

Secularism on the Edge

Rethinking Church-State Relations in the United States, France, and Israel

Edited by
Jacques Berlinerblau,
Sarah Fainberg, & Aurora Nou

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To our friend Melissa Weinberg Spence

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Introduction: Secularism and Its Confusions

Jacques Berlinerblau

In the summer of 2013, Canada's Parti Québécois aired a political commercial that, through no intent of its own, raises intriguing questions for scholars of secularism. The advertisement was created in defense of the PQ's boundlessly controversial Charte des Valeurs Québécoises.[1] Among other desiderata, this document proposed that public workers in the province be prohibited from wearing ostentatious religious symbols on the job. "In the exercise of their functions," decrees the Charter, "personnel members of public bodies must not wear objects such as headgear, clothing, jewelry, or other adornments, which, by their conspicuous nature, overtly indicate a religious affiliation."[2]

Subjection to God and/or government often ignites all manner of human passions. This may explain why "*Hyperbolic responses will ensue!*" is an Iron Law of church–state conflicts the world over. The case of Quebec was no exception. Critics of the Charter accused its authors of Islamophobia, racism, monoculturalism, crypto-Catholic triumphalism, and xenophobia, among other injustices.[3]

The PQ, for its part, vociferously denied the charges. Parrying the national, and even global, wave of condemnation was Minister Bernard Drainville. Aside from repeatedly invoking principles of gender equality, he riposted that the Charter was simply promoting the lofty virtue of state neutrality.[4] Describing to *The Montreal Gazette* the proper countenance of a civil official, he explained: "You must be neutral and also have the appearance of neutrality. Because when you wear a religious symbol, you send a religious message to the person who sees you."[5]

It was into this maelstrom that the PQ's spot was broadcast. The ad opens with an image of a dignified granite wall, evoking the Kotel in

Jerusalem or, at the very least, Something Holy And Deserving Of Our Utmost Respect. As a lurching cello serenades the viewer, the words "*Tabernacle. Ciboire.*" appear and disappear. The verdict-like pronouncement "*SACRÉ*" then dashes in front of our eyes accented by a cluster of violins. That locution fades out as the lonely cello returns. Now, the terms "*Synagogue. Mosquée. Église.*" flit across the screen, again trailed by "*SACRÉ*" (and a chorus of stringed instruments). The sequence repeats as "*Coran. Torah. Bible.*" grace the wall. Those texts are deemed sacred as well. Surging to what those in the arts sometimes refer to as "the reveal," we next read the phrases "*Égalité hommes-femmes.*" and "*Neutralité religieuse de l'État.*" The transmission delivers its final judgment to the accompaniment of a demurring, soul-searching piano: "*TOUT AUSSI SACRÉ.*"[6]

No matter what one might think of the PQ's Charter, this thirty-second transmission makes a deceptively significant point about the political philosophy known as secularism. Many of its variants tacitly affirm that states, metaphorically speaking, possess a sanctity *equal to* that of the religions that they govern. One needs look no further than the United States or Israel to understand how difficult it is to make that case. Vocal religious groups in those countries have depicted their governments as theologically illegitimate, profane, an impediment to salvation, godless, and even demonic.

The PQ advertisement does not broach a much more provocative possibility. Namely, that the state may be, metaphorically speaking again, *more* sacred than the religious bodies under its jurisdiction. This claim is likely to be heard in France.[7] The state, in this understanding, is the repository of the collective aspirations of all citizens. It guarantees the well-being, security, and religious freedom of the entire social body. Entrusted with these noble duties, is it so unreasonable to endow the state with the nimbus of sanctity?

Nimbus or no nimbus, isn't there a harsher, baser truth in all of this? It is, after all, the state, not religion, which monopolizes the use of legitimate violence.[8] The state can dictate what citizens wear on the job because—to put it tautologically—*it is the state and thus it controls the apparatus of force and coercion.* This rationale emerges only as a last resort in liberal and democratic governments. It figures, by contrast, rather saliently among governments of the *non*-liberal and *non*democratic variety. With these regimes, the notion of state sanctity departs from the realm of the metaphorical. The state's sacred status is at once a cause and effect of its proclivity for physical and symbolic violence.

