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The Nation, Psychology, and International Politics, 1870–1919

Glenda Sluga



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

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For Anna-Sophia

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Acknowledgements

I am one of those people who always reads the acknowledgements pages first, in the hope of some autobiographical titbit that might situate the whole book, or perhaps just the chance to eavesdrop on someone else's writing life. There will be none of that here. I do want to use this space, however, in the conventional manner of thanking the myriads of people who made this book possible. To begin with, there is the financial support of the University of Sydney, and the Australian Research Council. At Sydney, Stephen Garton, Ros Pesman, Richard Waterhouse, and Shane White have been impeccable colleagues, to whom I am intellectually and personally indebted. The History Department and Australian Centre at Melbourne University offered scholarly shelter at a critical moment. Thanks especially to Kate Darian-Smith, David Goodman, Charles Zika, Pat Grimshaw, and Stuart Macintyre there.

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I appreciate too the feedback I gained from the journals that published articles based on some of the material and arguments in this book, albeit in significantly altered form: 'What is National Self-Determination? Nationality and psychology during the apogee of nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism* 11(1) 2005; 'Narrating Difference and Defining Nation in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Western Europe', *European Review of History*, 9(2) 2002: 183–97; 'Bodies, Souls, and Sovereignty: The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Legitimacy of Nations', *Ethnicities* 1(2) 2001, pp. 207–32; 'Female and National Self-Determination: A Gender Re-Reading of the "Apogee of Nationalism"', *Nations and Nationalisms,* Special Issue on Gender, 6(4) 2000, pp. 495–521; and 'Masculinity, Nations and the New World Order', in K. Hagemann and S. Dudnik (eds), *Masculinity in Politics and War: Rewriting the history of politics and war in the modern era* (Manchester University Press, 2004).

The history of this book has coincided with the history of a daughter, whose own background is, to say the least, transnational. It is all for her.

Foreword

We are very pleased to publish this pioneering study of the idea of the nation in the Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series.

What is a nation? How did the idea of nationhood develop, and how, in particular, was it conceptualized at the end of the First World War when the principle of national self-determination seemed to have ushered in a new epoch of world history? Are all people entitled to have their own national entities? What differentiated more mature nations from others? When there were so many divergences among national groupings, what justification was there for conceptualizing a world order on the basis of the nationality principle?

Glenda Sluga explores these questions in the context of "transnational conversations" before and after the war in which intellectuals and statesmen from many countries took part so as to clarify the meaning of what was called the nation. She pays particular attention to the development of psychology as a discipline and shows how writings in this field gave scholarly authenticity to ideas about "national consciousness" and provided the basis for judging which nationality groups deserved to determine their own fate as independent nations. The nation was seen as a "psychological reality" whose validity was to be certified by science (in this instance psychology). If national consciousness could not be said to have been fully developed among some people, they presumably did not deserve to translate their nationality into nationhood. But for those with a clear national psychology, self-determination would equate with democratic self-governance. Modern nationhood was thus given meaning as a psychological reality, a product of a transnational science.

Because the principle of national self-determination was enshrined at the Paris peace conference (1919), the subsequent history of world affairs has tended to be understood as an interplay of national policies and ambitions. It is as if nations were the key to the "international community" – this very term reveals the centrality of nations. But we shall gain a fresh understanding of international affairs if we view nations as psychological constructs, as this book suggests. Whose psychology are we talking about? Men's or women's? Conservatives' or liberals'? Nationalists' or anti-nationalists'? These are fascinating questions that suggest the fragility, even the artificiality, of national entities. This is an important perspective and enables us to view nations, not as some immutable givens but as variable groupings just like many other

communities that exist in the world. Nations, in other words, become comprehensible as transnational phenomena.

