Hajnal Andréka

Miklós Ferenczi · István Németi

Editors

Cylindric-like Algebras and Algebraic Logic

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Hajnal Andréka
Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Reáltanoda u. 13-15
Budapest 1053
Hungary
e-mail: andreka.hajnal@mta.renyi.hu

Miklós Ferenczi
Department of Algebra
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Egry J. u.1
Budapest 1111
Hungary
e-mail: ferenczi@math.bme.hu

István Németi
Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Reáltanoda u. 13-15
Budapest 1053
Hungary
e-mail: nemeti.istvan@mta.renyi.hu

Cover photo of Alfred Tarski made by Steven Givant

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Dedicated to the memory of

Leon Henkin,

friend and co-author

INTRODUCTION

The theory of cylindric algebras (CAs) and Tarskian algebraic logic have been immensely successful in, e.g., applications to such a diversity of fields as logic, mathematics, computer science, artificial intelligence, linguistics and even relativity theory. In some of the applications one has to transcend (a little) the original definition of CAs but *not its spirit.* For example, the emphasis shifted to relativized CAs and to adding extra operations such as, e.g., substitutions (s_τs). To keep the original Tarskian spirit of CAs, in this volume we consider only quasi-polyadic operations (e.g., substitutions where τ is finite) as opposed to Halmos' polyadic ones (e.g., substitutions with all infinite τs). These and similar generalizations are the reason for "cylindric-like" algebras in the title in place of simply CAs.

In the literature of cylindric-like algebras, the following three books are regarded as the main source of the theory: [Hen-Mon-Tar,85], Part I, [Hen-Mon-Tar-And-Nem,81] and [Hen-Mon-Tar,85], Part II. Sometimes, they are referred to as [CA1], [CA1.5], and [CA2], respectively. We will use this notation ([CA1] etc.) in the present introduction. We will refer to the three of them together as [CA]. Since those volumes were completed before 1985 (almost 30 years ago) and since the theory grew and diversified much in the meantime, a general consensus formed that it would be timely to edit a new book [CA3] summarizing new trends, new directions of development/applications in a coherent volume, using the terminology, notation and overall structure of the original [CA]. For completeness, we note that after [CA2] important volumes did appear on the topic, some of them being [And-Mon-Nem,91b], [Ber-Mad-Pig,90], [Cra,06], [Csir-Gab-Rij,95], [Gab-Kur-Wol-Zak,03], [Hir-Hod,02a], [Mad,06], [Mar-Pol-Mas,96], [Mar-Ven,97], [Tar-Giv,87], but neither of them had the just described ambition.

The present volume [CA3] intends to be a guide to the field of cylindric-like algebras and algebraic logic as it developed after the completion of [CA2]. It is also the purpose of the present volume to highlight new horizons, new research directions found after [CA2], promising new possibilities for research and application of cylindric-like algebras. Let us take an example. The application of Boolean algebras (BAs) to logic was spectacularly

successful. At the time [CA1] and [CA1.5] were written, this success story of BAs could not be repeated for CA-theory, e.g., because of the nonexistence of a Stone-type representation theorem for CAs. Actually, such a representation theorem was known to be impossible by the non-finitizability results of J. Donald Monk, Roger Maddux, James Johnson, Hajnal Andréka, Balázs Bíró and others. This mercilessly unfriendly picture started to soften when the Resek–Thompson result with Andréka's simple proof appeared in 1988 [And-Tho,88]. This meant that shifting emphasis to representing CAs by *relativized* cylindric set algebras in place of "square" cylindric set algebras yielded positive representability (hence axiomatizability) results. Indeed, this insight (together with [CA1.5] and [Nem,86]) led eventually to a flurry of applications of cylindric-like algebras to logic as summarized in Johan van Benthem's paper in this volume [Ben,thisVol]. (For completeness we note that a distant hope for such a positive turn was found already in [CA2] in the form of Remarks 3.2.88, p. 101.) Representation theory of cylindric-like algebras is nicely developing in the direction of using more and more natural variants of relativised set algebras, see, e.g., by Maddux, Andréka and Ferenczi: [Mad,89b], [And,01] and [Fer,12a]; developments in this field are surveyed in Miklós Ferenczi's paper in this volume [Fer,thisVol,a].

We dedicate this volume to the memory of Leon Henkin, our friend, collaborator, co-author and co-teacher, who passed away in 2006. Leon had a noble unselfish passion (and insistence) on looking for positive results (as a reaction to discovering negative ones). His positive-oriented influence can be felt throughout logic, not just in algebraic logic. Henkin-type semantics and his completeness theorem for higher-order logics is an example of this approach. Diane Resek was a student of Henkin, and their work on relativized cylindric algebras and merry-go-round equations led to the just discussed Resek–Thompson–Andréka turn. A further example of Henkin's striving for positive results (in the face of negative ones) is his method of "twisting elements" which he designed for non-standard representation of non-representable CAs ([CA2], 3.2.71, p. 89). Indeed, Henkin conjectured that by his methods of relativization and twisting, all CAs might be representable (in terms of square set-CAs). This conjecture was confirmed by András Simon in 1999; it is summarized in his paper for this volume [Sim,thisVol]. In the spirit of Leon's work, we would like to pass on his dedication for advancing science by striving for positive contributions, to our readers, our students, and to future generations.

The papers in this volume are survey papers expanded by proofs or by ideas of proofs. All of them were invited by the editors. The subjects

were carefully selected in order to provide a balanced representation of the development of the field after completion of [CA2], and we are pleased with the result. There are subjects, though, we would have liked to devote separate papers to, but which were omitted from the list of papers for one reason or another. Below we list some of these subjects with some pointers to the literature:

– relation algebras (RAs) (two monographs appeared recently about these [Hir-Hod,02a], [Mad,06] and [Giv,12] by Steven R. Givant is to appear; further, paying proper homage to RAs would have overthrown the balance of [CA3]),

– translation of logic to algebra and back, the process of algebraization of logics and the "bridge theorems" (development after [CA2] in this important subject is discussed in detail in [And-Nem-Sai,01], [Nem,87a], [Nem,90] and also, in less detail, in the PhD dissertations of Eva Hoogland, Szabolcs Mikulás and others in Amsterdam from around 2000; György Serény's paper [Ser,thisVol] discusses the model theoretic part or aspects of this "translation of logic to algebra and back" subject under the name "cylindric algebraic model theory", and this subject is also touched upon in this volume in [Sai,thisVol], [Say,thisVol,a]),

– the finitization problem and its positive solutions (by Ildikó Sain and Viktor Gyuris [Sai-Gyu,97], Vera Stebletsova and Yde Venema [Ste,00], [Ste-Ven,98], and via non-well-founded set theory by Ági Kurucz and István Németi [Kur-Nem,00]; this finitization problem/issue is discussed (to some extent) in the updated version of [Nem,91]),

– the related weakly higher-order algebraic logic approach (CA ↑) (by Németi, Simon, and Gábor Sági [Nem-Sim,09], [Sag,00]),

– Galois theory of CAs by, e.g., Stephen Comer [Com,84],

– connection between CAs and RAs (by Maddux, Simon, Robin Hirsch, Ian Hodkinson and Németi [Nem-Sim,97], [Hir-Hod,02a]).

