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Heinz Gärtner

International Security and Peace

Definitions from A–Z

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Introduction

The idea of the book is to present the most important scientific definitions of concepts of international security and peace and to summarize the scientific-political debate on the subject. It is not a glossary, but the presentation of the most important arguments on the defined concepts.

The third edition of this book was published in 2018. This book is the English translation of the fourth edition. It adds terms that did not exist at the time of the third edition, such as "rule-based order". Important definitions and authors that were not included in the previous editions have been included. The explanations of the terms have also been updated.

The fundamental approaches and theories on international security and peace have changed little, although further arguments and empirical results have been added to the academic debate. In the real world, however, there have been far-reaching developments that have had a significant influence on concepts and theories and their operationalization.

The inspiration for this book came from two observations. As a supervisor of countless seminar papers, theses and dissertations, I realized that political science students were increasingly taking definitions of genuine political science terms such as power, hegemony, state, security, peace, anarchy, structure, etc. from the internet, general dictionaries or popular science encyclopedias. This is insufficient practice for scientific workers. Not that these definitions are incorrect, but they serve a purpose other than political science literature. They do not claim to reflect the state of the scientific debate. This book makes scientific working definitions easily accessible to students and experts. Further target groups are political, administrative and journalistic practitioners, who very often use political science terms and thus often also shape the understanding of the terms in public opinion. Practitioners usually do not have the time to read the extensive literature on the respective terms. This lexicon is intended to give them the opportunity and security to quickly ascertain whether they are using terms appropriately.

Traditional classical lexicons have to limit themselves to a few general terms and definitions; specialized dictionaries on international politics are necessarily stuck with random choices. You can find international organizations (UNO, NATO, OSCE, GATT, etc.) alongside other organizations (e.g. PLO) and country names and concepts (liberalism, isolationism, Marxism and others). Definitions stand alongside descriptions.

This book specializes in definitions of concepts of international relations, international security and peace. It is not a dictionary of international relations, but an encyclopedia of definitions about these areas. It does not include and describe issues that contain clear empirical information, such as NATO or the Second World War. However, the book does contain terms such as deterrence, alliance, defense guarantee, war and strategy, which are not clearly and obviously empirical objects. You cannot define Machiavelli or Morgenthau either, but you can define realism. The name Clausewitz cannot be found as a term in this encyclopedia, but his definitions of war, strategy, offence, defense, etc. This is an encyclopedia on

security and peace policy, in which terms relating to concepts and theories can be found. It is not an encyclopedia of military policy and technology. Therefore, you will probably find terms such as strategy or tactics and even information warfare, but not maneuvers, weapons or specific categories of weapons.

The dictionary is intended to help identify and reduce ambiguities and vagueness. Care is taken to ensure that the definiendum, which is being defined, and the definiens, which defines, are strictly separated, and that the definiendum does not appear again in the definition, as otherwise it would be a circular definition. Nominal definitions are also avoided, in *which* one term (explicandum) is merely replaced by another or a synonym (explicate).

Definitions are quoted from the relevant literature, as well as being based on the author's own definitions. Definitions without quotation marks, but with references, have been summarized and concentrated by the author. Sometimes a definition by a particular author has been slightly altered linguistically without alienating the idea. In almost all cases, they are explained in more detail. The explanations are intended to clarify the definitions, but also to encourage further study of the subject.

Explanations of basic concepts are presented in more detail and placed at the beginning of the book. These are: deterrence, empire, peace, violence, intervention, war, power and rule, neutrality, proliferation, terrorism, theory, security and strategy. These terms deserve to be dealt with in more detail, because they have been central to the peace and security debate in recent years and in many respects form the basis for most other definitions. An introduction to the content of the book has been omitted because these basic terms provide a good overview of the topic of international security and peace.

Partial definitions have now been integrated into these umbrella terms. Sub-concepts such as comprehensive security, security dilemma, security community, etc. can be found in the overall terms security, humanitarian intervention in intervention and so on.

Overly topical references are avoided, as after some time they no longer have such great explanatory power. However, historical references were retained, and new ones created if a definition can be better explained with them. General lexicons were used very rarely and only when no suitable or only inadequate definitions were found in the security policy literature (e.g. patriotism). Sometimes specialized lexicons were consulted. The rule of the book is that definitions must be short and clear. Not all definitions used in this book are recognized as such in the literature. However, the author has found them to be appropriate. Since the earlier editions of this book, new editions of the literature cited have also been published; for reasons of practicability, the information in the earlier editions has been retained.

Some users may wonder why this or that definition has not been included. Such a question may be justified in some cases. However, a lexicon is always an unfinished work. It will have to remain selective. It is often a subjective decision by the author as to why one definition was included and another not. Definitions

that fit more into a neighboring discipline of international security have also not been included. However, definitions from neighboring disciplines related to international security have a place in this lexicon. The term democracy is a term more commonly used in classical or comparative politics, but has been included because it is central to the concept of democratic peace, according to which democracies behave more peacefully towards each other than towards non-democracies. This concept gives the term a clear security policy dimension. This lexicon contains around 800 terms with over 1000 definitions, associated explanations, references and around 5000 cross-references.

Of necessity, the explanations in this encyclopedia cannot fully satisfy experts in the respective fields, as each individual definition is backed by years of debate and countless publications. Of course, a brief explanation cannot provide the entire background, as some specialists would expect. Nevertheless, the author has endeavored to capture the current state of discussion in definitions and explanations. The purpose of the lexicon is to explain the specialized definitions both briefly and comprehensibly. The author is also grateful for the comments that have been incorporated into this new edition.

The comprehensive cross-references to other terms are helpful for scientific research. This establishes connections that are usually not visible in the literature, which primarily deals with one topic. The encyclopedia can therefore also be read as a monograph if the reader continues to follow the references. They can decide for themselves which path they want to continue reading. The work is organized in such a way that the entire book could be read in this way.

