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STUDIES IN GLOBAL
ANTI-AMERICANISM

EDITED BY

TONY JUDT AND

DENIS LACORNE

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WITH US OR AGAINST US

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Our primary purpose in publishing this volume—derived from a conference jointly organized by the Remarque Institute and the Paris Center for the Study of International Relations (CERI), held in Paris in the Fall of 2002—is to describe the complexity of anti-American sentiment in six distinct parts of the world: Western and Eastern Europe, Russia, the Middle-East, and Central and Southeast Asia. Publication of the conference proceedings was delayed in order to allow all the contributors to update their essays after the American invasion of Iraq. The case studies in this volume were selected to present a comprehensive understanding of Western and non-Western perceptions of the United States since the second World War.*

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* Some contributors have chosen to cover a longer historical period, starting either with the very foundation of the United States or with the first U.S. settlements in Asia. See chapters 10 and 11. For practical reasons, we were not able to include Latin American countries, India, China, and Japan among our case studies.

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INTRODUCTION

THE BANALITY OF
ANTI-AMERICANISM

Denis Lacorne and Tony Judt

Anti-Americanism is above all about perceptions. Nothing is more difficult to preserve than the good image of a country, particularly when the country—like the United States—claims to set the tone for the rest of the world and insists on the highest possible standards of freedom and democracy. Unexpected events can deeply affect perceptions. The traumatic events of 9/11 certainly generated sympathy throughout the world. But the invasion of Iraq, the split between the United States and “Old Europe,” the poor management of an unprecedented experiment in nation building, and the revelations about the tortures in the Abu Ghraib jail have seriously damaged the image of the United States and led numerous Americans to reassess their understanding of the proper response to the attack of 9/11.

The first, most obvious form of anti-Americanism is anti-Bushism—a widespread phenomenon, both in the United States and in the rest of the world. Consider, for instance, the opinion of a prominent British Tory, Michael Portillo, who had strongly supported the war in Iraq and initially saw no problem with “the younger Bush’s robust foreign policy.” Shocked at the Abu Ghraib prison atrocities, astonished that “such a formidable executive has made so many disastrous mistakes,” he could only conclude that “For America to brush away its recent disgraces, the electorate will have to bin this administration. I never expected to say this to my American friends: vote Democrat.”¹ Or again, consider the opinion of a leading American businessman, Eric Best, a managing director at Morgan Stanley, who declared at about the same time: “I can testify to the extraordinary destruction of ‘American Brand Value’ accomplished by this administration, from Europe to Hong Kong to Shanghai to Tokyo, and beyond [. . .] If any

CEO of a global multinational had accomplished this for his enterprise as quickly and radically as George Bush Jr. has done for the U.S., he would be replaced by the board in no time.”²

A poor image can be repaired and the Bush administration has spent considerable time and energy, in 2004, trying to improve perceptions through renewing a more consensual form of multilateral diplomacy, as demonstrated in a series of diplomatic events: the D-Day commemorations in Normandy, the G-8 gathering in Georgia, the reunion with EU leaders in Dublin, and the Istanbul NATO summit. June 2004 was “arguably . . . the most intense month of summitry in the history of the Atlantic alliance.”³ Bush has been frantically trying to achieve what John Kerry had announced he would do a genuine trans-Atlantic reconciliation. But, in the end, it is not a board of directors that decides who is responsible for the destruction of the “American Brand Value,” but the American people themselves.

Of course, there are other forms of anti-Americanism than anti-Bushism. Anti-Americanism is as old as America itself. It can be defensive or reactive, rational or irrational, popular or elitist, political or cultural; it can center on economic or religious issues or on no particular issue at all.⁴ In its mildest form, anti-Americanism is merely criticism of some American policies or social characteristics. At the other extreme, it expresses a real clash of civilizations, the complete rejection of anything and everything “American,” to the point of denying that there even is such a thing as an American culture or an American democracy.

Thus, when French philosopher Jean Baudrillard formulates a radical death wish—the total destruction of America—simply because the United States has become too hegemonic for his taste, his *ressentiment* can in no way be compared to the refusal of President Chirac or Chancellor Schröder to support the American decision to invade Iraq. The French philosopher’s Americanophobia is so extreme that it does not lend itself to rational interrogation. By contrast, Chirac’s and Schröder’s strategic opposition to invading Iraq, however displeasing to the Bush administration, belongs in the realm of reasonable and reasoned disagreement. It is important to distinguish between the two.

