Volume 1
of An Analytical Commentary on
the *Philosophical Investigations*

Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning

Part I: Essays

G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker

Fellows of St John's College · Oxford

Second, extensively revised edition

by

P. M. S. Hacker

Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning

Part I: Essays

Other volumes of this Commentary

Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volume 2 of An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*

G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker

Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*
Part I: Essays

P. M. S. Hacker

Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*
Part II: Exegesis §§243–427

P. M. S. Hacker

Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, Volume 4 of An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*
Part I: Essays

P. M. S. Hacker

Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, Volume 4 of An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*
Part II: Exegesis §§428–693

P. M. S. Hacker

Epilogue:
Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytical Philosophy

P. M. S. Hacker

Companion to this volume

Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1 of An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*
Part II: Exegesis §§1–184

G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker
second, extensively revised edition by P. M. S. Hacker

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Blackwell
Publishing

For Anne and Sylvia

Contents

Acknowledgements

Thoughts reduced to paper are generally nothing
more than the footprints of a man walking in
the sand. It is true that we see the path he
has taken; but to know what he saw on the way,
we must use our own eyes.

Schopenhauer

Introduction to Part I: Essays

The first edition of *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning* was written between 1976 and 1979. Gordon Baker and I intended it to be a comprehensive commentary on §§1–184 of Wittgenstein's masterwork that would serve as a reference work for scholars intent upon a close study of the text. The essays attempted to give overviews of Wittgenstein's treatment of specific themes. They aimed to trace the development of his thought, in particular contrasting his first philosophy in the *Tractatus* with his evolving ideas in the 1930s and with the definitive statement of his later philosophy in the *Philosophical Investigations*. The exegesis attempted to explain Wittgenstein's individual remarks, their role in the dialectic, and the structure of the evolving argument. For this purpose we traced their ancestry in his *Nachlass*, as best we could, making full use of the Cornell volumes of photocopied *Nachlass* that had been purchased by the Bodleian Library.

As the years went by, further works of Wittgenstein came to light, some of them highly relevant to what we had written. Wittgenstein studies flourished, and we learnt much from others who wrote on the same subjects. We also continued to work on the philosophy of Wittgenstein — together until 1987, and thereafter separately; and we came to realize that in various respects we had erred. We did not always agree on what we had misunderstood or on how what we had misunderstood should be understood. But some things that had seemed altogether opaque sometimes became, or seemed to become, clear. By the end of the century, we both thought that we should produce a thoroughly revised edition of the first volume of the Commentary. With that project in mind, we approached Blackwell in June 2001, and were pleased to find that they were willing to offer us a contract. Each of us was busy with other unfinished work at the time, but it was our intention to start work together on the revised edition in January 2002.

The original joint project of the Commentary had come to an end after we had completed the second volume, *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity* (1985), which took the Commentary as far as §242. Although we had planned to write Volume 3 together, fundamental differences of interpretation emerged between us. These differences were at the strategic — indeed, grand-strategic — level of our approaches to Wittgenstein, for they turned on our respective understandings of his philosophical methods and his overall conception of philosophy. Consequently they could not be avoided. We agreed

that I should continue the project alone. The third volume of the Commentary was published in 1990, and the fourth volume and the Epilogue, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*, in 1996. When, in 2001, we decided to try to produce a second edition of Volume 1 of the Commentary together, we discussed our disagreements again. We hoped that we would be able to sidestep them, at least in dealing with the exegetical materials, and agreed that if, on any particular topic, that proved impossible, we would leave the original text as it stood.

This was our plan. But it came to nothing. In December 2001, Gordon was found to have cancer, from which he died in June 2002. In the last months of his life, he was too unwell to participate in the project, and did not see any of the revised text of this volume. The rewritings and new writings that I present here reflect my understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy and my interpretations of his text. In view of the deep differences that had emerged between us in our interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy, I must emphasize that Gordon Baker bears no responsibility for the many changes that I have made.

Four different kinds of considerations weighed with me in my decision to produce a new edition of this book.

