

Phaenomenologica 206

Alfred Schutz

Michael Barber *Editor*

Collected Papers VI. Literary Reality and Relationships

 Springer

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AND RELATIONSHIPS

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Michael Barber
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Collected Papers VI. Literary Reality and Relationships

Alfred Schutz

 Springer

Editor

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Editorial Introduction

Michael Barber

The papers by Alfred Schutz in this volume have been selected because they deal with the specific features of the human condition on which literature focuses; because they present a theory of multiple realities, of which literature is one; because they describe in detail the Thou-relationship of which the interconnection between author and reader is an example; or because they are actually instances of how Schutz read literature, what he looked for or what impressed him, as he read, in particular, Goethe's novels. In addition, these papers have been collected here because the first paper (itself originally a book), *Life Forms and Meaning Structures*, is out of print, and the second two papers represent translations of Schutz's work by Professors Fred Kersten and Michael Barber that have not been previously published in English.

Life Forms and Meaning Structure contains the early writings of Schutz from his so-called "Bergson-period" (1924–1928) in which he sought to provide philosophical foundations for the social sciences by turning to the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Although Schutz eventually turned to Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to provide such foundations, these writings are important in that they show Schutz's philosophical mind at work in seeking to establish a base for the social sciences. In the first essay, itself entitled "Life Forms and Meaning Structure," Schutz distinguishes and discusses through ideal-type constructions three life-forms, namely duration, memory, the acting I (without discussing three other life-forms, namely the I in relationship to the Thou, the speaking I, and the thinking, conceptualizing I—all of which are treated in the following essay, "Meaning Structures and Language"). Such life-forms are lived dimensions of the subject, which are thoroughly intermingled in everyday life until the reflecting philosopher, Schutz, distinguishes them and articulates what characterizes them. Schutz also develops a theory of symbolization, including its revelatory capacity and its limits, both of which appear whenever one from within a higher life-form, such as memory, seeks to symbolize experiences present in a lower-level life-form, such as duration. For instance, when one within the life-form of memory remembers a segment of duration, she is able to convey something of that duration's ongoing experience, but of course, the

remembered segment differs from what is remembered insofar as the remembering introduces distinctions that are at the least blurred in duration or omits features of duration's lived flow.

This first large essay, though it aims at providing a philosophical foundation for the social sciences, is also of great importance for Schutz's views of literature. Indeed, in the essay he repeatedly shows himself preoccupied with the relationship with the Thou even though it is not explicitly addressed until the second essay of *Life Forms and Meaning Structures*. Such an interpersonal Thou relationship, in particular the one between author and reader, becomes a central focus of his reading of literature, as the third essay of the volume, "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms," demonstrates. In addition, in this first essay, Schutz goes to pains to insist upon diverse strata, or realms, of experience and to uphold the diversity and plural nature of experience that rationality often undervalues. This concern for diverse spheres of reality will reappear in "The Problem of Personality in the Social World," which is a prelude to Schutz's "On Multiple Realities," although the life-forms of this first essay vary from the spheres of reality in the later two works, which include such things as the spheres of fantasy, dreaming, and theoretical contemplation. In his writings on Goethe, Schutz will demarcate the distinctive sphere of literary reality against the sphere of everyday life and theoretical contemplation, and these distinctions become the centerpiece of his interpretation and defense of Goethe's novel the *Wanderjahre* because Goethe's critics attack him for violating the rules governing everyday experience within the novel. Moreover, in this large essay from the Bergson-period, Schutz analyzes the pervasiveness of duration, even though it is hidden beneath other life-forms, such as that of memory or the acting I—and hence it should come as no surprise that it will be Goethe's concern in his novels and poetry for the passage of time that will intrigue Schutz. Hence, in Goethe's novels, Schutz is drawn to consider the special case of metaphysical "wandering" that the *Wanderjahre* novel symbolizes or the passage of time that suggests that our past destines our future in the *Lehrjahre* novel. Furthermore, in this large essay, Schutz is acutely aware of the perspective from which one looks back on the past and selects events and details of significance, and in novels, we find readers, narrators, and even characters working in a kind of common project as they continually reinterpret the past in the light of new data emergent in the present that compels such reinterpretation. The building-up of a novel is massive intersubjective construction achieved by characters and readers and author all in relationship with each other and across time. Finally, the theory of action that Schutz spells out in this large essay takes account of how unexpected obstacles impede planned actions or make possible unexpected outcomes, and Schutz's analyses of literature, whether Goethe's novels or Shakespeare tragedies, are often based on just such occurrences. In summary, this first large essay presents a picture of the fundamental nature of human experience including the Thou-relationship, pluralized realms of experience, the passage of time, perspectival interpretation, and action and its impediments, all of which are either central themes in literature or the kinds of structures that make it possible.

Schutz's "Meaning Structures of Language" takes up the other life forms that were not addressed in the first essay, that of the Thou-relationship, of the speaking I, and of the thinking/conceptualizing I. He also treats the functions of nouns in language, the transition to plural nouns, the relationship between subject and predicate, and the distinction between attributive and predicative adjectives.

In addition, Schutz's third essay in the book *Life Forms and Meaning Structures* entitled "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms" examines carefully how language forms develop and, importantly for our purposes, how social relationships between author and reader/listener are at work in poetry, drama, and novels. Schutz describes in great detail, for instance, how the poet produces a self-expression of which the reader becomes an external observer, how the author of a drama withdraws behind the play in which the reader enters into the action the actors present, and how the author of the novel plays a more commanding role in giving the reader only what she intends him to have access to in the time when she wants him to have such access. In that essay, Schutz highlights the difference between artistic expression and everyday communication, and he discusses in depth the laws of unity and unfolding particular to art, including the laws of art for specific times, material rational laws (tied to specific materials and crafts), and the laws of meaning, particularly appropriate for literature. The latter have to do with the unities of action, time, and space that literary forms satisfy in diverse ways.

