



EDITED BY  
SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN  
JAMES DEFILIPPIS

READINGS IN  
**PLANNING**  
THEORY

**FOURTH EDITION**

WILEY Blackwell



# Readings in Planning Theory



# Readings in Planning Theory

Fourth Edition

Edited by

Susan S. Fainstein and James DeFilippis

**WILEY** Blackwell

This fourth edition first published 2016

© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Edition history: Blackwell Publishers Ltd (1e, 1996); Blackwell Publishing Ltd (2e, 2002; 3e, 2012)

*Registered Office*

John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

*Editorial Offices*

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at [www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell](http://www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell).

The right of Susan S. Fainstein and James DeFilippis to be identified as the authors of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book.

*Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty:* While the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services and neither the publisher nor the author shall be liable for damages arising herefrom. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data is available for this title*

Paperback 9781119045069

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Cover image: By Nikada iStock 181070373

Set in 11/13pt Dante by SPi Global, Pondicherry, India

# Contents

Acknowledgments	viii
Introduction: The Structure and Debates of Planning Theory <i>Susan S. Fainstein and James DeFilippis</i>	1
<b>Part I The Development of Planning Theory</b>	<b>19</b>
Introduction	19
1. Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier <i>Robert Fishman</i>	23
2. Co-evolutions of Planning and Design: Risks and Benefits of Design Perspectives in Planning Systems <i>Kristof Van Assche, Raoul Beunen, Martijn Duineveld, and Harro de Jong</i>	51
3. Authoritarian High Modernism <i>James C. Scott</i>	75
4. The Death and Life of Great American Cities <i>Jane Jacobs</i>	94
5. Planning the Capitalist City <i>Richard E. Foglesong</i>	110
6. The Three Historic Currents of City Planning <i>Peter Marcuse</i>	117
<b>Part II What Are Planners Trying to Do?     The Justifications and Critiques of Planning</b>	<b>133</b>
Introduction	133
7. The Planning Project <i>Patsy Healey</i>	139

8.	Urban Planning in an Uncertain World <i>Ash Amin</i>	156
9.	Arguments For and Against Planning <i>Richard E. Klosterman</i>	169
10.	Is There Space for <i>Better</i> Planning in a Neoliberal World? Implications for Planning Practice and Theory <i>Heather Campbell, Malcolm Tait, and Craig Watkins</i>	187
11.	Green Cities, Growing Cities, Just Cities? Urban Planning and the Contradictions of Sustainable Development <i>Scott Campbell</i>	214
12.	Disasters, Vulnerability and Resilience of Cities <i>Brendan Gleeson</i>	241
13.	Spatial Justice and Planning <i>Susan S. Fainstein</i>	258
<b>Part III Implications of Practice for Theory</b>		<b>273</b>
	Introduction	273
14.	The Neglected Places of Practice <i>Robert Beauregard</i>	277
15.	Home, Sweet Home: American Residential Zoning in Comparative Perspective <i>Sonia Hirt</i>	293
16.	Understanding Community Development in a “Theory of Action” Framework: Norms, Markets, Justice <i>Laura Wolf-Powers</i>	324
17.	Participatory Governance: From Theory to Practice <i>Frank Fischer</i>	348
18.	Cultivating Surprise and the Art of the Possible: The Drama of Mediating Differences <i>John Forester</i>	363
<b>Part IV Wicked Problems in Planning: Identity, Difference, Ethics, and Conflict</b>		<b>383</b>
	Introduction	383
19.	Inclusion and Democracy <i>Iris Marion Young</i>	389

20.	Towards a Cosmopolitan Urbanism: From Theory to Practice <i>Leonie Sandercock</i>	407
21.	Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning <i>Paul Davidoff</i>	427
22.	The Minority-Race Planner in the Quest for a Just City <i>June Manning Thomas</i>	443
23.	The Past, Present, and Future of Professional Ethics in Planning <i>Martin Wachs</i>	464
24.	Insurgent Planning: Situating Radical Planning in the Global South <i>Faranak Miraftab</i>	480
<b>Part V Planning in a Globalized World</b>		<b>499</b>
	Introduction	499
25.	Place and Place-Making in Cities: A Global Perspective <i>John Friedmann</i>	503
26.	Urban Informality: The Production of Space and Practice of Planning <i>Ananya Roy</i>	524
27.	Seeing from the South: Refocusing Urban Planning on the Globe's Central Urban Issues <i>Vanessa Watson</i>	540
28.	Global Cities of the South: Emerging Perspectives on Growth and Inequality <i>Gavin Shatkin</i>	561
	Index	587

# Acknowledgments

Scott Campbell was co-editor of earlier editions of this reader. Some of the introductory material and choices of readings in the present edition continue to reflect his participation.

# Introduction

## *The Structure and Debates of Planning Theory*

Susan S. Fainstein and James DeFilippis

### **What Is Planning Theory?**

What is planning theory? We start with this question because it is the central focus of this book; one that the various readings grapple with in different ways. But we also start with it because there is no clear or easy answer to this question; and this absence makes planning theory both more demanding, and more exciting, than it would otherwise be. The purpose of this reader is twofold: (1) to define the boundaries of planning theory and the works that constitute its central focus; and (2) to confront the principal issues that face planners as theorists and practitioners.

Defining planning theory is hard: the subject is slippery, and explanations are often frustratingly tautological or disappointingly pedestrian. While most scholars can agree on what constitutes the economy and the polity – and thus what is economic or political theory – they differ as to the content of planning theory. Several reasons account for the complexity of defining planning theory. First, many of the fundamental questions concerning planning belong to a much broader inquiry concerning the roles of the state, the market, and civil society in social and spatial transformation. As John Friedmann has put it, planning theory has been “cobbled together from elements that were originally intended for altogether different uses” (Friedmann 2011, p. 131). Consequently, planning theory overlaps with theory in all the social science and design disciplines, making it difficult to limit its scope or to stake out a turf specific to planning. Second, the field of planning is divided among those who define it according to its object (producing and regulating the relations of people and structures in space) and those who do so according to its method (the process of decision making as it relates to spatial development). These different approaches lead to two largely separate sets of

theoretical questions and priorities that undermine a singular definition of planning. Whether to emphasize one or the other is a problematic issue within planning theory and constitutes, as will be discussed later in this introduction, one of the principal debates in the field.

