

Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory

Richard Beardsworth

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To the memory of my beloved father

Neville Fogg Beardsworth

1924–2007

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polity

First published in 2011 by Polity Press

Polity Press
65 Bridge Street
Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press
350 Main Street
Malden, MA 02148, USA

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4323-6
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4324-3(pb)

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Typeset in 10.5 on 12 pt Times New Roman
by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited
Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Group Limited, Bodmin, Cornwall

For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.politybooks.com

Contents

Acknowledgements

My thanks to Stephen Barker, Seyla Benhabib, Garrett Brown, Michael Dorsch, Robert Fine, Philip Golub, Daniel Gunn, Peter Hägel, Patrick Hayden, Christian Joppke, Seán Molloy, Scott Nelson, Patricia Owens, Ali Rahnema, Leif Wenar and Michael Williams for comments on the book or discussions around it. Some of the ideas in this book were rehearsed recently in various academic venues: my particular thanks to Anne-Marie Le Gloannec and Ariel Colonomos, Sci. Po., Paris, to graduate students in the Yale Political Theory group, especially Lucas and Louis, and to past and present undergraduate and graduate students at the American University of Paris. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments on the original manuscript, as well as the editorial and production teams at Polity for their speed and grace. My research assistant, Tyler Shenk-Boright, was more than productive in the last year retrieving and checking statistical information: a large thanks to him.

My final thanks to Brooke, who has always offered careful advice and patiently awaited the end of the manuscript. I dedicate this book to my father, a man who understood, with deep joy, the risk of political construction.

Introduction

The aim of this book is to relate the concerns of cosmopolitanism to the discipline of International Relations and its field, international relations and world politics.[1] The principles of cosmopolitanism – together with the cosmopolitan disposition towards international relations to which they lead – are often referred to or discussed in IR literature (earlier examples are Bull, 1977; Carr, 2001; Morgenthau, 2004; more recent examples flourish: for example, C. Brown, 1992 and 2002; Keohane and Nye, 2003; Linklater, 1998; Ruggie, 2003). Equally, both moral and political philosophy and political theory increasingly refer to international relations and the literature of IR (for example: Beitz, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Brock and Brighouse, 2005; Caney, 2005; Erskine, 2008a; Held, 1995a; Nussbaum, 1998). Given deepening dependence between states, between peoples and between individuals, it is understandable that there is this parallel growth in interdisciplinary reference between philosophy, political theory and IR.[2]

Since specific problems facing actors in the field of world politics are of an increasingly global nature, and since the solutions to them call for both global cooperation and global vision, the relations between the constructs of cosmopolitanism and those of IR need, however, to be explored more systematically. What are feasible cosmopolitan commitments in world politics? What are the important and effective agents for these commitments in this field? How does one respond to the persistent IR charge that cosmopolitan commitments are well-intentioned, but idealistic, if not

dangerous? How does one respond to the similar charge that, when pitched pragmatically, they are ultimately complicit with liberal hegemony or with global liberal governance, and that cosmopolitan behaviour in the field of international relations must lead to elitism? These types of question need to be squarely addressed by creating a reflective space of debate between cosmopolitanism and IR. The moral and political philosophy of cosmopolitanism is fairly secured, although there are distinct positions assumed within it. What is not secured is the *relation* between the constructs of cosmopolitanism and those of international relations in a globalizing world. For this, more interdisciplinary dialogue between cosmopolitanism and the theory orienting IR thinking and research is required. Such dialogue is the subject of this book.

To orchestrate this dialogue, I have made several assumptions and one decision. Before turning to the substantive content of the book, I wish to rehearse them.[3]

(1) This book is theoretical and is theoretical on several levels. In considering the relation between cosmopolitanism and international relations, I turn to specific schools of IR theory and debate the ways in which these schools frame international relations and the way in which cosmopolitan thought can effectively respond to these framings. To make this step, I assume that theory is vital to cognition in the first place, and that, despite constituting distinct ways of theorizing the world, cosmopolitanism and IR theory are necessarily talking to each other because they are both constructs *of* the world. Cosmopolitan theory and IR theory are distinct from each other in one simple sense: the first is more normatively minded (moral framing of what should be the case); the second more empirically minded (explanatory framing of what is the case). Normative IR theory has worked with this normative/empirical distinction in recent years from within IR theory (Beitz, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; C. Brown, 1992 and 2002; Erskine, 2008a; Frost, 1996). The assumption of the book is the following in this context: in a world of growing interdependence, the theoretical constructs of cosmopolitanism have increasing purchase on empirical reality with regard to a *specific* range of issues: international security, international human rights, financial and economic regulation, climate change mitigation, development, health and sustainability, and intercultural dialogue. Consequently, while the difference between normative theory and empirical theory remains ever-important, the actual distinction between the normative and the empirical in the domain of world politics is becoming blurred. Thus, *qua* constructs of the world within growing empirical interdependence, the moral and political thought of cosmopolitanism and IR theory are necessarily ever-more related to each other. The fact that there is an increasing volume of books on cosmopolitanism (see Brown and

Held, 2010) and that students of IR appear increasingly interested in cosmopolitan responses to international conflict and cooperation would seem to testify to this convergence of levels of interest, even if cosmopolitanism could, and should, never become an empirical theory in the heuristic tradition of social scientific theory (see Lakatos, 1970; Keohane, 1986, pp. 1–24). Cosmopolitanism constitutes a normative theory in relation to the field of world politics, but its positions on specific areas of this field are 'empirically meaningful' (to use the language of rational choice theory) given growing dependence between states. A dialogue between contemporary cosmopolitan ideas, on the one hand, and IR theory, on the other, is thus timely and fruitful.

