The Leader's Dileman



HOW TO BUILD AN EMPOWERED AND ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATION WITHOUT LOSING CONTROL JEREMY HOPE PETER BUNCE FRANZ RÖÖSLI

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How to Build an Empowered and Adaptive Organization Without Losing Control

By Jeremy Hope, Peter Bunce and Franz Röösli



This edition first published 2011 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Under the Jossey-Bass imprint, Jossey-Bass, 989 Market Street, San Francisco CA 94103-1741, USA

www.jossey-bass.com

Registered office

John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom

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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-119-97000-2 (hardback) ISBN 978-1-119-97557-1 (ebk)

ISBN 978-1-119-97050-7 (ebk) ISBN 978-1-119-97051-4 (ebk)

Foreword

This book addresses a paradox about the nature of management in large organizations. On the one hand, the pace of change in the business world today feels faster than it has ever been. There is plentiful evidence of corporate failure, there is widespread distrust of senior executives, and there are many observers calling for dramatic changes in how organizations are run. On the other hand, the standard "command and control"-based model of management, the one that has served us for more than a century, continues to dominate the business landscape.

This is not a new paradox. Every generation of management researchers and consultants argues that we need to make profound changes in how work gets done, and since at least the 1930s the primary emphasis has been on such themes as empowering workers, flattening hierarchies and creating greater levels of trust. And, yet, for all the careful research, and for all the evidence that some companies are experimenting with new ways that appear to offer a better way, the amount of real and lasting change is small. When we look at the *management* systems for getting work done in large organizations today – how we motivate people, control activities, and set objectives – they are little different from the ones used by our grandparents.

Some management books try to sidestep this paradox: they focus on the things that are changing in the business world and leave readers to figure out what to do differently; or they provide a new perspective on the paradox. Other books focus on one part of the story only, perhaps giving some new techniques for motivating employees or measuring performance. But in *The Leader's Dilemma* Jeremy Hope, Peter Bunce and Franz Röösli avoid any such tactics.

First of all, they take on the whole challenge – the organization as a complex system of interconnected parts – and they make it clear that you cannot just cherry-pick the ideas that suit you. Rather, you have to see how all the different parts of the story connect to each other, and think through the consequences of your actions. Second, they confront the paradox that large organizations seem immune to the changes that they need to make. Their argument is alluded to in the subtitle of the book: *How to build an empowered and adaptive organization without losing control.* The way forward, they argue, lies on the knife-edge between anarchic self-organization on the one side, and traditional command and control on the other.

The Leader's Dilemma lays out an agenda for change in large organizations built around 12 principles, such as "bind people to a common cause, not a central plan" and "make planning a continuous and inclusive process, not a top-down annual event." All of these principles will be familiar to a business audience, but the point is that while the words are frequently used, they are rarely enacted. So Hope, Bunce and Röösli provide lots of examples of how these principles can be applied in practice: well-known companies like Southwest Airlines and Whole Foods Market, and lesser-known companies like Sydney Water Corporation and Tomkins.

Their agenda is all about putting people first – about building an adaptive system around the needs and aspirations of employees, not treating the organization as an "obedient machine." The curious thing about this agenda is that it didn't emerge from an HR conference, or from a class in organizational behavior at a business school; it came out of an industry group called the "Beyond Budgeting Round Table," or BBRT, founded by Jeremy Hope, Robin Fraser and Peter Bunce a decade ago.

BBRT is group of finance and a accounting professionals, all with personal experience of the limits to traditional top-down, fixed-target based budgeting. Inspired enlightened companies such as bv a few Handelsbanken, they sought to find alternatives to the budgeting traditional process. But such is interconnected nature of large organizations that rethinking of budgeting quickly led to a rethinking of the entire management architecture of large organizations.

This book is the result of that process. The authors are professionals who wouldn't normally have started from a "people"-focused agenda but ended up there because it was the only possible place to end up if you want to make organizations more effective over the long term. The authors also understand deeply how difficult it is for those in positions of power to loosen up on the levers of control. So this is an important book: it offers a synthesis of a lot of recent thinking about how to improve management in large organizations, and it provides a clear agenda for change. If you are interested in building an adaptive and progressive company, this book gives you the ideas and inspiration to make it happen.