Third, planning theory is further divided into those who understand planning through analyzing existing practices and those who theorize in an effort to transform planning practices. Thus, planning theory may be either explanatory or normative. And while all theorizing contains some sort of normative framework (even if it is not acknowledged or recognized), these forms of theorization follow different paths and ask different questions rooted in politically and analytically different concerns. Moreover, the questions dealt with by planning theory reflect its somewhat ungainly straddling of both academic and professional matters.

Even if the focus is narrowed to understanding practice, planning practice itself evades a coherent theoretical framework. The boundary between planners and related professionals (such as real estate developers, architects, city council members, civil society leaders) is not sharp: planners do not just plan, and non-planners also plan. Is planning theory about what planning professionals do or how places develop, regardless of who is doing the planning? And although many fields (such as economics) are defined by a specific set of methodologies, planners commonly use diverse methodologies from many different fields. Consequently its theoretical base cannot be easily defined by its tools of analysis. It is determined more by a shared interest in space and place, a commitment to civic community, and a pragmatic orientation toward professional practice. Taken together, the debates about the proper role for planning theory, the very scope and function of planning, and the problems of distinguishing who is actually a planner make difficult the specification of an appropriate body of theory.

Despite the difficulties we do believe that we can specify a central question of planning theory. We see that central question as the following: *What role can planning play in developing the good city and region within the constraints of a capitalist political economy and varying political systems?* Thus we are explicit in our normative goal of thinking that theory should inform and improve practice in ways that meaningfully improve cities and regions and the lives of the people that live and work within them now and in the future. Addressing this question requires examining what planning currently accomplishes, the constraints upon it, and the potential for changing it. Thus, planning theory must be both explanatory and normative.

## Why Do Planning Theory?

This question, and our framing of it, presumes a relationship between theory and practice in planning. That is, it presumes that planning theory should, and does, inform planning practice, and should in turn be informed by planning

practice. But the relationship between theory and practice in planning is a problematic one. Most planning practitioners largely disregard planning theory and do not often think fondly of any planning theory course they had to take as a student.<sup>1</sup> Planning is an applied field, and most planning students become practitioners not academic researchers. A professional political scientist, economist, or geographer is expected to “do theory” and is rewarded for theoretical contributions, not applied engagements. But in planning this is reversed, causing problems for practitioners who avoid theoretical analysis. Planning must be predictive, and predicting the future impacts of planning interventions requires theoretical understanding of the processes that shape the making of spaces and places. Thus, planners need theory and, while they may be relying on theory that is internalized, implicit and unexamined, it is present nonetheless. This raises another problem, which is that the devaluing of planning theory by practitioners leaves too much of the decision-making in day-to-day planning practice to be based on intuition and instinct. Such intuition and instinct is implicit planning theory but its implicitness raises obstacles to challenging it, altering it, or evaluating it. We argue that theory can and should inform practice and should do so in explicit ways that are reflective and emerge from a dialogical relationship between theory and practice.

Enabling practitioners to achieve a deeper understanding of the processes in which they are engaged has motivated us to edit this book and select the particular readings within it. We hope that this will enable planners to achieve better results than acting based only on simple intuition and common sense. Although many in the field have decried the gap between theory and practice, we do not envision eliminating it completely. Planning practice can never simply enact academic reflection. We do not expect practicing land use planners to implement the unadulterated arguments of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (who provides the conceptual foundations for communicative planning) in their jobs, nor do we wish graduate students to accept existing land-use practice uncritically. True, if the gap is *too big*, then planning education is irrelevant, but if there is *no* gap, then planning education is redundant. The role of planning theory should be to generate a creative tension that is both critical and constructive, and that provokes reflection on both sides. In other words, its role is to create both the reflective practitioner and the practical scholar. These two need not think alike, but they should at least be able to talk to each other.

Beyond this intention, we aim to establish a theoretical foundation that provides the field not only with a common structure for scientific inquiry but also with a means for defining what planning is. Theory allows for both professional and intellectual self-reflection. It tries to make sense of the seemingly unrelated, contradictory aspects of urban development and to create a framework within which to compare and evaluate the merits of different planning ideas and strategies. It seeks the underlying conceptual elements that tie together the disparate

planning areas, from housing and community development to transportation policy and urban design. Providing a common language is an important function of introductory theory and history courses for Master's students, who gain a shared identity as planners with other students during their first year before veering into their sub-specialties in the second year. It can be both comforting and encouraging, when encountering the challenges of contemporary urban poverty, shortages of public space, the profit orientation and shortsightedness of urban developers, as well as the enormous informal settlements within the developing world, to know the ways in which earlier reform movements have addressed similar problems. We not only know that we have been here before, but we also remind ourselves that in many ways urban life *has* improved, and planners can take some credit for this.

### Our Approach to Planning Theory

We place planning theory at the intersection of political economy, history, and philosophy. This does not mean that we see cities and regions as simply structurally determined outcomes of larger historical political economic forces. To do so would erase the actors and agents that produce, shape, mitigate, and struggle against such forces. In short, it would make planning either a simple tool for ruling elites (part of the "committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" as Marx famously put it), or it would make planning pointless and ineffectual by definition. That is most definitely not how we theorize planning. However, such macro-scale forces are central to producing the contexts in which planning occurs, and all planning theory, properly done, must therefore make such forces central in its explanations. The challenge for this professional – and sometimes activist – discipline is to find the leeway within the larger social structure to pursue the good city. This requires imagination, a historical understanding of the field, and, yes, active theoretical reflection on the best ways forward given the contexts in which planning occurs.