Akira Iriye
Rana Mitter

Cambridge, MA
July 2006

Introduction

The history of the peace process that ended the First World War has become one of the great political stories of our time. Historians have attributed to this illustrious gathering in the war-weary Paris of 1919 the beginnings of modern international relations, the dawn of a more democratic age grounded in the principle of nationality, and, rather more notoriously, the causes of the Second World War. Few contemporaries, however, celebrated the achievements of peacemaking without registering some doubts not only about the allegedly unfair treatment of Germany, but also the procedures, premises, and outcomes. Among the critics was Walter Lippmann, one of the architects of Wilson's Fourteen Points that shaped the peace process. In 1919, a disillusioned Lippmann fled Paris, returned to the east coast of America, and wrote *Public Opinion* (1922), a study of the complexities of democratic representation in mass societies and of the deeper cultural significance of the principle of nationality enforced by the peacemakers. Lippmann singled out for special criticism the common resort to stereotypes of national difference drawn from the 'slums of psychology', and the prevailing assumption that 'collective minds, national souls, and race psychology' were the 'democratic El Dorado'.[1] According to Lippmann, this psychological perspective on nationality manifested a 'deeper prejudice' in the constitution of a new world order, in favour of advanced nations over those thought of as backward, and of men over women. Given the prevailing political and cultural climate on both sides of the Atlantic, these were radical claims. If true, they had similarly radical implications for the ways in which the political significance of nationality could be understood. Nationality did not take its force as a political ideal from really existing psychological propensities to national identification. Rather, those propensities were fictions that reflected 'the jungle of obscurities about the innate differences of men,' and 'the extraordinary differences in what men know of the world'.[2]

This book attributes to the peace process of 1919 a new international age of nationalism fortified not only in the democratic ideals of the peace

and its international setting, but also in what were changing psychological conceptualisations of nationality. In this study, I pursue a new cultural and political story of the idea of the nation, and of international politics in the early twentieth century, which situates both in the context of the history of psychology.[3] That story begins with the Paris Peace Conference, and moves backwards in time to the history of the rise of scientific psychology, conventionally dated to 1870. It suggests that the formidable international authority attached to nationality by liberal-minded British, American, and French peacemakers was tied to the lingering popularity of a transnational discourse of psychology that had taken shape in the previous half century.

Throughout the trans-Atlantic world, the explosion of scientific interest in evolution, biology, and race, as well as the interiority of the self,[4] helped popularise conceptions of the nation as psychological, of nationalities as forms of subjectivity, and of nationalism as a political force that could be explained by reference to the workings of the unconscious. In 1864, the French historian Hippolyte Taine proposed his well-known formula for understanding the formation of national character, 'race, *milieu* and moment', on the basis that nations were the products partly of their racial origins and partly of the psychological process of imitation. Imitation, in turn, was the product of the evolution of instincts.[5] Complex theories of the psychological status of nations, of their psychological and physiological relationship to races and their debt to evolution, were in germination on both sides of the channel. Walter Bagehot's *Physics and Politics; or Thoughts on the application of the principles of 'natural selection' and 'inheritance' to political society* (1872) added to the role of imitation the concept of 'unconscious selection'. According to Bagehot, unconscious selection acted as a determinist psychological force, driving individuals to choose like-minded social and sexual partners, and thereby linking national communities to their biological past as well as their present geographical or social environments.[6] Twenty years later, among both English and French-speaking scholars of nationalism, the crowd psychology of Gustave Le Bon consolidated this view of the nation as the manifestation of unconscious, albeit irrational, forces. By the turn of the twentieth century, popular publications on the topic of the nation confidently claimed that whereas once national patriotism was considered an expression of the territorial or political state of the '*patrie*', it was now understood to be 'a psychological reality, an affective disposition, such as filial or paternal love, which everyone could find in oneself and which it would be unnatural not to experience'.[7] Variants of this idea of the nation as psychological echoed throughout the published works of numerous practitioners not only of psychology, but also of history and the social sciences, including Woodrow Wilson, the man who presided over the ideas as well as the processes of the peace of 1919.

It is true that from at least the eighteenth century Europeans had conceptualised nations as psychological in some form, whether as a spirit or *geist,* or as specific qualities of the mind. Enlightenment writers such as Montesquieu, Hume, Rousseau, and de Staël had expressed interest in the mental characteristics of nations, and 'the internal changes in the character and culture of a nation', its 'propensities and characters'.[8] Early nineteenth century Romantics such as Fichte and Hegel had described nations as spirits that transformed into a conscious national will, or the manifestation of self-consciousness.[9] However, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the association of nations with spirits, souls, wills, characters, and consciousness became entangled in new and pervasive assumptions about the nature of human psychology and how it might be studied, including 'the view that a person's character was determined by the physical structure of his or her brain – not by a spiritual entity'.[10] In the fifty years that preceded the peace of 1919, theorists of the nation and liberal-minded proponents of the democratic credentials of the ideal of nationhood, used the language of psychology to make tangible the idea that individuals possessed national subjectivities, and that nationality was the expression of conscious and unconscious individual desires. In doing so, they drew upon and reinforced new scientific assumptions about the nature of the nation. Given the epistemological inflections of late nineteenth century science, the most influential psychological versions of the nation were indebted to evolution theory, and to the idea that acquired characteristics could be inherited, collectively as well as individually. They also echoed assumptions about the incommensurable status of specific races, and of the sexes.

