A Genealogy of Power Politics

Seán Molloy

The Hidden History of Realism

The Hidden History of Realism

The Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought Series seeks to publish the best work in this growing and increasingly important field of academic inquiry. Its scholarly monographs cover three types of work: (i) exploration of the intellectual impact of individual thinkers, from key disciplinary figures to neglected ones; (ii) examination of the origin, evolution, and contemporary relevance of specific schools or traditions of international thought; and (iii) analysis of the evolution of particular ideas and concepts in the field. Both classical (pre-1919) and modern (post-1919) thought are covered. Its books are written to be accessible to audiences in International Relations, International History, Political Theory, and Sociology.

Series Editor
Peter Wilson, London School of Economics and Political Science

Advisory Board
Jack Donnelly, University of Denver
Fred Halliday, London School of Economics and Political Science
David Long, Carleton University
Hidemi Suganami, University of Keele

Also in the Series

Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought
   by Carsten Holbraad

The International Theory of Leonard Woolf: A Study in Twentieth-Century Idealism
   by Peter Wilson

Tocqueville, Lieber, and Bagehot: Liberalism Confronts the World
   by David Clinton

Harold Laski: Problems of Democracy, the Sovereign State, and International Society
   by Peter Lamb

The War over Perpetual Peace: An Exploration into the History of a Foundational International Relations Text
   by Eric S. Easley

Liberal Internationalism and the Decline of the State: The Thought of Richard Cobden, David Mitrany, and Kenichi Ohmae
   by Per Hammarlund

Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations: From Anarchy to Cosmopolis
   by Robert Jackson

The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics
   by Seán Molloy

The Hidden History of Realism

A Genealogy of Power Politics

Seán Molloy

palgrave
macmillan

To my parents

Contents

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the Department of Government and Society (now the Department of Politics and Public Administration), University of Limerick for all its wonderful support during the writing of the Ph.D. thesis from which this book is derived. Professor Nicholas Rees, Professor Edward Moxon-Brown, and Dr. John Logan were particularly helpful in promoting my development as a researcher through the provision of funding for my participation in conferences, summer schools, and exchange with UMass, Amherst.

Limerick's vibrant research culture at the turn of the millennium had quite an impact on how this project developed. Luke Ashworth was a thought provoking and idiosyncratic supervisor, while others deserve special mention for their fortitude in listening to me drone on about E.H. Carr and the assorted characters and themes in this book. Stand up John Armstrong, Robbie Downes, Patrick Holden, Rory Keane, Louise Kingston (*muchas sonrisas*), Martin Mullins, John O'Brennan, Bernadette Sexton, Dara Waldron, and my long-suffering students. Similarly, I benefited from a genuinely stimulating encounter with American academia at UMass, where I took a very interesting course with Peter Haas and where Bob Lacey, Paul Adams, and Rebecca Root were both friends and interlocutors.

I would also like to thank the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Plassey Campus Centre for their financial support of my Ph.D. Thanks must also go to the Fulbright Commission and the Watson Institute for International Studies (especially its director, Thomas J. Biersteker) who financed my Visiting Fellowship at Brown University.

I'd also like to thank all those I worked with at the University of Sussex and my current colleagues at the University of Glasgow from whose conversations I have benefited.

A very special word of thanks must go to James Der Derian, whose work first inspired me to begin work on this project, and who has been remarkably helpful ever since I first contacted him.

Finally, I thank Peter Wilson the editor of the History of International Thought Series and Heather Van Dusen of Palgrave for their patience and forbearance.

Permissions

Parts of chapter 1 and the conclusion were originally published in "Realism: A Problematic Paradigm," *Security Dialogue* (2003), Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 71–85. Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd. Copyright (© NISA: Nordic International Studies Association, 2003).

Chapter 3 was originally published as "Dialectics and Transformation: Exploring the International Theory of E.H. Carr," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* (2003), Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 279–306. Reprinted by kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.

Chapter 4 was originally published as "Truth, Power, Theory: Hans Morgenthau's Formulation of Realism," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* (2004), Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 1–34. Reprinted by kind permission of Taylor and Francis, http://www.tandf.co.uk.