First, since 1979, various primary sources and derivative primary sources have come to light and been published. MS 142, the first draft of the *Investigations* §§1–189, written in 1936/7 in Norway, was rediscovered. The four volumes of post-war writings on the philosophy of psychology were published. Students' lecture notes covering the years 1930–2 and 1932–5 were edited by Desmond Lee and Alice Ambrose respectively, and notes of the last lectures on the philosophy of psychology were edited by Peter Geach. *The Voices of Wittgenstein*, dictations to Waismann for the project of *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy* (*Logik, Sprache, Philosophie*), were edited by Gordon Baker. And various other lesser items have come to light over the last quarter of a century. In addition, a great deal of invaluable bibliographical work was done on the Wittgenstein manuscripts by Georg Henrik von Wright, Heikki Nyman, Joachim Schulte, Alois Pichler, Brian McGuinness and Stephen Hilmy. This clarified the complex relationships between the different manuscripts and typescripts — many aspects of which were unknown when we first wrote. There was much here that shed light on the exegesis of §§1–184 and on the subjects of the essays of the Commentary.

Secondly, working on the *Nachlass* between 1976 and 1979 meant paging through more than 20,000 pages of photocopies of typescripts and, more importantly, of manuscripts, distributed over more than 100 volumes. Wittgenstein's handwriting is often none too easy to decipher, and the Cornell xeroxes were woefully defective. In 2000 the Bergen project of transcribing the whole of the *Nachlass* into machine-readable form was completed, and it was published by Oxford University Press on CD-rom together with a search engine. In 2001 the 'critical-genetic' edition of the *Investigations* was published, edited by Joachim Schulte together with Heikki Nyman, Eike von Savigny and Georg

Henrik von Wright. It incorporates the various versions of the *Investigations* together with detailed editorial notes on the relationships between the drafts. All this has transformed the work of studying the development of Wittgenstein's thought and interpreting his remarks.

Thirdly, Volume 1 of the Commentary was a pioneering endeavour in Wittgenstein studies in making extensive use of the *Nachlass* to interpret his remarks and to trace the development of his ideas (preceded in this respect only by Garth Hallett's *A Companion to Wittgenstein's* Philosophical Invest-igations). We were then only beginning to find our way around the *Nachlass*, and trying to find our feet. In the later volumes the endeavour to trace the ancestry of individual remarks achieved a higher standard. That alone furnished a reason for doing a second edition, for I wanted to bring Volume 1 up to that standard. With the search engine, I could be confident of finding almost everything that I looked for (which, to be sure, is not the same as finding everything pertinent). The thought of tracing the source and evolution of every remark was a powerful incentive to undertake the labour. I was pleasantly sur-prised to find that we had missed relatively little, and equally pleased to find significant new materials. The tables of sources in the volume of exegesis are now comprehensive and will, I hope, be of use to scholars.

Furthermore, when working on the first volume, we could not know where subsequent research on §§185–693 would lead. As I worked on the next three volumes during the subsequent fifteen years, there were very many surprises and discoveries. Much of this, especially materials on intentionality used in Volume 4, shed important light on topics discussed in Volume 1. So I wanted to close the circle, as it were, to bring Volume 1 into line with the subse-quent volumes.

Finally, I had come to see numerous errors in what we had written 25 years ago. At the grand-strategic level, I saw no reason to change my mind. The guiding light for our interpretation of the *Investigations* in *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning* was the co-ordination of meaning, understanding and explanation. This still seems to me to be correct. So too does the general conception of philosophy and philosophical method that we ascribed to Wittgenstein. However, at the strategic level there was much that was awry. The book bore the marks of the preoccupations of Oxford analytic philosophy in the 1970s. T-sentences and theories of meaning for natural languages stalked the wings and sometimes even stumbled on to the stage. And the account of Frege's philosophy that we gave was strongly coloured by local interpretations that subsequently came to strike both of us as anachronistic. In this edition, these aspects of the book have been corrected. The discussions of Frege have been reduced in scope, and are intended to be as uncontroversial as possible. All views ascribed to Frege are backed up by ample textual evidence. An import-ant strategic change has been a much reduced emphasis on the Augustinian conception of meaning. I continue to believe that this theme *is* important, and that it is indeed a (muted) *leitmotiv* running through the book. But its role

was exaggerated in the first edition, and its interpretation was, in certain respects, distorted. At the tactical level of interpretation of individual remarks, there were very many errors, and many things that needed examination were passed over.