The argument that the idea of the nation changed meaning in the late nineteenth century under the influence of science, and specifically of evolution and race theories is not in itself a radical departure from the accepted history. However, for many historians, the shifting conceptual orientation of the idea of the nation is proof of its conservative and right-wing credentials.[11] One of my motivations for writing this book is to tackle precisely the failure of this interpretation of the intellectual history of the nation to address the enthusiastic embrace of nationality in the name of a more democratic new world order. The points at which the history of international politics intersects with the history of psychology illuminate the fascination that psychological versions of the nation, and of nationality, held for liberal-minded intellectuals and scientists, and for enthusiasts of nationality as a political principle ever since.

Viewed from the perspective of the idea of the nation, and of 1919, the late nineteenth century was a cultural and political watershed, for a range of related if often contradictory reasons, not all of them subsumed by the history of race. It was a period when the 'nation question' emerged as an elusive and ineluctable factor in national and international politics, and when new scientific disciplines and educational institutions made

the nation the object of liberal as well as conservative inquiry. It was also a time when psychology gradually assumed the mantle of a science and, concomitantly, supplied the bulk of the methodologies utilised in those inquiries. From at least the 1870s, a variety of liberal-minded psychologists, philosophers, social scientists, historians, and intellectuals more broadly, were attracted to psychology as a basis for defining the special status of nations. They made nations expressions of individual agency, and of social and historical determinism. They adopted the nation as a category of difference that proved the limits of biological determinism and emphasised instead the role of social and historical factors in the formation of individual and collective psychologies.

The idea of the nation promoted by the supporters of a new more democratic world order also reveals the overlapping and mutual influence of race and gender categorisations in liberal-minded conceptions of normative selves and states. At the turn of the twentieth century, psychologists elaborated conceptions of men and women, like different races, as having different instincts and psychological propensities. Significantly, for my purposes, women, like the more backward peoples, were represented as lacking those same psychological characteristics regarded as pertinent to the political status of individuals and nations: a self, a personality, and the capacity to exercise will and self-determination. I argue that the intersecting histories of psychology and of the idea of the nation are the crucial context in which first-wave European and American feminists were inspired to bring their self-determination agenda to the peace process of 1919, alongside the claims of aspiring national groups.

This book also attempts to question the national framework that dominates most historical accounts of the idea of the nation. It emphasises, instead, intellectual and political networks developed across national borders and in the context of international relations. Transnational links were critical to the discursive elaboration of national differences, and the political legitimation of nation-states. Certainly, one of the difficulties in writing a history of the idea of the nation is that much intellectual history is written as if ideas are checked in, along with other quarantined goods, at national borders. This tendency is even further complicated by the fact that, in the period under study, ideas and theories about nations were embedded in comparative and stereotypical representations of European nation-states and peoples. Anglophone and francophone intellectuals and social scientists made comparisons between English and French, or Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic, and Eastern and Western European states, and made those comparisons central to their theories of the psychological nature of the nation, and of the intrinsic political tendencies of certain nations, and not others.[12] In this account of the history of the nation, psychology, and international politics, I have utilised a transnational context for understanding the cultural work involved in creating and maintaining the

political legitimacy of national sovereignty and nationality. The international privileging of nationality as the revelation of individuals' and peoples' inner selves (the 'democratic El Dorado') was not, could not have occurred as, the mere translation of any one nation-state's political concerns or priorities. The mapping of the relative relevance of the principle of nationality for some races/nations/peoples, men, and women that took place in 1919, that simultaneously disavowed racial hierarchy and affirmed instead a natural hierarchy of nations, was both an international and transnational phenomenon. The hegemony of specific nations and intellectuals in that international/transnational process was in itself a marker of the mutually reinforcing relationship between conceptions of a natural national hierarchy and international politics.