What is often disappointing about the existing literature on anti-Americanism is its repetitive nature: old stereotypes are endlessly reproduced, as if nothing had changed for years, if not centuries, between the United States and its critics, whether or not they used to be friends or allies. We take issue with such an approach in our own contributions to this book (chapters 1 and 2). Anti-American sentiments do change over time and pro-American feelings exist as well, but are often ignored because they weaken the arguments of those on both sides

who see the world in black and white. There are indeed clashes of cultures, conflicts of ideas, and strong political rivalries between the United States and its critics. But expressions of friendship, support, and sympathy coexist with these, even though they are rarely reported. We have attempted to describe the full nature of Western and non-Western perceptions of America, while respecting the ambiguities, contradictions, and frequent reversals of these perceptions.

Anti-Americanism today, as Tony Judt argues in chapter 1, is the master narrative of the age. It is also, by its nature, immensely diverse. It finds its source in a variety of religious, cultural, political, and philosophical experiences, which vary from one continent to the next and sometimes divide entire blocks of nations within a single continent. Such, for example, was the nature of the debate that opposed the misleadingly labeled “Old” and “New” Europes at the time of the Iraq war, as Jacques Rupnik demonstrates in chapter 5.

Such *varieties* of anti-Americanism are well documented by the authors of this volume. Less obvious and perhaps more worrisome for American policymakers is another pervasive phenomenon that one might call, with due acknowledgment to Hannah Arendt, the *banality* of anti-Americanism. This is nicely illustrated by the following comments, made recently by some French high-school seniors to their English teacher in one very well-regarded French *lycée*:⁵

America is an extreme country, a new country, where the reality is often cruel and hard for more than half the population. It is the most powerful country [in the world], but it is also the most dangerous.

America wants to look like God because they [the US government] want to decide who must die or not.

George Bush wants to control the world. He is not a good president. . . . There is very much racism because the society is controlled by the WASPs . . . It's not a democratic country.

I just hate the politics in the United States.

The United States is great, without the Americans . . . I hate their president because he abuses his power, and makes war everywhere.

I hate America, because it makes war in Iraq for its oil.

These quotes suggest a sustained level of anger, resentment, and even hatred—widely shared feelings among a new generation of European high-school students. But these sentiments are quite detached from anti-American rhetoric of even the relatively recent past: the Vietnam War and the old anti-imperialist struggles of the European Left evoke practically no memories or empathy among today's teenagers, who

simply do not like “America” and dislike President Bush and his policies even more. The America they do like—and for them it is often the *real* America—is that of Michael Moore, the beloved hero of contemporary French, German, and Spanish moviegoers. There are, of course, discordant voices—intellectuals who truly “love” America—but they are few and isolated and their opinions carry almost no weight.⁶

The banal universality of anti-Americanism is well documented in the case studies presented in this volume. The emergence of anti-American sentiment cannot be attributed to a single cause. It results, rather, from widely different contexts, each with its own distinctive history. In Iran, for example, as Morad Saghafi demonstrates (chapter 10), Americanophilia was the norm until the early 1950s. Post–World War II America was seen as “liberating” the country from Soviet occupation. But the 1953 CIA-sponsored coup against Mossadegh seriously tarnished the reputation of the United States and transformed the American ally into a “disloyal and deceitful” friend.

Later in the century, when the American-backed monarchy became the enemy of the insurgent mullahs, anti-Americanism emerged as the key slogan of the age, unifying two radically different discourses—the traditional propaganda of the communist left and the religious discourse of the Islamists—and lending a very particular and enduring vigor to Iranian anti-Americanism. Today, the “Great Satan” is no longer such a threatening demon, and in the aftermath of 9/11, the Iranian middle class expressed a surprising level of sympathy for their American counterparts. The Iranian case thus perfectly illustrates the cyclical nature of pro- and anti-American perceptions. It also suggests that anti-Americanism is often a reactive phenomenon and is one that cannot be easily separated from the study of *pro*-American sentiment.