In this volume, some familiarity with the central notions of [CA] is assumed. [CA3] uses the notation and terminology of [CA]. Further, [CA3] follows the logical structure (chapter titles) of [CA] with some minor changes. Relative to [CA], there are two new kinds of chapters: Chapter 4 (Applications of cylindric-like algebras) and Chapter 6 (Connections with abstract algebraic logic and universal logic). Both topics, Chapters 4 and 6, are regarded as "hot topics" recently, e.g., there is an article on the latter in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The bibliography of [CA3] intends to cover most publications, in the subject, which appeared after [CA2]. An

Internet site devoted to open problems in cylindric-like algebras as well as following the status of problems published in, e.g., [CA] is under preparation.

We want to express our grateful thanks to J. Donald Monk and Leon Henkin whose consistent help and support throughout the years beginning with the conception of [CA1.5] made this volume possible. We want to express our thanks to all the authors of this volume for accepting our invitation and contributing excellent papers. Finally, warm thanks go to Ildikó Miklós who typed the volume, trying to coordinate the typographies of the papers originating from 19 authors.

Budapest, July 2012.   The Editors

I. Algebraic Notions Applied to Cylindric-Like Algebras

Reducing First-order Logic to Df_3, Free Algebras

HAJNAL ANDRÉKA and ISTVÁN NÉMETI

Alfred Tarski in 1953 formalized set theory in the equational theory of relation algebras [Tar,53a, Tar,53b]. Why did he do so? Because the equational theory of relation algebras (RA) corresponds to a logic without individual variables, in other words, to a propositional logic. This is why the title of the book [Tar-Giv,87] is "Formalizing set theory without variables". Tarski got the surprising result that a propositional logic can be strong enough to "express all of mathematics", to be the arena for mathematics. The classical view before this result was that propositional logics in general were weak in expressive power, decidable, uninteresting in a sense. By using the fact that set theory can be built up in it, Tarski proved that the equational theory of RA is undecidable. This was the first propositional logic shown to be undecidable.

From the above it is clear that replacing RA in Tarski's result with a "weaker" class of algebras is an improvement of the result and it is worth doing. For more on this see the open problem formulated in Tarski–Givant ([Tar-Giv,87, p. 89, line 2 bottom up – p. 90, line 4 and footnote 17 on p. 90]).

A result of J. D. Monk says that for every finite n there is a 3-variable first-order logic (FOL) formula which is valid but which can be proved (in FOL) with more than n variables only (cf. [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, 3.2.85]). Intuitively this means that during any proof of this formula there are steps when we have to use n independent data (stored in the n variables as in n machine registers). For example, the associativity of relation composition of binary relations can be expressed with 3 variables but 4 variables are needed for any of its proofs.

Tarski's main idea in [Tar-Giv,87] is to use pairing functions to form ordered pairs, and so to store two pieces of data in one register. He used

this technique to translate usual infinite-variable first-order logic into the three-variable fragment of it. From then on, he used the fact that any three-variable-formula about binary relations can be expressed by an RA-equation, [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, 5.3.12]. He used two registers for storing the data belonging to a binary relation and he had one more register available for making computations belonging to a proof.

The finite-variable fragment hierarchy of FOL corresponds to the appropriate hierarchy of cylindric algebras (CA_n's). The n-variable fragment $\mathcal{L}_n$ of FOL consists of all FOL-formulas which use only the first n variables. By Monk's result, $\mathcal{L}_n$ is essentially incomplete for all $n \geq 3$, it cannot have a finite Hilbert-style complete and strongly sound inference system. We get a finite Hilbert-style inference system $\vdash_{\overline{n}}$ for $\mathcal{L}_n$ by restricting a usual complete one for infinite-variable FOL to the first n variables (see [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Sec. 4.3]). This inference system $\vdash_{\overline{n}}$ belonging to $\mathcal{L}_n$ is a translation of an equational axiom system for CA_n, it is strongly sound but not complete: $\vdash_{\overline{n}}$ is much weaker than validity $\models_n$ (which is the restriction of $\models$ to the formulas in $\mathcal{L}_n$).

Relation algebras are halfway between CA_3 and CA_4, the classes of 3-dimensional and 4-dimensional cylindric algebras, respectively. We sometimes jokingly say that RA is $CA_{3.5}$. Why is RA stronger than CA_3? Because, the so-called relation-algebra-type reduct of a CA_3 is not necessarily an RA, e.g., associativity of relation composition can fail in the reduct. See [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Sec. 5.3], and for more in this line see [Nem-Sim,97]. Why is CA_4 stronger than RA? Because not every RA can be obtained, up to isomorphism, as the relation-algebra-type reduct of a CA_4, and consequently not every 4-variable sentence can be expressed as an RA-term. However, the same equations are true in RA and in the class of all relation-algebra-type reducts of CA_4's (Maddux's result, see [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Sec. 5.3]). Thus Tarski formulated set theory, roughly, in CA_4, i.e., in $\mathcal{L}_4$ with $\vdash_{\overline{4}}$, or in $\mathcal{L}_3$ with validity $\models_3$.

Németi ([Nem,85b], [Nem,86a]) improved this result by formalizing set theory in CA_3, i.e., in $\mathcal{L}_3$ with $\vdash_{\overline{3}}$ in place of validity $\models_3$. The main idea for this improvement was using the pairing functions to store all data always, during every step of a proof, in one register only, so as to get two registers to work with in the proofs. In this approach one represents binary relations as unary ones (of ordered pairs).

First-order logic has equality as a built-in relation. One of the uses of equality in FOL is that it can be used to express (simulate) substitutions of variables, thus to "transfer" content of one variable to the other. The

reduct SCA_3 of CA_3 "forgets" equality d_{ij} but retains substitution in the form of the term-definable operations s^i_j. The logic belonging to SCA_3 is weaker than 3-variable fragment of FOL. Zalán Gyenis [Gye,11] improved parts of Németi's result by extending them from CA_3 to SCA_3.

We get a much weaker logic by forgetting substitutions, too, this is the logic corresponding to Df_3 in which FOL and set theory were formalized in [And-Nem,11a].

Three-dimensional diagonal-free cylindric algebras, Df_3's, are Boolean algebras with 3 commuting complemented closure operators, see [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, 1.1.2] or [Kur,thisVol]. The logic $\mathcal{L}df_3$ corresponding to Df_3 has several intuitive forms, one is 3-variable equality- and substitution-free fragment of first-order logic with a rather weak proof system $\models^{\underline{df}}$, another form of this same logic is modal logic $[\mathbf{S5}, \mathbf{S5}, \mathbf{S5}]$, see [Kur,thisVol] and [Gab-Kur-Wol-Zak,03]. Not only set theory but the whole of FOL is recaptured in $\mathcal{L}df_3$. This is a novelty w.r.t. previous results in this line. All the formalizability theorems mentioned above follow from this last result.