Curiously, the one domain where historians have been most disinclined to examine the idea of the nation is in the transnational realm of international history. Yet it seems to me that it is impossible for an historian of the idea of the nation not to reflect on the peace of 1919 in particular as a critical moment in the constitution of modern political life. Before 1919, nationality was a word that was utilised randomly by intellectuals, and politicians, on behalf of a range of political ideas. After 1919, nationality had achieved the status of an inevitable and necessary political ideal, as representative of the ambitions of liberalism and democracy. For all the historical attention that has been paid to post-First World War peacemaking and the principle of nationality that it was meant to uphold, very little interest has been shown in parsing out the meanings of nationality as they were understood at the time by those most in a position to implement the conceptual and practical terms of the new national world order. F. S. Marston's meticulous history, Lawrence Gelfand's comprehensive account of American preparations, and more recent studies by Michael Heffernan, Neil Smith, and Jonathan Nielson have fleshed out our understanding of the individuals and processes that shaped the peace.[13] My contribution to this history of peacemaking in 1919 is to bring to the fore the endurance of psychological interpretations of the idea of the nation in international politics, their shifting resonances, and the persistence of conventionalised race and sex classifications in those interpretations.

By 1917, men as divergent in their liberalism, political views, and peacemaking tasks as Woodrow Wilson, Walter Lippmann, Raymond Poincaré, Leon Bourgeois, Arnold Toynbee, and Lloyd George, presented themselves as the architects of a new objective and scientific (and thus unassailable) world order. In this way, it was argued, the post-war world would reflect the natural aspirations of whole peoples and grant them democracy through 'self-determination'. Inevitably, this scientific approach to nationality was unable to establish consistent concrete factors for determining national peoples and borders. It is the ideological work – the resort to the tools of racial and gender stereotyping – that was required to sustain the

authority of the principle of nationality, of the experts involved, and of their liberal idealism, that I seek to describe and explain in this study.

My use of the term 'liberal-minded' in this book is meant to evoke the forms of liberalism articulated by men and women with sometimes the best democratic intentions, who also believed in the potential of science for their political quests. In England they were known in the main as 'new liberals', in France as 'solidarists', and in the United States as 'progressives'.[14] Ultimately, it is because of the intellectual acuity and daring of one of those liberal-minded men, Lippmann, that it has been possible for me to reflect here on the significance of the 'deeper prejudice' of race and sexual chauvinism in the history of psychology, in the international politics of peacemaking, and in the liberal idealisation of nationality.

This book begins then with the story of the peace of 1919. The chapters that follow travel backwards in time from that point, observing the political and cultural scenery as it recedes, in order to map out an intellectual genealogy for the history of peacemaking, as well as the idea of the nation. My first stop on this journey is the later stages of the First World War, and the visions of the new national world order delineated by American, French, and British experts in the formal preparations for a scientific peace. Most of these experts were historians and geographers, officially employed in the service of the state, whether in the United States' Inquiry, the French *Comité d'études,* or the British Political Intelligence Department. I have concentrated on detailing the implicit as well as explicit assumptions about human nature and difference, science, and politics that were given voice by each of these bodies in the name of the principle of nationality. Chapter two takes us back to the earlier years of the war, focussing on those British, French, and American intellectuals, a majority of them historians again, who were drawn to psychological theories, and who were to influence the shaping of the peace. Some of them were connected through their participation in *The New Europe,* (a London-based wartime weekly that Lippmann reviewed enthusiastically), and organisations such as the English Union of Democratic Control, the French League for the Rights of Man, and the international Organisation for Permanent Peace. Chapters three and four take us back, farther in time, to the period before the First World War, to the history of the development of scientific psychology, and its application to the idea of the nation. These chapters provide the broader cultural context for understanding the conception of the nation as psychological that had become popular by the early twentieth century, especially among a transnationally-linked liberal-minded intelligentsia. In chapter four, I examine the gender dimensions of the pre-First World War history of psychology and the idea of the nation, and chapter five returns us full circle to the history of 1919, where I establish the relevance of gender analysis for the intersecting histories of the nation

and international politics. The epilogue moves forward in time again in order to survey the legacy of psychological theories of the nation and of the early twentieth century national view of the world.

Despite the threat of a teleological history that working chronologically backwards poses, I have tried to avoid the temptation of thinking of this historical account as progressive, continuous, or even consistent. Ideas, like nations, never evolve neatly, there is always forgetting, selective remembering, rejection and resumption. There are always individuals such as Lippmann laying out alternative intellectual landscapes and forgotten futures.

