THE LIFE CYCLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAS

Understanding Prominence and the Dynamics of Intellectual Change

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PREFACE

The idea for this book first emerged from a symposium invited by Division 1 of the American Psychological Association (APA) that was conceived by Lewis Lipsitt, who was president of the Division in 2000. The symposium, "Reflections in the Mirror of Psychology's Past," chaired by co-editor, Thomas Dalton was organized to pay tribute to John Popplestone and Marion McPherson, who founded the Archives of the History of American Psychology at the University of Akron, Ohio in 1965. The panel included John Popplestone, my co-editor, Rand Evans and Robert Wozniak, who have contributed chapters to this book. John and Marion, who both served as past presidents of Division 26 of the History of Psychology, retired in 1999 and turned the leadership of the collection over to its new director, David Baker. They were honored at that time by the APA with a Presidential Citation for their achievements and were given a Festschrift in April 2000 hosted by the Akron archives attended by several distinguished psychologists that included Lewis Lipsitt, Ludy T. Benjamin and John Burnham. An honorary fund also was established in their names for individual donations. Sadly, Marion passed away shortly afterward, but her spirit and determination live on at the Akron archives.

John and Marion's tireless efforts to make this a truly great repository are indicated by the sheer size of the collection. The archive now possesses the papers of more than 700 psychologists and the records of more than 100 psychology journals. It has stored 700 kinds of psychological apparatus and testing instruments, 3000 rare photos and nearly 153 miles of child development films, examples of which are wonderfully displayed in their popular book, *An Illustrated History of American Psychology*. Ludy Benjamin, who spent countless productive hours researching the Akron archives,

perhaps best described John and Marion's pioneering contribution, when he wrote:

> So one can argue that the time was right for someone to have the historical consciousness to recognize the need for a central archive for psychology. I want to emphasize the word vision... Vision is a rare commodity. In this context it means to see things in ways that no one else does. It means to be able to see in long stretches, to look beyond your own time and see needs that no one else may anticipate. The Zeitgeist may aid in the focus of such vision, but it isn't sufficient as an explanation.

Pioneers possess the uncanny ability to distance themselves from current events and anticipate future interests and needs long before they become apparent as present day concerns. Psychologists can point with pride at the many insights of its greatest thinkers and the marvelously inventive experiments of its laboratory researchers who contributed to human well-being. Signs of scientific advancement and professional success abound on every front even though most psychologists find it daunting to show how competing psychological ideas and theories form a coherent body of thought. The field of psychology continues to splinter into a multitude of sub-disciplinary groups barely able to communicate with each other. Consensus remains elusive on what the field should strive to be or do in the future. Given these predicaments, we may question whether it is possible for scientists and practitoners in a field to take a self-critical look at what they are doing, when there is no larger perspective on which we can base these judgments. Nevertheless, we can attempt to make our biases and values more explicit by adopting a broader historical perspective. We can interrogate the past to better comprehend the forces that contribute to convergent beliefs and their dissipation and thus avoid becoming unwitting victims of our own illusions.

The contributors to this volume address this vexing problem of perspective by taking a closer look at the relationship between the processes by which intellectual recognition is attained and the forces that contribute to the endurance or erosion of support for a body of thought over time. A scientific discipline and its specializations have evolved from predecessor fields whose philosophical perspectives and assumptions have undergone revision. Historians try to render explicit the social contexts and scientific processes through which these beliefs and assumptions are adopted, tested, validated or repudiated. Psychologists have been guilty at different times of uncritically celebrating, misinterpreting or misrepresenting the ideas of its major thinkers and scientists, and have sometimes ignored or overlooked key episodes, documented in this book, which put individuals

and events in an entirely different light. The contributors rejoin these fragmentary elements of personal biography, professional circumstance, theoretical debate and social controversy into a more coherent understanding of the forces that contribute to prominence and new ideas and beliefs that sometimes shift the intellectual and moral center of gravity of culture in a democratic society.