In his essay "Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera," Schutz traces the history of opera and analyzes drama as presenting living Thou-relationships in which characters' inner duration is revealed, as actors for the time of the play take their dramatic world to be real, though in ways different from which the Thou-relationship is experienced in everyday life. Schutz contrasts the views of Wagner and Nietzsche about whether music reaches for language, as the former thought, or whether the word is the servant of music, as the latter believed. A final comparison is drawn between the operas of Wagner and Mozart, in which Schutz, though admiring Wagner's sense of the tragic and his use of the leitmotiv, praises Mozart for capturing Thou-relationships to a greater degree than Wagner and for creating ensembles involving a simultaneous experience of them.

Although Schutz abandoned his view of distinctive life-forms whose symbolization processes tended to leave in a noumenal state, out of reach, the lower-level life-forms symbolized by the symbols employed in a higher level life-form, he never gave up his views on the social relationship between author and reader/listener in various literary genres. In fact, Schutz's later "Social Aspects of Literature," based on an outline of a talk Schutz gave at the New School for Social Research in 1955, only develops in a bit more detail the ideas on the literary relationships found in "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms," filling in commentary on the relevances, motives, and time-dimensions at play in the author-reader relationship that Schutz had already depicted in the 1920s.

Life Forms and Meaning Structure was originally translated and edited by Helmut Wagner. Wagner's general "Editor's Introduction" is preserved here, and in it he briefly describes the history of the production of the previously never-published manuscripts that made up the book, the characteristics of the manuscripts themselves,

the strategic choices he made in the translation process, and explanations of the terminology employed. Each subsection of the book contained briefer introductions by Wagner that are also preserved here.

Literature, though, is not only a matter of a social relationship between author and reader/listener, but it also involves entrance into a literary reality-sphere, a finite province of meaning, that is distinctive from the everyday world of working. The stage for understanding literature this way was set by Schutz's 1945 essay, "On Multiple Realities." The essay "The Problem of Personality in the Social World," based on unpublished manuscripts produced by Schutz in 1936 and 1937 and appearing in English for the first time thanks to an excellent translation by Professor Fred Kersten, is an earlier version of the 1945 essay. Professor Kersten presents an informative discussion of these manuscripts and of his strategies in producing the translations in the preface to the essay, and he accompanies the text with rich footnotes offering explanations and abundant cross-references.

The topic of these manuscripts is not so much the origin of the social person, but the kind of unity that the social person achieves. The first manuscript (of 1936) stresses the importance of *attention à la vie*, the relevances, and the motives that shape different social persons. It illustrates how reflection converts the *ego agens* into a *me ipsum* and into partial personalities, and it explains how the surrounding world is broken into diverging perspectives depending on one's pragma (actional intervention in the world) and pragmatic relevances. This first manuscript includes perceptive descriptions of somatic unity and temporality, including the experience of the dying off of earlier selves, and it concludes by analyzing the reality-spheres of working, phantasy, dreams, and theory that are later presented in "On Multiple Realities." The second manuscript (of 1937) describes the different attitudes (without using much the language of "relevances") of the self insofar as one is, for example, a citizen, church member, or party member, and these attitudes, seldom reflected on in straightforward living, are hierarchized. Again pragmatic motives, bodiliness, and temporality are key themes, and in regard to time, Schutz observes how the passing of dead partial selves, no longer present as possibilities, reveals how death is immanent in life, though he suggests that a harbinger of hope might be found in the fact that the *ego agens* is always present ever anew. This second manuscript presents a developed theory of will, and it extensively explains the world of working for the first time, which involves the *epoché* of the natural attitude, a world of potentialities for movement and bringing within reach, and pragmatic motivations. The second manuscript's account of the world of working sets the stage for the "shock-experiences" that, it explains, will catapult one into diverse provinces of meaning, such as phantasy, dreams, and theoretical contemplation. These manuscripts, which emphasize the pragmatic dimensions of the world of working, shows how Schutz moved beyond *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1932), and they reveal that even before his encounter with pragmatism on American soil after 1939, he was already thoroughly aware of and interested in the pragmatic dimensions of everyday experience. Not only, then, do these manuscripts bring into focus the finite provinces of meaning that are key for Schutz's understanding of literary reality—indeed the second manuscript even mentions fiction and art as finite provinces of meaning which can become aspects of a self engaged in them—but

the phenomenologically insightful descriptions of temporality, bodiliness, possibilities, relevances, and the many facets of the self provide the stuff of literature itself, as Schutz's Goethe manuscripts will show.

