STUDIES ON LOCKE:
SOURCES, CONTEMPORARIES, AND LEGACY

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197

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In Honour of G.A.J. Rogers

Edited by

Sarah Hutton • Paul Schuurman

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Contents

Foreword

John Cottingham

In the anglophone philosophical world, there has, for some time, been a curious relationship between the history of philosophy and contemporary philosophical inquiry. Many philosophers working today virtually ignore the history of their subject, apparently regarding it as an antiquarian pursuit with little relevance to their "cutting-edge" research. Conversely, there are historians of philosophy who seldom if ever concern themselves with the intricate technical debates that fill the journals devoted to modern analytic philosophy. Both sides are surely the poorer for this strange bifurcation. For philosophy, like all parts of our intellectual culture, did not come into existence out of nowhere, but was shaped and nurtured by a long tradition; in uncovering the roots of that tradition we begin see current philosophical problems in a broader context and thereby enrich our understanding of their significance. This is surely part of the justification for the practice, in almost every university, of including elements from the history of philosophy as a basic part of the undergraduate curriculum. But understanding is enriched by looking forwards as well as backwards, which is why a good historian of philosophy will not just be concerned with uncovering ancient ideas, but will be constantly alert to how those ideas prefigure and anticipate later developments. By engaging in a dynamic dialogue with the past, we gain a fuller sense of who we now are, and in this sense the history of philosophy has a vital role to play in the "examined life", by helping to develop that critical self-awareness which Socrates identified as the goal of all philosophical inquiry.

For these, and many other reasons, the vigorous growth of scholarship in the history of philosophy in recent years is greatly to be welcomed, and, in Britain, G.A.J. Rogers has played a very significant part in fostering a climate favourable to such growth. It is therefore is a pleasure and a privilege for me to have been asked to write a short foreword to this volume honouring his work. As Chairman of the British Society for the History of Philosophy from 1991-5, I was able to see at first hand what a vital role John Rogers played in the work of the Society; its annual conferences and other activities not only kept the history of philosophy strongly alive in the UK, but strengthened a host of valuable links between British scholars and those working in Continental Europe, North America and the rest of the world. One great joy of working in the history of philosophy is its genuinely international dimension. The radical disparities of methodology and style, which still to a considerable extent

divide contemporary "analytic" and "continental" practitioners seem to melt away once one goes back a century or more, so that when philosophers from diverse backgrounds leave behind Quine and Derrida, and sit down to hear papers on Kant or Descartes, they are able to tread common ground. The several different nationalities of the contributors to this volume testify to that catholicity in the study of history of philosophy, which is such a welcome contrast to the cliquishness found in some other areas of philosophical research.

To expatiate on John Rogers' own particular contribution to the history of ideas would greatly exceed the space allowed for a brief forward of this kind. He has, of course, made the early-modern period especially his own, and, within that period, the philosophy of Locke has been his abiding interest; all the papers in this collection reflect the first focus of interest, and many of them the second. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are periods of particular richness for our philosophical culture, not just because the ideas developed then laid the foundations for modernity, but because of the striking continuities that linked the ideas of the early-modern writers with those of their classical forebears. The period that followed the Renaissance had a peculiar intellectual richness, since its philosophers broke strikingly new ground while at the same time being steeped in the newly revived ideas of antiquity. With an ease and familiarity that has long since ceased to be possible for us moderns, they were able to work out their new ideas while drawing on the philosophical frameworks of Stoicism, Epicureanism, Platonism and Aristotelianism. That extraordinary fertility of early-modern thought, in its reference back in time as well as its prefiguring of the future, is, again, captured in many of the essays printed here. Another feature of the collection, which also reflects John Rogers' own work, is the range of philosophical areas covered—political, religious, ethical, scientific, epistemological; in our own more fragmented philosophical culture, it is not without nostalgia that we look back on a period when philosophers like Locke could write seriously and systematically in so many branches of inquiry that have now become the preserve of specialists.

A final feature of this volume which deserves mention, and which is also a fitting tribute to its honorand, is the meticulous precision and detail with which the various texts and sources are treated. Our modern academic environment is one of complex Byzantine struggles for the allocation of funding and resources, and in-fighting its professional corner the history of philosophy has strong ammunition in the high standards of scholarship for which its practitioners are rightly known. Of crucial importance in this connection has been the establishment of the *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* as a major international quarterly; this has been an invaluable scholarly vehicle for those working in the subject during the past two decades, and the role of John Rogers has of course been absolutely central here. Not only has his vision and administrative efficiency been vital from the early days of the launch of the journal, but also (as noted by Michael Ayers in his essay in this volume) many scholars have cause to thank John Rogers for the help and guidance they have received as a result of his editorial labours. Though the *BJHP* constitutes a continuing visible sign of John's service to the history of philosophy, the present volume is a more special and particular tribute to his work, and I am sure that the

reader will find, in the richness and variety of the papers gathered here, ample evidence of the flourishing current state of the subject, to which he has himself so signally contributed.

University of Reading, England John Cottingham
November 2007

Editors' Introduction

Sarah Hutton and Paul Schuurman

This collection of new essays on John Locke (1632-1704) reflects the fact that he was very much a responsive philosopher. His groundbreaking work in epistemology, philosophy of science, political philosophy, theory of education and theology was produced in response to his predecessors and in friendly or polemical dialogue with contemporary thinkers. Locke, however, is a figure who is often studied in isolation from his contemporaries and in terms of his contribution to particular thematic developments in the history of philosophy and political thought. His legacy is fragmented by the separate disciplinary categories by which work is classified nowadays (epistemology, political thought, religious toleration and history of education) and his legacy is also divided by the chronological boundaries which separate seventeenth from eighteenth-century history. The present collection of essays views Locke not in isolation from his times, but alongside those thinkers to whom he responded, or who were engaged either directly with him or with the same sets of problems. Abandoning the traditional compartmentalization of his writings, we emphasise Locke's links to his contemporaries and near contemporaries. A major emphasis of the collection is the relationship between Locke and seventeenth-century philosophers, Descartes, Hobbes, Cudworth, Bayle, Malebranche and Leibniz. Also represented here are members of his circle, like Pierre Coste and William Popple. And coverage is given to some of the early reactions to his philosophy, from the negative assessment of one of his earliest critics, Thomas Beconsall and the reception of aspects of his thought by two very different eighteenth-century thinkers, Rousseau and Kant.

As Victor Nuovo reminds us, Locke was educated in the classics. Among classical philosophies, Stoicism is the one which appears to have strongest affinities with Locke's philosophy. Nuovo's opening essay examines the evidence for the impact of Stoicism on Locke's thought. He identifies a number of characteristically Stoic themes in Locke's philosophy (the relationship of God to nature, the origin of knowledge and, above all, moral rationalism). But he also shows areas where Locke differs fundamentally from the Stoics, such his theory of the law of nature, and his subordination of reason to revelation. He argues that although Stoic metaphysical and moral rationalism can be viewed as an instrument of modernization, Locke's use of Stoicism was constrained by its Christian premises, and that this had the effect of reducing his foundational role in enlightenment thought.

