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Dorion Cairns

Lester Embree *Editor*

The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl

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DORION CAIRNS AND LESTER EMBREE
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Editorial Foreword

This is the first volume of what will probably be six volumes of the *Philosophical Papers of Dorion Cairns* and contains his Harvard dissertation of 1933. The Editorial Committee for this project is composed of Profs. Fred Kersten, Richard M. Zaner, and myself. Zaner is Cairns's literary heir and has final approval for the edited publications. The present forward seeks to introduce this volume with a brief biographical sketch through the time of Cairns's completion of his dissertation and offers some remarks about the significance of this text. A thorough biography is planned for a subsequent volume where there will be more space available.

Dorion Cairns (1901–1973) was born in the Village of Contoocook, in the town of Hopkinton, New Hampshire on the 4 of July, 1901. His father was a Methodist minister who moved the family several times. His mother was quite religious. Cairns attended High School in Saugus, Massachusetts, after earlier schooling chiefly in Chattanooga, Tennessee. He was admitted to Harvard College in 1919 as a Freshman-on-trial, presumably because of his weak preparation. He had a scholarship of $200 from a lady in Saugus and savings from after-school and summer work in a meat market, where, alluding to Plato, he later commented that he learned to cut at the joints. He also lived at home the first year, commuting by streetcar. At Harvard he soon impressed his teachers, was awarded scholarships for his second, third, and fourth years, and received his Bachelor of Arts degree *magna cum laude* in 1923.

In his second year of Graduate School at Harvard, Cairns succeeded Marvin Farber to the Sheldon travelling fellowship and planned to spend the year visiting all of the leading philosophers in Europe. He had been interested chiefly in philosophy since he was a senior in High School, had come to focus at Harvard on epistemology and the philosophy of natural science, but had begun to be disillusioned. A professor who had taught him phenomenological value theory and who had himself studied with Edmund Husserl, namely, Winthrop Bell, recommended that Cairns visit Husserl first, which he did. When Husserl heard what Cairns had read of his work, the phenomenologist "turned around in his desk chair, took down the first part of the second volume of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, and said: 'Study this. Study it pen in hand. If you don't understand or if you object, write down your question or objection.

Come to me next week and we shall discuss it together."[1] In a letter to his father that same day, Cairns wrote:

> And [Husserl] directed me to read, slowly, pen in hand, critically, open-mindedly. He has the reputation of a disciple hunter, but he is a very clever one if such, for he assured me that he valued independent thought far more than slavish following. I am to read then and go to him with any questions. Altogether I was quite pleased with my visit and went away feeling that here was a real boss-philosopher, a philosopher more nearly in the grand manner, like Kant and Hegel, than any I had met before. (September 24, 1924)

Cairns took credit for examples in his dissertation, but the reader of it will have many occasions in which to recollect the example in this description of a case of teaching:

> I followed Husserl's advice on how to read them and, taking him at his word, brought him my major difficulties and objections. He was exceedingly generous with his time. Looking back, I am struck by the number of genuine discussions we had. I made no notes on those early conversations, but I recall particularly one argument about visual perception. I had been defending the doctrine that only perspective appearances are strictly seen. At last Husserl looked down at a box of matches in his hand, turned it this way and that, then, looking me squarely in the eye, reported loudly and distinctly: "*Ich sehe den Streichholzschachtel*." It was the proper method at that moment. I was startled into recognition of the obvious. (042363)

In his autobiographical sketch he continued,

> My plan to do the grand tour of all the universities of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom went completely by the board. Soon I became immersed in studying Husserl, and talking with him, and I decided to remain and study with Husserl. The first thing that made me believe he had something that nobody else had was his analysis of perception, imagination, and memory. I had never seen anything like it before. I felt: "The guy is right! and nobody else. He's right, at least on these things, and I'm going to stick with him. Who cares about a grand tour? etc."

No doubt on Husserl's recommendation, Cairns's fellowship was renewed and so he spent two years attending Husserl's courses and working with him individually. Back at Harvard in 1926–1927, Cairns wrote about 100 pages of a doctoral dissertation on *a priori* grammar that he entitled *Experience and Understanding* and about which he noted to himself in 1940, "Having looked through this material again, I believe that some things in it are not derivative and might be worth communicating."

Why Cairns did not complete his first attempt at a dissertation is not known. He served as an Assistant in Philosophy at Ratcliff College as well as at Harvard in 1926–1928. He also earned money reviewing books in this time. But in Spring 1929 he was overworked and suffered a nervous breakdown (he always suffered from depressions) and went to New York City for psychoanalytic treatment. In order to remain there for that purpose, he declined positions offered by the universities of Washington, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, even as the Great Depression

[1] Dorion Cairns, "My Own Life," ed. Lester Embree, *in Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism: Essays in Memory of Dorion Cairns*, ed. Fred Kersten and Richard M. Zaner (The Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1973), p.7.

was beginning. He also taught in New York as a lecturer at the Rand School for Social Science in 1929–1931.

Cairns was somehow able to return to study with Husserl for a year and a half, i.e., from June 1931 until December 1932. In the meantime, Husserl's *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Zeitbewüßtseins* (1928), *Formale und transzendentale Logik* (1929), and *Méditations Cartesiennes* (1931) had been published, he was given access to some of Husserl's manuscripts, and he had some 150 meetings with him that have been posthumously published as his *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*.[2] (Cairns later regretted not recording his meetings from his earlier trip in this way as well and also doing so in German.)

Returning home, Cairns wrote his dissertation in six months. He had become confident about his understanding of how more than 40 years of Husserl's published results could be raised to the 1931 level, which included a systematic arrangement for them, especially including resort to the *Abbau-Aufbau* method, association, and non-doxic positing and also an accurate English terminology. (But of course his work on terminology continued later, *Erlebnis*, for example, being rendered in the dissertation as "awareness," later rendered as "subjective process," then as "mental process," and, finally, in his own investigations, as "intentive process.") Nothing better indicates Cairns's confidence in his understanding of Husserl at that time than his decision to include no bibliographical references in this dissertation.

Down through the years, Cairns not only refined terminology, but also refined his understanding of Husserl further, and, above all, revised and extended various positions beyond those of his master.[3] And in later years he also expressed unspecified doubt about his dissertation, once wondering if a student might steal it from the Harvard Library so he could destroy it! But of course he kept three copies in his papers. Future scholars with later volumes in the *Philosophical Papers* to begin from may wish to attempt to determine what Cairns's later misgivings were.

