THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF

MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT

Second Edition

———

EDITED BY WILLIAM OUTHWAITE

Advisory editor
Alain Touraine

———

Blackwell
Publishing

THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF
MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT

THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF

MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT

Second Edition

EDITED BY WILLIAM OUTHWAITE

Advisory editor
Alain Touraine

Blackwell
Publishing

Contents

Preface

This dictionary first appeared in 1993, as *The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought*. It was one of Tom Bottomore's last projects; he died in December 1992, at the early age of 72, just as the Dictionary was printing. Tom's many books and articles have served and still serve as a uniquely lucid and reliable guide for generations of students of sociology and the other social sciences, and his contributions to this Dictionary, as well as its overall conception, display his characteristic sense of the range and diversity of social concerns. Social thought, as we both conceived it, is empirical as well as normative or speculative, cultural as well as economic and political.

In revising the dictionary for the present edition, I have retained this broad focus, rather than reorienting it towards the individual social sciences on the one hand, or a more delimited conception of social theory on the other. Many contributors accepted the invitation to revise their entries, though as many replied that they had nothing to change, or only minor bibliographic details. This is in part, of course, because the original dictionary went to press when what J. H. Hexter, in his entry on history, called the 'short' twentieth century, running from 1914 to 1989, was already over. The dust of state socialism, symbolized in microcosm by that of the Berlin Wall, had already settled. The Cold War, which had threatened the globe with a nuclear winter was over, though it was already clear, as the world was again reminded in the autumn of 2001, that the post-Cold War 'order' is also dangerous and unpredictable.

I would like to thank Alain Touraine, Peter Dickens, Simon Mohun and other colleagues who gave valuable advice and help with this edition. I dedicate it to the memory of Tom Bottomore and of our former Advisory Editors, Ernest Gellner and Robert Nisbet.

WILLIAM OUTHWAITE

Note

A dictionary of modern social thought must necessarily range very widely, from the social sciences to philosophy, political theories and doctrines, cultural ideas and movements, and to the influence of the natural sciences. In compiling the present work we have tried to encompass this vast field by commissioning entries on three themes: first, the major concepts which figure in social thought; second, the principal schools and movements of thought; and third, those institutions and organizations which have either been important objects of social analysis, or have themselves engendered significant doctrines and ideas.

Much of the dictionary is devoted to particular bodies of thought that have been influential in the past century: individual social sciences, philosophical schools, political doctrines, distinctive styles of art and literature. In each of these cases a long general entry is supplemented by other entries which elaborate specific aspects of the ideas and theories involved; thus, for example, the entry on economics is further developed in entries on the diverse schools and concepts which have emerged in economic thought, and similarly the entry on Marxism is complemented by entries on various forms that this body of theory and doctrine has assumed. Indeed, all the major spheres of social thought have developed and proliferated historically, and we have aimed to incorporate this historical aspect, reaching back in many cases to the ideas of earlier centuries.

Each entry is followed by a short list of further reading, and there is also a general bibliography at the end of the dictionary which lists other books and articles referred to in the text. The author-date citations in the text generally refer to first editions or first appearances of the works; dates of subsequent editions are given in brackets where applicable.

While each entry is intended to be complete within itself, cross-references to other entries which would illuminate or extend the subject under discussion are signalled by the use of small capitals in the text.

WILLIAM OUTHWAITE
TOM BOTTOMORE

Contributors

Philip Abbott
Wayne State University

Nicholas Abercrombie
Lancaster University

Hugh G. J. Aitken
Amherst College

Martin Albrow
London

David E. Apter
Yale University

Anthony Arblaster
University of Sheffield

David Armstrong
Guy's Hospital, University of London

Giovanni Arrighi
State University of New York at Binghamton

Michael Bacharach
Christ Church, Oxford

Peter Baehr
Lingnan University, Hong Kong

Patrick Baert
University of Cambridge

Paul Bailey
University of Edinburgh

E. Digby Baltzell
University of Pennsylvania

Lorraine F. Barić
Information Technology Institute, University of Salford

Clive Barker
University of Warwick

Rodney Barker
London School of Economics

Alan Barnard
University of Edinburgh

Michèle Barrett
English, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London

D. J. Bartholomew
London School of Economics

Kaushik Basu
Delhi School of Economics

Patrick Bateson
University of Cambridge

James A. Beckford
University of Warwick

Leonard Beeghley
University of Florida

Reinhard Bendix †

Geoffrey Bennington
Emory University

Ted Benton
University of Essex

Henry Bernstein
Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester

Christopher J. Berry
University of Glasgow

David Berry
University of Sussex

Roy Bhaskar
Centre for Critical Realism, London

Michael Billig
Loughborough University

Ken Binmore
University of Michigan

Mildred Blaxter
School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia

Josef Bleicher
Associate Member of the Theory Culture & Society Centre

J. Blondel
European University Institute, Florence

Stephan Boehm
University of Graz

Peter J. Boettke
New York University

Tom Bottomore †

Gerhard Botz
Institut für Geschichte, Universität Salzburg

Raymond Boudon
Groupe d'Etude des Méthodes de l'Analyse Socio-logique, Université de Paris-Sorbonne

Margaret M. Braungart
State University of New York

Richard G. Braungart
Syracuse University

E. A. Brett
London School of Economics

Asa Briggs
Sussex

George W. Brown
Royal Holloway and Bedford New College

Rogers Brubaker
University of California, Los Angeles

Hauke Brunkhorst
Institut für Grundlagen der Politik, Freie Universität Berlin

W. Brus
Wolfson College, Oxford

Alan Bryman
Loughborough University

Tom Burden
Leeds Polytechnic

Colin Campbell
University of York

Tom D. Campbell
Australian National University

Julius Carlebach †

Allan C. Carlson
Rockford Institute, Illinois

Elwood Carlson
University of South Carolina

Terrell Carver
University of Bristol

Alan Cawson
Sussex

Gérard Chaliand
Paris

Simon Clarke
University of Warwick

Ira J. Cohen
Rutgers University

Selma Jeanne Cohen
New York

David E. Cooper
University of Durham

Lewis A. Coser †

Bernard Crick
Birkbeck College, University of London

Roger Crisp
St Anne's College, Oxford

Ian Crowther
Literary Editor, The Salisbury Review

Fred D'Agostino
University of New England

R. W. Davies
Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham

Meghnad J. Desai
London School of Economics

Torcuato S. Di Tella
Buenos Aires

Marco Diani
Centre d'Analyse et d'Intervention Sociologiques, Paris

Peter Dickens
Social and Political Sciences, University of Cambridge

James Donald
University of New South Wales, Sydney

François Dubet
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris

Bohdan Dziemidok
University of Gdansk

Andrew Edgar
University of Wales, College of Cardiff

S. Eilon
Imperial College of Science and Technology, London

Peter P. Ekeh
University of Buffalo

Pascal Engel
Centre de Recherche en Epistémologie, Paris

Helen Fein
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Joseph V. Femia
School of Politics and Communication Studies, University of Liverpool

Zsuzsa Ferge
Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Eötvos Loránd University, Budapest

Rubem César Fernandes
Instituto de Estudos da Religiao, Rio de Janeiro

Robert A. Foley
University of Cambridge

Tom Forester †

Murray F. Foss
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC

Lawrence Freedman
King's College, London

Christopher Freeman
Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex

R. G. Frey
Bowling Green State University

Diego Gambetta
University of Oxford

David Garland
University of Edinburgh

Ernest Gellner †

Norman Geras
University of Manchester

Naomi R. Gerstel
Department of Sociology, and Social and Demographic Research Unit, University of Amherst

Margaret Gilbert
University of Connecticut, Storrs

Hannes H. Gissurarson
University of Reykjavik

Peter E. Glasner
University of the West of England

Frank Gloversmith
University of Sussex

Jack A. Goldstone
Centre for Comparative Research in History, Society and Culture, University of California, Davis

Stanislaw Gomulka
London School of Economics

Peter Goodrich
Cardoso School of Law, New York

Robert Grant
University of Glasgow

S. J. D. Green
School of History, University of Leeds

Roger Griffin
Oxford Brookes University

David B. Grusky
Stanford University

Anne-Marie Guillemard
Université de Paris IV (Panthéon–Sorbonne)

