the evolved nuclear family. It had been difficult enough when father had been physically absented from the home by his work; now his lack of authority in the home meant a lapse in moral standards as well (Lasch, 1978, pp. 172–9).

A second consequence was that the mother attempted to compensate for the husband's absence by indulging her children in every feeling and desire. "In this way," Lasch argued, permissive parents "undermine the child's initiative and make it impossible for him to develop self-restraint or self-discipline" (Lasch, 1978, p. 178). Just as ties between parents and children were weakened by the abdication of parental authority, he suggested, ties between men and women had been frayed by what he called the "cult of intimacy." Predicated upon the increased importance of sexual gratification in conjugal relations as well as the "emotional overloading of personal relations" between husbands and wives, marriages dissolved under the weight of unrealistic expectations (Lasch, 1978, p. 188). Divorce was the result and its unparalleled rise, he concluded, could be laid at the doorstep of feminists who had advanced such improbable demands in the first place and worse, who had called off the tacit truce between men and women and their mutual, "easy-going contempt for the weakness of the other sex" (Lasch, 1978, p. 195). Lasch shared Moynihan's presumptive uneasiness about matriarchy as well as his conviction that the nuclear family offered society's best hope against the pathologies that hinder social progress for the majority of Americans and perpetuate poverty and deprivation among blacks (Lasch, 1977, pp. 157–62, 165; US Department of Labor, 1965, p. 76).

A more even-handed assessment of many of the trends troubling Christopher Lasch was offered by Andrew Cherlin in *Marriage*, *Divorce*, *Remarriage* (1981). Cherlin's was a stock-taking enterprise that proposed to puzzle out what he described as the "roller-coaster" patterns of marriage and divorce since World War II. If familial living arrangements were transformed in the decade after the war, they looked radically different again by the last quarter of the twentieth century. Not only was divorce near an all-time high and the birth rate at an all-time low, family configurations, single parenthood, and average age at first marriage all reversed patterns that had emerged immediately after World War II. If Lasch wrung his hands over the state of American family life by the 1970s, Cherlin and others pointed to the 1950s as the anomaly to be explained, for the 1960s and 1970s merely reasserted trends of long standing in marriage, fertility, women's labor force participation, and divorce. For Cherlin the appropriate question to ask was: what happened during the 1950s to create such an exceptional cluster of family-forming behaviors?

Cherlin presented the debate over how to explain the 1950s as dividing into two camps. One, which he characterized as the "period" explanation, posited that the rush to marriage, prolific childbearing, slowed divorce rate, and initial withdrawal of married women from the workforce after the war could best be understood as the product of a specific historical era: a collective, emotional response to the deferral of family formation made necessary by the straitened circumstances of the 1930s and then by the absence of marriageable males during World War II. A competing theory, which Cherlin called the "cohort" explanation, had been championed by Richard Easterlin. The cohort explanation understood the 1950s as a reaction to the gener-

ational experience of the men and women who had come of age during the late 1940s and 1950s. Born just before and during the 1930s, they had experienced the deprivations of the Great Depression and thus had low material expectations as they moved into the labor market. Yet because their birth cohort was small and the United States rode a long wave of prosperity in the wake of the war, jobs were abundant and wages were relatively high. Able to meet their standards for material comfort early in their working lives without having to trade comfort for children (which most young couples *must* do), they had children. Cherlin sensibly considered some combination of the two explanations as most plausible. Neither cohort size nor the catastrophes of depression and war could alone explain the extraordinary convergence of low age at first marriage, high birth rate, the tendency for newly married women to give birth in their first year of marriage, a stabilizing divorce rate, and an all-time-high ratio of men and women marrying (95 percent).

Cherlin's was one of the first attempts to unravel the complex and baffling puzzle of the baby boom and its aftermath. Yet his characterization of the debate as it stood in 1980 could not anticipate the shape of future historical interpretations of the demographic and political "events" of postwar America. Since the publication of *Marriage*, *Divorce*, *Remarriage*, historians have struggled not just with behavioral patterns but with the attitudes that informed these behaviors and with the discourse about family life, attempting to understand parents and children as agents of change as well as continuity. I will examine some of these studies below, but Richard A. Easterlin's *Birth and Fortune* (1980), which, as Cherlin pointed out, had the "virtue of theoretical simplicity" in its modeling of postwar social trends, exemplified an approach to historical change that aspires to a kind of scientistic rigor absent in most of the studies undertaken since.

