Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 1

Alessandro Capone
Franco Lo Piparo
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Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy

Springer

Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology

Volume 1

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ISSN 2214-3807 ISSN 2214-3815 (electronic)
ISBN 978-3-319-01010-6 ISBN 978-3-319-01011-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-01011-3
Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013951326

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Acknowledgments

I would like to give thanks to a number of people who made this project possible. Of course, the Authors of this volume need special thanks and praise for writing the papers within strict limitations of time and, also, of subject-matter. My friends Igor Douven, Wayne Davis, Istvan Kecskes, Jacob L. Mey, Yan Huang, Katarzyna Jaszczolt, Michel Seymour, Neil Feit, and Keith Allan have tangibly helped the cause of this book, directly or indirectly, by providing feedback. Words do not suffice to express my gratitude. Ties Nijssen (Springer) has stimulated this project by providing us editorial guidance and also by persuading the publisher to accept the manuscript. I would like to thank him warmly. I would like to give thanks to Francesca Piazza, Pietro Perconti, Marco Mazzone, and Francesco La Mantia, whose reassuring attitudes have played an important role in launching this project. I would like to thank Eleni Gregoromichelaki for her continuous support, help, and encouragement.

Professor Tullio De Mauro stimulated my research activity on pragmatics and philosophy. I owe my various papers on this topic to his benevolent and stimulating attitude to me. I am eternally grateful.

I would like to give warm thanks to my coeditors Franco Lo Piparo and Marco Carapezza for their fruitful and tireless collaboration.

But chiefly I would like to dedicate this volume to my father and my mother, Giuseppe Capone and Venerina Scilipoti, who have never stopped providing me with books and paper.

We would like to give thanks to Routledge, John Benjamins, Elsevier, and OUP for granting permissions to republish the following papers.

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Steven Gross. What is a context? This paper originally appeared as Chapter II of Gross 1998 Harvard Ph.D. Dissertation, which was subsequently published by Routledge as Gross 1998/2001. *Essays on Linguistic Context-Sensitivity and its Philosophical Significance.*

Alessandro Capone

Contents

Introduction

We would like to give thanks to Ties Nijssen who encouraged the idea of this book in a number of ways, giving us feedback and advice.

Pragmatics (or the Pragmatics of Language) is one of those areas of human knowledge that are rapidly expanding, transcending the boundaries of linguistics proper (the most recent applications outside linguistics concern anthropology, law studies, literary theory, etc.). No one really denies the importance of pragmatic theory, but very often the wars at the boundaries (e.g., the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics or between syntax and pragmatics) are fierce, and often produce no definitive results. So we are clearly faced with a discipline which on the one hand is evolving rapidly, on the other hand is constantly under attack and runs the risk of regression. In this volume, we only confine ourselves to results which appear to be solid enough to allow us to draw the boundaries and give shape to what promises to be a stable picture of pragmatics and philosophy. We pass on to students and scholars the territory of this subject confident enough that the theoretical questions presented here will produce further theoretical questions and discussions as offspring.

We are pleased to introduce a volume that is nonstandard in its coverage of topics pertaining to pragmatics and philosophy. The idea of assembling this volume came to us during numerous conversations with philosophers like Igor Douven and Wayne Davis, but we should say that other people encouraged the idea, like Istvan Kecskes, Yan Huang, Jacob L. Mey, Keith Allan, Ferenc Kiefer, and many others whose names figure in the Editorial Board of the series in which this volume appears.

Pragmatics deals with inferential processes allowing hearers to recover the speaker's intention(s) as evinced through her speech with the aid of numerous cues and clues. A genuine pragmatics of language must be able to situate the message in the context from which it draws its meaningfulness (see Gross, in this volume) and thus also requires a sensitivity to socio-linguistic considerations (Mey 2001). Initially, pragmatics started in the philosophers' publications, but soon it was divulged and spread to other fields of inquiry, such as linguistics. Within linguistics, during the twentieth century we have seen the most important pragmatic theories thrive and persuade numerous practitioners to follow this path of inquiry, being finally integrated in linguistic methodology going beyond the idea of the

Saussurian sign with its strict relationship between the signifier and the signified. The most spectacular achievement of this period is the application of pragmatics to linguistic anaphora, ellipsis, etc. In the new millennium, we witness a trend that is the reverse of what happened in the twentieth century. Pragmatics, as we have it today, deeply influenced by linguistic ideas, can be put to use in philosophical enterprises, following the model of Paul Grice's original ideas. We cannot easily forget, in fact, that pragmatics started as a way to rescue philosophy from skepticism (see Grice's essay on perception; see also Chapman, in this volume). Recently, Igor Douven has proven that pragmatics can play a role in the dissolution of Gettier's problem and utilizes it constructively to provide an adequate pragmatics of belief. In other words, Douven uses pragmatics to solve epistemological problems (see also Douven, in this volume). In essentials Douven develops an Epistemic Hygienics:

Epistemic Hygienics (EH): Do not accept sentences that could mislead your future selves.

This principle is clearly involved when we fail to memorize sentences or thoughts in a form which might mislead our future selves and clearly has an effect on what we believe. I think that one should find a way to derive the Epistemic Hygienics, developed by Igor Douven, from general cognitive principles and, in particular the Principle of Relevance by Sperber and Wilson (1986); but this is an issue which is beyond the scope of this Introduction. I have reasons to believe that Douven's Epistemic Hygienics can be applied to (philosophical) issues such as knowing how, quotation, and indirect reports.