CONTENTS

Introduction 1
Putting Prominence in Historical and Analytical Context 1
Focus of this Book 3
Overview of the Chapters 5
References 14

PART 1. RECONSTRUCTING PSYCHOLOGY'S FOUNDING AND GROWTH

Chapter 1
New Growth from Phantom Limbs: Tenuous Attributions to Our Predecessors 17

Rand B. Evans

Introduction 17
Origin Myths 18
Have We Need of Founders? 19
How We Identify Founders 22
Is William James the Founder of American Psychology? 24
Personalism and the Rivalry over American Psychology's Founding 26
Some Lessons About Founders and Historiography 30
References 31

Chapter 2
Lost Classics and Forgotten Contributors: James Mark Baldwin as a Case Study in the Disappearance and Rediscovery of Ideas 33

Robert H. Wozniak

Survival, Disappearance, Rediscovery: The Life Cycle of Ideas 36
James Mark Baldwin: The Case of a Missing Major Contributor 46
References 54
Author's Note 58

Chapter 3
Reinventing the Past Through Reinterpretation: Reflections on the History of Psychology—35 Years in the Trenches 59

John A. Popplestone

Introduction 59
Carson's Panopticon 66
Herman's *The Romance of American Psychology* 68
The Foucaultian or Foucaultista Subtext 70
Contrasting Interpretations of the Boulder Conference, 1949 73
Stephen Jay Gould's *The Mismeasure of Man* 76
Concluding Thoughts 78
References 81

Chapter 4
High-Impact Research Programs in Psychology: Quantitative and Qualitative Aspects 83

Dean Keith Simonton

Nomothetic Findings 85
Conclusion 97
References 100

Chapter 5
Tracking Trends in Psychological Science: An Empirical Analysis of the History of Psychology 105

Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and Samuel D. Gosling

Introduction 105
Conceptualizing Prominence and Scientific Progress 107

Discussion of Findings 120
What Lies Down the Road for Psychological Science? 127
References 128

PART 2. COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY

Chapter 6
Becoming Big Frogs in a Small Pond: On Gaining Eminence in Comparative Psychology 133

Donald A. Dewsbury

Quality 134
Case Studies 134
Some Additional Cases, Characteristics, and Extensions 144
Later Developments 150
Conclusion 152
References 152

Chapter 7
The Psychology of *Homo Sapiens*: Changing Comparative Perspectives 155

Michael C. Corballis and Stephen E. G. Lea

The Cartesian Beginnings 156
The Behavioral Revolution 157
The Cognitive Revolution 158
Beyond the Cognitive Revolution 163
Conclusion 167
References 169

PART 3. COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Chapter 8
How Otto Selz Became a Forerunner of the Cognitive Revolution 175

Pieter J. van Strien and Erik Faas

Otto Selz, A Brief Biography 176
Selz's Psychology of Thinking and its Reception Among his Contemporaries 179
Paradigm Lost: The "Mannheim School" 183

Paradigm in Disguise: Popper's Conjectures and Refutations 186
Paradigm Regained: From Mannheim to Carnegie Mellon 189
The Vicissitudes of Fame 192
References 196

Chapter 9
Consciousness Regained: The Scientific Restoration of Mind and Brain 203

Thomas C. Dalton and Bernard J. Baars

Introduction 203
Competing Conceptions of Mind 204
The Rejection of Conscious Experience: Behaviorism and Positivism 205
John Dewey's Alternative to Behaviorism: Interacting Minds 207
The Macy Conferences, 1942–1954 209
Herbert Jasper and the Laurentian Conferences on Brain and Consciousness, 1954–1997 213
Francis Schmitt and the Neurosciences Research Program, 1962–1982 219
Gerald Edelman and the Neurosciences Institute, 1982– 221
The Revolution in Neuroimaging 224
Expanding the Boundaries of Mind: From Science to Culture in the 1990s? 226
Defining a Scientific Agenda: The ASSC 1997– 228
Toward a Comparative and Interdisciplinary Science of Mind and Consciousness 230
Conclusion: Understanding the Scientific Revival of Consciousness 234
References 241

PART 4. PRAGMATISM, INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Chapter 10
Myrtle McGraw, The Maturation Debate and Aftermath 251

Thomas C. Dalton

Introduction 251
Putting McGraw's Research in Context 252

Forshadowing the Mind in Development 256
Dewey's Stake in McGraw's Research 259
Gesell and the Maturation Controversy 263
Contesting McGraw's Research 266
Briarcliff and Beyond, 1950–1970 270
Professional Blunders and Reengagement 272
Conclusion 274
References 276

Chapter 11
The Contemporary Reconstruction of Developmental Psychology 281

Sheldon H. White

Introduction 281
Social Conceptions of Human Development in the 19th Century 283
Transitions of the 1920s and 1930s 285
The Tests and Measurements Program 290
Developing Idiographic and Discourse-Analytic Procedures 290
Efforts to Map out the Ecology of Human Development 291
The Invention of Interesting and Provocative Research Procedures 292
Coevolutionary Theories of Human Evolution 292
The Reemergence of Human Social Development in the 1960s 293
Advancing the Reconstruction 294
References 295