Students of secularism know all too much about this. One thinks of the Soviet Union and the unsightly franchise of successor states left in its wake.[9] Catastrophic things occurred when Arab governments in Tunisia, Algeria, and Syria dabbled with secularism.[10] Although not an unmitigated disaster, Ataturkism in Turkey left much to be desired (as does the entity that succeeded it).[11] Secularists (and opponents of secularism), take heed! Imbuing the powers that be with too much holiness is a prescription for disaster.

All of which permits us to identify some of the questions raised by the PQ's accidental thought experiment. Ought we think of secular states as performing "sacred" tasks on behalf of society as a whole? If so, on what basis does the state's "sanctity" or legitimacy rest? What rights accrue to a secular state? How are these to be balanced against those of its religious citizens? What about those of a-religious or irreligious citizens? How do women in all of these categories fare under secular policies? What constitutes the limit of coercive secular state power?

All of these concerns presuppose the most rudimentary query of them all: what exactly is a secular state?

"Confusion to Our Enemies!"

Secularisms across the globe are "on the edge." By this we mean that they are encountering myriad existential challenges (and a handful of opportunities). These challenges are unsettling longstanding assumptions about what secularisms are, what they are good for, and what they can feasibly accomplish.

The complex case of Quebec features a political party intent on imposing one type of secular policy on its citizenry. Interestingly, the majority of the Province's French-speaking population *does not seem opposed* to the imposition.[12] But as Anglophone Canada's very different response to the PQ's Charter indicates, not all secular policies are met with approbation.[13]

Quite the contrary: in liberal democracies across the world, politically organized religious groups have vigorously contested the secular status quo. In the United States there has been the decades-long ascent of the Christian Right. Israel's ultra-Orthodox parties have staggered the secular Zionist worldview that engendered the Jewish State. Although stable and enduring, French *laïcité* has been pressured and provoked by Islamists. These canny activists have performed similar operations on secular regimes—some worthwhile, some execrable—throughout the world.[14]

Religion, to invoke the cheery phrase, has "returned to the public square." Or, as Jürgen Habermas put it: "Religious traditions and communities of faith have gained a new, hitherto unexpected political importance since the epoch-making historical juncture of 1989–1990."[15] These euphemisms, however, obscure everything that is sociologically relevant about what they purport to describe. They mask the truism that only very *particular* types of communities of faith are presently making this unruly pilgrimage into public space.

After all, the left-leaning United Church of Christ is not the one aspiring—and often succeeding—to abolish abortion by gaining control of statehouses across America. It is not Israel's miniscule Reform movement that rails against gender-integrated units in the armed forces. Progressive Muslims in France do not rank among those calling for stringent veiling practices.

Rather, it is politically conservative religious actors who have besieged the public square. They clutch, variously, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim scriptures that they profess to interpret in "traditional" ways. More often, they profess *not to interpret them at all*, the meaning of those sacred texts, in their view, being self-evident.[16]

Although these formations are often mutually antagonistic, they share a number of core convictions. All reject the idea that a society functions best when (their) faith is sequestered in the private sphere. The past half-century's hard-fought gains in gender equality, sexual freedom, and reproductive rights strike them as moral, legislative, and judicial abominations. Quietism not being their theological cup of tea, they view politics as the arena through which they can monumentalize the tenets of their creed. For a few of these movements the state is congenitally diabolical and must be eliminated. For most, however, the state can feasibly do some good. It just has to get right with (their interpretation of) God. These savvy actors see their mission as helping the state attain that status.

These religious conservatives loathe secularism—an ideology they correlate with the assault on the aforementioned convictions, and with godlessness to boot. Focused, disciplined, well funded, and endowed with no small measure of worldly sophistication, they have achieved stunning political gains. They have accomplished this at the expense of a languid secularism that a perceptive critic described as "illusory, unpopular, elitist, and doomed to fail."[17] They have done so mostly within the parameters of the law.

Shadowing the global revival of traditionalist religion has been a relentless critique of secularism emanating from within the Academy. Conservative religious thinkers have strafed their old adversary with renewed verve. Princeton's Robert George laments liberal secularism's "near hegemony in the elite institutions of culture."[18] The philosopher David Novak, who is also an ordained Conservative Rabbi, writes: "The type of atheism that undergirds authentic secularism, by its inevitably vehement denial of any God, is just as concerned with the connection of religion and morality as are religious people."[19]

Novak's equation of atheism with secularism is as commonplace as it is dubious. He rightly calls attention, though, to a catastrophic defect in the secular worldview: at its worst, it conduces "to the unjust exercise of state authority, which is the very antithesis of constitutional democracy."[20] As the failed regimes mentioned earlier demonstrate, statism run amuck is secularism's gravest liability.