Julian Birkinshaw Professor of Strategic and International Management London Business School

Preface

One summer Albert Einstein's students complained that the questions on this year's exam paper were no different from those on the previous one. "Well, yes," said Einstein, "the questions were indeed the same. What the students needed to understand, however, was that the answers had changed!" If the question on today's management exam paper is "How does the way we manage need to change to meet today's challenges?" then the answers are indeed different from those most leaders would have given a few years ago.

The traditional "command and control" management model was never perfect. In an industrial age when suppliers could sell all their output to eager customers, business leaders could "plan and control" their way to the future. Annual plans and budgets were negotiated with the corporate center; all divisional and line managers had to do was to follow the plan and meet the numbers. This model was already in trouble in the 1990s as customer loyalty collapsed in the wake of globalization, privatization and the Internet revolution, but in the credit crunch of 2007–9 it turned into a liability as organizations failed to anticipate and respond to the economic eruptions that engulfed world markets. The trouble is that increasing levels of uncertainty and turbulence are here to stay.

Another crucial change is that the next generation of managers weaned on Facebook and YouTube are used to sharing just about everything with their families and friends. But when they enter the workplace they are faced with antiquated systems and closed mindsets that make transparency and sharing so difficult. There is little doubt that to attract and keep the best people in the future, leaders will need to make their organizations more engaging, transparent and fulfilling places to work.

This book is about rethinking how we manage organizations in a post-industrial, post-credit crunch world where, according to strategy guru Gary Hamel, innovative management models represent the only remaining source of sustainable competitive advantage. It is also about releasing people from the burdens of stifling bureaucracy and suffocating control systems, trusting them with information and giving them time to think, reflect, share, learn and improve.

It is an outcome of the work we have been engaged in for over 10 years in the "beyond budgeting" movement (we use "budgeting" as another term for "command and control" management). In our 2003 book *Beyond Budgeting* Jeremy Hope and Robin Fraser set out 12 principles that represented the "best of best practices" at that time. These have stood the test of time. This book provides more depth and case examples based on these principles. We have also integrated these principles with "systems thinking" and illustrated how they enable organizations to become more empowered and adaptive.

This book is aimed at leaders who want to change their management cultures and build organizations that will adapt, improve and endure for generations to come.

No book is completed without the help and support of many people. We would like to acknowledge the support of Robin Fraser, Steve Player, Bjarte Bogsnes and Steve Morlidge, who have not only contributed to this book but also been instrumental in pushing the boundaries of Beyond Budgeting. We would also like to thank many Beyond Budgeting members who have generously given their time to facilitate case studies and interviews that we have drawn on extensively throughout this work. Also, our publisher Rosemary Nixon and her team have given us expert guidance throughout the process. Our sincere thanks go to them all.

Some definitions

It is important that we all share the same understanding of what key terms mean throughout this book. For example, many people find it difficult to distinguish between a budget, a target, a goal and a forecast, yet a clear definition of these terms as they are applied in practice is crucial for designing and implementing any management model. It is also fundamental to reading this book. Our definitions are set out below and are applied throughout.

A management model describes how an organization sets goals and strategy; how it motivates and rewards people; how it steers its course through plans, budgets and forecasts; how it makes decisions and allocates resources; and how it measures and controls performance.

A command and control management model assumes that an organization has many layers of management and that strategy and key decisions are highly centralized. Targets, plans, budgets, resources and controls flow down the hierarchy in the form of annual instructions, and subsequently flow back up the hierarchy in the form of results. The annual budget coordinates all plans and resources and is the "glue" that holds the management model together. We use the word "budgeting" as a generic term for command and control management, and thus "beyond budgeting" means beyond command and control toward a management model that is more empowered and adaptive.

An adaptive management model assumes that an organization has few layers of management and that strategy and key decisions are devolved to front-line teams who have the scope and authority to respond rapidly to emerging threats and seize new opportunities as they arise. Fixed plans and budgets are usually replaced with more

flexible systems including quarterly business reviews and rolling forecasts. The glue that holds the organization together is fast, open and transparent information.

A target is usually short-term (often one year) and fixed. It invariably becomes a fixed performance contract between one organizational level and another. In the cultural climate of many organizations, such contracts or commitments must be met, which often leads to undesirable behavior.

A *goal* is usually aspirational and set over the medium term (two to five years). A goal should stretch managerial ambition so that an organization or work unit maximizes its performance potential, as opposed to making incremental performance improvements over the previous period.