Peter Gurney
University of Glamorgan

Peter Halfpenny
University of Manchester

John A. Hall
McGill University, Montreal

Charles Hallisey
Committee on the Study of Religion, Harvard University

Norman Hampson
Emeritus Professor, University of York

Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap
University of East Anglia

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins
University of Hull

Laurence Harris
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

David M. Heer
University of Southern California

Arnold Heertje
Universiteit van Amsterdam

András Hegedüs
Budapest

Adrian Henri
Liverpool

John Heritage
University of California, Los Angeles

J. H. Hexter †

Susan Himmelweit
Open University

Barry Hindess
Australian National University

Paul Quentin Hirst †

Barry Holden
University of Reading

Martin Hollis †

Axel Honneth
Universität Frankfurt am Main

Leo Howe
University of Cambridge

T. W. Hutchison
Professor Emeritus, University of Birmingham

Richard Hyman
Industrial Relations Research Unit, University of Warwick

Marie Jahoda †

Hans Joas
John F. Kennedy Institut, Freie Universität Berlin

Terry Johnson
University of Leicester

Kay Junge
Institute of Sociology, Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen

Mary Kaldor
London School of Economics

Haider Ali Khan
Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver

V. G. Kiernan
Professor Emeritus, University of Edinburgh

Richard Kilminster
University of Leeds

Alden S. Klovdahl
Australian National University

I. S. Kon
Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology, Academy of Russia, Moscow

Krishan Kumar
University of Virginia

Jorge Larrain
Universidad A. Hurtado, Santiago, Chile

Gerhard Lenski
University of North Carolina

Charles T. Lindholm
Boston University

Alain Lipietz
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives d'Economie Mathématique Appliquées à la Planification, Paris

Peter Lloyd
University of Sussex

Eero Loone
University of Tartu, Estonia

Alfred Louch
Claremont Graduate School, California

Terry Lovell
University of Warwick

Steven Lukes
New York University

Francis P. McHugh
St Edmund's College, University of Cambridge

John Spencer Madden
The Countess of Chester Hospital, Chester

Michel Maffesoli
Université de Paris V (René Descartes)

Peter T. Manicas
University of Hawaii at Manoa

Patrice Mann
University of Bordeaux

Peter Marsh
MCM Research

David A. Martin
London School of Economics

Ali A. Mazrui
State University of New York at Binghamton

Ulrike Meinhof
University of Southampton

Volker Meja
Memorial University of Newfoundland

J. G. Merquior †

Ian Miles
Programme of Policy Research in Engineering, Science and Technology, University of Manchester

David Miller
Nuffield College, Oxford

Enzo Mingione
University of Biocca, Milan

Kenneth R. Minogue
London School of Economics

Simon Mohun
Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London

Maxine Molyneux
University of London

Raymond A. Morrow
University of Alberta

Michael Mulkay
University of York

Eleanor M. Nesbitt
Religious Education and Community Project, University of Warwick

Robert Nisbet †

Peter Nolan
School of Business and Economic Studies, University of Leeds

Roderick C. Ogley
Emeritus Reader, University of Sussex

John O'Neill
University of Lancaster

Sarah Norgate
The Open University

Geoffrey Ostergaard

William Outhwaite
Sociology, University of Sussex

John E. Owens
School of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Westminster

Trevor Pateman
Sussex

Geoff Payne
University of Plymouth

Donald Peterson
Cognitive Science,
University of Birmingham

Tony Pinkney
University of Lancaster

Jennifer Platt
University of Sussex

Ken Plummer
University of Essex

Jonathan Powis
Balliol College, Oxford

Vernon Pratt
School of Independent Studies,
Lancaster University

Allan Pred
University of California

David L. Prychitko
State University of New York, Oswego

Derek Pugh
Business School, Open University

Terence H. Qualter
University of Waterloo, Ontario

Ali Rattansi
City University, London

L. J. Ray
University of Kent at Canterbury

Gavin C. Reid
University of St Andrews

Karin Renon
Centre d'Analyse et d'Intervention
Sociologiques, Paris

John Rex
Professor Emeritus, University of Warwick

Ken Richardson
The Open University

Adrian D. Rifkin
Middlesex University

Paul Rock
London School of Economics

C. A. Rootes
University of Kent at Canterbury

Steven P. R. Rose
The Open University

W. D. Rubinstein
*School of Social Sciences,
Deakin University*

Anne Showstack Sassoon
*School of Social Science,
Kingston University*

Werner Sauer
*Institute of Philosophy,
Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz*

Johann F. Schneider
Universität des Saarlandes

John Scott
University of Essex

Teodor Shanin
University of Manchester

A. M. Sharakiya
State University of New York at Binghamton

Andrew Sherratt
*Ashmolean Museum,
University of Oxford*

Cris Shore
*Goldsmiths' College,
University of London*

Kazimierz M. Slomczynski
*Institute of Sociology,
University of Warsaw*

Peter Sluglett
University of Durham

Andrew Spencer
University of Essex

Patricia M. Springborg
University of Sydney

Nico Stehr
University of Alberta

Herbert Stein
*American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, Washington DC*

Rudi Supek
Zagreb

György Széll
*Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaften,
Universität Osnabrück*

Steve Taylor
London School of Economics

John B. Thompson
Jesus College, Cambridge

J. K. J. Thomson
University of Sussex

Alan Tomlinson
University of Brighton

Alain Touraine
*Centre d'Analyse et d'Intervention
Sociologiques, Paris*

Peter Townsend
University of Bristol

Keith Tribe
University of Worcestershire

Sylvaine Trinh
*Centre d' Analyse et d'Intervention
Sociologiques, Paris*

Bryan S. Turner
University of Singapore

Jonathan H. Turner
University of California, Riverside

Ernest Tuveson
University of California, Berkeley

John Urry
Lancaster University

Ivan Varga
Kingston, Ontario

Loic J. D. Wacquant
*University of California,
Berkeley*

Sylvia Walby
University of Leeds

Nigel Walker
*Professor Emeritus, Institute of Criminology,
University of Cambridge*

Immanuel Wallerstein
*State University of New York at
Binghamton, and Maison des
Sciences de l'Homme, Paris*

J. W. N. Watkins †

Carolyn Webber
*Survey Research Centre,
University of California, Berkeley*

Wlodzimierz Wesolowski
*Institute of Philosophy and Sociology,
Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw*

Michel Wievorka
*Centre d'Analyse et d'Intervention
Sociologiques, Paris*

Aaron Wildavsky
*Survey Research Centre,
University of California, Berkeley*

R. A. Wilford
The Queen's University of Belfast

Robin M. Williams Jr.
Cornell University

Christopher Wilson
London School of Economics

Charles R. M. Wilson
Portsmouth Polytechnic

H. T. Wilson
York University, Toronto

Peter Worsley
London

Dennis H. Wrong
New York University

Lucia Zedner
London School of Economics

Sami Zubaida
*Birkbeck College,
University of London*

Introduction

At the end of the nineteenth century the term 'social' was still a relatively new one, as was for the most part the concept of distinct 'social sciences'. The first professional associations and journals were just beginning to be established and some new social sciences, such as sociology, were gaining recognition, while economics as an older discipline was developing rapidly in the neoclassical form given to it by Carl Menger, Léon Walras, Alfred Marshall and others, or with quite a different emphasis in the work of the German historical school. All the social sciences could look back on distinguished precursors in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or earlier still in the case of political science and history, and the ideas of some of these precursors have remained influential. But in the twentieth century the social sciences became more distinctly constituted and differentiated, and they have had a stronger impact on social thought as a whole. Political doctrines generally, and social criticism in particular, became more dependent on theories of society, and many nineteenth-century ideas came to find an institutional embodiment. Positivism established itself in a rather different form from its original Comtean one, as a philosophy of science particularly influential among social scientists. Evolutionism survived all kinds of attacks and retained its place in social thought, assuming new forms after World War II in conceptions of modernization, underdevelopment and development, and more recently in theories of the development of moral reasoning and human thought as a whole. The influence of Marxism, as a critique of political economy, a theory of society and a political doctrine, grew steadily during most of the century, though in increasingly diversified ways that were reflected, after the Russian Revolution and still more after 1945, in the sharp division between Marxism-Leninism and what came to be called Western Marxism, the latter being itself extremely diverse. The dramatic events of 1989 put an end to the communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe and to the world influence of Leninism, but although Marxism and to some extent socialism are at present in eclipse in post-communist Europe this is not so evidently the case elsewhere.