PART 5. CAREER PATHWAYS AND PROFESSIONAL IMPACT

Chapter 12
Breaking the Silence: Helen Bradford Thompson Woolley 301

Katharine S. Milar

Beginnings and Early Career 302
Vocational Guidance Psychologist 307
The Merrill-Palmer School 311
Teachers College 313
Conclusion 320
References 322

PART 6. THE DYNAMICS OF SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Chapter 13
Prominence, Schools of Thought and Social Transformation 331
Thomas C. Dalton

Factors Influencing Prominence 331
References 348

Author Index 351
Subject Index 359

INTRODUCTION

PUTTING PROMINENCE IN HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL CONTEXT

The past is a mirror reflecting the images of ourselves created by thinkers whose ideas and contributions we hold in high esteem. The intellectual achievements of our eminent forebears seem to persist as indelible images that are inscribed in our minds and lodged in our hearts. Though separated by decades and even centuries, psychology's founders continue to enchant and provoke us because their ideas have withstood the test of time.

Perhaps a better analogy to describe how (and why) we remember, reflect on and interpret the intellectual contributions of prominent psychologists differently over time is that of looking into a *rear view mirror*. In this instance, everything is in motion and undergoing change. The past is gradually receding from view, as it disappears over the horizon. The future is moving towards us, first as dimly perceived problems whose significance is uncertain, until they come into sharper conceptual and theoretical focus. Our predecessors' discoveries and theories are milestones that enable us to map the territory already traversed. We rely on their insights, metaphors and methods to understand unfamiliar phenomena and try to anticipate what lies on the road ahead. As we move closer to the horizon, we can look back and sometimes better grasp in their entirety the intellectual, personal and institutional factors that supported the emergence of a unique discovery, idea or perspective, which continue to hold our attention.

The rapid pace of scientific discovery forces historians continually to reassess the contributions of their contemporaries and predecessors and to put their work in historical and contemporary perspective. Scientists are recognized and rewarded for their originality and their intellectual

authorship through a system of citations that records their influence and traces the dispersal of their ideas through time. This system for intellectual recognition provides an important source of data for quantitative analyses, which reveal how the pathways through which intellectual credit is distributed change over time as prominent thinkers gain influence in new fields, while having a declining impact in others. But those who are rewarded with recognition for their originality do not always pay their cognitive debts to those who contributed to their own intellectual development. Historians occasionally find new archives that provide significant new information about a person's background, the sources of their ideas or other influences, or new experiences that put their ideas in a new light. Reconstructing the circumstances surrounding these episodes enables historians to distribute credit more equitably. Examples are not difficult to find in which new evidence surfaces that instigates a wholesale reassessment of an individual's work, such as Frank Sulloway's (1979) biographical investigation of Freud's intellectual roots. The discovery of John Dewey's largely unknown collaboration in the 1930s with infant experimentalist Myrtle McGraw also has stimulated a re-examination of the scientific basis of his theory of mind and inquiry (Dalton & Bergenn, 1996 & Dalton, 2002).

It is important to put the contributions of great psychologists in a larger cultural context, because eminent psychologists, such as William James and John Dewey, were *public intellectuals*, whose ideas were disseminated widely to become the possession of American culture. Pragmatism rapidly became a movement whose origin was of less importance than its power as a practical technique that could be adapted to solve new problems. But when a body of ideas or theory moves beyond the control of intellectual communities into the larger culture, the social or policy implications are frequently contested. This is indicative of the public's inclination to reduce complex theories and evidence to simple either/or slogans, such as that engendered by the nature versus nurture debate. This tendency to dichotomize is reinforced by the intellectual propensity, documented by Simonton (2000), of psychologists who attain eminence, to do so by taking extreme positions on issues and debates that enable them to stand out from the crowd. But this strategy attracts competitors and rivals who adopt opposing positions at the other end of the continuum rather than encouraging moderation and balance.

The forces that shift the center of gravity of scholarship toward new interpretations of classic works remain perplexing and controversial. The study of the history of ideas advances through a dynamic process in which the worth of previous contributions is always measured according to new expectations and different values. This sometimes enables scholars to attain the psychological distance necessary to take a more balanced and nuanced

view of past accomplishments. But it also runs the risk of taking ideas out of context and ignoring the time-sensitive and culturally bound nature of thought of a specific era. Thus scholars who seek new meaning and significance in ideas that have endured must be sensitive to time and place in their assessments and attempts to adapt them to changing institutional needs and cultural demands.