In Section 1 we define our weak "target logic" $\mathcal{L}df_3$ and we state the existence of a structural translation mapping of FOL with countably many relation symbols of arbitrary ranks, $\mathcal{L}_\omega$, into $\mathcal{L}df_3$ with a single ternary relation symbol, see Theorem 1.1.6. If equality is available in our target logic, then we can do with one binary relation symbol, we do not need a ternary one, see Theorem 1.1.7. For theories in which a conjugated pair of quasi-pairing functions can be defined, such as most set theories, we can define a similar translation function which preserves meaning of formulas a bit more closely, see Theorem 1.1.6(ii), Theorem 1.1.7(ii). Theorem 1.1.6(ii) is a very strong version of Tarski's main result in [Tar-Giv,87, Theorem (xxxiv), p. 122], which states roughly the same for the logic corresponding to RA in place of Df_3. After Theorem 1.1.7 we discuss the conditions in both Theorem 1.1.6 and Theorem 1.1.7, and we obtain that almost all of them are needed and that they cannot be substantially weakened.

In Sections 2 and 3 we concentrate on the applications of the theorems stated in Section 1. In Section 2 we show that our translation functions are useful in proving properties for n-variable logics as well as for other "weak" logics. In particular, we prove a partial completeness theorem for the n-variable fragment of FOL ($n \geq 3$) and we prove that Gödel's incompleteness property holds for it.

In Section 3 we review some results and problems on free cylindric-like algebras from the literature since 1985. As an application of the theorems in

Section 1, we show that the free cylindric algebras are not atomic (solution for [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Problem 4.14]) and that these free algebras are not "wide", i.e., the $k + 1$-generated free cylindric algebra cannot be embedded into the k-generated one, but these free algebras have many k-element irredundant non-free generator sets (solution for [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Problem 2.7]).

1. Interpreting FOL in its Small Fragments

Instead of Df_3 and CA_3, we will work with fragments of FOL which are equivalent to them because this will be convenient when stating our theorems. We treat FOL as [Hen-Mon-Tar,85] does, i.e., with equality and with no operation symbols. We deviate from [Hen-Mon-Tar,85] in that our connectives are $\vee$, $\neg$, $\exists v_i$, $v_i = v_j$, $i, j \in \omega$ and we treat the rest as derived ones, by defining $\varphi \wedge \psi \stackrel{d}{=} \neg(\neg\varphi \vee \neg\psi)$, $\bot \stackrel{d}{=} (v_0 = v_0 \wedge \neg v_0 = v_0)$, $\top \stackrel{d}{=} \neg\bot$. We will use the derived connectives $\forall$, $\rightarrow$, $\leftrightarrow$, too, as abbreviations: $\forall v\varphi \stackrel{d}{=} \neg\exists v\neg\varphi$, $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \stackrel{d}{=} \neg\varphi \vee \psi$, $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi \stackrel{d}{=} (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \wedge (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$. We will use x, y, z to denote the first three variables v_0, v_1, v_2. Sometimes we will write, e.g., $\exists xy$ or $\forall xyz$ in place of $\exists x\exists y$ or $\forall x\forall y\forall z$, respectively.

We begin with defining the fragment $\mathcal{L}df_3(P, 3)$ of FOL. It contains three variables and one ternary relation symbol P. It is a fragment of FOL in which we omit the equality, quantifiers $\exists v$ for v distinct from x, y, z, and atomic formulas $P(u, v, w)$ for $uvw \neq xyz$; and we omit all relation symbols distinct from P.

Definition 1.1.1 (3-variable restricted FOL without equality $\mathcal{L}df_3(P, 3)$)**.**

(i) The *language* of our system contains one atomic formula, namely $P(x, y, z)$. (E.g., the formula $P(y, x, z)$ is not available in this language, this feature is what the adjective *"restricted"* refers to.) The logical connectives are $\vee$, $\neg$, $\exists x$, $\exists y$, $\exists z$. Thus, the set Fdf_3 of formulas of $\mathcal{L}df_3(P, 3)$ is the smallest set F containing $P(x, y, z)$ and such that $\varphi \vee \psi$, $\neg\varphi$, $\exists x\varphi$, $\exists y\varphi$, $\exists z\varphi \in F$ whenever $\varphi, \psi \in F$.

(ii) The *proof system* $\models^{df}$ which we will use is a Hilbert-style one with the following logical axiom schemes and rules.

The logical axiom schemes are the following. Let $\varphi, \psi \in Fdf_3$ and $v, w \in \{x, y, z\}$.

$((1))$ φ, if φ is a propositional tautology.

$((2))$ $\forall v(\varphi \to \psi) \to (\exists v\varphi \to \exists v\psi)$.

$((3))$ $\varphi \to \exists v\varphi$.

$((4))$ $\exists v\exists v\varphi \to \exists v\varphi$.

$((5))$ $\exists v(\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow (\exists v\varphi \vee \exists v\psi)$.

$((6))$ $\exists v\neg\exists v\varphi \to \neg\exists v\varphi$.

$((7))$ $\exists v\exists w\varphi \to \exists w\exists v\varphi$.

The inference rules are Modus Ponens ((MP), or detachment), and Generalization ((G)).

(iii) We define $\mathcal{L}df_3(P,3)$ as the logic with formulas Fdf_3 and with proof system $\models^{df}$.

(iv) We define $\mathcal{L}df_n(\mathcal{R},\rho)$ where n is an ordinal, $\mathcal{R}$ is a sequence of relation symbols and ρ is the sequence of their ranks (i.e., numbers of arguments), all $\leq n$, analogously to $\mathcal{L}df_3(P,3)$. When we do not indicate $\mathcal{R}$, ρ in $\mathcal{L}df_n(\mathcal{R},\rho)$, we mean to have infinitely many n-place relation symbols. ■

The fragment $\mathcal{L}ca_3$ is similar to the above fragment $\mathcal{L}df_3$, except that we do not omit equality from the language, hence we will have $u = v$ as formulas for $u, v \in \{x, y, z\}$, and we will have two more axiom schemes concerning equality in the proof system. Since we have equality, our "smallest interesting" language will be when we have one binary relation symbol E.

Definition 1.1.2 (3-variable restricted FOL with equality $\mathcal{L}ca_3(E,2)$)**.**

(i) The *language* of our system contains one atomic formula, namely $E(x,y)$. The logical connectives are $\vee$, $\neg$, $\exists x$, $\exists y$, $\exists z$ together with $u = v$ for $u, v \in \{x, y, z\}$ as zero-place connectives. Thus, $x = x$, $x = y$, etc are formulas of $\mathcal{L}ca_3$. We denote the set of formulas (of $\mathcal{L}ca_3$) by Fca_3.

(ii) The *proof system* $\models^{ca}$ which we will use is a Hilbert-style one with the logical axiom schemes and rules of $\mathcal{L}df_3$ (understood as schemes for $\mathcal{L}ca_3$) extended with the following two axiom schemes:

Let $\varphi \in Fca_3$ and $u, v, w \in \{x, y, z\}$.

$((8))$ $(u = v \to v = u) \wedge (u = v \wedge v = w \to u = w) \wedge \exists v \ u = v$.