This first assumption on theoretical convergence can be deepened by three further theoretical remarks.

First, it is commonplace within IR theory that methodological pluralism prevails, since international political reality is too complex for one type of abstraction to have descriptive or explanatory monopoly. Unlike in the physical sciences, there is no attempt to claim a unified theory of the political real. Human society is multilayered; its agents are at the same time its observers, which renders theoretical unification a priori impossible. One's theory is thus apt to change given the nature, and limits, of the object analysed. It makes little sense, for instance, to reflect upon interstate violence in the terms of the International Criminal Court. Conversely, it makes every sense to theorize state responsibility towards other states and their citizens as well as towards its own citizens in terms of the institutional evolution of international law. As the plurality of IR theories indicates, the theoretical frame and the chosen unit of analysis must fit. Given this plurality, an articulated relation between a moral and political philosophy of the world, like cosmopolitanism, and the theorization of world politics can help one to understand *what* one is theorizing and *how* one is theorizing when framing the emerging political entity called 'global politics'.

Second, normative theory in IR since the 1990s has helped many students of IR understand the immanence of ethics to questions of power in international affairs. As dependence between states increases, the question of legitimate behaviour between states also increases (Buchanan, 2003; Clark, 2005; Lebow, 2003). Ethics and law, that is, become part and parcel of one's understanding of international politics as processes of globalization deepen. This means that the relation between morality and politics grows in intricacy, the more socially dense international relations become. I make a lot of this historico-sociological argument in the book. It was first formulated on the domestic level by the sociologist Norbert Elias (1982); it is applied to the global level by Andrew Linklater (2002, 2007a,

2007b). A mutually self-excluding distinction between the normative and the positive in social science is thereby undone. In other words, while not explanatory, normative IR theory proceeds on the basis that its reflections on the principles of political behaviour and loyalty speak to empirical reality. Without this purchase upon the latter, such reflection would simply not be made in the first place. As a normative theory, cosmopolitanism itself holds a strong place in any reflection on international and supranational terms of political legitimacy. Since political legitimacy is now an immediate concern of global power structures, cosmopolitanism has, again, empirical meaning.

Third, the normative status of cosmopolitan thought is no longer distinct from empirical political reality as such. As several cosmopolitan commentaries on international law point out (see Cabrera, 2004; Hayden, 2005; Held, 2004; Robertson, 2002), normative arguments about the basic needs and interests of human beings are embedded in the international human rights regime. Following Stephen Krasner's classic definition, an international regime is composed of a set of 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (1983, p. 2). The international human rights regime is one such body of norms, rules and expectations that pertain to the relations between all signatory governments and their citizens, as well as to those between these governments and international or stateless refugees. Human rights constitute a normative understanding of human relations: they posit what relations between human beings as human beings *should* be. As an international regime, this normative framework has, precisely, effects in the real, although these effects remain notoriously uneven (see C. Brown, 2002 and 2005, pp. 221–46). Despite this unevenness, it is nevertheless correct for cosmopolitans to claim that, with the rights regime, normative theory has an immanent relation to the real as such. This means again that the standard social science distinction between the normative and the empirical offers too crude a theorization of reality and that affirmation of the human rights regime places cosmopolitanism squarely *within* IR theoretical framings of twenty-first-century political reality (see, particularly, Hayden, 2005 and 2008).

By looking at the relation between cosmopolitanism and international relations through debate on their respective *theories*, this book is assuming, then, several points under my first basic assumption of theoretical convergence. These theories are framing the same complex object of international reality; they therefore provide a privileged access to mutual debate. Although they are framing it differently and/or their emphasis is

different, this difference fits methodological pluralism within the discipline of IR. Given increasing dependence between states and the consequences of this interdependence (I alluded above to change in terms of political legitimacy and to the rise of international regimes), the normative status of cosmopolitan theory has growing purchase on empirical international reality. Prevalent distinctions in social science between the normative and the empirical are thereby unmade. My own use of theory, when I stage debate between cosmopolitanism and IR theory, will be varied and tiered, according to the specific object analysed within the schools of IR theory selected. For example, power, global justice, international political economy and universalism form, respectively, different types of theoretical object and require different theoretical treatments within the overarching debate between cosmopolitanism and IR as a whole. I return to this very last point later in the introduction.