We also see planning theory as sitting at the intersection of the *city and region* as a phenomenon and *planning* as a human activity. Planning adapts to changes in the city and region, which in turn are transformed by planning and politics. Planners not only plan places; they also negotiate, forecast, research, survey, and organize financing. Nor do planners have an exclusive influence over territories; developers, business groups, politicians, and other actors also shape urban and regional development. This interaction is not a closed system, as exogenous forces act on regions and localities, causing changes in the spatial system and the rethinking of planning interventions.

## Debates within Planning Theory

The teaching of planning theory requires that we should explicitly explore the roots and implications of long-standing disputes in the field. In fact, describing the differences among approaches provides a perspective on the subject that is lacking when a single narrative is used to define its scope. In this light, we can identify a set of issues that have bedeviled it for quite some time. These are: (1) How do we understand the history of planning? (2) Is planning about means or ends, processes or outcomes, and should it emphasize one or the other? (3) Why should we plan, and when? (4) What are the constraints on planning in capitalist political economies, and how do those vary in different contexts? (5) What are the values that inform, and should, inform planning? (6) Is there a singular, identifiable “public interest”?

### How do we understand the history of planning?

The first question for theory is one of planning’s identity, which in turn leads to history. The traditional story told of modern city planning is that it arose from several separate movements at the turn of the twentieth century: the Garden City, the City Beautiful, and public health reforms (Krueckeberg 1983; Hall 2002). Four basic eras characterized its history: (1) the formative years during which the pioneers (Ebenezer Howard, Patrick Geddes, Daniel Burnham, etc.) did not yet call themselves planners (late 1800s to World War I); (2) the period of institutionalization, professionalization, and self-recognition of planning, together with the rise of regional and national planning efforts (*ca.* 1920–45); (3) the postwar era of standardization, crisis, and diversification of planning (1945–75); and (4) the time up to the present of redefining planning in relation to the private sector, with emphasis on the planner as mediator, strategist, and advocate within public–private partnerships.

This narrative, often repeated in introductory courses and texts, serves our understanding in several ways. The multiplicity of technical, social, and aesthetic origins explains planning’s eclectic blend of design, civil engineering, local politics, community organization, and social concern. Its development as a twentieth-century, public sector, bureaucratic profession, rather than as a late-nineteenth-century, private sector one like medicine underlies its status as either a quasi- or secondary profession (Hoffman 1989). At the most basic level, this framework gives the story of planning (at least modern professional planning) a starting point. Planning emerges as the twentieth-century response to the nineteenth-century industrial city (Hall 2002). It also provides several foundational texts: Howard and Osborn’s *Garden Cities of Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform* (1945 [1898]), Charles Robinson’s *The Improvement of Towns and Cities; or the Practical Basis of Civic*

*Aesthetics* (1901), and Daniel Burnham's plan for Chicago (Commercial Club of Chicago et al. 1909), as well as several defining events: Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann's redevelopment of Paris during the 1850s and 1860s; the Columbia Exposition in Chicago (1893), which launched the City Beautiful Movement in the United States; the construction of Letchworth, the first English Garden City (1903); and the first national conference on city planning, held in Washington, DC in 1909.

Despite this utility, there are several ways in which the usual story is suspect. First, the story has been repeated so much, as we have socialized new cohorts of planners into the profession with it, that it has taken on the status of a disciplinary/professional mythology. Thus the complexity and contingency of the earlier periods get lost. Second, and relatedly, this mythology too often comes without critical examination of the past. Third, this "great men with great ideas" view of planning history leaves out a whole set of other actors and other kinds of planners. It is the story of plans that have been influential – either by having been built or having shaped what others have built – but not of opposition and radical alternatives.

Some scholars have told planning's history in ways that have gotten past this mythologized history. Those who have pursued a more negative examination of the past have presented planning's history as a form of critique. Richard Foglesong's *Planning the Capitalist City* (1986; Chapter 5 is an excerpt), Peter Marcuse's large body of work on planning history (Chapter 6 is a version of this), David Harvey's *Paris: Capital of Modernity* (2003), Robert Fishman's *Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia* (1987), and Robert Self's *American Babylon* (2003) are some of the better examples. The second way has been to open up that history to the other actors that have been planners, in the broad sense of having made plans to shape spaces and the actions of people in those spaces. This is a history that people like James Holston (2009), Leonie Sandercock (1998), and others have been telling. It is a history in which planning is not just what the state does, or what influential white men do. Instead, planning's histories are plural and indigenous; marginalized and oppressed actors have their histories of planning told. The exclusion of so much of this other planning from standard texts does not mean that these planning efforts failed to occur; it simply means such plans and their planners have been largely erased from history.

The challenge is to write a planning history that encourages not only an accurate but also a critical, subtle, and reflective understanding of contemporary planning practice and the forces acting upon it. An effective planning history helps the contemporary planner shape his or her professional identity.

Is planning about means or ends, and which should it emphasize?

In its early days planning concerned itself primarily with outcomes. Baron Haussmann in Paris, Daniel Burnham in Chicago, among those who saw their vision translated into reality, pictured modern cities with efficient transportation

systems, attractive public spaces, and imposing buildings. Their methods consisted primarily of influencing private developers and/or government officials to achieve these ends. While they assumed technical expertise on the part of those doing the actual designing, their orientation was toward the results of their efforts, not the process by which they were achieved.

