Contributions to Political Science

Jörg Husar

Framing Foreign Policy in India, Brazil and South Africa

On the Like-Mindedness of the IBSA States

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Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BNDES	Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social
BRIC	Brazil-Russia-India-China
BRICS	Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
CEPAL	Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (UN)
CII	Confederation of Indian Industries
COPE	Congress of the People
COSATU	Council of South African Trade Unions
CSN	Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional
CUT	Central Única dos Trabalhadores
CVRD	Companhia Vale do Rio Doce
DA	Democratic Alliance
DIRC	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribbean (UN)
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FGV	Fundação Getulio Vargas
FICCI	Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
G7/8	Group of 7/8
G15	Group of 15
G20	Group of 20
G20+	Group of 20 (WTO)
G24	Group of 24
G77	Group of 77
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum
IMF	International Monetary Fund

ISEB	Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros
ISI	Import substitution industrialization
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs (India)
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MRE	Ministério de Relações Exteriores (Brazil)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NDB	New Development Bank (BRICS Bank)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAC	Pan-African Congress
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACU	Southern Africa Customs Union
SASOL	South African Synthetic Oil Limited
TRIPS	Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
UFRJ	Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Unión de Naciones Suramericanas
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
UNICAMP	Universidade Estadual de Campinas
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
WTO	World Trade Organization

Chapter 1
Introduction

On 6 June 2003, the Foreign Ministers of India, Brazil and South Africa met in Brasilia to announce the creation of a new trilateral initiative: the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA). In its first joint declaration, the Declaration of Brasilia, IBSA is defined as a "meeting of [. . .] three countries with vibrant democracies, from three regions of the developing world, active on a global scale, with the aim of examining themes on the international agenda and those of mutual interest" (IBSA 2003). In the aftermath, the IBSA process evolved gradually, through regular trilateral meetings at different political levels, and coordinated by rotating host countries without a fixed secretariat.

Preliminary ideas of founding a "G7 of the South" can be traced back to at least the 1990s, when Thabo Mbeki, as deputy president of South Africa, sent out formal requests to "key drivers of the South" to come together in an effort to counter the influence of the G7. However, the initiative did not receive much attention at the time, so that the South African Foreign Ministry decided to shelve the initiative (SA-Aca-2: 3).[1] The basic idea of a Southern coalition was brought up again by the Brazilian side in a meeting between the Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and his South African counterpart Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in January 2003 (SA-Aca-2: 1). Amorim has acknowledged the South African idea of a G7 of the South, but claims to have come up with the IBSA idea himself, as "something more simple and functional [than a Southern Group of Seven]", in the early 1990s (B2010a: 33).[1] In any case, the dedication to the idea has been more on the part of Brazil and South Africa, while India is said to have rather "played along" (SA-Aca-2: 3) on the way to the creation of IBSA. In short, the IBSA Dialogue Forum has been said to have arisen "out of South Africa's inspiration, Brazil's initiative and India's immediate acceptance" (Hirst 2008: 155).

[1] "SA-Aca" indicates a South African academic interviewee, "B2010a" refers to a Brazilian official speech held in 2010, see list in the Annex. On the reference system for speeches and interviews see Sect. 3.4.

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After the official announcement in New York, of the creation of IBSA, Brazilian President Lula visited South Africa and India in November 2003 and January 2004 respectively. In February 2004 a first trilateral meeting of defence ministers took place in Pretoria, and 1 month later the first meeting of the three countries' foreign ministers as the *IBSA Trilateral Joint Commission* was held in New Delhi. Ever since there have been yearly gatherings of the *Trilateral Commissio*n in Cape Town (2005), Rio de Janeiro (2006), New Delhi (2007), Somerset West (2008), Brasilia (2009) and New Delhi (2011).[2] Since 2006 the process has been complemented by annual summits of the heads of state and government. The First IBSA Summit was held in Brasilia in September 2006, the second in Pretoria in October 2007, and the third in New Delhi in October 2008. The fourth IBSA summit was postponed from October 2009 to April 2010, when it was held back-to-back with the BRICs meeting in Brasilia. The fifth IBSA summit took place in South Africa in October 2011 and the next one will be hosted by India in 2015, thus completing the second cycle of summits.