(2) My second basic assumption narrows the field of debate that I seek at a second level and makes straightforward sense of my choice of IR theoretical schools elaborated in point (3) below. This book considers cosmopolitanism in relation to basic liberal tenets and therefore rehearses cosmopolitan concerns as a whole in the context of modern liberalism and its avatars. This will seem to some a rather arbitrary, indeed violent circumscription. For diverse, if not opposing reasons, many theorists are today concerned to widen critical debate around a common humanity *beyond* liberal tenets (for example: Appiah, 2006; Dallmayr, 2004 and 2010; Walker, 2010). Furthermore, as Simon Caney rightly notes in *Justice Beyond Borders*, there are a series of reasons why cosmopolitanism and liberalism cannot be aligned (2005, pp. 4–6). Cosmopolitan tenets can be found in many religions; the philosophy of cosmopolitanism has a long intellectual history that well pre-dates liberalism; some committed to liberal principles (in particular, the outstanding worth of the individual) are not cosmopolitan (John Rawls, for example), while cosmopolitan understanding in Buddhism or Confucianism is not liberal. There are thus 'both non-liberal cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitan liberals' (ibid., p. 6). These reminders regarding the complexity of cosmopolitan discourse are important, especially for cross-cultural dialogue in a globalized world (see Dallmayr, 2002; Held and Moore, 2008). The recent escalation of violence between aggressive universalism and Islamic fundamentalism is testament to the importance of cross-cultural and interreligious exchange in world politics (Dallmayr, 2004). It is also important to emphasize, in this context of bringing together cosmopolitanism and liberalism, the critical distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' cosmopolitanism.[4]

Weak cosmopolitans, like David Miller and Thomas Nagel, do not consider that rights pertaining to the dignity of moral personhood can be universalized since some of them are specific to liberal communities. That said, rights pertaining to the lower (liberal and non-liberal) threshold of the dignity of life can be (Nagel, 2005; Miller, 2007a and 2007b). Strong cosmopolitans, like Simon Caney and Thomas Pogge, consider, on the contrary, that the universalization of the rights pertaining to moral autonomy is, theoretically and ethically, the only consistent cosmopolitan position (Caney, 2005; Pogge, 1992). This distinction is important for IR not only because it concerns the contours of just war, of the rights and responsibilities of intervention, and the global reaches (or not) of economic and social justice. It is also important for deciding what *agents*, in the field of world politics, can have what *responsibilities*. One major thread of this book will be, for example, that leading states should aim for minimal cosmopolitan responsibilities given the need to solve global collective action problems, while transnational civil actors and international organizations may continue to work with, and look to, a larger pool of rights and responsibilities for humanity and the planet as a whole.

The above said, my basic claim is nevertheless the following at this stage of the argument. Although cosmopolitanism, as a loose philosophy of the universal *polis,* is larger than liberalism, contemporary cosmopolitan argument constitutes, broadly speaking, an 'offshoot' of Enlightenment liberal thought. Whether one is a weak cosmopolitan or a strong one, arguments around the extent and purpose of cosmopolitan concerns for the world as a whole are working from out of the background of liberalism. For, only with this background does one decide, to begin with, what is universalizable about the liberal subject or not. This background entails the following major attributes: separation of morality from religion; separation of the state from religion and civil society; thick civil life and market independence; moral constraints on law; individual freedom; political self-determination and political community (see the collection of writings in Rosen and Wolff, 1999). Since there are necessary trade-offs between these various attributes, liberalism has various political and economic forms through which these attributes are assumed: libertarian, neo-liberal, social or social-democratic, republican, progressive. I do not address these forms yet in the context of the international. My present concern is much more basic: when working within the contemporary fields of political thought and IR, the ideas of cosmopolitanism and liberalism are necessarily linked in some constellation or other. Given its object, world politics, this book works throughout with this link between the two.

The latter remark leads to my third decision concerning the parameters of a discussion between cosmopolitanism and international relations.

(3) The book focuses on three schools of thought within IR theory: Realism, Marxism and its avatars, and postmodernism.[5] This focus is given for strategic reasons: each school offers, from out of its intellectual identity within IR, a critique of universalism, in general, and of liberalism, in particular. Since contemporary cosmopolitanism constitutes, in the main, an offshoot of Enlightenment liberal thought, these schools' constitutive critiques of liberal universalism in the IR context of international liberalism necessarily puncture the ambitions of cosmopolitan thinking. In other words, I confront contemporary cosmopolitanism with three schools of IR theory that are most critical of cosmopolitan ideas given their innate scepticism towards liberal forms of universalism either in the international field alone (Realism) or in both the domestic and international fields (Marxism and postmodernism).

This book does not consider at length approaches to world politics in IR theory that are either methodologically individualist (rational choice theory) or methodologically insistent on a hard distinction between national and international community (certain versions of international liberalism). Although the contemporary form of international liberalism is referred to at length in chapter 1 and recurrently through the book, and although rational choice theory is used within my exposition of the realist critique of cosmopolitanism (chapter 2), this book does not give these schools of IR thought independent attention. It focuses, rather, on those theories that are constitutively critical of universalism in the international domain, and that allow me to exposit through a set of theoretical dialogues where, and how, borders fall; and where, and how, borders remain necessary. I intend to give specific attention to the minimal universalisms of international liberalism, weak cosmopolitanism, and cosmopolitan Realism in a separate book.

I turn now from these three assumptions and decisions, regarding the overall parameters of the book, to the reasons for these dialogues or debates. There are, to my mind, five major reasons for setting up these dialogues between cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and Realism, Marxism and postmodernism, on the other.

The first reason, of which I have already spoken, is because each school of thought in IR explicitly conceives of itself as a critique of liberalism at the international level: the schools constitute themselves through their opposition to liberal thought as such. Given my claim that contemporary cosmopolitanism constitutes an offshoot of Enlightenment liberal thought in the global domain, their critiques are important. As an avatar of Enlightenment liberalism, contemporary cosmopolitanism must respond to them if it wishes to work consistently and effectively with IR. Since this claim provides the major theoretical rationale for the book and for its method, let me detail it further before turning to the other reasons.

