



Winfried Schneider-Deters

## UKRAINE'S FATEFUL YEARS 2013–2019

*Vol. I: The Popular Uprising in Winter 2013/2014*

*ibidem*

**General Editor:** Andreas Umland,  
Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, [andreas.umland@ui.se](mailto:andreas.umland@ui.se)

**Commissioning Editor:** Max Jakob Horstmann,  
London, [mjh@ibidem.eu](mailto:mjh@ibidem.eu)

## EDITORIAL COMMITTEE\*

### DOMESTIC & COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Prof. **Ellen Bos**, *Andrássy University of Budapest*  
Dr. **Gergana Dimova**, *University of Winchester*  
Dr. **Andrey Kazantsev**, *MGIMO (U) MID RF, Moscow*  
Prof. **Heiko Pleines**, *University of Bremen*  
Prof. **Richard Sakwa**, *University of Kent at Canterbury*  
Dr. **Sarah Whitmore**, *Oxford Brookes University*  
Dr. **Harald Wydra**, *University of Cambridge*

### SOCIETY, CLASS & ETHNICITY

Col. **David Glantz**, *"Journal of Slavic Military Studies"*  
Dr. **Marlène Laruelle**, *George Washington University*  
Dr. **Stephen Shulman**, *Southern Illinois University*  
Prof. **Stefan Troebst**, *University of Leipzig*  
POLITICAL ECONOMY & PUBLIC POLICY  
Dr. **Andreas Goldthau**, *Central European University*  
Dr. **Robert Kravchuk**, *University of North Carolina*  
Dr. **David Lane**, *University of Cambridge*  
Dr. **Carol Leonard**, *Higher School of Economics, Moscow*  
Dr. **Maria Popova**, *McGill University, Montreal*

### FOREIGN POLICY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Dr. **Peter Duncan**, *University College London*  
Prof. **Andreas Heinemann-Grüder**, *University of Bonn*  
Prof. **Gerhard Mangott**, *University of Innsbruck*  
Dr. **Diana Schmidt-Pfister**, *University of Konstanz*  
Dr. **Lisbeth Tarlow**, *Harvard University, Cambridge*  
Dr. **Christian Wipperfürth**, *N-Ost Network, Berlin*  
Dr. **William Zimmerman**, *University of Michigan*  
HISTORY, CULTURE & THOUGHT  
Dr. **Catherine Andreyev**, *University of Oxford*  
Prof. **Mark Bassin**, *Södertörn University*  
Prof. **Karsten Brüggemann**, *Tallinn University*  
Dr. **Alexander Etkind**, *University of Cambridge*  
Dr. **Gasan Guseynov**, *Moscow State University*  
Prof. **Leonid Luks**, *Catholic University of Eichstaett*  
Dr. **Olga Malinova**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*  
Dr. **Richard Mole**, *University College London*  
Prof. **Andrei Rogatchevski**, *University of Tromsø*  
Dr. **Mark Tauger**, *West Virginia University*

## ADVISORY BOARD\*

Prof. **Dominique Arel**, *University of Ottawa*  
Prof. **Jörg Baberowski**, *Humboldt University of Berlin*  
Prof. **Margarita Balmaceda**, *Seton Hall University*  
Dr. **John Barber**, *University of Cambridge*  
Prof. **Timm Beichelt**, *European University Viadrina*  
Dr. **Katrin Boeckh**, *University of Munich*  
Prof. em. **Archie Brown**, *University of Oxford*  
Dr. **Vyacheslav Bryukhovetsky**, *Kyiv-Mohyla Academy*  
Prof. **Timothy Colton**, *Harvard University, Cambridge*  
Prof. **Paul D'Anieri**, *University of Florida*  
Dr. **Heike Dörrenbächer**, *Friedrich Naumann Foundation*  
Dr. **John Dunlop**, *Hoover Institution, Stanford, California*  
Dr. **Sabine Fischer**, *SWP, Berlin*  
Dr. **Geir Flikke**, *NUPI, Oslo*  
Prof. **David Galbreath**, *University of Aberdeen*  
Prof. **Alexander Galkin**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*  
Prof. **Frank Golczewski**, *University of Hamburg*  
Dr. **Nikolas Gvosdev**, *Naval War College, Newport, RI*  
Prof. **Mark von Hagen**, *Arizona State University*  
Dr. **Guido Hausmann**, *University of Munich*  
Prof. **Dale Herspring**, *Kansas State University*  
Dr. **Stefani Hoffman**, *Hebrew University of Jerusalem*  
Prof. **Mikhail Ilyin**, *MGIMO (U) MID RF, Moscow*  
Prof. **Vladimir Kantor**, *Higher School of Economics*  
Dr. **Ivan Katchanovski**, *University of Ottawa*  
Prof. em. **Andrzej Korbonski**, *University of California*  
Dr. **Iris Kempe**, *"Caucasus Analytical Digest"*  
Prof. **Herbert Küpper**, *Institut für Ostrecht Regensburg*  
Dr. **Rainer Lindner**, *CEEER, Berlin*  
Dr. **Vladimir Malakhov**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*

Dr. **Luke March**, *University of Edinburgh*  
Prof. **Michael McFaul**, *Stanford University, Palo Alto*  
Prof. **Birgit Menzel**, *University of Mainz-Germersheim*  
Prof. **Valery Mikhailenko**, *The Urals State University*  
Prof. **Emil Pain**, *Higher School of Economics, Moscow*  
Dr. **Oleg Podvintsev**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*  
Prof. **Olga Popova**, *St. Petersburg State University*  
Dr. **Alex Pravda**, *University of Oxford*  
Dr. **Erik van Ree**, *University of Amsterdam*  
Dr. **Joachim Rogall**, *Robert Bosch Foundation Stuttgart*  
Prof. **Peter Rutland**, *Wesleyan University, Middletown*  
Prof. **Marat Salikov**, *The Urals State Law Academy*  
Dr. **Gwendolyn Sasse**, *University of Oxford*  
Prof. **Jutta Scherrer**, *EHESS, Paris*  
Prof. **Robert Service**, *University of Oxford*  
Mr. **James Sherr**, *RIIA Chatham House London*  
Dr. **Oxana Shevel**, *Tufts University, Medford*  
Prof. **Eberhard Schneider**, *University of Siegen*  
Prof. **Olexander Shnyrkov**, *Shevchenko University, Kyiv*  
Prof. **Hans-Henning Schröder**, *SWP, Berlin*  
Prof. **Yuri Shapoval**, *Ukrainian Academy of Sciences*  
Prof. **Viktor Shnirelman**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*  
Dr. **Lisa Sundstrom**, *University of British Columbia*  
Dr. **Philip Walters**, *"Religion, State and Society"*, *Oxford*  
Prof. **Zenon Wasyliv**, *Ithaca College, New York State*  
Dr. **Lucan Way**, *University of Toronto*  
Dr. **Markus Wehner**, *"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung"*  
Dr. **Andrew Wilson**, *University College London*  
Prof. **Jan Zielonka**, *University of Oxford*  
Prof. **Andrei Zorin**, *University of Oxford*

\* While the Editorial Committee and Advisory Board support the General Editor in the choice and improvement of manuscripts for publication, responsibility for remaining errors and misinterpretations in the series' volumes lies with the books' authors.

# Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (SPPS)

ISSN 1614-3515

<p>Founded in 2004 and refereed since 2007, SPPS makes available affordable English-, German-, and Russian-language studies on the history of the countries of the former Soviet bloc from the late Tsarist period to today. It publishes between 5 and 20 volumes per year and focuses on issues in transitions to and from democracy such as economic crisis, identity formation, civil society development, and constitutional reform in CEE and the NIS. SPPS also aims to highlight so far understudied themes in East European studies such as right-wing radicalism, religious life, higher education, or human rights protection. The authors and titles of all previously published volumes are listed at the end of this book. For a full description of the series and reviews of its books, see <a href="http://www.ibidem-verlag.de/red/spps">www.ibidem-verlag.de/red/spps</a>.</p> <p><b>Editorial correspondence &amp; manuscripts</b> should be sent to: Dr. Andreas Umland, Department of Political Science, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, vul. Voloska 8/5, UA-04070 Kyiv, UKRAINE; <a href="mailto:andreas.umland@cantab.net">andreas.umland@cantab.net</a></p> <p><b>Business correspondence &amp; review copy requests</b> should be sent to: <i>ibidem</i> Press, Leuschnerstr. 40, 30457 Hannover, Germany; tel.: +49 511 2622200; fax: +49 511 2622201; <a href="mailto:spps@ibidem.eu">spps@ibidem.eu</a>.</p> <p><b>Authors, reviewers, referees, and editors</b> for (as well as all other persons sympathetic to) SPPS are invited to join its networks at <a href="https://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=52638198614">www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=52638198614</a>  <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/groups?about=&amp;gid=103012">www.linkedin.com/groups?about=&amp;gid=103012</a>  <a href="https://www.xing.com/net/spps-ibidem-verlag/">www.xing.com/net/spps-ibidem-verlag/</a></p>	<p><b>Recent Volumes</b></p> <p>245 <i>Oleksandra Keudel</i> How Patronal Networks Shape Opportunities for Local Citizen Participation in a Hybrid Regime A Comparative Analysis of Five Cities in Ukraine With a foreword by Sabine Kropp ISBN 978-3-8382-1671-3</p> <p>246 <i>Jan Claas Behrends, Thomas Lindenberger, Pavel Kolar (Eds.)</i> Violence after Stalin Institutions, Practices, and Everyday Life in the Soviet Bloc 1953–1989 ISBN 978-3-8382-1637-9</p> <p>247 <i>Leonid Luks</i> Macht und Ohnmacht der Utopien Essays zur Geschichte Russlands im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert ISBN 978-3-8382-1677-5</p> <p>248 <i>Iuliia Barshadska</i> Brüssel zwischen Kyjiw und Moskau Das auswärtige Handeln der Europäischen Union im ukrainisch-russischen Konflikt 2014-2019 Mit einem Vorwort von Olaf Leïße ISBN 978-3-8382-1667-6</p> <p>249 <i>Valentyna Romanova</i> Decentralisation and Multilevel Elections in Ukraine Reform Dynamics and Party Politics in 2010–2021 With a foreword by Kimitaka Matsuzato ISBN 978-3-8382-1700-0</p> <p>250 <i>Alexander Motyl</i> National Questions Theoretical Reflections on Nations and Nationalism in Eastern Europe ISBN 978-3-8382-1675-1</p> <p>251 <i>Marc Dietrich</i> A Cosmopolitan Model for Peacebuilding The Ukrainian Cases of Crimea and the Donbas ISBN 978-3-8382-1687-4</p> <p>252 <i>Eduard Baidaus</i> An Unsettled Nation State-Building, Identity, and Separatism in Post-Soviet Moldova With forewords by John-Paul Himka and David R. Marples ISBN 978-3-8382-1582-2</p> <p>253 <i>Igor Okunev, Petr Oskolkov (Eds.)</i> Transforming the Administrative Matryoshka The Reform of Autonomous Okrugs in the Russian Federation, 2003–2008 With a foreword by Vladimir Zorin ISBN 978-3-8382-1721-5</p>
--	--

Winfried Schneider-Deters

UKRAINE'S FATEFUL YEARS  
2013–2019

Volume I

The Popular Uprising in Winter 2013/2014

*ibidem*  
Verlag 

## **Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek**

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

Cover-picture: ID 87825923 © Panaramka | Dreamstime.com

ISBN-13: 978-3-8382-7725-7

© *ibidem*-Verlag, Stuttgart 2022

Alle Rechte vorbehalten

Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und elektronische Speicherformen sowie die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronical, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

# Content

Preface to the English Edition: Ukraine's War of Independence .....	15
Foreword.....	53
Outline of the Content.....	53
Notes on Transliteration .....	60
List of Abbreviations .....	65
Sources .....	69
Bibliography .....	71
Author Information.....	82
 <b>I Brussels and Moscow Integration Competition over Ukraine</b>	
I.1 Outbreak of Latent Integration Competition.....	83
I.2 The "Strategic Choice" of Ukraine between European and Eurasian Integration.....	87
I.2.1 The Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine .....	87
I.2.2 Ukraine Facing an Existential Choice .....	88
I.3 "Füle's List": Brussels' Conditions for Its Signature under the Association Agreement.....	90
I.4 The "Eurasian Card" in the Game of Association Poker between Brussels and Kyiv A Bluff?.....	96
I.5 "Double Membership": The "3 plus 1" Formula .....	99
I.6 The 16th EU-Ukraine Summit Diplomatic Détente between Brussels and Kyiv .....	102
I.6.1 "Political Association and Economic Integration": The New Formula.....	102
I.7 Threats and Enticements: Moscow's Pressure on Kyiv.....	110
I.7.1 Russian "Concerns" .....	110
I.7.2 Import Barriers: A Counterproductive Bargaining Chip ..	113
I.7.3 The European Union's "Strong Message" .....	118
I.7.4 The Ominous "Complex of Measures" .....	119
I.7.5 The Communist Party: Moscow's "Fifth Column" in Ukraine.....	123