The philosopher who dominated the English philosophical landscape throughout his life was Thomas Hobbes. In the first of two essays on Locke's political thought, Tom Sorell challenges the received view that Hobbes and Locke differ deeply and systematically, and, indeed that Locke formulated his concept of the State of Nature in opposition to Hobbes. With an acknowledgement to Peter Laslett he suggests that the likely target for Locke in *Two Treatises*, was Robert Filmer. He goes on to discuss difficulties in Hobbes and Locke's divergent conceptions of the state of nature, arguing that Locke's conception of the state of nature as the state of perfect freedom is contradictory, and that there is something utopian about of Locke's view that reasonableness is natural.

Stuart Brown discusses the development of the consent theory of government (the commonplace "that governments derive their rightful powers from the people") as a European constitutional idea, by examining the specific seventeenth-century contribution to its history. As background to Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*, he uses the examples of the Jesuit, Juan de Mariana and the Levellers, to illustrate how "the myth of the people's consent" developed into political theory of contract theory of government. Richard Overton, who argued that "power is a property of individuals," was one of the first to try to formulate a philosophical basis for the theory. Locke's development of contract theory of government in *Two Treatises* makes a further distinction between the consent every individual must give in order to join political society and "the majority consent of the people as a corporate body." His emphasis on the distributive character of the sovereign power of the people is democratic a modern sense.

Michael Ayers focuses on a specific element of Locke's epistemology: abstract ideas. His essay is a reply to two critical articles by Jonathan Walmsley in which Ayers crisply defends his original view about Lockean abstraction as partial consideration against Walmsley's rival interpretation of abstraction as mental separation. Ayers argues that to have the abstract idea of a triangle actually before the mind, is to perceive or imagine a *particular* or determinate triangle, while considering it simply as triangle. Ayers extends his discussion to the earlier drafts of Locke's *Essay* , and considers possible sources for Locke's account of abstract ideas, most notably the *Port-Royal Logic* by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole.

Alongside Hobbes, the other shaping influence on seventeenth-century philosophy in Locke's youth, was René Descartes. Shigeyuki Aoki's essay deals with an aspect of the relationship of Locke's philosophy to Descartes', Locke's rejection of the Cartesian conception of matter. Aoki focuses on a particular aspect of Locke's case against Descartes that has been overlooked, namely Descartes' identification of extension with *the* essence of matter. He shows how Locke used a combination of *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments to reject Descartes' identification of matter with extension, and argues that Locke's persitent attack on various aspects of the Cartesian system amounted to an alternative empiricist philosophy that provided an epistemological basis for the development of natural science.

Although Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's attempt to engage Locke in philosophical dialogue was ultimately frustrated, his *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain*, with its titular echo of Locke's *Essay* could be viewed as the dialogue he would like

to have had with Locke. In the first of two essays on Locke and Leibniz, Martha Brandt Bolton compares Locke and Leibniz's conceptions of powers and potentialities in substances. In a detailed analysis she argues that they agreed that "causality, action, and power cannot exist without a more complex structure that constitutes thinking." But, insofar as Locke admits the possibility of the spirit existing without thinking, for example during sleep, there is the problem of how, and by what power, it can be brought back into thinking, since the state of thoughtless sleep seems to deny the presence of the very power that is supposed to end the state of non-thinking. Against Locke, Leibniz's argues "(a) activity is essential to a substance; a substance is never without perceptions, although it is often unaware of them; (b) everything that occurs in a substance comes to it from its own depths; that is, a substance has no "passive" powers, if this means that it has modifications caused by another (created) substance; (c) in nature, there are not even bare inactive faculties, let alone inactive substances." Although she appreciates Locke's stand on the structure of substance as "sober, well-considered," she concludes that Leibniz's account can do something that Locke cannot: it can "explain how a substance underwrites and unites several powers, and specifically active powers."

Luc Foisneau discusses the theory of personal identity in Locke and Leibniz, demonstrating that Hobbes is an important *point de repère* for both. He credits Locke with presenting the modern problem of personal identity through his conjunction of the theory of the person and the theory of identity. For his part, it was in response to Locke that Leibniz developed his ideas on the principle of individuation and on the basis of the identity of the human person. Foisneau discusses ways in which Hobbes may be said to provide some of the basis for Locke's theory. Locke's definition of the person as a juridical term is, he argues, indebted to Hobbes's definition of the natural person. Leibniz, on the other hand, made self-conscious use of Hobbes when, in *Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain*, he called into question Locke's radical distinction between personal identity founded on unity of consciousness, and physical identity founded on the unity of substance. Notwithstanding their difference on the identity of the moral person, Hobbes's concept of a natural person with its close coupling of the natural and the moral dimensions of human personality, may be said to anticipate the objections which Leibniz made against Locke.

Mark Goldie introduces the first published critique of Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*. Hitherto overlooked, this was published in 1698 in *The Grounds and Foundation of Natural Religion* by the sometime Oxford fellow and Anglican clergyman, Thomas Beconsall. The critique is remarkable, first for its early date (as critiques of *Two Treatises* go) and because, notwithstanding the anonymity of Locke's book, Beconsall recognised the link with Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Beconsall focuses on law of nature. Although he convicts Locke of irreligiousness, his critique does not register the theological concerns raised by Stillingfleet. In defence of patriarchalism, Beconsall charged Locke with subverting the authority of fathers over sons and took Locke to be an advocate of uncontrolled emigration which, he claimed would have economically debilitating consequences.

Differences in epistemology and philosophical style have resulted in Cambridge Platonists and Locke being treated as mutually antithetical. Taking as her starting point Locke's highly positive evaluation of Ralph Cudworth in *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, Sarah Hutton argues that Cudworth's philosophical horizons were more modern than might first appear from the space he devotes to ancient philosophy in his work. The essay focuses on Cudworth's interpretation of Protagoras, and argues that, beneath its classical exterior, there is more affinity between Locke and Cudworth than is normally acknowledged.

Locke was a sociable philosopher. As Luisa Simonutti reminds us, he enjoyed participating in discussion groups or intellectual *salons* (such as the "Lantern" group at the house of his friend, Benjamin Furly). He was also responsible for founding some of his own, such as the so-called "Dry Club", taking care to set out rules for their governance. The purpose of such regulation was to ensure the free exchange of ideas, so that, they might serve as *fora* for exploring topical issues. She argues that religious issues, especially Socinianism, were a major subject of discussion in the with William Popple and members of the "Dry Club". Since Locke's views can be shown to anticipate his late writings on the same issues, it is likely that these discussions were an important stimulus for developing his ideas. The discussions continued even after Locke moved to live at the home of Lady Masham during his final years. As the hub of correspondence and calling point for friends and acquaintances, her home constituted a "virtual salon" of Lockeans.