An arrow > indicates if there is a definition of a >term elsewhere in the dictionary. A double arrow ($\rightarrow$) refers to the basic concepts found at the beginning of the book. However, the arrows are only shown if the term is mentioned for the first time in the definition and explanation. Otherwise, the references would become confusing. Too many superfluous italicized terms and inverted commas opposite are avoided because they do not contribute to clarity.

Terms that are included under a different definition are mentioned and also labelled with arrows. This applies in particular to sub-terms of the basic concepts. For example, security dilemma can be found under the main term $\rightarrow$ security. No distinction is made between singular and plural. If a definition has a main term and an attribute, the main term is usually labelled with the arrow, e.g. >regime, international. In the case of compound terms, the one to which reference is to be made is indicated by an arrow (e.g. in the case of the term violation of international law, >international law). If a term is found in the basic concepts at the beginning of the book, there is also a reference to its alphabetical place (e.g. security see $\rightarrow$ security or peace see $\rightarrow$ peace).

Each entry is followed by a selection of three literature recommendations. These come either from the references used or from relevant literature not directly cited. The selection was made in good conscience; however, given the wealth of literature and sources, it had to remain the author's subjective decision.

Finally, it has sometimes been objected to this project that definitions are only meaningful after a study has been completed, as they would say little on their own. It is certainly true that definitions should be related to the respective object of investigation. However, it is not necessary for all the steps that led to a definition to be undertaken anew each time. New developments can build on the basis of previous findings that led to a particular definition.

Finally, it should be noted that most of the definitions used do not use both genders. It should therefore suffice at this point to point out that, where appropriate, both the feminine and masculine forms are meant.

Basic concepts

Deterrence

Deterrence is a very colorful concept for which there are many definitional variants. Proponents assume that it averts war (→ War, >Prevention), whereas skeptics argue that this cannot be proven. The effectiveness is also interpreted differently, which is reflected in the different definitions:

Deterrence is a → strategy that is intended to deter an opponent by threatening them using → force, to deter them from using force themselves (→ Violence).

Deterrence means "persuading a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of activity" (>Persuasion) (Schelling, 1960, 9).

Nuclear deterrence is the >capability, in the event of an >attack or a threat (>Threat) of an attack retaliate using nuclear weapons (>Nuclear Weapon States).

Deterrence is intended to prevent, by threat of serious harm, one party from doing something that the first party does not want (cf. Morgan, 2003, 1).

Deterrence is "predicted to succeed when the expected utility of using force is less than the expected utility of not using force" (Huth and Russett, 1990, 469–470).

Deterrence is intended to convince the adversary that its costs of a potential attack are higher than its benefits.

Deterrence is the threat to use force to >influence behavior to the extent that something happens that one does not want. An action is to be prevented, because of the fear of consequences.

Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by a credible threat of an unacceptable counter-reaction.[1] To be credible, nuclear weapons must also be usable. This meant that they must not only serve as a deterrence, but they must also be weapons of warfare.

Dieter Senghaas (1972, 6) contradicts the formal definition of the prevailing opinion, according to which deterrence is "that new principle of state-society (would be), by means of which interstate communication could be regulated using skillful manipulation of instruments of → violence in such a way that the open use of violence would tend to be eliminated." In contrast, Senghaas interprets the deterrence policy "as a consequence of peacelessness" (→ Peace). Although it is not "the cause of peacelessness," it is "itself a motor of armament dynamics and thus an important cause for the perpetuation of peacelessness."

Dieter Senghaas (1972, 2013) interprets the policy of deterrence in terms of the theory of organized peacelessness, which points out that the policy of deterrence can only increase the existing potentials of conflict (>Conflict), whereas a rational security policy does everything to reduce existing conflict potentials which potentially push towards warlike conflicts (14). Deterrence policy perpetuates a

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1   Department of Defense Dictionary, 1994 cited in Morgan (2003, 1).

mechanism of "autistic hostility": threats provoke counter-threats, mistrust feeds mistrust, and arms investments lead to counter-investments (170–179). "Peace will only exist beyond deterrence." (274).

The system of deterrence is based on the assumption that all involved >actors act rationally, because irrational actors would also launch an >attack from the position of inferiority, even at the risk of self-destruction. The strategy of deterrence developed during the >East-West conflict and was the cause of the arms race (>Armament control), because of always emerging gaps (bombers, missiles, etc.) had to be constantly rearmed. Both sides strived for escalation dominance, i.e. the capability to strike the final blow.

Massive retaliation means the assured second-strike nuclear capability following a massive strategic first-use of nuclear weapons. Massive retaliation was the first sophisticated nuclear strategy during the East-West conflict and >Cold War and dates back to the 1950s. A conflicting party should have so many nuclear weapons (>Strategic nuclear weapons) left after a nuclear first strike that it can inflict a devastating or at least unacceptable second nuclear strike on the attacking side. This strategy became known as MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction). However, both sides (Soviet Union and U.S.) repeatedly tried to achieve the possibility of a devastating first strike (e.g., using missiles with multiple warheads).

Although the concept implies annihilation of the enemy through a single attack the deterrence strategy during the East-West conflict led to the creation of a nuclear arsenal, which size would have allowed for a 40-fold destruction of the world. Mutual deterrence in the course of the Cold War was no longer understood simply as potential mutual destruction. Rather, it was understood as potential destruction in a sophisticated manner, which was clearly evident from the nuclear policies of the superpowers was clearly discernible.

The concept of massive retaliation and annihilation was replaced by tailored use of nuclear weapons. Flight times were shortened and hit accuracy increased. The system of deterrence must be credible. That is, the threat of retaliatory strike with small, limited-use nuclear weapons is more credible than large-scale destruction strikes. Smaller nuclear weapons, however, can be used not only as a deterrent, but can also be used for >warfare.

