

International Perspectives on Migration 5

Margaret Walton-Roberts
Jenna Hennebry *Editors*

Territoriality and Migration in the E.U. Neighbourhood

Spilling over the Wall

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Editors

Margaret Walton-Roberts
Balsillie School of International Affairs
International Migration Research Centre
Wilfrid Laurier University
Waterloo, ON, Canada

Jenna Hennebry
Balsillie School of International Affairs
International Migration Research Centre
Wilfrid Laurier University
Waterloo, ON, Canada



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Part I

Introduction

Chapter 1

The New Realities of European Migration Management, What Does It Mean for Insiders and Outsiders?

Jenna Hennebry and Margaret Walton-Roberts

This volume brings together an interdisciplinary group of scholars around an important question: how has migration changed in Europe as the European Union (EU) has enlarged, and what are the consequences for countries (and for migrants themselves) that are cast inside and outside of the redrawn jurisdictional and territorial borders of the EU?¹ By addressing this question the book contributes to three current debates with respect to EU migration management: (1) that recent developments in EU migration management represent a profound spatial and organizational reconfiguration of the regional governance of migration,² (2) evidence of a trend towards the externalization or subcontracting of migration control³ and, (3) how the implications of Europe's changing immigration policy are increasingly felt across the European neighborhood and beyond. Based on new empirical research, the authors in this collection explore these three processes and their consequences for both member and non-member EU states, for migrants themselves, and for migration systems in the region.

Migration has been a central political and practical concern for EU states during the various phases of regionalization. With the formation of the EU, member states

¹The collection emerges from a conference held in the spring of 2010 on "European Integration: Past Present and Future", which was organized by three research centres at Wilfrid Laurier University, the Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in Canada, the Viessmann European Research Centre and the International Migration Research Centre. The conference was sponsored by The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and Wilfrid Laurier University. This collection is based on papers presented at the conference in addition to chapters the editors solicited.

²For example see: Geddes (2000), Walters (2010) and Geiger (2010).

³For example see: Aubarell et al. (2009), Samers (2004) and Zolberg (2002); among others.

J. Hennebry • M. Walton-Roberts (✉)

Balsillie School of International Affairs, International Migration Research Centre,
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada
e-mail: jhennebry@wlu.ca; mwaltonroberts@wlu.ca

desired to build a zone of economic co-operation, but they were also concerned to stop further immigration – and creating a border-free Europe meant reinforcing external borders, building a “ring fence” around the common territory and moving towards common asylum and visa policies (Hollifield 1992). Thus, the crux of the internal paradox of the EU began: the liberal economic logic of openness, but a political and legal logic of closure (Hollifield 1998, 2007). Furthermore, the consequences of such regional processes have significant influence externally; as Walters (2010, 90) argues with respect to the EU’s anti-illegal immigration discourse; “through its ‘external dimension’...the EU is clearly engaged in an almost world-wide campaign to promote border control as a central plank of good governance.”

The radical shift in the territorial logic of Europe, and the related consequences for human migration, can be traced in the most recent period to the reunification of Germany. The fall of the Berlin Wall raised new questions and challenges to existing immigration regimes in the EU, with consequences for migrants on either side of the newly formed walls of “Fortress Europe”. By November 12th 1989, just days after the Berlin Wall came down, more than three million people from the East had visited the West, while record numbers of international tourists flocked to the region to chisel off chunks of the Wall to keep as souvenirs. Souvenirs of a time past, souvenirs said to mark an end to an era of separation and exclusion between East and West; with the West becoming a symbol to the world of freedom and progress. Yet, over two decades on, despite the possibilities of the European Union to harmonize and include, exclusion and separation are alive and well in ‘Fortress Europe’.

The current period of sovereign debt inspired economic crisis and austerity comes just as Europe has completed a bold experiment in expansive regionalization with the accession of 10 Eastern European states. As these states have joined the EU, new challenges for the integration of immigrants have emerged. This is particularly the case for newer immigration states, such as Greece and Portugal, where the expectations of assimilation create restrictive conditions for new immigrants, and where Eastern CEECs⁴ increasingly play the role of “buffer zones” between the current EU Member states and the other countries of Southern and Eastern Europe (OECD 2001). For some member states that have recently joined the EU, the issue of immigration and assimilation has yet to rise on their domestic political agenda (European Commission Employment and Social Affairs 2005). Yet, the countries of the European Union have taken steps toward a shared approach to immigrant integration. One of these was the European Council’s unanimous adoption, in November 2004, of a set of “Common Basic Principles [CBPs] for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union” (Joppke and Seidle 2012), which outline immigrant rights (e.g. equal treatment and non-discrimination, freedom of religion), immigrant obligations (e.g. language acquisition, etc.) and host society obligations (enabling immigrants to acquire basic knowledge about the receiving society, etc.). Despite such intentions, these remain only guiding principles that have not been uniformly adopted or applied across

⁴CEEC is being used here to refer to Central and Eastern Europe, specifically former communist states in Europe, after the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989/90.

member states. It is within this context that we see immigrants face low levels of social integration and labour market participation (e.g. lower wages and underemployment) in many states, most notably those new to the EU.