I.7.6	“We Are One People”: Putin’s Ethnic-Nationalist (“Völkisch”) Postulate.....	124
I.8	The “European Week” in Kyiv: President Yanukovych’s “Historic Decision for Europe” .....	127
I.9	The Ukrainian Dilemma of the European Union.....	131
I.9.1	“To Sign or Not to Sign...”: The European Union Facing a Historic Decision.....	131
I.9.2	Smouldering Dissent between the National Governments of the European Union.....	133
I.10	The Tymoshenko Problem: “Last Obstacle” on the Way to “Vilnius” .....	136
I.11	The Monitoring Mission of the European Parliament: A “Mission Impossible” .....	158
I.12	The Final Phase before “Vilnius” .....	163
I.12.1	The European Parliament: The Resolution of October 23, 2013 .....	163
I.12.2	The Final Performance in the Ukrainian Parliament Directed by the Presidential Administration .....	164
I.13	The Vilnius Debacle: The Failed “Historic Summit” of the “Eastern Partnership” .....	170
I.13.1	Termination of the Association Process by Ukraine .....	170
I.14	The “Open Door” of the European Union .....	179
I.14.1	The European Union: A Good Face for a Bad Game .....	179
I.14.2	Continuation of the “Dialogue” between Brussels and Kyiv “for the Sake of the Ukrainian people” .....	180
I.15	Reasons for Yanukovych’s Change of Mind.....	183
I.15.1	The Official Justification .....	183
I.15.2	President Yanukovych’s Signature: A Question of Money? .....	184
I.15.3	Yanukovych’s “European Integration Course”: A Deception? .....	190
I.16	Reactions to the Vilnius Failure.....	192
I.16.1	The “Party of Regions” Need for Justification instead of Mood of Victory .....	192
I.16.2	The Powerlessness of the Opposition: Demand for the Resignation of the Government .....	195
I.16.3	The European Union: Unconcealed Disappointment.....	197
I.16.4	Russia Concealed Satisfaction.....	199

I.17	In Retrospect: What Should Have Been Done.....	202
I.17.1	The European Union: Strategic Myopia .....	202
I.17.2	The European Union's Share of the Blame.....	203
I.17.3	Brussels Late Insight.....	205
I.17.4	Withheld Accession Perspective.....	208
I.17.5	"Arrangement" with Russia's Eurasian Integration Project.....	210
I.18	The "Trilateral Consultation Process": Renegotiations with Russia .....	213
I.18.1	Tripartite Consultations.....	213
I.18.2	Tripartite Negotiations on a Bilateral Agreement: The "Russian List" .....	214
I.18.3	The Search for "Practical Solutions" to Dispel Russian "Concerns" .....	217
I.18.4	Cancellation of the CIS Free Trade Agreement by Ukraine.....	222
I.19	After the Victory of the "Maidan": Signing and Ratification of the Association Agreement .....	225
I.19.1	Signing of the Political Part: Postponement of the Application of the Economic Part.....	225
I.19.2	Four Years after "Vilnius": The Association Agreement EU-Ukraine in Force.....	226
I.20	EU-Associated Ukraine: Dream and Reality .....	229
I.20.1	The Crisis in the Relations between the EU and Ukraine .....	229
I.20.2	Implementation of the Association Agreement.....	236

## **II "Maidan": The Popular Uprising against the Kleptocratic Regime of President Yanukovych**

II.1	Yanukovych's Change of Course: The "Murder of a Dream" .....	241
II.1.1	Yanukovych's "Biggest Mistake" .....	241
II.1.2	The "Euro-Maidan": A Protest Movement of the Academic Youth.....	242
II.1.3	The First "Viche": A Spontaneous Gathering of Citizens of Kyiv .....	243
II.1.4	The Unification of the Parliamentary and Extra- Parliamentary Opposition .....	245
II.1.5	The Day "After Vilnius": Crackdown on the Protest .....	248
II.1.6	The "Storming" of the Presidential Administration: Staged by Yanukovych's Regime?.....	254



II.1.7	The “March of Millions”: Occupation of Public Buildings in Kyiv .....	259
II.2	From Protest to Revolt: From the “Euro-Maidan” to “The Maidan” .....	264
II.2.1	People’s Anger: The “Nationalization” of the “Maidan” ..	264
II.2.2	The Failed “Storming” of the “Maidan”: Protest Camp by the “Berkut” Riot Police on December 11 .....	268
II.3	Solidarity of the “West” with the “Euro-Maidan” .....	270
II.3.1	The Diplomatic “Concerns” of the Europeans .....	270
II.3.2	“Visit of a European to Europeans”: The German Foreign Minister Westerwelle on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti.....	271
II.3.3	Sanctions: The Dilemma of the European Union .....	273
II.3.4	Disappointment with “Europe” .....	284
II.3.5	The European Council: The Ukraine Resolution of its Parliamentary Assembly of January 30, 2014 .....	285
II.3.6	“America Is with You!” .....	287
II.4	The “Euro-Maidan” from the Kremlin’s Point of View: A “Pogrom” .....	293
II.4.1	Moscow’s Visible Hand .....	293
II.4.2	The Statement by International Experts on Eastern Europe about the “Kyiv Euro-Maidan” .....	296
II.4.3	The “Maidan”: Not an Anti-Russian Movement.....	298
II.4.4	The “Maidan”: Not a Ukrainian “East-West Conflict” .....	299
II.5	The Attempt at a Violent Solution on December 11, 2013 .....	301
II.5.1	The “Kravchuk Table” .....	301
II.5.2	The Nocturnal Storming of the “Maidan” Protest Camp..	302
II.5.3	The “People’s Association Maidan”: The Civil Organization of the Popular Uprising .....	305
II.6	The “Emergency Legislation” of January 16, 2014.....	309
II.6.1	“Legalization of the Dictatorship” .....	309
II.6.2	Foreign Reaction to the Adoption of the “Laws of January 16” .....	313
II.7	The “January 19” 2014 Outburst of Violence.....	315
II.7.1	The “Peaceful Maidan” .....	315
II.7.2	The Eighth “People’s Assembly” on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti: Call for a “Leader of the Resistance” .....	315
II.7.3	The Street Battle in the Lower Hrushevskii Street .....	319
II.7.4	The First Fatalities.....	322

II.8	Sham Negotiations .....	325
II.8.1	President Yanukovich's Call for Dialogue: The "Group for the Regulation of the Political Crisis" .....	325
II.8.2	Negotiations with the President .....	327
II.8.3	Secret Preparation of a State of Emergency?.....	333
II.9	The Spread of the Insurgency .....	353
II.9.1	The "People's Council": A Parallel Parliament .....	353
II.9.2	Occupation of Administrative Buildings in Large Parts of the Country .....	354
II.10	The Partial Capitulation of the Regime: Resignation of Prime Minister Azarov .....	357
II.10.1	Withdrawal of the "Laws of January 16" .....	359
II.11	The Second "Amnesty Law" A Trap?.....	360
II.11.1	The Amendment of the First Amnesty Law .....	360
II.11.2	"Hostages" in Exchange for Buildings.....	364
II.12	Towards a Peaceful Settlement of the "Political Crisis"?.....	367
II.12.1	"Don't be Afraid!": Hardening of Resistance .....	367
II.12.2	Release of "Hostages" in Exchange for the Release of Occupied Buildings .....	369
II.12.3	Negotiations of the Opposition with Prosecutor General Pshonka .....	371
II.12.4	Conditional Release of the Kyiv City Hall .....	373
II.12.5	The "Viche" of February 16, 2014: The Last People's Assembly on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti .....	375
II.12.6	Return to the Constitution of 2004: A Possible Way out of the "Crisis"? .....	377
II.13	The Positioned Forces of the Opposing Camps before the "Final Struggle" .....	380
II.13.1	The Parliamentary Opposition to the Yanukovich Regime.....	380
II.13.2	The "Self-Defense of the Maidan" ("Samooborona") .....	384
II.13.3	The "Anti-Maidan" .....	387
II.13.4	The Regime's Security Forces.....	390
II.13.5	"Titushky" State-Licensed Hooligans as "Auxiliary Police" .....	392
II.13.6	The Army "Loyal to the People" or to the Regime?.....	398
II.14	The Bloody End of the "Maidan" .....	407