The school of Realism was born of the failure of international liberalism and more cosmopolitan aspirations between the two world wars. Its attack on liberal universalist thought in the international domain ensues from realistic appraisal of the effect of plurality and force in world politics. With international terrorism, consistent problems besetting humanitarian intervention, the second Iraq war debacle, and the renewed insurgency in Afghanistan, principles of Realism have returned quickly to the forefront of IR thinking after the initial idealism of post-Cold War globalization theories. In the contemporary context of international terrorism, 'Great Power' nemesis, charges of liberal imperialism and global governance concerns, a prolonged dialogue between IR Realism and cosmopolitanism would be fruitful. As a result of this dialogue: (i) careful distinctions can be made between particularist and universalist claims in, and for, a globalizing world (particularly with regard to interventionism); (ii) focus can be placed on the changing dynamics of power and interest in structural interdependence, and argument can be made for a rethinking of 'national interest' in the light of this interdependence; and (iii) in the context of Realist concerns with states and with a limited ethics of statesmanship and prudence, a cosmopolitan *political ethics* of state responsibility can be delimited and rehearsed.[6] This cosmopolitan political ethics is important given the structural and historical need for state-led global leadership. In distinction to cosmopolitan literature that disowns Realism, I will therefore argue (iv) for a 'cosmopolitan realism' that considers, at this moment in history, states to be the major agents of change for cosmopolitan commitments.

Classical Marxist thought emerged as a critique of liberal thought and practice during nineteenth-century European capitalism and colonialism. It established the tenets of historical materialism, the dynamics of capitalism, and class interest and class conflict within those dynamics. Marxism, as a school of thought in IR theory, transposes this critique to the world economy and to false distinctions within liberalism between international politics and international economics. With recent accusations against Northwestern imperialism (from the 'no alternative to liberal democracy' to economic and political interventionism) and, in the context of the present financial and economic global crisis, this type of critique has an important place in political sociology, political theory, and IR (for a recent overview, see B. Cohen, 2008). The relative absence of Marxist analysis in US economic and political educational programmes remains in this light regrettable. A dialogue between Marxism and cosmopolitanism is important for at least three reasons: (i) because of the need to consider relations of power in economic terms; (ii) because of Marxist and cosmopolitan attention to the systemic inequalities of the capitalist system and to respective ways of addressing them;[7] and (iii) because of the materialist critique of liberal

universalism, in general, and of the recent domestic and international practices of neo-liberalism, in particular. These three concerns are highly interrelated, but my cosmopolitan response to Marxism will increasingly foreground the third. For, in the dialogue between Marxism and contemporary cosmopolitanism, I argue the importance of discussing the normative and the empirical together: how, that is, cosmopolitanism endorses global capitalism, what type of universalism cosmopolitanism advocates in distinction to neo-liberal prescriptions and to global liberal governance, and how it frames institutional arrangements regarding the world economy in a globalized world. In other words, given fears of capitalist homogeneity and calls to local and regional resistance to it, important distinctions need to be made concerning *why* and *how* one posits the universal in global conditions of economic interdependence. A specific dialogue between Marxism in IR and cosmopolitanism is theoretically and empirically of value in this context. It allows one to appreciate, first, how differentiated cosmopolitan universalism is in distinction to recent neo-liberal universalism and, second, how what I call a 'progressive liberal cosmopolitanism' can begin to be thought in global terms.[8] These theoretical engagements are, accordingly, different in type from those with Realism and with postmodernism since they are concerned as much with the grounds of policy as they are with principled argument.[9]

Postmodernism in IR theory is not mainstream. It is nevertheless acquiring more attention in the field (see, for example, Edkins and Zehfuss, 2008). It constitutes a set of alternative frameworks for those dissatisfied with the assumptions and limits of empirical theory and embraces within IR explicitly interdisciplinary, rather than multidisciplinary, perspectives. With its stress on multiple subjectivities, it also constitutes an intellectual haven for those on the Left who have lost faith in the practical dimension to Marxism. My concern with this body of theory is here specific. Born out of the non-Marxist, French critiques of liberalism and liberal governance in the second half of the twentieth century – the thought of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and others – postmodernism in IR theory considers liberal normative rule as an exercise of domination and looks, consequently, to a *non-normative* ethics as opposed to a cosmopolitan norm. It sets itself up, therefore, as a critical theory of the present terms of globalization and governance, of the expansion of modernity and modernization processes, and of liberal forms of violence in general, reserving in the field of IR some of its strongest intellectual disquiet for the concept and practice of 'humanitarian intervention'. A dialogue between postmodernism and cosmopolitanism is valuable here because a great deal of critical IR theory assumes, to a lesser or greater extent, postmodern attitudes and is critical of liberal cosmopolitanism (see, most recently, Edkins and

Vaughan-Williams, 2009). It is therefore important at this moment of historical change to clarify the stakes in IR thinking around: (i) liberal universalism and the illiberal consequences of liberalism; (ii) the function of liberal law and its tendency to dominate or to empower; and (iii) the nature and demands of ethico-political responsibility in the international political domain. My claim is that, despite telling critiques, postmodernism fails to address the requirements of the political domain and, therefore, the way to think ethically within it. My cosmopolitan response to postmodernism dovetails with conclusions to the debate between Realism and cosmopolitanism – specifically with regard to a political ethics of the lesser violence that affirms, *contra* postmodern IR thought, the *productive* power of limitation and limits in the political field.