Other people did what Igor Douven is doing for the pragmatics of belief; thus a number of scholars have grappled with the pragmatics of belief reports showing how Millian ideas can be reconciled with the view that substitutions of co-referential NPs in that-clauses of belief reports appear to be illicit. Consider the following example. Mary meets Elisabeth and comes to know a number of things about her. However, she ignores (as that information has not been given to her) that Elisabeth is the Queen of England. Then one can very well describe one of Mary's beliefs as in the statement "Mary believes that Elisabeth is playing tennis" but attributing her the belief that the Queen of England is playing tennis will not do, essentially, because we have no idea whether she also believes that Elisabeth is the Queen of England or we positively know that she believes that Elisabeth is not (likely to be) the Queen of England. A statement such as "Mary believes that the Queen of England is playing tennis" pragmatically communicates that Mary has that belief under the mode of presentation "Queen of England" while, in fact, the mode of presentation of the reference that is operative in her belief is "Elisabeth". Presumably the same kind of story can be provided for the analysis of indirect reports, which pragmatically mirror belief reports.

Pragmatics does not only deal with defeasible or, in any case, nonconventional inferences, but also with rules of discourse (or rules of usage). The papers by Montminy and Anderson and Lepore discuss discourse rules correlating with assertion and the prohibition of slurs. These papers are of interest because they show that assertions are rooted in discourse practices which have been consolidated

through the sedimentation of collective beliefs (see also Gilbert and Priest, this volume).

Now, if we have managed to extend somehow the number of topics a pragmatic theory must deal with, it is clear that in a volume with a specific focus on pragmatics and philosophy there is greater hope to extend still further the number of topics that can be treated with the aid of a pragmatic theory. Thus, we asked for the collaboration of numerous colleagues, experienced authors who have dealt with the topics of interest to us, and we found that our proposal has had a deep resonance and impact on their imaginative powers so much so that in about a year we have been ready to offer a thick volume on the topics proposed to readers. We also asked our colleagues to write in a way that could be easily grasped by those outside philosophy, say anthropologists, literary theorists, etc. So an ideal audience is in front of us: all those who would like to familiarize with pragmatics and would like to see in what ways pragmatics can deal with philosophical problems. We invited philosophers to write papers, with an aim to let philosophy and pragmalinguistics interact in a fruitful way.

Retrospectively, we should say that we were very glad to have persuaded world renowned academics to write on areas in which they are specialists. So, this volume works well both as a stimulus to further research, as our authors provide guidelines for future research by asking important theoretical questions, and as a guide to less experienced researchers and students who would like to know more about this vast, complex, and difficult field of inquiry. We have both asked theoretical questions which are in need of important replies and provided a list of topics that is ambitious. This is not to say that this list of topics is exhaustive, but I am sure that it will allow students to find out what they are interested in. To use the words of Kasia Jaszczolt (personal communication), one should also find the topics that one tackles stimulating and intriguing ('enjoyable') from the point of view of the researcher. Furthermore, this volume will allow readers to find out more about their inner intellectual resources, as research is often a matter of "bringing out" what one has in one's mind. The maieutical role of pedagogy is embodied in the principles which allowed the editors to assemble the articles.

In this book, we largely have discussions about conversational implicatures and (conversational) explicatures. Explicatures figure prominently in what is said—as in many cases it is not possible to recover the proposition intended by the speaker without unpacking the implicit parts of the message (by using resources such as cues and clues, background knowledge, etc.). While ambiguity reduction and reference fixing (saturation of deictic elements) are surely part of explicatures, recent discussions in pragmatics have stressed the role played by free enrichment, that is the provision of constituents of thoughts that are combined with the ones that belong to the explicit logical form (see Carston 2002). Conversational implicatures are generally meaning augmentations on top of explicatures—even if the current views are that explicatures and implicatures are worked out in parallel (through mutual adjustments). There is a tension within current theories between those authors who adhere to a more classical view of conversational implicatures, and those who want to analyse some of these implicatures as explicatures. What

characterizes both explicatures and conversational implicatures is that they are calculable and nonconventional (that is, they are not (directly) tied to conventional meaning. Presumably nondetachability also correlates with explicatures and conversational implicatures (even if there are some controversial cases).

The volume is largely about Gricean pragmatics, which mainly deals with a speaker's communicative intentions as manifested through her speech (or animating her speech). Intentions, of course, are in the speaker's head; however, if they were solely in the speaker's head, they could not come out, they could not emerge from her mind and be shared with the co-participants. This sharing of intentions happens when a speaker manages to get her message across. Now, clearly this practice is not like putting a message into a bottle and putting it into the sea in the hope that someone, if anyone at all picks up the bottle, will be induced to open it, read the message and then carry out an action. Sending a message in daily interaction amounts to shaping the message in such a way that the speaker's intention(s) can be recognized by the hearers. Recognition can be aided through contextual cues and clues. Cues may lead a hearer to detect an interpretation problem (e.g., a mismatch between the literal and the nonliteral level of meaning) and clues can serve to fill the gaps left in the text (Dascal and Weizman 1987; see also Sbisà in this volume). But now it is clear that the pragmatic enterprise is not like bottle throwing in the hope that the message in the bottle will be recovered by someone; the message must be shaped by taking into account the concrete situation of the utterance and the predispositions of the hearers to pick up the cues and clues that direct the communication process. We have a hearer whose history we know, we have a person in front of us, and we use part of the history we share with her and the background assumptions that normally have a bearing on the understanding of a message to anticipate the direction which the interpretation work will take. We furthermore use principles of language use (whether we accept Gricean pragmatics (see Chapman, this volume) or a theory à la Sperber and Wilson to anticipate the direction which the interpretation process will take. So, a theory of interpretation must also be one of the speaker's intentions. Intentions and recovered messages are both the objects of pragmatics, since speakers and hearers both shape their codification and interpretation processes by taking into account principles of language use (whether the Gricean maxims or a single cognitive/communicative principle). This topic also intersects with that of collective beliefs (Gilbert and Priest in this volume), since while a conversation unfolds, both the speaker and the hearer construct shared files which are mutually recognized as being shared. Intentions are not only communicated but recognized and this process of communication/recognition is validated by shared files that are part of officially recognized resources.