According to the US "Nuclear Posture Review" (US Department of Defense, 2018 and following), nuclear weapons are supposed to be "tailored" and "flexible" in use. They are credibly deployable only if they are small enough to cause merely "limited" damage. This would also inevitably turn nuclear weapons into weapons of warfare. Smaller nuclear weapons make deterrence more credible, but also more likely to be used. This principle was already valid in NATO's strategy of >"Flexible Response" in the 1970s, when it was seen that a threat of massive mutual destruction was not credible.

Counter-force is a nuclear strategy which - in contrast to counter-value - is generally directed against military targets or, more specifically, against a target that is part of the enemy's nuclear system (forces and command centers). The strategy

of nuclear deterrence must credibly demonstrate the use of nuclear weapons. In addition to reducing the size of nuclear warheads, the counter-force-strategy make their use against military targets seem more credible than against civilian ones. However, no one could credibly eliminate the danger of escalation. Because of the growing number of targets during the Cold War, there were more attack options and thus a greater number of nuclear weapons became necessary. Infrastructure (>Critical infrastructure), political and military command staffs, and armed forces were added to the target list. During the 1970s, the counter-value-strategy (destruction of cities and population centers) was gradually complemented by the counter-force which further expanded the list of potential targets. As a result, there was a broadening of operational planning in the adversary's country and an extension to territories of allies in case they would be occupied. In contrast to counter-force, counter-value is a nuclear strategy that - unlike counter-force - is not directed against narrower military targets, but against economic, political, and industrial structures (factories, power plants, transportation systems, warehouses, government buildings, police stations, etc.). Some disarmament experts argue that a pure counter-value-strategy would require fewer targets and thus fewer nuclear weapons. However, this argument can hardly be morally justified if a deterrence strategy threatens only civilian and not military targets.

Glenn Snyder (1961) distinguishes between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by making an action ineffective (by denial). In the first case, high costs are threatened in case of a certain activity (e.g. destruction of a city), in the second case the gain of such an activity is to be kept too low to carry it out (e.g. by a missile defense system).

During the Cold War the concept of "extended deterrence" was developed, which expresses that deterrence can be extended to allies (>Alliance). There were always doubts whether this would work in an emergency. Would the United States have sacrificed Washington for Paris? This dilemma would have arisen if the U.S., in response to an attack of the Soviet Union on Europe, risked a counterattack on its own territory.

Representatives of the realist school (>Realism) are convinced that the absence of a nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was mainly due to the mutual deterrence. In truth, however, it is not possible to say with absolute certainty whether deterrence works. One cannot prove why something did not happen. The fact that a nuclear war did not occur was due to a variety of different political and military factors, including arms control negotiations, confidence-building measures, and cooperation within the CSCE and other arms control regimes and institutions ($\rightarrow$ Security).

The difference between deterrence theory and negotiation models (>Negotiations) consists in the fact ($\rightarrow$ Theory) that classical deterrence theory predicts that war becomes more likely when the imbalance between two or more >states increases. Negotiation models on the other hand, assume that war becomes more likely not when there is a greater imbalance, but when there are different assessments of the balance (>Balance of power).

Deterrence and >defense are in tension with each other. A missile defense system of the USA (>Missile Defense Shield) is supposed to complement deterrence, but this would decisively reduce the second-strike capability, a central element of deterrence theory. The argument was that this system of mutual destruction was immoral and that its failure would have apocalyptic consequences. Peace through mutual >vulnerability of both the military and the civilian population should be replaced by invulnerability. For this reason, in 2002 the United States terminated the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which prohibited the deployment of such a system. This treaty, it was argued, was a symbol of >bipolarity, which is the morally unacceptable threat of mutual destruction and arms control in general. The missile defense system is intended to protect the U.S., and perhaps later allies, against missiles primarily from problem states (>Rogue states). However, the effectiveness of such a system is doubted by many experts. The principle of deterrence was defined in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002 by that of >preventive war supplemented.[2] However, the U.S. and NATO continue to adhere to the principle of deterrence. NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (2012) states that allies view deterrence as a core element of collective >defense. and that deterrence leads to indivisibility of the security of the alliance contributes.[3]

After the end of the East-West conflict new threats are coming to the fore. As a result, many observers argue that deterrence is in a world of so-called rogue states and terrorists (→ Terrorism), since these are irrational actors and deterrence would only be effective if all the and that it would only be effective if all participants act rationally.[5] Gallucci (2005) therefore speaks of "expanded deterrence" being possible against nuclear terrorism. The USA is working on the program >prompt global strike, which should be able to reach almost all parts of the world with conventional weapons. Nuclear deterrence could thus be partially replaced or supplemented.

There are a number of attempts to create deterrence-free areas, such as nuclear weapon-free zones or >negative security assurances (NSAs), as the promise by >nuclear-weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was adopted in June 2017 by 122 member states of the United Nations and entered into force in January 2021, has replaced the old system of norms (>Norms) of deterrence. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, on the other hand, points out the disastrous consequences when deterrence fails or does not work at all (cf. Kmentt, Alexander, 2021).

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2 The National Security Strategy 2002 states, "Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness." The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, Chapter 5. See also National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, Sec. 5.

3 "Allies' goal is to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defense and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance." North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, May 2012.

Nina Tannenwald (2007) has observed a nuclear taboo. The assumption is that decision-makers would be reluctant to use nuclear weapons because of their great destructive power. Her case study was when U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson refused to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam in 1967 despite pressure from part of the Defense Department. Tannenwald (2023) later considered the use of small nuclear weapons, particularly by Russian President Vladimir Putin during the war in Ukraine in 2023, to be possible. Paradoxically, she simultaneously maintained the nuclear taboo.

A weakening of the nuclear taboo was noted by Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino (2017). Their poll showed that about 60 percent of Americans support the use of nuclear weapons against Iran if the government shows a threat from Iran to be credible, similar to that posed by Japan at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Americans would accept up to two million casualties. However, these numbers have not been borne out by other polls. The reason may be that Sagan and Valentino built into the question a maximum disaster scenario along the lines of a nuclear Pearl Harbor.