Coming from a different direction altogether is the critique emerging from the University's immense postmodern and postcolonial column indebted to the philosopher Michel Foucault.[21] These scholars depict their object of scrutiny as if it were an ideological Death Star, trawling the Post-Enlightenment Galaxy, mind set on malice. In this type of analysis secularism is portrayed as massive in scope, deviously well organized, confident in its (inhumane) beliefs, and menacing to all and sundry.

Consider the following observation from proponents of the school known as "radical Orthodoxy": "For several centuries now, secularism has been defining and constructing the world. It is a world in which the theological is either discredited or turned into a harmless leisure-time activity of private commitment."[22] These writers attribute to secularism the ruin of "embodied life, self-expression, sexuality, aesthetic experience, human political community."[23] The ascription of preternatural coherence, power, and malevolence to the secular is a hallmark of this approach.

Both the conservative and radical Left critics have correlated the failures of particular secularisms with *all* secularisms.[24] The political scientist Rajeev Bhargava has noted the ubiquity and imprecision of "damning secularism…by citing the atrocities of Hitler and Stalin or crimes committed by 'secularists' such as Saddam Hussain or Ali Hyder."[25] His caution reminds us that there is, in the words of Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, "no pure model of secularism."[26] Indeed, there exists a bewildering heterogeneity of global secularisms both on the state and on (the less scrutinized) non-state levels.[27] The heterogeneity indicates that as a political doctrine, secularism has far less conceptual coherence than its many detractors allege.

The ructions of anti-secular academicians are nowhere near as consequential as the activism of the political movements mentioned earlier. Still, their intervention has fomented paralyzing public misunderstandings. "Confusion to our enemies!" exclaims a character in Salman Rushdie's *The Moor's Last Sigh*.[28] To equate secularism with Nazism is to sow confusion. To define it as atheism is to virtually guarantee that political discussions transmogrify into metaphysical ones. To depict secularism as antireligious is wont to trigger the hyperbolic responses alluded to earlier.

A Blizzard of Semantic Drift

These confusions, admittedly, cannot be attributed solely to political operatives and unsympathetic academic critics. The peculiar and unspeakable truth is: we don't know very much about secularism. Foucauldian analyses aside, theoretical investigations of this subject are few and far between. Studies that try to reconstruct the broad historical unfolding of the secular idea are, inexplicably, rare.[29] While we possess an infinity of tracts about secularization, few longitudinal works on the distinct topic of secularism exist (on its development in the United States and Israel, there is very little; France, by contrast, is fairly well spoken for).[30]

What might assist us in thinking the problem through? A cursory outline of secularism's civilizational "meta-narrative"—*pace* postmodernism—would be most helpful. Sketched roughly, its opening chapter would probably be set in Christian Antiquity.[31] It was there that the pivotal notion of the "Two Kingdoms," one heavenly and one earthly, first emerged. This dualistic framework, for better or for worse, has resided at the core of all secular thought until this day. It would mature and mutate gradually and unevenly in the political philosophy of Western Christendom.

Throughout the Middle Ages, Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment, Christian intellectuals ceaselessly pondered relations between "pope and emperor," "*Sacerdotium* and *Regnum*," "spiritual rule and temporal rule," and "ecclesiastical and civil authority." After this millennial incubational period, various political secularisms were finally "hatched" between the late eighteenth and twentieth centuries. By now, the ancient binaries had lexically and institutionally morphed into "church and state."[32]

In this modern frame we find another factor that may account for our present confusions. Secularism rarely produced a national or transnational intelligentsia the likes of which we associate with ideologies such as, let's say, socialism or neoliberalism. France notwithstanding, it is hard to identify countries endowed with a robust, influential, and enduring class of Gramscian "organic intellectuals" who are *specifically interested in the advancement of secularism*.[33]

As a result, secular thought has often remained stunted in its youth. Concepts that are extraordinarily relevant nowadays were rarely on the agenda in the 1780s (the years of the American Constitutional Convention), the 1880s (a period of pronounced church–state turbulence in France), 1917 (the revolutionary moment in Russia and Mexico), or the decades leading up to the formation of the state of Israel (the period of the *Yishuv*). Gender, for example, was either not a major consideration for the nearly all-male cast of nascent secularisms, or considered in the most patriarchal terms imaginable.