Can intentions communicated through pragmatics be canceled? (And are they different, in this respect, from intentions projected through semantics (if there are such things)). Cancellability is the focus of an acrimonious controversy. There are some authors who take the nonstandard position that once intentions are communicated (even if through pragmatics means) they cannot be unimplicated, as numerous clues and cues have been mobilized to make the speaker and the hearer converge toward the intended message. Some Authors also make a distinction

between potential and actual explicatures—potential explicatures being cancellable. Some suggest that there are cases of explicatures that cannot be canceled, even if explicatures in general can be canceled. Presumably this intermediate position is likely to be consolidated in the future. This is an intriguing topic, which has been discussed recently by Burton-Roberts (2005), as well as myself. Scholars are split on this issue. While Capone (2009), drawing on ideas by Burton-Roberts (2005), develops the idea that in many important cases explicatures are not cancellable, Seymour (this volume) and Michal Haugh (this volume) take the contrary stance. Of course, only through future work can we arrive at a clearer view of the way things stand. But it is important to disseminate the seeds of the controversy in this book.

Is it true that semantics only provides schematic information which is then expanded into propositional forms through pragmatic processes? This is clearly one of the problems tackled in this book, and one promising to receive different answers. Our approach is not dogmatic, but we invite readers to be open to the multifarious proposals in this area of the semantics/pragmatics debate. What is clear is that, whatever our approach to pragmatic intrusion (whether we accept a minimal semantics which is fully propositional or a semantic theory which only provides interpretative schemas) pragmatic intrusion can be put to use in the understanding of philosophical topics. Which are the topics that can benefit most from pragmatic intrusion? These are clearly those of indirect reports (see Wieland in this volume), quotation, mixed quotations (see Saka in this volume), belief reports, knowing how, "de se" attitudes, Immunity to Error through misidentification (see Capone in this volume), the attributive/referential distinction (see Bezuidenhout, in this volume), fictional names (see Voltolini in this volume), negation (see Davis in this volume), and argumentation theory (see van Eemeren and Garssen), etc. So we are sure that by providing multiple connections between linguistic and philosophical topics, we can find out how to fuel the philosophical topics and how to construe them in such a way that we can provide constructive answers.

Is there any hope that we can find out further topics where pragmatics and philosophy interconnect? Our answer is positive. At this point we dare say that the issue of how to extend these topics is one of method and not of content. Whenever we find that a philosophical question can be reduced to a linguistic one (even if partially) and if the linguistic question reduces in one way or another to a pragmatic one, then we are sure that pragmatics can be applied to the resolution or dissolution of a given philosophical problem (see also Chapman on Grice and philosophy, in this volume). But how can a philosophical question reduce to a pragma-linguistic question? If a metaphysical or epistemological issue hinges on a logical problem and the logical problem has a linguistic structure using connectives or words admitting pragmatic intrusion, then the metaphysical or epistemological issue promises to be reducible to a pragmatic issue (See Capone on Immunity to Error through Misidentification and pragmatic intrusion, in this volume).

In general, if pragmatics makes progress and demonstrates that a linguistic phenomenon evinces partial or drastic pragmatic intrusion and if it turns out that an

epistemological issue uses that linguistic structure as part of the discussion and the essential part of the discussion hinges on that linguistic structure (or part of the argumentation is based on that linguistic structure), then we know in advance that pragmatic intrusion can be applied in a fruitful way to that epistemological problem (see Douven, in this volume). The question, essentially, is whether a certain epistemological problem is also partly a semantic problem and whether that semantic problem turns out to be a semantico/pragmatic problem (one allowing or requiring pragmatic intrusion). Of course, it is not easy to assess whether an epistemological problem is also partially a semantic problem and every attempt must/can be made to disentangle the epistemological from the semantic side of the problem. However, if, despite all attempts, the epistemological problem hinges on some semantic categories (say pronominals or indexicals or some other linguistic structure), and such categories are amenable to pragmatic analysis, then it is clear that applicability of pragmatic categories to epistemology must be granted. Is not this a good thing for pragmatics? Is not this a good thing for the view that much of our philosophy hinges on linguistic structures? We assume positive answers to these questions. This is not surprising since much of our theorizing is done through arguments which are crucially advanced in virtue of the linguistic resources of our theoretical arsenal.

Alessandro Capone
Franco Lo Piparo
Marco Carapezza

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Pragmatics and Philosophy

Margaret Gilbert and Maura Priest

This paper introduces some ideas developed over the past 20 years concerning the phenomenon referred to here as *collective belief*, and relates those ideas to the topic of conversation. Generally it suggests the benefits of a less individualistic approach to the social interaction constituted by a conversation than is standard. It proposes in particular that paradigmatic conversations involve the development of a *collective cognitive profile* of the parties. This occurs through the negotiation of a series of collective beliefs. These are constituted by commitments that are *joint* in a sense that is explained. The parties to any joint commitment have obligations towards each other to conform to the commitment. This helps to entrench a given collective belief once established. Even when interlocutors do not manage to negotiate a collective belief whose content has explicitly been specified, they are likely to establish one or more associated *implicit* collective beliefs. This idea is briefly related to some of the existing literature on conversation, including classic articles by Stalnaker and Lewis on presupposition and conversational score.