Everywhere, however, there is much rethinking of the social and political doctrines which had their origins in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and flowered in the present century against the background of massive and rapid changes in the structure and culture of human societies. The Industrial Revolution and the political revolutions in France and America had initiated this transformation, giving birth to the democratic movement and later to socialism, as well as to the counter-doctrines of conservatism and liberalism, but the new industrial capitalist societies were also characterized by nationalism and imperialist expansion. As a result the twentieth century, contrary to the expectations of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, came to be one of the most violent in human history, with two immensely destructive and savage world wars and innumerable, equally savage, lesser conflicts, as well as persecution and genocide on a large scale. New forms of aggressive expansionism emerged with the fascist regimes in Europe, which also established totalitarian dictatorships of a new kind (though these had a parallel, or even precursor, in Stalinist Russia), and in a different, more militaristic style in Japan.

Underlying the destructiveness of modern warfare has been the unprecedented advance during the past century of natural science and technology, which has transformed the conditions and modes of social life. Incessant technological innovation in the industrial countries has been a major factor in economic growth, and an important factor in the emergence of giant corporations, among them, notably in the past four decades, multinational corporations, which increasingly dominate the world economy. At the same time innovation and growth have a disruptive effect, not proceeding steadily and smoothly, but in a cycle of boom and depression, marked by periods of large-scale unemployment, as in the 1930s and again in the 1980s. Hence there has been much debate about ways of regulating the economy for social ends, a debate which until 1989 often involved contrasting (relatively) free market capitalist economies with the centrally planned

economies, and still raises questions about the role of partial, indicative planning in the management of the economic system.

Economic growth itself has raised new issues for social thinkers; first, the contrast between the growing wealth of the industrial countries, within which there remain however substantial impoverished sectors, and the widespread poverty – in some cases increasing, as in large parts of Africa – of much of the Third World, and secondly, the environmental impact of growth itself. In relation to the first issue there have been many attempts to formulate models of development for the poorer countries, and to work out practical policies for overcoming this North/South divide, but the policies actually implemented have not so far been notably successful and by the end of the 1980s the transfer of resources from rich to poor countries, through aid programmes and other means, had turned, as a result of accumulated debt, into a reverse flow from the poor to the wealthy. In consequence a critical debate about what is to be understood by development in a world context, or by the idea of a 'new international economic order', which so far remains largely a catchphrase, has engaged an increasing number of social thinkers, and the debate has expanded into an additional area of concern with the human environment. Indeed it is with this issue, and with the burgeoning ecology movements, that much social thought has been engaged in recent decades. The pollution and destruction of the human habitat through industrial production and the apparently insatiable demand for raw materials, has affected not only the industrial societies themselves but also the countries of the Third World, where it is often even more devastating, sometimes compounded by the effects of rapid population growth.

It is against the background of the upheavals, conflicts, discontinuities and new problems of the twentieth century that social thought, whether produced by social and political activists themselves or by the growing army of professional scholars, must be understood. Yet many of its central themes remain much as they were in the 1900s: the nature of work, the role of the nation-state, the relation between individual and society, the effect of money on social relations, the contrast between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society/association), stratification and equality, the tension between partisanship and value-freedom in the social sciences, even such labels as *fin de siècle* itself. The latest diagnoses of postmodernity or postindustrialism look remarkably like early accounts of modernity and industrialism, and modern futurology, despite the availability of computer models, not unlike the predictions of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century social thinkers.

These earlier themes, however, have in many cases acquired a new content. The nature and meaning of work has now to be examined in the context of a radically changing occupational structure, the reduction of working hours, and the expansion of time available for freely chosen activities. The state has become more obviously the provider of vital social services and of the essential economic infrastructure, but the experience of fascism and Stalinism has shown that its power can be used in some circumstances to establish a totalitarian system. Democracy, which at the beginning of the twentieth century was a relatively new and limited growth, in only a small minority of countries, and was subsequently destroyed again in some of them, has become (in theory at least) an almost universal political value, though its eventual scope is still vigorously debated between advocates of liberal or participatory democracy, and in the context of recent discussions of the meaning of citizenship. Stratification and equality, which had a central place in the political conflicts between left and right throughout the twentieth century, have become more complex issues in recent decades as other kinds of inequality – of gender, race and nationality – have been more strongly emphasized by new social movements, and as the claims of communist societies to have eliminated class inequalities were more vigorously disputed by internal and external critics of their strongly hierarchical structures.

This dictionary aims to provide a reliable and comprehensive overview of the main themes of social thought, broadly conceived, and of its development from the beginning of the twentieth century (or earlier) to its end, against the background of the vast and shifting panorama of social life in this turbulent era. It will prove, we hope, a valuable source of reference for all those who, in different ways, are concerned with the prospects for the future development of human society as we enter a new century and a new millennium.

WILLIAM OUTHWAITE
TOM BOTTOMORE

A

action and agency   Someone performs an action when what he or she does can be described as intentional (see Davidson, 1977). Actions are practical conclusions drawn from intentions and beliefs; 'action' and 'rationality' are interrelated. Sociological action theories from the time of Max Weber build on this relation in analysing action into components and types. Social actions are always part of larger systems and of processes of intersubjective understanding, and this raises the question of the role of the acting subject ('human agency') in the processes by which actions are co-ordinated.

Rationality of action

Aristotle, in his *Nichomachean Ethics*, saw the rationality of an action as lying in the conclusion which leads from intentions or norms and from assessments of the situation and of the available means to immediate consequences in terms of action. Action is rational in so far as it follows premises which ground and justify its performance. A minimal rationality must therefore be presupposed in any action, in any bodily movement falling under this definition. Aristotle emphasized that even undisciplined actions which escape rational control, such as the excessive consumption of sweet things, can be formally at least fitted into the model of rational justification (cf. Davidson, 1980; Wright, 1971).

Will formation

A simple example of purposive-rational will formation is provided by Kant's technical imperative, the 'imperative of capability', in which intentions are extended from ends to means (cf. Wright, 1971). Someone who wants something and knows how it is to be obtained must want to obtain it by these means. Even the complex process of social will formation, coming to a decision as a consequence of collective deliberation, can be described as a process of practical inference. This involves a

union of many (at least two and at most all) actors concerned with a common purpose or problem. If this union is not brought about through force, threat or propaganda, it must be through the free compulsion of argumentative inference, that is through convincing reasons (cf. Habermas, 1971; Apel, 1973, 1979). Practical discourses are not concerned with the extension of intentions from ends to means, explaining to the actor why it is rational for *him or her* to take certain decisions, but rather with whether it is possible to generalize the ends and make clear to all why *they* should follow particular norms (see NORMS). In what Hegel (*Logic*) called the 'conclusion of the good', in which means and end are identical and the act is good in itself, it is a question of what is legitimate and justifiable in the light of shared and freely accepted principles (Wellmer, 1979, pp. 25ff.).

Consequences of actions

The conclusion of a practical inference is an action. From the observer's perspective, the choice of available means to given ends *explains* the action. Such an explanation also has prognostic relevance, since institutional and normative contexts ensure that intentions and beliefs remain stable and are regularly reproduced (cf. Wright, 1971). But since one can never exclude the possibility of actors changing their intentions, forgetting the best way to do things or unexpectedly finding new ways to solve a problem, the link between intentions and beliefs and future behaviour is a contingent one. But we can only identify a given behaviour *as* a specific action if we succeed in interpreting it, in the perspective of a participant, as the consequence of rationally understandable intentions and beliefs. 'To interpret behaviour as intentional action is to understand it in the light of an intention' (Wellmer, 1979, p. 13).

The participant's perspective, and only that perspective, opens up a similar logical-semantic relation between intentions and actions. For the actor,

the practical conclusion *means* an obligation to perform a future action. It is not empirically guaranteed that someone who promises to come on time will in fact do so, but someone who has given that undertaking will need to offer an apology if he or she is not punctual. The expectation that in normal circumstances someone who has promised to be on time very probably will be is not only inductively supported by observed behavioural regularities; this expectation is based even more on the fact that we can usually rely on one another. The Other will probably be on time because the agreement has reciprocal validity (cf. Apel, 1979). This is not an empirical and contingent relation between intentions and activities but a logical-pragmatic one. We recognize the seriousness of the intention by its consequences for action; we call someone who does not do what he or she wants to do and can do, inconsistent. This is not unlike the case of someone who asserts that snow is all white *and* all black. Just as we suspect weakness of will as the cause of inconsistent action, we may infer that someone who unintentionally utters contradictions is weak in the head. Like evidently contradictory statements, evidently inconsistent action has 'something essentially irrational' about it, so that such actors might find it hard to recognize themselves in their actions (cf. Davidson, 1980).