In his paper on Locke and Malebranche, Paul Schuurman shows how Locke's epistemological agnosticism about God, mind and matter drove both his attack on Malebranche's Vision in God and his defence of the possibility of thinking matter against Stillingfleet. Focusing on the Locke's *argumentative strategies* he argues that there are similarities between these debates. In addition, there may be a direct connection between the *content* of Locke's arguments in favour of the possibility of thinking matter and of his arguments against the Vision in God. For Malebranche there was a clear connection between these two issues: denial of the Vision in God opens the door to agnosticism about the essence of matter, which in its turn leads to the error about thinking matter. Locke denied the Vision in God *and* he was agnostic about the essence of matter *and* he refused to deny the possibility of thinking matter.

As the French translator of Locke's *Essay* Pierre Coste was a key transmitter of Locke's philosophy to a European audience. John Milton's essay examines the uneasy relationship between Locke and his translator which is revealed in Coste's correspondence after Locke's death. Coste's closeness to Locke (they did after all live in the same household during Locke's final years), did not, it seems amount to friendship. Although Coste wrote a very flattering "Eloge" immediately after Locke's death, John Milton demonstrates that his private view of Locke was far from amicable, which may explain why he never honoured the deathbed request by Locke that he translate one of his other works after his death. This work is not named in Coste's account, but Milton advances a plausible hypothesis that the book in question was Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*.

The subject of Ian Harris's paper is, Pierre Bayle the protestant champion of religious toleration who is often compared to Locke. Focusing chiefly on Bayle's

Commentaire philosophique Harris argues that Bayle's the view of liberty of conscience was shaped by his metaphysical beliefs. Among these, he draws attention to the importance of epistemological certainty as the ground of toleration, thereby reversing the usual emphasis on Bayle's scepticism. He also highlights the positive role Bayle accords the state as protector of religion and morality. He argues that this *difference* from Locke may be accounted for in terms of Bayle's different personal experience of the institutions of church and state as a Hugenot in France and in exile.

Jean Jacques Rousseau aspired to be a thorough Lockean, and his early educational writings clearly show a debt to Locke, in spite of his criticisms of him. Nevertheless, Rousseau dismissive of Locke's *Some Thoughts on Education*. Refuses to take him at his word, Sylvana Tomaselli demonstrates the influence of Locke on Rousseau's philosophy of education in less obvious ways. By focusing on the moral and political purpose of *Some Thoughts* she shows similarities between them, in spite of differences. Notwithstanding his denials, she argues that "Rousseau wrote with Locke in hand."

A less obvious dimension of Locke's European legacy was his impact on Kant, explored here by Yasuhiko Tomida who examines the parallels and differences between "things themselves", "affections", and sensible "ideas" in Locke and Kant's "things in themselves", "affections" and sensible "representations". For Locke, sensible ideas are the product of affections that are *caused* by corpuscular "things in themselves". Similarly, in Kant's framework sensible representations are given to us by things in themselves that affect our senses; but it makes no sense to talk about these unknown things in themselves as being in space, hence there can be no causal relation between things in themselves and our representations. Yet Tomida makes a convincing case for the profundity of Kant's debt to Locke by focusing on Kant's admission of similarities between Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities and his own distinction between space and all other modifications of body (the former being the subjective condition for the latter), including both primary and secondary qualities.

Broadly speaking, by setting Locke's thought in the context within which it was produced, the essays presented in this volume seek to give a rounded picture of his contribution to the intellectual culture of his time. However, the collection as a whole aspires to be neither comprehensive in its coverage of Locke and his immediate context, nor uniform in its treatment of the various topics discussed. Rather, the particular topics have been selected as representative of Locke's philosophy and its context. Different approaches highlight different features of his thought and intellectual milieu, which, when taken together will, we hope, serve to complement one another. Furthermore, in their central focus on Locke and their diversity of style and content, these essays are designed to be a fitting tribute to John Rogers, to whose work Locke is central, and who has done so much to promote the cause of the history of philosophy in its widest sense.[1]

[1] The editors wish to thank Ferdinand Delcker (Erasmus University, Rotterdam) for his assistance in preparing this volume.

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Sarah Hutton holds a chair at Aberystwyth University and is director of the international Archives of the History of Ideas. Her publications include, *Anne Conway. A Woman Philosopher* (CUP 2004). She has also edited Ralph Cudworth's Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (CUP 1996).

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Yasuhiko Tomida is Professor of Philosophy at Kyoto University. He has publishing extensively on Locke and his two most recent books are *The Lost Paradigm of the Theory of Ideas* (Hildesheim: Olms, 2007) and *Quine, Rorty, Locke* (Hildesheim: Olms, 2007).

Abbreviations: Writings of Locke

Correspondence	*The Correspondence of John Locke*, 9 vols., ed. E.S. de Beer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976—)
Drafts	*Drafts for the* Essay concerning Human Understanding, vol. I, ed. Peter Nidditch and G.A.J. Rogers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)
ELN	*Essay on the Law of Nature*, ed. W. von Leiden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974)
Essay	*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975)
LL	*The Library of John Locke*, compiled by J. Harrison and Peter Laslett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971)
Paraphrase and Notes	*A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul*, ed. Arthur W. Wainwright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)
Reasonableness	*The Reasonableness of Christianity*, ed. J.C. Higgins-Biddle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999)
STCE	*Some Thoughts concerning Education*, eds John W. and Jean S. Yolton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
TOL	*Epistola de Tolerantia*, ed. Raymond Klibansky (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968)
Two Treatises	*Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (second edition corrected (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)
Works	*The Works of John Locke* (London: Thomas Tegg, 1823; repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1963)
WR	*Writings on Religion*, ed. Victor Nuovo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002)

Chapter 1
Aspects of Stoicism in Locke's Philosophy

Victor Nuovo

Introduction

To begin with, Locke was not a Stoic philosopher, at least not a self-conscious one. There is no evidence that he made any attempt to recover Stoic principles through a careful study of ancient sources that were available to him, one comparable to the study he made of the New Testament in search of the fundamental principles of the Christian Religion, or that, having once recovered Stoic principles, he endeavoured to conform his philosophical theories to them. Nevertheless, there are major aspects of Locke's philosophy that appear characteristically Stoic and that, when brought clearly into view, make him seem almost but not quite a Stoic philosopher. *Almost, but not quite*: this may serve as a motto for my essay. Being not quite one thing suggests not just privation but being something else as well. This other may consist of contrary philosophical positions. No modern philosopher who was schooled in antiquity, as was Locke, could escape being somewhat eclectic. In Locke's case, however, the other consisted of something very different, that was not philosophy, even though it was regarded by many who professed it as a form of wisdom, something which when reduced to dogma often seemed antithetical to philosophy generally and to Stoicism in particular, even while it claimed to represent what all philosophers knowingly or not aspired to. That significant other is Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures. Locke was a Christian, who was confident of his faith, and who held his Christian beliefs in higher regard than mere philosophical opinion, including his own.