Palestinian perceptions of America, as argued by Camille Mansour (chapter 8), are in no way monolithic. What the population at large resents to the point of enduring hatred is U.S. foreign policy (and particularly George W. Bush’s Middle East policy), which is perceived as one-sided and “blindly pro-Israel.” But the opinions of the “Palestinian street” should not be confused with those of the political elites. American society and its culture are often greatly admired, particularly by the educated middle class, whether they are in Palestine or in exile. The anti-Americanism of many middle-class Palestinians allows for a certain pragmatism: the realization that the United States is the only superpower and therefore the only country that can have an influence on Israel. Palestinians, concludes Mansour, do not see themselves in

some grand clash of civilizations, despite the efforts of local Islamists to “universalize their local anti-Israeli struggle.”

Anti-Americanism in Southeast Asia is inextricably tied to the region’s colonial past and America’s involvement in the area, particularly in the Philippines. The strength of anti-American sentiment is related to the size of local Muslim minorities, their treatment by ruling elites, and the respective influence of radical and moderate Islamists. Opinions are not fixed, however, and they are directly related to the nature of domestic policies. One of the most unfortunate (and unanticipated) consequences of 9/11, as demonstrated well by Farish Noor (chapter 11), has been the increasingly repressive policies of Asian governments against Muslim minorities. This has had the predictable consequence of exacerbating the anti-Americanism of “many Islamists and pro-democracy activists,” who can now readily demonstrate the link between U.S. interests and their own government’s authoritarian rule. The effort to “export democracy” to Afghanistan and Iraq has, in fact, strengthened authoritarian Southeast Asian regimes, which have been only too pleased to clamp down on local democratic movements in the name of an ill-defined struggle against terrorism.

The key to understanding Pakistani–American relations, as argued by Mohammad Waseem (chapter 9), is foreign policy. America was never a colonial power in that part of the world and is not perceived as one. On the contrary, it cultivated friendly relations with Pakistan—the most anti-Communist country of the region—particularly following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There was thus a “convergence” of outlooks between the United States and Pakistan. This convergence, and the pool of sympathy that it generated, disappeared for a while after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. With 9/11 and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the two countries were free to “rediscover each other,” at least at the elite level. Pakistan had become a necessary, if occasionally embarrassing, ally in the struggle against Al Qaeda.

But the divergence between elite and mass public perceptions of the United States in Pakistan has remained substantial. Public opinion is steadfastly and increasingly anti-American, particularly because it is all too well informed about the conflicts that oppose the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. The Islamic media “explosion” of the 1990s, according to Waseem, has greatly tarnished the positive image of the United States, which is held directly responsible for the mistreatment of Muslim populations throughout the world. By globalizing local conflicts (and, indeed, giving local meaning to international developments), the modern Islamic media—television above all—fuels the anger and resentment of a public whom Waseem describes as “ignorant and gullible.”

In Saudi Arabia, of course, anti-Americanism is endemic; this is in part because here, too, public opinion is increasingly well informed—albeit selectively—about the world, and is especially sensitive to the violence unleashed by the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. But even here, anti-Americanism, as Gregory Gause points out (chapter 7), is not monolithic. It is highly segmented, reflecting the diverging views of intellectual elites, governmental leaders, and *salafī* Islamist circles. The *salafīs* are clearly the most likely to denounce the United States, for religious reasons, as an evil crusader that should be removed from the region.

But a number of prominent *salafīs*, together with certain liberal intellectuals, have favored greater dialogue with the West in the name of pragmatism and realism. In fact, Gause argues, the true nature of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia should be judged only at the elite level: “On neither side is there a strong *public* constituency for the relationship. It is a relationship between elites, based on very clear understandings of mutual interest. There is no sentiment in it. . . . It is on oil that the relationship began, and it will be on oil that the relationship will in the future evolve.”

Does public opinion in Europe differ significantly from non-Western, Middle Eastern, or Asian sentiment? As Gérard Grunberg demonstrates in chapter 3, it certainly does not with regard to the American invasion of Iraq. Europeans as a whole were hostile to the war in Iraq, even when their leaders favored the American intervention. It is, in fact, striking that two-thirds of the Poles, 90 percent of the Spanish, and over 50 percent of the British declared their opposition to the war. Once the war started, to be sure, Tony Blair was able to benefit from a “rallying around the flag” effect, as nearly two-thirds of the British expressed support for the intervention. But that support faded very quickly, and in the absence of any evidence of Iraqi “weapons of mass destruction,” it has now almost completely evaporated. In any case, and notwithstanding the British exception, Grunberg’s conclusion should be seriously pondered: “The Europeans are no longer certain that they defend the same causes and strive for the same objectives as the Americans.”