Further reading:

Morgan, Patrick M, Deterrence Now
Senghaas, Dieter. Abschreckung und Frieden
Senghaas, Dieter, On Perpetual Peace: A Timely Assessment
Senghaas, Dieter, Pioneer of Peace and Development Research
Snyder, Glenn H., Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security
Schelling Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict

Empire

The term empire was discussed anew in the first decade of the century in connection with the role of the United States. The discussion focused primarily on the similarities and differences with empires of the past.

An empire "is a multinational or multiethnic state that extends its influence through formal and informal control of other polities" (Cohen, 2004, 50). This definition places emphasis on the two characteristics of heterogeneity and dominance. An empire is ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous and it is hierarchical (>Hierarchy).

Empires are "relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective >sovereignty of other political societies" (Doyle, 1986, 19). This definition implies the coercive nature of political control. However, this can also be exercised not only through coercion, but also through the provision of benefits. There are also different gradations from more military to more administrative oriented political control. In addition, political control can also be exercised through >hegemony, which is usually not the same as empire.

An Empire "is the rule exercised by one nation over others both to regulate their external behavior and to ensure minimally acceptable forms of internal

behavior within the subordinate states" (Rosen, 2003, 51). This definition is quite ambiguous and leaves all interpretations open. The influence on foreign policy behavior is made clear, but what is a minimum of acceptable internal behavior? This can be understood as including direct or even indirect influence on internal structures (>Rules-based order).

The term empire is often used to distinguish the hegemonic position of the USA from classical >imperialism: "America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man's burden. ... The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known" (Ignatieff, 2003a).

On the question of whether the USA should be called an empire at all there are essentially two positions: 1) The U.S. is an empire, albeit a liberal one, in the sense of the British tradition, because imperial control creates order (Ferguson, 2004). After the inauguration of the George W. Bush administration (2001 to 2009), neoconservative intellectuals (>Neoconservatism) began to discuss at the beginning of the century whether the USA was not an empire after all. A British offspring, Niall Ferguson (2004), points to the global extent and great influence of the U.S. without equal in history and the present. The USA, however, lacks the self-confidence of an empire or a world power (>Unipolarity). He therefore speaks like Andrew J Bacevich (2002) of a certain self-denial ("Empire by denial") about what the U.S. is and what it aspires to be. 2) If a dominant >state (>Dominance) in a hierarchical system (>System, international) does not try to convert its position in uncontrolled influence, but to follow the rules of conduct of international >diplomacy and institutions (>Institutions, international, >Institutionalism) on the basis of reciprocity and negotiation, it is not an empire (Ikenberry, 2004). Furthermore, empires are incompatible with republics and >democracies (Hart, 2004).

One criterion for determining empires is territory. But there too there are contradictory interpretations. Herfried Münkler (2005) supports the thesis that empires by definition do not need a clearly defined territory and that all empires in history have had frayed edges (>Contiguity). Critics (Maier, 2006) argue that empires are states that have fixed borders (>Contiguity), but these borders are the result of conquest. The securing of these borders is the source of constantly recurring → violence at the border. Münkler even sees it as the beginning of the collapse of empires, in that the peripheries engage the imperial center in permanent struggles, constantly weakening it internally. If the empire (such as the decision of Emperor Augustus in the 1st century B.C. to limit the Roman empire at the Rhine) recognizes fixed borders, the empire renounces its universal claim.

A decision on whether the USA is an empire or not cannot be made with the criterion of territory, since both those who reject the criterion of fixed borders (Münkler, 2005) and those who recognize it (Maier, 2006) would like to see the USA as an empire. The U.S. has not conquered territory in the global sense, but

it has conquered its present territory by force from Spain and Mexico as well as from the natives, by purchase from France and Russia, and by convention with Great Britain. The argument that the criterion markets and global transactions would be tantamount to territorial possessions that are constantly renewed ignores that direct U.S. military interventions have had little to do with creating markets when one thinks of Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan and Iraq.

John Judis (2004) compares the period at the beginning of the 21st century to the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Whenever the United States embarked on imperial adventures, it failed. Presidents T. Roosevelt and W. Wilson ultimately had to realize that after the Spanish-American War in in 1898 in their occupation of the Philippines and in their attempt to bring about change of regime in Mexico at the beginning of the 20th century. The same would be true of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan later in the century.

A number of other factors point to the fact that the USA is not an empire in the classical sense. The fact that it has no colonies also means that it has little direct influence on domestic political structures in other countries, even where its foreign policy influence is great. They cannot control which governments in the Middle East, the Gulf, or even in Europe come to → power, even if they wanted to. This is why Robert Kaplan (2006), who is adamant about sticking to the term empire, speaks of an implicit rather than an explicit empire.. To save the term for the U.S., some authors spoke of an "empire of a special kind." This term became mixed with that of "American exceptionalism," as in Ignatieff's "Empire lite." By exceptionalism is meant the special position of the U.S. in the world, often not accurately distinguishing subjective self-assessment from objective power. Hawks tend to overestimate the objective power position and to believe above average in positive results or the controllability of their actions. (Kahneman/Renshon, 2006) To highlight the benevolent nature of American empire, the term "empire by invitation" has been rediscovered (Maier, 2006). Originally, the term was used in the context of the >Cold War to express the voluntary protective role of the U.S. over Western Europe against the Soviet Union (Lundestad, 1991[4]). This term is meant to highlight the contrast with conquest-imperialism. Although the U.S. does not carry out conquests in the classical imperial sense, its interventions do not always take place because of requests; it was not invited to Vietnam, not to Iraq, and not even to Germany and Japan after 1945. In addition to those who believe that the U.S. is an empire or is on its way to becoming one, there are also those who believe it is an empire in decline. This line of argument borrows from the → theory of >hegemonic cycles (>Hegemonic decline, >Imperial overstretch) (Todd, 2002; Johnson, 2000, 2007).