FOCUS OF THIS BOOK

This book focuses on the familiar but little understood cycle whereby some "great" psychologists' ideas reach a pinnacle of influence that endure while others slide into oblivion and then are "rediscovered" and rehabilitated to become relevant again (see Watson and Evans, 1991). The contributors to this volume examine and assess several factors (i.e., personal professional, scientific, organizational, theoretical and ideological, etc.) that contribute to this cycle whereby some influential psychologists enjoy enduring prominence for their ideas, while others suffer periods of indifference, misinterpretation and sometimes, derision before being revived and seen in a new light. A closely related issue examined here is why prevailing ideas and assumptions about psychological phenomena undergo significant change that sometimes topple or even reverse received theory. Why some theories and theorists' reputations flourish, attract adherents and form schools of thought while others don't are interesting questions that require us to adopt a larger perspective, by comparing individuals and their intellectual contributions across time and through different domains.

The editors and contributors shed light on this putative cycle and examine why it seemingly contributes to the never-ending search for the origins and founders of a discipline and to attempts to retrace their theoretical heritage. Provocative questions are addressed that include the following: Through what interpersonal and professional processes do scientific leaders gain recognition as "founders" of a discipline? How and why do the histories of a field written by its practitioners differ from those written by those outside the field? How do individual cognitive orientations, personal styles, professional activities, theoretical perspectives and scholarly productivity affect and predict recognition and prominence? How do career decisions and strategies affect the prospects of recognition and posterity? What are the long-term career advantages and disadvantages of having a prominent mentor? What enables a body of work to withstand distortion by false attribution, labeling and stereotyping? Why do some theories attract renewed attention while others fail to gain a foothold needed to sustain long term intellectual development? How do rivalries affect the

processes of professional recognition for originality and impact? Through what processes is a theory interpreted and appropriated to become a school of thought or is culturally dispersed through a movement that attracts adherents? When do the signs become apparent that a movement (e.g., behaviorism) is on decline or will run out of steam? Through what intellectual and institutional processes do new theoretical perspectives emerge and how do they become dominant to influence prevailing views about what phenomena are considered important objects of investigation?

We argue that the processes through which psychologists and other scientists attain eminence and authority in their field of endeavor can be more clearly understood, when viewed within a broader historical and institutional framework. Our contention is that the processes through which professional identities are constructed, expertise is acquired, innovation is rewarded and theoretical disputes are resolved over time furnish information pertinent to understanding the role of prominence in demarcating a field of study. Moreover, we believe that the question of how leading psychologists capture the attention and inspire the analysis of or emulation by their contemporaries and successors cannot be neatly separated from underlying professional and institutional processes. These processes bestow merit and confer authority on those whose ideas are appropriated, repudiated and/or rejuvenated over time. Prominence is a reward for being recognized for making contributions that can involve the successful adoption of different roles. Some scientists gain an enormous reputation for seminal discoveries or persuasive theories while others attain recognition for professional leadership, mentoring students, developing innovative methods or applications or brilliantly synthesizing intellectual trends begun by others. Each of these modes of prominence is attained through different pathways of recognition.

Contributors to this volume take different approaches toward understanding the phenomena of prominence. Some contributors focus on historical figures whose ideas have undergone interpretive revision and whose popularity has gone up or down, or attracted different audiences or adherents over time. From these individual cases factors are identified that are relevant to questions and issues about prominence, which have been raised in this introduction. Others approach the phenomena from a different angle of vision to understand the functions of prominence in forming schools or instigating intellectual or social movements. Significant factors and recurring themes are singled out that enable us to generalize from individual cases and episodes. Analyses of how the career fortunes of single individuals intersect with contextual factors and institutional forces contributes to our understanding of the larger phenomena of intellectual change in general (see Collins, 1998 and Sulloway, 1996).

European and American psychologists attained academic and professional recognition sooner than their colleagues in the other social sciences, but this success did not depend solely on their methodological skills or commitment to science. Wilhelm Wundt, William James, John Dewey, Stanley Hall, Sigmund Freud and John Watson were visionaries, who recognized more clearly than their contemporaries that the fortunes of psychology were inextricably bound with their roles as professionals and reformers. They perceptively anticipated that the demand for psychology would rise, when its techniques and theories were seen as levers to bring about social reform and human betterment. That is why pragmatism and behaviorism alike were not simply distinctive philosophical and theoretical positions about knowledge and human behavior, but became *social and educational movements* that advocated the societal adoption of distinctive child-rearing and educational policies and strategies.