Types of action

Disturbances of action through such massive inconsistencies that we cannot understand our own action ('I don't know how I could have done it') bring us up against the internal connection between action and self-understanding. Max Weber and Sigmund Freud drew opposite conclusions from this relation. Whereas Freud is interested in the unconscious causes of self-deception, Weber bases his sociology on an IDEAL TYPE of meaningfully oriented action intelligible to the actor; his well-known typology of action is founded on this relation of self-evidence.

Social action is 'behaviour which is meaningfully oriented to the behaviour of others' (Weber, 1921–2). One limiting case of social action is the completely self-evident, conventional, habitual and almost mechanical course of traditional action based on 'internalized habit'. This 'dully habitual everyday action', quietly adapted to the normative background of the life-world, is pushed into an affectual or emotional reaction when the conventionally meaningful background of everyday action suddenly collapses and confronts the actor with unfamiliar and exceptional demands, problems and conflicts. This is the other limit case of social action. To speak of *action* which is governed by 'present affects and emotions' means that, even in uninhibited reaction to an exceptional stimulus, the actor retains scope to decide how to react, or whether not to react at all and to swallow his or her rage. But Weber reserves the description 'rationally intelligible' for social behaviour which is fully conscious and based only on reasons which the actor considers to be valid and conclusive; this corresponds to the ideal types of purposive-rational and value-rational action. With this distinction Weber looks back, via NEO-KANTIANISM, to the Aristotelian theory of action. Whereas value-rational action follows what Hegel called the 'conclusion of the good' and identifies means and ends in 'the unconditioned value in itself of a specific behaviour', in purposive-rational action all that counts is the effectiveness of means to a given end. In Weber's conception, only this type of action can be fully rationalized; it is therefore the true ideal type of meaningfully oriented behaviour that expresses Hegel's 'conclusion of action'. Only here can one say 'that *if* someone were to act in a strictly purposive-rational manner, they could *only* do it this way and no other way' (Weber, 1921–2).

For Weber, the rational understanding (see VER-STEHEN) of action advances methodically from this universal and counterfactual rationality assumption. This makes it possible to explain actual actions as a deviation from an ideal standard. Freud's interest in explaining irrational action is therefore complementary to Weber's interest in understanding the rationality of consistent action. In a world shaped by causal reasoning, rational action of this kind is only possible when the actor's reasons for a particular action are causally effective *as intentions*, and *cause* the action (cf. Davidson, 1980). If a real action is to be understood as the consequence of a rational inference (for example, rational argumentation), the reasons must have a causal, that is, rationally motivating, force as causes of the action-event. The causal force which a grounded will, transforming reasons into intentions, gives to our actions is of course, as Davidson (1980) and Apel (1979, p. 189) have shown in their criticisms of C. G. Hempel, a causality without causal laws. What Kant called the 'causality of freedom', in which the will or the intention which causes the action counts

as a valid justification for it, involves not causal laws, but normative-universal principles of rationality (Apel, 1979). The case of unconscious self-deception with which Freud is concerned is one in which an action or speech-act is caused as an event without being justified by its causes (cf. Löw-Beer, 1990). In this case the action or speech-act is not rationally motivated, by a valid sequence of symbols, but only empirically, by way of 'split-off symbols' (cf. Habermas, 1968, pp. 246ff.; 1981, pp. 8ff.). But because this explanation in terms of merely empirically effective motives presupposes the possibility of rational action, Freud can combine his methodological interest with a therapeutic interest in emancipation and the critique of action which is not brought about by reasons.

This interest does not of course come near to satisfying Weber's criterion of ideal purposive rationality. The irrational action with which Freud is concerned is caused by the latent force of distorted, compulsively integrated communication. To explain it as action which is no longer intelligible to the actor it is not enough to postulate an ideal type of purposive-rational action and to measure its divergence. What must be presupposed is rather an ideal criterion of *undistorted communication* (cf. Habermas, 1968; Apel, 1979). What the actor who needs the help of a therapist finds unintelligible about his or her own action is the breaks in the system of reasons which would appear acceptable to a community of autonomous subjects. The motives which cause the action and speech of the neurotic, without justifying and grounding it, are causes which cannot count as reasons because a free communication community could not accept them as reasons.

Action, system and subject

Weber's theory of action appears inadequate in another quite different respect. It underestimates from the start the complexity of the *double contingency* (cf. Parsons and Shils, 1951, pp. 14ff.) in the meaningfully oriented reciprocal perspectives of ego and alter, as well as the hypercomplexity of any meaningful orientation. The improbability of a meaningfully guided act, related to an unlimited and inconceivable multiplicity of alternative possibilities which might have been realized, is further increased by the improbability in *social* action that everyone knows that everyone can act or not act as expected. Without mechanisms for the re-duction of this monstrous and in principle ungraspable complexity of meaningfully oriented action, mechanisms which functionally integrate the individual actions independently of the will and consciousness of the subjects, social order seems impossible (cf. Luhmann, 1970–90, vol. 2, pp. 204ff.; 1981, pp. 195ff.). The question is then whether social order can be envisaged entirely without collective will formation and whether actions can be separated from a notion of agency produced by subjects themselves by means of acceptable reasons.

Reading
Brubaker, R.1984: *The Limits of Rationality: an Essay on the Social and Moral Thought of Max Weber.*
Davidson, D. 1980: *Essays on Actions and Events.*
Parsons, T. 1937: *The Structure of Social Action.*

HAUKE BRUNKHORST

aesthetics   In its modern meaning aesthetics is most frequently understood as a philosophical discipline which is either a philosophy of aesthetic phenomena (objects, qualities, experiences and values), or a philosophy of art (of creativity, of artwork, and its perception) or a philosophy of art criticism taken broadly (metacriticism), or, finally, a discipline which is concerned philosophically with all three realms jointly.

Aesthetic reflection is much older than the term itself. The history of Western aesthetics begins usually with Plato, whose writings contain a systematic reflection on art and a speculative theory of beauty. Neither Plato nor his great disciple Aristotle, however, treated these two great themes of aesthetics in conjunction.

The term 'aesthetics' was introduced to philosophy as late as the mid-eighteenth century by a German philosopher, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762). Baumgarten, a disciple of Leibniz's follower Christian Wolff (1679–1754), concluded that the system of philosophical disciplines was incomplete and required a science parallel to logic which was a science of clear and distinct cognition achieved by the intellect. The new science should be aesthetics, a science of clear and confused cognition realized by the senses. This view was expressed for the first time by Baumgarten in his dissertation *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus* (of 1735) and in a completed form 15 years later in his *Aesthetica*.

Contrary to the expectations which the etymology of the word aesthetica might suggest (Greek *aistheticos* = perceptive), this work did not concern itself with the theory of sensory cognition but dealt with the theory of poetry (and indirectly of all the arts) as a form of sensory cognition for which the main object of perception is beauty. The combination of the two – the reflection on art and the reflection on beauty – defined the subsequent development of the newly emerged branch of philosophy, but this has become the source of both its accomplishments and never-ending theoretical and methodological difficulties. Without doubt it was an event of historical significance, marking the beginning of a new period in the development of the philosophy of art, particularly in that it coincided with a summing up of the longlasting search for the common denominator of all the arts which was achieved by a French theorist of art Charles Batteux in his *Traité des beaux arts réduit à un même principe* (in 1746). Batteux recognized that the common feature of the fine arts is the beauty proper to them all, and therefore they may be termed *beaux arts*.

The name aesthetics took some time to be accepted. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) began with a criticism of Baumgarten for his lack of consistency, and in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (of 1781 and 1787) used the term transcendental aesthetics to mean a philosophical science of sensory perception. However, in his *Critique of Judgement* (of 1790) he used the term aesthetics to define the reflection on beauty and judgements of taste. The traditional meaning of aesthetics became popular in the nineteenth century through the influence of Hegel (1770–1831), whose lectures on the philosophy of the fine arts in 1820–9 were posthumously published as *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* (in 1835).