$((9))$ $u = v \wedge \exists v(u = v \wedge \varphi) \to \varphi$,   where u, v are distinct.

(iii) We define $\mathcal{L}ca_3(E, 2)$ as the logic with formulas Fca_3 and with proof system $\models^{ca}$.

(iv) We define $\mathcal{L}ca_n(\mathcal{R}, \rho)$ where n is an ordinal, $\mathcal{R}$ is a sequence of relation symbols and ρ is the sequence of their ranks, all $\leq n$, analogously to $\mathcal{L}ca_3(E, 2)$. When we do not indicate $\mathcal{R}, \rho$ in $\mathcal{L}ca_n(\mathcal{R}, \rho)$, we mean to have infinitely many n-place relation symbols. ∎

Remark 1.1.3 (On the fragment $\mathcal{L}df_3$ of FOL)**.**

(i) The proof system $\models^{df}$ is a direct translation of the equational axiom system of Df_3. Axiom $((2))$ is needed for ensuring that the equivalence relation defined on the formula algebra by $\varphi \equiv \psi \Leftrightarrow \models^{df} \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$ be a congruence with respect to (w.r.t.) the operation $\exists v$. It is congruence w.r.t. the Boolean connectives $\vee, \neg$ by axiom $((1))$. Axiom $((1))$ expresses that the formula algebra factorized with $\equiv$ is a Boolean algebra, axiom $((5))$ expresses that the quantifiers $\exists v$ are operators on this Boolean algebra (i.e., they distribute over $\vee$), axioms $((3))$, $((4))$ express that these quantifiers are closure operations, axiom $((6))$ expresses that they are complemented closure operators (i.e., the negation of a closed element is closed again). Together with $((5))$ they imply that the closed elements form a Boolean subalgebra, and hence the quantifiers are normal operators (i.e., the Boolean zero is a closed element). Finally, axiom $((7))$ expresses that the quantifiers commute with each other. We note that $((1))$ is not an axiom scheme in the sense of [And-Nem-Sai,01] since it is not a formula scheme, but it can be replaced with three formula schemes, see [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Problem 1.1] (solved in [McC,97]).

(ii) The logic $\mathcal{L}df_3$ corresponds to Df_3 in the sense of [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Sec. 4.3], as follows. What is said in (i) above immediately implies that the proof-theoretic (Lindenbaum–Tarski) formula algebra of $\mathcal{L}df_3$ (which is just the natural formula-algebra factorized by the equivalence relation $\equiv$ defined in (i) above) is the infinitely generated Df_3-free algebra, and that of $\mathcal{L}df_3(P, 3)$ is the one-generated Df_3-free algebra. Moreover, valid formulas of $\mathcal{L}df_3$ correspond to equations valid in Df_3, namely we claim that $\mathcal{L}df_3 \models^{df} \varphi \Leftrightarrow \mathsf{Df}_3 \models \tau\mu(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\varphi \in Fdf_3$, where $\tau\mu(\varphi)$ is as defined in [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, 4.3.55].

(iii) The logic $\mathcal{L}df_3$ inherits a natural semantics from first-order logic (namely Mod, the class of models of FOL, and $\models_3$, the validity relation restricted to 3-variable formulas). The proof system $\models^{df}$ is strongly sound with respect to this semantics, but it is not complete, for more on this

see Section 2. We note that just as Df_3 corresponds to the logic $\mathcal{L}df_3 = \langle Fdf_3, \overset{df}{\models} \rangle$, the class of algebras corresponding to $\langle Fdf_3, \models_3 \rangle$ is the class RDf_3 of representable diagonal-free cylindric algebras ([Hen-Mon-Tar,85, 5.1.33(v)]). For more on connections between logics and classes of algebras, besides [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Sec. 4.3], see [And-Nem-Sai,01], or [Sai,thisVol].

The expressive power of $\mathcal{L}df_3$ is seemingly very small. It's not only that "we cannot count" due to lack of the equality, we cannot transfer any information from one variable to the other by the use of the equality, so all such transfer must go through an atomic formula. Hence if we have only binary relation symbols, in the restricted language there is just no way of meaningfully using the third variable z, and we basically have two-variable logic which is decidable. However, Theorem 1.1.6 below says that if we have at least one ternary relation symbol and we are willing to express formulas in a more complicated way (than the most natural one would be), then we can express any sentence that we can in FOL.

(iv) In the present paper we will use $\mathcal{L}df_3$ as introduced above because it will be convenient to consider it a fragment of FOL. However, $\mathcal{L}df_3$ has several different but equivalent forms, each of which has advantages and disadvantages. Some of the different forms are reviewed in [And-Nem,11a, Sec. 2]. We mention two of the equivalent forms. One is modal logic [**S5**, **S5**, **S5**], this is equivalent to $\mathcal{L}df_3$ (while the modal logic **S5** $\times$ **S5** $\times$ **S5** introduced in [Kur,thisVol] is equivalent with $\langle Fdf_3, \models_3 \rangle$), see [Gab-Kur-Wol-Zak,03, p. 379]. The other equivalent form is just equational logic with the defining equations of Df_3 as extra axioms. ∎

Remark 1.1.4 (On the fragment $\mathcal{L}ca_3$ of FOL).

(i) The logic $\mathcal{L}ca_3$ corresponds to CA_3 just the way $\mathcal{L}df_3$ corresponds to Df_3. The proof system $\overset{ca}{\models}$ is a direct translation of the equational axiom system of CA_3. ((8)) expresses that = is an equivalence relation and ((9)) expresses that formulas do not distinguish equivalent (equal) elements. Take the Hilbert-style proof system with axiom schemes ((1))–((9)) and rules as (MP) and (G). Add the axioms

((0)) $R(v_{i1}, \ldots, v_{in}) \leftrightarrow \exists v_j R(v_{i1}, \ldots, v_{in})$ for R an n-place relation symbol and $j \notin \{i1, \ldots, in\}$.

Then the so obtained proof system is complete for FOL (with usual semantics Mod, $\models$). Hence, $\mathcal{L}df_3$ and $\mathcal{L}ca_3$ are "proof-theoretic" fragments of FOL when taking this complete proof system for FOL.

(ii) The expressive power of $\mathcal{L}ca_3$ is much greater than that of $\mathcal{L}df_3$, due to the presence of equality. E.g., one can express that a binary relation is actually a function, one can express composition of binary relations, one can express (simulate) substitution of variables. However, the proof system $\models^{ca}$ is still very weak, e.g., one can express but cannot prove the following: the composition of two functions is a function again, composition of binary relations is associative, converse of the converse of a binary relation is the original one, interchanging the variables x, y in two different ways by using z as "auxiliary register" results in an equivalent formula (this is the famous merry-go-round equation [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, 3.2.88], see also [Fer,thisVol,a], [Sim,thisVol]). More precisely, one cannot prove these statements if one expresses them the most natural ways. Our theorems below say that if we express the same statements in more involved ways, they become $\models^{ca}$-provable. ∎

Let $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ denote usual FOL with countably many variables and with countably many relation symbols for each rank, i.e., we have countably many n-place relation symbols for all positive n. Let L_ω denote the set of formulas of $\mathcal{L}_\omega$. Thus $\mathcal{L}_\omega = \langle L_\omega, \vdash \rangle$ where $\vdash$ is either the proof system outlined in Remark 1.1.4(i) above, or just the usual semantic consequence relation $\models$. We assume that E is a binary and P is a ternary relation symbol in $\mathcal{L}_\omega$. Then $L_\omega(E, 2)$ denotes the set of formulas in $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ in which only E occurs from the relation symbols. Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory written up in $L_\omega(E, 2)$ is denoted by ZF. A formula of $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ is called a *sentence* if it does not contain free variables.