There were seventeen essays in the first edition of this volume, and there are seventeen in the current edition. But two of the original essays have been dropped, and two new essays have been added. Many essays have been completely rewritten. Others have been substantially expanded in order to accommodate new materials, to reply to serious criticisms of Wittgenstein, to respond to significant misunderstandings of his ideas, and to rectify errors of judgement and interpretation in the first edition.

The opening essay, now entitled 'The Augustinian conception of language' has been completely rewritten, with many changes of emphasis and argument. The essay on language-games, now entitled 'The language-game method', has been substantially expanded in order to explain the gradual emergence of the method and its relationship to other methods with which Wittgenstein experimented with in the early 1930s. In the first edition, we thought that we could avoid the task of spelling out Wittgenstein's conception of meaning as use. With hindsight, this was a misjudgement, which I have accordingly remedied with the essay 'Meaning and use'. This new essay obviated the need for the final essay of the original edition 'Meaning and understanding'. The ideas in it have been distributed among other essays. The essay 'A word has a meaning only in the context of a sentence' has been replaced by 'Contextual dicta and contextual principles'. Frege invoked a contextual principle not for one reason and one purpose, but for different reasons and different purposes. Although Wittgenstein quoted Frege's dictum in the *Tractatus*, his motivation for his contextual principle differed from Frege's, being picture-theoretic rather than function-theoretic, and when he quoted the dictum in the *Investigations*, its significance and motivation were different yet again. So I have tried to tell the story of the various invocations of the dictum, and to explore its significance. The essay on family resemblance has been substantially expanded to include an examination of the tradition of real definition and of Wittgenstein's precursors in reacting against essentialism. The essay on vagueness and determinacy of sense has been dropped, and the ideas in it incorporated in the exegesis and essay on family resemblance. The two original essays on philosophy and methodology have been completely rewritten, and have been reinforced with a new essay entitled 'Turning the examination around: the recantation of a metaphysician'. This, as intimated by the title, concerns *Investigations* §108 and the discussion leading up to it, which, as I have come to realize, contain some of Wittgenstein's deepest reflections on the methodological sins of the *Tractatus*, written in 1936/7 especially for incorporation into the early draft of the *Investigations*. 'Surveyability and surveyable representations' replaces the earlier essay entitled 'Übersicht'. It is much expanded, and traces the development of the idea of elucidation by overview more comprehensively than its

precursor. The interpretation we had given of Wittgenstein's conception of an overview and of the notion of a surveyable representation subsequently aroused grave doubts and misgivings in Gordon Baker. The new essay supports the old interpretation with detailed evidence from the *Nachlass*. 'Truth and the general propositional form', as signalled by its modified title, differs from its original. It examines the motivation for the conception of the general propositional form in the *Tractatus*. It then explains Wittgenstein's reasons for repudiating that conception and investigates his views on truth and on multi-valued logic. In particular, it confronts the question of whether Wittgenstein cleaved to a correspondence theory of truth in the *Tractatus*, and how his later conception of truth is related to his earlier view. All the other essays have undergone various degrees of redrafting and compression, and often the addition of new material.

Wittgenstein remarks in the Preface to his book that the nature of his investigation compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction. Each of the pivotal concepts that he examines in order to resolve philosophical puzzlement is linked with numerous other concepts in the dense web of words. He is engaged, to use Strawson's felicitous term, in *connective analysis*, and which connections require clarification and illumination depends upon the difficulty under consideration. One conceptual problem may demand that its local network be described from one direction, while another may require that the same reticulations be traced from a quite different direction. The essays in this volume that are intended to explain Wittgenstein's thoughts display considerable overlap for the same reason. The concept of the meaning of a word, for example, is linked with that of explaining the meaning of a word, with using a word, with understanding what a word means, with the meaning of a sentence, and with what is meant by using a word and by uttering a sentence. As each of these nodes in the web is examined, its links with adjacent concepts require description afresh. That has unavoidably meant a moderate degree of repetition among the essays. Since the Commentary is not designed to be read through consecutively, and since I have tried to make each essay as self-contained as possible, the repetition is, I hope, excusable.