Throughout the twentieth century, however, planners increasingly focused on procedures. Rules for creating master plans and zoning maps, formulating standards (e.g., the amount of parking spaces needed per housing unit or open space per person), proposing regulations that would ensure adherence to plans, and creating methodologies for calculating transport impacts became more and more prominent. During the years after World War II, approaches pioneered by the military and the private sector gave rise to the use of the “rational model” and cost–benefit analysis for decision-making. These strategies relied on quantification and involved figuring out the least-cost alternative to achieving desired goals. The underlying assumption was that following proper procedures would ensure beneficial outcomes. The goals would be developed external to the planning function, and the job of planners was to figure out the means.

Criticisms of these approaches exposed the subjectivity disguised by numerical exactitude. Reaction to the depredations caused by top-down decision-making justified by an apparently scientific methodology led to the development of the communicative model. In this approach planners would no longer prescribe either ends or means, but instead would act as negotiators or mediators among the various stakeholders, working out a consensus on what to do. The resulting compromise would constitute a plus game in which all participants would receive some benefit. Although communicative rationality represented a sharp break from earlier methods-based approaches, it resembled them in focusing on process rather than outcomes.

The emphasis on method and process has led to several counter moves, most of which have tried to integrate a normative vision of desired outcomes with a democratic ethos delimiting the processes involved in reaching those ends. Davidoff’s classic “advocacy planning” framework (Chapter 21) is an early effort, as he focused not just on the power differentials in planning processes but also on the object of planning. His target was the top-down decision-making of the postwar period, and his work greatly shaped that of those who later articulated frameworks for “equity planning” (Krumholz and Forester 1990) or “the progressive city” (Clavel 1986; 2010). In these, the emphasis is shared between process and desired outcomes.

More recently, the model of the “just city” arose in response to the emphasis on communication. The argument of just city theorists is that inequalities of resources and power lead to unjust planning decisions, and that reducing the planner’s role simply to mediation does nothing to counter initial inequality (Marcuse et al. 2009; Fainstein 2010). Overcoming inequity requires pressing for a contrary vision. Although planners alone cannot stop injustice, they can avoid contributing to it by always calling for more just outcomes and spelling out policies that can improve the situation of the relatively disadvantaged. This becomes especially crucial as,

under neo-liberal regimes, income distributions have become more unequal and public benefits reduced within many metropolitan areas (see the discussion in Campbell *et al.*, Chapter 10, this volume). Justice planning requires sensitivity to differences among social groups and to democratic expression but most importantly to economic structure. It also calls for a greater emphasis within planning theory on the object of planning – that is, the metropolis – instead of a focus on the activities of planners (Fainstein, Chapter 13, this volume).

### Why and when should we plan?

Planning is an intervention with an intention to alter the existing course of events. The timing and legitimacy of planned intervention therefore become questions central to planning theory: Why and in what situations should planners intervene? Implicit here is an understanding of the alternative to planning by the public sector. Though it is most commonly assumed that the alternative is the free market, it could equally be chaos or domination by powerful private interests. Proponents of relying on the market regard planning as producing sub-optimal results and, at an extreme, consider that it is antithetical to freedom (Hayek 1944). Supporters of planning argue that it can replace the uncertainty and cruelties of the market with the logic of the plan and thereby produce a more rational arrangement of the environment.

The duality between planning and the market is a defining framework in planning theory and is the leitmotiv of classic readings in the field (such as Mannheim 1949; Meyerson and Banfield 1964; Dahrendorf 1968; Galbraith 1971). As usually framed, the debate assumes a neat and tidy division between the public and private worlds, each with its unique advantages. But this is inherently wrong. The state has always been in the market, and the structures of capitalist markets rely upon the state. For instance, zoning may be an intervention that regulates the potential uses of private properties, but private property is always, in the first instance, legally created by the state, and one of the functions of zoning is to protect property values. In contemporary theory and practice, Hernando DeSoto's (2003) argument for giving legal title to occupants of informal housing units illustrates the co-constitution of state and market.

Evaluations of planning reflect assumptions about the relationships between the private and public sectors – and how much the government should “intrude.” The safe stance in planning has been to see its role as making up for the periodic shortcomings of the private market (“market failures”) (Klosterman, Chapter 9). In this interpretation planning acts as the patient understudy, filling in when needed or even helping the market along (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989). Accordingly planning should never presume to replace the market permanently or change the script of economic efficiency. This way of legitimizing planning significantly limits creative or redistributive planning efforts, but it does make a scaled-down version

of planning palatable to all but the most conservative economists. In contrast, for the aforementioned equity, progressive and just-city planners, planning ought to confront the private actors directly and focus on remedying disadvantage. In this view privileging the private sector reinforces unjust outcomes, while empowering planning has the potential for enhancing equity.

The inter-connections between the public and private have become increasingly evident. The rise of public-private partnerships in the wake of urban renewal efforts reflects this blurring of sectoral boundaries (Squires 1989). Public sector planners borrow tools developed in the private sector, such as strategic planning and place marketing (Levy 1990). The emergence of autonomous public authorities to manage marine ports, airports, and other infrastructures, and of urban development corporations to promote economic growth has created hybrid organizations that act like both a public agency and a private firm (Walsh 1978; Doig 1987). In addition, the growing non-profit or “third sector,” embodied in community development corporations within the United States (see Wolf-Powers, Chapter 16) and housing associations in Europe, clearly demonstrates the inadequacies of viewing the world in a purely dichotomous framework of the government versus the market (Harloe 1995; Rubin 2000).

More troublesome than the inter-weaving of the public and private, according to some theorists, is the appropriation of the public domain by the logic of privatization. Privatization of traditionally public services raises the question of whether democratic citizenship – and all its rights and responsibilities – is being reduced to consumerism and consumer freedom. This critique in one formulation regards the public sector as wholly captured by capitalist interests, engaging in activities imitative of ruthless corporations, and generally incapable of planning for the benefit of the mass of people (Harvey 1985, 1989). More temperate viewpoints regard the outcome of the tug of war between capitalist and community interests as dependent on conflict, bargaining, and the mobilization of political resources, the results of which are not predetermined (Stone 1993; Purcell 2008; Clavel 2010).