While some attention is given to the impact of EU regionalism on integration within Europe (particularly with respect to more recent member states), this edited collection does not focus on immigration *within* Europe per se, rather it examines how EU regionalization influences migration processes, practices and policies beyond the EU's borders. Increasingly, migration management within Europe is more and more dependent upon the EU's relations with the rest of the world, the most important of which are their immediate neighbours to the South and East. As growing international flows (migration, trade, investments, etc.) penetrate European territories, many political decisions seemingly related to purely "internal affairs", are in fact based on a political and economic relations beyond the borders of the EU (Beckouche and Grasland 2007). Further, not only have the politics of migration expanded geographically beyond the EU, but they have also expanded organizationally, in so far as these relations now extend beyond the state, as the role of non-state actors (ranging from migrant support agencies to elements of the growing migration industry) and international organizations (e.g. IOM) have increased considerably. We examine these complex issues throughout the book, but for organizational purposes we have divided the collection into five parts. Part one provides this overview of the book and a chapter by Saskia Sassen, who critically assesses the politics of membership. Sassen's chapter questions what becomes of citizenship in an age of transformation in both the nature of migration and the state in Europe? In an era of continued denationalizing of economic space, yet simultaneous renationalizing of political discourse that increases the ambiguity surrounding politics of membership within Europe, Sassen returns to the issue of immigration to ask again – as she has done in the past – how does immigration test the new order? Sassen solidly reminds us that with respect to the anti-immigration politics on the ascendance in Europe today: "We have been here many times before." Her chapter also confirms "that over the generations of each immigration cycle we have incorporated vast numbers of immigrants so that today we are actually a mix: the *they* have become the *us* over our five centuries of intra-European migrations" (27). Certainly Sassen's reflections help us to historicize the process of civic community formation in the face of significant human mobility.

Part two of the book "Working your way in- Workers and entry into EU economic space" examines the issue of labour migration through three case studies. One of the core freedoms of the single European space is the mobility of labour and the right to work for member state residents. This fundamental component of the European experiment was put to the test during the eastward expansion of the EU. Enlargement of the European Union in May 2004 was followed by an increase in migration (largely labour migration) from the poorest of the central and eastern European new member states to other member states, having social and economic consequences across the union (Barrell et al. 2010; Galgoczi et al. 2009). Moreover, this incorporation process significantly influenced previously established migration circuits, some of which were established through former colonies – such as the affect of Central and East European accession on the movement of Turkish labour (Oğuz 2012).

The first chapter in part one is by Alex Caviedes, who explores the reactions of national governments and their social partners to EU enlargement and the opening of national labour markets to A10 nations. Caviedes advises us that *nationally* based political differences were the most influential determinates of how aspects of labour market regionalization rolled out across the EU. Despite the grand experiment, the process of labour market regionalization is determined to an important degree, by national, not supranational cultures and norms. Margaret Walton-Roberts examines another element of regionalization that shapes labour mobility, that of the harmonization of educational and credential processes as activated through the emergence of the European Higher Education Area and the widespread adoption of the Bologna tuning process to align training competencies and outcomes among member states. She examines how this process of credential integration is worked out in terms of internationally educated nurses (IENs), showing how incorporation of nurses from A10 states into the core of the EU appears to be displacing non-EU IENs from source regions such as India and the Philippines. Thus, shifts within the EU have the capacity to restructure existing geographical nurse migration circuits at the global scale. Jenna Hennebry et al., also explore the development of new labour migration routes structured in part by commodity chains connecting Europe with Morocco as well as by the externalization of the EU migration management regime, by highlighting the emerging role that Morocco's export processing area of Tangier plays as a "migration hub" for internal and EU-bound labour migrants. Hennebry et al., offer a perspective on the conceptualization and operationalization of the concept of "migration hubs", and argues for their growing relevance in the world migration system, and vis-à-vis the EU in particular. Hennebry et al.'s chapter highlights the complex web of intra and inter-state policy frameworks that have emerged between non-EU states and the EU. She explores the consequences of this for migrants, and shows how the paradox identified by Hollifield (2007) between open economic and closed political boundaries also extends beyond Europe.