II.14.1	The Operational Planning for the Offensive of the Regime's Security Forces .....	407
II.14.2	The "Peaceful Offensive" of the Opposition in Parliament.....	409
II.14.3	The "Peaceful Offensive" of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition .....	411
II.14.4	The Violent Offensive of the Regime: The Street Battle in the Government Quarter .....	415
II.14.5	"Targeted Killing": Snipers Against Street Fighters .....	421
II.14.6	February 18: The Nighttime "Storming" of the Maidan Nezalezhnosti.....	423
II.14.7	Nocturnal Visit of the Oppositional "Troika" to President Yanukovych .....	428
II.14.8	The Bloody Interim Balance of February 18.....	431
II.14.9	"Oligarchs" Against Violence .....	440
II.14.10	The Counterattack of the "Defenders of the 'Maidan': Reconquest of Lost 'Maidan' Territory" .....	443
II.14.11	The Massacre of February 20.....	445
II.14.12	Use of Firearms by "Maidan" Defenders? .....	448
II.14.13	The "Heavenly Hundred": The Bloody Result of the "Three-Day War" in Kyiv's Streets .....	451
II.15	Crisis Diplomacy: The European Mediation Mission .....	453
II.15.1	European Union Sanctions .....	453
II.15.2	Conflict Mediation of the European Union.....	456
II.15.3	The Signing of the Agreement "on the Regulation of Crisis" .....	459
II.15.4	The Outcome of the Negotiations: A Sham Success of the Opposition? .....	462
II.15.5	Diplomatic Comments on the "Peace Agreement" .....	463
II.16	Yanukovych's Loss of Control in Parliament .....	467
II.16.1	The Defection of the Opportunists Changing Sides in the Verkhovna Rada .....	467
II.16.2	The Extraordinary Session of the Verkhovna Rada on February 20, 2014 Victory of the Opposition in Parliament.....	469
II.17	Rejection of the "Peace Agreement" by the "Maidan" .....	473
II.17.1	Negotiations Without the "Maidan" .....	473
II.17.2	The Justification Attempts of the Opposition Leaders before the "People of the Maidan" .....	475

II.17.3	The Sotnyk Parasyuk: The “Hero of the Day” .....	478
II.18	The Victory of the “Maidan” .....	485
II.18.1	The Capture of the Government Quarter by the Insurgents .....	485
II.18.2	The Withdrawal of the Regime’s Security Forces: An Orderly Desertion? .....	485
II.18.3	The Escape of the President’s Accomplices.....	491
II.18.4	The Escape of the President Yanukovych .....	493
II.19	The “Revolutions” of the Years 2004/2005 and 2013/2014 in Comparison.....	499
II.19.1	Incompleted Revolutions.....	499
II.19.2	The “Maidan”: Not a Political System Change.....	500
II.20	The “Maidan”: Rebirth of the Ukrainian Nation .....	503
II.20.1	Crisis of National Identity .....	503
II.20.2	Ukrainian Nationalism: A Defensive Patriotism.....	509

### **III The Parliamentary Change of Power in Kyiv**

III.1	A Parliamentary Seizure of Power.....	511
III.1.1	Change of Power by “Emergency Legislation” .....	511
III.1.2	Oleksandr Turchynov: The New President of the Verkhovna Rada .....	513
III.1.3	The “Removal from Office” of President Yanukovych .....	515
III.1.4	Parliamentary Safeguarding of Power.....	520
III.1.5	Oleksandr Turchynov Election as Interim President by Parliament.....	521
III.1.6	Repeal of the Language Law The “Original Sin” of the New Power .....	522
III.1.7	The “Peace Agreement” of February 21 Maculature .....	524
III.2	Yuliya Tymoshenko and the “Maidan” .....	526
III.2.1	“To the Ukrainian People”: Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Message from Prison.....	526
III.2.2	Yuliya Tymoshenko: The Ukrainian Hopeful of the European Union.....	527
III.2.3	Release of Yuliya Tymoshenko through Legal Amendment.....	528
III.2.4	“Freedom for Yuliya, but Not Power!”: Tymoshenko on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti.....	530
III.3	On the Political Stage: The Old Performance .....	534

III.3.1	The First Government of Prime Minister Yatsenyuk: A “Suicide Mission” .....	534
III.3.2	The “Maidan Quota” in the Government.....	537
III.4	The “Maidan” and the New Power .....	540
III.4.1	“The Moor May Go” .....	540
III.4.2	“Lustration!” .....	543
III.5	The International Reaction to the Change of Power in Kyiv .....	548
III.5.1	Prompt Recognition in the West.....	548
III.5.2	The Reaction in Moscow “Coup d’État” .....	549
III.6	The “Post-Maidan” Revolutionary Afterpains.....	557
III.6.1	The Tent Village on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti Shelter for the Homeless? .....	557
III.6.2	The Peaceful Evacuation of the Protest Village on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti .....	559
III.7	The Question of the Legitimacy of the “Maidan” .....	564
III.7.1	A “Revolution of Dignity” .....	564
III.8	The Democratic Legitimization of the “Maidan” through Elections.....	568
III.8.1	The Early Presidential Election of May 25, 2014.....	568
III.8.2	Petro Poroshenko The Real Winner of the “Maidan” .....	570
III.8.3	The Parliamentary Elections of October 26, 2014 .....	576
III.8.4	The “Maidan Parties”: Electoral Victories and Defeats in the Patriotic Camp .....	584
III.8.5	The “Anti-Maidan Parties”: In Opposition .....	590
III.8.6	From the Barricades to the Parliament: The ‘Children of the Revolution of Dignity’ .....	598
III.8.7	The Election Results in “the East” .....	602
III.8.8	The International Election Observation: “A Step Forward” .....	606
III.8.9	The European Union: “Victory for Democracy” .....	609
III.8.10	Moscow Putin’s Lament .....	609
III.9	The New Parliament of the VIIIth Legislature .....	611
III.9.1	Power Relations in the New Parliament: Number of Seats Held by Political Parties and their Factions .....	611
III.9.2	The New (Governmental) Coalition “European Ukraine” .....	612
III.9.3	The “Old Order” Restored.....	615