Schutz does not only theorize about literature, the social relationship between author and reader, and the literary sphere, but this publication of Michael Barber's translations of two unpublished manuscripts on Johann Wolfgang Goethe's *Lehrjahre* and *Wanderjahre* further illustrates how he actually read literature. In the *Lehrjahre* manuscript, written in 1948, Schutz examines how Goethe treats the themes of fate and freedom and the relationship between life and art. The repeated appearance of a Stranger who guides and engages Wilhelm in discussions of destiny and freedom runs like a thread throughout the *Lehrjahre*. At repeated points, Schutz revels in explaining how chapters or events that might seem irrelevant space-fillers (e.g., Lothario's visit to a former woman-companion in book seven, or the sixth book of the novel, the "confessions of a fair soul") actually fit and serve well Goethe's deeper literary purposes. Lothario's visit stands between Wilhelm's just finished encounter with Theresa and his dream- encounter with the deceased mother of his child, thereby providing commentary on these two love-relationships of Wilhelm. Similarly, the confessions are those of the aunt of a young woman who shares many characteristics with her aunt and who is about to enter into a close relationship with Wilhelm who has been seeking her throughout the novel. Moreover, attunement to the details of a literary text resembles the kind of sensitivity to biographical details that, at first taken for irrelevant, are subsequently seen to have led unexpected momentous outcomes, some tragic and some fortuitous. In considering how earlier experiences, seemingly insignificant, come to take on new meaning in the light of later events, Wilhelm and Schutz (and perhaps we as readers) are drawn to speculate on the possibility that our lives have destinies to which we are being guided despite ourselves. For instance, Schutz dwells on the case in which Wilhelm dresses up in the clothes of a count who returns home earlier than expected and startled by the experience of seeing what he takes to be himself undergoes a conversion of heart and joins the Moravians. Or Schutz highlights the situation of the countess whom Wilhelm embraces, accidentally driving a broach pin into her breast and causing a wound that she subsequently thinks is cancerous and that leaves her melancholic for the rest of her life—an outcome ironic in being produced by an embrace. Or he emphasizes how the unexpected discovery that Theresa, to whom Wilhelm had committed himself, is not the daughter of a woman who was the mother of her brother, whom she loved but could not marry, frees both her to wed the man she loves and Wilhelm to pursue the relationship with Nachodine, whom he has finally discovered after having sought her in vain throughout the novel. Of course, these unexpected outcomes, prompting reflections on fate, all depend upon the ongoing stream of temporality, oscillating always between empty or vague anticipations of the future yet to be fulfilled or reflections on the past from a present shaped by one's present relevances that enable one to select what past moments as are taken significant for one's present and future. In addition, the structure of inter-subjectivity is latent within temporality itself insofar as the subjective meaning of one's actions available to oneself at a certain point are able to be seen in a broader

objective context, by oneself as “another person” at a later point in time or by other characters or even by the reader of the novel who sees perhaps what characters, from their own subjective point of view, cannot see. Novel-reading is not merely a matter of the flowing of time but consists in an intersubjective construction of reality in which characters and reader alike have differing perspectives enabling them to understand the significance of actions from an “objective” perspective that may not coincide with the “subjective” perspective of a character. But these basic features of human experience are just the topics that are central in *Life Forms and Meaning Structures* and “The Problem of Personality in the Social World.” These central characteristics of the human condition that literature thematizes also inform Schutz’s approach to the social sciences, as is evident for example when he cautions economists against blaming economic agents for earlier “mistaken economic decisions” that actually may have been the correct ones, given the data the agents had available *at the time* and their lack of access to the data that the subsequent unfolding of time might have made available to those economists.

The *Wanderjahre* manuscript, which frequently simply narrates the plotline of Goethe’s novel and which is handwritten rather than typed, shows itself, for both these reasons, to be in a less developed form than the *Lehrjahre* manuscript. Nevertheless, Schutz in this manuscript, produced in the summer of 1948 while traveling back and forth from Europe, defends Goethe in multiple ways against critics who argue that his second version of the novel (published in 1829) contains careless inconsistencies (e.g., characters in a novella within the novel end up actually appearing in the novel) that are not found in the earlier shorter version of (1821). Schutz constructs his defense by arguing that the literary sphere of reality, one of the multiple realities, is not bound by the rules of everyday life or rational theorizing. Hence, when one asks why more detail is not filled in, why fuller explanations are not given, or why novella characters suddenly appear in the novel, the problem is not with the carelessness of the ageing Goethe, but with the inquirer. This inquirer mistakenly expects the novel to follow the rules of practical everyday life instead of the norms governing the literary sphere of reality which is not bound by everyday constraints and which is able to omit details that might be necessary in everyday life—if these transgressions against everyday life serve well the literary purposes of the author. There is, Schutz claims, a “logic of the poetic event” that follows neither the logic of everyday life or rational theorizing, and art in his view involves the “conscious re-interpretation of the relevance structure of the life-world.” Schutz also defends Goethe by showing the inconsistency in the diaries of his critic/literary executor, Johannes Eckermann. Again defending the elderly Goethe, Schutz demonstrates how several changes made in the second version, such as having Hersilie give Wilhelm the novella “The Foolish Pilgrim” about a woman like herself is superior to Friedrich’s giving of it to Wilhelm in the first version.

In the manuscript, Schutz also demonstrates how the theme of metaphysical wandering and temporality unfolds throughout the novel, accompanied by the kind of renunciation that the flow of time requires, especially since Wilhelm, due to an unexplained pact with his love Natalia, is forced to wander without staying in any one place for more than 3 days. In the novel, Wilhelm is often seen reflecting on his past

history under the influences of the relevances of the present, as when he speculates about how his becoming a surgeon results, at least in part, from having witnessed the death of a childhood friend who could have been saved by expert medical intervention. Following the pattern of the *Lehrjahre* manuscript, which reflects on how little causes can have the most significant of effects, Wilhelm's training as a surgeon leads to the unexpected outcome that he saves the live of his son at the end of the novel. In defending Goethe, Schutz spends a great deal of time demonstrating how the poems ("Testament" and "On Schiller's Skull") that end books two and three of the novel respectively fit in with Goethe's preoccupation for the flowing of time, ageing, and death—a preoccupation that appears in many of his other well-known poems as well as in the whole structure of the novel's focus on wandering, contrary to Eckermann's charge that these poems were merely space-fillers. Goethe's fascination with temporality converges with Schutz's own immense interest in the topic that is to be found in *Life Forms and Meaning Structures* and "The Problem of Personality in the Social World." The manuscript is filled with perceptive comments about how Goethe's brief descriptions reveal the entire personality of a single character or how the themes of Goethe's *Faust* or *Die Wahlverwandtschaften* reappear in the novel. Also of great interest are the several moments in this manuscript, where Schutz makes comparison between music and literature, and, at one point, in which he illustrates how the rhyme contributes to the meaning of Goethe's poetry in the novel, one has the feeling that Schutz is re-addressing the question of the interrelationship between music and the word that he considered in his early essay "Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera."