In part three "Asylum seekers, migrants and the moving border"; our contributors extend their analysis beyond labour mobility in the EU's core, to that of its periphery, moving from new flows and hubs to "hangers" – spaces of limbo (both within and outside the EU) where marginalized migrants converge – in order to examine the spatial complexity of this form of territoriality under regimes of regionalization. Alison Mountz and Ronja Kempin's chapter opens this section with a careful overview of the southward shift of the southern frontier for asylum seekers attempting to reach the EU. They highlight how the borders of the margin and the construction of island detention spaces at the periphery control movement and present a form of carceral containment. Mountz and Kempin clearly indicate the consequences of this regional management strategy in terms of the continual pushing of the EU's southern frontier into further distant and, for migrant and asylum seekers, dangerous territory. Lanre Ikuteyijo's chapter on irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa further reveals how EU tactics to reduce these flows have evolved through various phases of management – especially voluntary assisted return – and how the Arab Spring has altered the EU's ability to manage the process of this further

shifting of the extended frontier southward. On the other hand, Michal Malecki's chapter on the plight of Roma in France demonstrates that some of the most extreme cases of marginalization are occurring at the centre, rather than the margins, of EU space. His chapter demonstrates France's increasing assertion of national exclusive sovereignty inside the EU revealing, along with Sassen, that the Roma represent the sharpest version of the figure of minoritized labour within the EU today.

The case of the Roma is a glaring example of the failures of citizenship and integration processes within the EU, an area we explore in part four of the book "Reworking citizenship and integration". Some aspects of migration management fall to the national level, such as entry requirements or levels of economic migration of the highly skilled, while those forms of migration seen as being far more problematic, such as asylum-seeking and irregular immigration, have been shifted up to the European level (Geddes 2005). As the borders of the EU have pushed outward across the European continent, migration pressures from those outside the EU have disproportionately been downloaded to these margins. This has not only heightened ethnocultural tensions and reignited xenophobic fears, but prompted more restrictive migration and citizenship policies and border controls in the core of Europe. Moreover, differences across member states with respect to immigration and citizenship further complicate the policy terrain – particularly for would be migrants from outside the EU attempting to access residency and citizenship in member states. For example, citizenship laws of the member states differ according to legal tradition, the history of immigration or emigration, and are also influenced by international developments. Among older immigration countries, such as France, UK and Germany, there seems to be a convergence of the criteria based on similar experiences with immigration. But across the EU as a whole, the requirements for citizenship vary greatly – from 10 years residence in Luxembourg, Spain, Greece, Italy and Lithuania to 3–5 years in Belgium, France and the UK (European Commission Employment and Social Affairs 2005). Europe is thus the archetypical case where super-diversity (Vertovec 2007, 2010) has become the new normal, and the complexities of status become one more means to control and differentiate social rights and obligations in a Europe increasingly seen as 'post-multicultural'.

When compared to North America, particularly Canada, there is a sense that across the EU there is less informed public debate regarding immigration and the economic need for it (Salim Murad's paper in part five also explores this issue in the case of the Czech Republic). Enhancing public debate and awareness might counter the fear of immigration and multiculturalism, but the current tendency appears to be in the other direction. Rather, what we have seen in the EU is political leadership publicly declaring that multiculturalism has failed, and must be replaced with something more like 'muscular liberalism'.⁵ To counter such positions, Canadian scholar Will Kymlicka (2012, 1) has argued that EU leaders offer only a caricature of multiculturalism, and that multiculturalism actually offers the "pursuit of new

⁵"State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron" BBC News, Feb 5th 2011 accessed May 15th 2012 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994>

relations of democratic citizenship, inspired and constrained by human-rights ideals.” Our first chapter in part four, by Shahamak Rezaei et al., explores this issue in the case of Denmark using the idea of substantive citizenship as a lens through which to critique some of the current processes of immigrant incorporation. Many researchers have similarly complicated the simple view of post-multicultural Europe by focusing on the neighbourhood scale, where they find local authorities become a vital site to re-imagine immigrant futures and inclusion.⁶ It is these sites of everyday multiculturalism and reimagining where the changing contours of multicultural national identity and belonging emerge. Robin Ostow’s chapter on German neighbourhood museums demonstrates such reimagining of the contours of multicultural national identity and belonging. Marinel Mandres’ chapter contributes to this part of the book by highlighting the increasingly complex geography of return and retirement migration across the expanded space of the EU; raising some interesting questions about the nature of social and economic integration and transnational citizenship and belonging, not just in terms of the spatiality of migration, but also in terms of its temporality (particularly in terms of the life course).