The new German anti-Americanism, as convincingly demonstrated by Detlev Claussen (chapter 4), does indeed mimic older anti-American narratives and revive older anti-American memories based on the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. But “new anti-Americanism” is not merely a *reprise* of older political debates. It expresses a new phenomenon: the social psychology of the new German middle classes in a reunified Germany, eager, for the first time in six decades, to reaffirm their

identity and willing to denounce America's use of military force as the manifestation of an unacceptable "arrogance of power."

German anti-Americanism is well established among both cultural elites and the public at large. It is reinforced and legitimized by what many Germans see as their country's distinctive approach to international affairs, with its emphasis on peaceful engagement and a high moral tone. This self-congratulatory and rather self-regarding outlook helps explain, in Claussen's view, why Europeans have not always grasped the underlying significance of the events of 9/11—reinforced by the Madrid train bombings of March 2004—that the attacks targeted not just the United States, but the entire Western world: "Only when the international community acknowledges that international terrorism is a shared threat will anti-Americanism recede in strength."

In examining the rather contrasting feelings expressed by East European leaders (but, again, not their publics), Jacques Rupnik in chapter 5 raises an uncomfortable question: was it just appreciation of and admiration for the U.S. "liberator" or were there other, less noble motivations? Genuine gratitude, Rupnik argues, was mixed with more opportunistic considerations, particularly on the part of the Polish and Rumanian leadership: ex-Communist leaders, eager to erase the memories of their own Communist past, eagerly seized the occasion to cultivate friendship with America. As America's most "trusted" allies, they openly expressed the hope that their backing would, in turn, generate tangible economic and military rewards. Above all, friendship with America was cultivated for its "equalizing effect" on Europe's dominant economic and political partners—France and Germany. "New Europe" plus America was supposed to counterbalance the excessive influence of "Old Europe."

Russian perceptions of America are truly distinct from Western and Eastern European perceptions, partly because of the persistence of old attitudes inherited from the Cold War, and partly because of Russia's "growing disenchantment" with the experience of market democracy during the years of the Yeltsin presidency, as explained by Nikolai Zlobin (chapter 6). In addition, Russia's global loss of influence—the fact that it can no longer claim to be a superpower—has had a traumatic impact on Russian political elites. As a result, the dramatic events of 9/11 did not significantly alter Russian perceptions of the United States. The revival of the Russian "national idea" and Russian "pride" under Vladimir Putin's rule, together with a certain nostalgia for the "cultural values of Soviet times," is well documented. Paradoxically, this makes Russian public opinion less vulnerable to the sort of resentful anti-Americanism of states and peoples who seek to

escape from the shadow of American power. Russians don't object to the emergence of a "closer relationship" with America, as long as this relationship is understood to be a relationship of "equals."

* * *

The chapters in this volume, while covering considerable ground, are not intended to be a comprehensive, country-by-country survey of anti-American sentiment in the contemporary world. Certain important countries are not discussed in detail—the United Kingdom, to take one example—and, as noted above, we have not attempted to cover every part of the world. Thus, Latin America, whose various nations have complicated and differing relationships with both the idea of "America" and the policies of the United States, is not covered here. We have sought, rather, to engage with anti-American sentiment in certain regions that are key to America's own foreign policy dilemmas and interests, and in countries, such as France and Russia, where the sources and varieties of attitudes to America are not always well understood—not least by Americans themselves.

As volume editors, we have not sought to impose a single interpretation or perspective upon our contributors. On the contrary, we believe that one of the distinctive merits of this collection is that it not only reflects a range of scholarly opinion but also captures rather well the different approaches to the subject itself, as they emerge from very different national and cultural angles. It is also perhaps worth noting, in view of the highly contentious and sensitive nature of the subject itself, that we have not tried to align the views of our contributors. These cover quite an eclectic range, as readers will discover—and that is as it should be.

This book, then, is decidedly not a contribution to the anti-American "case," nor is it a defense of the United States in the face of its many critics. In both categories, there is a voluminous and growing literature that casts diminishing light upon the subject. If, as we have suggested, "anti-Americanism" is the banal but decidedly widespread discourse of our age—the rhetorical form through which much of the world organizes its understanding of the age we live in—then what is called for is sustained attention to the *sources* of this new master narrative, to its present variety and likely trajectory. The chapters in this book may thus serve as an analytical introduction: a prolegomenon to what we hope will be a growing body of scholarship on a subject destined to play a crucial role in twenty-first-century public affairs.