Each engagement between cosmopolitanism and the schools of Realism, Marxism and postmodernism concerns explicit critiques of liberal universalism in its various guises – political, legal, economic, historical and ideological – and the need to specify what modality of cosmopolitanism and what type of universalism informs an effective cosmopolitan response to it. This is the first and major reason for my choice of schools.

The second reason for my choice concerns the topics covered by these schools. As a global ideology in a globalized world, cosmopolitanism has a very large agenda that works on several theoretical levels. It addresses, at the very least, the intellectual traditions of liberalism, global justice, international law, international and global political economy and environmental issues. In a globalized world, these issues and problems are inextricably interrelated: some sort of global vision for them (however minimal, however articulated), together with a set of goals and institutions underpinning this vision, are increasingly considered of import in spite of social science professionalization and specialization. In their critiques of liberalism, each school attends to at least one of the above issues. To discuss these issues in terms of a theoretical debate between a moral and political philosophy that has global pretensions, and IR schools of thought, which are constitutively nervous of liberalism and these pretensions, gives me a focal point (contemporary cosmopolitanism and its critiques) by which to address vision and goal for the twenty-first century at an appropriately abstract level, but in the context of interrelated sets of concrete concerns.

The third reason follows on from the first two and is both methodological and substantive. By placing IR critiques of universalism against contemporary cosmopolitan ideas, and responding to each critique in turn under an interrelated set of concerns, I can make a dual theoretical move. I can claim that, in the dialogue between IR and cosmopolitanism, the cosmopolitan universalism that responds best to IR theory must be either fairly *weak* and/or expressly *differentiated*. For example, in direct response to

Realism's concerns with the reality of international relations, cosmopolitanism needs to be both (a) feasible and (b) pitched at several levels. It needs (a) to work out of the practical reality of the system of states and look to cosmopolitan state-leadership. This cosmopolitanism can only be minimal, since it must remain compatible with (a nevertheless expanding) national interest, and since its issues must be concentrated enough to permit success at the intergovernmental level of negotiation. It needs (b) to conceive of its concerns with post-national democratic legitimacy in explicitly differentiated terms so that it is not branded holistic (one type of democracy for all) or idealistic (world democracy as such). My cosmopolitan response to Realism attempts to do both these things and, thereby, offers a varied, context-based understanding of contemporary cosmopolitanism. Given the pressing need for global leadership, cosmopolitanism should focus on the positive role of states in world politics and argue for state-led minimal cosmopolitan commitments. In the context of the emerging architecture of global governance, it should *at the same time* argue for a wider understanding of commitment that advocates how the political principle of self-determination can be reinvented at post-national levels.

My various responses to IR critiques of cosmopolitanism suggest therefore a mixed approach to contemporary cosmopolitan ideas. As opposed to strong cosmopolitanism (as defined earlier), I do not argue for a comprehensive liberal cosmopolitanism. Such a comprehensive theory is analytically beautiful (as in Thomas Pogge's and Simon Caney's works), but I believe that such comprehensiveness is of neither theoretical nor empirical use when confronting the reality of international relations with cosmopolitan ideas. A more minimal universalism is more effective. Since international relations essentially involve relations of power, the previous comment is not simply instrumental or pragmatic; it is also ontological. This is not to say, however, that cosmopolitans should not, at the same time, reason more comprehensively. International institutions like the UN and the World Bank require cosmopolitan moral arguments that frame each human being's right to a sustainable life in the context of global warming and climate change mitigation (see Caney, 2009a). Such sustainability, as strong cosmopolitans like Simon Caney claim, requires consideration of conditions that exceed respect for a minimally decent life (the universal right to asylum, for example). I do not think the two different arguments are, however, theoretically inconsistent: they work at different levels of reasoning and in different contexts. The obligations of the UN or of an ethically motivated NGO are not the same as those of a state. Just as neither position should be ignored when analysing world politics, so equally there is no synthesis of both. A multilayered analysis of cosmopolitan commitments is therefore appropriate. My three responses to IR critiques of

contemporary cosmopolitanism work within this overall framework of theoretical flexibility. The book argues, accordingly, for both a cosmopolitan realism in the context of Realist and postmodernist critiques and a modest, 'progressive liberal' cosmopolitanism in the context of Marxist and postmodernist critiques.

The fourth reason for these specific dialogues is particular to this book, and I can be brief thereupon. These dialogues bring up important moments of theoretical clarity. Errors of argument or ambiguity of analysis can be carefully addressed through outlining respective positions. At the same time, areas of persistent theoretical difficulty come to light that require further and deeper exploration. The specific engagements of the book lead, consequently, to a set of research questions and agendas that would, I claim, enhance and refine the relevance of cosmopolitanism to the theorization of world politics.