A more complete explanation of these related phenomena then should take into consideration the following questions posed by the contributors to this volume and discussed in a concluding chapter:

- Through what personal, professional, institutional and political processes do seminal thinkers attain prominence and how is this recognition sustained over time?;
- Why do some theorist's ideas gain widespread acceptance to form schools of thought or social movements that have wide cultural impact?
- Why do some scientific innovators fail to get recognition for their discoveries or their ideas are misrepresented, misinterpreted or associated erroneously with a school of thought?
- Why do schools of thought attract different audiences, adherents and critics over time, who see their ideas in a different light?;

OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

Reconstructing Psychology's Founding and Growth

Contributors to Part 1 focus on questions pertinent to the founding of psychology as a discipline, its growth and assessment as a profession, its processes of intellectual recognition, the changing influence among its dominant theoretical perspectives and their relationship to other fields. Rand Evans traces an important source of "origin myths" to textbooks and conferences that have become key mediums through which knowledge is disseminated and beliefs are reinforced about those who have been "first"

in the field. This reflects a sequential view of history that focuses on the contributions and intellectual leadership of a few pioneering individuals. But Evans shows why this conception of great men serves certain functional, institutional purposes that are not clearly understood.

Founders are largely transitional figures, according to Evans, who may have started but do not perfect the theories and methods carried forward by second and third generation scientists. Wilhem Wundt boldly undertook the institutional initiatives that helped establish psychology as an independent discipline. But even these accomplishments are not enough to guarantee founder status, as in the case of G. Stanley Hall. Hall, who, unlike William James, squandered much intellectual and political capital by his imperious and blunt leadership style and professional vendettas.

Political strategies are employed to advance professional causes that are sometimes not obvious but nonetheless significant. Evans describes how Hall and James competed for recognition as the founder of their discipline by employing strategies that ultimately had paradoxical consequences. Evans shows that there are symbolic uses of founding and founders that satisfy the psychological need for leadership, authority and continuity. He argues that founders not only must demonstrate superior intellectual capacities and institutional leadership skills, but also must possess human virtues that dignify them (and us) and justify our belief in their authority and legitimacy.

Robert Wozniak contends that the received "truths" of psychology's history are now viewed by some observers to be much more complicated, contextualized, and open to interpretation than was once realized. This has led to a critical reexamination of the traditional way to record the history of psychology involving a linear, incrementalist birth-revision-replacement-survival format. The processes supporting the creation and endurance of ideas do not conform always to a predictable linear trajectory but appear to reflect cyclical forces involving reputation, prominence and changing assessments of classic works.

Wozniak focuses on three important issues relating to the life cycle of ideas. First, he examines how history comes to regard a work of the past as a "classic" and its author as a "major contributor." This involves an analysis of the general criteria by which ideas come to be seen in retrospect as "significant." Second, he analyses why some contributors and ideas famous in their own day subsequently disappear from recorded history. And third, he assesses the conditions under which ideas seemingly lost to history are sometimes rediscovered and the reputations of their authors rehabilitated. Wozniak uses James Mark Baldwin's career and works as a case study to illustrate how several factors he describes help explain why

Baldwin's classic works experienced a renaissance despite his personal humiliation and professional derogation.

John Popplestone contends that scholars who hold fundamentally different perspectives about the field of psychology have documented the history and growth of psychology as a discipline and profession. Trained psychologists focus on traditional questions about how the past led to the present and how scientific progress has been achieved. They try to understand how contemporary psychology came into being, explain how different research traditions emerged and how they relate to each other. The focus is largely internal, emphasizing ideas, concepts and the people and places that are associated with them. Practitioners of this approach include experimentalist Edwin Boring and social psychologist Gardner Murphy, who conducted research and wrote textbooks for students in the field.

Another group comes from outside the field of psychology, Popplestone contends, who view academic disciplines as social and political organizations whose practitioners reflect intellectual and professional biases and whose knowledge disguises subtle forms of power. These practitioners of "science and society studies," inspired by Michel Foucault, contend that they are not bound by psychologists' interests and biases and thus are not forced to adopt an uncritical, progressive view of its history. Popplestone illustrates through several case studies the differences in cognitive orientation, research styles and political attitudes that lead these observers to take sharply contrasting perspectives toward the history of psychology as a science and profession. He takes the position that practitioners in the field of psychology are more likely to be sensitive to problems of bias, factual validity, chronology and contextual interpretation that may cloud historical assessments by those who view psychology from the outside.