The EU is certainly not an isolated space in terms of its immigration politics and changing policy, and local transformations here can influence developments elsewhere. For example, immigration and border security policies have an important impact beyond the core European countries, particularly in terms of the securitization of Eastern and Southern European states (effectively the “new” Europe). We focus explicitly on this issue in part five of the book; “Securitization and migration management” to draw attention to how policies can ‘spill over’ the EU’s borders. Externalized border and migrant securitization has produced a European space that is highly experimental in terms of new relationships and methods for managing migration at the margins of the region. Such approaches often call upon non-democratic regimes as well as international organizations to carry out policies and programs for the EU. Related influences also extend beyond Europe to Eastern neighbours such as Ukraine and Albania, and North African states, such as Morocco – a transit country seen as a gateway to Europe for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa (particularly from West African countries such as Mali and Senegal). Branislav Radeljić’s chapter on the European Neighbourhood Policy examines these expanding geographical relationships, arguing that despite troubled times within Europe; the stability of neighbouring regions is something that continues to be of significant concern for the EU. While migration agreements are one way to ease possible turmoil in regions neighbouring a more expansive EU, many non-EU states have been reluctant to enter into such agreements, which are often viewed as highly Eurocentric in their design and formation (as Ikuteyijo’s chapter demonstrates). The EU’s political climate has also enhanced the tendency toward a securitized politics of anti-immigration in newer member nations, such as the Czech Republic, which is examined in Salim Murad’s chapter on the developing anti-immigrant discourse emerging there. This tendency is emerging even as the Czech

⁶<http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/research/urbanchange/amicall/#c2212>

Republic struggles to meet its labour market needs. Martin Geiger's chapter in this part also examines the influence of the EU through a critical interpretation of the *joint* work of intergovernmental organizations and the state in managing and governing migration, indicating the rise of regionalized migration governance mechanisms. Geiger offers a critical discussion of these practices under what he terms the process of 'Europeanization' emerging in migrant management policy in Albania and Ukraine. Geiger demonstrates how European space is highly experimental in terms of the emergence of these new relationships and methods for managing migration at the margins of the region.

This general overview brings us back to one of our opening points, that what happens in the EU does not stay there, since policy options and frameworks devised in this regional hub filter or are pushed out by various initiatives and interests emerging from state and non-state actors. In some cases they become policy options and 'best practice' models that spill over territorial and jurisdictional borders and can be picked up and emulated elsewhere beyond the EU (Boswell 2005). We can anticipate such policy mobilities within and beyond the EU in the four chapters in this collection that illustrate the changing dynamics of internal migration policies in specific EU member states (Ostow, Mandres, Malecki, Razaee et al.). Ostow's examination of the changing face of everyday multiculturalism at the community level, Mandres' focus on increasingly complex circular and temporary migration throughout the life course, and Malecki's and Razaee et al.'s illustrations of the production of citizens and non-citizens at the core of the EU, all have the potential for exportation to other policy contexts through research, civic society and governmental policy networks (particularly as the EU is already actively externalizing its policy interests on non-EU soil).

1.1 Conclusion

This volume brings together an interdisciplinary group of scholars around issues of migration, spatiality and governance within and beyond the borders of the EU and explicates the significant reconfiguration of the regional governance of migration, involving the growing reach of EU migration management. In particular, this volume contributes to three current debates with respect to EU migration management, summarized in turn below.

First, the volume illustrates the changing *spatial* realities of migration management in the region, through case studies that highlight different labour market sectors (e.g., agriculture, nursing), and the effects of changing migration management regimes in countries that were once sources of emigration but now have become countries of immigration. The context of EU enlargement, particularly following the fall of the Berlin Wall, has led to substantial changes to established immigrant settlement patterns in the traditional EU core as new EU member states become countries of immigration and emigration (or transit) simultaneously. For example, new dimensions of migration have emerged due to EU enlargement and enhanced EU-wide mobility

initiatives in areas such as higher education. Further it shows how border security and immigration policy are variably mandated and enforced across the European Union, and *spatially* externalized beyond the EU, depending upon geopolitical strategic location (such as the cases presented focusing on North Africa, the Ukraine and Nigeria).

Second, the collection documents cases of the widening geopolitical context of the EU, which also incorporate the involvement of new international and transnational bodies and actors that extend far beyond the state (such as the role of the IOM). These networks illustrate the trend towards the *organizational* externalization or subcontracting of migration control.

Third, the collection brings further empirical heft to debates about the means by which Europe's changing immigration policy are increasingly translated across the European neighborhood and beyond. In particular, these chapters have illustrated the consequences of such changes for both member and non-member EU states, for migrants themselves, and for migration systems in the region.

This volume aims to address what has been identified as a paucity of literature providing critical assessment and empirical analysis of both the political and geographical implications of region-making within and beyond the EU (Bialasiewicz 2012). In addition, it provides a much needed perspective on the changing realities of European migration in terms of the externalization of EU migration management, which is reshaping the political and policy landscape well beyond the borders of countries of destination.⁷ Furthermore, the case studies documented in this volume demonstrate the shift toward securitization within and beyond the EU space in some detail.