A budget is a plan expressed in financial terms against which performance will be measured. It is a tool for allocating scarce resources and for committing managers to a predetermined financial outcome, usually on an annual basis. It also acts as a constraint on spending and a basis for evaluating management performance and rewards. A budget also defines authority levels and influences how managers behave in large organizations.

A *plan* is a set of actions that derive from a strategic review and aim at improving the performance of the organization or any of its subsets such as divisions or frontline teams.

A *forecast* is a financial view of the future derived from a manager's best opinion of the "most likely outcome," given the known information at the time it is prepared. Thus it should be unbiased, reflect all known events (good and bad), and, of course, be realistic. It should also be a moving window (or rolling forecast) that always looks between 12 and 24 months ahead.

INTRODUCTION

The organization as an adaptive system

What ultimately constrains the performance of your organization is not its operating model, nor its business model, but its management model.

Gary Hamel, The Future of Management

Most of you will remember Aesop's fable about the tortoise and the hare who decide to have a race on a sunny day. The brash, confident hare thinks he has won the race before it even starts and decides to have a nap under a tree half way through. But when the hare awakes, the tortoise is at the finish line.

Too many business leaders think and act like hares. They think they can grow shareholder value at unrealistic rates each year by setting aggressive targets and incentives and then (like the hare) "predict and control" their future results through detailed budgets and short-term decisions. Tortoises don't make such promises, predictions or assumptions. Instead they keep their eye on the path ahead and continuously improve their performance. Tortoises always win in the end. Their aim is to adapt to changing conditions, beat their peers and endure over long periods of time. The best organizations are adaptive systems that continuously learn, adapt and improve.

Unfortunately, in the business world, when tortoise-type organizations appoint new leaders they can turn into hares. Royal Bank of Scotland (founded 1727), Citigroup (1812),

Lehman Brothers (1850), Washington Mutual (1889), Merrill Lynch (1914) and AIG (1919) had all adapted and endured for, in most cases, a century or more but collapsed when a new leadership generation changed the way they were managed. The result was the credit crunch of 2007–9, when trillions of dollars were wiped off corporate balance sheets, leaving governments around the world with no option but to step in with taxpayers' funds to avoid a catastrophic collapse of the financial system.

What followed was the worst recession since the 1930s. Everyone is asking the same questions: How did it happen? How did the banking sector, full of mature organizations with long histories of steady growth and run by highly professional people, suddenly collapse? Why did governance and regulatory systems fail so badly? Who is accountable? What lessons can we learn? And how do we prevent it from happening again?

Commentators have pointed their fingers at naïve central bankers, inept regulators, unrealistic ratings agencies, politicians, greedy aggressive passive executives. salespeople, unscrupulous mortgage brokers and shortselling hedge funds. While all these actors in this tragedy (or was it a farce?) are culpable in one way or another, the roots of the crisis lie elsewhere. They are deeply embedded in the management model itself. Hijacked by financial engineers a few decades ago, lent credence by academics and pseudo-management science, and seized upon by macho leaders and private equity partners, it was a slowburning fuse waiting to explode.

The harbingers of this crisis were visible several years ago when Enron, WorldCom and many other large corporations collapsed, triggering the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation. Like today, fingers were pointed at greedy executives and inept regulators but, also like today's crisis, the root causes lay in a corrupt culture and a flawed management model.


If you doubt this conclusion, think about how the typical management model works.² Like the hare in the fable, leaders sit down once a year and plan the annual race: "What target will excite the market and boost the share price? Fifteen percent growth in earning-per-share feels good, so that's what we'll choose." The next step is to cascade this target down the organization so each division, business unit, function and department owns a piece of it. Tough negotiations take place as the less pliable managers protest that such growth is impossible. But most meekly accept the target and hope for the best. The incentive scheme helps to win them over. Once the budget is agreed the leadership team, just like the hare, thinks the race is over. They have done their job. Investors like the target and the share price responds favorably. Execution is a given.