As a psychologist, Dean Simonton has devoted more than a quarter century to the scientific study of creative genius in the arts and sciences. He argues that Boring was mistaken in claiming that the zeitgeist perspective on history (i. e., the general intellectual, cultural or moral climate of an era) is more naturalistic than is the great person or genius perspective. Instead, Simonton believes that prominence can be treated as a "natural phenomena" in which history is partially rooted in individual biography. He contends that there are good scientific reasons to focus on that portion of the personal biography that matters most—research and publications—because he found that the cross-sectional distribution of total lifetime output is highly skewed right. Accordingly, a small percentage of the individuals in any given domain of research contribute disproportionately to the total contributions. Significantly, this concentration of productivity at the highest echelons—a pattern that prevails in all of the sciences—is

strongly associated with the citations that a scientist receives in the research literature. Simonton summarizes the findings of a series of citation studies, supplemented by qualitative and contextual analyses that he and other scientists have conducted, which demonstrate that the relationship between productivity, intellectual quality, citation frequency, eminence and enduring prominence conforms to recurring statistically predictable pattern. Simonton explains why he believes that individual and situational factors can be combined into a single causal model for the scientific analysis of psychology's history.

Thomas Kuhn started a debate about the structure and practice of science that has challenged psychology and other disciplines to think critically about the institutional processes through which knowledge is produced and theoretically integrated. He believed that the conduct of science conformed to a cyclical pattern in which mid-range puzzle solving and theoretical competition gives way, under the accumulated weight of anomalies, to the adoption of a completely new paradigmatic framework of understanding. This paradigm furnishes the unifying assumptions and methods for the practice of "normal" science until the accumulated evidence of exceptions again forces the overthrow and replacement of the prevailing paradigm. Jessica Tracy, Richard Robins and Samuel Gosling present the results of several quantitative analyses of citation practices among competing schools of thought in psychology, which, they contend, suggest that the field of psychology is "multiparadigmatic," and thus there is no need to assume the eventual emergence of a unifying paradigm. Accordingly, several dominant theoretical perspectives may compete indefinitely for scientific leadership and experience the waxing and waning associated with the uneven rate of methodological innovation and scientific discovery. They document the changing fortunes of behaviorist, psychoanalytic, cognitive and neuroscience perspectives involving the ascendance of cognitive and neuroscientific schools. While the authors point out that these latter two schools have introduced a strong interdisciplinary orientation in psychology, they caution that it would be premature to interpret that this as a sign of paradigmatic unification.

Comparative Psychology

The larger intellectual and institutional forces shaping the field of psychology reflect underlying individual differences in style, strategy and substance. In part 2, Donald Dewsbury presents several interesting case studies that examine and assess why noteworthy comparative psychologists and ethologists have differed in their ability to attain prominence and retain recognition over time. He describes personal and professional

factors that are not easily quantified but immeasurably affect the recognition and respect accorded to comparative psychologists for their contributions to psychological science. Dewsbury illustrates why notoriety for a significant discovery or the development of a powerful theory does not translate easily and smoothly into a reputation that endures. Dewsbury shows how a variety of factors that include personality, writing style, academic pedigree, professional connections, intellectual adaptability and promotional skills, among others, contribute positively or negatively to prominence and historical posterity.

Michael Corballis and Stephen Lea contend that from its inception comparative psychology has been divided by a long-standing debate between those who believe in the uniqueness of the human mind and those who argue for the continuity of mind between humans and closely related animal species. The philosopher René Descartes believed that the possession of a mind, language and soul fundamentally set humans apart from beasts because the mind is a God-given, non-material entity. Charles Darwin, of course, proposed that humans evolved through natural selection that included a shared ancestry with our ape relatives. Wundt and Titchener were dualists who believed that only human minds were accessible to introspection. The behaviorist revolution eliminated the mind as a serious subject of study thus opening the door to comparative studies. But dualism was reintroduced, Corballis and Lea argue, by Noam Chomsky, an early leader in cognitive science, who contended that language and syntax are rooted in human genetics. But the discovery that humans and chimpanzees share 98.4% of their DNA instigated sophisticated empirical studies, the authors assess, involving the potential shared ape and human capacity to imitate gestures, read other minds and display handedness, which have contributed to a renewed belief in the continuity of species.