1.1 The IBSA Dialogue Forum and Its Global Context

The founding and evolution of the IBSA Dialogue Forum took place in a context of a ever more lively debate on an ongoing power shift from the established powers to developing countries (e.g. Hoge 2004; Hurrell 2006; Zakaria 2008; Khanna 2008; Mahbubani 2009; Kupchan 2012; Buzan and Lawson 2014). To some extent, this debate resembles the discussions about a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s: in 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted the *Declaration on the Establishment of a NIEO*, which stated that:

> The developing world has become a powerful factor that makes its influence felt in all fields of international activity. These irreversible changes in the relationship of forces in the world necessitate the active, full and equal participation of the developing countries in the formulation and application of all decisions that concern the international community. (UN 1974: §2)

One could almost apply the same affirmations to the contemporary situation. Spurred by the end of the Cold War, one of the major debates in International Relations has evolved discussing the increasing influence of emerging powers in the international system. This is reflected in discussions about "pivotal states" (Chase et al. 1996, 1999), the "new power of the South" (Dieter 2003), a "new geography of international trade" (Ricupero), the economic catch-up of the "BRIC countries" (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003), "anchor countries" (Stamm 2004) and "new leading powers" (Husar et al. 2009, 2010), as well as "network powers" (Flemes 2013). In parallel to the acquisition of emerging power status, these new actors are

[2] In 2010 a ministerial meeting was held on the margins of the 65th UN General Assembly.

aspiring to move on from their former status as mere emerging markets by further enhancing their political profile in global affairs.

In bringing together three states which are seen as increasingly important in global negotiations in an exclusive meeting, IBSA also links into the debate about a trend towards what is called club governance, where states come together with a view to "exercising governance functions beyond the immediate circle of actual club members, in one or more fields of policy" (Schneckener 2009: 3). Club governance processes have also become increasing inclusive of new actors over the last decade, as epitomized by the move from the G7/8 to the G20, which is described by Postel-Vinay (2013) as a "laboratory for the observation, experimentation and invention of new forms of international cooperation that are redefining global politics". Since an effort is made to include civil societies in additional fora, e.g. for business and academics, the IBSA forum also picks up on models of "networked governance"[3] (Haas and Haas 1995: 256), in which state and non-state actors collaborate in the search for solutions to global problems.

Research on IBSA has focussed primarily on the question of convergences and divergences of material interests among the three members in different policy areas, evaluating on this basis ongoing cooperation and the future prospects of the initiative for achieving tangible outcomes (e.g. Costa Vaz 2006; Villares 2006; Tokatlian 2007; RIS 2008; Flemes 2009; Stuenkel 2015). This is in line with most of the research on the emerging powers in general, which has focussed either on the theoretical implications of the rise of emerging powers or on the analysis of their actual policies and material capabilities in regional and global contexts. However, looking beyond the attractive design of the IBSA initiative (see Chap. 2 for details) and the tangible interests involved, there exist important differences in the fundamental approach to global issues among the three IBSA countries, which seem to limit the potential for joint global action. This leads to the main research question of this study.

1.2 Basic Argument and Research Question

The basic argument of the present investigation is that, beyond the problem of ensuring common positions on specific issues, e.g. in global trade or climate negotiations, IBSA has to grapple with the compatibility of the general strategies by which its members intend to insert themselves into a global order, which is in a state of flux due to the rise of new actors, including IBSA states themselves. So far, research has made too little effort to analyse the foundations of the three countries' alleged like-mindedness that IBSA declarations portray as stemming from the members' democratic systems, multi-ethnic societies and developing country status. The present analysis, therefore, intends to add to the debate a constructivist

[3] Combining public and private actors in issue-specific initiatives of global relevance.

perspective which focusses on convergence and divergence among IBSA countries at the level of national discourses and the foreign policy role conceptions negotiated therein. The main research question is twofold: *(a) How do India, Brazil and South Africa frame their role(s) in the international system, and (b) to what extent are the three framings compatible with the pursuit of the joint IBSA initiative?*