The constraints on planning power – how can planning be effective  
within a mixed economy?

Even if we agree that planners should routinely shape the operations of the private market, we have no assurance that their intervention will be effective; in other words, that they will be able to achieve their ends. Unlike some other professionals, planners do not have a monopoly on power or expertise over their object of work. They operate within the constraints of the capitalist political economy, and their urban visions compete with those of developers, consumers, politicians, and other more powerful groups. When they call for a type of development to occur, they do not command the resources to make it happen. Instead, they must rely on either private investment or a commitment from political leaders. They also work within

the constraints of democracy and bureaucratic procedures (Foglesong, Chapter 5, this volume). Moreover their concerns may have low priority within the overall political agenda. Thus, despite the planning ideal of a holistic, proactive vision, planners may find themselves playing frustratingly reactive, regulatory roles, especially in the United States.

The most powerful American planners are those who can marshal public and private resources to effect change and get projects built (Doig 1987; Ballon and Jackson 2007). They bend the role of the planner and alter the usual dynamic between the public and private sectors. The resulting public–private partnerships make the planner more activist (Squires 1989); yet, they also strain the traditional non-political identity of the public planner and make many idealistic planners squirm. How else can one explain the uncomfortable mixture of disgust and envy that a lot of planners felt towards Robert Moses, who, as the head of various New York City agencies, had far more projects built than did all the traditional city planners he disparaged (Caro 1974)? Even Moses, however, for all his reputed power, relied on the support of the extremely powerful Rockefeller family to build his roads, playgrounds, etc. (Fitch 1993). The proliferation of neo-liberal ideologies and practices in the past 30 years has conceptually and practically limited the space for planners to shape developments (Campbell *et al.*, Chapter 10, this volume), thereby further reducing the scope of imagined possibilities of planning theory and practice.

### What values inform planning?

To be a certified planner in most countries you must abide by a professional code of ethics. But applying professional ethics in planning presents many problems. First, if planners work in the private or quasi-private sectors, as is increasingly the case, do they still owe loyalty to the public at large? Planners are torn regarding whom they should serve: clients, consulting or development firms for which they are staff, the general public, or specific groups within the population (e.g. community organizations, homeowners' associations) (Marcuse 1976, 2011). Flyvberg, *et al.* (2005) have argued that the demonstrable underestimation of costs and overestimation of benefits by planning consultants involved in mega-projects involves lapses from professional ethics. But why should a private planning entity serve any interest other than that of its owners? And why should we expect private entities to behave as public ones?

Second, planners must deal with uncertainty. Planning, as we have already argued, is future-oriented and predictive. But as Wachs (Chapter 23) points out, the future is marked by uncertainty and our inability to ever fully foresee the impacts of our actions. Values and expectations fill in the gaps when empirical information is limited (and, of course, shape how we interpret the empirical information we do have). But planners' values are not rooted only in planning

schools or in planning certification processes; they spring also from the families, communities, and cultures in which planners have grown up and lived.

Third, planning decisions are further complicated because so much of planning extends beyond technical activities and into much larger social, economic, and environmental challenges. Within society at large the values of democracy, equality, diversity, and efficiency often clash (Fainstein 2010). These conflicts arise in the choices that planners must make as they try to reconcile the goals of economic development, social justice, and environmental protection. Despite the long-term desirability of sustainable development, this triad of goals has created deep-seated tensions not only between planners and the outside world but also within planning itself (Campbell, Chapter 11, this volume).

Finally, ethical questions inevitably emerge from the planner's role as "expert." Questions concerning the proper balance between expertise and citizen input arise in issues like the siting of highways and waste disposal facilities, when particular social groups must bear the costs of more widespread social benefits. Planners mostly adhere to a utilitarian system of ethics, but utilitarianism has long been critiqued for its downplaying of distributional issues (see, most notably, Rawls 1971). Thus planners' claim to expertise incorporates a set of (hotly contested) value judgments, while at the same time obscuring such values in a cloak of objectivity and rationality. The ethical issues of the expert role are perhaps most evident when planners quantify risk, often placing a monetary value on human life (Fischer 1991).

### The enduring question of the public interest

The most enduring question in planning theory revolves around the definition of the public interest. The American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP) states clearly that "our primary obligation is to serve the public interest." But planning continues to face the central controversy of whether a single public interest exists and, if it does, whether planners can recognize and serve it. Incremental planners (beginning with Lindblom 1959) claim that complexity makes discovering the public interest unrealistic, while advocate planners argue that what is portrayed as the public interest in fact represents merely the interests of the privileged. More recently, postmodernists and poststructuralists have challenged the universal master narrative that gives voice to the public interest, seeing instead a heterogeneous public with many voices and interests. In sum, attacks on the concept of the public interest take two forms: first we cannot know what the public interest is; and second, and more fundamentally, there is no such thing as a unified public that can have an interest.

Nevertheless, planners have not abandoned the idea of serving the public interest, and rightly so. Postmodernists provided planning with a needed perspective on its preoccupation with a monolithic "public" (epitomized by Le Corbusier's

and Robert Moses's love of the public but disdain for people); yet, a rejection of Enlightenment rationality, shared values, and generally applicable standards leaves the planner without adequate tools for serving a fragmented population. Some have touted strategic planning and other borrowed private sector approaches as the appropriate path for planning, but these approaches neglect the "public" in the public interest. A belief in the public interest is the foundation for a set of values that planners hold dear: equal protection and equal opportunity, public space, and a sense of civic community and social responsibility.