Martin Montminy

Timothy Williamson holds that the knowledge rule of assertion, according to which one should assert only what one knows, is the single norm of assertion. Montminy explains and defends Williamson's thesis. He identifies three key features associated with the thesis: the single norm of assertion should be *constitutive*, *individuating* and *basic*. Roughly, a constitutive rule of a speech act governs every possible performance of the act. A rule of assertion is individuating if it differentiates assertion from every other speech act. Finally, a rule of assertion is basic if it does not derive from other rules governing assertion, or other speech acts. He thus construes Williamson's thesis as the claim that the knowledge rule is the only individuating, constitutive and basic rule of assertion. This thesis is compatible with the idea that assertion is governed by nonepistemic constitutive rules such as moral and prudential rules. Since these rules are not individuating, there is no need to understand Williamson's thesis as bearing solely on the

epistemic rule of assertion. The Author explains how the existing arguments in favor of the knowledge rule can serve to support the thesis that this rule is also the single norm of assertion. He also responds to some objections against the knowledge rule, and criticizes alternative rules.

András Kertesz and Ferenc Kiefer

The puzzle of thought experiments is a hot topic in the philosophy of science. The paper raises the puzzle with respect to pragmatics as follows: How is it possible that thought experiments in pragmatics yield new experiential information about communication, although they are carried out entirely in one's head? The paper shows, first, that the structure of thought experiments in pragmatics consists of a series of plausible inferences. Second, the function of thought experiments is to serve as the initial step in the process of plausible argumentation as well as to test the plausibility of rival hypotheses. Third, while on the one hand, thought experiments and real experiments may be continuous, on the other hand, the former may be also indispensable components of the latter. Fourth, these properties provide a solution to the puzzle of thought experiments in pragmatics. The key idea of the solution is that thought experiments in pragmatics cannot generate new experiential information; rather, during the process of plausible argumentation they contribute to the retrospective re-evaluation of experiential information already given.

Michael Devitt

It is common to distinguish the "semantic" properties of an utterance from its "pragmatic" properties, and what is "said" from what is "meant". What is the basis for putting something on one side rather than the other of these distinctions? Such questions are usually settled largely by appeals to intuitions. The paper rejects this approach arguing that we need a theoretical basis for these distinctions. This is to be found by noting that languages are representational systems that scientists attribute to species to explain their communicative behaviors. We then have a powerful theoretical interest in distinguishing, (a) the representational properties of an utterance that arise simply from the speaker's exploitation of a linguistic system from, (b) any other properties that may constitute the speaker's "message". Devitt calls the former properties "semantic", the latter, "pragmatic". The semantic ones are constituted by properties arising from linguistic conventions, disambiguations, and reference fixings. Devitt foreshadows an argument in a forthcoming book, Overlooking conventions: the trouble with linguistic pragmatism, that many of the striking examples produced by linguistic pragmatists exemplify semantic rather than pragmatic properties. This argument counts against the popular pragmatist theses of "semantic underdetermination" and "truth-conditional pragmatics". It is very much in the spirit of the tradition that pragmatists reject.

Steven Gross

Gross examines a variety of criteria for context individuation, with an eye towards identifying and distinguishing various theoretical projects for which they would be appropriate in semantics and pragmatics. The discussion is organized around six possible desiderata for contexts: (1) that they metaphysically determine proposition expressed, (2) that they be nontrivial (in a sense explained in the text), (3) that they provide epistemic illumination of how hearers understand what proposition was expressed, (4) that they be (in various senses) finite, (5) that they be nonintentionally characterized, and (6) that they be context-insensitively characterized. Particular attention is directed to the conceptions of context developed by Lewis, Stalnaker, and Davidson(ians).

Michael Haugh

The standard position in pragmatics to date has been that cancellability is useful way of differentiating implicatures from logical implications, semantic entailments and the like. In recent years, however, there has been considerable debate as to whether implicatures are in fact always cancellable, or indeed whether they are cancellable at all, amongst linguistic pragmaticians and language philosophers. In this chapter, it is suggested that cancellability encompasses a range of actions that play out in different ways depending on whether we are analyzing inferences that can lead to implicatures or the implicatures themselves. In this way, we can see how analysts have often underplayed the contingency of inferences as well as the inherent indeterminacy of implicatures in such debates. Haugh proposes that cancellability should thus be the subject of further empirically-driven analyses in order to provide a solid foundation for the theorization of implicature.

Siobhan Chapman

This chapter addresses the contrast between Grice's philosophical motivations in developing his account of conversational implicature, and the linguistic framework in which it has subsequently generally been discussed. It begins with a review of the dichotomy in twentieth century analytic philosophy between 'ideal language' and 'ordinary language' philosophy, and discusses Grice's work as an attempt to demonstrate some fundamental misconceptions in both positions. It offers an exegesis of Grice's conception of conversational implicature and then considers his application of it to a range of established philosophical problems, including the viability of his own earlier work on "nonnatural meaning", the contrasting claims of realism and skepticism, apparent differences between logic and natural language and the debate over Russell's logical account of definite descriptions. This chapter concludes with an assessment of the significance of Grice's delineation of "what is said" as a defining opposite of "what is implicated". For Grice himself, although it was central to his original philosophical motivations, this remained one of the most troublesome and least successful

aspects of his philosophy of language. For pragmaticists it has proved one of the most enduring, challenging and intriguing topics of debate.