Chapter 5 was originally published as "The Realist Logic of International Society," *Cooperation and Conflict* (2003), Vol. 38.2, pp. 83–99. Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd. Copyright (© NISA: Nordic International Studies Association, 2003).

Introduction: A Genealogical Reading of Realism

> Granted this too is only interpretation—and you will be eager
> enough to raise this objection?—Well so much the better.
>
> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*.[1]

> *Historia Abscondita*: . . . all of history is put on the scale again, and
> a thousand secrets of the past crawl out of their hiding places . . . .
> There is no telling what may yet become a part of history: Maybe
> the past is essentially undiscovered!
>
> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*.[2]

Realism continues to excite controversy and debate in International Relations (IR), generally in the form of Realism versus some other theory. To date, Realism has survived liberal, Marxist, constructivist, and poststructural challenges and continues to be at the center of discussions about the theory and practice of international politics. A less noticed trend in the debates about Realism has been the debate about its nature, about what constitutes Realism. The debates have continued almost in the absence of a knowledge of Realism, as Realism has become a cipher, a codeword, generally for opprobrium. The primary means of understanding Realism has been that of describing it in terms of a paradigm that seeks to present an essential set of core elements of which Realism is composed. Debate then centers on whether or not this paradigm of Realism is refuted, confuted, healthy, or in decline.[3] This book argues that this method of understanding Realism is flawed and obscures much of the value of Realism. The above quote from Nietzsche's *The Gay Science* encapsulates the spirit of this book in that its intention is to put the history and theorization of Realism in IR on the scale again, to reinvestigate the supposedly "given" nature of this central theory of international politics.

That Realism is a more complex set of ideas than is recognized within the paradigmatic approach has been illustrated elsewhere; the focus of this book, however, is to uncover the hidden history (*historia abscondita*) of Realism, and by doing so to reconfigure the debates about Realism and the wider question of the place of Realism in IR theory.[4]

Realism has been relatively well served in terms of intellectual history recently, with Roger Spegele and Brian C. Schmidt writing about the origins and development of Realism in the (primarily American) discipline of IR, while Jim George's ferocious *Discourses of Global Politics* was a full frontal historical-theoretical assault on the idea of Realism itself.[5] Other works have also appeared, for example, Jack Donnelly's primer and expanded second edition of John A. Vasquez's *The Power of Power Politics*.[6] Whereas all these works have added to our knowledge of the Realist tradition, its origins and development, they do not attempt to come to grips with what seemed to me to be the most important issue involved in understanding the nature of Realism: how did a series of complex philosophical theories about the nature of IR transform to such an extent that current representations of Realism now barely approximate the original formulations of Carr, Morgenthau, and Wight? This new entity, most commonly referred to as Neorealism or structural Realism, is a hyperstable, abstract model of international politics dominated by a concept of an international system, but is very distant from Realist forms of theorization, which were essentially critical, dialogical, and rooted in the concept of the politics of international society as a unique field worthy of study in itself, obeying its own logic rather than the idea of a system that translates across time, space, and even across disciplinary boundaries.[7]

This book attempts to recover the aspects of the Realist tradition that have been forgotten or obscured in the wake of Neorealism's rise to almost uncontested status as the ultimate form of Realism in IR. The book seeks to liberate Realist concepts, as expressed by their authors, from the stifling straitjacket of the Realist paradigm. This is not to argue that the dominant "scientific" reading of the Realist tradition is "incorrect," but rather that its essentialized version of Realism as a paradigm is too narrow to do justice to an eclectic and diverse Realist tradition; to quote Nietzsche again, "today we are at least far away from the ridiculous immodesty of decreeing from our angle that perspectives are *permitted* only from this angle."[8] This book argues for an alternative conception of how to think about Realism, to provide a counter-memory of its emergence, development, and, crucially, content.