The trouble is that this "predict and control" view of management is increasingly unhinged from reality. What happens if customer demand takes an unexpected turn for the worse (or even for the better)? What happens if there is a fire or flood, or a key supplier suffers a serious problem? What happens if a new competitor enters the market or an existing competitor changes prices or introduces a new "killer" business model? What happens if commodity prices, interest rates or inflation indexes gyrate up or down? In 2008, who predicted that the price of oil would drop from \$147 per barrel to under \$40 within six months, or that consumer demand for cars and property would fall by 30 to 40 percent within a similar period? There are many uncertainties that can derail the most carefully crafted targets, plans and budgets, and they are becoming more common and exaggerated over time. Many leaders have been forced to reset and recalibrate targets and budgets many times as they have tried to maintain some semblance of control.

The decline and fall of "command and control"

The traditional management model is commonly known as "command and control." As <u>Figure I.1</u> illustrates, strategy is translated into targets, budgets and incentives that are cascaded down the organization, directing and dictating what people do. Each division, function and department is then accountable for meeting their numbers and must explain any variances from plan to a higher authority.

FIGURE 1.1 The command and control model



The command and control model is under pressure for many reasons. The switch in power from the supply chain to the demand chain (including marketers, consumers, designers and retailers) is forcing all suppliers to be more innovative in order to meet changing customer needs. The life cycles of products, strategies and business models are shrinking, placing greater pressure on the speed of response and continuous renewal of strategies. Entry costs into many different markets are falling as more products and services are delivered digitally. And innovation has moved from the exclusivity of the R&D department to anyone, anywhere, anytime.

Centralized, inflexible (command and control) organizations find it difficult to compete in this world of fast adaptation, continuous innovation and customer participation. They were designed for producing affordable products and services through standard processes as efficiently as possible. But merely being efficient is no longer sustainable competitive position in the global economy. Everyone now works in a global labor force: there will always be someone cheaper than you. So the key to competitive advantage is differentiation. To avoid the "metoo" commodity trap, the focus of innovation is moving from products to services and from the exclusivity of the R&D department to employees, customers and business partners.

Differentiation can be applied in many areas, including how products are produced, delivered and consumed. Customers' needs increasingly go beyond the standard product or service, and they are prepared to pay more to satisfy them. Opportunities exist in every product and market category to provide more options from the basic product to the full menu. In fact, in some cases (e.g. cars), the standard product is nothing more than a loss leader. The profit comes from value-added options and finance packages. Being able to satisfy wide-ranging customer needs at the lowest cost is today's opportunity.

Another problem facing the centralized organization is that the Facebook generation is not prepared to be told what to do. In their personal lives they are used to fast, open collaboration between colleagues, and they are bringing these expectations into the workplace. They want to know about values, goals, plans and results. They want more engagement and fulfillment. And they are only willing to contribute their passion and creativity if the climate is one that encourages transparency and trust. It is clear that the

rules of the management game have changed and there is no going back.

But the final (and perhaps fatal) blow has been delivered by the credit crunch. How has the command and control model become so toxic that a generation of macho leaders, financial engineers and private equity investors were able to use it to pursue the maximization of short-term shareholder value and personal wealth at almost any cost, destroy so many great organizations and take the whole financial system to the brink of collapse?

To answer this question, let's retrace the history of savings and loans organizations (known as "building societies") in the UK.

How the pursuit of "shareholder value" ruined many large UK Building Societies

One of the authors was born and raised in a part of northern England where many small savings and loans organizations were major features of the business landscape, with names such as "Halifax" (now part of HBOS and recently acquired by LloydsTSB) and "Bradford and Bingley" (now part nationalized and part owned by Spanish bank Santander). Building societies were owned by and existed for the benefit of their depositors and borrowers (their members). Indeed, their original purpose was to raise money through deposits and lend that money to their members (usually within the same community) to buy a house. Apart from occasional mergers, they grew steadily (within the limits of their income) and some (like the Halifax) became giants of the industry. Their aim was to adapt and endure, and for over 150 years they achieved this purpose admirably. But in the 1980s their world changed.

In 1986 a new Act of Parliament was passed to allow building societies to "demutualize." This meant that they could convert their status to banks and become listed companies. In the 1990s, driven by the prospect of directors and members making capital gains from the listing of the shares, many took advantage of this Act and became public companies. All seemed to start well. But over the next decade new "professional" highly paid managers arrived action to "maximize shareholder took niche strategies." "implement "alian management incentives," "leverage the asset base," "create off-balancesheet vehicles," "trade in innovative financial products" and "manage risk."