In brief, the essays in this book can be seen to support a theory of literature that takes account of the social relationship between author and reader and the distinctive reality one inhabits when one opens a novel, and they show how Schutz actually read literature, that is, what he did when he entered the literary sphere.

Life Forms and Meaning Structures

Editor's Introduction

Helmut Wagner

In the years between 1924 and 1928, Alfred Schutz worked on a book project which, in scope and intent, anticipated his major work, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, which he wrote in 1930 and 1931 and which was published early in 1932. The earlier project had no overall title; I selected the title Schutz gave to the first main part of the study as general title: “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur” (in translation, “Life Forms and Meaning Structure”).

At the outset, he had considered but rejected the idea of seeking a philosophical basis for his undertaking in Husserl's earlier work, notably the *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901) and *Ideas I* (1913). Instead, he seized upon various works of Bergson, most of all *Time and Free Will* (1889) and *Matter and Memory* (1896).¹ For reasons which I have discussed elsewhere,² he found himself compelled to abandon the whole project and to return to Husserl, whose writings of the middle period, in the meantime, had become available, and to re-orient his undertaking by accepting the latter's phenomenological psychology.

Thereby, he did not disavow Bergson; rather, he made him a quite important second foundation of his work. For this reason, the manuscripts of his Bergson period are not obsolete. In fact, they remain valuable documents of the germination of fundamental conceptions which entered his work of 1932 and remained with him throughout his scholarly activities. In addition, they contain observations, insights, and theoretical considerations which remain genuine contributions to his

¹ As far as I could ascertain, Schutz worked exclusively from the French original texts of Bergson's writings.

² See Helmut R. Wagner, The Bergsonian Period of Alfred Schutz. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 38, 1977: 187–99.

life work. Even though the whole project and most of its pieces remained unfinished, these manuscripts add to the scholarly stock of the intellectual inheritance which he left to the growing international circles of his followers. Their publication, then, is not merely a tribute to his memory; it is offered as a service to the phenomenological movement.

Dr. Ilja Srubar, of the University of Constance, has taken care of the preparation of the German original manuscripts, for publication in 1981. Since space limitations prohibit the inclusion of an extensive theoretical introduction into the present volume, the editor plans, in collaboration with Dr Srubar, to publish a companion volume containing an expository and critical appraisal of Schutz's thinking during his Bergson period.

THE MANUSCRIPTS

The manuscript collection of the Bergson period consists of four textually coherent manuscripts; three of them definitely unfinished. In addition, there exists a collection of shorter manuscripts, containing sundry preparatory matters. In my as yet not published/annotated bibliography of Schutz's writings, they fall under the group of unpublished manuscripts (UM) and are individually identified by the approximate year(s) in which they originated. The list of these titles is the following:

- UM 1924–1925 “Soziale Aspekte der Musik als Artform”
“Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera”
- UM 1925 “Spracharbeit”
“Meaning Structures of Language”
- UM 1925–1926 “Goethe: Novelle”
“Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms”
- UM 1925–1927a Preparatory materials for an untitled book
- UM 1925–1927b “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur”
“Life Forms and Meaning Structure”

The key to the planned structure of the whole project is found in the preparatory materials. The sequence in which the manuscripts are presented in this volume follows the given outlines; that means, it differs from the chronological sequence of the previous list.

CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MANUSCRIPTS FOR THE MAIN BODY OF THIS VOLUME

(1) “The outline of the project”

A comprehensive outline for the whole project was put together by me by telescoping four separate but overlapping outlines of altogether seven handwritten pages.

At the beginning of the main body of this book, I will render a shortened translation of the major items of this outline.

(2) "Author's introduction"

Three coherent shorter manuscripts, belonging to the collection of preparatory materials, are offered sequentially under three different subtitles. Together, they comprise ten handwritten pages of the German texts.

(3) "Life Forms and Meaning Structure"

This is by far the largest of the manuscripts of the Bergson period. It comprises a typescript of 168 pages legal³ size yet breaks off unfinished. Schutz designated it as the first of three main parts of his study. For reasons explained in the technical introduction to this part, the translation contains a number of condensations of more or less elaborate and rather technical passages.

The next three manuscripts originated in Schutz's Bergson period but were not written as chapters of the planned book. At least two of them originated as, or became background material for, oral presentations. In their substance, however, they fall within the range of the second main part of the Bergson project; they touch upon a number of themes relevant for this part.

(4) "Meaning Structures of Language"

This unfinished manuscript consists of 41 handwritten and 10 typed pages. Its purpose was to establish the relationships between language and other life forms.

(5) "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms"

This unfinished manuscript consists of 42 typewritten pages, legal format. It is concerned with the symbolization of experiences in literary language. Its original title was "Goethe: Novelle." It was not appropriate to maintain it because the manuscript broke off before Goethe was introduced and the art form of the novella, the story inserted into a novel, was discussed.