Definition 1.1.5 (Structural translations). Let $\mathcal{L} = \langle F, \vdash \rangle$ be a logic (in the sense of Remark 1.1.8(i) below). Assume that $\vee, \neg$ are connectives in $\mathcal{L}$, and let $\rightarrow$ denote the corresponding derived connective in $\mathcal{L}$, too. Let $f : L_\omega \rightarrow F$ be an arbitrary function. We say that f is *structural* iff the following (i)–(ii) hold for all sentences $\varphi, \psi \in L_\omega$.

(i) $\vdash f(\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow \left[f(\varphi) \vee f(\psi) \right]$,

(ii) $\vdash f(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \left[f(\varphi) \rightarrow f(\psi) \right]$. ∎

The following is proved in [And-Nem,11a] together with [And-Nem,11b], by defining concrete translations tr. For the role of $\neg\,\mathsf{tr}(\bot)$ in (ii) below see Remark 1.1.8(iii), (iv).

Theorem 1.1.6 (Formalizability of FOL in $\mathcal{L}df_3$).

(i) *There is a structural computable translation function* $\mathsf{tr} : \mathcal{L}_\omega \to \mathcal{L}df_3(P, 3)$ *such that* tr *has a decidable range and the following* (a), (b) *are true for all sets of sentences* $Th \cup \{\varphi\}$ *in* $\mathcal{L}_\omega$:

  (a) $Th \models \varphi$ *iff* $\mathsf{tr}(Th) \models^{df} \mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$.
  (b) $Th \models \varphi$ *iff* $\mathsf{tr}(Th) \models \mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$.

(ii) *There is a structural computable translation function* $\mathsf{tr} : \mathcal{L}_\omega(E, 2) \to \mathcal{L}df_3(P, 3)$ *such that* tr *has a decidable range and the following* (c), (d) *are true, where* Δ *denotes the set of the following two formulas:*

$$E(x, y) \;\leftrightarrow\; \forall z P(x, y, z) \wedge \exists xyz \big[P(x, y, z) \wedge \neg \forall z P(x, y, z) \big],$$

$$x = y = z \;\leftrightarrow\; P(x, y, z) \wedge \neg E(x, y).$$

  (c) *Statements* (a) *and* (b) *in* (i) *above hold for all sets of sentences* $Th \cup \{\varphi\}$ *in* $\mathcal{L}_\omega(E, 2)$ *such that* $Th \cup \Delta \models \neg \mathsf{tr}(\bot)$. *Further,* $ZF \cup \Delta \models \neg \mathsf{tr}(\bot)$.
  (d) $\Delta \cup \big\{ \neg \mathsf{tr}(\bot) \big\} \models \varphi \leftrightarrow \mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$ *for all sentences* $\varphi \in L_\omega(E, 2)$. ∎

The following is proved in [Nem,85b], [Nem,86a] (taken together with [And-Nem,11b]), by constructing concrete tr's. It says that we can replace the ternary relation symbol P with a binary one in Theorem 1.1.6 if we have equality.

Theorem 1.1.7 (Formalizability of FOL in $\mathcal{L}ca_3$).

(i) *There is a computable, structural translation function* $\mathsf{tr} : \mathcal{L}_\omega \to \mathcal{L}ca_3(E, 2)$ *such that* tr *has a decidable range and the following* (a), (b) *are true for all sets of sentences* $Th \cup \{\varphi\}$ *in* $\mathcal{L}_\omega$:

  (a) $Th \models \varphi$ *iff* $\mathsf{tr}(Th) \models^{ca} \mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$.
  (b) $Th \models \varphi$ *iff* $\mathsf{tr}(Th) \models \mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$.

(ii) *There is a computable, structural translation function* $\mathsf{tr} : \mathcal{L}_\omega(E, 2) \to \mathcal{L}ca_3(E, 2)$ *such that* tr *has a decidable range and the following* (c), (d) *are true:*

  (c) *Statements* (a) *and* (b) *in* (i) *above hold for all sets of sentences* $Th \cup \{\varphi\}$ *in* $\mathcal{L}_\omega(E, 2)$ *such that* $Th \models \neg \mathsf{tr}(\bot)$. *Further,* $ZF \models \neg \mathsf{tr}(\bot)$.
  (d) $\neg \mathsf{tr}(\bot) \models \varphi \leftrightarrow \mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$, *for all sentences* $\varphi \in L_\omega(E, 2)$. ∎

On the proof of Theorem 1.1.7. The most difficult part of this theorem is proving $\models \varphi \Rightarrow \models^{ca} \mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$, for all $\varphi \in L_\omega$, therefore we will outline the ideas for proving this part. So, we want to prove a kind of completeness theorem for $\models^{ca}$.

Formulas $\varphi(x, y)$ with two free variables x, y represent binary relations and then the natural way of expressing relation composition of binary relations is the following:

$$(\varphi \circ \psi)(x, y) \stackrel{d}{=} \exists z \big(\varphi(x, z) \wedge \psi(z, y) \big), \quad \text{where}$$

$$\varphi(x, z) \stackrel{d}{=} \exists y \big(y = z \wedge \varphi(x, y) \big) \quad \text{and} \quad \psi(z, y) \stackrel{d}{=} \exists x \big(x = z \wedge \psi(x, y) \big).$$

Now, assume that we have two unary *partial* functions, p, q which form pairing functions, i.e. for which the following formula π holds:

$$\pi \stackrel{d}{=} \forall xy \exists z (\mathsf{p}(z) = x \wedge \mathsf{q}(z) = y).$$

For supporting intuition, let us write $z_0 = x$ and $z_1 = y$ in place of $\mathsf{p}(z) = x$ and $\mathsf{q}(z) = y$, and let $\langle x, y \rangle$ denote an arbitrary z for which $z_0 = x$ and $z_1 = y$. Now, we can "code" binary relations as unary ones, i.e., if $\varphi(x)$ is a formula with one free variable x, then we can think of it as representing the binary relation $\{ \langle x_0, x_1 \rangle : \varphi(x) \}$. With this in mind then a natural way of representing relation composition is the following

$$(\varphi \odot \psi)(x) \stackrel{d}{=} \exists y (\varphi(y_0) \wedge \psi(y_1) \wedge x_0 = y_{00} \wedge y_{01} = y_{10} \wedge y_{11} = x_1).$$


Fig. 1. Illustration of $\varphi \odot \psi$

As we said in Remark 1.1.4(ii), associativity of $\circ$ cannot be proved by $\models^{ca}$, i.e., there are formulas φ, ψ, η in Fca_3 such that

$$\not\models^{ca} \big((\varphi \circ \psi) \circ \eta \big) (x, y) \leftrightarrow \big(\varphi \circ (\psi \circ \eta) \big) (x, y).$$