III.10 Solving the “Maidan Massacre”: Obfuscation by the New Government?.....	619
III.10.1 The “Maidan Massacre”: Unpunished.....	619
III.10.2 The Black Company of the Berkut Riot Police: The Main Suspect.....	623
III.10.3 Obstruction of Investigations “From Above”? .....	625
III.10.4 Fatal Shooting of Militiamen.....	642
III.10.5 Moscow’s Invisible Hand .....	647
III.10.6 The Council of Europe “No Substantial Progress” in the Maidan Investigations.....	650
III.11 The “Maidan Massacre”: A “False Flag” Operation? .....	652
III.11.1 The Disconcerting Impressions of the Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet.....	653
III.11.2 The “Story” of the British Journalist Gabriel Gatehouse...	658
III.11.3 The “Monitor” Report by Stefan Stuchlik Fake News in Germany’s Public Service Broadcasting .....	660
III.11.4 The “Maidan Massacre”: A “Planned Operation of the Opposition”: The Conspiracy Theory of the Ukrainian-Canadian Political Scientist Ivan Katchanovski .....	665
III.12 The “Maidan Criminal Case” Closing of the Investigation? .....	675
III.13 Addendum: The Prisoner Exchange of December 19, 2019	
Murderers for Political Prisoners .....	679
III.13.1 Exchange at the Expense of Justice? .....	679
III.13.2 The “Maidan Massacre”: Unatoned Forever?.....	684
III.13.3 “Revanchist” Attack on the “Maidan” Narrative.....	693



# Preface to the English Edition

## Ukraine's War of Independence

### February 24, 2022: Ukraine's Fateful Day

Since the victory of the “Maidan”, the popular uprising against the kleptocratic regime of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich at the end of February 2014, a Russian military invasion has hovered over Ukraine like a sword of Damocles. Eight years later, on February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin cut the silken thread; with an army of 175,000 men, he invaded Ukraine.

The long path from 2013 to February 24, 2022, the actual “fateful day” of Ukraine, is described in the present two volumes—“Ukraine's Fateful Years 2013–2019”—especially in Part VI of the 2nd volume: “Russia's Hybrid Aggression against Ukraine”. The goal of this path, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, was not predicted *expressis verbis* by the author, but this turn was also not entirely excluded—although he himself considered a different development more probable. (See Chapter VII.14 to Chapter VII.16).

The manuscript of the German version of “Ukraine's Fateful Years” was completed in February 2020; two years later there is war in Ukraine. All “Kremlinologists”, experts as well as politicians, Western as well as Ukrainian, did not expect such a military invasion. It surprised and shocked the whole world.

The U.S. had expressed concern about Russia's war preparations many weeks before Putin's declaration of war, but American warnings were disregarded.<sup>1</sup> On February 18, U.S. President Biden personally told the world that Putin had made the decision to invade Ukraine. But even Ukrainian President Zelensky did not want to hear the warnings about a Russian attack, as Biden himself told.<sup>2</sup>

The numerous conjectures—including those of the author—about the intentions of Russian President Putin proved to be wastepaper, when he decided to solve *his* Ukraine problem militarily (probably) in the fall of 2021. Since his plan—the author suspects—to influence Ukraine's internal and external orientation by implementing the “Minsk Agreement” (“Minsk II”<sup>3</sup>) did not work out,

---

1 Ever since the U.S. war of aggression against Iraq, which was justified by untrue claims, Europeans have distrusted “information” from U.S. intelligence agencies.

2 The Russian-Belarusian military maneuver “Zapad-2021” (“West”), which took place from September 10 to 16, 2021—without Western observers—could be recognized in retrospect, but also already in its course, especially in the Russian troop deployments after its official end, as a preparation for the war of aggression against Ukraine. A clear indication, among other things, was the provision of large quantities of blood reserves (blood bags) near the border.

3 Specifically, by enshrining extensive autonomy for the southeast of Ukraine's Donbas region, occupied by Russia (since 2014) but remaining part of Ukraine. In the “Minsk Agreement” (“Minsk II”), Putin had assigned to the two so-called People's Republics “DNR” and “LNR”



Putin lost “patience”; he is now attempting a violent achievement of his overall goal, namely the subjugation of Ukraine under Moscow’s rule.

Similarly to 2014 – when he took advantage of the temporary impotence of the Ukrainian state<sup>4</sup> and annexed Crimea without encountering serious counter-measures from “the West” – Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to have seized an opportunity in 2022 that he perceived as favorable. Speculative answers to the question “why now?” may lie in Putin’s presumed perceptions: The U.S. is weak, its president an old man. The withdrawal of the world’s most modern army from Afghanistan, where it could not defeat the Taliban in 20 years of war, was tantamount to an escape. And in general, the U.S. is tired of its role as “world policeman.”

NATO is “brain dead”, French President Emmanuel Macron had stated in an interview with the British magazine “The Economist” in November 2019. Yet Putin insists that Russian security interests are threatened as a result of NATO’s encirclement of Russia: In reality, the narrative of “encirclement” was merely a pretext for Russia’s planned westward expansion, specifically a pretext to justify the intended submission of Ukraine.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO seemed obsolete. Its eastward expansion did not pose a threat to Russia – at most, Moscow was (rightly) irritated by U.S. unilateral moves such as the planned construction of a *national* U.S. (not “Euro-Atlantic”) missile defense system in Poland (and the Czech Republic). This American operation was also carried out under a pretext, namely the defense against Iranian missiles. Yet 30 years after the end of the Cold War, NATO has regained its *raison d’être*, indeed existential necessity – revived by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; in itself, Russia should be interested in the slow demise of “brain-dead” NATO. In the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, NATO committed itself not to permanently station military forces in countries that would join NATO after 1999. Russia is now practically forcing NATO to revoke that commitment.

The European Union is divided. Euro-skeptical national populism is spreading in all member states. In the weeks leading up to the Russian military aggression, there was no clear commitment to support Ukraine in the case of invasion by the Russian army. Instead of deterrence, the EU’s leaders practiced “appeasement” – as the British and French prime ministers did in 1938 – appeasing the belligerent dictator in the Moscow Kremlin: for Putin, a demonstration of weakness. Faced with dissension and half-heartedness on the part of “The West”, Putin thought he could undertake a blitzkrieg – a “special military operation,” as he had the war officially called – without encountering serious Western opposition. The opportunity seemed favorable – as with the annexation of

---

in the Donbas the role of a team of two Trojan horses, which he wanted to use as levers of influence within the Ukrainian state in order to gain control over the whole of Ukraine.

4 As a result of the change of power in Kyiv and because of the scrapped state of the Ukrainian armed forces.

Crimea in 2014—especially since the “Beijing 2022 Olympic Games” (February 4–20, 2022) diverted the attention of the world public.