(6) "Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera"

Although with 39 typewritten pages (legal format) the shortest of four major manuscripts, it is the only one which gives the impression of being finished in itself. However, the original title, "Social Aspects of Music as Form of Art," is much broader than the one imposed by the editor as more adequate. It is possible that Schutz considered it as merely one part of a larger study, which he failed to execute. He took up the topic of music in considerably greater depth later.⁴

The titles of these three manuscripts of the second part of the study have been provided by the editor. The general designation, "meaning structures," was chosen for all of them in order to emphasize their substantive relevance for the central

³ About 14 in. long.

⁴ See Alfred Schutz, "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music". Edited by Fred Kersten. *Music and Man 2, 1976: 5-71*. This manuscript was written in 1944 and exists in mimeographed form, that the essay is published in *Collected Papers 4*.

theme of the whole project. The specification of the titles was chosen not in accordance with the central topic Schutz had intended to treat in each manuscript, but in agreement with the actual content of the existing fragmentary texts.

(7) "Object and Method of the Social Sciences"

This is a token representation of the third main part of the project. It consists of a seven-point outline of the major topics which Schutz intended to treat in the last part of his study. It was taken from one of the manuscripts which provided the overall outline of Schutz's Bergson project.

STYLE AND FORM OF THE TRANSLATION

The German edition of the original texts of Schutz's Bergson manuscripts, as prepared by Dr Srubar, is a documentary edition which preserves Schutz's formulations faithfully. Anyone who seeks text-critical exactness and literal correctness will have to refer to this edition.

The existence of this documentary edition has allowed me to treat the task of preparing this English-language edition with a certain amount of freedom. Such freedom was the more desirable as Schutz's texts themselves provide particular difficulties for their translator and, in a sense, resist translation. Essentially, the manuscripts available were first drafts. That is, they were not subjected to the careful process of correction and rewriting which Schutz used to prepare his publications, doing his drafts three to five times over. What he originally pinned down on paper were formulations of thoughts jotted down without any regard for style. In consequence, a dual problem arose. On the one hand, many of his coherent expositions were full of complex sentences, beset with inserts and inserts within inserts whose meanings were sometimes difficult to figure out. On the other hand, he resorted to a telegram style: jotting down words and phrases, leaving their expansion to coherent sentences and paragraphs for later.

The main purpose of the English-language edition of Schutz's Bergson manuscripts is not that of a literally faithful translation—an impossible task—but a faithful rendering of their meaning in a form which allows the maximum of understanding by English and American readers. Therefore, I have not hesitated to take Schutz's compound sentences apart, making two or three sentences out of one, whenever necessary. With a few exceptions and in reverse, I have expanded outline terms and phrases into complete sentences. In this, I based myself on the immediate textual context, or on the larger context of the manuscript in question, or finally on my knowledge of Schutz's later work.

On occasion, a singular noun in the texts has been changed to the plural when the more consistent rules of English grammar advised it. The definite article has been omitted from some nouns, especially when they were used in abstract or typified form.

In the texts, Schutz was sometimes given to the abundant use of prepositions which, when rendered in English, would sound redundant. In this and some other respects, the translation has been simplified in accordance with English-language

usage. In dealing with the compound sentences of Schutz, I have sometimes linked as well as separated two parts of a statement by a colon (:). Often, the colon simultaneously replaced conjunctions and transitional expressions, such as, "because," "to wit," "namely."

NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY

A few explanations will have to be given concerning the selection of terminological equivalents for Schutz's theoretical or philosophical terms, for the handling of foreign phrases or sentences in his texts, and finally about the selection of some particular expressions by Schutz.

The words chosen for rendering the many specific terms of the texts in English, as far as possible, follow the terminology of Schutz's English writings. In a few cases, Schutz used two terms homonymously. In this case, I have taken the term most consistent with his theories, so: "conduct" instead of "behavior" if intent and deliberation is involved. Only in one case did I deviate from Schutz's terminology. He, and most other English-writing phenomenologists, rendered Husserl's term, *die natürliche Einstellung*, with "natural attitude." As sociologist, I find myself unable to follow this example; in my field, attitude means not a general disposition to respond to all phenomena coming to attention within a broad era of experience, especially of the life-world, but a specific mode of responding to specific types of objects, situations, or persons. Therefore, I have rendered Husserl's term "natural stance."

According to the custom of Central-European scholars with an intensive humanistic education, Schutz occasionally inserted Latin and Greek phrases or sentences into his texts. I have tried to render their meaning, as emerging from the given textual context, rather than to aim at an essentially literal translation. It would have served no specific purpose, to render the original Latin or Greek formulations in parentheses or otherwise mark the translated passages from the classical languages in every specific case. However, when the terms in question were of a flavor which I could not adequately catch in English, I added the original expression to the text.

A few expressions, which Schutz used frequently, became standard equipment of his expositions without being explicitly defined. Obviously, he found the latter unnecessary because they were standard equipment also of those of his intellectual contemporaries in Central Europe who worked in the areas of the *Geisteswissenschaften*. Five of them, however, call for comments either because he largely abandoned them in his American writings, or he maintained them in their English equivalent but used them with a different meaning. They are: Law, Logic, Material, Phenomenon, Symbol, and their derivative forms.