The first edition was published in a single hardback volume of 692 pages, in which the essays were dovetailed into appropriate places in the sequence of exegetical discussions of the individual sections of the *Investigations*. When the book was published as a paperback, it was split into two separate volumes, one of essays and the other of exegesis. This second edition is bifurcated from the beginning, the intended location of the essays in the exegesis being indicated in the table of contents of Part I, and in the text of Part II.

Wittgenstein's masterpiece is the most important work in philosophy since Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is also as *radical* a work of philosophy as has ever been written, for it does indeed go down to the very roots of our thought. It is therefore not surprising that it is difficult to understand. To follow Wittgenstein's footsteps as he walks criss-cross over the wide landscape of ideas

that he traversed requires much time and effort. This Commentary is written
for those who are willing to spend the time and to make the effort. I hope
that it will assist them in their quest for illumination.

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P. M. S. Hacker
St John's College, Oxford
October 2003

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Abbreviations

1. Wittgenstein's published works

The following abbreviations, listed in alphabetical order, are used to refer to Wittgenstein's published works.

BB   *The Blue and Brown Books* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1958).

BlB   Occasionally used to refer to the Blue Book.

BrB   Occasionally used to refer to the Brown Book.

BT   *The Big Typescript*, ed. and tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell, Oxford, 2005).

C   *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1969).

CL   *Cambridge Letters*, ed. Brian McGuinness and G. H. von Wright (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995).

CV   *Culture and Value*, ed. G. H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman, tr. P. Winch (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980).

EPB   *Eine Philosophische Betrachtung*, ed. R. Rhees, in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Schriften 5* (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1970).

GB   'Remarks on Frazer's "Golden Bough"', tr. J. Beversluis, repr. in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951*, ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann (Hackett, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1993), pp. 118–55.

LPE   'Wittgenstein's Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"', ed. R. Rhees, repr. in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951*, ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann (Hackett, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1993), pp. 202–88.

LW I   *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. I, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell, Oxford, 1982).

LW II   *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. II, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell, Oxford, 1992).

NB   *Notebooks 1914–16*, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd edn (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979).

PG   *Philosophical Grammar*, ed. R. Rhees, tr. A. J. P. Kenny (Blackwell, Oxford, 1974).

PI   *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, tr.
          G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd edn (Blackwell, Oxford, 1958).
PO   *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951*, ed. J. Klagge
          and A. Nordmann (Hackett, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1993).
PR   *Philosophical Remarks*, ed. R. Rhees, tr. R. Hargreaves and R. White
          (Blackwell, Oxford, 1975).
PTLP   *Proto-Tractatus: An Early Version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, ed.
          B. F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg and G. H. von Wright, tr. D. F. Pears
          and B. F. McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1971).
RC   *Remarks on Colour*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright,
          tr. L. L. McAlister and M. Schättle (Blackwell, Oxford, [1977]).
RFM   *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, ed. G. H. von Wright, R.
          Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, rev. edn (Blackwell, Oxford, 1978).
RLF   'Some Remarks on Logical Form', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian
          Society*, suppl. vol. 9 (1929), pp. 162–71.
RPP I   *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. I, ed. G. E. M.
          Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe
          (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980).
RPP II   *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. II, ed. G. H. von Wright
          and H. Nyman, tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell,
          Oxford, 1980).
TLP   *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness
          (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961).
Z   *Zettel*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. G. E. M.
          Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1967).

Reference style: all references to *Philosophical Investigations*, Part I, are to sections (e.g. PI §1), except those to *Randbemerkungen* (notes below the line) on various pages. Reference to these pages is given by two numbers, the first referring to the page of the first and second editions, the second to the third edition. References to Part II are to pages, in a like manner (e.g. PI p. 174/148). References to other printed works are either to numbered remarks (TLP) or to sections signified '§' (Z, RPP, LW); in all other cases references are to pages (e.g. LFM 21 = LFM, page 21) or to numbered letters (CL); references to *The Big Typescript* are to the original pagination of the typescript as given in the Bergen electronic edition of *Wittgenstein's Nachlass* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000).