As the following investigation will elaborate, the IBSA initiative inscribes itself very aptly onto all of the major debates surrounding the rise of the new leading powers: First, it embodies the three countries' (potential) claim to the status of both regional and global players (Husar et al. 2009, 2010) and even "regional/global leaders" (Flemes 2010). Second, it emphasises the three countries' shared democratic values, thus contributing to the discussion revolving around their potential contribution to the promotion of democracy (e.g. Mair and Dierks 2010; Stuenkel and Jacob 2010). Third, it nurtures the discourse about the emerging powers acting as new donors of development cooperation (e.g. Manning 2006; Rowlands 2008; de la Fontaine 2013).

These global debates are so well addressed through the design, composition and declared objectives of the IBSA forum that the group has been emphatically welcomed as "indicative of a new post-Cold War order, that is trying to come to terms with a changing and more complex global environment and where multipolarity holds out new promise for a restructured world order" (le Pere et al. 2010: 334). Ever since its foundation, IBSA has been denominated as the "new diplomacy of the South" (Alden and Viera 2005), a "new Non-Alignment" (Nafey 2005), as a counterweight against the hegemony of the USA (Soko 2007; Flemes 2007; Beri 2008), an important force in the "re-emergence of South–South cooperation" (RIS 2008) and as an instance of the "rise of the South" (Stuenkel 2015). However, from a constructivist perspective, there are very dynamic fields of tension within and between the IBSA countries' foreign policy discourses, which seem to have major implications for the way in which IBSA fits into national foreign policy frameworks.

1.3 Major Tensions in Foreign Policy Discourses

At the most fundamental level, there are ongoing debates concerning the extent and content of the IBSA countries' global actorness, so that the nature of global engagement by the three can by no means be seen as a self-evident given. International actorness in the broadest sense entails the "capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system" (Sjöstedt 1977: 15). As regards the IBSA countries, key debates apply especially to the question as to the degree of their **revisionism in global fora**. In defining their position and actorness in the international system, IBSA countries need to weigh the theoretical extremes of acquisition to the global model of "disciplinary neoliberalism" as dominated by the "G-7 nexus" (Gill 1995; Soederberg 2006) on the one hand, and the self-confident propagation of a profound revision of global structures on the

other. In positioning themselves between these extremes, the emerging powers can be expected to weigh the increased profile to be gained by a revisionist stance against the ambition to gain international status merely by entering the existing fora of decision-making – which requires a certain degree of commonality with the established powers. At the same time, the IBSA countries themselves are counted among the actors with the potential to contribute to the weakening of the G-7 nexus, adding to the complexity of the trade-off between revisionist and acquiescent foreign policy.

The simultaneous engagement in **North–South and South–South relations** entails a further trade-off, not only in terms of the dedication of scarce diplomatic resources but also in terms of political commitment. In response to the ongoing shifts in power and perceptions, global governance structures are struggling to accommodate the emerging powers. Their rise has prompted the developed countries to try and engage these states in new formats of North–South Dialogue or outreach. This is frequently interpreted as a strategy of co-optation with a view to preserving the vested rights of the established powers (Cooper and English 2004: 2). While the North–South dimension provides new opportunities for asserting influence at the global level, all three IBSA countries also have a historically strong legacy of South–South relations, as manifested in their activities and even leadership under the Non-Aligned Movement, the G77, G24 and/or G15.[4] This legacy bears the potential to be used as an asset of foreign policy inasmuch as the Global South is an important constituency to build on in the pursuit of global reform initiatives, especially in the UN.

A third field of tension within foreign policy discourses which has a bearing on the definition of IBSA consists in debates on a **development** strategy, the terms of insertion into the international economy and the role of foreign (economic) policy – i.e. the state – in this regard. How could the three IBSA members possibly start sustainable trilateral South–South cooperation projects without agreeing on such basic terms of reference? All three countries have a certain degree of affinity with the concept of a developmental state – at least historically. However, such issues are subject to heated debate: fuelled by the ongoing global financial crisis, the role of the state in the economy and external economic relations has become subject to a further re-evaluation. The emergence of a Beijing consensus around a state-led, authoritarian development model is further gnawing away at the influence of what Gill (1995) called disciplinary neoliberalism. So the question as to the development model informing the IBSA initiative is anything but trivial, and again it cannot be simply taken for granted that the three IBSA states are like-minded in this regard.