However, visible to the whole world, Putin achieved the opposite of what he expected to achieve through his war of aggression against Ukraine: The “aged” president of the “degenerate” (Adolf Hitler) USA, Joseph (“Joe”) Biden, turned out to be—despite initial restraint easing the anxieties of the American people (see below)—the most determined and energetic opponent of Putin and the “healer” of American-European “fractures”. The widespread critical attitude toward the U.S. in Europe until February 24, 2022 (to which, however, U.S. administrations, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon / because of the Vietnam War 1955–1975; George W. Bush / because of the war on Iraq and Donald Trump in every respect)<sup>5</sup> have made their contribution) gave way to a new unity in the face of Russia’s aggression. Putin’s expectation of being able to drive a wedge between Europe and America proved deceptive. Since taking office, U.S. President Biden has sought to close ranks with Europe once again. Transatlantic relations are now closer than at any time since the end of the Cold War; Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has welded the Atlantic defense alliance, which had become fragile, together again.

NATO proved far from “brain dead.” At its June 29, 2022 summit in Madrid, NATO updated its “Strategic Concept” (last time in 2010) with a fundamental shift in priorities and a new perception of threat: NATO identified Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to the peace and security of its member countries. China was classified as a “strategic challenge” for the first time. In the face of Russian aggressiveness, even Sweden, which has been neutral for 200 years, and Finland are taking refuge under NATO’s protective umbrella; both countries were welcomed in Madrid. And the European Union, which for two decades stalled Ukraine’s desire for membership—out of “consideration” for Russia—with hollow phrases such as that of the “open door” and “Ukraine belonging to the European family”, and which did not even want to give Ukraine the prospect of eventual membership in the preamble of the agreement on its association,<sup>6</sup> decided after the Russian invasion to give the victim the status of an “accession candidate”.

The “Euro-Maidan” in the winter of 2013 / 2014 was the most impressive demonstration “for Europe” in the entire history of the European Union. No candidate deserves admission to the EU more than Ukraine. At its summit on June 23, 2022, Ukraine (as well as Moldova) was officially accepted into the circle of accession candidates with the (long-overdue) unanimous decision of the 27 member states. President Zelensky had repeatedly demanded such a message

---

5 The author admits to having also been critical of U.S. global hegemony.

6 Reasons (some of them valid) were advanced, such as rampant corruption, which, however, was not an obstacle when Romania and Bulgaria were admitted. In reality, the issue was the shifts in the EU’s financial structure, which would result from Ukraine’s membership: net recipients would become net payers.

from the EU in view of the Russian war against his country – also to show the more than 40 million citizens of his country that the fight for freedom is worthwhile.

Apart from these misperceptions about the West's unity and determination, Russian President Putin underestimated (as did the West) Ukraine's will to resist, the fighting spirit and fighting strength with which Ukrainians are fighting back. In his assessment of the West's reaction to his war against Ukraine, Putin was probably deceived by his experience in the case of Russia's annexation of Crimea and in the following case of Russia's covert aggression in the Donbas; both times the West contented itself with completely ineffective personalized and economic sanctions.

Regarding the hot "reception" of the Russian ("liberation") army in Ukraine, Putin may have been a victim of misinformation by his advisors (e.g. Sergei Karaganov), his agents on the ground, and "pro-Russian" Ukrainian politicians (e.g. Viktor Medvedchuk). Self-deception cannot be ruled out either: his idea of Russians and Ukrainians being "one people" does not correspond to reality. Putin has probably never understood the changes in Ukrainian society since the independence of the Ukrainian state: The outward orientation of the majority of the Ukrainian population toward the West and the resulting turning away from Russia, the internalization of democracy – even if it is (still) deficient – are reality. Putin possibly believed himself that Ukraine wanted "reunification" with Russia, or he did not care, just as he does not care about the fate of the Russian people. And because Ukraine does not want to be the "smaller brother" (grammatically actually "sister") of the "bigger brother", Putin acts according to the motto: "And if you don't want to be my brother, then I'll smash your skull" (a German proverb), and pursues the subjugation of Ukraine with military force.

### **China: On Hold**

However, Putin did not become a "pariah on the international stage" as which Biden wants to see him. The "Global South" did not condemn Russia and did not join the sanctions of the West. With foresight, Russia revived relations with the "Third World" that had been severed after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 – and established a special relationship with China.

As a result of the severance of its relations with the West, Russia will inevitably become even more dependent on China, Estonian journalist Kadri Liik writes.<sup>7</sup> In order to achieve the subjugation of Ukraine, Putin has undermined his own future position in the global power structure, she argues. In fact, China dictates to the Russian Federation the price of the raw materials it imports from Siberia; the time will come when it will not pay for oil, gas – and wood – from neighboring Siberia at all, the author assumes. China does not invest in Russia

---

7 Kadri Liik is "senior policy fellow" at the "European Council on Foreign Relations".

in technically sophisticated and promising areas; it contents itself to attack in rhetorical solidarity the West in unison with Russia.

The author sees “the West”, namely the European Union, and “the East”, specifically the Russian Federation, being pushed to the periphery of the “Middle Kingdom” in the course of the “Chinese Century” (See Part VII of Volume 2: “Pax Sinica” – the Pacification of Eurasia by China”). If the “descending” powers, the USA and the EU – together with the RF – do not unite to form an “anti-Chinese wall”, they will be dominated by the new world power. In the foreseeable future, China will be the decisive factor fomenting or ending regional conflicts such as the current renewed “East-West conflict” in its own interest.

The author sticks to his assessment that the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be the “Chinese Seculum” (See Part VII of the 2nd volume: “Pax Sinica”). In the Russian war against Ukraine, China is (still) holding back; this suggests that it does not yet feel sufficiently equipped for the role of “world policeman” – i.e., taking over the legacy of the United States of America. Obviously, however, the war of its Russian “partner” irritates the Chinese leadership, because it is setting back the peaceful conquest of the world through global infrastructure projects (“Belt and Road Initiative”; see Chapter VII.4 in Volume 2). Though China attaches great importance to a close political relationship with Russia (apart from Xi Jinping’s and Putin’s shared aversion to U.S. global hegemony), the importance of economic relations with the U.S. still seems to prevail. World domination by the “Middle Kingdom” is not “planned” until 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

### **Putin’s February 24 Declaration of War**

In the televised speech in which Putin announced the attack on Ukraine, he repeated the lie, that the Ukrainian government had been “mistreating and murdering” people for years.<sup>8</sup> The speech Putin delivered at 6 a.m. on February 24, 2022, is reminiscent of Hitler’s September 1, 1939 speech to the German Reichstag (Parliament), broadcast on Greater German Radio (“Grossdeutscher Rundfunk”), on the occasion of the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, thereby triggering World War II. Hitler justified the attack on Poland (“Since 5.45 a.m. we are now shooting back!”) by saying that the German minority living in Poland was being disenfranchised and mistreated. He stated that he had often tried to change these conditions by peaceful proposals. The parallels – like those to the “Sudeten crisis” of 1938 – are striking.