In historical comparison, the United States has little in common with classical imperial empires. In the Roman and Persian empires, the centers at least tried to determine the internal structures of the periphery through subjugation, even

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4 Geir Lundestad goes a step further by speaking of an American "empire by integration," thereby emphasizing the complementary development of the United States and Western Europe.

if this was the reason for repeated >rebellions. Athens can be seen in this sense only conditionally as an empire, because it had brutal punishment actions against disloyal states (e.g. Thasos and Melos), but it essentially pursued a policy of >balance of power towards Sparta.

The British Empire exercised colonial rule through long-term commitment. It invested in infrastructure and built up an administration in which it employed people who were prepared to spend most of their lives in the respective colonial empire and also learned the respective languages. This, however, also shaped the internal political system (>Levels of analysis) according to the ideas of the colonial power. The European imperial powers suppressed >resistance, which was directed against these from the outside imposed inner political structures partly with extreme use of force. The colonial powers remained in the colonies long after it had become clear that the costs of domination outweighed the profits from the colonies. The United States, on the other hand, shied away from long-term and costly engagements outside its territory. Nor are there any educated American administrators who would have wanted to spend their lives in, say, Vietnam or Iraq, like those Oxford or Cambridge graduates in India (Ferguson, 2004; Cox, 2006).

Paul Kennedy (2006) defines an empire as a country A "that has disproportionate influence on country B; country B is protected by country A and allows it to use air bases and ports on country B; country B is protected by country A and allows it to use air bases and ports; country B's main exports go to country A." For Paul Kennedy, by this definition, the U.S. is already an empire, because U.S. soldiers are stationed around the world, and have access rights to numerous ports and have established air bases in many countries. As the economically strongest country in the world, it is of course also an important importing country. If one applies these criteria, Western European countries would also be colonies of the United States. Kennedy also keeps the definition so general because this makes his thesis of the rise and fall of great powers (Kennedy, 1987) applicable to the empires of the past as well as to the USA.

Timothy Garton Ash (2023) envisions a future transformation Europe to a new form of liberal empire, which is a consummation of Europe's blend of historical empires into a functioning bloc with a supranational form of government and global ambitions. In this way, Europe could become a counterweight to the declining Russian empire and the rising Chinese empire.

In order to make a clear distinction between hegemony and empire a more precise definition of empire is necessary. The most important difference is that hegemonies are limiting influence over the external behavior of other states, whereas empires determine the internal political structures. Clearer definitions could therefore be:

An empire is a state that can determine both the external behavior and the internal political system of other states in the long term. Influencing the external behavior of other states can also be exerted by a state which holds a military and economic monopoly position. An empire on the other hand, must also influence

the internal structures of other states in order to achieve → security, acceptance, and stability (>Strategic stability), to bind the political elites to the empire and to and to collect taxes for the empire's expenditures. The empire determines the rules and principles of hierarchical behavior without being subject to them itself.

Further reading:

Ferguson, Niall, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire
Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
Münkler, Herfried, Empires: The Logic of World Domination

Intervention

Intervention is "the attempt by an external >actor, to influence a country's system of rule" (Czempiel, 1998, 149; Czempiel, 1992, 268–271). Somewhat more specifically, an intervention is an "attack on the >sovereignty of a >state in the form of interference in its internal affairs through the exertion of political pressure, the use of economic, military, or other means of → power to make it compliant" (Buchbender, 2000, 159).

This definition means exerting pressure and setting measures that may ultimately lead to the use of military means to interfere with the sovereignty of a state. In order to speak of a military intervention (→ Security), it must be intended (>Intention). It can therefore be defined as the intended use of military → force to force another government to perform or refrain from performing certain actions. Military interventions serve either to enforce one's own interests and goals by violent means or to prevent other parties from using violent means to achieve their interests and goals.

Sidita Kushi and Monica Duffy Toft discuss various definitions. On the one hand, they use the broad definition of the Congressional Research Service. Intervention includes all cases of "U.S. Armed Forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict, or other than normal peacetime purposes." On the other hand, narrower definitions exclude brief interferences or interventions involving small numbers of troops.

According to research by the authors, between 1950 and 2019, there were about 200 violent interventions by the U.S., including quite a few attempts to overthrow governments of other states including a number of >democracies. Threats (>Threat) and display of → violence, as well as covert operations (>Covert action), are not included. In the short phase of >unipolarity after 1990, there were 25 percent of the 400 U.S. military interventions since 1776 (Kushi and Toft, 2022).

A humanitarian intervention is a >coercive measure by states in another state, without its consent, to prevent serious and massive violations of human rights and international law. (>Genocide) Humanitarian intervention includes, in contrast to other humanitarian operations, missions to alleviate human suffering and to save

human life involving the use of force (→ Violence) and can be carried out with or without the authorization of the United Nations (according to DUPI).[5]

An intervention for humanitarian reasons in civil wars with military means can only rarely (in about 30 percent) of the cases put an end to the immediate hostilities (>Combat). A mix of political, economic, and military measures proves more successful (Regan, 2000). According to John Shattuck[6] (2004), four criteria must be present in order to canvass an intervention in a humanitarian >crisis: First, whether a >crime against humanity is present, second, whether the >conflict causes regional instability, third, whether the >conflict threatens to escalate into a larger conflict, and finally, fourth, whether there is a willingness to use a minimum of means (>Capability) to achieve the set goals. The definition leaves open the questions of who is authorized to make the decision to intervene, what are legitimate reasons for doing so, and at what point in time it should be done.

A new debate on humanitarian intervention began after NATO's military intervention in Kosovo in March 1999. That intervention was undertaken without a UN Security Council mandate, because approval was not obtained from permanent members Russia and China. Many international law experts considered this intervention therefore a violation of >international law. They emphasize that in the United Nations Charter[7] the Security Council has priority in the observance of human rights in connection with the "maintenance of peace and security." The debate is therefore centered on the question of whether the prevention of massive human rights violations could take precedence over traditional international law. Some observers spoke of a "new international law", some about the reform of the United Nations Security Council.