Kant, Schelling and Hegel were the first prominent philosophers for whom aesthetics constituted an inherent part of their philosophical systems. For Kant aesthetics was first and foremost the theory of beauty, of the sublime and of aesthetic judgements. For Hegel aesthetics was mainly the philosophy of the fine arts. The two models of moulding aesthetics either as a philosophy of beauty (and later of aesthetic values) and of aesthetic experience, or as a philosophy of art become dominant in the aesthetics of nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. Most frequently, the two variants were joined together and the results were varied.

In the course of years, however, the idea of aesthetics as philosophy of art appeared to be more popular. In the nineteenth century there was the first attempt to go beyond philosophy in aesthetic considerations and to create a scientific aesthetics. In his *Vorschule der Aesthetik* of 1876, the German psychologist Gustav Theodor Fechner attempted to create an experimental aesthetics on the basis of psychology, and the twentieth century also witnessed attempts to create a psychological aesthetics by the representatives of gestalt psychology (Rudolf Arnheim and Leonard Meyer) and of depth psychology (Ernst Kris and Simon Lesser). Other developments have included mathematical aesthetics (George Birkhoff and Max Bense), informatics aesthetics (Abraham Moles), semiotic and semiological aesthetics (Charles Morris, Umberto Eco, Yuri Lotman), and sociological aesthetics (J. M. Guyau, P. Francastel, Pierre Bourdieu, Janet Wolff). In the philosophical domain the project of creating a scientific aesthetics was attempted by Etienne Souriau and Thomas Munro. Aesthetics, however, has not ceased to be a branch of philosophy.

Since the turn of the century there has been a growing interest in the methodological difficulties of aesthetics, which began to take into account doubts and arguments directed against the scientific status of aesthetics and the very sense of creating aesthetics theories. Of particular relevance here are the still popular ideas of Max Dessoir (1906) and Emil Utitz (1914–20). These thinkers introduced a distinction between aesthetics and a general science of art and emphasized that the two disciplines cross but do not overlap: the functions of art cannot be reduced to aesthetic functions only, whereas aesthetic merits are to be found in objects which are not works of art at all, such as natural phenomena and extra-artistic man made products. They also claimed that the general science of art differs methodologically from aesthetics and should evolve into an independent branch outside philosophy. Aesthetics, too, should go beyond the borders of philosophy and make much greater use of the results produced by other sciences, in particular psychology and sociology (see also ART; SOCIOLOGY OF).

The first aesthetician who not only systemized the objections against aesthetics but also attempted to overcome them was Edward Bullough, in his lectures of 1907 on '*the modern conception of aesthetics*' (in Bullough, 1957). He ordered the objections

raised against aesthetics into two groups: popular and theoretical, both kinds being reducible to assertions that:

1 Attempts to create a theory of such specific, relative, subjective and mutable phenomena as beauty, aesthetic effects and the pleasure and displeasure connected with them are futile. These phenomena cannot be rationalized and verbalized, they can be only experienced.
2 The definitions of beauty and other aesthetic phenomena are too abstract and general and thus are completely useless and practically unnecessary. They do not help anyone to enjoy beauty and art.
3 Both the artists and the enthusiasts of art are worried and annoyed by the fact that the rules of creation and reception are defined and imposed on artists and the public, and presented moreover with absurd and insolent pedantry.

Bullough's work was the first self-examination which summed up the actual internal methodological difficulties of aesthetics, and the objections raised from outside, which, if not always fully justified, were not without reason.

According to Stefan Morawski (1987), Bullough's work began the third period in the history of aesthetics, the period of critical self-knowledge of its research status, and of the development of its methodological self-reflection. This process reached its peak in 1954 with the publication of W. Elton's famous anthology *Aesthetics and Language*, and the equally famous papers by M. Weitz 'The role of theory in aesthetics' (1956) and W. E. Kennick 'Does traditional aesthetics rest on a mistake?' (1958), which continued and developed the ideas set out in Elton's collection. These three works were inspired by the ideas in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), and they criticized traditional philosophical aesthetics sharply and thoroughly for its lack of linguistic precision, conceptual vagueness and mistaken theoretical and methodological assumptions which were most apparent in the unsuccessful attempts to create a philosophical theory of art. Wrong assumptions led naturally to the failure of the hitherto proposed philosophical theories of art.

The first mistaken assumption identified was the essentialist claim that art possesses a universal nature, or an absolute essence, which it is the task of aesthetics to dig out and define. Art, it was now claimed, is an incessantly mutable phenomenon, lacking any universal essence, and the notions 'art', 'work of art', 'aesthetic experience', and so on are therefore open concepts (Weitz, 1959) and cannot be defined. Secondly, the representatives of traditional aesthetics missed another basic truth that every work of art is valued for its uniqueness and unrepeatable originality, and therefore there is no place for any general rules of creation and evaluation of such work. The aestheticians, however, were persistent in their attempts to discover or make such general rules, even though any generalizations about art are unjustified and dubious. The aestheticians' arguments were analogical to those in ethics, but any analogies appeared to be misleading. Generalizations in ethics are possible and necessary, whereas in aesthetics the situation is quite different. 'When in aesthetics one moves from the particular to the general, one is travelling in the wrong direction' (S. Hampshire in Elton, 1954). Thirdly, aesthetics followed philosophy in its mistaken assumption that facts can be disclosed and interpreted, whereas in fact its proper task is not disclosing facts but clarifying the meanings of words. Words, concepts and expressions are used in a number of ways which are not always proper. A solution of philosophical problems consists in recognizing how given words are properly used. The basic problem of aesthetics is not answering the question 'What is art?' but 'What kind of concept is "art"?' (Weitz).

The criticism of aesthetics by analytical philosophy, however, did not result either in the death of aesthetics or in a lasting victory of cognitive minimalism, and the abandonment of new attempts to create a theory of art. One might even defend the view that anti-essentialist criticism of aesthetics resulted in its recovery and revival in the 1970s and the 1980s. At the same time, however, aesthetics continued to be criticized from outside and the aestheticians continued their methodological self-reflection which in part answered the external criticism and in part resulted from aesthetics' inherent needs. Nonetheless, the aestheticians rejected all the basic objections articulated by the analytical philosophers. Aesthetics should and indeed can be practised with a greater logical and linguistic precision, but at the same time it cannot be reduced to the analysis of concepts and the ways they are used. In this respect the situation of aesthetics does not differ substantially from the other branches of the humanities. It is a misunderstanding if one applies

to aesthetics the requirements applied to science or mathematics. Moreover, even in natural sciences there is no single and universal paradigm of scientific exactness.

One has to realize that any generalizations concerning such diverse and mutable phenomena as art and the aesthetic experience are very risky but there is no need to abandon such generalizations altogether. Avoiding essentialist and anti-historical definitions of traditional aesthetics does not mean abandoning attempts to create a theory of art and of aesthetic phenomena. Normative considerations which jeopardize the freedom of creation and which are notoriously ascribed to aesthetics are by no means characteristic of aesthetics and occur much more frequently in art criticism. It is true, however, that the majority of aesthetic theories do contain elements of evaluation. But then again, axiological aspects are typical of any discipline and form an organic part of cognition, they cannot be, and do not have to be, eliminated from science. At the same time it is possible to create purely descriptive theories of art (Dickie, 1971).

Rejecting far-reaching criticism of aesthetics by analytical philosophers, aestheticians themselves periodically take note of criticisms and reservations directed against their discipline, and express their own doubts as to its research status. In most cases, however, they defend its value, though some would like to pursue it in a fully or partly modified form. At least three attempts to balance the arguments pro and contra made by aestheticians themselves in the last three decades are worth noting.

The first was made in 1960 by Jerome Stolnitz in *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism* (pp. 7–19). The second was made by Stefan Morawski in two works published in Polish (1973, 1987). Morawski's conclusions differ in the two works, however; in the first he defends the significance of aesthetics, while in the other he abandons this defence and argues that it is now in decline. The third author who listed the objections raised, and defended aesthetics against them, is Göran Hermerén, who devoted the final chapter of his *Aspects of Aesthetics* (1983, pp. 224–60) to this question.