The means to achieve this counter-memory of Realism is through a genealogical reinterpretation of Realism that uncovers the Realist tradition in a manner sufficient to answer the question of how we have got to the present state of Realist "theory," and to what extent this dominant, received notion

accurately represents Realism as a whole. This notion of a single tradition of Realism is untenable and misleading; as R.B.J. Walker has argued:

> References to a tradition of International Relations theory are by no means innocent . . . particularly as they are inserted into textbooks, into passing references and obligatory footnotes—accounts of a tradition serve to legitimise and circumscribe what counts as proper scholarship.[9]

The scope of this work was limited to four authors in order to keep the project within workable parameters dictated by time and space—to go beyond four writers would have necessitated a far larger project. The selection of the four writers was determined by their usefulness in illustrating the diversity of Realism from its inception. One strain of Realism is dialogical, predicated on a profound knowledge of history and philosophy and committed to the study of politics as it occurs in both historical and contemporary international society. As representatives of this strain, I chose E.H. Carr and Martin Wight. The other strain attempts to make Realism fit into a systemic or structural framework, although as shall be demonstrated, one of my representatives of this tradition, Hans Morgenthau, has elements of the critical, historical trend in his approach to international politics. Kenneth Waltz, the creator of structural or Neorealism, is also unusual in that he turned away from the first strain in order to create an "ideal" Realism that had the effect of revolutionizing the meaning in language of the wider Realist tradition. Theoretical purity and consistency among authors is not a trait in the Realist tradition—the very diversity of which could almost count as an argument against its existence as a single "theory" of IR. To insist on a theoretical purity of Realism is to force Realism into an inappropriate evaluative space.

A key part of the reinterpretation of Realism put forward in this book is that international theory is a human science qualitatively different from natural science. As Gadamer writes:

> the human sciences are joined with modes of experience which lie outside science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself. These are all modes of experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science.[10]

The book, therefore, can be seen as a project to restore (all to human) humanity to Realist thought through a philosophical-historical method, deconstructing and denaturalizing through detailed interpretation the inherited language, philosophies, and metanarratives that have contained and constrained Realism in IR theory.[11]

Realism and the Current State of IR Theory

The collective decision of the majority of practitioners of IR theory (at least in America) to surrender theory to a specific reading of scientific method, ostensibly in the name of "political science" has had a significant effect on how Realism has been understood as a theory of IR. In this decision to surrender to a standard means of operation, the content of the theory was sacrificed to the means by which it was interpreted. Thus, the historical nuance of Realism was shed in the formation of Neorealism, and in the shedding created a new perspective on Realism in which these nuances no longer mattered. Brian C. Schmidt argues that it is a presentist bias that has led to the misrepresentation of IR in the "Great Debate" models becoming accepted as uncomplicated and has preserved the simple "paradigms" of the so-called debates. Under this theoretical scheme, there are three distinct debates that have shaped the discipline: an idealist/Realist debate, a classicist/behavioralist (or positivist) debate, and the latest debate between the positivist and postpositivist wings of international theory. According to Schmidt, this entire edifice is built upon the mistaken notion of an epic history of IR, based on the ahistorical idea of overarching "traditions." This analytical tradition-based description of the discipline's past from the perspective of the present has the effect of obscuring the historical reality of IR as it was practised in the interests of an epic historical unity.[12] This has severe consequences in terms of our understanding of the theory in question. What we know about the theory, the "truth" of the theory, becomes fixed and static—an unquestioned given. As Nietzsche illustrates, this has serious repercussions:

> For that which henceforth is to be "truth" is now fixed; that is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation of things is invented and the legislature of language also gives the first laws of truth; since here for the first time, originates the contrast between truth and falsity.[13]

The second debate, or more accurately, the transition from "classical" to behavioral standards of theory in the 1950s and 1960s represented a moment in which the "designation of things" and the "legislature of language" were transformed—the version of Realism presented as paradigmatic became canonical, unchangeable, and unchallengeable. Nowhere is this clearer than in the distinction between the truth of rationalist/scientific "theory" contrasted with the inadequate, if not mendacious, "wisdom literature" (Kaplan's term) of previous theory.[14] Something can be considered theory, therefore, only if it conforms to a prescribed way of doing things, and to the standards of truth particular to theoretical endeavor (correctly defined); otherwise, even

if it contains theoretical elements of use (which Waltz recognizes that Realist thought does), it cannot *be* theory because it is not theory in the epistemological terms he endorses.[15] What has been lost sight of in this transition from thought to theory is that the transition was effected by means of a shift in perspective, that this theory, the truth of its particular age, was an intellectual construction, based upon the attractiveness of a particular type of theorization, rather than a "scientific" advance on primitive theory. The dominant means of perceiving Realism as a "social scientific" paradigm then is a social-intellectual construction that results from and reinforces a consensus about how to perform theory. It is not the sole means by which to understand the nature of the Realist tradition. The problem is that there is a lack of awareness of the plurality of truths, as opposed to the single truth of scientific method: only certain truths are admitted into the consideration of things, the acceptance of which is the precondition of recognition as a bearer of truth.[16]