In this context, a distinction is also made between legal and legitimate intervention (>Legitimacy), to indicate that an intervention may be legitimate, even if there is no authorization by an >international organization (primarily by the United Nations Security Council) granted. If a group of states or a state acts without a mandate from the Security Council, however, the question arises as to the competent authority (autoritas potestas) that judges such an intervention to be as legitimate and just. For the assessment of a just → war, the competent authority is in addition to the just cause (causa justa), the bona fide intention (intentio recta), the last resort (ultima ratio), and proportionality (proportionalitas) a decisive criterion. The question arises, who can be this authority if not the Security Council? If everyone can decide, then they do so according to their own discretion and interests.

A Canadian initiative set up a commission which, at the beginning of 2002, submitted its report to the United Nations its report on "Humanitarian Interven-

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tion and State Sovereignty in the Twenty-First Century."[8] The report took as its starting point the criteria of just war. Its central assertion is that the right to intervene is is to be replaced by the responsibility to protect (>Responsibility to Protect - R2P). This includes prevention (>Conflict prevention), military action and reconstruction (>Peacebuilding). The primary authority is the UN Security Council; in the event of failure of a proposal in the Security Council, alternatives include the UN General Assembly (Uniting for Peace procedure) and regional arrangements under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Only if the Security Council is unable or unwilling to act in the event of "conscience-shocking situations" can states act independently to respond appropriately and in a timely manner to the gravity of the situation. Such situations would arise if there were mass casualties or ethnic cleansing. But, according to the report, that would damage the credibility of the Security Council. The report does, however, leave it open to the regional organizations of the United Nations to the possibility to judge in which situations to act and when, if the Security Council is incapable of doing so.

The concept of R2P operates at the intersection of the UN Charter's prohibition of intervention and the protection of human rights and civilians by the international community. This tension between the maintenance of the sovereignty of individual states and the emphasis on universal values has always been present in modern international relations. Even the CSCE[9] Helsinki Final Act of 1975 had recognized the post-war territorial order and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, but at the same time, formulated a set of values on human rights and fundamental freedoms that had great explosive power.

The following definition says nothing about legitimate authority and leaves the decision about whether an intervention is just or fair, to outside states: Humanitarian intervention is "the injection of military power - or the threat of such action - by one or more outside states into the affairs of another state that has at its purpose (or at least as one of its principal purposes) the relieving of grave human suffering" (Garret, 1999, 3).

This definition could be applied to the Indian intervention in Pakistan in 1971, the intervention Tanzania in Uganda in 1979, and the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 1979. These interventions were only secondarily concerned with the protection of human rights of human rights; the primary goal was to prevent refugee flows. The definition also says nothing about the success of the >mission. Non-partisan peace missions, as in the Balkans in the 1990s, are not covered by this definition (>Civil-military cooperation; >Peace enforcement; >Peace implementation; >Peacekeeping, >Extended and classical; >Peacemaking; >Peace support operation).

Interventions without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council are subject to the prohibition of intervention in the Charter of the United Nations.

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8 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility To Protect, December 2001.
9 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) gave rise to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995.

Article 2.7. prohibits "intervention in matters which, by their nature, belong within the internal competence of a State." The application of >coercive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter is not affected.

A humanitarian intervention is to be distinguished from >humanitarian missions in general. Humanitarian missions are carried out to relieve or reduce the impact of disasters caused by man or nature. In this general form, humanitarian missions are supported by the international community (>Community, international). They are carried out by many >international organizations (UN, EU, NATO, OSCE). A military component is possible but not necessary.

Further reading:

Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, Governance and Democratization

Fenkart, Stephanie/Gärtner, Heinz/Swoboda, Hannes, (ed.), Gerechte Intervention? (Just Intervention?)

ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect

Orford, Anne, Reading Humanitarian Intervention

Neutrality

Neutrality means non-participation of the >state in a → war or armed conflict (>Conflict, armed) between states or recognized parties in a civil war as well as the non-membership of a state in a military >alliance; it includes the prohibition for a neutral state to place its territory at the disposal of foreign troops for stationing or for carrying out acts of war. In particular, the permanently neutral state may not enter into military alliances (also not with other permanently neutral states) or, as a matter of principle, enter into any agreements on >collective defense or collective → security with >defense obligations (cf. Neuhold/Hummer/Schreuer, 1991, 477).

Neutrality has never been a necessary condition for → peace, but it has historically avoided one of the possible causes of war, namely participation in military alliances ready for war. Liberal thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson saw the existence of military alliances as a threat to peace and a potential precursor to war. Theorists of >realism on the one hand tend to regard alliances as part of the >balance of powers to maintain peace. Liberals (>Liberalism), on the other hand, have always pointed to the danger of escalation of the polarity of military alliances.

Neutrality enables a state to remain neutral at the moment when a war between other states does not take sides and does not intervene militarily. In this way, it prevents that a small war turns into a conflagration - as in the Balkans in 1914, and it prevents what Pascal Lottaz (2022) calls "joining the wrong side."

Narrow definitions within international laws see neutrality merely as the "impartiality between belligerents" (Oppenheim, 1912, Vol. I, para. 293. cf. also Lottaz, 1922a). This traditional definition sees neutrality as merely the non-participation in wars or in a particular war. This occasional neutrality is therefore the (legal)

status of a state between third states, where the state takes an impartial attitude towards the belligerent (→ War) parties. If joining military alliances is not included in the definition, in peacetime all states are neutral. One goal of this type of neutrality is to reduce the uncertainty about the behavior of a state over a longer period of time or if required. Since the beginning of the >Cold War the emphasis of the definition of neutrality shifted from the view of neutrality as non-participation in foreign wars and military conflicts to the non-participation in military alliances. The member states of an alliance pledge, individually and collectively, not to allow members, if they are threatened by states outside the alliance threatened or attacked by states outside the alliance, to come to their aid, including by military means. It is precisely the provisions on nonparticipation in a military alliance that prohibit a neutral state from membership in NATO, since its founding treaty contains an explicit obligation to provide assistance (Article V). Just as neutrality means non-alignment, non-alignment means the renunciation of alliance membership. Neutral states take an uncompromising position between rival alliances which do not necessarily have to be involved in open hostilities but have a conflict- and tension-laden relationship to each other. Neutrality seeks to avoid involvement in wars of alliances ("entrapment"), but risks being left alone in an emergency ("abandonment"). The → power of the neutral states thus also consists in not having to submit to instructions from alliances.