However, associativity of relation composition expressed in the unary form can be proved, by assuming a formula $\mathsf{Ax} \in Fca_3$ which is semantically equivalent with π but proof-theoretically stronger:

$$\mathsf{Ax} \models^{ca} \big((\varphi \odot \psi) \odot \eta \big)(x) \leftrightarrow \big(\varphi \odot (\psi \odot \eta) \big)(x)$$

for all formulas φ, ψ, η with one free variable x such that $\models^{ca} \varphi(x) \to \mathsf{pair}\,(x)$, etc, where $\mathsf{pair}\,(x) \stackrel{d}{=} \exists y x_0 = y \land \exists y x_1 = y$. (I.e., $\mathsf{pair}\,(x)$ holds for x if both p and q are defined on it.) We note that π is not strong enough for proving associativity of $\odot$, and even Ax is not strong enough for proving associativity of $\circ$, see [Nem,86a, 15T(ii), (iv)]. We mentioned already that $\models^{ca}$ cannot prove that composition of functions is a function again. Roughly, Ax is π together with stating that composition of at most three "copies" of p, q is a function again (i.e., $\mathsf{p} \circ \mathsf{p} \circ \mathsf{q}$, $\mathsf{p} \circ \mathsf{q}$ etc are all functions). Similarly to the above, we can express converse of binary relations and the identity relation (coded for their unary form) and prove for these by $\models^{ca}$ all the relation algebraic equations, from Ax of course. Thus we defined relation-algebra-type operations on the set of formulas of form $\varphi(x) \land \mathsf{pair}\,(x)$, and we can prove from Ax that these operations form an RA. If p, q can be expressed as above, then we have a so-called quasi-projective RA, a QRA, which are representable by [Tar-Giv,87, 8.4(iii)], and we know that representation theorems help us to get provability from validity (i.e., the hard direction of completeness theorems). It remains to get suitable pairing formulas p, q (see (1) below) and to translate all FOL-formulas, in a meaning-preserving way, to the above QRA-fragment of $\mathcal{L}ca_3$ (see (2) below).

(1) We can get p, q by "brute force": we add a new binary relation symbol E to our language, intuitively we will think of it as the element-of relation $\in$. Then we express ordered pairs the way usually done in set theory (i.e., $\langle x, y \rangle \stackrel{d}{=} \big\{ \{x\}, \{x, y\} \big\}$), and realize that we can write up the two projection functions belonging to these using only three variables. By using these projection functions we can convert every FOL-formula to one in Fca_3 so that we preserve validity (we can use the pairing-technique to code all the relations into one binary one, and then we can code up all the variables into the first three ones). This part is not so difficult because we may think "semantically".

(2) It remains now to translate all 3-variable formulas $\varphi \in Fca_3$ into the QRA-fragment of $\mathcal{L}ca_3$ we obtained above. The paper Simon [Sim,07] comes to our aid. In [Sim,07], to every QRA a CA_3-type subreduct is defined which is representable, i.e., which is in RCA_3. Let $\mathfrak{C}$ be this subreduct of our above-defined QRA, then the universe of $\mathfrak{C}$ is a subset of Fca_3 and the operations

of $\mathfrak{C}$ are defined in terms of formulas of Fca_3, too. Let $f : Fca_3 \to \mathfrak{C}$ be a homomorphism (where the CA_3-type operations of Fca_3 are the natural ones), and then we define $\mathsf{tr} : Fca_3 \to Fca_3$ by $\mathsf{tr}(\varphi) \stackrel{d}{=} \mathsf{Ax} \to f(\varphi)$. Now, one can check that $\models \varphi \Rightarrow \models^{ca} \mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$. For the details of the proof outlined above and for the proof of Theorem 1.1.6 we refer the reader to [And-Nem,11a, And-Nem,11b, Nem,85b, Nem,86a]. ■

Remark 1.1.8 (Discussion of the conditions in Theorems 1.1.6, 1.1.7)**.**

(i) In Abstract Algebraic Logic, AAL, and/or in Universal Logic the key concept is a logical system (logic in short) $\langle F, \vdash \rangle$ where F is a set (thought of as the set of formulas) and $\vdash \subseteq \mathsf{Sb}(F) \times F$ (thought of as a consequence relation), where $\mathsf{Sb}(F)$ denotes the powerset of F. If $f : F \to F'$ is a function between two logics $\mathcal{L} = \langle F, \vdash \rangle$ and $\mathcal{L}' = \langle F', \vdash' \rangle$, then f is called a *translation* iff it preserves $\vdash$, i.e., iff $Th \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow f(Th) \vdash' f(\varphi)$ holds for all $Th \cup \{\varphi\} \subseteq F$, and f is called a *conservative translation* if $\Rightarrow$ can be replaced by $\Leftrightarrow$ in the above. Jeřábek [Jer,11] proved that FOL can be conservatively translated even to classical propositional calculus (CPC); and moreover, every countable logic can be conservatively translated to CPC. In this sense, the existence of conservative translations does not mean much in itself. However, if we require the translation to be computable in addition, then undecidability is preserved along the translation, and so FOL can be translated to undecidable logics only (i.e., where $\{\varphi \in F : \emptyset \vdash \varphi\}$ is undecidable), and so it cannot be translated to CPC. For this reason, the conditions that we have at least one at least ternary relation symbol, we have at least 3 quantifiers (closure operators), and that they commute are all necessary conditions for our target logic in Theorem 1.1.6 since without these conditions we get decidable logics. (We have seen that $\mathcal{L}df_3(P, 2)$ is basically 2-variable logic which is decidable [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, 4.2.7], and the logic we get from $\mathcal{L}df_n$ by omitting the axiom scheme ((7)) requiring that the quantifiers commute is proved to be decidable in [Nem,86a, Chap. III], [Nem,95, Theorem 1.1]). If we require more properties for the translation function to hold, then more properties are preserved along them. E.g., structural computable conservative translations preserve Gödel's incompleteness property from one logic to the other, see Theorem 1.2.4.

(ii) The achievement (of Theorems 1.1.6, 1.1.7) that the range of the translation is decidable can be omitted, since if we have a translation function then by using the trick in [Cra-Vau,58] we can modify this function so that its range becomes decidable and keep all the other good properties, at least in our case when our logics are extensions of CPC.

(iii) There are sentences in $L_\omega(E, 2)$ which are not equivalent semantically to any formula in $L_3(E, 2)$, hence there is no function $f : L_\omega \to L_3(E, 2)$ for which $\models \varphi \leftrightarrow f(\varphi)$ would hold for all sentences $\varphi \in L_\omega$. For this reason, $\neg\mathsf{tr}(\bot)$ cannot be omitted in Theorems 1.1.6(ii)(d), 1.1.7(ii)(d). For example, such a 4-variable sentence is exhibited in [Nem,86a, p. 39]. We note that Δ in Theorem 1.1.6(ii) is an explicit "definition" of E and $=$ from P.