Cognitive Science and Consciousness

The rise of cognitive psychology constitutes and important episode in the history of psychology. But little is known among American psychologists about the pioneering role of Otto Selz in the German Würzburg school after the turn of the twentieth century. In Part 3, Pieter van Strien and Erik Faas draw on newly available archives that indicate that Selz never received proper credit for his seminal ideas for both personal and professional reasons, which included his persecution and untimely death during the holocaust. Selz advanced the theory that familiar, goal-directed actions are guided by "anticipatory schemas" that involve the activation of underlying motor programs. "Productive thought" requires devising new methods of creative problem solving that go beyond an existing

cognitive repertoire. Selz adopted a position that differed fundamentally from association psychology and proposed a structural holism that strongly influenced gestalt psychologists, such as Koffka, who failed to credit Selz's influence. Selz's ideas had a greater immediate impact on educational policy in both Germany and The Netherlands.

The authors contend however, that the philosopher Karl Popper could have contributed to a revival of Selz's psychological theory had he explicitly acknowledged that he had adapted Selz s ideas to fit his theory of inquiry that hypotheses must be testable and thus falsifiable by experience. Not until the early 1950s did Selz receive the recognition denied him during his lifetime. That is when the pioneers in cognitive psychology Herbert Simon and Alan Newell credited Selz with having inspired their information processing theories of human and machine intelligence. Van Strien and Fass provide fresh insights why Selz's theory was rediscovered despite undergoing a process of appropriation that nearly erased personal credit for his subsequent influence.

Thomas Dalton and Bernard Baars examine and assess why the scientific study of mind and consciousness, which have been central topics of philosophical analysis for centuries, was revived after nearly being extinguished by the behaviorist movement in America at the turn of the twentieth century. Philosophers and scientists have always been divided about whether consciousness is an objective phenomena that can be studied scientifically or a subjective one only accessible to the individual who experiences his own mental and bodily states. William James believed in the scientific importance of conscious volition and attention. However, the behaviorists successfully terminated, for several decades, scientific resolution of this debate by dismissing consciousness as unsuitable for scientific study.

Through his connections to the Josiah Macy Jr., Foundation, pragmatist co-founder John Dewey contributed to the revival of the interdisciplinary scientific analysis of mind and consciousness. In the early 1940s, Dewey and his foundation collaborators sponsored a series of conferences that included cybernetics, the brain and consciousness, which encouraged scientists to confront their uncertainties, reexamine their assumptions and find new methods to make the mind accessible through inquiry. Dalton and Baars trace the subsequent political and professional strategies undertaken by veterans of the Macy conferences from the 1950's to early 1980s to secure financial support, increase participation of key scientists in research and gain institutional recognition of mind and consciousness as valid and credible objects of scientific analysis. The authors also examine the theoretical and technical breakthroughs in the early 1990s that catapulted the study of consciousness into the cultural mainstream as an interdisciplinary science

capable of testing rival theories and contributing to human well being and betterment.

Pragmatism, Development and Social Psychology

Dewey believed that experience played a central role not only in the integration of brain and behavior but in the construction of social communities dedicated to intelligent action for the public good. In Part 4, Thomas Dalton and Sheldon White examine the challenges that Dewey, his colleagues and collaborators experienced in demonstrating how these two fundamental and complementary dimensions of pragmatism could be studied scientifically and theoretically unified.

Dalton describes infant experimentalist Myrtle McGraw's little known collaboration with Dewey in the 1930s to determine whether the pattern of inquiry that Dewey proposed in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* was foreshadowed in biological processes of growth and development. He predicted that her work would "revolutionize the field" of child development. Nevertheless, McGraw was never able to publicly benefit from her close association with her famous mentor because that relationship was confidential. Her innovative methods of special stimulation and studies of early motor development have inspired research by contemporary experimentalists. But only recently has neuroscientific research corroborated her contentions that early experience contributes to brain growth and the rapid expansion and acquisition of motor and cognitive skills. But McGraw has never been able to escape completely from the shadow of neural maturationism (i. e., that brain development precedes behavioral development) and the nature versus nurture debate that continues to stalk her work. These paradoxes are worth examining, because they enable us to retrace the intellectual and professional pathways through which McGraw's developmental theories have been interpreted and contested and to examine McGraw's novel strategy to counter misrepresentations and rectify her own blunders.