I came to Lippmann's post-First World War critique of the role of psychology in the politics of peacemaking only after I had already begun thinking about the problem why and how the idea of national self-determination, an idea dependent on the Enlightenment conception of individual autonomy, became so important in 1919, a time when new theories of human psychology destabilised assumptions about individual agency and will. Consequently, at the core of this study is the disjuncture between a modernist destabilising psychological self in crisis, and the aggressive positivism of a redoubtable liberalism drawn to the promise of the nation. I also have a larger less psychologically oriented quest in mind: a renovated understanding of how and why nations have remained pivotal to the purpose of political emancipation throughout the twentieth century and beyond. I do not offer tidy historical revelations of cause and effect in the history of the idea of the nation and its consequences for nationalism, nor, I think, do I achieve any psychological insights. My intention is merely to shed more light on the shades of the international history of the idea of the nation, and on how and why we think of the nation as a psychological phenomenon at all.

1
Science and the New National World Order, 1919

The process of international peacemaking began in earnest in Paris in 1919 under the auspices of the dominant victor states – Britain, the United States and France – and of the ideals of nationality and international government. These ideals were distilled from the American president Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' speech, presented to the United States Congress almost exactly one year earlier, and committing his country to a crucial role in the war, and to a peace based on the principle of nationality.[1] Wilson described the war as having 'its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities.' Consequently, so the argument ran, permanent peace would rely on an acknowledgement of 'the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security and the peace of mind of the peoples involved.'[2] Out of the war would emerge 'a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice', including 'self-determination,' 'an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.'[3]

For the first time in history the authority of a peace process was to lie not in the military force of its brokers but in its democratic claims. For the first time too, or at least so it was argued, the emphasis on nationality would allow the resort to empirically-based scientific methods, rather than national interests, in resolving the territorial disputes that often led to international conflict. From the perspective of American preparations the peace conference 'was to take on the appearance of a huge laboratory whose director would be the American president.'[4] This theme of an overlapping national and scientific peace was reiterated at the first General Session of the Peace Conference in January 1919 by the French President, Raymond Poincaré, who proclaimed its importance for keeping at bay 'the ever-possible revivals of primitive savagery' evidenced in the war.[5] He added:

> The time is no more when diplomatists could meet to redraw with authority the map of the empires on the corner of a table. If you are to

> remake the map of the world it is in the name of the peoples, and on condition that you shall faithfully interpret their thoughts, and respect the right of nations, small and great, to dispose of themselves, and to reconcile it with the right, equally sacred, of ethnical and religious minorities – a formidable task which science and history, your two advisers, will contribute to illumine and facilitate.[6]

In the almost hundred years since the Paris Peace Conference, historians have tended to embrace a view of the principle of nationality as giving political expression to really existing nations, and of scientific knowledge about national differences as divining popular political wishes. They have directed their analyses to the limited, inconsistent, or cynical application of national self-determination, when they have not focussed on the consequences of reparations.[7] Yet, at least one contemporary was more critical of the assumption that scientific knowledge was the key to determining popular will and national difference. Walter Lippmann's 1922 publication *Public Opinion* condemned specifically the application of psychology to the determination of nationality.[8]

Lippmann's singling out and critique of the role of psychology in peacemaking in 1919 was not the act of a convinced sceptic. Prior to the war, he had expressed enthusiasm for psychology as a tool that would reveal to men their desires and improve national governance.[9] *Public Opinion* itself was devoted to the premise that the notion of democracy had to accommodate the psychological complexities of modern mass societies. But Lippmann's postwar perception of the appropriate analytical uses of psychology was driven by what he understood to be the ambiguities, inconsistencies, and bias of the Wilsonian program, especially its implicit hypothesis that 'adult electors taken together make decisions out of a will that is in them'.[10] Liberal-democrats, Lippmann complained, had made 'collective minds, national souls, and race psychology' the 'democratic El Dorado':[11]

> The democratic El Dorado has always been some perfect environment, and some perfect system of voting and representation, where the innate good will and instinctive statesmanship of every man could be translated into action. [...] The democrat is hypnotized by the belief that the great thing is to express the will of the people, first because expression is the highest interest of man, and second because the will is instinctively good.[12]