My essay falls into three parts. The first part will focus upon philosophical themes in Locke's thought that are characteristically Stoic, in particular the following: God and nature, the origin of knowledge and the growth of reason, good and bad, the passions, the grounds of morality and the law of nature. Locke's philosophical opinions concerning these themes will be compared with their Stoic archetypes, and, since it is not my intention to make him out to be a complete Stoic, special attention will be paid to those instances where Locke departs from Stoic orthodoxy: in his opinions about God and creation, about the origin of our ideas of good and bad and about moral obligation. However, these differences are far outweighed by Locke's profound affinities with Stoic rationalism. Locke's

Sarah Hutton, Paul Schuurman (eds.), *Studies on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy*, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008, 1–25.

reliabilist and developmental theory of reason and cognition constitutes a revival of Stoic theory. To be sure, it is original and idiosyncratic, yet its pedigree remains. However, reason is, for Locke, not merely the indispensable and only means to our human pursuits of truth; it is also, and just for this reason, the divinely ordained key that provides us access to revelation, to things above reason, which without reason cannot be vouchsafed or understood. Locke's Stoic rationalism, then, together with his departures from Stoic orthodoxy, sets the stage for the second part of this essay. Here my main purpose is to provide a clear and comprehensive account of Locke's Christian worldview and the beliefs that it encompassed. The first part of this essay falls under the heading of *Reason*, and the second, *Reason Enlarged*. This should remind the reader of Locke's grand assertion concerning reason and revelation, that reason is natural revelation and revelation reason enlarged.[1] These are headings, of which Locke might have approved, for the terms, as he uses them, suggest not only a continuity between reason and revelation but a synthesis of them. The third part of this essay is more reflective and evaluative than expository. It adds nothing new to what precedes it. Some brief historical comments on the role of Stoicism with respect to Christianity and modernity may clarify my purpose. Locke's encounter with Stoicism occurred at a critical moment in history when Stoic philosophy, long domesticated as part of the Christian intellectual tradition, re-emerged as an instrument of modernization. Metaphysical naturalism and moral autonomy, which are basic marks of modernity, have their roots in Stoicism. Stoic moral rationalism had a more immediate role to play. Christian scholars, most notable among them, Justus Lipsius and Hugo Grotius, employed it as a means to counteract sectarian dogmatism. Locke is loosely connected to this group of Christian humanists. In this connection, his role as a major founder of liberal Protestantism, or indeed of liberal evangelicalism, becomes apparent. It is arguable that by joining reason to revelation Locke fashioned a momentous synthesis that is still a source of intellectual capital from which Christian philosophers may continue to draw. This is what, I think, Locke hoped for. On the other hand, it is arguable, from the standpoint of modernity and the Enlightenment, that the effect of this conjunction of reason and revelation was a fettering of reason and a diminishment of its potential. Accordingly, the

[1] *Essay* IV. xix. 4, p.698: "*Reason* is natural *Revelation*, whereby the eternal Father of Light, the Fountain of all Knowledge communicated to Mankind that portion of Truth, which he has laid within the reach of their natural Faculties: *Revelation* is natural *Reason* enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by GOD immediately, which *Reason* vouches the Truth of, by the Testimony and Proofs it gives, that they come from GOD. So that he that takes away *Reason*, to make way for *Revelation*, puts out the Light of both, and does much what the same, as if he would perswade a Man to put out his Eyes the better to receive the remote Light of an invisible Star by a Telescope."

heading of this final section identifies two evaluative options: *Reason Enlarged or Diminished*?[2]

Before proceeding, I offer a brief account of the Stoic sources available to Locke. He owned numerous copies of the works of Cicero and Seneca.[3] The former, although not a Stoic, was an important transmitter of Stoic ideas, and was sympathetic to many of them, especially ethical ones. Locke especially valued the latter's *De Officiis*, which offers a compendium of Panaetius' moral doctrines. He also owned two editions of Epictetus' *Enchiridion*, several copies of Diogenes Laertius' *Lives* and of Plutarch's *Moralia* and Gellius' *Noctes Atticae*.[4] Hence he had immediate access to the main Latin and Greek sources. Among the Patristic transmitters of Stoic ideas, he owned copies of the works of Lactantius and Origen.[5] Among more or less contemporary sources he owned an English translation of Guillaume Du Vair's *Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks* and a Latin edition of Justus Lipsius' *De Constantia*.[6] Hugo Grotius' *De Jure belli ac pacis* was a modern source of Stoic natural law theory.[7] Manuscript sources show that Locke read extensively in Seneca and Cicero. One undated manuscript, in Locke's hand, contains chronology of almost all of Cicero's writings.[8] Locke also owned a copy of the first edition of Spinoza's posthumous works. The latter is arguably the most creative of modern Stoics.[9] Locke's earliest writings on the law of nature show that he consciously connected the doctrine of the law of nature to Stoic sources and adopted Stoic terminology in defining it.[10]

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[2] There is a third option: Locke's achievement may be viewed as a corruption or profaning of revelation. Whether this is so is a question for theologians to consider and is beyond the scope of this essay, which is historical and philosophical.

[3] *LL*; Cicero, items 711–720, 721a–q; Seneca: 2612–16, 2616a. In an early notebook, Locke made extensive notes from Seneca's *De Ira*, especially Bk. III (there are 22 citations), plus several from Seneca's *Epistulae Morales*, MS Locke e.6, fos. 7, 8, 9, 10.

[4] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (henceforward *DL*) 2 copies, *LL* 969, 970; Plutarch, *Moralia* 2356–58, 2358a–b, 2359, 2360.; Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 4 copies, 1231, 1232, 1232a–b.

[5] Lactantius, *LL*, 1651, 1651a; Origen: *LL*, 2140.

[6] Du Vair, *LL*, 1003d; Lipsius, *LL*, 1763.

[7] Grotius, *De Jure*, 2 copies, *LL*, 1329, 1329a.

[8] "Ciceronis Scripta secundum ordinem temporis digesta," MS Locke c. 31, fos. 139–46.

[9] Susan James, "Spinoza the Stoic," in *The Rise of Modern Philosophy*, ed.Tom Sorell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 289–314; also Paul Kristeller, "Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza's Ethics," *History of European Ideas* 5: 1–15. See A.A. Long, "Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, ed. Brad Inwood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 365–92. Long cautions that Spinoza should be regarded as at best a partial Stoic and not at all as a self-conscious one.

[10] *ELN* 108f.

Reason

God and Nature

Stoicism is a sort of naturalism, although the particular variety of naturalism that it espouses differs fundamentally from modern naturalism. The Stoics conceived of nature as a finite unified system, a living body that manifests not only intelligence but also design. It exists self-contained in an infinite void of space.