(iv) Our translation functions are not Boolean homomorphisms in general, e.g., the translations tr we define in the proofs of Theorems 1.1.6, 1.1.7 do not preserve negation in the way they preserve disjunction. Consequently, $\neg\mathsf{tr}(\bot)$ is not the same as $\mathsf{tr}(\top)$, and more importantly, $\neg\mathsf{tr}(\bot)$ is not a valid formula. From the fact that tr is structural, it can be proved that $\vdash \mathsf{tr}(\varphi) \leftrightarrow \big[\neg\mathsf{tr}(\bot) \to \mathsf{tr}(\varphi)\big]$. Hence, $\neg\mathsf{tr}(\bot)$ seems to be the weakest assumption under which one can expect semantical equivalence of φ with $\mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$. Intuitively, $\neg\mathsf{tr}(\bot)$ is the "background knowledge" we assume for the translation function tr to preserve meaning. This is the role of $\neg\mathsf{tr}(\bot)$ in Theorems 1.1.6(ii), 1.1.7(ii).

(v) A logic $\langle F, \vdash \rangle$ is defined to be a *propositional logic* (or sentential logic) in AAL if F is built up from some set, called propositional variables, by using connectives and $\vdash$ is *substitutional*, i.e., $\vdash$ is preserved by substitution of arbitrary formulas for propositional variables. In this sense, $\mathcal{L}df_3$ and $\mathcal{L}ca_3$ are propositional logics, but $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ is not, see e.g., [And-Nem-Sai,01] or [Sai,thisVol].

(vi) Any logic $\mathcal{L} = \langle F, \vdash \rangle$ which is between $\mathcal{L}df_3(P, 3)$ and $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ can be taken in Theorem 1.1.6 in place of $\mathcal{L}df_3(P, 3)$. (We say that a logic $\mathcal{L} = \langle F, \vdash \rangle$ is contained in another one, $\mathcal{L}' = \langle F', \vdash' \rangle$, if $F \subseteq F'$ and $\vdash \subseteq \vdash'$.) This is easy to check. ■

Problem 1.1.9 (Interpreting FOL in weaker fragments)**.** Can the requirement of the closure operators being complemented be omitted in our theorems? I.e., is there a computable (structural) conservative translation from $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ to the equational theory EqBf_3 of Bf_3 where Bf_3 denotes the class of all Boolean algebras with three commuting (not necessarily complemented) closure operators? Is EqBf_3 undecidable?

2. Applications of the Interpretation

There are many applications, of different flavors, of the interpretability theorems of which Theorem 1.1.6 is presently the strongest one. In this and the next sections we state some of these applications. We will concentrate on consequences for cylindric algebras, CA_n, RCA_n and their logical counterparts, but analogous results hold for all their variants, e.g., for diagonal-free cylindric algebras Df_n, RDf_n, substitution-cylindrification algebras SCA_n, RSCA_n, polyadic equality algebras PEA_n, RPEA_n, polyadic algebras PA_n, RPA_n, for relation algebras SA, RA, RRA and their logical counterparts. For the definition of these classes of algebras see, e.g., [Hen-Mon-Tar,85], [Mad-Say,thisVol], [Mad,82].

The first applications we talk about here concern completeness theorems. Tarski used his translation in [Tar-Giv,87] to transfer the completeness theorem for $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ into a kind of completeness theorem for his target logic, which in algebraic form is stated as a representation theorem, namely that every quasi-projective relation algebra is representable. (Later Maddux [Mad,78] gave a purely algebraic proof for this.) It is shown in [Nem,85b, 3.7–3.10], [Nem,86a, 17T(viii)] that RA cannot be replaced with CA_3 in this consequence, namely, quasi-projective CA_3's are rather far from being representable (and the same is true for the class SA of semi-associative relation algebras, in place of CA_3). So, in this respect, Tarski's result cannot be improved.

Yet, we can use our translations in Theorems 1.1.6, 1.1.7 to prove completeness results for our target logics, but in a different way. We begin with recalling some definitions from [And-Nem-Sai,01, D. 33, D. 48]. A proof system is called *Hilbert-style* if it is given by finitely many axiom schemes and rules where the rules are of form $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_k \vdash \varphi_0$ for some formula schemes $\varphi_0, \ldots, \varphi_k$. A proof system $\vdash$ is called *sound* w.r.t. the semantics $\models$ iff $\vdash \varphi$ implies $\models \varphi$, *strongly sound* if $Th \vdash \varphi$ implies $Th \models \varphi$, *complete*, *strongly complete* when "implies" is replaced with "implied by" in the above, for all sets $Th \cup \{\varphi\}$ of formulas. Finally, we define $\mathcal{L}_n = \langle L_n, \vdash_n \rangle$, the usual n-variable fragment of $\mathcal{L}_\omega$, as restricting $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ to those formulas of L_ω which contain only the first n variables. (E.g., $R(y, x, x, z) \in L_3$ when R is a 4-place relation symbol in $\mathcal{L}_\omega$.) More precisely, $\vdash_n$ is the provability relation we get from the axiom schemes ((0))–((9)) understood as schemes for L_n and rules (MP), (G), cf. Remark 1.1.4(i). Throughout this section, we

assume that E is a binary relation symbol in $\mathcal{L}_\omega$ and $n \geq 3$ is finite. Hence, in Theorem 1.1.7 we can replace $\mathcal{L}ca_3(E, 2)$ with $\mathcal{L}_n$ (see Remark 1.1.8(vi)).

We know that $\mathcal{L}_n$ is inherently incomplete, i.e., there is no complete and strongly sound Hilbert-style proof system for the "standard" validity $\models$ restricted to L_n. In the literature, there are approaches aimed at getting around this inherent incompleteness of $\mathcal{L}_n$. One goes by replacing "standard" models and validity with "non-standard" models and validity which one can obtain from CA_n. This approach originates with Leon Henkin. The other approach is keeping the standard semantics and using new complete inference systems which are sound but not strongly sound. Such inference systems are introduced, e.g., in [Ven,91], [Ven,thisVol] and in [Sim,91]. Problem 7.2 in [Sai,thisVol], as well as [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Problem 4.16], and [And-Mon-Nem,91b, Problem 1(a) (p. 730), Problems 49, 50 (p. 740)] are strongly related to this direction.

Let $\models_{nt}$ denote the proof system we obtain from $\models_n$ by adding the rule which infers φ from $\mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$ when φ is a sentence in $\mathcal{L}_n$, where tr is the translation in Theorem 1.1.7(i). This last rule is sound but not strongly sound, i.e., $\models_{nt} \varphi$ implies $\models \varphi$, but it is not true that $Th \models_{nt} \varphi$ implies $Th \models \varphi$ (namely, $\mathsf{tr}(\varphi) \models_{nt} \varphi$ for all φ, but $\mathsf{tr}(\varphi) \models \varphi$ is not true for all φ).

Our first theorem in this section is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1.1.7(i). It says that the "standard" Hilbert-style proof system $\models_n$ is strongly complete and strongly sound within a large enough subset of L_n; and the "non-standard" proof system $\models_{nt}$ is complete and sound for the whole of $\mathcal{L}_n$.