The paucity of intellectuals compounded by a lack of scholarship has summated to produce a long running crisis of clarity. It is, *and has always been*, exceedingly difficult to pinpoint what secularism *is*. The term has been vulnerable to a blizzard of semantic drift since the Englishman George Jacob Holyoake coined it in 1851.[34] By way of comparison, let's consider the first reference to the word *secular* (without the -ism) in contemporaneous deliberations of the US Supreme Court:

> Now if there be aught essentially characteristic of religious liberty, it is the exemption of ecclesiastical discipline . . . from secular control; and this, because the external forms and practices of religion are all that temporal power can directly invade. Faith, doctrine, are beyond its reach; objects of the understanding and the heart.[35]

These remarks in the 1845 *Permoli v. First Municipality* case are consistent with Medieval and early modern conceptions of our subject just mentioned. There, the ideal government was bifurcated into an ecclesiastical and a civil component. Each of these "Two Swords" had its proper domain of action within a well-defined division of labor. The secular arm was responsible for warfare, punishment of criminals, taxation, order, and so forth. As did its counterpart, the civil sword *always* encroached; collisions between cross and crown are endemic in Western European history. These encounters spawned a massive, millennial literature that endeavored to properly regulate the tensile relations between the two powers.

Protestant thinkers like Martin Luther, Roger Williams, and John Locke would shore up the crucial and oft-ignored proviso that the temporal arm had no right to trespass upon the realm of the soul (an instance where proto-theorists of the secular evinced genuine concern about unchecked "state" power).[36] Yet what cannot be stressed enough is that the secular arm performed a *God-ordained* function. Quebec's PQ wasn't the first to impute holiness to the functions of the state! From William of Ockham, to Marsilius of Padua, to Luther, and beyond, one discerns the insistence that the temporal sword is divinely sanctified.[37] Far from being opposites, the secular and the religious were originally envisioned as coordinated, mutually enriching components of a *polity under God*. This is why attempts to link secularism to atheism are, at the very least, historically imprecise.

In any case, Holyoake, who coined the term "secularism" just six years after *Permoli*, proceeded to define it in, at least, *12 different ways*.[38] None of these were remotely related to the longstanding Medieval and Reformation usage—a dramatic conceptual rupture whose import has been noted.[39] A few decades later, the American activist Robert Ingersoll, in a paean to secularism, described it as everything from "religion of humanity" to "common sense."[40] On and on it has gone, until the present where atheism has gradually emerged as a synonym for secularism.

But these problems of definition are just the beginning of our difficulties. We had spoken earlier of the centrality of the state to secular thought. In this vein let us ask: what *is* secularism's core principle as regards the state? Is it: (1) separation of church and state, (2) state neutrality vis-à-vis religion, (3) state non-cognizance of religion, (4) disestablishmentarianism, (5) equal state accommodation of all religions, (6) state control of religion, (7) state-sponsored a-religion, (8) state-sponsored irreligion, or (9) state reliance on canons of science and rationality as the sole driver of domestic and foreign policy? There are, of course, imbrications between many of these ideas. Yet they all obviously do not describe the same thing.

The concept of secularism lacks nomenclatural clarity. It is unclear about its historical and theoretical moorings. It is subject to overheated and intellectually underwhelming public debates. Too often, it is studied by scholars who are "for" it, or "against" it, but not curious as to what "it" is. As a result, secularism is edging into complete confusion. While ambiguity can often be a good thing—a spectacular thing!—too much of that, in the realm of politics and political analysis anyhow, can be ruinous. Secularism is a meandering cello of an -ism, searching in vain for a conceptual tonic, playing way out of its time, desperately in need of *any* harmonizing consensus as to what set of ideas it stands for.

Secularism on the Edge

This volume aspires to probe—though certainly not to solve—the complex questions articulated earlier. Intellectual eclecticism being our antidote to confusion, the editors aspired to engage this subject from as many disciplinary angles as possible. We thus called upon historians, philosophers, political scientists, demographers, theologians, gender theorists, novelists, legal scholars, sociologists, and clergy to assist us with our inquiry. Many of our contributors had specific expertise in the question of secularism in either the United States, France, or Israel—the empirical body of evidence upon which our investigation is based.