Claudia Bianchi

This article aims to investigate the notion of implicature and its connections with speaker's intentions, communicative responsibility and normativity. Some scholars stress the normative character of conversational implicatures more than their psychological dimension. In a normative perspective, conversational implicatures don't correspond to what the speaker intends to implicate, but should be interpreted as enriching or correcting inferences licensed by the text. Bianchi's paper aims to show that the idea of an implicature that the speaker does not intend to convey is not persuasive. In Grice's theory conversational implicatures are speaker-meant: this means that inferences derived by the addressee but not intended by the speaker should not count as conversational implicatures. On the contrary, Bianchi claims that propositions intended by the speaker and not recognized by the addressee should count as implicatures, if the speaker has made her communicative intention available to her audience.

Douglas Walton and Fabrizio Macagno

In this paper, the Authors use concepts, structure and tools from argumentation theory to show how conversational implicatures are triggered by conflicts of presumptions. Speech acts are conceived as grounded on different types of presumptions, which can be pragmatic, factual or epistemic in kind. Ordinary conversation is based on generic principles valid most of the time, such as the generalization that an interrogative statement is presumed to request information, or that people can usually perform ordinary actions. However, such presumptions can conflict with each other. For instance, the two presumptions above are the conflicting ground on which the question whether the hearer can pass the salt or not is grounded. This apparent contradiction needs to be explained or solved. Implicatures are shown to be forms of explanation, based on defeasible forms of inference used in conditions of lack of knowledge, such as abductive reasoning, argument from sign, pragmatic or causal argument.

Marina Sbisà

This paper moves from a well-known pragmatic theme in the philosophy of language—speech acts—to the philosophy of action. It focuses on the problem whether an utterance token can carry out more than one speech act, to which the attention of philosophers of language was drawn by Cappelen and Lepore's (2005) defense of speech act pluralism. It is argued that Austin's notions of the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts already presuppose speech act pluralism. In particular, it is shown that the notion of perlocutionary act, as defined by Austin, makes sense only within a pluralist framework, where no additional

behavior on the part of the speaker is needed in order for her performance of a perlocutionary act to take place, besides those of the locutionary and illocutionary acts. The central section of the paper discusses speech act pluralism as it applies to illocutionary acts, in the light of an Austin-inspired view of illocution developed by Sbisà herself and of the analysis of the conversational practices of multiaction ascription recently outlined by Levinson. As to the locutionary act, it is argued that plural ascriptions are by far more limited than is claimed by Cappelen and Lepore, if they exist at all. In conclusion, it is shown that all the views admitting of speech act pluralism that are examined in the paper (those of Cappelen and Lepore, Levinson, and Sbisà) require an ascription-centered conception of action, such as that outlined by Austin in his papers in the philosophy of action.

Michel Seymour

Are there pragmemes determining primary sentence meanings that are not prescribed by semantic features and that are not cancelable? In this paper, Seymour argues that there are no such examples. Pragmemes may contribute to the determination of the content of certain assertions, but they do not contribute to the determination of minimal content of the sentence-types used in these utterances. Seymour concludes that a proper appreciation of the role of pragmemes forces us to accept speech act pluralism and bifurcationism, the idea that there are two levels of content: minimal and maximal. That is, different pragmemes produce different inferential augmentations of a minimal level of linguistic meaning. But this is precisely what semantic minimalism is all about.

Paolo Leonardi

Contextualism deems that the meaning of most utterances, if not any, varies from context to context. Here, Leonardi argues, instead, that utterances added to a context change the context by shifting salience. Considering truth-conditions together with appropriateness, he tries to show that utterances claimed to make the same assertion—such as "Rain is over", "Here, rain is over", "In Florence, rain is over" and "Here in Florence, rain is over"—differently affect salience, and hence in an important sense do *not* assert the same. The idea is rather that "Rain is over", for instance, says the same in any context, but that it differently shifts salience in different contexts, and the various assertions listed may get at the same salience only in different contexts.

Kepa Korta and John Perry

Making the distinction between semantics and pragmatics has proven to be a tricky task, leading to several problems that look like Gordian knots, or worse; perhaps semantics and pragmatics are so tangled that separating them is impossible, like squaring the circle. A widespread, plausible, Grice-inspired view of the distinction is threatened by what (Levinson 2000) called "Grice's circle."

Gricean inferences to derive the pragmatic content of the utterance (such as conversational implicatures) require the determination of what is said (also known as the "semantic content" or the "literal truth-conditions"); but determining what is said (by processes of disambiguation, precisification, reference fixing, etc.) requires pragmatic inference. In a nutshell, pragmatic inference both requires and is required by the determination of what is said. Thus, there is no way to unravel semantics and pragmatics. In this paper, Kepa Korta and John Perry will show how to square Grice's circle. They untie the semantics/pragmatics knot, without using any of Alexander's methods: slicing it with a sword or removing the (semantic) pin around which it was bound. The approach consists in assuming a minimal but truth-conditionally complete notion of semantic content (Perry 2001), which doesn't constitute what is said by the utterance, but does provide the required input for pragmatic reasoning.