The challenge is to reconcile these elements of a common public interest with the diversity that comes from many communities living side by side. David Harvey looked to generally held ideas of social justice and rationality as a bridge to overcome this dilemma (Harvey 2001); similarly, Susan S. Fainstein (2010; Chapter 13, this volume) presents the model of the just city. The recent interest in communicative action – planners as communicators rather than as autonomous, systematic thinkers – also reflects an effort to renew the focus of planning theory on the public interest (Forester 1989; Innes 1998). Within this approach planners accept the multiplicity of interests, combined with an enduring common interest in finding viable, politically legitimate solutions. Planners serve the public interest by negotiating a kind of multicultural, technically informed pluralism. Sandercock, who has done as much as anyone to question the idea of a unitary public, is making such a claim when she argues for the transformative possibility of dialogue in allowing different groups to occupy and collectively govern shared space (Chapter 20).

In the end, the question of the public interest is the leitmotiv that holds together the defining debates of planning theory. The central task of planners is serving the public interest in cities, suburbs, and the countryside. Questions of when, why, and how planners should intervene – and the constraints they face in the process – all lead back to defining and serving the public interest, even while it is not static or fixed. The restructured urban economy, the shifting boundaries between the public and private sectors, the effects of telecommunications and information technology, and the changing tools and available resources constantly force planners to rethink the public interest. This constant rethinking is the task of planning theory.

## **The Continuing Evolution of Planning Theory**

Planning theory is an evolving field, and this book, therefore, is just a moment in that evolution. In the 20 years since the first edition of this reader was published, the subject has undergone a set of shifts and refinements. Debates and issues that had seemed central have receded from prominence – either discarded or, conversely, have become incorporated into "accepted wisdom." Postmodernism has thus faded as a major focus, but its influence endures in an increased emphasis on

discourse, on varied ways of knowing, and on pluralism of interpretation. Similarly, communicative planning has arguably also entered a new phase: it is simultaneously more accepted, differentiated, and criticized. And the debates surrounding New Urbanism have also shifted, as many of its goals have become squarely part of planning practices.

Over a generation, the most significant advances in planning theory are a changing understanding of power (Brindley et al. 1996; Flyvbjerg 1998), of communicative action and the planner's role in mediating interactions among stakeholders (Forester, Chapter 18, this volume; Booher and Innes 2010), of modernization/modernism (Scott, Chapter 3, this volume), of the complex links between diversity, equity, democracy, and community (Young, Chapter 19, this volume; Thomas, Chapter 22, this volume, and Sandercock, Chapter 20, this volume), and of the relations between processes and outcomes (Fainstein, Chapter 13, this volume). Significant efforts have also been made to understand the concepts of sustainability (Campbell, Chapter 11, this volume), resilience (Gleeson, Chapter 12, this volume), and complexity (de Roo and Silva, 2010).

If we assume that planning theory will continue to evolve in response to changes in planning practice, the development of cities, and the rise of social movements, then we can speculate on future directions for planning theory. Planners urgently need a larger conceptual world view to absorb the ramifications of the digital revolution of the Internet, massive data storage and retrieval, and geographic information systems (GIS). Planning methodologies need to be revised to deal with the coming flood of data. The real-time tracking of flows in time-space coordinates (e.g., microchips and bar codes creating a world of geo-coded products, resources, and even people) creates new opportunities for planners to understand dynamic spatial processes, such as time-space-based user fees, the "sharing economy" facilitated by smart phone applications, development impact fees, and GIS-based performance zoning. However, this data revolution will also thrust the field into the tricky ethical world of data privacy issues.

Increasing globalization will force planning theory to incorporate different types of cities into what had been Euro-American models of urbanization; Shanghai, Tokyo, Mexico City, Mumbai, and so forth will more and more provide the basis for concepts of planning's role and aims. Thus questions of informality (Roy, Chapter 26, this volume) become central to planning the world's most rapidly growing metropolises. We would expect questions of equity and economic development to continue to be central parts of planning theory as applied to both the developing world and developed world. As globalization continues to raise tensions between the preservation of local communities and the acceleration of global networks, maintaining local communities as meaningful spaces for collective endeavor will remain crucial (DeFilippis 2004). The impact of climate change on all parts of the globe requires traditional planning concerns with environmental protection to encompass much broader ecological threats than before (Gleeson, Chapter 12, this volume).

All these examples suggest that the interaction between theory, urban change, and planning practice is symbiotic and often asynchronous. Planning theory acts as a kind of intellectual vanguard, pushing the professional field to rethink outdated practices and the assumptions underlying them. Planning theory aims also to bring our thinking about planning up to date and in line with both urban phenomena (sprawl, globalization, etc.) and social theories from other fields (such as deliberative democracy or critical theory) (Friedmann 2011). In addition, the theory–practice time lag may run the other way round: the task of planning theory is often to catch up with planning practice itself, codifying and restating approaches to planning that practitioners have long since used (such as disjointed incrementalism or dispute mediation). Planning theory can therefore alternately be a running commentary, parallel and at arm’s length to the profession: a prescriptive avant-garde or instead a response to planning practice.

If there is a persistent gap between grand theory and modest accomplishment, it may also be overly simplistic to attribute it to the distance between theory and practice. It may instead reflect the discrepancy between what the theorist rightfully envisions as the ideal social–spatial arrangement of the world (i.e., the good, just city) and the more modest contributions that planners can make toward this ideal (given the political-economic constraints posed on the profession). Planning scholars frequently conflate the two, imagining an ideal urban society and then making all its characteristics the goals of the planning agenda. However, should the discipline be faulted for its lofty (and overreaching) ambitions?