In the exaggerating manner of his period, Schutz occasionally referred to "laws" pertaining to social and cultural matters. Thus, he spoke of "laws of artistic creation." In contrast to positivist sociologists, adherents of the German *Geisteswissenschaften* used the concept of "law" not in deference to the model of the natural sciences but in defiance of positivist philosophers. In spite of our sharp separation of the human

sciences from the natural ones, we too are scientists in our fashion. Thereby, they referred to their adherence to the principle of impartiality ('objectivity' in common terms), to their rationally controlled procedures, and to the claim of the validity of their findings, subject to the same condition as the validity of the findings in the natural sciences: valid as long as no counter-evidence was found which challenges them.

While, in the opinion and practice of most scholars working in the fields of the so-called social sciences, the same criteria obtain today, the need for asserting the "scientificity" of their undertakings has greatly lessened. The aggressive prestige of Science, fostered both by the triumph of Evolutionism and the breathtaking progress of Physics in the last decades of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century, has long since been broken by a growing scepticism about the validity of the simplistic principles that Science has the answer to every answerable question and that questions which are unanswerable by Science are devoid of meaning. It is no longer important to decide whether or not the criteria of scientific operations, as mentioned above, are both necessary and sufficient conditions for calling humanistic disciplines "sciences."

In any case, where Schutz in these texts spoke of laws in the scientific sense, while referring to matters of the analysis of consciousness and/or social relations, he spoke according to the intellectual usage of his time. In all cases in which he used the term positively, that is, not critically, we could replace it by the term, "rules," in accordance with a more adequate present-day understanding of the nature of the regularities involved.

Schutz also followed the usage of his European contemporaries, who, in the early decades of the century, tended to speak of "logic" and of "logical conclusions" not only when they actually referred to the strictly formalistic correctness of deductions and propositions, but also when they were concerned with the substantive consistency of empirical comparisons and conclusions. Schutz sometimes used the terms logic and logical in the narrow technical sense, and sometimes in the loose sense of judgments about the factual context and content of a theoretical argumentation.

A further conspicuous term in the present manuscripts is that of "material." The term was generally accepted at the time as a label for the substantive subject matter to which a scholar directed himself. Schutz used it in this fashion. Thus, the term may point to anything which makes for the content of any kind of experience, the given phenomenological data in Husserl's manner. In the "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms," it also denotes the contents of literary creations as linguistic expressions of imagined experiences.

Occasionally, Schutz spoke of "phenomenon" or "phenomena." At the time he wrote the Bergson manuscripts he had not accepted the specific meaning these terms have acquired in Husserl's philosophy. He used these terms operationally and in the loose fashion of most of his intellectual contemporaries. Thus, they indicate not merely anything which appears to our senses or in our consciousness, but also general categories which label wholegroups of data and observations. Thus, Schutz spoke of the "phenomenon of memory" as if the ability to remember and to recall were of the same quality as a concretely appearing "memory image."

Finally, Schutz made use of the term “symbol” in the same omnibus fashion in which his contemporaries used it. In the light of his later elucidation of the problems of signs and signification, symbols and symbolization,⁵ his expositions do not bring out the for his purposes relevant distinctions between the “symbol system” of language and the “symbol systems” of life forms or realms of meaning constructed with the help of linguistic “symbol” systems, and finally the distinction between the symbolizations of everyday life and those of the spheres of artistic experiences.

These short remarks on some of Schutz’s terms ought not to be read as a critique. Rather, these terminological characteristics are pointed out because they are indicators of the transitional stage of Schutz’s work during the period of 1924–1928. He tried to deal with the problems of subjectivity and consciousness to a large degree with the terminological equipment he had acquired prior to his involvement with Bergson’s writing which, in turn, were not entirely free from traditional, especially biological and evolutionary, conceptions. What he achieved in the direction of a phenomenal psychology of consciousness, even though with the help of Bergson, demands all the more respect because it was achieved with partially inadequate means.

EDITORIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF INSERTS IN THE TEXT

- (-----) Either passages set in parentheses by Schutz or rendering of the German original term for which a translated term stands.
- (-----, HRW) Short explanatory term or phrase added by the editor.
- [-----] Passage or paragraph crossed out by Schutz in the original manuscript but preserved in the translation.
- [[-----]] Passage or paragraph which has been either condensed or added by the editor.

ABBREVIATIONS IN NOTES

In order to distinguish notes written by the author and such added by the editor, the following identifying letters appear before the note text:

AS: Alfred Schutz

HRW: Helmut R. Wagner

Where all notes in a part of this book originated either with the author or the editor, this identification of individual notes is omitted. Instead, a corresponding note is given on top of the relevant notes section.

⁵ See Alfred Schutz, “Symbol, Reality and Society”. Chapter VII of Lyman Bryson et al. (editors), *Symbols and Society*, New York, Harper, 1955: 135–203.

Only two other abbreviations occur in the text of notes:

E.T. English translation

MS(S) Manuscript(s)

SHORT OMISSIONS IN TEXTUAL PASSAGES

According to generally accepted usage, I have indicated the omission of words and phrases or short sentences in the text by three dots (ellipses). Such abbreviations were made most of all in the case of terms and phrases which repeated statements made shortly before but which, in the differently arranged English text, did not require repetition.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

In the present publication, the compilation of a list of all bibliographical references occurring in texts and notes would hardly serve any tangible purpose. The necessary information, at least in the Introductory Part, can be found in the text: for the manuscripts of Schutz, it has been given in notes attached to the actual textual places at which hints at the corresponding publications appear.