The first chapter contains the long analysis of the way to transcendental phenomenology from the idea of science as criticized knowledge that Cairns was unsuccessful in urging Husserl to use in the expanded German edition of the *Cartesianische Meditationens* that was being contemplated: "I defended the desirability of the motivation from the general ideal of radical knowledge, as being a motivation independent of cultural situations and [thus] universal. Husserl defended the first motivation as admitting a simpler exposition. The second would require a long analysis of the nature of knowledge and belief."[4]

As stated above, a later volume of these *Philosophical Papers* will contain as complete as possible a biography of Cairns, including his teaching during the Great Depression, his medal-winning war service, and especially his teaching on the

[2] Edited by the Husserl-Archives in Louvain, with a forward by Richard M. Zaner (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).

[3] Lester Embree, *Animism, Adumbration, Willing, and Wisdom: Studies in the Phenomenology of Dorion Cairns* (Bucharest: Zetabooks, 2012)

[4] *Conversations*, p. 81, cf. pp. 27 and 75–77.

Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of the New School for Social Research during the last two decades of his life.

The editing of this volume has chiefly included correction of the few orthographical and typographical errors, the two carbon copies with later handwritten and sometimes dated changes, and the handwritten original text being consulted. My few editorial footnotes are identified with the initials "L.E." Cairns's notes have no initials. The library of Harvard University is thanked for help identifying the internal references not copied into the carbon copies. My research assistants at Florida Atlantic University, Dr. Daniel Marcelle and Mr. Elliot Shaw, are thanked for dedicated efforts in the transcribing and proofreading necessary for this project. And Prof. Richard M. Zaner is also again thanked for the permission to edit and publish our teacher's work.

William F. Dietrich Eminent Scholar Lester Embree
Florida Atlantic University

Preface

The theme of the present essay is the *content* of Edmund Husserl's philosophy in its present state of development. Earlier phases of that philosophy and its position in the history of philosophy and culture in general lie outside the present theme. This essay is primarily expository. What little it contains of criticism of Husserl's theories or of comparison of them with those of other philosophers has been introduced only to clarify the exposition.

The sources used by the author are (1) Husserl's published works, (2) his unpublished manuscripts, and (3) his oral expositions of his philosophy to the author. A list of the published works is appended at the end of the present essay. From June 1931 to December 1932, Prof. Husserl allowed the author free access to his manuscripts and over 150 lengthy interviews on his philosophy.

The published works are indispensable, but nevertheless inadequate, sources for such an essay as this. They have been written at various times throughout a period of over 40 years during which Husserl's philosophy has been developing. This development has brought with it changes in doctrine which are not all indicated in the later published works. None of the works is a complete systematic exposition. The theme of the *Logische Untersuchungen* is restricted[5]; and the later books, in so far as their themes are more general, are in the nature of summary reports of work accomplished. Certain already developed and essential parts of Husserl's philosophy (e.g., the contents of Chaps. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the present essay) are no more than mentioned in the published works.The manuscripts are, then, an indispensable source providing not only indications of changes in theory but also the wealth of concrete analyses upon which the published theories are founded. They too are of widely varying dates and themes and are so extensive that the author was unable to read enough of them to arrive thereby at a sufficiently clear and adequate understanding of the extent, development, and present status of Husserl's philosophy.

Conversations with Husserl were, therefore, a threefold aid to the present effort: They increased the author's knowledge of the detail and extent of Husserl's

[5] B change accepted—semicolon replacing the "A" comma.—L.E.

investigations. They revealed certain changes in doctrine of which the author had not known and the motivations for these and other changes. Most important, they clarified the meaning of what had been obscure and removed certain misconceptions.

The purpose which was set and the nature of the sources made the work of preparation more than a mere passive understanding and recording. Earlier works had to be judged critically in the light of later pronouncements even where the subject matter of the earlier works was but implicitly referred to by these. Moreover, it fell to the author to make explicit the system implicit in this vast theory, which Husserl has nowhere expounded as a whole. This was necessary if the projected essay was to have a rational structure. Over and above the understanding of the sense of Husserl's theories and the criticizing of earlier in the light of later ones, the work of discovering a relatively satisfactory order of exposition has been considerable.

The present exposition is, moreover, incomplete. Some of the astounding richness of Husserl's theoretical achievement is omitted, not only because of the author's ignorance, but also because inclusion of all of it that he knows would make this essay even longer. On the other hand, the place in the system of all the here omitted matter should be clear from what is given.

The fact that perhaps two-third of the material is based wholly or in part on unpublished sources would make any system of source-references inadequate. References to published sources have also been omitted. In many chapters almost every sentence would require a separate footnote, frequently with references to two or three works. Such an apparatus would be far too bulky and yet of little value.

The terminology of the present essay requires a word of apology. Husserl's conscious purpose is not to take up the philosophic tradition where his predecessors have left off, to criticize their theories and solve their problems. The "phenomenological reduction" (Chap. 1) involves a deliberate attempt to break absolutely with all tradition. The ideal of Husserl's philosophy is a purely descriptive theory of what we see; science and philosophy as cultural facts are merely certain of the things that we see and wish to describe. Every habitually familiar concept is to be "bracketed" and new ones are to be created on the basis of direct acquaintance with the sheer data. We are forced, if we wish to communicate our theories, to employ as a basis the traditional language. Always, however, the reader must understand that in doing so we are putting good new wine in bad old bottles simply because that is the only way of delivering it. The familiar label is no adequate indication of contents. Whatever Husserl says is an exhortation to the reader that he look at the facts themselves and see for himself. Any word, any description, which helps the reader to see what the writer sees performs its proper function. But the less easy it is for the reader to attach some purely habitual meaning to the writer's words, the more surely do they perform that function. The development of a new vocabulary has accordingly been an indispensable part of the development of phenomenology. Old words are used in new senses, what are usually synonymous terms are frequently differentiated to express evident factual differences in the subject matter, and where some newly discovered phenomenon is to be expressed, or where every traditional word is dangerously burdened with familiar theoretical implications, new words have been invented. If the resultant text is hard to understand, it is largely because it is harder to *misunderstand*.