A considerable number of the doubts and reservations about aesthetics repeat themselves. There are also new criticisms which have arisen in the course of development of modern culture and in particular of avant-garde art, mass media and mass culture. Recent criticism has two main aspects. In the first place, the main reservations still concern the status of aesthetics as a field of research. The critics assert that aesthetics is cognitively futile, anachronistic and inadequate, its methods oldfashioned and based on mistaken methodological principles. Consequently, even if it did make some sense in the past, it appears to be completely helpless when faced with the latest avant-garde in art and the most significant phenomena of mass culture. So it ignores them (a disqualifying attitude) or tries to describe them, interpret them and evaluate them using its traditional methods and traditional, quite irrelevant categories, which leads to its failure and humiliation.

This mode of criticism is to be found in the papers by T. Binkley, in Michael Kirby's *The Art of Time* (1969), and in the latest works by Stefan Morawski. Kirby holds that traditional philosophical aesthetics should be rejected in favour of historical or situational aesthetics. Binkley claims that aesthetics could survive if it reduced the scope of its interest to a reflection on aesthetic phenomena and abandoned creating theories of art, since aesthetics cannot explain avant-garde art, which as such rejects the aesthetic paradigm of art, if it keeps assuming that the nature of art is aesthetic. Morawski claims that aesthetics is declining not only because of avant-garde art but also because art 'has lost part of its significance and its further existence is jeopardized'. Aesthetics, then, should give the floor either to 'poietics' as the theory of creativity or to anti-aesthetics understood in terms of 'a critical reflection on the crisis of the culture and art of our times' (1987, p. 77). It is not the methodology that is responsible for the decline of aesthetics; it is the disintegration of its main object: art.

Aesthetics however, is criticized not only for its helplessness in the face of avant-garde art, but also because of its *a*historical attitudes, 'aspirations for totality' (Werckmeister, 1971), essentialism and making abstract rules irrespective of the fact that 'art is a dynamic syndrome' (Adorno, 1984), and that art itself and its reception are produced by a historical process (Bourdieu, 1979). If aesthetics wishes to survive it has to transform itself and become a dialectical aesthetics (Adorno) or a sociological aesthetics (Bourdieu).

The other kind of argument against aesthetics consists in suggesting that no-one really needs it. Aesthetics does not help ordinary recipients of modern art to find their way about in the chaos of the latest artistic phenomena. Someone with a serious interest in aesthetics would do better to refer to

works on the history and theory of particular realms of art, or on the psychology of art, sociology of art, philosophy of CULTURE, the theory of mass communication, semiotics, and so on.

It is hard to foresee the future of aesthetics. The theses about its death or decline, however, are just as weak as the theses about the death or decline of art. But aesthetics has to change, taking account of the transformations of its subject and the achievements of other disciplines concerned with art and aesthetics phenomena. Perhaps one should come back to the idea of two disciplines, in the vein of Dessoir and Utitz: the philosophy of art and the philosophy of aesthetic values and experiences. There is no doubt, however, that the development of psychology, sociology, semiotics and other disciplines concerned with art does not eradicate strictly philosophical (axiological, methodological, cognitive and ontological) problems of art and of aesthetic phenomena. This is the unquestionable *raison d'être* of aesthetics.

See also ART, SOCIOLOGY OF; LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY; MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM.

Reading

Adorno, T. 1984: *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. C. Lenhardt.
Barrett, C. ed. 1965: *Collected Papers on Aesthetics*.
Beardsley, M. 1958: *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*.
Caygill, H. 1989: *The Art of Judgement*.
Elton, W. ed. 1954: *Aesthetics and Language*.
Ingarden, R. 1985: *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*.
Margolis, J. ed. 1987: *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*.
Shusterman, R. ed. 1989: *Analytic Aesthetics*.
Sparshott, F. 1963: *The Structure of Aesthetics*.
Tatarkiewicz, W. 1970–4: *History of Aesthetics*, 3 vols.
Werckmeister, O. 1971: *Ende der Ästhetik*.
Wolff, J. 1983: *Aesthetics and the Sociology of Art*.

BOHDAN DZIEMIDOK

affluent society   A society in which there is sufficient wealth to ensure the continued satisfaction of the privately serviced basic needs of the majority of the population (such as food and clothing) with the result that individuals employ their disposable incomes to gratify ephemeral and insatiable wants, while insufficient funds may be directed to the satisfaction of publicly serviced needs (such as health care and education).

The term was made famous by Kenneth Galbraith in his book *The Affluent Society*, first published in 1958. This is a powerful critique of the

pattern of resource allocation then prevailing in the United States (and, by extension, in some individual national economies of Western Europe) and involves three main claims. First, that increases in productive capacity and efficiency have resulted in an economy capable of providing a great and unprecedented affluence for the majority of people. As Galbraith observes, in the contemporary United States many goods are 'comparatively abundant', a point which he illustrates by pointing to the fact that more people die each year from eating too much food than from eating too little (p. 102).

Secondly, he argues that conventional economic wisdom has failed to take this development into account, continuing to embody the earlier and anachronistic assumption that further annual increases in production are necessarily to be desired. What, in particular, is outdated is the priority accorded to the ever-increasing production of goods in the private sector, which leads to a situation where 'private affluence' is matched by 'public squalor'. The 'great and comprehensive contrast between the care and encouragement which is lavished on the production of private goods and the severe restraint which it imposes on those that must emerge from the public sector' is for Galbraith 'the most singular feature of the affluent society' (p. 155).

Thirdly and lastly, the stimulation of artificial wants through advertising coupled with an excessive provision of credit is required in order to maintain a high level of demand, now that there are no longer any urgent needs to be satisfied.

The term Galbraith introduced is still widely encountered, having entered into popular use. The critique of conventional economic thought is usually missing from this usage, however, as too is the implied contrast between private affluence and public squalor, while the harsher economic climate of the 1980s also resulted in the phrase being used in a more ironic manner than Galbraith ever intended. The kernel of meaning which therefore remains is the suggestion that citizens of such a society experience a state of widespread and unprecedented abundance with the consequence that economic resources are predominantly employed in the wasteful gratification of trivial wants rather than in the necessary satisfaction of fundamental needs.

Galbraith's claims have been extensively criticized. His third thesis in particular has been fiercely attacked on the grounds that he denigrates consumer choice, fails to distinguish between the

general cultural conditioning of wants and the spe-
cific influence exerted by producers, and ignores
the empirical evidence concerning the effects of
advertising (Hayek, 1967; Riesman, 1980). His
famous contrast between private affluence and
public squalor has also been criticized, largely on
the grounds that his approach involves a misunder-
standing of the declining marginal utility of goods
while understimating the natural profligacy of gov-
ernments (Rothbard, 1970). Despite this, even his
fiercest critics tend to accept that it is accurate to
describe modern North American and Western
European countries as affluent societies (Friedman,
1977, p. 13). Hence Galbraith's central thesis can be
said to have found widespread acceptance and to
have exerted a major influence on modern social
and economic thought. In this respect it is particu-
larly important to note that his exposure of the
taken-for-granted nature of the wisdom of striving
for ever-increasing levels of production and his
attack on the conventional view that supremacy
should be accorded to market values has undoubt-
edly assisted the subsequent emergence of environ-
mental and anti-growth critiques of modern
society.

See also CONSUMER SOCIETY; ECONOMIC GROWTH.

Reading
Beckerman, W. 1974: *In Defence of Economic Growth*.
Hession, C. H. 1972: *John Kenneth Galbraith and his
    Critics*.
Riesman, D. 1980: *Galbraith and Market Capitalism*.
Sharpe, M. E. 1973: *John Kenneth Galbraith and the Lower
    Economics*.

                                    COLIN CAMPBELL

age   *See* OLD AGE

agency   *See* ACTION AND AGENCY

aggression   While almost all current theories of
aggression have been developed in the twentieth
century, the underlying conceptual issues and
major debates have much earlier roots. Recent ar-
guments concerning the extent to which aggression
is biologically rooted in human nature revive
themes from Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* and the
liberal philosophies of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Freud (1920), for example, recasts many of Hob-
bes's original ideas on the inherent brutality of man
towards his fellows in a psychoanalytical frame-
work, providing a model subsequently emulated

in the very different field of ethology by Konrad
Lorenz (1966) and the neo-Darwinists.