Putin expressed worries and concerns “about these fundamental threats that [...] are directed against our country by irresponsible politicians in the West. I am referring to the expansion of the NATO bloc to the east [...] the war machine

---

8 February 24, 2022, source: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843> ZEIT ONLINE; <https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2022-02/wladimir-putin-rede-militaereinsatz-ukraine-wortlaut>.

is on the move, it is approaching our borders.” Over the past 30 years he had persistently and patiently tried to reach an agreement with the leading NATO countries on the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. Instead, Putin said, they have broken the promise to our country not to expand NATO an inch further east. [...] “They have created [...] on the territories adjacent to us—I emphasize, on our own historic territories—an ‘Anti-Russia’ hostile to us [...] placed under complete external control.” The West’s so-called “policy of containment” is “ultimately a matter of life and death for Russia, a matter of our historical future as a nation ...”.

The two Donbas People’s Republics, he said, have asked Russia for help. “Circumstances demand that we act decisively and immediately.” In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter—the right to self-defense—and in accordance with the treaties of friendship and assistance ratified by the Federation Assembly with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic, he had decided to conduct a “special military operation”. “We do not intend to occupy the whole of Ukraine, but to demilitarize it,” declared Putin, a notorious liar; experience shows that the exact opposite of what he says is the case. The goal of the Russian special operation, Putin said, is to protect the people who have been mistreated and murdered by the Kyiv regime for eight years. “To this end, we will seek to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine and bring to justice those who committed numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including Russian citizens.” Russia cannot feel secure, develop and exist if it is constantly threatened by Ukraine, Putin said—a *casus belli* that cannot be surpassed in absurdity. In reality, the point is that Russia cannot develop into a great empire again unless it recaptures Ukraine. “Russian policy is based on freedom,” says the man who tramples on freedom in his own country. “And we consider it important that this right can be exercised by all peoples living on the territory of today’s Ukraine.” Putin’s mendacity knows no bounds. Then Putin addressed the Ukrainian military: “The Ukrainian military has sworn allegiance to its people, not to the anti-people junta that is plundering Ukraine.” “Dear comrades!” he appealed to Ukrainian soldiers:

Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight against the Nazis to defend our common fatherland so that today’s neo-Nazis could take power in Ukraine. I urge you not to carry out criminal orders, to lay down your arms immediately and go home. All soldiers of the Ukrainian army who comply with this demand will be allowed to leave the war zone and return to their families without hindrance.

“We respect the sovereignty of all newly emerged countries in the post-Soviet space,” Putin declared; the “Newly Independent States” know, that Putin means the opposite. In the case of Ukraine, Putin has exposed his lie already by his invasion. In the spirit of Hitler, Putin calls for “cohesion of society, its willingness to consolidate and join all forces to move forward. Strength is always needed.” Hitler made it sound like this on September 1, 1939: “If we form this

community, closely conspired, determined to do everything, never willing to capitulate, then our will can master every adversity.”<sup>9</sup> The enemy, the United States, is an “empire of lies”, Putin said. “The heart of its politics is above all brute force.” And with unsurpassable hypocrisy, dictator Putin, who seeks to maintain his power through lies and violence, proclaims “that true power lies in justice and truth, which are on our side.”

Turning to the West, Putin threatened, “Now a few important, very important words for those for whom the temptation might arise to interfere in events from the side. [...] Whoever tries to obstruct us [...] must know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead to consequences that they have never experienced in their history.” Hitler was more restrained in this respect; in his declaration of war on September 1, 1939, he merely feigned “incomprehension” that the Western European states, meaning Great Britain and France, were “interfering in the conflict.”

### **Putin’s War in Ukraine**

The war in Ukraine is Putin’s war, just as World War II was Hitler’s war—quite different from World War I, when the political actors “sleepwalked” (Christopher Clark)<sup>10</sup> into the “primordial catastrophe” (George F. Kennan)<sup>11</sup> of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Before his assassination (February 27, 2015), Russian dissident Boris Nemtsov had collected material for a report on Putin’s readiness for war under the title “Putin. War”.

Putin’s war is a war of aggression, which is forbidden in principle under modern international law. (Briand-Kellogg Pact 1928; Article 2, No. 4 of the UN Charter of 1945; Rome Statute, legal basis of the International Criminal Court). Consequently, Ukraine is fighting a defensive war that is legitimate under international law. Putin’s war in Ukraine is not just a war of conquest; it is a war of extermination—like Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union. It is literally about Ukraine’s very existence; Ukraine is to be wiped off the European map, according to Putin’s will. Dmitrii Medvedev, currently Deputy Head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (sovet bezopasnosti R F) and former (interim) president, publicly expressed doubts about Ukraine’s future existence.

But it is not just about the Ukrainian state; it is about the national identity of Ukrainians. The goal of the war of extermination is the eradication of the Ukrainian language, the eradication of Ukrainian culture: a cultural genocide.

---

9 [https://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument\\_de&dokument=0209\\_pol&object=translation&l=de](https://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0209_pol&object=translation&l=de).

10 Christopher Clark: *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*; New York (Harper Collins) 2013. Sir Christopher Munro Clark is an Australian historian living in the United Kingdom. Professor Clark teaches modern European history at St. Catharine’s College, Cambridge.

11 In 1979, U.S. historian and diplomat George F. Kennan called World War I “the great seminal catastrophe of this century.”

Hence the targeted attacks on Ukraine's material cultural heritage, the destruction of churches, museums, archives and monuments. In Mariupol, after taking the city, the Russian occupiers burned books from the library of the Petro Mohyla Cathedral, among them unique Ukrainian-language works. The "book burning" took place at the behest of a Moscow delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church. Local collaborators were instructed to pray for the Russian soldiers.

Putin's war in Ukraine is also a colonial war in the tradition of the Russian Empire. In Putin's imagined world, Ukraine is part of the "Russian soil" (*Russkaya zemlya*) which Russia is "reclaiming" in this war, as he himself said in his speech at the launch of the Russian invasion on February 24. Putin's war in Ukraine is—also—a proxy war, a war against the U.S. and against the EU (which in his view is a collection of "satellite states of the U.S."). In an insolent letter to Washington, Putin called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, especially their nuclear weapons, from Europe. And Putin's war against Ukraine is also a war against the international order established after World War II, against the UN Charter and against international law—and against the European order established after the end of the "Cold War", as established in the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe"<sup>12</sup> on November 21, 1990. For German political scientist Herfried Münkler, it is clear that Putin "seeks a large-scale revision of the European order"; it is this motive that drives Putin above all others.

This war is a "clash of orders," a war by Russia against Western civilization, against the rule-based international order. It is a return to the "right of the stronger", juridically inflated in Carl Schmitt's concept of sovereignty: "Sovereign is he who decides on the state of emergency." Many Russian political scientists feel that Carl Schmitt had to be read in order to understand Putin's politics, says Russian journalist Maxim Trudolyubov.<sup>13</sup> Putin's "entire power is based on the state of emergency." The "sovereign" state does not need to abide by any rules.