Wayne Davis

Davis will examine negations that are *"irregular"* in that they are not used in accordance with the standard rules of logic, including scalar, metalinguistic, and evaluative implicature denials; presupposition denials; and contrary affirmations. The principal question is how their irregular interpretation is related to their regular interpretation. Davis focuses here on theories maintaining that one of the interpretations is an "explicature" (Carston) or "implicature" (Bach) rather than an implicature (Grice, Horn, Burton-Roberts). Three types can be distinguished, depending on whether the theory claims that the regular interpretation can be "pragmatically derived" from the irregular, the irregular from the regular, or both the regular and the irregular from the meaning of the negation. Davis argues that no compelling reason has been provided for distinguishing explicatures or implicatures from implicatures, and that claims that one interpretation can be pragmatically derived using either Gricean or relevance theory are completely unfounded. With one class of exceptions, Davis argues for a semantic ambiguity thesis maintaining that irregular interpretations are idioms that plausibly evolved from generalized conversational implicatures. The exceptions are evaluative implicature denials, which are still live implicatures.

Anne Bezuidenhout

This paper tackles the question as to whether or not the referential-attributive (RA) distinction has any information-structural significance. That is, does this distinction mark a contrast between different ways a speaker might package the informational content of utterances that use definite descriptions? Furthermore, are there any overt markers of this distinction? In this paper Bezuidenhout focuses on referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, and leaves the issue of indefinites for another occasion. She answers both of the above questions negatively. While definite descriptions have an information-structural role to play,

the RA distinction does not. Moreover, after examining several potential candidates for markers of the RA distinction, she concludes that there are no such overt markers. This is in fact to be expected if one accepts my proposal to see referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions as having the same general function, namely to single out something as a center of interest. The difference is simply that referential uses focus on role bearers, whereas attributive uses focus on role properties.

Paul Saka

In "Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction," Paul Saka argues that the ability to quote an expression ultimately rests upon the ability to mention it. Simplifying a little, Saka says that while speaker S *uses* an expression X if and only if S intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to the customary extension of X, S *mentions* an expression X if and only if S intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to some item associated with X other than its customary extension. (In Saka 2011, this gets revised to: S mentions an expression X if and only if S intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to some *linguistic* item associated with X other than its customary extension, such as X's pronunciation, X's meaning, or X itself.) Thus, for Saka mentioning is a pragmatic phenomenon, being something that speakers can do with their languages. It is not a part of the language itself, as a speaker can choose to refer to his or her very own words regardless of what language the speaker is using, be it natural or artificial.

This natural pragmatic ability is harnessed by quotation, a language-variable convention. In English, the convention is to flank a mentioned expression with inverted commas. Thus, when a speaker S utters a sentence consisting of elements *<a "b" c>*, S semantically signals that S uses *a* and then mentions *b* and then uses *c* (Notice that even when Saka moves from discussing the pragmatics of mention to discussing the "semantics" of quotation, his framework remains oriented toward speech acts, and in that sense is thoroughly pragmatic.).

Nellie Wieland

An indirect report typically takes the form of a speaker using the locution "said that" to report on an earlier utterance. In what follows, Wieland introduces the principal philosophical and pragmatic points of interest in the study of indirect reports, including the extent to which context sensitivity affects the content of an indirect report, the constraints on the substitution of co-referential terms in reports, the extent of felicitous paraphrase and translation, the way in which indirect reports are opaque, and the use of indirect reports as pragmatic vehicles for other speech acts such as humor, insult, or irony. Throughout she develops several positions: (i) that a semantic analysis of indirect reports is insufficient, (ii) that the distinction between direct and indirect reports is not clear and that indirect reports are the predominate way of reporting while direct reports may be a para-linguistic variation on them, (iii) that most questions about the semantics and pragmatics of

indirect reports will rely on a full understanding of the nature of what is reported and how it gets reported, (iv) that an analysis of reporting requires the pragmatic tools of metarepresentation and a social, inter-personal understanding of relevance and shared knowledge.

Alessandro Capone (I.E.M.)

In this paper, Capone defends the idea that pragmatic intrusion is involved in "de se" constructions: the ego-concept being a component of the "de se" thought. He defends this idea from a number of objections. He explores the related notion of immunity to error through misidentification and claims that this too depends on pragmatic intrusion. He defends this view from obvious objections. He takes immunity to error through misidentification in "de se" thoughts to depend on the fact that the thinking subject makes an implicit use of the first-person pronominal and there is no question of attributing a referent to the pronominal, since the referent is given in the subject of the thought. In third-person "de se" attributions, some form of simulation can be used to reconstruct the thinking subject as using a form of the first-person pronominal. Immunity to error through misidentification is attributed to the thinking subject through simulation.

Alessandro Capone (Minimalism)

In this paper the author discusses a paper by Wedgwood in which he considers the possibility that Relevance Theory and Semantic Minimalism share at least some common resources. Capone maintains that the two theories have different aims and different orientations and that it might be fruitful to understand why Cappelen and Lepore stick to Semantic Minimalism despite the various objections leveled to their theory. He explores certain minimalist solutions along the lines of considerations by Michel Seymour, adopting Jaszczolt's considerations on parsimony of levels of interpretation. He assumes that in some cases which are alleged to be cases of (radical) pragmatic intrusion logical forms contain certain variables which can be filled (or saturated) in context. As a final proposal, he broaches the idea that pragmatic enrichment at the level of the predication can be avoided by resorting to a more complex enrichment at the level of the subject. He resorts to ideas by Jaszczolt (specifically POL), to argue that parsimony considerations require that enrichments be made at the level of subjects, if possible, thus avoiding a less parsimonious view according to which both subject and predicates should be enriched (in the same utterance).