Nietzsche: Historical Philosophy as an Alternative Means of Evaluation

As will have become apparent through the course of this introduction, the works of Friedrich Nietzsche have had an impact on the writing of this book. In terms of Nietzsche, the book is concerned solely with his method of evaluation—the historical-philosophical approach that begins with his analysis of perspectivism, his methods for exposing the nature of truth, and his genealogical project. While these techniques emerged in the context of Nietzsche's wider philosophical concerns, Nietzsche as moral thinker is mentioned only in passing, while Nietzsche the bombastic prophet of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, is conspicuous by his absence. What is of interest here are Nietzsche's critical techniques.

The interpretation of Nietzsche's works is a difficult task—one that necessitates making a choice between competing critical traditions, one that insists that there is a "true" reading of Nietzsche, and another that states that there are multiple, if not infinite, ways of reading Nietzsche's texts. The first of these approaches, typified by Martin Heidegger, maintains that there is one way of reading Nietzsche, especially in relation to the concept of the will to power. Heidegger stresses that a single meaning can be derived from Nietzsche's text, that by careful reconstruction one may "arrive at the concept and the proper use of the word" in Nietzsche's canon.[17] The other approach typified by Jacques Derrida finds any one-sided interpretation of Nietzsche ridiculous.[18] The latter approach seems the more convincing one in that Nietzsche's own works ultimately rest on the awareness of a shifting and relative perspective on truth. The intrinsic involvement of the individual in the

construction of truth in reality, as opposed to the revelation of truth in the ideal, requires the exercise of the will to power in truth claims, thus the real world becomes a matter of the play and contest of interpretations.[19] Nietzsche's own testimony on the issue is rather elegant in relation to the problem of recognizing the perspectival, interpretive nature of knowledge— "the human mind cannot avoid seeing itself under its perspectival forms, and solely in these . . . Alas too many ungodly possibilities of interpretation are included in this unknown: too much devilry, stupidity, foolishness of interpretation—our own human, all too human one, even, which we know."[20] This is not to say, as has often been leveled at postmodernists, that all interpretations are equal. The play of interpretations is governed by relationships of power—interpretations are in a state of conflict, the truth within them must emerge from the contest, a weak theory may be exposed, a strong theory may emerge, but always in the context of a swirling universe of interpretation.

That something is an intellectual construction, rather than a single, scientifically derived truth, for example, in this case the Neorealist version of Realism, does not mean that it is not necessarily true, but the recognition that it is an intellectual construction, dependent upon perspective and determined by subscription to an epistemologically determined set of beliefs, does enable us to recognize the perspectival element inherent in its construction. The first casualty of the recognition of perspectivism is the notion of a single truth, either about the content of a theory, or the way it is to be understood.[21] This notion of providing a definitive theorization and content of a paradigmatic Realism is the basis for the alleged superiority of the "Scientific Wing." The relationships between man, cognition, and theory are for the rationalist a simple matter of recognizing the relationship between objects and extrapolating rules and theories either on the basis of observation or logical deduction (see chapters 1 and 6). If this relationship is more complex, and Nietzsche argues it is, then the concept of truth contained therein becomes much more problematic.

This book provides a different means of understanding the development and content of Realism. It also provides an alternative means by which theory and theorization can be understood. It draws in large part on the historical-philosophical explorations of Nietzsche, in particular his "critical historical" approach, which culminates in the creation of the genealogical method of evaluation. The value-added aspect of Nietzsche's work is in his insistence that theory and modes of theorization are perpetually in the process of becoming, an evolving rather than static means of knowing the world. This shifting basis of cognition ensures that there are no eternal facts and no eternal truths, what is necessary is a "historical philosophizing" that puts ideas in the context of their emergence and development.[22] This "historical philosophizing" may be

contrasted with the metaphysical certitudes that masquerade as certainties in scientific IR theory. Historical philosophizing, however, demands that we recognize that we are in the "realm of representation," and as such truth becomes a matter of how it is represented. This realm of representation is a result of humanity's creation of a world of language that exists almost as a filter through which "reality" is experienced. Man's triumph, but also his error, was to mistake the world of language for the world of reality.[23]