## The Readings

Compiling a reader in planning theory presents a dilemma. One can reprint the early postwar classics – thereby duplicating several other anthologies and providing little space for contemporary debates – or else risk over-representing transient contemporary ideas.<sup>2</sup> We have chosen a somewhat different path. Rather than trying to cover the whole field, whether historically or at the present moment, we have selected a set of readings – both “classic” and recent – that effectively address the pressing and enduring questions in planning theory. In particular, they address the challenges and dilemmas of planning as defined at the beginning of this introduction: *What role can planning play in developing the good city and region within the constraints of a capitalist global economy and varying political systems?* We approach this question primarily through texts that address specific theoretical issues. However, we have also included several case studies that provide vivid and concrete illustrations of these questions.

Planning theory is a relatively young field, yet one can already speak of “classic readings.” Our guide has been to choose readings – both old and new – that still speak directly to contemporary issues. Most have been written in the past 10 years,

though some articles from the 1960s are still the best articulation of specific debates. Most draw upon experiences in North America and Europe, but this edition differs from earlier ones in including a section on the developing world. The selections compiled here represent a substantial revision of the third edition of *Readings in Planning Theory* (Fainstein and Campbell 2011). Roughly half the selections are new, reflecting more recent or more accessible statements of planning theories or newly emerging themes. We have retained those readings from earlier editions that students and teachers of planning theory reported finding particularly useful and exciting.

The readings are organized into five parts, each prefaced with a short introduction to the main themes. We begin with the foundations of modern planning, including both traditional and critical views of planning history. We then turn to two interrelated questions: *What are planners trying to do?* And *The justifications and critiques of planning*. Addressing the political and economic justifications for planning, the chapters place planners in the larger context of the relationship between the private market and government (both local and national). They thus address the fundamental questions of why we plan and what we are trying to do when we do plan.

The third part of the book uses practice examples to inform theory-building. Thus it is not theory informing practice, but the other way around. These are not case studies, per se, but the use of examples from practice to explicitly theorize planning. Racial, ethnic, and gender politics have emerged as powerful, transformative, and conflictual forces in urban planning. The readings in the fourth part explore the themes of difference, discrimination, and inequality. These theories challenge planning to be more inclusive, to accept the city as home to divergent populations with radically different experiences and needs, to see how the existing city fabric perpetuates antiquated social and gender relations, and to pursue social justice more aggressively. Finally the book concludes with a set of readings that examine issues for planners in developing countries. The principal question raised here is whether the theories that have arisen in the West are applicable in parts of the world with vastly different economic circumstances, political frameworks, and social divisions, and how we should transform our theoretical apparatuses to understand planning in the cities where the majority of the world's people live.

## Notes

1. One of us had a student who, early in the semester in a planning theory course, quoted the humorously dismissive Yogi Berra line that: "In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is."
2. Faludi (1973) contains a classic set of readings. Hillier and Healey's (2008) three-volume collection is inclusive of the major writings in planning theory until that date.

## References

- Ballon, Hilary, and Kenneth T. Jackson, eds. 2007. *Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Booher, David E., and Judith E. Innes. 2010. Governance for Resilience: CALFED as a Complex Adaptive Network for Resource Management. *Ecology and Society*, 15 (3): 337.
- Brindley, Tim, Yvonne Rydin, and Gerry Stoker. 1996. *Remaking Planning: The Politics of Urban Change*. 2nd edn. New York: Routledge.
- Caro, Robert. 1974. *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York*. New York: Alfred Knopf.
- Clavel, Pierre. 1986. *The Progressive City*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Clavel, Pierre. 2010. *Activists in City Hall*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Commercial Club of Chicago, David Hudson Burnham, Edward H. Bennett, and Charles Moore. 1909. *Plan of Chicago*. Chicago, IL: The Commercial Club.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1968. *Essays in the Theory of Society*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- DeFilippis, James. 2004. *Unmaking Goliath*. New York: Routledge.
- de Roo, Gert and Elisabete Silva (eds). 2010. *A Planner's Encounter with Complexity*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- DeSoto, Hernando. 2003. *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*. New York: Basic Books
- Doig, Jameson. 1987. Coalition Building by a Regional Agency: Austin Tobin and the Port of New York Authority. In Clarence Stone and Heywood Sanders, eds, *The Politics of Urban Development*. Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, pp. 73–104.
- Fainstein, Susan S. 2010. *The Just City*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Fainstein, Susan S., and Scott Campbell (eds). 2011. *Readings in Urban Theory*, 3rd edn. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Faludi, Andreas (ed.). 1973. *A Reader in Planning Theory*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Fischer, Frank. 1991. Risk Assessment and Environmental Crisis: Toward an Integration of Science and Participation. *Industrial Crisis Quarterly*, 5(2): 113–32.
- Fishman, Robert. 1987. *Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Fitch, Robert. 1993. *The Assassination of New York*. New York: Verso Press.
- Flyvbjerg, Bent. 1998. *Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Flyvbjerg, Bent, Mette K. Skamris Holm, and Søren L. Buhl. 2005. How (In)accurate Are Demand Forecasts in Public Works Projects? The Case of Transportation. *Journal of the American Planning Association*. 71(2): 131–46.
- Foglesong, Richard E. 1986. *Planning the Capitalist City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Forester, John. 1989. *Planning in the Face of Power*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Frieden, Bernard, and Lynn Sagalyn. 1989. *Downtown Inc. How America Rebuilds Cities*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Friedmann, John. 2011. *Insurgencies: Essays in Planning Theory*. Routledge: New York