2. Derivative primary sources

AWL   *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932–35, from the Notes of Alice Ambrose
          and Margaret MacDonald*, ed. Alice Ambrose (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979).
LA   *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs*,
          ed. C. Barrett (Blackwell, Oxford, 1970).

LFM   *Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939*,
        ed. C. Diamond (Harvester Press, Hassocks, Sussex, 1976).
LPP   *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946−47*, notes by
        P. T. Geach, K. J. Shah and A. C. Jackson, ed. P. T. Geach (Harvester
        Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1988).
LWL   *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930−32, from the Notes of John King
        and Desmond Lee*, ed. Desmond Lee (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980).
M   G. E. Moore's notes entitled 'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930−33',
        repr. in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912−1951*, ed.
        J. Klagge and A. Nordmann (Hackett, Indianapolis and Cambridge,
        1993), pp. 46−114.
PLP   *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, by F. Waismann, ed. R. Harré
        (Macmillan, London, and St Martin's Press, New York, 1965).
RR   *Discussions of Wittgenstein*, by R. Rhees (Routledge and Kegan Paul,
        London, 1970).
VoW   *The Voices of Wittgenstein*, transcribed and edited by Gordon Baker,
        tr. Gordon Baker, Michael Mackert, John Connolly and Vasilis Politis
        (Routledge, London, 2003).
WWK   *Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, shorthand notes recorded
        by F. Waismann, ed. B. F. McGuinness (Blackwell, Oxford, 1967).
        The English translation, *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* (Blackwell,
        Oxford, 1979), matches the pagination of the original edition.

3. Nachlass

All references to other material cited in the von Wright catalogue (G. H. von
Wright, *Wittgenstein* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1982), pp. 35ff.) are by MS or TS
number followed by page number ('r' indicating recto, 'v' indicating verso)
or section number '§', as it appears in the Bergen electronic edition of
Wittgenstein's Nachlass.

   In the case of the first manuscript draft of the *Investigations*, MS 142 (the
so-called *Urfassung*), references are to Wittgenstein's section number ('§'), save
in the case of references to pp. 77f., which are redrafts of PI §§1−2 and to
pp. 78−91, which Wittgenstein crossed out and redrafted on pp. 91ff., sub-
sequently assigning them section numbers in the redrafts alone.

Manuscripts
MSS 105−22 are eighteen large manuscript volumes written between 2 Feb-
ruary 1929 and 1944. These were numbered by Wittgenstein as Vols I−XVIII.
In the first edition of this commentary they were referred to by volume
number, followed by page number (e.g. 'Vol. XII, 271'). Since then it has
become customary to refer to them by von Wright number alone. Here they
are referred to on their first occurrence in a discussion by their von Wright
number, followed by volume number in parentheses, followed by page number

as paginated in the Bergen edition (e.g. 'MS 116 (Vol. XII), 271'). In the sub-sequent occurrence of a reference to the same volume in the same discussion, the volume number is dropped.

'MS 114 (Vol. X) Um.' refers to Wittgenstein's pagination of the *Umarbeitung* (reworking) of the *Big Typescript* in MS 114. The *Umarbeitung* begins on folio 31v of MS 114 (Vol. X), and is paginated consecutively 1–228.

Typescripts

B i   *Bemerkungen I* (TS 228), 1945–6, 185 pp. All references are to num-
         bered sections (§).
B ii   *Bemerkungen II* (TS 230), 1945–6, 155 pp. All references are to num-
         bered sections (§).

All other typescripts are referred to as 'TS', followed by the von Wright number and pagination as in the Bergen edition.

The successive drafts of the *Investigations* are referred to as follows:

TS 220 is the typescript of the *Early Draft* (*Frühfassung* (FF)) of the *Investigations*, referred to in the first edition of this Commentary as 'PPI' ('Proto-Philosophical Investigations'), dictated from MS 142 (the *Urfassung* (UF)).

TS 226$_R$ is Rhees's pre-war translation of TS 220 §§1–116, referred to in the 1st edn of this Commentary as PPI(R).

TS 227a and 227b are the two surviving carbon copy typescripts of the *Investigations* (the top copy having been lost).

TS 238 is a reworking of TS 220, §§96–116, with renumberings, deletions, corrections and additions in Wittgenstein's hand, referred to in the 1st edn of this Commentary as PPI (A).