Terminology has accordingly presented a peculiar problem for the present essay. There could be no thought of merely translating Husserl's *words* into English, according to the conventional system of "dictionary" equivalents. Such a process frequently results in unintelligible jargon, and is occasionally an absolute impossibility (*viz.*, where the English vocabulary is essentially inadequate to express directly differentiations which can be expressed in German, where Husserl's expressions are not "dictionary" words at all, and where some German idiom is either untranslatable or loses its contextual significance when translated). The only hopeful method has been to go back to the phenomena themselves and use the resources of the English language according to the principles which have guided Husserl in using German. Where the conventional English vocabulary is less adapted to express the thought than is the German, there has been more neologizing and indirection than in Husserl. On the other hand, English occasionally allows a more direct and less barbaric terminology. Where Husserl has introduced a totally new word, it has generally proved the case that the reasons for introducing it in German are reasons for introducing it in English. Either there is no familiar word which can be pressed into service or all familiar words which offer themselves are too likely to be understood in terms of the philosophical tradition. The neologisms which Husserl has adopted in such situations are mostly derived from the Greek and are accordingly no less at home in an English setting than they are in a German one. The result is that, although no German words are to be found in the present essay, the reader who turns from it to Husserl's works will recognize in them enough familiar landmarks to orient himself.

With a few trifling exceptions all the concrete illustrations in this essay are the author's. In many instances illustrations have been provided where Husserl has merely stated a general proposition, but it would have been impossible to illustrate everything without writing a book four times the size of this one. In certain places in the text, notably where the example brings out essential structures which have not been analyzed by Husserl, the author's responsibility is expressly stated.

The process of systematizing Husserl's theories brought out certain distinctions and refinements of theory which, so far as the author knows, have not been made explicit by Husserl, but yet could not be repressed if the general structure was to be made clear. These points are in every case indicated in the text. Otherwise every proposition which we state has either been expressly asserted by Husserl, or in a special consequence of some more general proposition which he has asserted.

The author wishes to expresses his indebtedness to Prof. Husserl and his assistant, Dr. Eugen Fink, for their most generous assistance, not only in making material available but in helping him to evaluate and understand it. Without any one of these aids this essay could not have been written.

Summary[6]

The present thesis is an exposition of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl.

I believe in the world and in myself as an object in the world. To believe in the world is to take the world as existing, and to believe in any object is to take it as existing in the world. While taking the world as existing, I can also reflect upon this my believing in the world and take "the world" not as existing but as "what I believe." This is to be in two attitudes at once, the *natural* attitude of believing in the world (taking it as existing) and the "phenomenological" attitude of believing only in my natural belief in "the world," while taking "the world" not as existing but as the "objective sense" of my belief.

In the phenomenological attitude I do not believe in myself as an object in the world; rather is "myself as existing in the world" a part of the total objective sense of my natural belief in the world. Accordingly, in the phenomenological attitude I posit my belief in the world not as itself an object in the world, but as an object "transcending" the world. I distinguish between "my believing" qua psychological phenomenal object in the total world phenomenon and my believing qua posited transcendental object, the phenomenal-objective sense of which includes "my believing" qua phenomenon. "Being" has gained for me a new sense. When I am in the natural attitude being is always and only being-in-the-world. When I am in the phenomenological attitude being is, on the one hand, transcendental being, and on the other hand, phenomenal "being," i.e., being as posited objective sense of transcendental awareness and belief.

My transcendental awareness of the world phenomenon is an object whereof, in the transcendental attitude, I am immediately aware. In the natural attitude, on the

[6] The following concise statement was found with one of the author's copies of the dissertation. It seems to be a statement of what Cairns considered the core of his exposition of Husserl's philosophy at its stage of development in 1932. Probably it was prepared for and read at the defense of the dissertation at Harvard in Spring 1933.—L.E.

other hand, I am aware of my awareness only as a moment in the world. Between the two—transcendental awareness and phenomenal psychological awareness—there is a peculiar relation not to be found between any two phenomenal objects, as it were, an identity and also a diversity. They belong to different spheres of being and their relation is not to be grasped according to categories which apply only within a single one of these.

Phenomenology aims at a description of the immediately given essential nature of transcendental awareness, as awareness of the world-phenomenon. On the one hand, it aims at an analysis of the structure of the objective-sense "world"; on the other hand, it aims at analysis of the structure of the transcendental awareness which is a believing in "the world."

My transcendental awareness is a "temporal" flux in which I intend not only things outside the flux, but also the flux itself. In each phase of itself the flux intends itself as *that* present phase and also by retaining its past and protending its future phases. Each phase intends its own outside (impressional) object, and, through the retained and protended phases, the objects of the latter (retentional or habitual object, protentional object). A non-present phase of the flux may be intended not only retentionally or protentionally, but impressionally like an outside object (immanent recollection and anticipation). Every impressional object is intended as in or of the world which is a continuously impressional and habitual object given as "there in person." The flux itself is intended as in the world. The world being continually and necessarily given as "there in person," is a *necessary valid* outside object. If the world and all that is in and of it were invalid objects, the present phase of the flux of awareness would still be necessarily given (evident) as "there in person," with its character as between a past and future, as intending an outside "world," etc. The intended nature of the flux as "in the world" is as evident and certain as the world itself. But *if* the world could be an invalid object, the intended nature of the flux as "in the world" would be invalid. The present phase of the flux, and its essential nature as implicating the whole flux, has a being no more certain than that of the world, but of a *higher order*. We call this "transcendental being." The flux as implicated in its own present transcendental phase is intended as having the same sort of being (transcendental being) as the present transcendental phase. The themes of the present essay are, then, (1) transcendental being, and (2) the world (with all that is in and of it) as its intended object.

Particular "world objects" are impressionally intended in isolable extents of transcendental consciousness (acts). The act intends the object as having a given object-sense. The intending has its modes of attention (actuality) of which one is inattention (inactuality). The unattended is the intended background of the attended. The sense (attended or not) is "given" in a certain way (e.g., clearly, obscurely, perceptually, memorially), and posited in a certain way (e.g., as existent, as valuable). The intended object as posited with a certain sense we call the thetic character. Thetic character is either belief (doxa) or not (e.g., valuational, volitional thetic character). Every type of thetic character has a range of modalities of certainty, all derived from the mode, "complete certainty." Phantasy is positing as a fiction against a fictive world background, but with the real world still intended as

background of the fictive world. Positing as pure possibility is distinguished from phantasy. "Neutralization" is the "suspension of the force of a thesis." The full sense of an object is a function of its background (inactual, retained, protended). The transcendental ego is implicit in actual acts.