Truth is a much more problematic quality in Nietzsche's universe of shifting values and styles of valuation. Talking about the power of language to determine the truth, Nietzsche isolates the success of the rhetorician Hegesias:

> Such a predominance over entire centuries proves nothing in regard to the quality or lasting validity of a style; that is why one should never be too firm in one's own faith in any artist . . . The blessings and raptures conferred by a philosophy or a religion likewise prove nothing in regard to their truth: just as little as the happiness the madman enjoys from his *idée fixe* proves anything in regard to its rationality.[24]

Philosophy, positivist or otherwise, therefore, is insufficient to ground the truth, rather it can at best provide merely a linguistically limited perspective on the ideas that man has utilized in his language world simulacra of reality.[25] Indeed, philosophy without the necessary context of history is merely "monoto-theism," producing nothing but "conceptual mummies."[26] Our language world is where we make meaning, especially in relation to theory:

> It is *we* alone who have fabricated causes, succession, reciprocity, relativity, compulsion, number, law, freedom, motive, purpose; and when we falsely introduce this world of symbols into things and mingle it with them as though this symbol world were an "in itself," we once more behave as we have always behaved, namely *mythologically*.[27]

Language therefore determines meaning in a fluid sense, not as an eternal truth.[28] The power in language to create mythologies in turn legitimizes the dominant group of language users, who in themselves constitute authority, the problem here being, "as long as the world has existed no authority has yet been willing to let itself become the object of criticism."[29] Language then becomes the battleground for meaning. The role of the "good" historian is to act as a "subterranean man"—one who tunnels and mines and undermines the "prejudice of the learned that we now know better than any other age."[30] This is particularly important in the case of intellectual history as, "a good book takes time: good readers continually improve a book and good

opponents continually clarify it."[31] This has important consequences for the construction of theory—clearly each age understands a good book, and, by extension, the ideas contained therein, in a different way, with meaning shifting with context, modes of theorization, and the general *weltanschauung* in which it is being interpreted. The book, in short, lives and transforms over time with its audience. What is to be avoided therefore is a dogmatic conception of truth that allows no other interpretation or possibility of constructing "truth" about the book or the ideas within—for this reason Nietzsche advises to beware of systematizers, as systems ultimately become prisons for thought and means of exclusion.[32] These forms of knowledge, even the content of theory excluded from the paradigmatic prison, become "subjugated knowledges," the historical contents of which are "buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematisations."[33]

Truth, transitory and unfixed, lies not in the reification of concepts but in the contest of concepts and theories.[34] The epistemological basis for truth in a Nietzschean sense lies in the capacity of a theory to exert its power over other theories—the will to truth.[35] At this level, truth seeking, as opposed to an essential "truth," is the most important commitment that a thinker can make.[36] The means to seek truth then becomes important, hence Nietzsche contrasts the "pallid mental pictures" of Plato and the model approach of Thucydides, who unflinchingly engages with actuality rather than taking refuge in a metaphysical ideal.[37] Even whilst recognizing that our world of language is in itself not "reality," Nietzsche insists that we confront our existence within the experienced world, an existence that he recognizes others may identify as ugly:

> These [Platonists and other idealists] believe reality is ugly: but they do not reflect that knowledge of even the ugliest reality is itself beautiful, nor that he who knows much is in the end very far from finding ugly the greater part of that reality whose discovery has always brought him happiness.[38]

Part of the problem of knowledge of things according to Nietzsche is that philosophy since Plato has been seduced away from the world into abstract idealism, that thinkers have been unwilling "to sacrifice all wishfulness to truth, to every truth, even the simple, bitter, ugly, repulsive unChristian, immoral truth . . . For such truths do exist."[39] Plato's notion that the apparent world is merely a corruption of a real ideal world is something that has been "lyingly added," and leads to a metaphysical dead end for knowledge.[40]