July 22, 2004

NOTES

1. Michael Portillo, "There's only one way forward for America—Vote Democrat," *The Sunday Times*, July 4, 2004.
2. As cited in Jackie Calmes, "Chinks appear in Bush's pro-business armor," *The Wall Street Journal* (Europe), June 29, 2004.
3. Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, "An alliance waiting for November," *International Herald Tribune*, June 29, 2004.
4. Most of the authors in this volume present one definition or other of anti-Americanism. We have not tried to impose a single definition to be used throughout: each author assumes his own choice and theoretical justification.
5. The name and exact location of the school have not been provided to preserve the anonymity of the students and their teachers.
6. See Yves Berger, *Dictionnaire amoureux des Etats-Unis* (Paris, Plon, 2003) for a rare example of such Americanophilia.

A NEW MASTER NARRATIVE?
REFLECTIONS ON CONTEMPORARY
ANTI-AMERICANISM

Tony Judt

“Anti-Americanism” is the master narrative of the age. Until quite recently, political argument—first in the West, latterly everywhere—rested firmly, and, for most people, quite comfortably, upon the twin pillars of “progress” and “reaction.” The idea of progress encapsulated both the moral confidence of the Enlightenment and the various and ultimately conflicting political projects to which it gave rise: liberalism, democracy, socialism, and, in the twentieth century, communism. Each of these heirs to the Enlightenment project had a confident story to tell of its own origins, its desirability, its necessity, and ultimately its grounds for confidence in impending victory. Each, in short, was not merely a narrative of human progress but a *master* narrative, aspiring to contain within itself and, where necessary, explain away all other accounts of modernity.

Reaction—beginning, quite literally, with the reaction of certain early-nineteenth-century thinkers to the Revolution in France—was thus in this sense a *counter*-narrative: a denial, sometimes epistemological, often ethical, always political, of the projects and programs born of the optimistic eighteenth century. The political forms of reactionary politics were almost as protean and diverse as those of its nemesis: Catholic, paternalist, nostalgic, pastoral, pessimistic, authoritarian, and, ultimately, Fascist. But reactionary accounts of the human condition shared one common evaluative conclusion with progressivism: they tended, in every case, to the view that the modern world was, or would soon be, divided into two opposed and irreconcilable camps. The end of the Cold War appeared to close this centuries-long cycle of

Manichean political and intellectual apposition. Not only had capitalism and communism, the West and the East, democracy and authoritarianism, apparently become reconciled—largely through the unambiguous victory of the former in each case—but the very intellectual premises on which the distinctions rested, broadly associated with Marxism and its various heirs, seemed to have crumbled. If “capitalism” was no longer a passing and regrettable stage on the historical high road from backwardness to socialism (a core article of radical faith since the 1840s), but rather the default condition of well-regulated societies, as free-market liberals had long asserted and even social democrats now conceded, then even the distinction between “Left” and “Right” was unclear. “History,” as some pundits unwisely announced, had come to an “End.”

A mere 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is clear that such pronouncements were a little premature. The wretched of the earth and their better-heeled sympathizers and spokesmen in the rich world have once again found common cause. Capitalism, to be sure, is no longer the avowed target of opprobrium, though it is worth noting that it is much less universally admired or desired than many fondly suppose—or than was the case two decades ago. And outside of unreconstructed Trotskyist *groupuscules*, the prospects for a radical transition from present discontents to future idylls—the dream of revolution and socialism—are not widely discussed. And yet, there is, once again, an international rhetoric of rejection that binds politics, economics, and ethics into a common story about how the world works and why it doesn’t. And those who invoke this language, even if they have yet to find a common sense of purpose or even a common strategy, have chanced upon something much more important, at least in the medium term—a common target. That target is the United States of America.

It is tempting to dismiss out of hand the new politics of anti-Americanism. For what, after all, can this “America”—a huge and differentiated society, as ethnically and culturally diverse as any other and whose constituent peoples have diasporic ties to most of the rest of the world—stand for? Capitalism? Sweden, Spain, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Brazil, along with dozens of others, are all “capitalist” countries. Imperialism? The United States of America is without doubt the only empire of our times. But “anti-imperialism,” albeit a well-established radical politics in its own right, is hardly a self-sufficient account of the world—a “master” narrative. It is beholden to other narratives—theories of race and anti-racism, socialist explanations for capitalism’s voracious search for foreign markets, and so on.