Some acts are "founded" in others. The positing (objectification) of thetic quality is a founded act. The unity of transcendental consciousness is a unity through "synthesis." So is the unity of each act. Acts are simple or articulated (polythetic). Simple acts include simple "syntheses of identification," e.g., sense perception. Articulated acts, e.g., predicative judging, are founded in simple acts. An articulated act may found a simple act that objectivates in a simple thesis the articulated sense of the articulated act ("nominalization").

Objects are given "directly," e.g., in perception or memory, or indirectly, e.g., symbolically, if the former then originally (perception) or reproductively (e.g., memory, anticipation). The retained act when an object of a recollection is likewise—as intended—reproductively modified.

Evidence (self-givenness) has various modes and degrees of perfection. (E.g., original awareness is more perfect than reproductive.) A non-evident and an evident (or a less and a more evident) act may unite in a synthesis of object-identification which verifies or refutes the thesis of the non-evident.

The "world" is a "founded" sense with many strata.

Sense perception is the act in which the basic stratum of the world is given with the most perfect possible evidence. This also is a founded act with many strata. Basic is a stratum of "sense data" given (in a synthesis of identification) as part of the flux of consciousness. Transcendental consciousness is passive over against the synthetic "constitution" of the lower strata of the world sense—but active in the synthetic constitution of the higher phases thereof. Active constitution is founded in passive constitution. Attention is the lowest form of spontaneity. It may be directed on outer objects or on the flux. Higher doxic forms are "explication," syntactical judgment and ideation. Explication of the most primitive sort is the attentive singling out of moments in a complex objective sense constituted in pure passivity. Syntactical judgment is, in its simplest form, the conferring of a formal logical structure upon an objective sense formed in pure passivity. Ideation is the grasping of a universal or essence on the basis of intending an individual object, which thereby gains the sense of being an instance of the universal. Active syntactical judgment and ideation "follow" the passively preconstituted structure of objectivity.

The non-doxic acts of valuing and willing are founded in doxic acts and, in turn, found other acts in which the so-constituted value-qualities of objects are doxically grasped.

A syntactically formed objective sense is always, in the concrete case, "conceptualized," i.e., grasped as a syntactical structure, whereof each moment is grasped as an instance of some general essence. It is this *conceptualized* syntactical structure which, with the way in which it is posited, is the "meaning" of a verbal expression.

The flux of transcendental awareness is not merely awareness of the world, but is also *my ego's* awareness. That is a descriptive characteristic of every spontaneous act, and every non-spontaneous act (in which the ego does not "live") is potentially

an act of my ego. The latter is not a mere contentless "pole of identity"—it has a determinate character, by virtue of the acts in which it "lives."

The world has the sense of being "intersubjective," of being the correlate not only of *my* transcendental awareness, but of all other possible transcendental awarenesses. This is a *founded* sense of the world. On the lowest level of pure passivity there is constituted a "private" or egological world, as correlate of my own transcendental awareness, then, on the basis of the factual appearance of other organisms in the world, there is founded the fully constituted intersubjective world, as correlate of all transcendental awareness.

Contents

Chapter 1
The Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction: Husserl's Concept of the Idea of Philosophy

[1]The ideal of philosophy is perfect knowledge. This formulation, any formulation at the outset of philosophic investigation, may be inadequate and incompletely understandable, since philosophy is something we do not have, but are seeking. That one can understand it at all is owing to the fact that one already knows the meaning of the word "knowledge." This, in turn, is only because one already knows instances of knowledge, and knows them as instances of knowledge. But this knowledge of knowledge is not itself perfect; it admits of clarification. We shall first make present to ourselves certain characteristics of knowledge as a fact and as an ideal.

"Knowledge," in a *loose* sense, is an intersubjective "possession." But, in a strict sense, "knowledge" is only what is known to some single individual person; and is intersubjective knowledge only in that it is known to several individuals. My knowledge is strictly only what I know. The "knowledge" that only others possess is known to me as "their knowledge" on the basis of its intended analogy with what I know as "my knowledge"; moreover, even when I know they know, I need not know *what* they know. Furthermore, I distinguish even within the sphere of *my* knowledge (and within the sphere of any other self's knowledge) between that knowledge which is the "result" of my own *experience* of the objects known about and that knowledge which is merely taken over by me from other persons. Potentially, the knowledge that other persons have expressed in a way that makes it available to me—all the knowledge, for example, that is expressed in books—is my knowledge, even when the experience from whence it has "resulted" was not my experience. Thus one may say that, even when no living man has read them, the books in a library "contain" potential knowledge for me and for anybody who can read and understand them.

[1] Four section headings in this chapter, three of which were numbered, have been deleted because the practice was not continued in subsequent chapters. These were added by Cairns after the submission time of his thesis as he developed it. The section beginning before this paragraph was titled "Knowledge and Science." It is not inconceivable that he was thinking of chapter as a separate publication because it can stand alone.—L.E.

D. Cairns, *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*, Phaenomenologica 207,
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Whether "knowledge" be taken strictly, as some individual's knowledge (in the strictest and primary sense, as one's own knowledge), or loosely, as the intersubjective "knowledge" stored in books, knowledge in a certain eulogistic sense is exemplified only by *science*—the fact "science" and the ideal "science."

What is the essential nature of science? One characteristic of science, which distinguishes it from some less valued knowledge, is that it is express *propositional* knowledge. This distinguishes it, e.g., from such knowledge of a situation as is necessarily involved in what we call "knowing how" to act in that situation (a knowing[2] which need not involve making the situation a conscious theme), or again from the "knowledge" that consists in sheer perceptual awareness. These involve what may legitimately be called "knowledge"; but they do not necessarily involve knowledge of *propositions about* what is known; a fortiori, they do not involve expression of such propositions. (By "expression" we mean here the embodiment of the proposition in a symbol.)

Another, and more exclusive, character of science, at least as an ideal and in its highest realized instances, is that it is *systematized* propositional knowledge. Knowledge of the truth of certain propositions is the basis for knowledge of the truth of certain *other* propositions. More fundamentally, where knowledge is systematized, there is knowledge of relations of propositions in the forms of *proofs* and *theories*. But these relations uniting propositions in a system are not sufficient to make that system a science, a branch of *knowledge*. Unlike natural objects, propositions are *about* something and are true or false. They have a peculiar way of being knowledge if, in addition to being themselves known as objects, their truth (or the truth that they are false) is known—known to be either certain or likely. Such knowledge takes one beyond knowing only the proposition or the system, since truth (or falsity) involves a certain "relation"[3] of the proposition or system to that which it is about. If the truth or falsity is to be known, this relation also must be known. This means, moreover, that the subject matter itself must be known.