As noted before, modest but steady progress has been made in understanding how humans and apes perceive, process and communicate differently their awareness and knowledge of other minds. But Sheldon White argues that our uniquely human capacity to use language to interact in socially and morally significant ways is an important phenomena that enables us to understand the relationship between individual and social development. Even before the fall of behaviorism, White observes that there were several attempts by philosophers and psychologists that included Josiah Royce, John Dewey, Floyd Allport, James Mark Baldwin and George Mead to provide the outlines of a social psychology. But White contends that Dewey's efforts and that of his colleagues were disregarded

and subsequently "unremembered" by their successors in 1960s who desperately needed an experimental social psychology to make Head Start and other Great Society initiatives truly successful. White suggests how a new social psychology can overcome the problem of subjectivity, which besets attempts to connect individual and group processes, by establishing "social proof structures" that enable intersubjectively validated judgments and assessments.

Career Pathways and Professional Impact

The choices made early in a career about what to study and publish (see Simonton's chapter) and what strategies to adopt to fulfill professional ambitions can strongly influence ultimate attainments and eventual recognition. In Part 5, Kathy Milar (and see Robert Wozniak's chapter in Part 1) examine the distinguished but troubled careers of Helen Bradford Thompson Woolley and James Mark Baldwin. After showing great promise early in their careers, for different reasons they became mired in personal difficulties that adversely affected their professional reputations. This part will focus on Woolley's career.

The fields of child development, social and school psychology attracted several women who were pioneers and innovators. A few gained recognition for their contributions. Nancy Bailey, McGraw and Lois Murphy come to mind in child growth and social development. However, Milar examines why Helen Bradford Thompson Woolley does not evoke the same name recognition, even though she made several important contributions to psychology when the field was just emerging. Her accomplishments are impressive. Woolley was one of the first generation of American women to become an experimental psychologist. She conducted the first experimental investigation of sex differences in psychological characteristics and was one of the first psychologists in the United States to be employed by a public school. She was the first psychologist and the first woman to serve as president of the National Vocational Guidance Association and also was a leader in the nursery school movement of the early 1920s. It is perplexing nevertheless, that a former Dewey student at the University of Chicago and contributor to Dewey's classic book, *Studies in Logical Theory* would not enjoy enduring recognition for her subsequent accomplishments.

Woolley is best remembered among feminist historians for her sex differences research which formed only a very small part of her whole career. While there are a few good brief accounts of her life, Milar is critical of these and other accounts because the authors either have underestimated her accomplishments or distorted them. Milar provides a more complete

description of Woolley's life and work and discusses some of the reasons for her obscurity. While some of the factors influencing the absence of women scientists from histories of their disciplines are pertinent to understanding Woolley's relative obscurity, Milar contends that Woolley's little known mental illness played an important role. Woolley's difficulties coping in a professional manner with her illness and the silence about it among her closest colleagues cast a shadow over her accomplishments. Milar's chapter is an attempt to break that silence and recover the story of this complex, brilliant and tragic woman.

The contributors to this volume document the lives and works of pioneers in the field of psychology with whom undergraduates and graduate students should be acquainted in the course of their studies. Teachers of introductory and advanced courses in the theory and history of psychology will find this book attractive, because it describes and illustrates how the foundations of a discipline are constructed and remodeled over time through the intellectual innovations and strategic interactions of its most visible leaders. Scientists and scholars who want to know more about the roots of their discipline also will find this volume useful. Here they are exposed to different perspectives about how a field of knowledge and practices are formed and reshaped over time to address unanticipated problems and issues that require the adoption of new theories and methods of inquiry.

There are a number of texts that have examined the history of psychology from the point of view of its intellectual history, but rarely do the authors examine underlying patterns that involve the interplay among prominence, professionalization and organizational development. There is an emerging but modest scholarly literature that addresses themes and issues that are the focus of this book. These works include Evans et al. (1992) collection on the history of the APA and (Dewsbury's, 1996; 1997) volumes that examine the history of the divisions of the APA. Ever since Ben-David and Collins' (1966) sociological analysis of the intellectual and professional origins of American psychology, psychologists have been challenged to mount a critical response and to present an alternative perspective by those who have been trained within the discipline (see Ross, 1967 and Danziger, 1979). Book length studies by psychologists that put prominence in a theoretical and historical perspective similar to that contemplated by the editors and contributors include the classic work by Coan (1978) and a more recent book by Simonton (2002), who is also a contributor to this book. *The Life Cycle of Psychological Ideas* promises to stimulate a renewed interest among psychologists in their roots, the pathways to success and the processes through which the field has been transformed since the turn of the twentieth century.

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Part 1

Reconstructing Psychology's Founding and Growth