If anti-Americanism were indeed just the latest anti-imperialism, appropriately adjusted to the latest empire itself—in the manner, say, of the 1960s—it would hardly be so interesting, or so appealing to so many. America today is the object of suspicion and fear—mixed as ever with an element of fascination and seduction—because its global reach goes well beyond political or economic power, though it rests on these. Stretched to a planetary scale, the American way of modernity—*globalization*, to acknowledge the shorthand account if it—threatens local interests and identities in ways that no past empire could ever have imagined.

A world apparently busy remaking itself in what Americans all too readily claim is their own image stands challenged in many intersecting spheres: the decline of indigenous language; the dilution of high culture; the internationalization of popular culture; the uncontained risks to environmental health; the virtual disappearance of economic autonomy; the etiolation of public policy, and the apparent diminution of national sovereignty. Local commentators can hardly hope any longer to explain or address such concerns within their own borders. They are obliged to look beyond; and what they see there has become material in many people's eyes for a new, all-embracing explanation of our current woes. If America is the *fons et origo malorum*, the source and origin of all miseries, then it is America—whatever that is—that is the problem. If you want to understand how America appears to the world today, consider the sport-utility vehicle (SUV). Oversized and overweight, the SUV disdains negotiated agreements to restrict atmospheric pollution. It consumes inordinate quantities of scarce resources to furnish its privileged inhabitants with supererogatory services. It exposes outsiders to a deadly risk in order to provide for the illusory security of its occupants. In a crowded world, the SUV appears as a dangerous anachronism. Like U.S. foreign policy, the SUV comes packaged in sonorous mission statements; but underneath, it is just an oversized pickup truck with too much power.

In short, America is everywhere. Americans—just 5 percent of the world's population—generate 30 percent of the World's Gross Product, consume nearly 30 percent of global oil production, and are responsible for almost as high a share of the world's output of greenhouse gases. Our world is divided in many ways: rich/poor, North/South, Western/non-Western. But more and more, the division that counts is the one separating America from everyone else.

The United States, by virtue of its unique standing, is exposed to the world's critical gaze in everything it does or fails to do. Some of the antipathy the United States arouses is a function of what it is: long before

America rose to global dominion, foreign visitors were criticizing its brash self-assurance, the narcissistic confidence of Americans in the superiority of American values and practices, and their rootless inattentiveness to history and tradition—their own and other people's. The charge sheet has grown since the United States took the world stage, but it has not changed much. This “cultural” anti-Americanism is shared by Europeans, Latin Americans, and Asians, secular and religious alike. It is not about antipathy to the West, or capitalism, or freedom, or the Enlightenment, or any other abstraction exemplified by the United States. It is about America.

To foreign critics, these contradictions in American behavior suggest hypocrisy—perhaps, the most familiar of the accusations leveled at the United States. They are all the more galling because, hypocritical or not, America is indispensable. Without American participation, most international agreements are dead letters. American leadership seems to be required even in cases—such as Bosnia between 1992 and 1995—where the British and their fellow Europeans had the means to resolve the crisis unaided. The United States is cruelly unsuited to play the world's policeman—Washington's attention span is famously short, even in chronically troubled regions like Kashmir, the Balkans, the Middle East, or Korea—but it seems to have no choice. Meanwhile, everyone else, but the Europeans especially, resent the United States when it fails to lead, but also when it leads too assertively.

The position of the European Union is, on the face of it, a paradox. Fifty-five percent of the world's development aid and two thirds of all grants-in-aid to the poor and vulnerable nations of the globe come from the European Union. As a share of GNP, U.S. foreign aid is barely one third the European average. If you combine European spending on defense, foreign aid, intelligence gathering, and policing—all of them vital to any sustained war against international crime—it easily matches the current American defense budget. “Europe” is not inherently weak.

But decades of American nuclear reassurance induced unprecedented military dystrophy. The Franco-German condominium of domination was sooner or later bound to provoke a backlash among Europe's smaller nations. The inability of the European Union to build a consensus on foreign policy, much less a force with which to implement it, has handed Washington a monopoly in the definition and resolution of international crises. No one should be surprised if America's present leaders have chosen to exercise it. What began some years ago as American frustration at the Europeans' failure to organize and spend in their own defense has now become a source of satisfaction