The fifth and final reason for setting up these dialogues is more pragmatic and historically situated. In the broad context of recent American economic and military power, and in the specific context of 9/11 and its aftermath, there is a certain amount of conflation in IR theorizing between the ends and means of neo-conservatism and of neo-liberalism and those of cosmopolitan liberalism (these arguments are presented in chapters 2, 4 and 6). All lead, it is argued, to either the 'moralization' or the 'economization' of politics, processes that prove politically counter-effective. The era of George W. Bush's neo-conservative presidency has now passed. Neo-liberalism is reorganizing its ideological foundations, and the international community is preparing for the emergence of China as a great power. Although both the Bush administration and neo-liberalism have left a large legacy in international relations, the world has quickly entered a new era of power politics and of global responsibility. At this historical juncture, I consider it theoretically important to separate the fates of a modest, progressive cosmopolitan liberalism from those of neo-conservative American exceptionalism (nationalist universalism) and neo-liberal formalism (market fundamentalism). The coming generation of political leadership needs to demarcate itself from the recriminations of the previous two decades concerning political, military and economic interventionism in order to conceive appropriately its responsibilities in the next era of globalization. Theoretical distinctions, rather than conflations, can help this process. It is doubtful that the coming decades will open up an era of progressive global politics given the present economic crisis, the political uncertainty ensuing from the ongoing shift of power to Asia, and the recurrent problem of interstate coordination under conditions of resource-scarcity and climate change. It is nevertheless critical for the promise of such a political stance to demarcate cosmopolitan political judgement from

somewhat aggressive forms of political and economic 'universalism'. It is, in other words, important to clear the theoretical air: these 'dialogues' or 'debates' also work towards this end.[10]

The overall argument that emerges from these debates is the following. Contemporary cosmopolitan thought constitutes an intellectual framework within which problems directly and indirectly affecting the human species can be laid out in a way that gradually promotes reciprocal behaviour between nations, international organizations (public and private), and individuals. This framework is, firstly, *moral*. All human beings are moral individuals and, as moral individuals, carry, minimally, the dignity of life, or, maximally, that of moral personhood (autonomy). This framework makes questions of humanity and justice a primary focus of political thought. It is, secondly, *normative*. With regard to the field of world politics, it promotes an ethical horizon which seeks, normatively, to guide political principle, interest and agency. While cosmopolitanism is not explanatory per se, its normative status is not, however, simply prescriptive. With regard to the human rights regime, the emerging international regimes of global public goods and strong need for global leadership, I claim that cosmopolitan normative principles of human dignity, human reciprocity and human solidarity are empirically meaningful and are slowly changing the nature of national interest. Power-politics should therefore begin to negotiate under more cosmopolitan terms of institutional and political legitimacy; and, as Daniele Archibugi (2008) has argued, democratic states should take the lead. The cosmopolitan framework offers principles of legitimacy according to which problems with a global dimension can begin to be worked out. In these three respects, cosmopolitan's normative status has strong *legal*, *institutional* and *political* implications. International regimes anticipate more rule-bound legal behaviour on the part of states and markets. Despite the weak force of international law and the asymmetries of international power, legal cosmopolitanism makes, therefore, a historically effective argument for the transformation of moral questions of justice into legal questions of posited law. But such transformation requires commitment to global institution-building. The present international system is still heavily tipped in favour of the former Great Powers. Given the rapid rise of the emerging economies, the absence in global leadership in the first decade of the century, followed by the economic crisis, together with the global nature of an increasing set of international problems, this system is under permanent structural change. The temptation of economic and political regionalization is evident to all, especially with a Chinese regional hegemon. Effective global cooperation is nevertheless critical to the resolution of global problems and must work with new strategies of state-localization. I claim that such cooperation

requires enlightened, differentiated terms of institutional and political vision. While the institution of world government is undesirable in centralized form, world governance of some kind is necessary. Although its terms remain very unclear, it is important to prepare for it intellectually both at the level of nation-state behaviour and at the level of regional and global governance. The cosmopolitan argument becomes, accordingly, an *institutional* cosmopolitanism and a *political* cosmopolitanism in this context, and it is important to work out why and how.

Contra cosmopolitan positions that remain exclusively of one kind (moral, normative, legal, institutional or political), I argue, consequently, that contemporary cosmopolitanism should embrace the complementarity between the moral, normative, legal, institutional and political aspects of its own disposition. I argue this point in two ways: (i) in the sense that moral and legal cosmopolitan positions or legal and political cosmopolitan positions need increasingly to reinforce each other; and (ii) in the sense that different positions towards world politics need to be assumed depending upon the agent and its limits (whether it be the state or international organization, whether this organization be private or public, etc.). While flexible and pitched at several levels, this overall cosmopolitan disposition remains naive: it retains a straightforward optimism of the will. Naivety is, I believe, a good companion of moral and political prudence. As classical Realism teaches, idealism and realism must work together for effective progressive change to be possible. At the same time, cosmopolitanism should not be 'infantile' (in the Freudian sense of the term). It should not disavow the real, opposing the latter with idealistic constructions that are immediately undone by realities on the ground. Such rhetoric is, I believe, counter-effective to the cause of cosmopolitanism in the field of IR. Even if nations are moving towards regional blocs, I would prefer not to argue that the foremost regional bloc, the European Union, is 'cosmopolitan' (see, for example, Beck, 2006; compare Habermas, 2006; Rumford, 2007). Its juridical order (the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Justice) certainly contains cosmopolitan elements in it. European immigration policies immediately preclude it, however, from being cosmopolitan. Similar preclusions apply to the old and new rhetoric of 'global cosmopolitan citizens' and 'cosmopolitan global cities'. Being idealist, cosmopolitanism needs, at one and the same time, to work from within the parameters of geographical, functional and political differentiation. Its cause in IR will be the better served if it does: hence the book's emphasis on *various forms of cosmopolitanism*, on *the complementarity of these forms*, but on *their different contextual usage*.