In order to avoid "abandonment", a neutral state must meet two conditions. The status of neutrality must first be credible and predictable. Second, the neutral state must be useful. Credibility means that a neutral state can must communicate its neutrality unambiguously even in peacetime. In order to demonstrate usefulness, a neutral state may fulfill the function of a buffer state or offer good offices in a liberal sense and act as a mediator in the broadest sense.

Often neutrality is described as a child of the Cold War. This assumption is neither historically nor politically correct.[10] Neutrality has its historical roots in the Thirty Years' War, in the Napoleonic Wars and even partly in the 16th century (Battle of Marignano in in 1515). The Swedish neutrality policy dates back to the 19th century. The beginning of the neutral status of Finland and Austria falls in the time of the Cold War, which was not constitutive for their neutrality. It eluded the formation of the bloc. Finland concluded a so-called friendship and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in 1948. It was intended to avoid unforeseen conflicts with Moscow through a variety of contacts with Moscow. Some opponents of neutrality sometimes pejoratively referred to the cooperation agreement as Finlandization, which was meant to express a dependence of Finland on the Soviet Union. In fact, the emphasis on neutrality after 1955 was a means for Finland to gain more leeway within the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. After the Prague Spring of 1968, the Soviet Union deleted the term neutrality from all bilateral treaties. from all bilateral treaties because it was afraid of setting an example (Rainio-Niemi, 2017, 21–25).

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[10] Grimm's dictionary of 1889 defines neutrality as follows: "neutrality means such a performance that between two warring parties the third behaves in such a way that he lives at peace with both and does not accede to either before the other, nor does he concede any favor or advantage.

Austria's Neutrality Law of 1955 guaranteed Austria's independence and brought about the withdrawal of all occupation troops of the victorious powers.[11] The legal origin of Swiss and Austrian neutrality lies in the Hague Conventions V and XIII of 1907, which explicitly contain another point: non-participation in war. At the outbreak of war non-participating states should be able to declare themselves neutral - from which a right to territorial integrity is derived, because "the territory of the neutral powers is inviolable."

From a political point of view, neutrality was not part of the Cold War, but its anomaly. The Cold War was characterized in Europe by the formation of blocs, and neutrality was the exception. The formation of blocs was connected with the affiliation to an alliance, neutrality meant freedom from alliances. The idea of neutrality, of not participating in future confrontations in a divided Europe, found great support among the population of those states.

During the early years of the Cold War bloc formation the >superpowers (>Great powers) showed strong reservations about the principle of neutrality. Despite these initial reservations about neutrality the two superpowers became in the course of the Cold War more flexible towards their understanding of neutrality. Eventually, both were looking for pragmatic case-by-case solutions within the framework of bipolarity. Therefore, they were also interested in not losing the opportunity to cooperate with any of the established or emerging neutral states. This eventually gave rise to two different interpretations of neutrality: one of the West and one of the East. These were based on informal checklists that defined what a "genuine" neutral state characterized. Key points on the U.S. list were that a neutral state should be armed, democratic, and free-market oriented. The advantages of neutrality from the Soviet point of view consisted in the central requirement that neutral states spend less on defense and should spend more on social concerns (See Rainio-Niemi, 2017). Credibility is also underscored by the fact that the neutral state is armed. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, for example, agreed to Austrian neutrality only on the condition that it be defended by Austria "with all means at its disposal," i.e., also armed (Gärtner 2017a, 155–161).

The neutrals were able to contribute to conflict mitigation by offering good offices, mediation, but also peacekeeping troops (>Peacekeeping). Within the framework of the CSCE process the so-called N+N states formed a loose a loose association of neutral and non-aligned states countries that did not belong to any of the two alliances: NATO or the Warsaw Pact. They then also took on a mediating and bridging function between the blocs. Neutrality was also explicitly included as an option in the chapter on the principles of intergovernmental relations of CSCE members. Participating States "also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including the right to be or not to be a party to an alliance or not to be a party to an alliance; likewise, they have the right to neutrality."

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11 Agreement Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in the Event of a Land War, concluded at The Hague, October 18, 1907.

Not belonging to one of the blocs during the >East-West conflict had a realistic as well as an idealistic dimension. It was realistic in that it wanted to preserve its political independence in a bipolar environment. Moreover, Switzerland and Austria, together or separately, formed a neutral bar between the two blocs. Sweden, as a non-NATO member, maintained the Nordic balance. The neutral states acted idealistically, because they wanted to reduce tensions between the two blocs by acting as mediators and offering good offices. For this purpose, the neutral and non-aligned states found an excellent framework in the CSCE. The neutral states rejected violent conflict resolution and pledged not to participate in them unless they themselves were the target of a violent attack. They actively participated in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations.

With both the realistic and idealistic dimensions, the neutral states moved outside the → security dilemma and also tried to reduce it. They acted as >buffer zones which, however, could have only limited effect in view of the highly armed military alliances. Through their mediation activities (>mediation; >third party), they tried to establish more trust between the blocs and thus to reduce the security dilemma. Their existence in itself permanently signaled the possibility that an order in Europe was also conceivable without blocs. It was precisely this visible alternative that was not always pleasant for the leading states of the alliances, since they wanted to and had to present membership in their own bloc as the best option.

After the Austrian Neutrality Law[12] in Article I, Paragraph (1) has made a commitment to neutrality it defines neutrality in paragraph (2):
"(1) For the purpose of permanently asserting its independence vis-à-vis the outside world and for the purpose of maintaining the inviolability of its territory, Austria declares of its own free will its perpetual neutrality. Austria will maintain and defend this neutrality with all means at her disposal.
(2) In order to safeguard these purposes, Austria will not in the future enter into any military alliances and will not permit the establishment of military bases of foreign states on its territory."