TS 239 (the *Bearbeitete Frühfassung* (BFF)) is a reworking of TS 220.

ZF is the reconstructed Intermediate Draft (Zwischenfassung) of the *Investiga-tions*, previously known as the Intermediate Version, and referred to in the 1st edn of this Commentary as PPI(I).

In transcriptions from the *Nachlass* I have followed Wittgenstein's convention of enclosing alternative draftings within double slashes '//'.

4. *Reference style to the other volumes of* An Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*

G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volume 2 of an Analytical Commentary on the* Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, Oxford and New York, 1985).

P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the* Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge, Mass., 1990).

P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the* Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge, Mass., 1996).

References to these are of the form 'Volume', followed by the volume number, the quoted title of an essay in the designated volume, and the section number of that essay. Occasionally reference to specific pages in an essay is made, in which case it is the paperback edition that is referred to. References to the exegesis are flagged 'Exg.', followed by section number prefixed with '§' or page number (in the case of the *Randbemerkungen*).

5. Abbreviations for works by Frege

BLA i   *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, vol. i (1893); references to the preface by roman numeral indicating the original page number, all other references by section number (§).

BLA ii   *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, vol. ii (1903); all references by section number (§).

BS   *Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens* (L. Nebert, Halle, 1879).

CN   *Conceptual Notation and Related Articles*, tr. and ed. T. W. Bynum (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972).

CP   *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy*, ed. B. F. McGuinness (Blackwell, Oxford, 1984). To refer to individual articles in this volume, the following abbreviations are used:

       CO   'Concept and Object'
       CT   'Compound Thoughts'
       FC   'Function and Concept'
       FG   'Foundations of Geometry'
       N   'Negation'
       SM   'Sense and Meaning'
       T   'Thought'

       All page references to these articles are to the original German pagination, as it occurs in the margins of the English translation, followed by the page number in CP.

FA   *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, tr. J. L. Austin, 2nd edn (Blackwell, Oxford, 1959).

NS   *Nachgelassene Schriften*, ed. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach (Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1969).

PMC   *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence*, ed. G. Gabriel, H. Hermes,
        F. Kambartel, C. Thiel and A. Veraart, abridged for English edn by
        B. McGuinness, tr. H. Kaal (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980).
PW   *Posthumous Writings*, ed. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach,
        tr. P. Long and R. White (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979).

6. Abbreviations for works by Russell

AM   *The Analysis of Mind* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1921).
IMP   *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1919).
IMT   *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1940).
OK   *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in
        Philosophy*, rev. edn (Allen and Unwin, London, 1926).
PLAt   'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', repr. in *The Philosophy of
        Logical Atomism and Other Essays 1914–1919*, ed. J. G. Slater, in *The
        Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 8 (Allen and Unwin, London,
        1986).
PM   *Principia Mathematica*, vol. i (with A. N. Whitehead), 2nd edn
        (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1927).
PrM   *The Principles of Mathematics*, 2nd edn rev. (Allen and Unwin,
        London, 1937).
PP   *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, London, 1967;
        originally published 1912).
TK   *Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript*, ed. E. R. Eames in col-
        laboration with K. Blackwell, in *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*,
        vol. 7 (Allen and Unwin, London, 1984).

I

The Augustinian conception of language

1. *Augustine's picture*

The *Investigations* opens with a quotation from Augustine's autobiography in which he describes how he thinks he learnt his mother tongue. The child, Augustine holds, perceives adults naming objects and moving towards things. Accordingly the child infers that such-and-such an object is signified by a given sound. So, as the child hears words used in sentences, he progressively learns what objects words signify, and in due course comes to use them to express his own desires. Wittgenstein detected in this description a picture or conception of the essence of human language: namely, that (i) words name objects, and (ii) sentences are combinations of words. It is evident that he thought this conception of naming as the essence of language to be of the first importance (see Exg. §1). It is the natural way to think about language (MS 141, 1). After all, we teach our children that *this* is a horse, that *this* ☞ ■ colour is called 'black', that doing *this* is what 'run' means, and so forth; and these are respectively names of an animal, of a colour and of an action. Pointing at an appropriate thing is a natural way of explaining what a given word means, and is widely used in teaching children. Further, we encourage the child to string words together in sentences, e.g. to say 'The horse is black' and 'The black horse is running'. This pre-theoretical picture is manifest in the works of countless writers. Wittgenstein chose Augustine not because of the uniqueness of the conception, but because he was an exceptionally clear-thinking man, who belonged to a culture far removed from ours (MS 111 (Vol. VII), 15). If he too advanced this conception, then it *must* be important (see Exg. §1, n. 5).