Lippmann attacked not only this general idealisation of popular will and its conflation with nationality, but also the distorted outlook of the peacemakers, 'the great men who assembled at Paris to settle the affairs of mankind': 'Could anyone have penetrated the mind of M. Clemenceau,

what would he have found there? Did he see the Germans of 1919, or the German type as he had learned to see it since 1871?' Lippmann's own answer to these questions was that, particularly in the case of Germany, the peacemakers 'took to heart those reports, and it seems, those only which fitted the type that was in his mind.'[13] For Lippmann, the peacemakers' attitudes towards national difference and its political significance were the result of 'a great sediment of stereotyped ideas accumulated and hardened in a long and pugnacious existence'. During the war, the force of these ideas had been revived in evocations of an eternal struggle between '"Teutons" on the one hand, and "Anglo-Saxons" and French on the other'.[14] These stereotypes had settled in a range of practices and institutions, especially in the 'slums of psychology'. '[P]hrenologists, palmists, fortune-tellers, mind-readers, and a few political professors' were using the body to read the inner self: 'There you will still find it asserted that "the Chinese are fond of colors, and have their eyebrows much vaulted" while "the heads of Calmucks are depressed from above, but very large laterally, about the organ which gives the inclination to acquire; and this nation's propensity to steal, etc., is admitted"' [15]

From Lippmann's perspective, racialised conceptions of collective psychology shaped the system devised at the peace conference to transform former German colonies into mandates under the supervision of victor states and the new League of Nations, as was apparent in the accompanying premise that 'the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people'. A 'people's' 'stage of development', he argued, was interpreted in respect of the relative status of nationality, and that status, in turn, confirmed in the slums of psychology.[16] Finally, Lippmann pointed to the exhibition of 'a deeper prejudice' in the principle of nationality, that is a preference for masculinity: 'Unless the female line happens to be especially remarkable descent is traced down through the males. The tree is male. At various moments females accrue to it as itinerant bees light upon an ancient apple tree.'[17]

Lippmann's criticisms highlight the intersecting histories of psychology and international politics at the end of the First World War. They also offer a provocative analysis of the potency of the idea of the nation and the principle of nationality at a moment in modern history often described by historians as the 'apogee of nationalism'. While many aspects of Lippmann's critique remain as exceptional now as when they were first offered, his claims are all the more enticing because of his vantage point as an architect of Wilson's Fourteen Points. In the final years of the war, Lippmann had hardly hesitated to celebrate a new democratic age in which scientific facts about nations would be drawn upon to transcend the destructive political influence of national self-interest. He had helped organise for the White House the formation of the Inquiry, a national body of experts who were to establish scientific truths about disputed questions

of nationality in anticipation of post-war peace-making. However, the Inquiry, like the other national expert bodies created at this time – the French *Comité d'études* (Committee of Studies) and the British Political Intelligence Department – was a key contributor to those very aspects of the peace that Lippmann would later deplore, not only the idealisation of collective will and collective psychology, but also their race and gender biases. Indeed, taken together, the scientific preparations for the peace – fully underway by 1917 – and the peace process, constituted a critical moment in the modern history of international politics. But before we can revisit the history of Lippmann's own role in the preparations for peace, and the points at which psychology and international politics intersected, we need to set the scene for the Paris of peacemaking in 1919.

Peacemaking

The Paris of the 1919 peace-making process was a city transformed by the idea of nationality and its racial resonances. Even locals jaded by the cosmopolitanism of modern urban life, recognised the extent of that transformation. As Paul Gordon Lauren has observed, the peace conference 'struck many contemporaries as a dramatic visual representation of the new age.'[18] In the eyes of the young and ambitious Louise Weiss, the intellectual force behind *L'Europe nouvelle*, Paris had become the centre of world diplomacy alight with the colours of its negotiators: 'the amber of Arabia, the yellow of China, the black of India, the white of Scandinavia or America'; 'les Nègres' may not have been recognised as serious participants, but they too, according to Weiss writing from the perspective of the post-Second World War, were there.[19] One of these, W. E. B. Du Bois, counted thirty-two nations and races: 'Not simply England, Italy, and the Great powers are there, but all the little nations… . Not only groups, but races have come – Jews, Indians, Arabs, and All-Asia.'[20] For the Irish-born *Daily Telegraph* journalist-*cum*-philologist Emile Joseph Dillon, this transformation meant that 'the Paris of the Conference ceased to be the capital of France'.[21] Instead, Dillon exclaimed with poetic flourish, Paris had become

> a vast cosmopolitan caravanserai teeming with unwonted aspects of life and turmoil, filled with curious samples of the races, tribes, and tongues of four continents who came to watch and wait for the mysterious tomorrow….it was also a trysting-place for the ghosts of sovereignties and states, militarisms and racial ambitions, which were permitted to wander at large until their brief twilight should be swallowed up by the night.

In keeping with his own philological interests, Dillon gave racial, tribal, and cultural names to some of those ghosts wandering the streets of Paris,