
# **Jeff Grover**

# Strategic Economic Decision-Making Using Bayesian Belief Networks to Solve Complex Problems





For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/8921

Jeff Grover

# Strategic Economic Decision-Making

Using Bayesian Belief Networks to Solve Complex Problems



Jeff Grover Maple Crest Way 512 Elizabethtown, Kentucky, USA

ISSN 2191-544X ISSN 2191-5458 (electronic)
ISBN 978-1-4614-6039-8 ISBN 978-1-4614-6040-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-6040-4
Springer New York Heidelberg Dordrecht London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012951657

### © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher's location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Sergeant First Class Charles V. Lang, IV (U.S. Army, Retired)
"Friend"

## Contents

1	An ]	troduction to Bayes' Theorem and Bayesian	
	Beli	f Networks (BBN)	1
	1.1	Introduction to Bayes' Theorem and BBN	1
	1.2	The Identification of the Truth	3
	1.3	The Motivation for This Book	4
	1.4	The Intent of This Book	4
	1.5	The Utility of Bayes' Theorem	5
	1.6	Inductive Verses Deductive Logic	5
	1.7	Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery	6
	1.8	Frequentist Verses Bayesian (Subjective) Views	6
		1.8.1 Frequentist to Subjectivist Philosophy	6
		1.8.2 Bayesian Philosophy	8
	Refe	ences	9
2	A L	erature Review of Bayes' Theorem	
	and	Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN)	11
	2.1		11
		2.1.1 Early 1900s	12
		2.1.2 1920s–1930s	12
		2.1.3 1940s–1950s	13
		2.1.4 1960s–Mid 1980s	13
	2.2	BBN Evolution	14
		2.2.1 Financial Economics, Accounting,	
		and Operational Risks	14
		2.2.2 Safety, Accident Analysis, and Prevention	15
		2.2.3 Engineering and Safety	15
		2.2.4 Risk Analysis	15
		<i>U</i> ,	16
		2.2.6 Human Behavior	16
		2.2.7 Behavioral Sciences and Marketing	16

viii Contents

		2.2.8	Decision Support Systems (DSS) with Expert	
			Systems (ES) and Applications, Information	
			Sciences, Intelligent Data Analysis, Neuroimaging,	
			Environmental Modeling and Software, and	
			Industrial Ergonomics	17
		2.2.9	Cognitive Science	17
		2.2.10	Medical, Health, Dental, and Nursing	18
		2.2.11	Environmental Studies	18
		2.2.12	Miscellaneous: Politics, Geriatrics,	
			Space Policy, and Language and Speech	18
	2.3	Curren	nt Government and Commercial Users of BBN	19
	Refe	erences.		20
3	Stat	istical F	Properties of Bayes' Theorem	29
	3.1		uction to Statistical Terminology	29
	3.2		'Theorem Proof	29
		3.2.1	A Bayes' Theorem Proof with Two Events,	
			A and B	29
		3.2.2	A Step-by-Step Explanation of the Two	
			Event Bayes' Theorem Proof	30
		3.2.3	A Bayes' Theorem Proof with Three Events,	
			A, B, & C	31
		3.2.4	Independence and Conditional Independence	
			Evaluation	31
	3.3	Statisti	ical Definitions	32
		3.3.1	Axioms of Probability	32
		3.3.2	J control of the cont	32
		3.3.3		33
		3.3.4	<b>3</b>	33
		3.3.5	<i>C</i> ,	34
		3.3.6	1	34
		3.3.7	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	34
		3.3.8	Event	35
		3.3.9		35
		3.3.10	Intersection and Union (of Sets)	35
		3.3.11	Joint and Marginal Probability Distribution	35
		3.3.12	Mean, Arithmetic Mean	36
		3.3.13	Outcome Space	36
		3.3.14	Parameter	37
		3.3.15		37
		3.3.16	1	37
		3.3.17	Prior and Posterior Probabilities	37
		3.3.18	Probability and Probability Sample	37
		3.3.19	Product (Chain Rule)	38