Stoics admit two principles of nature: an active and a passive one, the former indwelling and infusing the latter with its active intelligent substance (a sort of *natura naturans*), and causing the emergence of manifold beings organized in a totality that is a perfect expression of the intelligent creative agent operating within it.[11] Stoics equate the active principle of nature with God, or Zeus, whose creative power is entirely subject to right reason, his primary attribute, by which he rules the universe and exercises providential care over everything in it. This personification of the divine seems to be more a matter of speaking than a real attribution. Stoics conceived of God as a material being. Thus it is represented as the creative fire (*pur technikon*), not to be confused with its familiar and grosser counterpart, or, derivatively, as spirit, a combination of rarefied fire and air that infuses everything and accounts for their expansive and contractive functions, and from whose substance all other grosser kinds of matter and material things proceed and are vivified, or again as pure energy or light endowed with the most sublimeintelligence.[12] Finally, the Stoic God is not a transcendent being. It is not exalted and exists by itself only in those intervals between an infinitude of world cycles, when the process of generation has been reversed and the manifold world is returned to its primitive inchoate state, in which the active principle remains indwelling.[13]

Locke's God, by way of contrast, is a transcendent person, who created the world out of nothing at a particular moment in time, not by virtue of the necessity of his nature but according to his good pleasure. Thus, God's actions are expressions not only of power, wisdom and goodness, which are not fully fathomable, but of his inscrutable will which endows all that he does with a transcendent authority that is supposed to be unlike anything in the world.[14] The primary motive of Locke's theology is biblical, that is, so far as the manifold representations of God in the Scriptures have been more or less refined by philosophical reflection, and codified

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[11] A.A. Long, "The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics," *Stoic Studies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 137.

[12] A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley (eds.), *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) vol. I, § 44, 268–72; § 46, 274–79. Recently, John M. Cooper has argued that some Stoics, Chyrsippus in particular, have supposed God to be an indwelling immaterial body. "Stoic Autonomy," in his *Knowledge, Nature and the Good* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 204–46. esp. 220f.

[13] Cicero, *De natura deorum* (hereafter *ND*) II, 118; *Loeb Classical Library*, 235. Hereafter all texts from *Loeb Classical Library* are abbreviated as *LCL.*

[14] "Supposed," because divine authority bears a striking resemblance to the authority and power of an absolute monarch.

into Christian doctrines that are conveniently read into biblical texts by learned expositors. Yet, notwithstanding this, Locke did not think it inappropriate to substitute the term "Nature" for "God," which he did without embarrassment, although rarely and only on suitable occasions, for example, when discoursing about aspects of natural existence that testify to the existence and attributes of God. In *Essay* I. iii. 3, he writes, "Nature, I confess, has put into Man a desire of Happiness, and an aversion to Misery: These indeed are innate practical Principles which (as practical Principles ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our Actions."[15] This practice of using the terms "nature" and "God" synonymously was not a new one for him; there are instances of it in one of his earliest writings, the so-called *Essays on the Law of Nature.* Here also it is an occasional practice. In one instance it is employed with a caution: Locke writes that "nature or (as I should say more correctly) God" could have created mankind differently.[16] The reason for the caution is that a Christian monotheist and voluntarist like Locke would not want it to be thought that nature by virtue of some principle inherent in it could create itself or that, as creator, God is bound by some necessity to create the world just the way it is. If he had such scruples, which seems most likely, then why use the practice at all? The answer lies in the indispensability to Locke's scheme of things of natural theology, and Stoic natural theology, as opposed to an Aristotelian variety, was for him the article of choice.

Locke's preference for Stoic natural theology is in no small way due to the important role that the doctrine of the law of nature plays in his moral and political theory, and to the Stoic derivation of this law from divine reason.[17] No doubt it also had something to do with the way Stoic proofs linked natural history to theology, by attributing the admirable contrivances of nature to the intelligent design of a superior rational being, whose wisdom, power and goodness are evident from all his works.[18]

In his long chapter on the existence of God, Locke emphatically denies the materiality of God, yet, curiously, he also expresses indifference to the hypothesis, allowing its admissibility so long as God's intelligence or cogitative nature was unequivocally and irrevocably affirmed. The variety of materialism he opposes in this chapter is not Stoic materialism, but Corpuscularism, which was the dominant

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[15] Locke, *Essay*, 67; see also *Essay* III. iii. 13, p. 415.

[16] *ELN*, 199: Von Leyden notes that there are two manuscript versions of this remark: "natura vel (ut rectius dicam) Deus" and "natura (vel ut rectius dicam) Deus"; see also pp. 123, 137. Locke's expression "natura vel Deus" means just the opposite of Spinoza's "deus sive natura" and was composed by him before he could have become aware of Spinoza's formula. Locke's caution is reminiscent of Calvin's remark, "I confess, of course, that it can be said reverently, provided that it proceeds from a reverent mind, that nature is God." *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, I. v. 5, ed. J.T. MacNeill (Philadelphia, 1960), 1:58.

[17] *ELN*, 109, 111.

[18] A primary source of such arguments, well known to Locke, is Book II of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum.*

theory, or, as Locke styled it, "the Philosophy now in the World."[19] It served his purposes well, giving him a rhetorical advantage over the unnamed materialists he was zealous to refute. But as though to suggest that this paradigm is not the final truth about matter, Locke alludes in a veiled and cautious manner to another philosophical notion of primal matter and the origin of the visible world, one that he may have learned of from Isaac Newton: according to this hypothesis, primal matter is infinite space, a portion of which God made into the visible world by a process of thickening.[20]

Which brings us to the idea of God as an indwelling spirit. Locke conceived of God as sending forth from himself an ubiquitous creative divine Spirit capable of operating in all things, illuminating the minds of intelligent creatures, providing for their happiness and making available to them the opportunities as well as the means to achieve it, yet always maintaining its self-identity, never ceasing to be itself. The motto printed on the title page of the *Essay* expresses this sentiment. "As thou knowest not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child: even so thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all things."[21] The scepticism expressed here should be taken in a reverential rather than in a dogmatic sense. Throughout his life, the idea of spirit fascinated Locke, and he attempted to comprehend its nature even while he admitted the immense difficulty of the task. The proposition that a creative spirit invigorates matter, which, when considered abstractly by itself, seems to be a shared principle between Locke and the Stoics, and although stated in different contexts, expresses the same abstract metaphysical principle. Locke's thoughts about spirit present his interpreters with a confusing tangle of ideas, some drawn from Stoicism, for example, that there are enduring spiritual beings that reside in realms above the terrestrial sphere, who in their refined state are pure intelligences, and that the spiritual state is a corporeal one, at least for angels and the resurrected spiritual bodies of the saints, although not for God. Mention of the latter, of course, shows that Locke's thoughts were intertwined with biblical cosmology and eschatology.[22] Like the Stoics, Locke believed that the individual soul is a spiritual substance, and even though he did not hold that individual souls are portions of the divine spirit, he also admitted the difficulty of conceiving the creation out of nothing of a spiritual entity. Finally, like the Stoics, Locke believed that the individual soul is mortal, although the authority he cites for

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[19] *Essay* IV. x. 18, p. 629.