Igor Douven

In earlier work, Douven argued that pragmatic considerations similar to those that Grice has shown to pertain to assertability pertain also to the epistemic notion of acceptability; in addition to the pragmatics of assertion, there is what he called

"the pragmatics of belief". Specifically, just as a patently true sentence may be unassertable on the grounds that by asserting it one might easily mislead one's audience, a patently true sentence may be unacceptable on the grounds that by accepting it one might easily mislead a future self who retrieves the accepted sentence from retentive memory. In this paper, the pragmatics of belief is applied to a puzzle related to the so-called Lottery Paradox. According to virtually all popular solutions to the Lottery Paradox, so-called lottery propositions—propositions to the effect that a ticket in a given lottery will lose—are unacceptable. The puzzle then arises from the fact that, according to all standard conceptions of what our epistemic goal is, we ought to aim at holding a body of beliefs with a favorable truth-falsity ratio. For, accepting of all minus one tickets in a given lottery that they will lose seems a safe way to improve the truth-falsity ratio of one's body of belief (while maintaining a consistent belief set). The present paper solves this puzzle by arguing that the standard conceptions of our epistemic goal should be reformulated in light of the pragmatics of belief and by further arguing that accepting a lottery proposition is wrong on account of the broadly Gricean considerations that were said to pertain to acceptability.

Alberto Voltolini

In this paper the author wants to hold that contextualism—the position according to which wide context, i.e., the concrete situation of discourse, may well have the semantic role of assigning truth-conditions to sentences—may well accommodate (along with some nowadays established theses about the semantics of proper names) three data about fiction, namely, the facts that as far as discourse involving fiction is concerned, (i) sentences about nothing are meaningful (ii) they may be true in fiction (iii) yet they may also be true in reality. Moreover, Voltolini also wants to hold that such a contextualist accommodation does not depend on endorsing a realist stance about fictional entities, although such a stance gives the best truth-conditional explanation for such data, in particular (iii).

Alec McHoul

In "Pragmatics and philosophy: Three notes in search of a footing", Alec McHoul turns to a seminal essay by Gilbert Ryle. Here Ryle explores the possible distinctions between ordinary everyday knowledge and recondite philosophical knowledge. He uses a number of metaphors in order to achieve this including those of "morning" versus "afternoon" types of questions, and the distinction between the villager's and the cartographer's knowledge of the locale. The present chapter extends these metaphors by drawing on Thomas Kasulis's distinction between the potter's and the geologist's knowledge of clay and uses this to reflect on lay as against professional knowledges of language. The idea of a "socio-logic" of ordinary talk, from Harvey Sacks, is alluded to as a way of seeing how such ordinary talk is grounded.

Luvell Anderson and Ernie Lepore

Slurs target race, nationality, religion, gender, sexual orientation, politics, immigrant status, line of work and many other demographics. They offend their targets—some more than others. Children who blurt out slurs are scolded regardless of their ignorance; but not uncommonly, targets appropriate slurs for themselves. The main questions of this paper are by which mechanism do slurs derogate, why some more forcefully than others, and how do targeted members succeed in mollifying some slurs?

A lacuna in the literature on slurs is the rarity with which their offenses are specified. We are told little more than that they derogate, belittle, disparage, or diminish, but never how. Explanatory options here are, however, limited. We know a lot about how words achieve efficacy; with that in mind, in what follows we will canvass alternatives in the hope of illuminating the offensive nature of slurs.

Anderson and Lepore's view, in brief, is that slurs are banished words, not because of any linguistic feature they exhibit or any content they carry, but rather because they are on a list of prohibited words—the higher up the list the more offensive their uses. This leaves a slew of questions: what determines whether a word is on or off the list, its position on the list; and why is it sometimes appropriate to flout its prohibition? The backdrop for this paper is the role of linguistics and philosophy of language in the investigation of slurs. Anderson and Lepore's answer is none.

Frans van Eemeren, Bart Garssen

In "Viewing the study of argumentation as normative pragmatics" van Eemeren and Garssen explain that the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation involves at the same time a pragmatic and a critical treatment of argumentative discourse. Starting from the speech act dimension of pragmatics, they indicate for each of the five components of the pragma-dialectical research program what a normative pragmatic approach amounts to. First they discuss the critical conception of reasonableness developed in the philosophical component of the research program, second the model of a critical discussion designed in the theoretical component, third the resolution-oriented analysis of argumentative discourse carried out in the reconstruction component, fourth the qualitative and quantitative research of the pursuit of reasonableness and effectiveness in argumentative discourse conducted in the empirical component, and fifth the development of adequate instruments for the analysis, evaluation and production of argumentative discourse in all sorts of argumentative practices undertaken in the practical component.