Most of the pieces in this collection were presented at the "Secularism on the Edge" conference. This gathering was hosted by Georgetown University's Program for Jewish Civilization on February 20–22, 2013. In selecting our contributors, we came not to damn secularism—as noted earlier, this has become a reflex in many quadrants of the research university. Nor, however, was our intention to praise mindlessly. The academic discipline of secularism needs to experience a "discovery" period. Simply put, more data is necessary before conclusions can be drawn. The case studies that follow provide input for further analyses of the questions raised earlier, as well as many others.

Our section on America opens with a discussion of an oft-heard claim regarding state sanctity. The historian John Fea engages the problem of whether the United States might best be referred to as a "Christian nation," or a secular one. His answer should give pause to those who insist that America is—and always was—an example of the latter. Next, the demographer Barry Kosmin advances an intriguing typology of "soft" and "hard" secular states. The reader might notice how his schema corresponds and conflicts with the nine secular state policies cited earlier. Kosmin's piece ends with reflections on the religiously unaffiliated (widely referred to as the Nones) in the United States.

Another expert on the Nones, Phil Zuckerman, draws upon his important transnational ethnography with this fast-growing cohort. We mentioned earlier that secularism has occasional opportunities; the rise of an affinity group assumed to be 20 percent of the American electorate is one of them.[41] Zuckerman also engages in a spirited, thoughtful, and intelligently reasoned defense of the idea that the word *secularism* can and should be defined as atheism (it is in this discussion that the present author's definition of secularism is also stated). Erika Seamon closes the section by reflecting on the hazards of assuming that an American's thinking on church–state issues directly correlates with whether this citizen is religious or not.

France, as the remarks earlier implied, is something of an outlier. Unlike the United States and Israel, French popular support for secular policies, even a secular constitutional framework, is robust.[42] Too, *laïcité* is an enduring and central component of French history, promulgated by intellectuals speaking specifically in its name. One of those intellectuals, Henri Peña-Ruiz, advances what might be considered the canonical vision of *laïcité*. In this vision, a powerful, centralized, almost schoolmasterly, state is entrusted with the challenging task of "promot[ing] what would not spontaneously occur in civil society, precisely because of its limits."[43] The state, for Peña-Ruiz, is honor-bound to recognize no religious community—a principle that approximates the policy of "non-cognizance" alluded to earlier.

Jean Baubérot's piece draws attention to an analytical distinction between separation and neutrality as the guiding principles of secular states. Just as John Fea reminds us that there can be *liberal* political religions, Baubérot identifies *conservative* secularisms that have made *laïcité* "a 'Right-wing value.'"[44] Even in France whose secular tradition is far sturdier, and better understood, than what is seen in other countries, Baubérot identifies "great confusion" in the nation's thinking about church–state issues.[45]

Another area where secularism has underperformed is the contemplation of individual versus collective rights. Régine Azria identifies a glaring, and generalizable, tension in French secular thought about its Jewish citizens. Ought the state confront the French Jew strictly as an individual French citizen (Azria refers to this as the "laïco-Jacobin" approach)? Or, in a throwback to Napoleonic statecraft, is a French Jew a member of a French–Jewish community replete with official representatives who can speak on French Jewry's behalf?

A plethora of problems arise: who is entitled to speak for such a community? What to do with individuals in "the community" who wish not to be spoken for? As it crafts policy, must the secular state consider the French Jew, French Jewry, or neither? Delphine Horvilleur observes that this late-blooming "communal" reading of Judaism's place in the *laïque* state tends to privilege traditionalist religious actors.

The latter seem remarkably confident in their ability to represent the entire Jewish community.

As the volume moves to Israel, Ilan Greilsammer describes the context that yielded the ever-controversial Status Quo Letter of 1947. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, he shows, made immense concessions to ultra-Orthodox leaders, partly out of moral scruple, partly out of pragmatism. Intriguing are Greilsammer's observations on the exigencies of coalition building within the Israeli electoral system. These exigencies often lead secular-oriented parties to "forget" their pledges to reform the system put into place by Ben-Gurion's Letter.