The Outline of the Project

Alfred Schutz

Editor's Introductory Note

By Helmut Wagner

The documents from which the comprehensive outline of Schutz's project of 1925–1927 was composed consist of a short indication of the over-all content of the planned three main parts of the study, and three other manuscripts specifying in considerable detail the content of an introductory part and of the first main part, drafts for both of which have been executed. My combination of these documents covers nine pages, typed single-spaced. The outline is reproduced here with the omission of overlap and lower-level details. The latter abound but, in part, would call for comments and explanations which would serve the purposes of the analysis of the scholarly-historical background of Schutz's approach but are not needed for the comprehension of his undertaking itself.

The titles and points of this outline are rendered in Schutz's formulation and arrangement. On a few occasions, I have added titles which were missing in the documents. They are marked by my initials, added in parentheses.

The greater part of the points and sub-points of the outline manuscripts carry identification marks in forms of Arabic or Roman numerals or else lower and upper case letters. The systems used in different documents are not necessarily consistent with one another. I have given the outline without these auxiliary identifications.

INTRODUCTION

Life and cognition

Sciences of Life and *Geisteswissenschaften*

Crisis of epistemology and logic

Approaches and objectives (HRW)

Applicability of modern epistemological tendencies to the social sciences

Subject matter and method of the investigation

Access to the central problem of the project (HRW)

Attempt at gaining access by way of Kant and the a priori-theory

Weber's theory of a sociology of understanding

Extraction of the categories

Reduction of these categories to Thou problem, reality, becoming and passing-away, symbolic action

Weber's social-scientific categories and logic

Weber's social-scientific categories in their practical application in the work of Max Weber himself

Result

Bergson's intuitionist philosophy

Representation of the *not* biological part

The critique; missing topics

Requirements of a vitalist philosophy

Method of such an investigation

Attempt at gaining access by way of Bergson and the philosophy of duration

PART I. THEORY OF LIFE FORMS AND SYMBOL CONCEPT¹

Life form and symbol' concept

Ideal-typical structure; auxiliary hypothesis

Selection of concrete life forms

The individual life forms

Pure duration

Memory-endowed duration

The acting I

The I in the Thou relation

The speaking I

The interpreting I

The concept of symbol relation and the concept of meaning

The function of duration

Laws of the symbol function

¹ An alternate title was given as "Theory of Life Forms and Analysis of Symbol Strata." Both forms differ from the title of the major manuscript for the first main part: "Life Forms and Meaning Structure." It was written along the left margin of the first page of manuscript UM 1925-1927b. As stated at the beginning of the "Editor's Introduction," the same title was given to the present volume.

Positing of meaning and interpreting of meaning
Meaning as complex symbol structure

PART II. THEORY OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIFICATION
OF MEANING

PART III. OBJECT AND METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Author's Introduction

Alfred Schutz

Editor's Note

By Helmut Wagner

It was not possible to ascertain the dates at which the three pieces of this introduction were written. It stands to reason that they originated in the first preparatory stages of the project and in conjunction with the outlines. However, these outlines show that they definitely belong to the introductory sections of the projected book. Every one of them has its specific characteristics. The one rendered first starts with historical-philosophical considerations of the development of a traditional position which has closed the door to the understanding of the phenomena of daily life. Attempts to open this door have been made by Ernst Cassirer, Henri Bergson, and Max Weber. Postulating his objective as that of dealing with "the pre-scientific materials of life as totality," Schutz changed to an outline style in order to set down the last four points of his introduction: the difficulties and the expected results of the planned investigation, and the discussion of the proposed methods and their justification.

The second introductory piece is of theoretical-philosophical character. It deals with the problem of "founding," in Scheler's sense, the point of departure and central over-all problem of the planned study. It stresses the significance of Bergson for the solution of this problem but also mentions the incompleteness and shortcomings of his attempts. In continuation, Schutz subjects Kant's position to a more extensive criticism. Finally, he begins a discussion of his concept of life forms. He contrasts the idea of an undetermined multiplicity of such life forms to both Kant's antithesis of sensuality and cognition and Bergson's opposition of duration and reason. Further, he underlines the basic unity of the experiences of the undivided I in the face of theoretically set limitations of single life forms. But he simultaneously explains that the life forms occur as a hierarchical order with a generally fixed characteristic mode of linkage between each of two adjacent ones. The text offers a detailed explanation of this.

The third piece of Schutz's introduction turns to Bergson in particular, characterizing his conceptions of duration and memory, linking them to symbolization, and contrasting the planned analysis as mere reflection about life to 'life itself.' These indications, too, have found fuller explanation in the text of the first main part of the project.

Obviously, the three pieces of Schutz's introduction were segments of a first draft. I have arranged them in an order which seemed substantively most consistent. This, of course, does not mean that Schutz, had he proceeded toward a final version, would have done the same; I even doubt that he would have maintained the three pieces in their preliminary structure. The title for the second one. "The Theory of Life Forms and the Analysis of Symbol Concepts," was provided by Schutz; the other two have been labeled by me.

(1) THE OBJECTIVES OF THE INVESTIGATION

By Alfred Schutz

Philosophy, as developed during the last half-century, was unable to achieve anything for the *Geisteswissenschaften*. The cause for this is as follows:

Kant, to whom all systems can eventually be traced back, started from mathematical physics. Since then the prevailing ambition has been to subsume the object of cognition under a minimum of categories according to formal procedures. (This has been done in two major ways, HRW.) There is the neo-Kantian assertion of the production of the object by the method, combined with the postulate of the purity of method and the prohibition of syncretism¹; that is, a way of chopping-up the unitary object of experience into the objects of uncounted special sciences. And there is the establishment of ultimate spheres of irreconcilability by Husserl's essential ontological analysis, the search for formal laws being unconditionally and generally valid for the forming of categories and their use in categorizing, and the establishment of the universal science.