This argument requires a particular method. Let me conclude this introduction with how I conduct it. Chapter 1 defines cosmopolitanism. In the

light of the above, it offers a spectrum of cosmopolitan positions that move from its weak cultural variant to its strong political variant. Following standard distinctions within cosmopolitan scholarship, I argue that these positions are important for understanding what I call 'the cosmopolitan disposition'. I also argue, however, that movement from one position to another is necessary, if problematic. The chapters following proceed within the framework of these distinctions and complementarities. Chapter 2 considers the Realist critique of cosmopolitanism. Since, as with Marxism and postmodernism, there is not a great deal of literature within IR theory explicitly concerned with this critique, my method of dialogue is one of extrapolation. I consider, first, the major tenets of Realism, and, second, from out of these tenets, pursue its critique of cosmopolitanism within selected current literature. Chapter 3 gives, as far as this author sees it, a cosmopolitan response to these criticisms and suggests where outstanding problems remain for a cosmopolitan argument that takes into account the Realist perspective. Several research questions are formulated that could orient further pursuit of these problems. Chapters 4 and 5 and chapters 6 and 7 follow this same procedure for Marxism and postmodernism, respectively. My readings are selective, but they try and bring out essential arguments, as far as I understand them. The conclusion brings together the important traits that inform the three debates as a whole. It argues (i) for cosmopolitan realism and state-led global leadership on specific global governance issues; (ii) in different institutional form, for a modest, progressive liberal cosmopolitan politics in the realm of the world economy and its regulation; (iii) for cosmopolitan political judgement, whatever instance is judging, and whatever context this instance is judging from. My overall claim is that these three arguments show the way in which a sophisticated cosmopolitan liberalism can be defended and articulated in the field of world politics.

Although the world political future is very uncertain, effective cooperation between nation-states, regional powers and private and public international organizations is increasingly vital. Sophisticated cosmopolitan argument can be persuasive in underlining the need for such cooperation. And, if effective cooperation begins, a new type of global politics – one in which states with cosmopolitan commitments lead; one in which national sovereignty is ceded to supranational organization on specific issues – will emerge, to which cosmopolitanism can make a large contribution from within IR.

Let me begin, first, with an initial discussion of cosmopolitanism and contemporary cosmopolitan ideas.

1

The Spectrum of Cosmopolitanism

This chapter serves the following three functions:

1 It provides a philosophical introduction to basic cosmopolitan ideas.
2 It underlines the differences within contemporary cosmopolitan thought, differences of modality (moral, normative or institutional cosmopolitanism, for example) that express a range of positions concerning international and global political reality.
3 It shows that these different positions are also mutually reinforcing and should be considered and theorized as complementary.

Following these three goals, this chapter presents, therefore, a spectrum of cosmopolitan positions, within which important differences and complementarities can be analysed with precision and clarity. The assumption of different positions is commonplace in contemporary cosmopolitan literature (see Benhabib, 2009; G. W. Brown, 2009; Cabrera, 2004; Caney, 2005; Heater, 1996 and 2002; Miller, 2007a; Pogge, 1992); the emphasis on complementarity in the context of IR is mine.[1] This chapter thereby frames the following dialogues between IR theory and cosmopolitanism by providing a conceptual set of distinctions.

The chapter contains two sections. The first provides a short narrative of the historical background to what I call the 'cosmopolitan disposition' in general. In the second section, I give an exposition of the spectrum of cosmopolitan differences and complementarities, in order of increasing

determinateness, cultural, moral, normative, institutional, legal and political modalities of cosmopolitanism. I note, finally, that my readings are selective, but fairly comprehensive in substance and that several arguments within the exposition of different cosmopolitanisms are particular to me, but make sense of later discussion.

1 The Historical Background to the Cosmopolitan Disposition

There are three major moments of cosmopolitan thought prior to recent and current re-engagement with its problematic and disposition. The first is the Stoic moment, the second that of natural law theory, the third that of European Enlightenment thought, in general, and Kantian cosmopolitanism, in particular.

As a specific way of thinking the world as a *polis* (literally, a city-state or polity), cosmopolitanism emerges, from out of religious and mythical cosmology, in the Greek Stoic writings of Diogenes (c. 413–327 BCE), Zeno the Stoa (c. 334–262 BCE) and Chrysippus (c. 280–206 BCE). Diogenes the Cynic is considered the first to describe himself as 'a citizen of the world'. 'When anyone asked him what country he came from, he said, "I am a citizen of the world (*kosmopolitĕs*)" ', that is, a member of the *polis* of the universe (Laertius, n.d.). The self-description meant specifically, for Diogenes, that all natural or man-made borders are morally contingent. A citizen, by chance, of the Athenian *polis*, Diogenes belonged morally to the universe. The cosmopolitan disposition emerges from out of this ironic, moral outlook on the contingency of Athenian citizenship and political empire. This outlook leads to two conceptions of the *polis*: one transcendent and borderless; the other contingent and bounded. Outside the terms of myth and religion, it provides the intellectual framework that permits the normative critique of empirical politics and loyalties. For Zeno and Chrysippus, the universe constitutes a *polis* because it is organized under law in distinction to chaos (Schofield, 1991, pp. 67–86). Members of the *cosmopolis* are gods and men only insofar as they obey laws through reason. Wider citizenship requires greater rationality. In Stoic cosmopolitanism a relation of identity is thereby set up among the universe (*cosmos*), reason (*logos*), law (*nomos*) and citizenship (*cosmopolitein*). This identity, together with the moral and normative framework it endorses, is refined in Roman Stoicism at the historical moment of violent transition from the Roman republic to the Roman *imperium*, in the authorships of Cicero (106–43 BCE), Seneca (4 BCE–65 CE), and Marcus Aurelius (121–180 CE). Seneca writes for example:

> Let us embrace with our minds two commonwealths (*res publicae*): one great and truly common – in which gods and men are contained, in which we look not to this or that corner, but measure the bounds of the our state (*civitas*) with the sun; the other the one to which the particular circumstances of birth have assigned us – the commonwealth of the Athenians or the Carthaginians or some other city (*urbs*) which pertains not to all men but to a particular group of them. Some give service to both commonwealths at the same time – some only to the lesser, some to the greater. (Seneca, *De otio*, Book 4, quoted in Schofield, 1991, p. 91)

Seneca's conception of the two cities offers not only a critique of empire, but, again, the terms within which the lesser, contingent *polis* can be appraised through a rational understanding of humanity and a moral conception of community and solidarity. This conception ultimately places the field of politics under the normative horizon of rational moral constraint. The Greek and Roman variants of Stoic cosmopolitanism provide therefore the embryonic language through which ethical behaviour is untied from religious custom and retied to political and legal system.

With the Christianization of the Roman Empire of the fourth century CE, the moral tenor of cosmopolitanism is resituated within the universality of Judeo-Christian monotheism. Augustine's *The City of God*, for example, pits the city of the Christian God and its moral duties against those of Rome when Augustine restricts himself to the power relations between them; when he attempts to lay out a comprehensive political theory, he subordinates the laws of the latter to those of the former (Augustine, 1972, Book V). With the European dissemination of Christian institutions (dogma, diocese, church, monastery) Stoic moral cosmopolitanism fuses with Christian universalism to forge, from the late European medieval age through to the Renaissance, the critical language of natural law theory. From Aquinas to important Thomists like Francisco di Vitoria (1492–1546 CE) and Francisco Suârez (1548–1617 CE), natural laws are deemed those given to humans as rational offspring of divinely-inspired creation (Finnis, 1992). These laws are those of 'natural' justice to which positive legal laws should bend: they are, most importantly, those of moral equality, of peaceful co-belonging, of just war (Brown et al., 2004, pp. 311–23). Natural law theory gives rise to the notion of 'natural rights'. Despite its evident ambiguities and hypocrisies ensconced within the language of Christendom (to which I return), natural law theory thereby prepares the ground for modern political egalitarianism.

In the third moment, of European Enlightenment thought, a consequent and more systematic cosmopolitanism emerges. I claim that it provides the overall framework within which contemporary cosmopolitan ideas are, in general, discussed, even if weaker forms of cosmopolitanism resist the

move to universalize moral personhood. This framework is best found in the work of Immanuel Kant and his ethical and political writings (1784, 1785, 1788, 1793, 1795, 1797). Kant constitutes such an instrumental figure in modern cosmopolitanism and its contemporary reconfigurations that this chapter returns to him several times; here I situate his thought in the context of this brief history. Indebted to the Stoics (Nussbaum, 1997), Kant aims to maintain the identity posited between human nature, reason and law *within* modernizing processes. The cosmos can no longer be placed under the rule of law. Human cognitive agents know nothing of its internal workings as a whole. Rational concepts of the world are accordingly 'speculative ideas' only: they have no relation to the empirical and cannot be verified (Kant, 1781/1929, pp. 315–26). These ideas have, conversely, speculative interest: they are thoughts of totality that testify to the rational vocation of the human species. More importantly, this interest is not only speculative, it is also practical. Reason has, for Kant, an immediate effect on the human will (1788/1956, pp. 74–91). As both rational and sensible beings, humans necessarily take a pure moral interest in the moral law. If human beings feel guilt when they believe that they have behaved wrongly, if they admire examples of virtue in both the moral and political domains, it is because they have a rational will, however overriding their inclinations to self-interest prove to be in everyday life (1785/1987, p. 55). For Kant, the existential 'fact' of the rational will places ethical motivation immediately in the empirical field. Kant then extrapolates that human beings are members of a 'kingdom of ends'. Transposed from the ethics of the New Testament – for Kant, the most moral of all religious writings – this kingdom constitutes an ethical realm in which each has an absolute worth in himself or herself (ibid., p. 56). It is this absolute worth of the individual that makes the New Testament morally outstanding. When taken as means to others' ends, individuals have a 'price'. When considered as ends in themselves – that is, autonomous givers to themselves of their own ends – they have 'value' and 'dignity' (ibid.). Bearing dignity, individuals constitute 'moral persons' with their own agency (ibid., pp. 57 and 63). Moral personality anticipates a system of universal laws in which it is both subject of, and subject to, these laws (self-determination).

Kant's moral community of ends is a direct translation of the Stoic cosmopolitan *polis*, supplemented by Christian individuality, in the context of modernity. The dignity of the moral person organizes the moral and normative critique of hierarchical societies. It leads Kant, politically, to a liberal republicanism: the political philosophy of a liberal community in which each person is free to the extent that his freedom does not harm the freedom of others under the rule of 'public law' (in Kantian terms, *das Recht*). I come back to this critical understanding of liberalism several