Contents ix

		3.3.20	Sample, Sample Space, Random Sample, Simple	
			Random Sample, Random Experiment (Event),	
			and Random Variable	38
		3.3.21	Real Number	39
		3.3.22	Set, Subset, Member of a Set, and Empty Set	39
		3.3.23	Theories of Probability	39
		3.3.24	Unit	40
		3.3.25	Venn Diagram	40
	3.4	_	gebra of Sets	41
		3.4.1	Theorem 1: For Any Subsets, A, B, & C of	
			a Set U the Following Equations Are Identities	41
		3.4.2	Theorem 2: For Any Subsets, A and B of	
			a Set U the Following Equations Are Identities	41
	Refe	erences.		42
4	Rav	esian Re	elief Networks (BBN) Experimental Protocol	43
-	4.1		ction	43
	4.2		xperimental Protocol	43
	4.3		teristics of a Random Experiment	43
	4.4		Research Methodology	44
	4.5		cting a Bayesian Experiment	45
	Refe			48
5	Mor	uifaatur	ing Example	49
3	5.1		lo	49
	5.2		nental Protocol	49
	5.3	-	sions	53
	5.5		Posterior Probabilities	53
			Inverse Probabilities	54
	Refe			54
6			ence Example	55
	6.1		0	55
	6.2	-	mental Protocol	55
	6.3		sions	58
			Posterior Probabilities	59
		6.3.2	Inverse Probabilities	59
7	Gan	nbling E	xample	61
	7.1	_	io	61
	7.2	Experir	mental Protocol	61
	7.3		sions	64
			Posterior Probabilities	65
			Inverse Probabilities	65

x Contents

8	8.1 Scenario	67 67 67 71 71 72
9	9.1 Scenario	73 73 73 77 77 78
10	10.1 Scenario	79 79 79 83 83 84
11	11.1 Scenario	85 85 89 89 90
12	12.1 Scenario	91 91 91 94 95 95
13	13.1 Scenario	97 97 97 01 01
	Reference	02

Contents xi

4	Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS)						
	Two-	·Stage Example	103				
	14.1	Scenario	103				
	14.2	Experimental Protocol	103				
	14.3	Conclusions	110				
		14.3.1 Posterior Probabilities	110				
		14.3.2 Inverse Probabilities	111				
	Refer	rences	113				
nd	ex		115				

# Chapter 1 An Introduction to Bayes' Theorem and Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN)

### 1.1 Introduction to Bayes' Theorem and BBN

Determining future states of nature based on complex streams of asymmetric information is increasing comes at a premium cost for today's organizations across a global economy. Strategic leaders at all levels face uncanny events where information feeds at near real-time require decision-making based on the interactive effects of this information and across all spectrums of operations, to include the militaries, governments, corporations, and the scientific communities. The dominate information that has historically been absent here is subjective in nature and flows directly from the innate knowledge of leaders and subject matter experts (SME) of these organizations. With the use of inductive reasoning, we can integrate this truth and have a more plausible future expectation based on the decisions these leaders make today when we filter it through the lens of Bayes' theorem. This is done by formulating a hypothesis (a cause) of the proportional relationships one believes that exists and then filtering this knowledge through observable information (the effect(s)) to revise the initial beliefs.

There is a gradual acceptance by the scientific community of traditionalists (frequentists) for the Bayesian methodology. This is not through any new theoretical revelation, but through the sheer momentum of its current utility in scientific discovery. It possesses the uncanny ability to allow researchers to seamlessly transition from the traditional cause and effect to the effect and cause scenario using inductive logic or plausible reasoning. This precipice is possible, in part, through the use of subjective (prior) beliefs where researchers obtain knowledge, either through historical information or subject matter expertise, when attempting

1

J. Grover, Strategic Economic Decision-Making: Using Bayesian Belief Networks to Solve Complex Problems, SpringerBriefs in Statistics 9, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-6040-4\_1, © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> E. T. Jaynes, in his book, "*Probability Theory: The Logic of Science*" (Jaynes 1995) suggests the concept of plausible reasoning is a limited form of deductive logic and "The theory of plausible reasoning" . . . "is not a weakened form of logic; it is an extension of logic with new content not present at all in conventional deductive logic" (p. 8).