Such approaches, focusing on rather simplistic
assumptions of instinctual mechanisms, while still
reviewed extensively in the major text books, are
now seen as largely excluded from current accounts
of aggression. The aspect of Freud's work which
focuses on aggression is viewed, with the benefit of
hindsight, as a rather hurried attempt to patch up
apparent weaknesses in his theoretical approach,
which relied heavily on the *pleasure principle* to
explain psychological processes and human behav-
iour. The bloody catastrophe of World War I re-
quired some quite different model, and so *thanatos*,
or the death instinct, appeared: 'As a result of a little
speculation, we have come to suppose that this
instinct is at work within every living creature and
is striving to bring it to ruin and reduce life to its
original condition of inanimate matter.'

A particular difficulty with these early instinct
theories was the central notion of 'spontaneity'. Not
only was aggression genetically preprogrammed,
and therefore ineradicable, it took the form of a
drive which must be consummated, channelled or
displaced. Expressions of aggression, whether in
the form of interpersonal VIOLENCE or in some
less direct form, were thus inevitable. Emphasis
was placed on the need to direct this hydraulic
force, rather than on ways of reducing it. Energetic
sports and physical competition were seen as essen-
tial ingredients in the control of 'natural' male
aggression, providing much of the rationale of the
British public school system.

While such views, like aspects of many early
psychological theories, have been incorporated
into lay 'social representations' of aggression and
violence, modern accounts of aggression in the
social sciences eschew virtually all notions of gen-
etic factors and biological substrates. The vast ma-
jority of published works since the 1950s lay
emphasis on the role of learning, social conditions
and deprivation. The essential assumption is that
aggression is a form of *behaviour*, rather than a
primary psychological force, and that, like any
other behaviour, it can be modified, controlled
and even eradicated. This is equally evident in the
laboratory-based work of psychologists such as
Bandura (1973) and in the sociological approaches
of writers as varied as Wolfgang and Weiner (1982)
and Downes and Rock (1979). We find a similar
emphasis on 'liberal' understandings of aggression
in post-war social anthropology with much effort

being devoted to finding totally peaceful societies in which aggression does not, or did not, exist – thus firmly nailing the false assumption of a genetic determinant. Such attempts were, by and large, unconvincing. Indeed, as Fox (1968) has pointed out, naive views of the Kalahari Bushmen as a people free from aggression were a little wide of the mark since evidence existed to show that they had a homicide rate higher than that in Chicago.

To some extent the rejection of biological theories of aggression is due not only to the manifest inadequacies of those theories but also to the gradual introduction of 'political correctness' into academic debates in the social sciences. People cannot be said to be naturally aggressive because that would mean that violence and destruction could never be eradicated, and that, unlike in the early decades of the century, does not fit at all with the contemporary intellectual Zeitgeist.

This new polarization, and the heated nature-nurture debate which has occupied most of the century, has probably detracted more than anything else from a 'sensible' understanding of aggression. Marsh (1978, 1982) has argued that whether aggression has a biological root or whether it is learned is a largely irrelevant argument since (a) it is undoubtedly both, and (b) the prognoses for the modification of behaviour are not much different in either case. An analogy can be made here with sexual behaviour. It would be foolish to assume that human sexuality does not have genetic, biological and hormonal bases. But sexual behaviour is largely controlled through cultural and social rule frameworks. People do not, in the main, consummate their sexual drives in random and spontaneous fashion – they are obliged to follow social conventions and observe ritual requirements. All cultures develop 'solutions' which maximize the advantages of sexuality and inhibit its potentially negative consequences.

It has become increasingly unfashionable in the social sciences to suggest that aggression has any positive value. Indeed, many current definitions of aggression exclude such a possibility. In psychology the most dominant definition is 'Intentional behaviour intended to harm another person who is motivated to avoid it.' In other social science fields it is most frequently viewed as 'maladaptive' behaviour or an unfortunate response to pathological social conditions (see also CRIME AND DEVIANCE). Only in fields such as Marxist sociology do we find the view that aggression is a rational and justified form of conduct.

In everyday discourse, however, it is clear that aggression is seen as having positive as well as pejorative connotations. In the world of sports we regularly praise the athlete for running an aggressive race, or hold in esteem the gutsy and aggressive quarter-back. In these arenas aggression is not only permissible, it is an essential ingredient of excellence. Similarly, aggression in the business world is the hallmark of the valued entrepreneur, without whom both post-Thatcherite Britain and the twentieth-century American Way would wither and die.

It is no wonder that writers such as Bandura (1973) have called the field of aggression a 'semantic jungle'. With several hundred definitions of aggression extant in the social sciences, it is inevitable that confusions reign and unnecessary arguments dominate the debate. The more promising approaches are those which have left the nature-nurture debate behind and focus on the understanding of specific forms of aggressive behaviour and the factors which influence them. Analysis of social frameworks which encourage or inhibit displays of aggression has also proved fruitful in explaining social phenomena such as football hooliganism (Marsh, 1978), female violence (Campbell, 1982), extreme political violence (Billig, 1978), etc. Work concerned with the role of specific physiological mechanisms (such as Brain, 1986) has also contributed to a more rational debate in which there are fewer obstacles to examining the complex interplay between biological and social factors. Whether we view aggression as an avoidable pathology or as an inevitable component of the human condition, our understanding of the phenomena will only increase if the focus is on why certain individuals in certain social contexts display extreme antipathy towards each other in order to achieve specific goals, whether these goals be the injury of others or the development of social prestige and status.

Reading

Berkowitz, L. 1962: *Aggression: a Social Psychological Analysis*.

Fromm, E. 1973: *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*.

Geen, R. G. and Donnerstein, E. I. eds 1983: *Aggression: Theoretical and Empirical Reviews*, vol. 2: *Issues in research*.

Sian, G. 1985: *Accounting for Aggression*.

PETER MARSH

AI   *See* ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

alienation   In the writings of Marx, this is the historical process whereby human beings have become successively estranged from Nature and from the products of their activity (commodities and capital, social institutions and culture) which then come to confront subsequent generations as an independent, objectified force, that is, as an alienated reality. He focused in particular on the deleterious effects of alienated labour in capitalist industrial production (see LABOUR PROCESS). Secondly, it refers to a sense of estrangement from society, group, culture or the individual self that people commonly experience living in complex industrial societies, particularly in large cities. Alienation evokes experiences such as depersonalization in the face of bureaucracy; feelings of powerlessness to affect social events and processes; and a sense of lack of cohesion in people's lives. That alienation in this general sense constitutes a recurring problem in contemporary societies such as our own is a prominent theme in the sociology of the modern urban experience (see MASS SOCIETY; URBANISM; ANOMIE).

In Europe between the wars the predicament of humankind in modern secular societies was widely discussed by existentialist philosophers, psychoanalysts, theologians and Marxists as the problem of alienation. The debate was further fuelled by the publication in 1932 of Marx's analysis of alienation in his *Economic and Philosophic (Paris) Manuscripts* (1844). The term is often linked with REIFICATION, which was not used by Marx but by the Marxist writer György Lukács in his influential *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), which anticipated the theme of human 'objectification' discussed in the *Manuscripts*. For Lukács, reification is the extremity of the alienation of humans from their products which arises from COMMODITY FETISHISM in developed capitalist societies.

In Britain, the concept of alienation came into currency in sociology and adjacent fields in the 1960s and 1970s via Marxism. A controversy subsequently raged about the significance of Marx's early writings on this subject for our understanding of his work as a whole. Some Marxists, for example Louis Althusser (1965), argued that Marx abandoned the humanistic concept of alienation in his early writings in favour of a scientific analysis of modes of production, while others, such as István Meszáros (1970) and David McLellan (1980) argued that the concept was integral to all his works, both early and late.

In Marx, the historical process of alienation has transformed human beings increasingly from creative subjects into passive objects of social processes. Hegel had already described, in a metaphysical framework, such a process, but Marx insisted that the end of alienation had to be achieved in practice by real people and not apparently solely in the realm of consciousness or self-awareness, as in Hegel (see PRAXIS). Marx's secular humanism relied heavily on Ludwig Feuerbach's materialist theory of religion in which he claimed that human beings have projected their own essence and potentialities into God, who then confronts them in an alienated form. In the *Manuscripts* Marx claimed that religious alienation was only one aspect of the propensity of human beings to alienate themselves in their own products, which could all be explained as aspects of economic alienation.