Their aim was to reach their goal (now to "maximize shareholder value") as quickly as possible, so that within a few years they would make the company so attractive that they could either acquire other companies or be acquired themselves. Whichever path was taken (and whether the company continued to exist or not), shareholders (and managers) would win. And in an age of deregulated rising property prices, markets, low interest rates. "innovative" financial products and gullible borrowers, everything was looking rosy. Shareholder values were booming, financial bonuses were exploding and mortgages were flying out of the door as borrowers who were previously excluded from the market were able to buy cheap products based on little or no evidence of secure income. But in 2007 their world changed again.

In August 2007, one of the more aggressive former UK building societies, Northern Rock, collapsed. Its high-growth oriented business model, based on raising short-term debt to fund aggressive growth in mortgage sales, ceased to function. And by September 2008 many of its UK rivals including RBS (Royal Bank of Scotland), HBOS, Alliance &

Leicester and Bradford & Bingley had either been nationalized or taken over by more stable institutions.

In less than 15 years after the building societies became public companies, their smart operators, educated at the best universities and business schools, had decimated a whole industry, leaving shattered communities and thousands of angry employees and shareholders wondering what went wrong. In a bizarre twist to the banking tale, it emerged that in the same week that news broke of the collapse of RBS its former chief executive, Sir Fred Goodwin, had asked for and received a doubling of his pension fund before he would agree to leave the bank. This took his pension to £16 million, which will pay out £693,000 annually for life.³

The same drama was playing out elsewhere, particularly in the United States as Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, Countrywide Financial, AIG, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Fannie Mae and many other financial services organizations collapsed and were forced to seek government help. Even the great Goldman Sachs was in trouble. In less than a generation, all these tortoise-like organizations had turned into hares. They thought that making money was easy. All they had to do was set aggressive targets, underpin them by even more aggressive bonuses and wait for profits to increase and share values to rise.

The downward spiral of decline - what went so disastrously wrong?

The decline and fall of command and control management didn't happen overnight. It was a gradual deterioration. Here are some of the key steps along this fateful journey:

• "Shareholder value" became an obsession. One of the reasons why many organizations have gone off the rails is that their leaders lost sight of why they were in business. While they all no doubt had mission statements with all the right words in them, what came across to employees and customers was that the only purpose in evidence was to maximize short-term shareholder value. But if organizations are seen as purely money-making machines, then we are all in trouble. Of course they need to make money to reinvest and renew the business and make a decent return on the risk capital invested, but this shouldn't be *why* they are in business. Indeed, if the purpose is perceived as only making money, then it should come as no surprise that people act in their own self-interest. Nor should it surprise anyone that power, greed and corruption are the outcomes.

 Aggressive targets and incentives encouraged the wrong behavior. The rise in "pay-for-performance" over the past 20 years has reinforced a culture of "business is about making money" and "management is about meeting the target." CEOs in particular have been treated by the media like celebrity athletes (many have agents and lawyers as part of their "team") who appear to be more interested in maximizing their short-term rewards than in longer-term success. Many executives at failed banks used accounting trickery and financial engineering to meet aggressive targets, achieve large bonuses and satisfy demanding shareholders. Like drugs, targets and incentives are addictive. But also like drugs, they come with many side effects.4 They provide the illusion that leaders can "predict and control" future outcomes in a fast-changing, highly unpredictable world. Target-setting is often a game of charades that rewards skilled political operators rather than the best teambuilders or innovative thinkers. While many leaders would no doubt argue that targets and incentives

- stretch and motivate, the evidence suggests that they stifle innovation and growth as well as drain energy and demotivate people. The result is unhappy customers and underperforming companies.⁵
- Regulation and risk management has failed. Why didn't the regulatory system work? One reason is that rules don't change behavior. Almost without exception, all the firms that collapsed had unqualified financial statements. When confronted with more regulations, large companies employ lawyers to work out how to get around them. Moreover, large companies are more likely to capture the most talented professionals, who are able to run rings around their counterparts in regulatory authorities. The reality is that too many organizations continue to operate in a gray area between what's right or wrong and too often step over the wrong side of the ethical line. When a short-term profit opportunity beckons, there is always a way to "explain away" the ethical dilemma or the risk. All the time and money spent on regulation and compliance has failed to change management mindsets, leaving a culture of self-interest, unethical behavior and outright fraud intact. In July 2010 Citigroup agreed to pay a \$75 million penalty for repeatedly making misleading statements in earnings calls and public filings through 2007. Apparently, Citigroup said it had reduced its investment banking unit's exposure to subprime-mortgage-backed securities to \$13 billion or less, when the actual exposure was closer to \$50 billion.⁸ In the UK, corporate fraud losses hit a record £1bn in the first half of 2010, with about 49 percent of these frauds occurring in the finance and insurance sectors.⁹
- Central control is more difficult and expensive. In repeated attempts to realign strategy, structure and systems over the past 20 years or so, many leaders