Finally, the relevance of **democracy** to foreign policy and the acceptability of the promotion of democracy seem to elude agreement at the national or intergovernmental level. For example, while India traditionally defends the principle of non-intervention, South Africa presents itself as the harbinger of democracy on the

[4] In the Non-Aligned Movement, Brazil participates only as observer. South Africa is not a member of the G15.

African continent. This throws into question the significance of democracy to the initiative: is it merely a selection criterion for the three members or could it also inform trilateral action, and – if yes – in what way?

In view of this set of fundamental debates, it is not self-evident that three like-minded IBSA countries will simply converge in a unified strategy of positioning themselves in the global system, which would make IBSA one of the main vehicles of their engagement in global issues.

1.4 Organisation of the Study

In order to investigate the national discourses on defining foreign policy priorities and the implications of these definitions for the joint initiative of IBSA, the present study will proceed in three main steps: (1) Chapters 1, 2 and 3 present the theoretical approach and develop the method for comparing national foreign policy discourses of India, Brazil and South Africa; (2) Chapters 4, 5, and 6 elaborate the discursive background against which political actors define foreign policy stances in these three countries, and apply the methodological framework; Chaps. 7 and 8 reflect on the merits and limits of the methodological approach before offering conclusions on the main research questions, as well as an outlook on IBSA's future potential as a global governance actor.

Specifically, Chap. 2 presents a review of IBSA in terms of its origins, concepts and the main theoretical perspectives which have been applied to it and which support different interpretations of its purpose and future prospects. The Chapter also provides an initial discussion of three potential constituents of like-mindedness of the IBSA states: global actorness, development and democracy, which leads to the presentation of the premises informing the constructivist approach pursued here. Building on these premises, Chap. 3 presents content analysis as the principal method by which the foreign policy discourses will be analysed, and defines the system of categories to be applied. The main characteristic of this system is the attempt to capture both the political and linguistic dimension of discourse: the category of *role conceptions* represents political orientations, while *argumentative frames* are included to account for the linguistic patterns in discourse. The latter often remain implicit in political science but, as will be argued here, their explicit inclusion can add to analytical rigour when comparing different strands of discourse and weighing their relative importance. The main empirical analyses of official discourse (Chap. 5) and societal discourse (Chap. 6) are preceded by an overview of the main strands in the three IBSA countries' foreign policy discourses (Chap. 4). Chapter 7 provides a reflection on the applied method and premises and Chap. 8 draws conclusions regarding the main research question of the study and offers an outlook on the future.

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Chapter 2
IBSA: Three Like-Minded States?

This chapter combines a literature review with a description of IBSA's practical setup, so as to define the analytical approach to IBSA. To this end, IBSA will first be described in three steps: First, in operational terms, the declared purposes of the forum are described; second, theoretical accounts of IBSA are briefly presented; and third, the main concepts underlying the stated objectives are discussed, to discern key elements of the like-mindedness that IBSA aspires to. Against this background the theoretical premises of the present study will be presented, spelling out a constructivist approach to studying like-mindedness of the IBSA countries.

2.1 Four Operational Dimensions of IBSA

Including the declaration on the occasion of the formal launch of IBSA by the heads of state at the UN General Assembly in September 2003 (IBSA 2003b) and the "Agenda for Cooperation" issued by the foreign ministers in New Delhi in March 2004 (IBSA 2004a, b), four main dimensions of IBSA can be distinguished: (1) coordination in multilateral fora, (2) trilateral South–South cooperation in different sectors, (3) the provision of development cooperation, and (4) interaction in non-government fora. In the following chapters the development of IBSA to date along these four dimensions will be briefly discussed.

2.1.1 Political Coordination

In the Brasilia Declaration, the three countries stated their goal:

> to hold regular political consultations on international agenda items, as well as to exchange information on areas of mutual co-operation in order to coordinate their positions on issues of common interest. (IBSA 2003a)

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