What makes it so important? It exhibits the roots from which numerous philosophical conceptions of meaning grow. It shows from what primitive picture or 'world-picture' a large range of *mis*conceptions about language and linguistic meaning flow (MS 111 (Vol. VII), 18).[1] Moreover, such an idea of meaning was something which he, Wittgenstein, had 'taken over' (MS 114 Um. (Vol. X), 35), presumably from Frege and Russell. It informed the *Tractatus*, and was a source of many of its confusions. And it provides the counterpoint

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[1]   This is not to say that Wittgenstein did not *accept* some of the points Augustine made. For elaboration, see Exg. §1.

to the new conception of language and meaning advanced in the *Investigations* (see sect. 3 below).

Being a natural way of thinking about language and language-acquisition, Augustine's picture shapes the background presuppositions of much reflection on language by philosophers and linguists alike. It produces what Wittgenstein calls 'a primitive philosophical conception of language' or 'a primitive philosophy of language' (BT 25; MS 114 Um. (Vol. X), 35). How is this 'primitive philosophy' to be characterized? Above all, it conceives of naming as the essence of language (ibid.; MS 111 (Vol. VII), 15f.), and of the meanings of words as the foundation of language (MS 152, 38). In the *Investigations*, having characterized Augustine's picture of language, Wittgenstein immediately moves on to a more self-conscious conception, which, he suggests, is rooted in Augustine's pre-theoretical picture. According to this,

(i)   every word has a meaning,
(ii)   this meaning is correlated with the word,
(iii)   the meaning of a word is the object it stands for.

This may be termed not 'Augustine's picture of language', since Augustine made no such claims in the *Confessions*, but 'the Augustinian conception of language'. It provides the point of departure for Wittgenstein's investigations, and is a muted *leitmotiv* throughout his whole book. For although Augustine's picture is not mentioned again after §32, the misconceptions associated with the ideas that the essential function of words is to name and that the meaning of a word is an entity for which a word stands are a recurrent theme not only in the *Investigations* but also in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (see Volume 2, 'Two fruits upon one tree').

Is anything further associated with the Augustinian conception? Elsewhere explicitly, and in the *Investigations* implicitly (PI §6), Wittgenstein linked the Augustinian conception with a fourth claim:

(iv)   the form of explanation 'This is . . .', i.e. ostensive explanation, constitutes the foundations of language (BT 25; cf. PLP 94f.).

This *idea* is another extension of Augustine's picture, but, as already suggested, it is part of its natural appeal that we commonly teach children the meanings of words by pointing and saying 'This is a so-and-so'. Finally, in *Investigations* §32, Wittgenstein links Augustine's picture of language learning with a further idea:

(v)   the child can think, i.e. talk to itself (in the language of thought, as it were), before it learns its mother-tongue from its parents.

Although the proposition that sentences are combinations of names is part of Augustine's picture, it is striking that Wittgenstein does not incorporate any

further claims about sentences into the 'idea' which he says is rooted in it. There can be no doubt that as far as Wittgenstein was concerned, the importance of Augustine's picture lay in the conception of word-meaning which it presupposes. Nevertheless, Augustine's idea of words as names and sentences as combinations of names, coupled with Wittgenstein's elaboration, suggests a further step, which is no less fundamental to Wittgenstein's early thought, and hardly less of a target of his later reflections (cf. PI §§27, 292, 317, 363, 577, 585): namely, that just as the essential function of words is to name things, so

(vi)　the essential function of sentences is to describe how things are.

After all, he had once argued that the general propositional form is 'Thus-and-so is how things stand' (TLP 4.5). The idea that describing is part of the essence of language is a natural corollary of the thoughts that the essence of words is to name things and that sentences are combinations of names. So although Wittgenstein himself did *not* explicitly incorporate this idea into the Augustinian conception,[2] it will be explored later in this essay.