In more detail, the first part of Corollary 1.2.1 below says that we can select a subset G of formulas, call it the set of "formulas of good shape", such that the natural Hilbert-style proof system $\models_n$ is strongly complete within this subset; moreover we can decide whether a formula is in good shape, and every formula φ can be algorithmically converted to one in a good-shape such that meaning is preserved in the sense described in Theorem 1.1.7(i).

Corollary 1.2.1. *Let G denote the range of* tr *in Theorem 1.1.7(i) and let $n > 2$ be finite. Then (i)–(iii) below hold:*

(i) *$\models_n$ is strongly complete within $G \subseteq L_n$, i.e., for all $Th \cup \{\varphi\} \subseteq G$ we have that $Th \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow Th \models_n \varphi$.*

(ii) *G is large enough in the sense that $\mathsf{tr}(\varphi) \in G$ for all $\varphi \in L_n$ and $\models \varphi \Leftrightarrow \models \mathsf{tr}(\varphi)$.*

(iii) $\models_{\overline{nt}}$ *is complete and sound in the whole of* L_n, *i.e., for all formulas* $\varphi \in L_n$ *we have* $\models \varphi \Leftrightarrow \models_{\overline{nt}} \varphi$. ∎

The next corollary concerns connections between RCA_n and its finitary approximation, CA_n. Let $\otimes$ denote the complement of the symmetric difference, i.e., $x \otimes y \overset{d}{=} (x \cdot y) + (-x \cdot -y)$. We note that $\otimes$ is the algebraic counterpart of $\leftrightarrow$.

Corollary 1.2.2. *There is a computable function* f *mapping* CA_n-*terms to* CA_n-*terms such that for all* CA_n-*terms* τ, σ *we have*

(i) $\mathsf{RCA}_n \models \tau = \sigma$ *iff* $\mathsf{CA}_n \models f(\tau \otimes \sigma) = 1$, *or, in an equivalent form*

(ii) $\mathsf{RCA}_n \models \tau = 1$ *iff* $\mathsf{CA}_n \models f(\tau) = 1$. ∎

The above corollary of Theorem 1.1.7 justifies, in a way, the introduction of CA_n. Namely, CA_n was devised in order to "control", have a firm grasp on equations true in RCA_n. Nonfinite axiomatizability of RCA_n implies that this firm grasp cannot be attained in the form of $\mathsf{Eq}\,\mathsf{CA}_n = \mathsf{Eq}\,\mathsf{RCA}_n$ where EqK denotes the equational theory of the class K of algebras. By contrast, the above theorem says that a firm grasp can be obtained by using the computable function f; the axioms of CA_n together with the definition of f provide a finitary tool that captures (reconstructs completely) $\mathsf{Eq}\,\mathsf{RCA}_n$.

A corollary of Theorem 1.1.6 says that the computational complexity of FOL is the same as that of the equational theory of Df_3. We recall from [Coo,03], informally, that the Turing-degree of $S \subseteq \omega$ is less than or equal to that of $Z \subseteq \omega$, in symbols $S \leq_T Z$, if by using a decision procedure for Z we can decide S. The Turing-degrees of S and Z are the same, in symbols $S \equiv_T Z$, if $S \leq_T Z$ and $Z \leq_T S$. The same notion can be applied to the equational theories of various classes of algebras, and to various FOL-theories. Let $Th(\emptyset)$ denote the set of valid formulas of $\mathcal{L}_\omega$.

The following corollary says that if we have a decision procedure for any one of $Th(\emptyset)$, EqK with K one of Df_n, RDf_n, CA_n, RCA_n, SCA_n, RSCA_n, ..., RA, RRA, $3 \leq n < \omega$ then we can decidable any other of the same list. In short, the Turing-degrees of all these classes are the same. This corollary follows from Theorems 1.1.6, 1.1.7.

Corollary 1.2.3. *Let* $3 \leq n < \omega$ *and let* K *be any one of* Df_n, RDf_n, CA_n, RCA_n, SCA_n, RSCA_n, PA_n, RPA_n, PEA_n, RPEA_n, SA, RA, RRA. *Then* (i) *and* (ii) *below hold.*

(i) $\mathsf{Eq}\,\mathsf{Df}_3 \equiv_T \mathsf{EqK}$.

(ii) $\mathsf{Eq}\,\mathsf{Df}_3 \equiv_T Th(\emptyset)$. ■

The above applications are all relevant to Problem 4.1 of [Hen-Mon-Tar,85]. Indeed, from Corollary 1.2.2 we can get a decidable equational base for $\mathsf{Eq}\,\mathsf{RCA}_n$ similar to that in [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, 4.1.9], and $\models_{\overline{nt}}$ gives a kind of solution for [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Problem 4.1] similar to [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, 4.1.20].

Now we turn to other kinds of applications. Tarski introduced and used translation functions from a logic $\mathcal{L}$ into a logic $\mathcal{L}'$ in order to transfer some properties of $\mathcal{L}$ to $\mathcal{L}'$. For example, if the translation function is computable, then undecidability of the valid formulas of $\mathcal{L}$ implies the same for $\mathcal{L}'$. This is how Tarski proved that $\mathsf{Eq}\,\mathsf{RA}$ was undecidable. The same way, Theorem 1.1.6 immediately implies that the sets of validities of $\mathcal{L}df_n$, $\mathcal{L}ca_n$ as well as the equational theories of Df_n, CA_n for $n \geq 3$ are undecidable. These have been known and have been proved by using Tarski's translation of set theory into RA for $n \geq 4$, and for $n = 3$ it is a result of Maddux [Mad,80], proved by an algebraic method.

The next theorem says that structural computable translations are capable of transferring Gödel's incompleteness property. For $\mathcal{L}ca_3$ this is proved in [Nem,85b, Theorem 1.6], and for $\mathcal{L}df_3$ it is proved in [And-Nem,11a, Theorem 2.3].

Theorem 1.2.4 (Gödel-style incompleteness theorem for $\mathcal{L}df_3$). *There is a formula* $\varphi \in Fdf_3$ *such that no consistent decidable extension T of φ is complete, and moreover, no decidable extension of φ separates the $\models^{\underline{df}}$-consequences of φ from the φ-refutable sentences (where ψ is φ-refutable iff $\varphi \models^{\underline{df}} \neg\psi$). The same is true for $\mathcal{L}ca_3$ and $\mathcal{L}_n$ in place of $\mathcal{L}df_3$.*

The proof of Theorem 1.2.4 goes by showing that the translation of an inseparable formula which is consistent with $\neg\,\mathsf{tr}(\bot)$ by a structural computable translation function tr is inseparable again.

In algebraic logic, the algebraic property corresponding to the logical property of Gödel's incompleteness is atomicity of free algebras (see [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, 4.3.32] and [Nem,85b, Proposition 1.8]). Indeed, Theorem 1.2.4 above implies non-atomicity of free cylindric algebras, this way providing a solution for [Hen-Mon-Tar,85, Problem 4.14]. We devote the next section entirely to free cylindric algebras, because of their importance.