As Anita Shapira's paper demonstrates religious and secular (i.e., Jewish, but not ultra-Orthodox) elements in Israel never forget their animosity toward one another. Yet they seem less aware of how much their worlds symbolically interpenetrate—a point demonstrated by her deft analysis. Shapira also offers evidence for what we have called secularism's legitimation crisis. Traditionalists contest the legitimacy of Israel's "secular" law. They believe that normative Jewish law (or *Halakha*)—as interpreted, naturally, by ultra-Orthodox rabbis—must serve as the sole judicial foundation of the country.

In two riveting presentations, Denis Charbit and A. B. Yehoshua proffer novel and provocative conceptions of Israeli secularism. Charbit stresses its debt to the preexisting Ottoman *millet* system—a legacy that when crossed with complex realities on the ground yields a secular state of affairs like no other in the world. A. B. Yehoshua, in a roiling dialogue with Sarah Fainberg, argues that, save one crucial exception, there is total separation of church and state in the Jewish State. The storied novelist also offers his own interpretation of how secularism was pushed to the edge:

> We did not see it coming. We did not foresee it. This is the case around world. We did not foresee the comeback of religion to the central experience of the human being. We saw it happen with Islam; we saw it with Jews; we even saw it with Christians—that people with all modernity still need a god, that rationality and modernity and science still have a margin for religious experiences and religious need. This is one of the problems.[46]

As alluded to earlier, studies of secularism need to pay far more attention to gender. Susan Thistlethwaite contends, with a wink, that secularisms should be, in theory, a "gender paradise."[47] After all, they oppose traditionalist movements that "in the name of orthodoxy,

[try] to push women out of the public square."[48] Secularism with its aversion to such faith-based political groups would seem to provide much-needed help. Yet, as Thistlethwaite laments, American secular movements of the present day (which are often, it should be stressed, atheist movements) provide no embowering and empowering paradise. She finds much to laud in postmodernism—not necessarily in its theorizing of secular "discursive formations," but in its embrace of hybridity. The Nones, she suggests, provide leads for new modes of hybrid identity construction.

Ariela Keysar draws a distinction between "state secularity" and "private secularity." Her remarks crack open the possibility that, outside of political secularism, there exists a secular "lifestyle" or ethos.[49] While the contents of that ethos have yet to be filled in, the positing of the category is promising. Keysar homes in on the argument that "women have made the greatest advances in the countries in which religion has the smallest influence over demographic decision making, especially reproduction."[50]

While Keysar is not positing secularism as a ticket to a "gender paradise," she does see substantial benefits for women in states where religion's influence in public policy is limited. The jurist Pascale Fournier approaches the question differently. Her ethnography among traditionalist religious women seeking divorces demonstrates how *neither* secular nor religious legal structures necessarily aid these women. Fournier chronicles how women craftily negotiate these two unhelpful systems as best they can in an effort to attain basic civil rights. Once again, secular policies, in and of themselves, do not appear to be a panacea to gender-based inequality.

Lori Beaman's appraisal proffers what the present writer would dub (also with a wink) an *authentic* postmodern analysis. Postmodern epistemology is unpredictable, volatile, inimical to all ideologies, omnidirectionally critical, and refreshingly destabilizing. None of which explains why so much academic postmodern critique nearly always dead ends into the exact same congeries of predictable political pieties.

Postmodern readings of secularism are, with few exceptions, scathingly dismissive and critical. Which is fine. But for some reason, its partner in the binary, "religion," is left relatively unscathed by whomever is performing the intervention. If the partner happens to be Islamism then, more often than not, the noisy postmodern critical apparatus simply powers down into silent mode. Such is not the case with Beaman's review—a ruthless critique that showcases an admirable even-handedness in pulverizing both poles of the binary.

Our volume closes with editors Sarah Fainberg and Aurora Nou's reflections on secularism's many confusions and its ongoing "legitimation crisis." Phrased in the PQ's parlance, they are interested in what justifies a state's metaphorical sanctity. The answers, they demonstrate, are still not clear, though hopefully this volume illuminates many of the intriguing possibilities.

Notes

1. Title of the Bill was eventually changed to "Charter Affirming the Values of State Secularism and Religious Neutrality and of Equality between Women and Men, and Providing a Framework for Accommodation Requests" in November 2013; The Canadian Press, "PQ Values Charter Gets New, 28 Word Name," *The Global Post*, November 6, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/the-canadian-press/131106/pq-values-charter-gets-new-28-word-name.
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