One's knowledge of the subject matter and of the proposition's or the system's relation to it need not, however, be immediate; there need not be original evidentness of the "correspondence" or the "discrepancy." Knowledge of truth is, in a wide sense, "knowledge," for example, in cases where one does not—and perhaps cannot—have an adequate immediate knowledge of the subject matter, as is the case with most of one's historical knowledge. But, even within the realm of what is more strictly knowledge, we find propositions the evidence for which is only mediate. Such knowledge consists in what are merely evident consequences of propositions which are, for their part, evident truths or probabilities—of propositions, that is to say, whose "correspondence" with their subject matters is immediately evident. The originally evident truth or probability of the premises is, in such instances, necessary to the knowledge of the truth or probability of the (evidently necessary) conclusion.

[2] B "a knowing" over A "a habitual familiarity."—L.E.

[3] Quotes are included in A but not B—LE.

Not all the systematized propositional knowledge which we call "science" is actually known to one person, nor has the validating subject-matter of all the propositions that are "known" to be true necessarily been evidently given to any one individual who knows them. Only *some* of science is knowledge in the strict sense, in that the "correspondence" (of the proposition or its premises) is known to the person said, with corresponding strictness, to "know" the proposition. For the rest, propositions are accepted as having been, for *someone else* evidently in correspondence with its their subject-matters. The first point, then, that we would emphasize is that no proposition—and, a fortiori, no alleged science—is in *any* sense knowledge about something unless *ultimately* it can be traced back to its (or its premise's) are in evident "correspondence" with its (perhaps imperfectly or indirectly) evident subject matter. Even knowledge that lacks characteristics essential to science has with science this point in common: that it has its basis in a subject-matter which is itself somehow "known" to someone.

It is the evidence, however, indirect or imperfect, of "correspondence" with this subject matter that distinguishes, from among beliefs in general, a certain class as "knowledge" in the widest sense. The difference in epistemic value between knowledge based on one's own direct experience of evidence and knowledge based on the testimony of others need not here be analyzed; nor need we do more now than mention the difference in epistemic value between, e.g., evidence of original presentational awareness and evidence of *memory* of original presentational awareness. Whether or not such differences are clearly formulated, we possess a habitual familiarity with them and use this "knowledge" constantly in estimating the epistemic value of various particular awarenesses. These and other differences (e.g., the difference in value between clear and obscure givenness) will be subjects of later analyses and do not affect the present considerations. We would only call attention to the fact that knowledge is known to be more or less perfect.

Among human activities, we may distinguish certain ones which are strivings for (further) knowledge. This knowledge may be desired either for itself or for the purposes of other activities, notably to further non-epistemic interests. Epistemic striving which is in the service of non-epistemic, e.g., "practical," interests is satisfied by evidence sufficient for the governing purpose, different practical purposes, e.g., requiring different degrees of perfection. In this sphere the knower has, as his goal, relative "truth," sufficient to the relative end. *Scientific* activity, in a strict sense, *viz.*, the attempt to realize "pure science," is, however, a striving for the most prefect possible knowledge of the object in question. Its ideal, its *goal*, is essentially different. Pragmatically "perfect" knowledge would not be enough for the scientist; he strives beyond it into an infinite horizon of approximations of to the theoretical ideal.

Within the sphere of knowledge, there are certain elements which have, from the point of view of pure science, a peculiar value. These are the bits of knowledge which are known to be not only *true* but *necessary*, "apodictic." Such knowledge is based on evidence, not only that "such and such is the case," but also that "such and such is necessarily the case." This is the ideal character of all knowledge of objects as "pure possibilities," of all knowledge of the essential natures of objects, and is notably exemplified in pure mathematics. *If* a fact is evidently apodictic, it is also evident that

its falsity cannot be evident. (But, as every mathematician knows from experience, this is no full guarantee that one is not wrong on both counts, that one or both of the evidences are not illusory.) Whether or not apodicticity is a valid ideal for all kinds of knowledge (it is indeed no valid ideal for all knowledge of individual matters of fact) is not here the point. We mention it only as a character of some knowledge to which attaches peculiar value, an ideal toward which the knower strives.

[4]Science (and non-scientific knowledge) differ in subject-matters, but all subject-matter is *one* in the sense that each separate subject-matter is a part of, or essentially related to, the world. Thus, certain sciences deal with certain types of world-objects, certain "regions" of the world (physical objects, psychic objects, value objects, tools, cultural objects, processes, deeds, etc.), while others—the "formal"-mathematical sciences—deal with the formal structure of possible objects of whatever region. Still other sciences deal with science (knowledge) itself as subject-matter, and have thus an indirect, but no less essential relation to the world. Sciences that deal with purely possible objects, deal with purely possible "world-objects." (Here, and in the future, "world-object" includes not only individual parts of the world, but objects—(e.g., universals, propositions)—which have an essential relation to the world—e.g., whose subject-matter or extension is, or involves, actual or possible world individuals.)[5]

All knowledge that I as a human being possess is knowledge either for or about the world, about myself as part of the world, or about the rest of the world. (About world-individuals, physical, psycho-physical, actual or possible; about the essential natures of world individuals; about the essential natures of such essential natures, about knowledge and types of knowledge of world-objects—, this knowledge itself being a world object—etc.) One's fundamental "knowledge" of the world is a habitual belief, established and confirmed by all one's experience. The world is directly given; the evidence of the world is continuous, whether one is actually busied with the world, or with some fictive pseudo-world. Moreover, every evidence for any other truth involves the habitual evidence of the world. We may call this belief "pre-scientific," in so far as science—as well as everyday knowledge—presupposes and involves it, in so far as it is perhaps never in itself an object of express awareness, and never criticized. But it is not "pre-scientific" in the sense of having been superseded by science. It persists in unquestioned certainty as the basis for all the rest of human knowledge, and is a part of the sense of every other human belief. "2 + 2 = 4" means 2 actual or possible world objects + 2 actual or possible world objects = 4 world objects.

[6]There may well be added here (1) an explication of the signification of the term "world" as used above and (2) an explication of the evidence of the world. The world is primarily given us as the unity of the individual objects in the present field of perception. As belonging to this unity, objects are world-objects, and all their given

[4] The section beginning with this paragraph was entitled "The World as the Subject-Matter of Science"—L.E.

[5] This reference to the *world* involved in all universals will be taken up later, Chap. 21, pp. 239ff.