Taken together, the chapters in this volume address the consequences of the emerging new realities of EU migration management for would be labour migrants, asylum seekers, migrant families and growing numbers of transnational migrants engaged in 'circular migration' from countries within and outside the EU (e.g. the case of retiree migration). This volume explicates the growing complexities of citizenship and the articulation of national identities for multicultural Europe (e.g., in Germany); and provides a glimpse into migrant political participation and activism when faced with the new realities of social exclusion, particularly among non-status migrants, many of whom have resided in Europe for decades (e.g. the case of the Roma). What emerges is a picture of a multi-layered and complicated migration management system characterized by multiple state and non-state actors (involving both EU and non-EU member states, international organizations, etc.) and a range of policy instruments (despite the unifying intensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy), within which migrant rights are relegated to the margins in favour of economic and security concerns. Despite the reality of past immigrant incorporation as Sassen recalls, present day exclusions and inclusions in Europe are characterized by ethnocultural and national divides, and rather than the ideological iron curtain of yesterday, today we have politically mobile borders that bureaucratically and selectively permit and deny people's entry into the EU, as well as their ability to access

⁷In some ways this identifies processes similar to what Zolberg has called "remote control" in the US context (2002).

rights while inside the territory. At the same time the core of Europe is also rewriting some of the fundamental freedoms that were so optimistically drafted in the early days of this grand regionalization experiment. It is evident therefore, that despite the rhetoric of social and spatial integration across the region, as one wall has come down, new walls have gone up as novel migration and security policy frameworks have been erected – making European immigration more complex and potentially more influential beyond the EU zone than ever.

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Chapter 2

Anti-Immigrant Politics Along with Institutional Incorporation?

Saskia Sassen

The growth of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe over the last two decades is pushing towards the renationalizing of particular features of membership politics (Baubock et al. 2007; Giugni 2006; White 1999; Vertovec and Peach 1997; Weil 2008; Body-Gendrot and de Wihol de Wenden 2007; Delanty and Turner 2011). Yet, this renationalizing of membership, even when ideologically strong, is institutionally weak given the increased formalization of the EU level. And although the EU level is still thin compared to that of the national state, it is beginning to alter the underlying conditions, which have fed the articulation between citizenship and the national state (Baubock 2006). At its most formal, the institutional development of the European Union and the strengthening of the European Human Rights Court, push the question of political membership towards a kind of European universalism (Jacobson and Ruffer 2006; Rubenstein and Adler 2000). I prefer to think of it as a trend towards the denationalizing of European politics. This is a denationalizing that (a) is fed by the emergence of multiple actors, groups, and communities increasingly keen on broader notions of political membership and unwilling automatically to identify with a national state (Basch et al. 1994; Beck 2006; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) 2002; Knop 2002; Koh 1997; Laguerre 1998; Spiro 2008; Turner 2000; Soysal 1997; Tunstall 2006), and (b) can coexist with virulent nationalisms, a subject I have developed at length elsewhere (2008: ch 6).

These transformations in the EU raise questions about the actual meaning of that renationalizing of membership. Is it an ideational event that can exist even as the institutional settings of membership are becoming partly denationalized? Can growing discrimination against the alien coexist with a strengthening of the right to have rights, as might be the case when the European Court of Human Rights confirms rights of immigrants that the national legislatures had tried to annul or restrict? And can the ideological renationalizing of citizenship inside nation-states coexist with EU wide instruments that strengthen the right to

S. Sassen (✉)

Department of Sociology, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

e-mail: sjs2@columbia.edu

membership of non-nationals, albeit non-nationals from other EU countries? Further, we need to ask, how that ideological renationalizing interacts with the multiplication of transnational identities at the ideational level – on vectors of feminism, race, religion, and others not necessarily confined to a nation-state.

These are the larger questions against which this chapter traces the interaction of ideological and structural conditions in Europe's history of migration, subjects explored at length elsewhere (Sassen 1999, 2007: ch 5; 2008: ch 6). Addressing the question of membership and acceptance, across diverse historical phases and diverse national histories, entails a specific stance by the researcher. It is quite possible to posit that at the most abstract or formal level, not much has changed over the last century in the essential features of membership and acceptance of foreigners. In an earlier period the hatred and demonizing we see today regarding immigrants from outside the EU went to other Western Europeans: for instance, the French despised the German and Belgian workers who Baron Haussmann recruited to work in the rebuilding of Paris; the epithets were not unlike what we hear today regarding North Africans or sub-Saharan Africans. The theoretical ground from which I address the issue is that of the historicity of the hatreds and intolerances. One instance of this historicity is their embeddedness in projects of national state construction in the past and in partial national-state deconstruction in the present, notably the strengthening of the European Union and of the European Human Rights Court.

2.1 Beneath Virulent Nationalisms...Inter-marriage!

Unlike the “citizen,” the “immigrant” or, more formally, the “alien”, is constructed in law as a very partial, thin subject, often enabling virulent discrimination, from a distance. Yet the immigrant and immigration are actually thick realities, charged with content. In this tension between a thin formal subject – the alien – and a rich reality, lies the heuristic capacity of immigration to illuminate tensions at the heart of the historically constructed nation-state and national citizenship (Sassen 2008: chapters 2, 3 and 6).