This analysis was then fused with the politics of communism, into which future society Marx projected the 'complete return of man himself as a *social* (i.e. human) being – a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development' (Marx, 1844). History is thus the simultaneous loss of human beings in their own products and their subsequent recovery of themselves, a real process that Hegel had simply perceived in a mystified manner. In Marx's theory of history the developing forces of production (content) progressively outgrow their relations (forms) in a series of historical modes of production as the realization of this process. With the social formation of capitalism 'the pre-history of human society accordingly closes' (Marx, 1859). Marx's socialscientific theory of the historical genesis of alienation and its overcoming in practice was thus burdened with the same teleology as that of the metaphysical theory it was trying to supplant.

In common with Feuerbach and with echoes of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Marx assumes that the essence or 'species being' of humankind is – unlike that of animals – inherently sociable and cooperative. Also, that labour too should have a communal character as the productive and creative life of the species as a whole in their necessary appropriation of Nature. Labour not only creates wealth, but is also its own reward and the means by which humankind has raised itself above the animal world and created human history. For Marx, therefore, the organization of large-scale commodity production and the individualistic wage labour contract of the early capitalist factories of his time constituted a

travesty of the species character that labour should have if it were to be organized in a way truly congruent with the assumed nature of man. Alienation is thus a 'critical' concept, used as a measuring rod calibrating the human costs of capitalist civilization.

Alienated labour alienated workers from (a) their product, which did not belong to them; (b) work itself, because it was only a means of survival, something forced on them in order to live; (c) from themselves because their activity was not their own, resulting in feelings of self-estrangement; (d) from other people in the factory because each was there individually selling their labour power as a commodity. For Marx, human egoism was a product of alienated labour, as was private property, which was not founded on a collective relation of humans to Nature. Hence neither represented enduring characteristics of human beings and their lives together, but were a product only of class societies in the capitalist phase. The abolition of alienated labour would mean that labour would acquire its true species character.

Two problem areas have dominated discussions of alienation. Firstly, the status of the model of human beings at the heart of the theory. In today's terminology, Marx's analysis is an example of philosophical anthropology because he posits, *a priori*, a timeless picture of HUMAN NATURE. His model of *homo laborans* takes labour from the dominant experience of factory work of his time and instates it as the universal defining human characteristic. Around this idea are then hung a number of further assumptions about human sociability, freedom and control, self-realization and collective labour as its own reward. Like all models of its kind, it is open to the charge of arbitrariness.

Secondly, controversy has continued about the feasibility of de-alienation. Existentialists have suggested that while alienation may be exacerbated under capitalist production, it is basically symptomatic of something perennial in the human social-natural condition. Marx thought that economic alienation was the basis of all other aspects, so the supersession of private property would mark the end of expropriation by the capitalists and hence all alienations. But, as Axelos says, 'Marx was unable to recognize the will to power' (1976, p. 305), so did not foresee the emergence of new forms of expropriation and the exploitation of people by each other and, hence, further alienation. The existence of powerful communist establishments in the socialist societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where private property was effectively abolished, would seem to bear this out. Also, eliminating alienation at the point of production by workers' self-management (as in the former Yugoslavia) leaves the spheres of distribution and exchange untouched as further sources of alienation.

The issue of the extent to which alienation can be eliminated ultimately turns on whether it is feasible to abolish the DIVISION OF LABOUR in a complex society. In the *German Ideology* Marx anticipates its utopian abolition under communism, which also dissolves the distinction between mental and physical labour. Thus would arise the universal human being who is able to 'hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner ... without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic' (Marx and Engels, 1845–6). Whereas later, in the *Grundrisse* and in *Capital*, he more cautiously says that in any society, even a socialist one, nature as a 'realm of necessity' cannot be eliminated nor can the superintendence, coordination and regulation of work, in short some kind of division of labour and, hence, alienation.

For Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) in the *Division of Labour* and other writings, the negative, alienating aspects of the division of labour are counterbalanced to some degree by the increased opportunities for individual self-realization made possible by its extension. He advocated developing occupational associations to promote solidarity and a new morality that acknowledges people's increasing dependence on each other that also accompanies it. Robert Blauner (1964) broke the concept of alienation down into the four testable dimensions of powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation and self-estrangement in the workplace. In a study of various industrial settings in the USA he found that alienation and freedom were unevenly distributed in the modern productive process. Alienation was at its greatest in mass production and at its least in craft production. Some have argued that this kind of empirical approach misses the critical-philosophical intention of Marx's concept, whereas others have said that it is the only way to give any kind of precision to a concept which is quasi-metaphysical and inherently indeterminate.

Reading
Althusser, L. 1965 (*1969*): *For Marx*.
Axelos, K. 1976: *Alienation, Praxis and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx*.

Blauner, R. 1964: *Alienation and Freedom*.

Durkheim, E. 1893 (*1984*): *The Division of Labour in Society*.

Lukács, G. 1923 (*1971*): *History and Class Consciousness*.

McLellan, D. 1980: *The Thought of Karl Marx*, 2nd edn.

Mészáros, I. 1970: *Marx's Theory of Alienation*.

Schacht, R. 1994 *The Future of Alienation*.

<div align="right">RICHARD KILMINSTER</div>

analytical philosophy   *See* LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY; PHILOSOPHY

anarchism   Repudiation of rulers is at the core of anarchism. In developing this negative notion, modern anarchists, broadly classifiable as either individualist or socialist, reject the state, hold that social order is possible in its absence and advocate moving directly towards 'society without a state'. The first to elaborate a theory of anarchism was Godwin (1793) but Proudhon (1840) was the first to call himself, defiantly, an anarchist. As a social movement, anarchism, in a revolutionary form, crystallized in opposition to Marxism in the period of the First International 1864–72, partly over the issue of whether socialists should seek the immediate 'abolition of the state'. In the twentieth century, as socialism became increasingly statist, the anarchist movement has declined but its ideas have influenced other movements and contributed to the critique of statist theories and practices. Anarchism also remains of interest because it raises issues fundamental to social and political theory.

One such relates to authority. 'Philosophical anarchism', a component especially of the individualist variety, rejects the idea of legitimate authority in the sense of the right of anyone (state official or not) to command the obedience of another. Individual autonomy, conceived morally, as by Godwin and by Wolff (1970), requires individuals to act according to their own judgements. Conceived egoistically, as by Stirner (1845), it implies that 'the unique one' who truly 'owns himself' recognizes no duties to others; within the limit of his might, he does what is right *for him*.

Since 'philosophical anarchism' makes cooperation and formal organization problematical, anarchists are often less radical. Although generally suspicious of authority, they may recognize the rational authority of experts within their fields of competence and the moral authority of basic social norms, such as 'contracts should be kept'. And in the sense in which 'politics' occurs in all organized groups when unanimity is lacking, they may recognize even political (but not state) authority. Thus, decisions taken participatorily by members of a commune or workers' cooperative may be deemed morally binding. But they reject authority backed by coercive power – the kind institutionalized, preeminently but not exclusively, in the STATE.

Anarchists reject the modern state because, within its territory, it divides people into rulers and the ruled, monopolizes the major means of physical coercion, claims sovereignty over all persons and property, promulgates laws held to override all other laws and customs, punishes those who break its laws, and forcibly appropriates through taxation and in other ways the property of its subjects. Further, with other states, it divides human society against itself into national societies, and periodically wages war, thereby authorizing mass murder. For anarchists, even a democratic state lacks legitimacy since it is not based on consent in any strict sense and the ruler–ruled relationship is merely masked. Anarchists may admit that sometimes the state performs useful functions, such as protecting – as well as also violating – human rights, but argue these could and should be carried out by voluntary organizations.

In rejecting the state, anarchists deny the widely held view, classically expressed by Thomas Hobbes (1651), that in its absence there is no society and life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Humans, they believe, are naturally social, not asocial; and until the first states developed some five thousand years ago all humans lived in stateless societies. Anarchists take John Locke's view that 'the natural condition of mankind', in which all are free and equal, no-one having the right to command obedience of others, does constitute a society. They do not accept Locke's justification in terms of consent of the limited state, an agency for protecting natural rights, especially the right to property – the nightwatchman view of the state associated with *laissez-faire* liberalism, which reappears in the libertarian work of Nozick (1974). But they endorse Locke's view, later vividly expressed by Paine (1791–2, pt 2, ch. 1) and recently restated by Hayek (1973, ch. 2), that social order exists independently of the state – an order spontaneously generated, a product of human sociability. What distinguishes anarchists from such liberals is their belief that this natural order does not need supplementing by order imposed from above. In the language of rational choice