- Galbraith, John K. 1971. *The New Industrial State*. New York: New American Library.
- Hall, Peter. 2002. *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century*, 3rd edn. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harloe, Michael. 1995. *The People's Home*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, David. 1985. On Planning the Ideology of Planning. In *The Urbanization of Capital*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 165–84.
- Harvey, David. 1989. From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 71(1): 3–17.
- Harvey, David. 2001. Social Justice, Postmodernism and the City. In S. S. Fainstein and S. Campbell, eds, *Readings in Urban Theory*, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Harvey, David. 2003. *Paris: Capital of Modernity*. New York: Routledge.
- Hayek, Friedrich A. 1944. *The Road to Serfdom*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hillier, Jean, and Patsy Healey. 2008. *Critical Essays in Planning Theory* (3 vols). Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Hoffman, Lily. 1989. *The Politics of Knowledge: Activist Movements in Medicine and Planning*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Holston, James. 2009. *Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Howard, Ebenezer, and Frederic James Osborn. 1945 [1898]. *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Innes, Judith E. 1998. Information in Communicative Planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 64(Winter): 52–63.
- Krueckeberg, Donald A. (ed.). 1983. *The Culture of Planning*. In D. A. Krueckeberg, ed., *Introduction to Planning History in the United States*, New Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy Research, pp. 1–12.
- Krumholz, Norman and John Forester. 1990. *Making Equity Planning Work*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Levy, John M. 1990. What Local Economic Developers Actually Do: Location Quotients Versus Press Releases. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 56(2): 153–60.
- Lindblom, Charles. 1959. The Science of “Muddling Through.” *Public Administration Review*. 19(2): 79–88.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1949. *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Marcuse, Peter. 1976. Professional Ethics and Beyond: Values in Planning. *Journal of the American Institute of Planning*, 42(3): 264–74.
- Marcuse, Peter. 2011. Social Justice and Power in Planning History and Theory. In Naomi Carmon and Susan S. Fainstein, eds, *Urban Planning as if People Mattered*. Philadelphia, PA: Penn Press.
- Marcuse, Peter, James Connolly, Ingrid Olivo Magana, Johannes Novy, Cuz Potter, and Justin Steil (eds). 2009. *Searching for the Just City*. New York: Routledge.
- Meyerson, Martin, and Edward C. Banfield. 1964. *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest*. New York: Free Press.
- Purcell, Mark. 2008. *Recapturing Democracy*. New York: Routledge.
- Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Robinson, Charles Mulford. 1901. *The Improvement of Towns and Cities; or the Practical Basis of Civic Aesthetics*. New York: G. P. Putnam.

- Rubin, Herbert J. 2000. *Renewing Hope within Neighborhoods of Despair*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Sandercock, Leonie. 1998. *Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities*. New York: Academy Press.
- Self, Robert O. 2003. *American Babylon*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Squires, Gregory D. (ed.). 1989. *Unequal Partnerships: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment in Postwar America*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Stone, Clarence N. 1993. Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 15(1): 1–28.
- Walsh, Annmarie Hauck. 1978. *The Public's Business: The Politics and Practices of Government Corporations*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

# Part I

## The Development of Planning Theory

### Introduction

1. Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier  
*Robert Fishman*
2. Co-evolutions of Planning and Design: Risks and Benefits of Design Perspectives in Planning Systems  
*Kristof Van Assche, Raoul Beunen, Martijn Duineveld, and Harro de Jong*
3. Authoritarian High Modernism  
*James C. Scott*
4. The Death and Life of Great American Cities  
*Jane Jacobs*
5. Planning the Capitalist City  
*Richard E. Foglesong*
6. The Three Historic Currents of City Planning  
*Peter Marcuse*

### Introduction

The readings in this first section examine influential visions of modern planning. They offer both established and critical views of planning history. We begin with Robert Fishman's examination of two foundational figures in planning's intellectual

history: Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier. (Fishman's larger book on *Urban Utopias*, from which this chapter is excerpted, also looks at a third visionary of twentieth-century urbanism: Frank Lloyd Wright.) Fishman goes beyond the standard account of Howard and Le Corbusier to examine the social history behind their distinctive utopias. Although all were reacting to the grimy reality of industrial cities, each took a fundamentally different path toward planning their ideal urban society. Corbusier's Radiant City was mass-scaled, dense, vertical, hierarchical – the social extension of modern architecture. Wright went to the other extreme: his Broadacre City was a mixture of Jeffersonian agrarian individualism and prairie suburbanism, linked by superhighways. Howard's Garden Cities were scaled somewhere in between: self-contained, relatively dense villages of 35,000 residents held together by a cooperative spirit, private industrial employers, and a communal greenbelt. The three utopias symbolize fundamental choices in the scale of human settlements: Corbusier's mass *Gesellschaft*, Howard's village-like *Gemeinschaft*, or Wright's American individualism.

Although spatial planning originated within the design professions, after World War II it increasingly became based in social science. Chapter 2 by Van Assche et al. examines the co-evolutions of planning and design in order to demonstrate the contribution of good design to good planning. The authors begin by distinguishing design from planning perspectives. They demarcate the planning system by those actors and institutions that regulate and coordinate the uses of space. In contrast, while urban design overlaps with planning, it is especially concerned with manipulating spatial imagery at the micro-scale, and it introduces an emphasis on aesthetics. In particular, a design perspective captures the character of specific places and allows for their differentiation. The authors recognize the tension between planning and design caused by differing priorities but argue that every resolution requires trade-offs, that the balance will be affected by the culture in which planning and design are embedded, and that each perspective can inform the other.

The political scientist James Scott traces the roots of modernist planning's effort to impose order on the messiness of humans and their environment – particularly focusing on what he calls “authoritarian high modernism.” In an excerpt from his book, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Chapter 3, this volume), Scott traces the link between modernism and the modern nation-state's efforts to simplify and standardize, while rejecting local context and initiative, to make the nation legible, measurable, and counted. This is how the modern state “sees.” Scott identifies three elements common to disastrous abuses of modern state development: administrative ordering of nature and society through simplification and standardization (“high modernism”); the unrestrained use of the power of the modern state to implement these rational designs; and a civil society too weak to resist effectively. “Social engineering” becomes the consequence of high modernism and nation-state power, and the authoritarian tendencies of the single modernist voice of rationality displace all other forms of judgment.

Scott sees three effective strategies to counter authoritarian high modernism: belief in a private sphere of activity outside the interference of the state (the idea