These tensions are not new, historically speaking, but as with citizenship, current conditions are producing their own distinct outcomes. Further, the changes in the institution of citizenship itself has implications for the definition of the “immigrant”; this becomes particularly acute at times when citizenship de-borders its formal definitions and national locations. In the current period, confronted with post-national and denationalized forms of citizenship, we might ask what is it we are trying to discern in the complex processes we group under the term immigration? On the other hand, the renationalizing of citizenship narrows what we might refer to as the customary definition of the citizen and thereby that of the immigrant (Knop 2002; Marshall 1977; Ribas-Mateos 2005; Ong 1999; Sassen 2010; Bosniak 2006).

As a subject, then, the immigrant filters a much larger array of political dynamics than her status in law might suggest. Working with the distinctions and transformations discussed thus far, we can discern the possibility of two somewhat stylized subjects that destabilize formal meanings and thereby illuminate the internal tensions of the institution of citizenship, specifically the citizen as a rights-bearing subject. (For a fuller development of these two stylized cases see Sassen 2008:

chapter 6.) On the one hand, we can identify a formal citizen who is fully authorized yet not fully recognized. Minoritized citizens who are discriminated against in any domain are one key instance. This is a familiar and well-researched condition. On the other hand, we can identify a type of informal citizen who is unauthorized by the law yet recognized by a potential community of membership, as might be the case with undocumented immigrants who are long-term residents in a community and enact membership they way citizens do. Thus, unauthorized immigrants who demonstrate civic involvement, social deservedness, and national loyalty can argue that they merit legal residency, and often get it. But even if they do not gain legal residency, we can posit a condition akin to informal citizenship that binds long-term residents, even if they are undocumented immigrants, to their communities of residence.¹ Mountz and Kempin (Chap. 6, this volume) explored this issue in terms of refugees, and how the island works to prevent such social connection and embeddedness through various forms of closure and exception.

These are dimensions of formal and informal citizenship and citizenship practices that do not fit the indicators and categories of mainstream academic frameworks for understanding citizenship and political life. Some scholars point to the fact of the multiple dimensions of citizenship and how this engenders strategies for legitimizing informal or extra-state forms of membership (Coutin 2000; Bosniak 2006; Shachar 2009). The practices of these undocumented immigrants are a form of citizenship practices (Sassen 2008: ch 6), and their identities as members of a community of residence assume some of the features of citizenship identities (Sadiq 2007). Supposedly this could hold even in the communitarian model, according to Bosniak (2006), where the community can decide on whom to admit and whom to exclude, but once admitted, proper civic practices earn full membership.²

¹Individuals, even when undocumented immigrants, can move between the multiple meanings of citizenship. The daily practices by undocumented immigrants as part of their daily life in the community where they reside – such as raising a family, schooling children, holding a job – earn them citizenship claims in the US even as the formal status and, more narrowly, legalization may continue to evade them. There are dimensions of citizenship, such as strong community ties and participation in civic activities, which are being enacted informally through these practices. These practices produce an at least partial recognition of them as full social beings. In many countries around the world, including those of the EU, long term undocumented residents often can gain legal residence if they can document the fact of this long term residence and “good conduct.” Liberal democracies recognize such informal participation as grounds for granting legal residency. However, such inclusion is limited in systems where immigrants are not actively incorporated into the body politic, as the chapter on Denmark by Shahamak et al. demonstrates.

²According to Coutin (2000) and others, movements between membership and exclusion, and between different dimensions of citizenship, legitimacy and illegitimacy, may be as important as redefinitions of citizenship itself. Given scarce resources the possibility of negotiating the different dimensions of citizenship may well represent an important enabling condition. Undocumented immigrants develop informal, covert, often extra-state strategies and networks connecting them with communities in sending countries. Hometowns rely on their remittances and their information about jobs in their countries of immigration. Sending remittances illegally by an unauthorized immigrant can be seen as an act of patriotism back home, and working as an undocumented can be seen as contributing to the host economy. Multiple interdependencies are thereby established and grounds for claims on the receiving and the originating country can be established even when the immigrants are undocumented and laws are broken.

While migrants' motivations and their countries of origin may have differed from previous flows, the fact remains that all of the current major European countries have taken in immigrants for centuries. And historical demography, notwithstanding its limitations, makes clear that most European nation-states have historically incorporated foreigners. Thus today's populations evince a significant incidence of foreign-born parents and grandparents. How did European nations in the recent and in the remote past negotiate strong discriminations and even hatreds against foreigners and yet, inter-marry and thereby incorporate often a rather significant share of those immigrants? Can we learn something from this integration history?