[6] Cairns directs in the left margin that this and the following paragraphs need to be single spaced, but this typographical treatment of this excursus is not followed here.—L.E.

determinations, whether sensuously perceived (color, size, shape, locus, etc.) or not (beauty, ugliness, undesirability; their character as tools, works of art, etc.; as well as the determinations of objects as being alive, as psycho-physical objects, the determination of processes as deeds, etc.) are determinations as world-objects.

But the present field of perception has, as part of its meaning, an indication of a "beyond": Not only that the world as given in the present has the sense of having been, before the present, and of promising to endure hereafter, but also that the world has further determinations beyond those now given. These "horizonal" determinations are, as horizons, essential to the sense of the non-horizonal presented core of the world. It "points beyond itself" to a "*plus*." This *plus ultra* is of two sorts: In the first place, the present, perceived, world-objects are presented, perceived, as having *further* determinations, not perceived. In the second place, the world is presented as extending spatially beyond the horizon of perceived space. The "style" (e.g., as spatial) of what is beyond, but not its full nature, is determined by the given. (As remembered, past-perceived, certain non-presented determinations are, of course, more fully determined.)

We shall not here analyze *how* the world, as presented to us with its horizons, comes to have this horizonal sense, more particularly, how these horizons come to have the sense of being infinite. Suffice it here to say, in summary, that the term "world," in the sense in which we use it, means this *presented* unity, presented as temporally and spatially infinite, presented as having infinite determinations (only a finite number of which are presented), or given in any other way (e.g., through memory, anticipation, or our indirect knowledge of the world as given to actual and possible other persons).

But, beyond this summary, we would indicate the fact that the meaning of the concept *world*—of any concept—, for myself or for any individual, is necessarily derived from his (preconceptual) experience of the world, and has no meaning except in terms of the world, this unity which *is* given to me and to other individuals in a personal experience given as having horizons (beyond the actually "given" content) of further ideally experienceable determinations. All consistent concepts that seem to involve a reference beyond the world as experienceable merely *seem* to do so. (That they can seem to do so is because they are not clearly grasped.) Thus, "being-in-itself," or "truth in itself," means an ideally experienceable determination of an object or else means either nothing or something absurd (inconsistent).[7]

[7] That philosophers have been mistaken about these things has, I think, been possible largely because they have ignored an evident character of the actually experienced, namely, its inclusion in itself of its infinite horizons, its inner determination as but a segment of all that there is. They have thus failed to see that, qua horizon, the infinite all is, in a strict sense, given. The realists have seen a thing "bad" idealists have ignored, namely that objects which are experienced as *real* are experienced as having validity beyond the range *of* actual and actualizable experience. This "beyond" they have been unable to explain in its *given* sense, as a reference to the given (but by them ignored) infinite horizon of what is experienced. Rather they have taken refuge in a "theory" (which assumes an absurdity) of a being-in-itself *known* to transcend all awareness. One can see the absurdity of this without seeing what the correct analysis of the "in-itselfness" of reality. In that case one may fly to the obvious *esse est percipi*. Between such idealism and the realism it opposes—between the evidently false and the evidently absurd—there is little to choose.

The "presentational awareness" of an external individual world-object, or individual determination, is the highest form of evidence of the existence of such an object, but at best is not apodictic. Indeed, we have apodictic knowledge that it can never be apodictic. Always it is ideally possible that future evidence may not show that the object was in part or as a whole, a hallucination, in spite of its direct original givenness, its *genuine evidentness*. This is the case also for any finite group, or higher unity, of individual objects. Future evidence may outweigh theirs and show them to be but a consistent hallucination. It is true that, in these and all other cases, whenever one genuinely evident belief is shown to be invalid (in our particular case, shown to be an hallucination), it is because something else, inconsistent with it, is shown with greater weight of evidence to be valid, to be a reality or a truth. Thus the world is never in this way to be "proved" unreal. It remains as the always evident background for all corrections of detail. But no knowledge of particular "external" world-objects is *possibly* apodictic.[8]

On the other hand, the awareness of one's own present psychic states, though incomplete, contains a *core* of apodicticity. In knowing with evidence *that* I am aware, I may also know that no future evidence can outweigh this evidence. (Furthermore, I have apodictic evidence that this *evidence* not only cannot be *outweighed*, but also that the evidence—as well as the evident object—can be no illusion. This makes this a "more apodictic" apodicticity, e.g., than any mathematical proposition.)[9]

We have indicated that the ideal of science is systematized propositional knowledge about the world based upon the highest possible evidence.

A further characteristic of the highest science—a partly realized, partly ideal, characteristic—is that it is *critical* knowledge. It is not merely known truth. The *evidence* itself has been examined. Criticism depends on seeing the nature of *seeing* that such and such is the case and consists in passing on the validity of that "seeing." Only that ostensible knowledge which undergoes and survives criticism is "knowledge" in the highest sense. The critically untried belief is, from the standpoint of criticism, but "alleged" knowledge, however unimpeachable its evidence may be, and may later (through criticism) be seen to be.

The usual motive for criticism is doubt aroused by the presence of "rivalry" between or among alleged truths. But doubt is not a necessary motive. An interest in more perfect knowledge leads one to inquire just what credentials a belief has, even when one knows that they are quite proper, that one is somehow quite justified in accepting the belief as true.

If we analyze the nature of criticism, we seen that deciding as to the truth of a belief is preceded by something like a suspension of believing it. This attitude is not a rejecting, nor even a doubting. It is a sort of "parenthesizing" or bracketing of the alleged bit of knowledge. Though one does not doubt it, one makes no theoretical use of it. Thus, if I wish to test the Pythagorean theorem, I do not necessarily doubt

[8] See Appendix for a more detailed explication of this fact (pp. 16ff.).

[9] Cairns's excursus ends here.—L.E.

the theorem, but I "disregard" my belief in it, do not use it to help prove itself. Similarly, if I want to test whether or not a thing I see is "real," exists. It is evident that this attitude can be taken then toward certainties as well as toward doubtful matters. It can also be taken toward something which, we are convinced is *not* the case, is false or non-existent.

We shall follow Husserl in calling this attitude "epochē" or "bracketing," and shall speak of the belief or other objectivity toward which such an attitude is taken, as being "in epochē," in "brackets" or "in parentheses." Epochē is not criticizing, but is a condition for criticizing.