Both procedures are of high value for the mathematical natural sciences; their cognitive goal is to find lawful regularities in the inanimate world. They are useless where one deals with the areas of knowledge of the *Geisteswissenschaften* and their animated and understandable objects. Therefore, these sciences vacillate between (a) empirical-historical collections of materials; (b) attempts at constructing methodologically pure theoretical systems which, however, do not serve the cognitive goal of the social sciences because they already alter their object so that it loses any

¹ The term syncretism is usually used negatively as a label for an uncritical mixing-together of elements from various philosophical systems. Schutz seems to introduce it here with a positive connotation, meaning a treating-together of 'things' which have been arbitrarily separated by the criticized analytical method.

connection with the real reality; and (c) mystical or misunderstood metaphysics on the basis of "a prioristic" valuations and ethic-political postulates.²

Consequences of (b) are: ever-growing remoteness from life; no attempt at explaining the most fundamental phenomena of our daily life with the help of these methods: awakens, sleep; Eros, music, understanding, Thou; dualism, syncretism, etc.

(Discuss the example of, HRW) Russel(1)'s hypothesis of the intelligence of other humans which is both nonprovable and nonrefutable.

(Consider the hopeless alternatives of accepting, HRW) either solipsism as necessity or pre-established harmony or occasionalism³ (as interpretation of the reciprocity of mind-body relations, HRW).

Misgivings about this situation are felt in philosophy itself. Attempts at bridging the opposition of life and cognition have been made: Cassirer referred to Goethe's conception of the possibility of a non-mathematical recognition of nature. Simmel gained insights into the transcendence of life. Bergson demonstrated that, in principle, the methods and conclusions which were gained from and applicable to an inanimate subject matter do not apply to an animated subject matter.

The last-named attempt is particularly significant. Through the introduction of the conception of duration, it is shown that a philosophy which is constructed on the time basis of inanimated matter is a special case. There are really experienceable yet essentially unreal worlds. Attempts at grasping the phenomena of duration with the methods of the natural sciences are fruitless. The central concepts of Bergson are: life, duration, and a particular conception of consciousness.

Bergson realized the stream of duration as the central problem. Next to this achievement, Scheler's last writings must be mentioned. In them, he emphatically designated as main problems of the *Geisteswissenschaften* the understanding of others and the evidence for the existence of the Thou.

Weber's sociology, too, places understanding in the center; it demonstrates that the cognitive goal of the social sciences is different from that of the natural sciences. Without naming it, he moves the Thou problem into the center. In addition, he introduces the eminently important concepts of the interpretation of meaning and of subjective meaning; and he refers to the empirical merely in the concept of the objective chance.

Common to all of these three attempts is the following: Rejection of the cognitive goals of the natural for the social sciences; emphasis on central concepts characteristic for the *Geisteswissenschaften* (or sciences of life): duration/Thou; occupation with what is offered by everyday life; the so-called pre-scientific material which is scorned by methodologically pure sciences and which every one of the empirical

²The figures 1, 2, 3 were written at the end of this paragraph. They could have been meant as indicators of successive footnotes, since three notes were set down at the bottom of the page. However, it seems more likely that the three notes indicate three additional points Schutz intended to insert between this and the next paragraph. Leaning to the second explanation, I have placed them in the text.

³ According to the Cartesian theory of occasionalism, seemingly causal relations (e. g., between spirit and body) are merely occasioned by a third agent; they do not originate in the necessities of the corresponding phenomena themselves.

sciences declares the responsibility of other sciences; and reality of life as totality. (Natural-science, HRW) cognition is arbitrary for the problems of the social sciences and pointless because it produces unreal segments (of the indivisible totality of life, HRW).

From this follows the postulate of an occupation with the prescientific materials of life as totality, of an attempt at its analysis according to duration and Thou, and of applying the results thus gained to a theory of the *Geisteswissenschaften* which are always social sciences.

Difficulties of this investigation

- (a) The habits of thinking in the social world of daily life are already highly complex constructions of the data of experience.
- (b) The instrument of language is supposed to penetrate beneath language.
- (c) The intimate person, who alone could elucidate the depth strata (of the human psyche, HRW), is ineffable.
- (d) Recognition of self already presupposes duration and the positing of the Thou.
- (e) In consequence, unavoidable paradoxes result.

Expected optimal results of the investigation

- (a) Demonstration of the identity of duration and Thou as exclusively primary facts of consciousness.
- (b) Analysis of the formative strata leads from life to thinking.
- (c) Discovery of a kind of regularity in the relationship (of life and thinking, HRW) to one another.
- (d) Discovery of the step-by-step transformation (of experience into thinking, HRW), shedding light upon the epistemological problems of the in theory "methodologically pure" systems and demonstrating the impossibility of realizing their postulate (rejection of the theory of dualism) and showing their uselessness for the social sciences.
- (e) Clarification of a few essential connections thus far left obscure (language-conditioned thinking, Thou-conditioned language, etc.).
- (f) Obtaining a theory of founding (*Fundierungstheorie*) in the sense of Scheler.

Proposed methods

Arbitrary construction of ideal types of the facts of consciousness which are experienced undifferentiated and as a whole in the totality of life. The artificial analysis of these ideal types. Investigation of individual events and their mutually reciprocal effects. Establishment of the mechanism of symbolization.

From the results gained will be derived the nature of the object of the social sciences. The consequences of the executed analysis for the theory of methodology and basic concepts of the sociology of understanding will be shown.