　The Augustinian conception of the essence of human language has moulded centuries of reflection. It is not itself a 'theory of language', let alone a 'theory of meaning'. It is, rather, a framework of thought, a conception commonly taken for granted prior to systematic reflection. It is, as it were, the gravitational field within which much European speculation on the nature of language has operated. Against the background suppositions that the essential function of words is to stand for things, that the things words stand for are what they mean, and that words are correlated with their meanings by ostension, which connects language to reality, many questions arise and are given a variety of different, often incompatible, answers. What they have in common is the unchallenged framework. In altogether characteristic manner, it is primarily this that Wittgenstein attacks — not so much the various doctrines and theses propounded by different, conflicting philosophies throughout the ages, but the common presuppositions. This will become evident in subsequent essays in this Commentary. But prior to examining Wittgenstein's criticisms of such presuppositions, it is worth investigating some of the ways in which full-blown and

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[2]　One reason why he may have omitted (vi) is that a magical aura and power surround the notions of names and naming, but not the ideas of description and describing. (Cf. MS 110 (Vol. VI), 177, quoted in Exg. §1, 2(i).)

　It should be noted that the fact that language-game (2) concerns only one-word imperatives (which are not descriptions), rather than corresponding one-word assertions, does not indicate that the idea that the essence of sentences is to describe is excluded from Wittgenstein's account. For language-game (2) is deliberately tailored to fit Augustine's *description* in the *Confessions* (quoted in PI §1), not the ideas that Wittgenstein finds to be rooted in Augustine's picture of the essence of language. For while language-game (2) is indeed 'right' for Augustine's description, it is far from right for the Augustinian conception of language. *Inter alia*, the meanings of the names ('block', 'pillar', etc.) are *not* the building-stones — otherwise one might say that some meanings are cuboid and others cylindrical (see Exg. §2).

articulate accounts of language can, according to Wittgenstein, be developed within this framework of thought.

2. *The Augustinian family*

The following family of ideas is determined by two guidelines. First, the propositions advanced should be natural extensions of the more primitive picture. It is not that anyone who unreflectively cleaves to some or all of the above six principles will also adopt this whole family of ideas. Far from it. Indeed, some are inconsistent with others, being alternative lines of thought. Rather, these ideas can be considered to reflect a range of commitments indicative of a thinker's operating under the influence of the principles of the Augustinian conception. Secondly, they should be directly related to arguments in Wittgenstein's writings. The illustrations and exemplifications in the footnotes are chosen to add substance and colour to the bare list of doctrines (many other authors could have been cited). Frege, Russell and Schlick apart, these quotations are not from authors Wittgenstein read (or, in some cases, could have read). They are meant to demonstrate the seminal importance of this conception of language — it is a seedbed from which numerous philosophies and theories of language grow.

(a) WORD–MEANING

(i)   Every significant word *names* (or *signifies*) something.[3]

(ii)   To have a meaning *is* to name some entity.[4] To name something is to stand for or represent it. Of course, there may be words in a sentence that do not stand for anything, but they play a different role, e.g. a purely syntactical one (like 'it' in 'It is raining').

(iii)   The entity a word stands for is what it means. So the meaning of a word is the thing it represents.[5]

(iv)   What kinds of entities word-meanings are is variously answered according to different pressures to which thinkers succumb. Certain pressures may induce one to think that words stand for various entities *in reality* — objects, properties, relations and so forth.[6] Other pressures have inclined many

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[3]   J. S. Mill: 'It seems proper to consider a word as the *name* of that which we intend to be understood by it when we use it' (*System of Logic*, Bk. I, ch. ii, sect. 1).

[4]   e.g. B. Russell: '*Words* all have meaning, in the simple sense that they are symbols which stand for something other than themselves' (PrM 47).

[5]   e.g.: 'A name means an object. The object is its meaning' (TLP 3.203); or, put differently, 'The meaning of Words, [are] only the *Ideas* they are made to stand for by him that uses them' (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. III, ch. iv, sect. 6).

[6]   e.g.: names 'link the propositional form with quite definite objects' (NB 53), 'relations and properties, etc. are *objects* too' (NB 61).