[10]Epochē and criticism, whether in the interest in knowledge alone or also in the interest of practice, are normally piecemeal affairs. We bracket this or that belief or group of beliefs, but not all belief. Indeed, criticism, in the normal sense, requires that some belief remain in force, whereby the bracketed can be tested.

Whatever may be bracketed, whatever left outside, the pre-scientific, pre-propositional belief in the world itself is normally not put in epochē, not criticized. Even when we are testing the *truth* of certain mathematical propositions, the implicit sense of the bracketed, and of other, unbracketed, propositions (and the laws of logic) as applying to a range of actual or possible *world*-objects is not bracketed.

The point that is essential here is not, however, that the belief in the world is not normally bracketed, but rather that *the ideal of philosophy as perfect knowledge requires that we do actually set this belief in parentheses*—not because we do or can conceivably doubt the world, but because perfect knowledge would include knowledge of the "nature" of the world's credentials. Incidentally, since each science presupposes the "existence" of its subject-matter, no science can be thoroughly scientific until the nature of the credentials of its subject-matter has been examined.

Does any belief remain in force when all world-individuals—things and men and gods—and the spatio-temporal medium in which they have their being, all "eternal essences" of individuals, and all general or particular truths (directly or indirectly) about the world—in short, when the whole world and all that is of it—are put in epochē?

Yes! To bracket a belief is not to destroy it—is not even to shut one's eyes to it. To exercise epochē on the whole world is not to lose it from sight. It is still there for me, but no longer *as believed*—or rather, I *still* believe it but *also* merely look at it *as believed,* without—for my theoretical purpose—"sharing" in my own belief. The "world" is now my "phenomenon."

But there is something peculiar about this. Who am I, this ego, who exerts the epochē and contemplates the world? I have said that I bracket the whole world. Am *I* not part of the world?—A man with father and mother, a mind "in" a body whose psychic processes have, by their connection with my body, a "location" in world-space, and have an intrinsic location and extension in world-time? Must I not be bracketed along with the rest of the world? And if this human being, this mind and

[10] The section heading "The Idea of a Phenomenological Reduction of the World" preceded this paragraph.—L.E.

body, is bracketed, am I able to say "the world *is my* phenomenon," without removing the brackets? This last is also a belief; is it not a *man's* belief about the world he is *in*? Must not it also be packed with the others? Does not the attempt to bracket the world cut the ground from under itself? Is not the epochē an absurdity?

The objections are well taken, but the conclusion is false. Indeed epochē of the world does include epochē of myself *as in the world*. But perhaps this does not involve epochē of all knowledge. Perhaps there is an *essential* "core" of my ego, with a core of my mind, that is not *in the world*, an ego for whom the world can be a phenomenon that includes "himself *qua* man." The belief in such an essential "core" of myself would be untouched by the epochē of the world.

[11]Before we can decide on these suggestions, so contrary to common sense, to our never-broken habit of seeing all things as in the world, let us make explicit what it is of myself that surely *is* bracketed along with the rest of the world.

My *body* is obviously part of the world, in world-time and -space, in the causal nexus of world-reality. It is part of the world-phenomenon, and so are the *determinations* of my mind as in world-space, -time, and -causality.

But my mental processes—my believing, doubting, denying, perceiving, judging, remembering, expecting, liking, disliking, loving, hating, wishing, willing—are "abstractable" from these their world-determinations. They have an intrinsic nature, they flow along in a time of their own. In them, world-objects "outside" my mind, and my mind as a world-object, are "meant." If the world-belief, once put in epochē, should prove to be through and through an error, the world completely non-existent—then the mundane characters of my mind would be illusory too, but it, in its *intrinsic nature, and I as the ego who had believed this falsity, would not have been proved to be non-existent.*

It is far from our intention to assert that the non-existence of the world is even conceivable. Our purpose so far is only to point out the *ontic* independence *from* the world of the fundamental ego who posits the world and can set it in parentheses.

This non-worldly self we shall call the "transcendental ego." My psychic processes, when denuded of their significance as in the world, we shall call "transcendental mind" or "transcendental consciousness." The epochē of the apperception of the ego and mind as in the world, is the *first step* of that we call "transcendental reduction," and transcendental mind we call "(transcendentally) reduced" mind. In a similar sense we shall speak of the "(transcendentally) reduced" *ego*.

Our exposition so far has been for the purpose of convincing the reader that the epochē of the world-belief is not necessarily an absurdity, but may be a genuine ideal possibility. This is not to say that we may not be hindered in carrying it out. It involves "resisting" a habit fundamental to all other habits, the habit of taking for granted the world as my fundamental situation. That is not to say that, even when we carry it out formally and after a fashion, we shall be aware of just the limits of the transcendental reduction—of just what is bracketed as "world," just what is outside, as a character of transcendent being. That is not to say that, once having

[11] This paragraph was preceded with a section heading of "Transcendental Subjectivity and World-Phenomenon."—L.E.

carried it out, we shall not find ourselves, as theorists and philosophers, slipping back into the natural, believing attitude that is necessarily ours as men. In spite of these possibilities, the transcendental reduction may be a valid ideal.

The world is, let us say, in parentheses. The transcendental ego has exercised epochē upon it, has reduced it to the world-phenomenon. (This we shall call the "phenomenological reduction" of the world-thesis. The subject as exercising phenomenological reduction is said to be "in the phenomenological attitude.") I, as transcendental ego exercising epochē on the world, no longer share my own belief in the world. But the "world" is still there for me as something believed in, as it were by another part of the transcendental me, as something that this other part knows—on the basis of evidence—to be actually existent. One part of me lives in the natural attitude, another part, in the phenomenological attitude.

This awareness by the "interested" part of the transcendental ego is not merely a knowing; nor is it merely an awareness of the world "in one lump." Particular world-objects are especially believed in particular acts of believing, are known or doubted(to be actual, possible, etc.), are valued, aimed at as goals, regretted, etc. as fundamentally believed, the various "meant"(or, as Husserl, says "intended") world-objects make up the complex object which is, for the transcendental ego, as exercising epochē on his own beliefs, the world-phenomenon. As including all intended, world-objects *qua* intended, no matter how (as—surely, doubtfully—real, unreal, possible, impossible, universal, individual), this phenomenon is a necessary correlate of the transcendental ego and of the transcendental consciousness. The latter have (transcendental) being only through intending the "world."