2.2 Europe and Its Migrations

It is a fact that the immigrant groups of the past are today reasonably well absorbed, though there are important differences. These older immigrant groups, dating three or four generations or centuries back, have given us many of today's citizens. They are not at issue in today's debates. But in their time, the picture was very different. They *were* the issue.

Anti-immigrant sentiment and attacks happened in each of the major immigration phases in all these countries (see Sassen 1999 for detailed accounts; Noiriel 2007; Marshall 1977). No labour-receiving country survives closer investigation with a spotless record – not Switzerland, with its long admirable history of international neutrality, and not even France, the most open to immigration, refugees and exiles. French workers killed Italian workers in the 1800s. But there were always, as is the case today also, individuals, groups, organizations, and politicians who believed in making our societies more inclusive of immigrants. History suggests that those fighting for incorporation in the long run won, even though only partly. Just to focus on the recent past, a third of the French have a foreign-born ancestor three generations up, as do 40 % of Viennese.

Part of the difficulty for Europe is, ironically, the lack of a historical perspective. Europe has a barely recognised history of several centuries of internal labour migrations. This is a history that hovers in the penumbra of official "European History," dominated by the image of Europe as a continent of emigration, never of immigration. Yet, in the 1700s, when Amsterdam built its polders and cleared its bogs, it brought in Northern German workers; when the French built up their vineyards they brought in Spaniards; when Milan and Turin developed they brought in workers from the Alps; when London built its infrastructure for water and sewage, it brought in Irish. In the 1800s, when Haussmann redid Paris, he brought in Germans and Belgians; when Sweden re-started its monarchy and needed some good looking palaces, they brought in Italian stoneworkers; when Switzerland built the Gothard Tunnel, it brought in Italians; and when Germany built its railroads and steel mills it brought in Italians and Poles to do the work.

At any given time there were multiple significant intra-European migration flows. All the workers involved were seen as outsiders, as undesirables, as threats

to the community, as people that could never become part of that community. But significant numbers did become part of the community, even if it took more than two generations; typically, it seems, it took three. Even when they kept their distinctiveness, they were members of the community: part of the complex, highly heterogeneous social order of any developed society. But at the time of their first arrival, they were treated as outsiders, racialised as different in looks, smells and habits, though they were so often the same phenotype, broad religious group and broad cultural group. They were all Europeans: but the differences experienced were as overwhelming and insurmountable, as they are today.

In the 1990s and especially since the 2000s, the argument against immigration may be focused on questions of race, religion, and culture, and might seem rational – that cultural and religious distance is the reason for the difficulty of incorporation. But in sifting through the historical and current evidence we find only new contents for an old passion: the racialising of the outsider as ‘other.’ Today the ‘other’ is stereotyped by differences of race, religion and culture. Equivalent arguments were made in the past when migrants were broadly of the same religious, racial and cultural group: they were seen as not fitting in with the receiving society, as having bad habits and the wrong morals. Migration hinges on a move between two worlds, even if within a single region or country – such as East Germans moving to West Germany, who were seen as a different ethnic group with undesirable traits. There is strong evidence of a cyclical character to anti-immigration politics and the clouding of the issues that comes with it. For centuries Europe’s major economies have gone through rapid cycles of great demand and then severe expulsion, only to fall back into high demand a few decades later. In the recent past, a country like France had a desperate need for immigrants during the first world war (using Algerian immigrants in its armies) and the reconstruction in the 1920s, only to move into aggressive anti-immigrant politics in the 1930s, to then wind up once again with acute needs for foreign workers in the late 1940s, and so on. In my reading of the features of that history and the current conditions described above, this cyclical history may well still be playing its part. If we consider the growing demand for low-wage workers and sharp population decline in today’s EU states, it is easy to see that we might actually switch to a phase of active import or acceptance of more immigrant workers within a decade.

Let me note here that beyond these cyclical ups and downs, many European countries in fact continuously employ “foreign” workers or their equivalent, such as members from minoritized communities; in many cases this has held for several centuries (Sassen 1999). Examples of these permanent minoritized workers in the contemporary period are second or third generations of diverse communities, depending on the country: of Turks in Germany, of Algerians in France, of Jamaicans in the UK, to mention just a few nationalities and a few countries. Perhaps the sharpest version of this minoritized labour reserve is the Roma.

When Italy, Spain, and Portugal became part of the EC free movement area, it meant integrating what had been major senders of migrants to the north, and who had been barred by 1973 from further entries for work. The policy change

generated widespread fears of invasions by masses of poor workers and families. In retrospect we can see how wrong this fear was. In fact, more immigrants returned home to Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal, and fewer emigrated to the North than had been expected. This was partly because they were free to circulate and partly because their economies were developing in ways that incorporated their people.