Recovering Realism

Part of the problem of confronting the history of Realism is that until recently it has not been written of in consciously historical terms. The lack of

a historical-philosophical sense has led to a somewhat complacent attitude. The paradigmists offer a definitive account of Realism without the transition from Realism to Neorealism being effectively charted or even recognized as a significant event, until after the event has occurred (see chapter 1). The content of Realism and the epistemology of Realism were transformed in the transition to Neorealism, yet the identification of Neorealism as Realism is almost universal: in this sense Nietzsche's observation that names are more important than things is correct, as the name stayed in place (albeit with a qualifying "neo" or "structural") and the theory was transformed—"what started as appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and *effectively* acts as its essence."[41] In this case, the abstract rationalism of Neorealism became the content of a Realism that had determinedly eschewed abstraction and rationalism (see chapter 2). This was not so much a case of the text disappearing under interpretation as a collective failure to recognize that a shift in meaning had occurred, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, "a power take over by a dominant language."[42]

This condition of knowledge, as being in effect a hostage to appearances and the transitory power of those who determine truth, is problematic but dynamic. Knowledge, of theory or of the past, is a question of warfare between the received ideas of our present, and thinkers resolved to determine anew the value of all things: historical philosophizing contra the present theoretical community's complacent attitude to what constitutes knowledge and theory, and the attendant "petrification of opinion" that results from the tyrannical habit of thinking in tune with the times.[43]

Genealogy

Arguably the most successful of Nietzsche's attempts to confront consensus is *The Genealogy of Morals*. This short book, a sequel to *Beyond Good and Evil*, outlines the shifts in power and language that led to the emergence of contemporary notions of morality. Previous attempts at writing a genealogy of morality, had, according to Nietzsche, put the moral cart before the historical horse.[44] What was necessary was to put history before the presumption of the utility of morals, to expose the previous genealogists as mistaken in the nature of their endeavor. In a statement echoed by Foucault nearly a century later, Nietzsche states that the "out of the blue" presentism of the English genealogist is opposed by "another colour which ought to be a hundred times more important to a genealogist of morals: that is grey—by that I mean what has been documented, what is really ascertainable, what has really existed, in short the whole long hieroglyphic text, so difficult to decipher of humanity's moral past!"[45]

In addressing the special role that genealogy plays in the context of intellectual history, Foucault states:

> It is a way of playing local, discontinuous, disqualified, or nonlegitmized knowledges off against the unitary theoretical instance that claims to be able to filter them, organize them into a hierarchy, organize them in the name of a true body of knowledge, in the name of a science that is in the hands of the few.[46]

Almost as important as the purpose of genealogies is what they are not:

> It is not that they demand the lyrical right to be ignorant, and not that they reject knowledge, or invoke or celebrate some immediate experience that has yet to be captured by knowledge. That is not what they are about. They are about the insurrection of knowledges . . . Genealogy has to fight the power-effects characteristic of any discourse that is regarded as scientific.[47]

The power-effect being, as just noted, the refusal of "science" to accord non-science a place at the table of theory. Such places must be secured through the conflict of interpretations.[48] This is a war of interpretations, an agonistic war of meaning that proceeds from an awareness that theoretical endeavors necessarily involve conflict, a special case of war: "a war without powder and smoke, without warlike attitudes, without pathos and contorted limbs."[49] It has to be demonstrated that a genealogy of Realism is capable of offering an alternative to the dominant knowledge/discourse.

One element of this conflict lies in demonstrating the weaknesses of the dominant discourse. Paradigmization (the representation of theory according to a particular reading of the philosophy of science, examined in chapters 1 and 6) seeks to place theorists under the unity of an artificial abstraction; based upon notions of fundamental similarity, a genealogy of Realism is an open-ended attempt to uncover the emergence of Realist thought and the complexity and divergences of its development. Whereas paradigmatic interpretations break down when confronted with non-conformism in the texts of the various Realists (as illustrated in chapters 1–6) and the differences between their worldviews, in the context of a genealogical approach, this dissimilarity and contention is to be expected. A genealogical approach as a means of theoretical investigation is not constrained by the dictates of the paradigmatic approach: its primary purpose is to identify and interpret, in the context of an organic intellectual tradition, the nature of Realist discourse (or discourses).