Francesca Piazza

The aim of this paper is to show that classical rhetoric can provide valuable insights in the contemporary debate in pragmatics. This is especially true for Aristotelian rhetoric, due to its philosophical approach. In the first part of the paper, the author discusses the conditions under which ancient rhetoric can be a real partner of current pragmatics: (1) rhetoric must be understood as a type of knowledge (a *techne*) and not as a "jumbles of techniques"; (2) we need to consider persuasion as an anthropological feature and not only as a specific case of communication; (3) we should not exclude truth from the rhetorical field. The second part of the paper focuses on what can be considered the basic insight of classical rhetoric (stated in a well-known passage of Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* 1358a 37-b1): *speakers and listeners are inside and not outside discourse*. If adequately interpreted, this statement has important consequences that can be interesting for current pragmatics. These consequences can be schematically summarized as follows: (1) a broader conception of persuasion, useful to overcame the opposition informative/persuasive; (2) the consideration of speaker and listener as internal component of discourse (with the latter in a key position); (3) the consideration of the stylistic elements of a discourse from a cognitive point of view; (4) the overcoming of the sharp opposition cognitive/emotional due to the consideration of *ethos* and *pathos* as discoursive elements.

Marcelo Dascal

Although we tend to consider controversy, discussion, dispute, and other forms of debating as typically communicative exchanges in which we confront others, we often engage in similar dialectical interactions within ourselves. As pointed out by Michel Foucault, while "we all struggle against each other, there is always something in us which struggles against something else in us". What this paper inquires is to what extent, if at all, these two kinds of struggle obey the same pragmatic rules and strategies. When deliberating whether to complete a task we are committed to end today or to watch a football match, does our self' somehow break up into parts that argue in order to persuade each other to adopt the opposite part's position? And if we have decided for the first option but end up performing the second, is such a flagrant violation of our own decision not only a case of uncontrollable weakness of the will, but also of the irrationality of a self whose integrity is supposed to preserve consistency? The investigation of questions such as these from a pragmatic perspective reveals that, in addition to the habitual use of language in communicative debating, we must take into account quite different dialectic practices involved in our self-debates, as well as the ontological and epistemological consequences of such differences. Philosophically, the acknowledgement of the distinctions between what I have suggested to call, respectively,

"socio-pragmatics", "psycho-pragmatics", and "onto-pragmatics", along with the identification of different kinds of rationality, provides new insights into some of the most puzzling problems of the philosophy of mind, such as weakness of the will and alleged irrationality.

Franco Lo Piparo

True' and 'False' are defined through a linguistic rule requiring the negation operator. This is the elaboration of an idea proffered for the first time by the Stoics on the basis of some remarks by Aristotle and then in modern times by Frege and Wittgenstein. Another thesis of this essay is the following: the true/false rule is a sort of UR-Regel underlying all linguistic practices (including prayers and commands) and all human cultures. Reinterpreting the notion of Spielraum put forward by Wittgenstein in 4.463 of the Tractatus, Lo Piparo will present an implicational pragmatic theory of a true proposition. Jokes and reductio ad absurdum are explained as examples of Spielraum.

Alessandra Pandolfo

Although Habermas' universal pragmatics has played a marginal role in studies on pragmatics, it can still make an important and meaningful contribution, precisely because it highlights the system of validity claims that lie in speech acts. This type of analysis allows one to consider the dialogic dynamics that engage speakers in the activity of reciprocal giving and asking for reasons for saying and doing things. The reasons why a speaker knows he or she can say what he or she says in the presence of other speakers constitute an essential element of the production of meaning; and reciprocally identification of the speaker's reasons by the listener is an indispensable condition of the activity of understanding of meaning. These factors allow one to render explicit the dialog dynamics on which the quality of the utterance and understanding, like the quality of social relationships, depend.

Felice Cimatti

Embodied Cognition (EC) is a new psychological version of an old philosophical idea: human cognition is grounded in sensorimotor experience. According to EC there is not such an entity as abstract and disembodied knowledge, that is, the root of every form of human knowledge is an acting body in the world. In this paper Cimatti will try to show that existing extensions of EC to language partly miss the point because do not fully account for the social and performative nature of language. Therefore a thorough embodied theory of language requires to consider the Wittgenstein legacy, which stresses at least two

main points: (a) a coherent theory of language is not possible if not embedded in a more comprehensive description of human way of living; (b) the meaning of a word is not an internal and psychological entity but its social use, it is the *action* we do using that word/tool. In this paper Cimatti will analyze EC literature showing that it needs to be complemented with Wittgenstein ideas on language and mind.

Conversation and Collective Belief

Margaret Gilbert and Maura Priest

Abstract This article proposes that paradigmatic conversations involve the development of a *collective cognitive profile* of the parties. This occurs through the negotiation of a series of *collective beliefs*. Collective beliefs are constituted by commitments that are *joint* in a sense that is explained. The parties to any joint commitment have associated rights and obligations. This helps to entrench a given collective belief once established. Even when interlocutors do not manage to negotiate a collective belief whose content has explicitly been specified, they are likely to establish one or more associated *implicit* collective beliefs. This supports the idea of a conversation as a collective activity whose stages are marked by the development of a relatively stable collective cognitive profile of the parties. This idea is briefly related to some of the existing literature on conversation, including classic articles by Stalnaker and Lewis on presupposition and conversational score.

Keywords Collective belief · Conversation · Conversational score · Common ground · Groups · Individualism · Negotiation · Joint commitment · Presupposition · Obligation · Rebuke

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This article is dedicated to the memory of David Lewis, who suggested the connection between the idea of collective belief elaborated in Section I and his own and Robert Stalnaker's work on conversation. See section III in the text below. The authors thank the following people for reading and commenting on the penultimate draft at short notice: Alessandro Capone, Antonella Carassa, Marco Colombetti, Daniel Pilchman, Frederick Schmitt, Martin Schwab, Richmond Thomason and Philip Walsh. Responsibility for the ideas expressed here is ours alone.

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A. Capone et al. (eds.), *Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy*,
Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 1,
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-01011-3_1,