The term "being" has, by the transcendental reduction, acquired for me a new sense or, rather, a sense never before distinguished. Not the belief that this or that is real or unreal, but the setting equal of "real being" or "being in the world" is characteristic of the natural attitude. The non-mundane transcendental ego was "there" all along, but this transcendental being was, as it were, hidden from him by the natural attitude. He lived himself in his world; that was the only being thematic for him; and, when he reflected on his own mental processes, he saw them only in their mundane vestments. The epochē of the world-thesis enables the transcendental ego to strip off these outer layers or, more aptly, makes it possible for him to see through them and see himself in his transcendental being.

But if we allow ourselves to speak thus of an "outer layer" we must be aware of confusing the phenomenological reduction with a process of *abstracting* the human psychic processes from their connexion with the body and the rest of the world. Such abstraction would leave to the "pure" psyche its character as human, as a *world* object, e.g., its temporality would be an abstracted segment of *world*-time. Transcendental subjectivity[12] is a different realm of being, newly discovered to the transcendental ego by the transcendental reduction. "Being and not-being in the world" are phenomena *inside* the world phenomena. The transcendental observer is aware of transcendental being not only as a new type of being, but as ontically "prior" to world being and world not-being.

[12] The "A" version replaces "mind" with "subjectivity."—L.E.

We must, however, be clearer as to what we have done in refraining from all use of our knowledge of the world. We have indicated that the ego who thus refrains from using his belief in the world is the same transcendental ego who otherwise believes in the world and apperceives himself as a human being in the world. The transcendental ego who executes all acts of belief now becomes, through a sort of doubling, the disinterested transcendental onlooker (1) at what he, as transcendental, believes in and (2) at himself as believing in them.

He has before his gaze (1) his transcendental self as positing the world, (2) the world itself, qua phenomenon. The world phenomenon itself is dichotomized: there is (1) himself qua "human psyche" (with a psychological "picture" of the world) and (2) the rest of "the world."

We see here, incidentally, the difference between the transcendental world-phenomenon and the "psychic[13] world-picture" or "world-view." The psychologist, historian of culture, or anthropologist frequently investigates the nature of a certain individual's or a certain society's world-view. The investigator distinguishes between the world-view and the way the world really is. As investigator, he brackets the investigated subject's beliefs, but not *his own* beliefs, about the world. If he criticizes the subject's beliefs, it is by their congruence with his own.[14] But the transcendental world-phenomenon lies before the distinction between world-"picture" and real world; this distinction lies *within* it.

The nature of the world, with its character as existing in itself, apart from my awareness of it is *a sense that the world has for transcendental consciousness*. The world, in every conceivable objective determination, is essentially something that transcendental consciousness in the natural attitude takes (or can take) as valid or invalid: a sense which, in the phenomenological attitude, the transcendental ego takes (or can take) as validity or invalidity *phenomenon*. Any alleged plus of objective character is really not a plus, but is already included in the world as possible or actual validity-correlate, as phenomenon.

Thus, actual and possible transcendental awareness, with its necessary intended correlates (its phenomenal "objects as intended"), include the whole realm of intendable being and non-being—a sphere no theory of being or non-being can in any way transcend, because it is the sphere of all possible meaning.

When an object is intended in any way, it is (as intended) necessarily a correlate of transcendental awareness. We have indicated above that all human meanings are essentially correlates of *human* awareness and refer to the sphere of actual and ideally possible human experience (not necessarily *sense*-experience). The *full-sense* of an object, the deeper founding sense as a *world* object, is not, however, posited by *human* awareness, but by transcendental awareness alone. Humanity itself is, we repeat, *part* of the world-sense. Transcendental being, transcendental consciousness, furthermore, is not known to us, qua human.

[13] The term "psychic" we shall use to characterize subjectivity [the mind] as in the world. "Psychology" correlatively means the science of subjectivity as in the world.

[14] See Appendix, pp. 16.

The world, with all that is of the world, is, for this disinterested onlooker a *phenomenon*. He himself, as psyche in the world, is a coordinate part of this phenomenon which he, as disinterested transcendental ego, observes.

If awareness consciousness has any ontic status in the world, if it exists in the world, it has no ontic priority over whatever else exists. Certain determinations of the world would indeed depend upon the existence of minds as parts within it, but only as other determinations of the world would depend upon the existence of certain types of material objects within the world. The transcendental ego (in the natural phenomenological attitude) can observe how he himself as transcendental ego is normally (i.e., in the natural attitude) *not* the disinterested observer but the positer of the world. He can observe how objects are not only believed in but intended ("meant") by the transcendental ego in a variety of *other* ways and how some of these objects come to be taken as valid (real world-objects) and others come to be taken as invalid (illusory, false objects, not *valid* parts of the world). He can observe himself as human, living in the world, and theorizing on the basis of a world sense, which he must, as human, always accept as "there," a sense which is the ineluctable horizon of every possible object of *human* intending, a sense which he, as human, *cannot but* posit—which he, as human, cannot set in epochē.

All this he can observe and explicate (describe) for himself without as it were "sharing" his "own" normal belief in the world and in his own being in it.

My believing transcendental life, with its valuings and activities which involve belief in the existence of the world and of particular objects in the world, still goes on. The transcendental ego has not ceased to live nor has it become more of a doubter. But, in addition to and apart from my believing, I watch myself believing (and otherwise positing) the world, and, for my theoretical purpose, I refrain from sharing my own belief in the world. It is a mere phenomenon of "validity." I am now in a position not only to explicate a world that I find myself in but also to know what it is to have a world and "be in" it, to understand what constitutes the validity of the world and my worldliness for myself—these most elementary facts of my existence. I can pose the questions of epistemology about the world without begging the question, as do both realists and idealists, unless they can exercise the epochē. For the ego, as in the world, lives on the basis of the world; as *human,* the ego cannot consistently bracket the world: that attitude necessarily involves the bracketing of the ego's *humanity*.

That the world and the self in its "humanity" are, to the nonparticipant transcendental observer onlooker, phenomenal, essentially intended, objects with the phenomenal character of "existence," does not mean that he has ignored the character of the "world" as, in its being, independent of being intended ("known," or meant). On the contrary, this "existence in and of itself" is a character with which he posits the world. For the transcendental onlooker it is precisely one of the world-phenomenon's *phenomenal* determinations—the way in which he otherwise "normally" (in the *natural attitude*) believes in the world as existing. The "disinterestedness" of the transcendental ego, qua onlooker, extends the reduction beyond the mere believing in the existence of the world. As onlooker, he does not share his natural disbeliefs and doubts either. The non-existence of dragons and round squares is a phenomenal