[20] For what follows, see *Essay* IV. x. 13–19, pp. 625–30. The hypothesis and its source were identified by Pierre Coste, Locke's sometime secretary and French translator; see Jonathan Bennett, "God and Matter in Locke: An Exposition of *Essay* 4.10" in *Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Christia Mercer and Eileen O'Neill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 180f. In §§ 18, 19 Locke also defends the doctrine of creation out of nothing.

[21] *Essay*, title page, eds. 4 and 5 only; the text quoted is Ecclesiastes 11: 5.

[22] On the idea of spirit during the Hellenistic age, see Kirsopp Lake, "The Holy Spirit," in *The Beginnings of Christianity, Part I*, ed. F.J. Foakes-Jackson and Kirsopp Lake (London: Macmillan, 1933), 5: 97–111. The threads of thought, biblical and philosophical, popular and learned, that made up the tangle in Locke's mind are carefully delineated here.

this opinion is not some Stoic text but Genesis 2: 19.[23] To say anything more on this theme here would be to introduce topics that will be properly treated in the next section of this essay.

Reason and the Origin and Growth of Knowledge

Locke conceived of the place of a human individual in the world in the same way as the Stoics did. This becomes particularly clear when one compares their theories concerning the origin of knowledge and the growth of reason. The following summary offers a convenient account of Stoic opinion on these topics.

> The Stoics say: when a man is born, he has the controlling part of his soul like paper well prepared for writing on. On this he inscribes each of his conceptions.
>
> The first kind of inscription is that by way of the senses. For in sensing something as white, they have a memory of it when it has gone away. And when many memories of the same type have occurred, then we say that we have experience, since experience is a multitude of impressions similar in type.
>
> Of the conceptions, some occur naturally by means of the aforementioned modalities and without conscious effort, while others come about by our instruction and attention. These latter are called conceptions, but the former are preconceptions as well.
>
> Reason, for which we are called rational, is said to be completed [lit. "filled up'] from our preconceptions as well. A concept is an image in the mind of a rational animal; for when the image comes to the rational soul, it is called a concept, taking its name from the mind.
>
> For this reason, what comes to irrational animals are images only; while those which come to us and to the gods are generically images but specifically concepts.[24]

Although this text is not one Locke is likely to have read, its convenience as a basis of comparison makes its use irresistible.

In the first place, Locke and the Stoics agree (1) that the original cognitive state of a newborn infant is, like a blank tablet, devoid of content.[25] They agree also (2) that the senses are the first sources of cognitive content, whereby a thing (e.g. something white) inscribes its likeness on the mind, which the memory then retains;[26] (3) that recurring sensations or tokens of like things fuse, by experience, into a

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[23] See *Reasonableness*, *WR*, 92f.; also pertinent are Locke's reflections on the materiality/immateriality of the soul in "Adversaria Theologica 94," MS Locke c. 42, pp. 32–3, *WR*, 20–30. The Stoic doctrine is that the individual soul is mortal, except in the case of those perfected in wisdom, but that the latter and the soul of the world persist throughout a particular world cycle; see *DL*, VII, 156–57; Plutarch, *On Stoic Self-Contradictions*, 1053, *Moralia, LCL*, Vol. XIII/2, p. 571f.

[24] Aetius *Placita*, IV, 1–4, *Doxographi Graeci*, ed. Herman Diels (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1958); the translation, with one exception, is by R.J. Hankinson, "Stoic Epistemology," *Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, p. 62; translation of the first sentence of the fourth paragraph is taken from Long and Sedley (eds.), *Hellenistic Philosophers*, § 39E, 1: 238.

[25] *Essay* II. i. 2, p. 104.

[26] *Essay* II. i. 6, p. 106; also II. x, passim.

type or preconception;[27] (4) that the process is wholly natural and, with respect to the acquisition of content generally, passive;[28] (5) but that the mind is also active, attending carefully to certain things and their qualities, and reflecting upon them, thereby transforming confused images into concepts (*ennoiai*);[29] (6) that reason is a capacity that grows, and so it is said to be filled up or enlarged, until it reaches completion, that is, until it is operationally mature.[30] Thus not only knowledge, but the capacity to reason also is the product of experience, and reason, as it grows or is enlarged, gains the ability to see the reasonableness of things that before it might not have expected could be so.

Our text does not mention any other activities of mind than abstraction or the formation of general concepts, but other texts provide what is missing here, and once again, there is broad agreement. Thus the mind, when reflecting on its concepts, not only abstracts, but also combines, compares, adds and subtracts, fits them into propositions and hypotheses, from which it draws inferences, and so forth. For the sake of completeness, one may add to this list that Locke, like the Stoics, adhered to a causal theory of perception, and that the perception of a thing is the criterion of its existence.[31]

I have remarked that Locke and the Stoics are in agreement that the mind is generally passive as a receptor of ideas. (See above, item (3)). But there is a subtle difference between the two that must not be overlooked. If I understand them correctly, Stoics were more cognizant than was Locke that the acquisition of knowledge is always a natural or organic process, which does not always involve conscious effort, but in which the mind is never entirely passive. The Stoic idea of a cataleptic impression (*katalêptikê phantasia*) involves grasping or apprehending.[32] Thus Locke defines perception, "the first faculty of the Mind," as thinking or what the mind does with its ideas; the Stoics carry the process back one step further to the very acquisition of ideas.[33] In this respect, they seem to be more consistent naturalists, a consequence, perhaps, of their belief that mind, as well as body, was a material composition.

There is a notable difference between Locke and the Stoics with respect to terminology. He displays a casual indifference to Stoic terms like "phantasm" and

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[27] *Essay* II. ix. 8, p. 145. This is a particularly interesting passage, for Locke observes that in the minds of mature adults simple ideas are upon reception "*alter'd by the Judgment*, without our taking notice of it." This, I think, approximates the Stoic idea of a preconception.

[28] *Essay* II. i. 25; xii. 1, pp. 118, 163.

[29] *Essay* II. xii. 1, p. 163.

[30] *Essay* II. i. 20, 22, pp. 116–17.

[31] Reason and reasoning are not "a priori and independent of events." Rather for Stoics as well as for Locke, it may be said that "the primary contents of human rationality … are derived from direct acquaintance of empirical events." A.A. Long, "The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue," *Stoic Studies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 206.

[32] Here I follow R.J. Hankinson, "Stoic Epistemology," 60, especially fn. 1.

[33] *Essay* II. ix. 1, but see also II. ix. 2, p. 143), where Locke directs his readers to what they themselves do when they see or hear or think.

"common notion," yet this may have had less to do with any antipathy to Stoic epistemology than with the fact that the meaning of the terms had become obscure.[34] This indifference to terminology probably does indicate that Locke had no professional interest in Stoic epistemology, with which he was surely acquainted, and whose affinities to his own thought he could not have failed to recognize, but he had no need to acknowledge this.