The Neutrality Law thus contains the prohibition of joining a military alliance and forbids the permanent stationing of foreign troops on Austrian territory. It is precisely paragraph two on non-participation in a military alliance that prohibits neutral states from membership in NATO, since its founding treaty contains an explicit defense >obligation. Likewise, the European Union (EU) would turn into a military alliance if it demanded obligatory military assistance from its members, which would no longer be compatible with neutrality. The Lisbon Treaty of the European Union[13] does oblige member states to provide a member state with "all the assistance and support in their power in the event of an armed attack on it." It does not affect "the specific character of the security and defense policy" of individual member states, however (Article 42/7).

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12 Austrian Neutrality Act, Federal Constitutional Act on the Neutrality of Austria, 26 Oct. 1955 (BGBL 1955/211).
13 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 2007.

Neutrality has a traditional and a modern face. A traditional understanding of neutrality of staying out or sitting still no longer meets modern challenges of security and peace. Was the deliberate keeping out of conflicts between the pacts by neutral states during the Cold War was often a successful policy during the Cold War, it seems downright anachronistic in the 21st century. Critics rightly point this out. But they are only hitting at the backward-looking traditional interpretation of neutrality. Traditional notions of neutrality advocated not only equidistance between the blocs, but occasionally neutrality in economic matters as well, and they even emphasized an incompatibility of neutrality with membership and cooperation in the United Nations. Modern neutrality has long since emancipated itself from such positions.

A modern understanding of committed neutrality must not, of course, mean sitting still in the sense of passively staying out of the conflicts of the present conflicts, but it also means maintaining relations with all parties of the conflict. This is all the more true, because this behavior could not prevent adverse security consequences for the neutral state, which could even be intensified by "sitting still." Neutrality, if it is to continue to have meaning and generate peace and security policy benefits, must orient itself to the new peace and security policy requirements and thereby prove its political appropriateness and flexibility. Having said this, the concept of neutrality has indeed already undergone a tremendous process of change in recent years.

Engaged neutrality does not mean staying out where possible and interfering where necessary, but the other way around: interfering where possible and staying out only where necessary (Gärtner, 2016, 2017ab). "Engaged neutrality means active participation in international security policy in general and in international peace operations in particular."[14] Neutrality in this understanding, requires engaged participation in international crisis management and in cooperative security. In this way, engaged neutrality distinguishes itself from an understanding that confuses neutrality with doing nothing and staying out of it.

Neither neutrality defined in terms of international law nor neutrality defined in terms of security policy means an impartial position between democracy and dictatorship, and dictatorship between the rule of law and arbitrariness, between the observance of human rights and their violation, and between right and wrong.

For opponents of neutrality, however, this attitude is too little. It is only "for us or against us." Therefore, the phase of >unipolarity of the USA after 1990 until about 2010 was difficult for neutral states. In a hegemonic unipolar system (>Hegemony) there is little room for neutrality. Thucydides already observed in the description of the Melian dialogue during the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta that the attitude of the Melians "friend with you, but enemy with no one" was too little for the Athenians. They destroyed Melos.

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14   Summary: "Austrian Security Strategy: Security in a New Decade - Shaping Security," 2011.

From the idea of neutrality developed into different types:

- **Neutrality in political-historical tradition** is a very strong version of neutrality, but it is not based on international law. Sweden's neutrality originated in 1814, but Sweden was not sovereign prior to its separation from Norway in 1905. The Soviet Union accepted Finnish neutrality after 1955 because it had negotiated a 1948 friendship treaty with Finland.

- **Permanent neutrality** mostly based on >international law. It is the strongest version of neutrality. The neutrality of Switzerland has a long tradition and was established with the recognition by the victorious powers after the Napoleonic Wars 1815 under international law. Austria's neutrality is based on the Neutrality Law of 1955. Austria has declared its neutrality to vis-à-vis the United Nations and all states with which Austria has had diplomatic relations. On top of that, Austria's neutrality is constitutional law. Permanently neutral states must prove their credibility and usefulness even in peacetime. Turkmenistan's neutrality was confirmed by the UN General Assembly in 1995.

- In contrast to permanent neutrality, **occasional neutrality** applies only in military conflicts. This type of neutrality is for other states not reliable and predictable. Therefore, neutrality in peacetime is a condition for reliable neutrality. One also speaks of the pre-effect of neutrality. This includes a declaration that the neutral state will not be a party to war in the future.

- There are forms of **neutrality based on bilateral treaties**. In 1980, for example, Malta and Italy signed a bilateral neutrality treaty that has permitted the presence of Italian troops since 1983. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1938 paved the way for Irish neutrality after the civil wars.

- **Self-declared neutrality** is weak because it is based on a national constitutional or parliamentary decision. This can be changed again domestically, as happened in Ukraine in 2014. The neutrality of Moldova and Serbia also fall into this category.

- **Integral Neutrality** is the most comprehensive version of neutrality. It includes not only the military, but also the economic and ideological dimensions. In Switzerland, this is called "sitting still." This passive neutrality has never prevailed in its ideal form.

- The interpretation and implementation of neutrality of Turkmenistan as **positive neutrality** comes close to integral neutrality. Turkmenistan was also supported by a UN General Assembly resolution in 1995; it is a member of loose organizations such as ECO, OIS, CIS. Ireland also occasionally refers to its neutrality as "positive."

- To hide in case of war (**>Hiding**), is the most common form of neutrality. It is similar to the occasional neutrality (>Free-riding).

- **Hedging** is a policy of protecting vital interests in order to gain more independence from the influence of large and major powers (>Small states).

- **Differential neutrality** is in contrast to integral neutrality selective, with the exception of e.g. economics, values, or war in the neighborhood. Even participation in the imposition of sanctions can be optional.