have expanded their control systems as increasing numbers of standard setters, compliance officers, risk managers, performance controllers, project leaders, internal consultants, quality controllers, customer relationship managers, business analysts, management advisors and many other back-office management positions have proliferated. And most of these new roles have come with expensive IT systems, training courses and management controls. The management control bureaucracy can often represent several layers of management: the people who work there do little else but handle information and make decisions that link high-level strategy with low-level execution. The levels of waste can be astonishing.¹⁰

• Trust has declined. The public perception of large corporations is at its lowest point in recent history. Just 33 percent of European and 40 percent of US consumers say that they trust large global corporations to act in society's best interest all, most, or even some of the time. Too many organizations use the creativity of their people not to develop new business models and products to attract new customers but to think up as many (often devious) ways as possible to squeeze more profit from existing customers without offering much in return. For example, a substantial proportion of retail banking profits comes from penalizing customers for breaking arbitrary, complicated rules about minimum balances, credit limits and payment deadlines. Mobile phone companies make much of their money out of the minutes we don't use. Hotels and travel operators make it hard to find out about discounts or upgrades, and some airlines have computer algorithms that run so often that it is impossible to identify what the "normal" price of a flight ought to be. A "surveillance" culture is emerging as leaders use technology to check the time

their people spend online, the time it takes to answer the telephone, and the time it takes to complete a call to a customer. Computer spyware and even cameras are used to check their every movement. The result is even less loyalty and more cheating.

• Employees are neither engaged nor empowered. In the 1970s and 80s "empowerment" was a concept that exercised the minds of many leaders. Though some leaders used the right words, their actions were undermined by intractable middle managers suffocating control systems that demanded obedience to the plan. Little has changed. A 2007 Towers Perrin survey of nearly 90,000 employees worldwide found that only 21 percent felt fully engaged at work (meaning they're willing to go the extra mile to help their companies succeed) and 38 percent were disenchanted or disengaged. The result is an "engagement gap" between the discretionary effort companies need and what people actually want to invest, and companies' effectiveness in channeling this effort to enhance performance. That negativity has a direct impact on the bottom line. Towers Perrin found that companies with low levels of employee engagement had a 33 percent annual decline in operating income and an 11 percent annual decline in earnings growth. Those with high engagement, on the other hand, reported a 19 percent increase in operating income and 28 percent growth in earnings per share. The result is that too few people are engaged in strategy and innovation, which remain exclusive, top-down processes. And frontline teams now spend increasing amounts of their time on annual budgets, irrelevant reports, burdensome administration and unnecessary meetings.

The failure of the command and control model means that the wrong story is being told about business. Joe Public hears more about excessive pay, defective products and environmental disasters than about the huge contribution that businesses all over the world make to the well-being of everyone. Where would we be without life-saving drugs, flat-screen TVs, laptops, mobile phones, low-cost airlines and so on? None of these breakthroughs could have been achieved by individuals working alone. They all needed thousands of people to collaborate effectively within and across large corporations to bring new products and services to market. There is an urgent need to eradicate the root causes of bad behavior and enable leaders to tell a more uplifting and inspiring story about business today.

Rethinking the management model

All these problems have been festering for many years. Successive leaders trying to solve them have spent billions of dollars on reorganizations, downsizing programs and management tools. But few have succeeded. The trouble is that the problems are *systemic*. They are embedded in management theories and mental models that most leaders base their management practices upon. For over 100 years these theories and models have been derived from some variant of "classical economics" and "command and control" management, both of which assume that the primary role of managers (agents) is to maximize value for shareholders (principals).

In his landmark 1962 book *Strategy and Structure* Alfred Chandler explained that the reason this command and control model proved so powerful was that it emphasized the decentralization of responsibility to operating divisions whose activities were planned, coordinated and controlled by a strong corporate center – the "general office," in