The industrial revolution, Easterlin pointed out, made possible continued increases in living levels for the masses in every society experiencing its upheavals beginning during the eighteenth century. However, industrialization also introduced tremendous volatility into individuals' financial fortunes and social status. In the United States, the Employment Act of 1946 addressed the worst consequences of industrial capitalism's cyclical growth and contraction. Because the federal government gained the ability to dampen the effects of economic downturn, the economic recessions of the postwar period were, he argued, "hardly enough to ruin a start on a working life for large numbers of young people" (Easterlin, 1980, p. 146). The lone determinant of one's relative prosperity or want, he illustrated repeatedly, was the size of the generation one was born into. The ways women and men organized their personal lives, from cohabitation to reproduction, are accordingly arrayed by the generational hand one is dealt. A bad hand is one in which the birth cohort is large. A lucky one is small. For the large cohort, employment will be relatively scarce and wages correspondingly low, whereas for the diminutive cohort, jobs will be abundant and remuneration generous. And while it has ever been so, according to Easterlin, this phenomenon stood as the single factor with sway over an economy whose cycles have been comparatively flattened out since World War II.

All of us, it seems, make a kind of internal estimate of what we need materially to be happy and then work, as couples, to support that calculus. We reproduce, or not, to the extent that children interfere with our combined capacity to reach our cultural target–family size. The argument is at once compelling (in his rendering, if not

mine) and depressing: while none of us chooses our parents and hence the socio-economic status or race we are born into, neither do we choose the size of our birth cohort. Whether or not we believe that women should have the power to decide to carry a pregnancy to term, that women and men should equitably divide the burdens of income earning, housework, and childcare, or whether the nation's social policy should assist or punish parents based on their marital status matters little in the face of factors beyond the individual's control. It is the marrying kind who decide what the fate of the next generation will be and those decisions are made twenty years before anyone looking for work can do anything about them (Easterlin, 1980, p. 56). Despite his unabashed demographic determinism, Easterlin's approach keenly illustrates the difference between the aims of historical demography, which is a tool to predict future reproductive behavior, and social/cultural history, which is a tool for understanding the way people acted and understood themselves, their choices, and their world.

Sociologist David Popenoe, like Lasch, has bemoaned the inevitable decline that he predicts will accompany the swells of change unleashed by the 1960s and that had been already partly realized by the end of the 1980s. *Disturbing the Nest*, which appeared in 1988, views divorce and a number of other indicators as leading the world's "advanced" societies into decline. Popenoe's comparative study of family life in Sweden, the United States, Switzerland, and New Zealand concluded that the collection of trends witnessed in Sweden since World War II is coming to America. These trends portend a shift from what he called the "bourgeois nuclear family" to the "postnuclear family." Early sexual experience, late age at first marriage, low marriage rates, rock-bottom fertility, high divorce rates, high rates of nonmarital cohabitation, serial monogamy (but an increase of sexual polygamy among the married), blended families, and increased reliance on nonfamilial childcare have all resulted in the post-nuclear family. Sweden, he wrote, has become a society dominated by single-person and "nonfamily" households, households with "pair-bonded" adults with no children, and households with children but only one adult. The extended family household with two generations of adults has been driven virtually out of existence and the "traditional" two-parent family "became a small fraction of the total" (Popenoe, 1988, p. 298). If the bourgeois nuclear family had been guilty of greatly restricting women's freedom of association, access to education and wealth, exposing women and children to physical abuse, and contributing to social inequality (by placing a premium on the family's ability to control and inherit wealth), it had the virtue at least, according to Popenoe, of placing the welfare of children at the center of its purpose. The hallmark of the bourgeois nuclear family was child-centeredness – the willingness of parents to forego personal gratification to satisfy children's needs for security, emotional nurturance, and the development of competence and autonomy – even at the cost of happiness in one's marriage, job, and social relations. The post-nuclear family, by contrast, was "adult-centered" and individualistic, and the form of individualism it championed, he asserted, was a "relative newcomer on the world scene" (Popenoe, 1988, p. 329).

Published the year after Popenoe's study, John Modell's *Into One's Own* examined an important consequence of this newly discovered individualism by tracing the structural bases for the experience of adolescence and youth during the middle decades of the twentieth century. While postwar "youth culture" had been flamboy-