The same is likely to hold with the much-feared migrations from the new EU members in the East. Indeed the latest figures show that one-third of the Polish migrants who came to the UK after EU enlargement have recently returned to Poland. People with deep grievances in their home countries are far more likely to emigrate permanently than those who might be low-income but are fully-fledged members of their communities. We have considerable evidence showing that being low-income is not enough by itself to leave your community. We also know that many low-income migrants want to come every year for a few months and then go back to their communities. Thus enlargement will enable far more circular migration and reduce trafficking. Perhaps the best story here is that of the Polish women who teamed up to take care of cleaning and housekeeping in Berlin households. Each wanted to spend a minimum amount of time in Berlin, no matter its comforts, and then go back and live their real life. So teams of four organized for each to spend 3 months in a given household, and rotate annually. The best strategy for the rich EU countries, so worried about receiving masses of low-wage, poorly educated workers from the new EU member states, is to do whatever can be done to ensure broad based development in those states, while at the same time facilitating the movement back and forth of low-skilled migrant workers.

There is one set of communities for whom this will be inadequate: the Roma. Europe has failed the Roma for centuries. All of the struggles fought in the name of civil society and civic rights fundamentally excluded the Roma. This will have its own backlash effect, and inevitably, the Roma will come. As Malecki's chapter illustrates, today we are paying the price for our historic neglect and, often aggression. There are significant numbers of very poor in some of the new EU member countries, and centuries of exclusion have left their marks. Enlargement must be a wake-up call: we need to think of the Roma as part of our future.

At the same time, the Roma also illuminate a key feature of our history of migrations in Europe: it has usually been particular groups who are at the core of a country's emigration, rather than massive generalised flows from poverty to prosperity. In the early 1990s after the wall went down, Germany received over two million migrants from Eastern Europe and Russia, but the vast majority were ethnic Germans and the rest mostly Roma. There were no high numbers of other nationalities. Similarly, the Turkish emigration to Germany, for instance, consisted largely of particular groups of minoritised Turkish, including Turkish Kurds. In brief, these were not indiscriminate movements from poverty in the East to wealth in the West. These two groups were motivated by very specific and long-standing historical conditions.

2.3 Migration as Embedded Process

Migrations are embedded in larger systems. That is to say, it is not simply a matter of the poor deciding to come to rich countries.³ If this were the case, we should plan on well over three billion people engaging in such movements, when in fact today there are only about 100 million who have migrated to rich countries (including North America), less than 4 % of the world's poor. Further, since only a very small share of the poor become immigrants, we can see that poverty by itself is not enough to explain emigration. It is, then, not helpful for politicians to think that all the poor will come: it is an incorrect datum and it leads to the wrong policies.⁴

Establishing whether labour migration is an integral part of how an economic and social system operates and evolves, rather than merely a decision by individuals to migrate is, in my view, critical to develop the politics of membership. The logic of this argument is, put simply, as follows: If immigration is seen as the result of individuals in search of a better life, the receiving country governments can shrug off immigration as an exogenous process, formed and shaped by conditions outside the receiving country. The receiving country would then be a bystander to the process of immigration, rather than one of the actors in the making of the conditions and/or the bridges for emigrations to happen. The immigrant-receiving country is then merely a nice or not-so-nice receiver or rejecter of those immigrants; it bears no responsibility for the immigrants. In this view, as poverty and overpopulation grow, there may be a parallel growth in immigration, at least potentially, because those are the main causes of emigration. The receiving country conducts itself as if it were a passive bystander to processes outside its domain and control, and hence with few options but to tighten its frontiers if it is to avoid an 'invasion.'

If, on the other hand, immigration is partly an outcome of the policies and practices of so-called "receiving" countries, both inside and abroad, it should be recognized in immigration policy. This is the case with certain types of war refugees: the war on Vietnam led the US, and earlier France, to accept Vietnamese as refugees from a war carried out by the US (and, earlier, France). But there is no such recognition for economic immigrants, in good part because the connections are often far

³At some point we are going to have to ask what the term immigrant truly means. People in movement are an increasingly strong presence, especially in cities. Further, when citizens begin to develop transnational identities, it alters something in the meaning of immigration. In my research I have sought to situate immigration in a broader field of actors by asking who are all the actors involved in producing the outcome that we then call immigration. My answer is that it's many more than just the immigrants, whereas our law and public imagination tend to identify immigrants as the only actors producing this complex process.

⁴Immigrants are estimated to be under 3 % of global population. From an estimate of 85 million international immigrants in the world, or 2.1 % of world population in 1975, it rose to 175 million or 2.9 % of world population by 2000, and an estimated of between 185 and 192 million in 2005 (International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2005, 2006). It is important to note the increased concentration of migrants in the developed world, and generally in a limited number of countries. About 30 countries account for over 75 % of all immigration; 11 of these are developed countries with over 40 % of all immigrants.