The Foundations of Morality and the Law of Nature

In this section I treat a series of moral topics, or, better, a medley of them, for each of the themes considered here mixes with the rest to constitute Locke's moral outlook. Here also my purpose is to clarify Locke's more or less near Stoic affinities.

Good and bad and indifferent: Stoic theory of value divides things into three classes: good, bad and indifferent.[35] Stoics maintain that virtue is the only proper good. Virtue is a unitary state of being, or a unitary disposition to act that has multiple expressions, viz. the cardinal virtues of wisdom, justice, courage and temperance. A virtue is a characteristic that is "transferred adverbially" to actions, for example, speaking truthfully or drinking sparingly.[36] The opposite of virtue is vice, which comprises all actions and motives that are contrary to virtue as well as the unsettled character from which they proceed. Happiness is a concomitant state with virtue. Since virtue involves the perfection of reason, all the judgements of reason would be correct, that is, the virtuous individual or sage would be guided in all her judgements by right reason, and so would not be led astray by bad or debilitating passions. The sage would know that the fears and hopes and anxieties of those less perfect involve false judgements and so would not be affected by them. This perfect state is not passionless. Stoic theory allows for good passions as well as bad ones. A standard list of good passions (*eupatheiai*) mentions three: joy, caution and wishing.[37] Indifferent things include all states, circumstances and events connected to an

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[34] *Essay* I. i. 8, p. 47.

[35] The summary of Stoic moral opinions that is provided in this section is not original. It is very much dependent upon the expertise of a number of scholars, especially Michael Frede, Brad Inwood, A.A. Long and the notes in Long and Sedley's *The Hellenistic Philosophers.* For details of their works on which I have relied see the notes and the bibliography.

[36] Long and Sedley (eds.), *Hellenistic Philosophers*, 1:365.

[37] *DL* VII, 116 (*LCL* 2: 221): these are rational states: elation of mind (as opposed to immediate vain or sensual pleasure); rational avoidance (as opposed to fear) and rational desire (as opposed to craving). See also Long and Sedley (eds.), *Hellenistic Philosophers*, 1:412, 419f. All three are arguably characteristics of Locke: the joy or pleasure of new learning and in general of rational pursuits (see *Essay, Epistle to the Reader*); Leo Strauss's characterization of Locke as a cautious man surely is apt, even if his use of it is doubtful; see his *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 206f; Locke's persistent desire for heaven was, at least as he understood it, a rational desire (Locke's considered opinion about the power of choice asserts the capability of an individual to suspend immediate desire for a greater good, viz. the joy of heaven; see *Essay* II. xxi. 65–71, pp. 277–84.

individual life that cannot either wholly or in part be brought under the hegemony of reason: these include physical states such as health, or socio-economic conditions, for example, one's station in life, reputation, prosperity or wealth. Indifferent things also include actions that have no immediate moral bearing: whether I stand or sit, dine now or later, exercise or rest. Yet a distinction can be properly made among all of these between what is to be preferred and what is to be rejected: among the former, health, vigour, good reputation and regular exercise. The sage will always make the right judgement concerning these actions and pursuits. It is by extending ethical thought to such circumstances as these that Stoic ethics comes to embrace the common life, recommending appropriate actions or prescribing rules or laws of various generality. Of course, Stoics believe that we live in a world perfected by reason, so that it may be said that everything happens for the best and nothing happens by chance. Stoic determinism, however, is of a compatibilist variety. Events are not determined by an unbroken chain of causes and effects, but by a sequence of causes, among them, rational choice. Misfortune always offers to the individual the opportunity to respond; there is always something that is "up to us."[38]

Locke's theory of good and bad seems irreconcilably opposed to Stoicism. He traces our ideas of these principles to perceptions of pleasure and pain that often accompany our perceptions of things in or outside of the mind, and on account of which we judge these things to be good or bad. Good is whatever "*is apt to cause or increase Pleasure, or diminish Pain in us, or to preserve us the possession of any other Good or absence of any Evil*" and likewise, *mutatis mutandis*, for good and bad.[39] Locke's account of the origin of our ideas of good and bad was not meant as a mere description of how these common notions arise in experience. For, since the conjunction or super-addition of pleasure and pain with or to certain perceptions is divinely ordained and not just a natural consequence of a thing affecting us, there must be something divinely normative in the affects as well as in our judgements about them. Moreover, reflection reveals to us that pleasure and pain often accompany things that are by design beneficial to us, for example, heat and cold cause comfort or discomfort respectively in those very situations where they are beneficial or harmful to us, and thus they serve in these different capacities to preserve us in life.[40] Hence, that there may be an alternation of the conjunction of pleasure and pain to the same perceived object that in the first instance is beneficial and in the second, harmful, should awaken the mind to the wisdom and goodness of the creator. There is an even higher truth to be learned from the inconstancy and impermanence of pleasure too often punctuated with pain.

> Beyond all this [viz. what serves the preservation of life], we may find another reason *why* God hath scattered up and down *several degrees of Pleasure and Pain, in all the things that environ and affect us;* and blended them together, in almost all that our Thoughts and Senses have to do with; that we finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete

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[38] See Dorothea Frede, "Stoic Determinism," *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, 189, 192ff.

[39] *Essay* II. xx. 2, p. 229.

[40] *Essay* II. vii. 3, p. 129.

> happiness, in all the Enjoyments which the Creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him, *with whom there is fullness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures forever more.*[41]

Locke also allows that pleasure and pain are conjoined to moral actions and higher attitudes of mind. In an entry written in one of his notebooks, dated 1692, he comments on the varieties and degrees of pleasure that a rational being may enjoy. Pleasures of the mind or contemplation are to be preferred to those material or sensible pleasures, because they are more lasting. He observes that the sum of corporeal pleasures, including those that "modestie speaks not openly of," take up no more than and probably less than a quarter of one's time. And even these enjoyments are, as it were, surrounded by or embedded in the satisfactions of reflection. He then prescribes a better way for all whose "interest & businesse" in life is "happynesse." The pleasures that are connected with giving food to a starving man, or to a friend, which give even greater pleasure, or saving the life of a child, in short, in doing good works of love and charity, yield a greater happiness, an "undecaying and uninterrupted" reward in heaven.[42] Locke seems to have wanted to combine in a single perception of pleasure the satisfaction that a virtuous agent takes in doing good deeds, a joy that, according to Stoic theory, accrues to self-governing rational agents through their virtuous actions, with the consolation of the pilgrim Christian hoping for a heavenly reward, which is a consummate pleasure to which no earthly pleasure can compare. The result is a mismatch.

A brief comment about public morality and the pleasure principle provides a useful conclusion to this discussion, for Locke supposed that public morality was motivated by pleasure and advantage. In one place in the *Essay*, he attributes the stability of public morality to the concurrence of virtue and public happiness. This too is divinely ordained, for God "by an inseparable connexion, joined *Virtue* with publick Happiness: and made the Practice thereof, necessary to the preservation of Society; and made visibly *beneficial* to all, with whom the Virtuous Man has to do," so that virtue is everywhere praised, as are the rules of government, which are supposed to be expressions of virtue. Here private interest and public esteem join to form what Locke acknowledges, somewhat petulantly, is a most effective bond of civil society.[43]

The Passions: Locke's theory of the passions follows after Stoic theory in one very important respect. He maintained that the passions are not mere emotions or impulses to action, but are judgements, or thoughts that something is good or bad and therefore is to be desired or avoided.[44] These judgements represent the

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[41] *Essay* II. vii. 5, p. 130; see also II. xx. 1–3.

[42] "Ethica," MS Locke c. 42, p. 224, *WR*, p. 15f. Mention of an undecaying reward no doubt was intended to evoke Matt. 6: 20.

[43] *Essay* I. iii. 6, p. 69.

[44] On the Stoic theory of emotions as value judgements, see Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind* (Oxford, 2000), ch. 2, pp. 29–54 and passim.

coincidence of pleasure or pain with certain objects. Locke's position on this theme is clearly stated in *Essay* II. xx. There, for example, he defines sorrow as "uneasiness of the mind, upon the thought of a Good lost" or of a "present Evil"; he observes that fear arises from "the thought of a future Evil likely to befall us"; he defines despair as "the thought of the unattainableness of any Good." Love and hatred are also judgements of value with respect to things that please or displease us. Our love or hatred of an inanimate object is a function of their utility or disutility; love or hatred of sensitive living beings arises "from a consideration of their very Being, or Happiness."[45] Violent emotions were the effects of wrong judgements. Locke also supposed that madness arose from wrong judgement.[46] Hence he maintained that the understanding must regulate desire by correcting its own misadventures and miscarriages.[47] This practice applies not only to matters of individual morality, but to religion as well. His common charge that every man's belief is his own orthodoxy is an instance of wrong judgement from which arise passions of pride or arrogance.[48] For the most part, Locke's thoughts about the passions appear to have been his own and not deliberately fashioned after Stoic models. Yet in one instance at least, he may have borrowed a definition. His definition of Anger: "uneasiness or discomposure of the Mind, upon the receipt of any Injury, with a present purpose of Revenge," has classical, if not strictly Stoic, antecedents.[49]

Locke's contention that the will is not an independent faculty or separate agency, distinct from the understanding, fits nicely here, and shows him to be in basic agreement with the Stoics, in contrast to Plato and Aristotle who claimed that the soul consisted of three parts, each with its distinct faculty, and with Augustine, who subscribed also to a doctrine of a will divided against itself.[50] Accordingly, Locke adhered to an intellectualist view of voluntary actions. These are actions that follow the "order or command of the mind," and hence are preceded by choice or judgements of good or bad, which are in turn determined by various passions, that is, by modifications of desire or uneasiness.[51]

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[45] *Essay*, p. 230f.

[46] *Essay* II. xx. 13, p. 161.

[47] *Essay* II. xxi. 62, p. 274f); also *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*, ed. Paul Schuurman, (Diss., Keele, 2000), passim.

[48] See, *TOL*, p. 58.

[49] *Essay* II. xx. 12, p. 231. Seneca, *de Ira*, 2. 3. 4–5; see Richard Sorabji's translation and discussion in his "Stoic First Movements in Christianity," in *Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations*, ed. Stephen K. Strange and Jack Zupko (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); see also *Seneca: Moral Essays*, ed. John M. Cooper and J.F. Procopé (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), 19, 20, fn. 8, 44. See also above fn. 3.

[50] For a full exposition of these distinctions, see Richard Sorabji, op. cit., and *Emotion and Peace of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[51] *Essay* II. xxi. 5, 28–30, 39, 54–5, 62; pp. 230, 248f, 257, 268f, 274f. Locke's notion of uneasiness seems to fluctuate between the Stoic (or more precisely Senecan) idea of a "first movement of action" and a proper passion. On Stoic first movements, see Richard Sorabji, "Stoic First Movements in Christianity." Locke follows a separate path from the Stoics in developing his theory of

The Education of Children: Of all of Locke's works, the one that shows the greatest Stoic affinities is *Some Thoughts concerning Education*. It is, therefore, assigned its own place in this essay. Stoic naturalism predominates throughout this work. Indeed, there is a prevailing secularity manifest in Locke's thoughts that confronts the reader in the very first sentence. "A sound Mind in a sound Body, is a short, but full Description of *a Happy State in this World*."[52] The expression "A sound Mind . . . " is from Juvenal, and in its context it may be read as recommending a self-governed life lived within the frame of divine providence. We may count it, then, as a Stoic idea. The love of heaven, however, does not go unmentioned in this work, and there are, as I shall point out, other signs that Locke has kept religious expectation alive in this work. Absent from it, however, is any consideration of evangelical themes: temptation, sin, repentance, grace and forgiveness.[53] A mortal life, then, in Locke's judgement, is something good in itself, and it provides sufficient opportunity for satisfaction and delight to warrant living it and not grieving over what it might have been.

The purpose of education is to enable a child to achieve a state of rational self-control, so that it may properly attend to the great business of life, which is virtue and wisdom.[54] A sound body is not something good in itself, although it is a state to be preferred just because it allows freedom of action, that is, action according to nature. The proper means to achieve it produces not only health; rather they endow the whole child, mind and body, with a predisposition to fortitude, by requiring it to endure hardship, and temperance, by training it to resist desire.[55] Such robust physical training is preparatory for that moment when it reaches the age of discretion, "when Reason comes to speak in them, and not Passion," although even then a child's education continues through reading and discourse.[56] It is in connection with this early training that Locke acknowledges the Stoic affinities to his counsels: to discipline the body through austerities such as exposing it to cold; eating plain food, sparingly and only when hungry and not, as custom prescribes, at regular

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free agency: whereas the Stoics attributed freedom only to the Sage, on account of the perfection of his reason, Locke's account is more clinical and descriptive: an action is free if and only if the agent of the action has "has the Power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the Mind shall chuse or direct." *Essay* II. xxi. 10, p. 238.

[52] Yolton & Yolton, p. 83, italics mine. By secularity, I mean not that religion is assigned no place in the education of children, but that the prospect of a happy and fulfilled mortal life is entertained, and that such a life involves the cultivation of reason and virtue. This is consistent with the claim Locke makes in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* that a mere mortal life is better than no being at all, and that God did nothing unjust in ordaining that Adam's progeny, although innocent of his sin, should nevertheless inherit mortality, which counted for Adam as punishment but for his progeny as a natural state. See *WR*, p. 94.

[53] See *Essay* II. xxi 57, p. 271f, where Locke equates temptation with the effect on an individual of physical deprivation, disease and violent torture.

[54] Ibid., p. 255.

[55] Ibid., pp. 103, 175.

[56] Ibid., p. 167. See also Seneca *Moral Epistles*, no. xciv, *LCL*, 3:42f.