### **No Choice between "War and Peace"**

After its hundred-year struggle for freedom against Poland and the "Soviet power" (*sovetskaya vlast*), Ukraine was virtually given independence in 1991 by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Now Putin's neo-imperialist Russia is imposing a real war of independence on Ukraine.

---

12 The "Charter of Paris (for a New Europe)" of November 21, 1990 is a fundamental agreement on the creation of a new peaceful order in Europe after the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War. It was signed as the final document of the CSCE Special Summit Conference by 32 European countries, including the Soviet Union, as well as the United States and Canada. The leaders of the participating states declared an end to the division of Europe, committed themselves to democracy as the only legitimate form of government, and assured their peoples that human rights and fundamental freedoms would be guaranteed.

13 Maxim Trudolyubov is a Senior Fellow at the Kennan Institute and Editor-at-Large of *Meduza*. *Meduza* is a bilingual (Russian and English) Internet newspaper based in Riga, Latvia. It was founded in October 2014 by the former editor-in-chief of *Lenta.ru*, Galina Timchenko, from his position of exile.

Ukraine does not have a choice between war and peace. For Ukraine, this war is about being or not being, literally about its existence. If Russia wins this war, Ukraine will not live on albeit amputated, as Germany did after the two lost world wars; Putin will wipe Ukraine off the map. And Putin is determined to win his war. He wants to finally eradicate Ukraine, the source of democratic infection, which has been a source of contagion for Russia since the Orange Revolution in 2004, threatening his regime; Putin is seeking a “final solution to the Ukraine question” —using a Nazi term. Therefore, Ukraine will fight as long as a Ukrainian men or women (10% of the fighting troops are female soldiers) are ready to fight with a weapon in their hands.<sup>14</sup> “Peace against land,” i.e., against land captured by the Russian army east and south of any cease-fire line, is not a sustainable “solution” for Ukraine, should it be forced upon it by war-weary Western allies. Putin would attack Ukraine again at the next favorable opportunity, which he would create himself; he will not stop conducting “special military operations” against Ukraine until he has brought the entire country under his control.

Western politicians repeat *their* war goal for Ukraine with the tautological formula: “Ukraine must not lose” or “Russia must not win.” If Putin succeeds with his war of aggression, then war will again become a “normal” foreign policy operation: the “continuation of politics by other means” (Carl von Clausewitz<sup>15</sup>). If Ukraine loses this war, Putin will carry his war to Moldova; Georgia will be the next target. Whether he will attack the Baltic states depends on the credibility of NATO’s deterrence. Putin’s army must be brought to a halt in the theater of war in Ukraine with the combined forces of Ukraine (fighters) and the West (weapons). “They (the West) want to defeat us on the battlefield [...] May they try” [...] we haven’t even really started yet”, Putin threatened.”<sup>16</sup>

If Russia “wins,” Ukraine will be literally “lost.” Putin will turn Ukraine into an “Archipelago GuLag” (Alexander Solzhenitsyn<sup>17</sup>). The number of refugees proves how real Ukrainians believe this prospect to be: as of mid-June 2022, 6 million Ukrainians, mostly women and children, have fled to the West;<sup>18</sup> by the end of 2022, the UNHCR expects the number to be 8.3 million: one-fifth of the country’s population.

Based on Putin’s military war goal, the subjugation of all of Ukraine, “winning the war” for Ukraine means preventing by any means Putin from bringing the country, even partially, under his control. From this war goal of Ukraine must follow the “war goal of the West” (USA and Europe, NATO): Complete

---

14 Of course, the Russian occupation forces will not lack “collaborators”.

15 Paraphrasing the title of subchapter 24, chapter 1, book 1 of Carl von Clausewitz’s (unfinished) magnum opus, *On War*: “War is a mere continuation of politics by other means”.

16 “My vzeret poka eshcho ne nachinali”; <https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/07/7/7356907/>. Source: RIA novosti 07.07.2022.

17 Alexandr Izaevich Solzhenitsyn: *Archipelag GULAG*; first published in 1973.

18 Conscript men between 18 and 60 years old are not allowed to leave the country. Many who left the country before February 24 returned to fight.



ousting of all Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. NATO members simply cannot demand anything else from Ukraine, having repeatedly stated emphatically that they would defend every square inch of NATO territory against a Russian attack. This means a “limited” defeat of Russia, which for obvious reasons must not be followed by a Ukrainian counterattack on Russian territory – something Ukraine’s Western allies would hardly allow for fear of (nuclear) escalation. While Ukrainian President Zelensky has in mind Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory, Western allies leave open the question of which “border” they mean:

1. the status quo ante (before February 24, 2022) – i.e., the “line of contact” between the part of the Donbas that has remained under Kyiv control and the internationally unrecognized “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.”
2. recapture of the secessionist territories in the Donbas already occupied by Russia since 2014, the so-called “DNR” and “LNR”.
3. “recapture of Crimea” was mentioned by Ukrainian President Zelensky as a war goal. For this war goal, however, Ukraine is unlikely to find military support in the West; Crimea’s annexation by Russia will remain unrecognized under international law, as a *de facto* “frozen conflict”, especially since the goal of military “recapture” is unrealistic in the highest degree.

On the 135th day of the war, July 9, 2022, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov listed three possible scenarios for ending the war:

1. deployment of Ukraine’s armed forces to the positions they held until February 24 and negotiations with the Russian Federation on the status of “Certain Rayons of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts”<sup>19</sup> and Crimea – with the participation of the West.
2. attrition of the Russian army. In this case, the war would last until the end of 2022, possibly until the beginning of next year.
3. disintegration of the Russian Federation.

The –hoped for– third scenario is certainly the least likely. The price of recapturing territories lost to Russia is high: Zelensky himself cited the figure of 200 to 300 fallen soldiers – daily, and on this basis an estimated 1000 wounded. But in the event of a Russian victory, the number of soldiers and civilians killed would be many times higher. “Liberation” of Russian-speaking Ukrainians from the tyranny of Ukraine’s “Nazi” leadership does not mean “freedom” as promised in Russian war propaganda, but murder of civilians, destruction of their homes, bombing of civilian infrastructure.

---

19 Ukraine’s official language regime for the secessionist territories in Donbas: “Okremi raioni Donetskoyi ta Luhanskoyi oblastei” / ORDLO.

In areas conquered by Russian troops, “cleansing” (“chistka”) is already taking place; politically disagreeable people, state officials, members of “patriotic” parties, etc., are being shot or deported. Russia has experience with deportation of whole peoples to Siberia and Central Asia (Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ukrainians (from Western Ukraine after the execution of Stalin-Hitler pact, Germans / Volga). Not only for the fight of the Ukrainian army against the Russian aggressor, the West must continue to supply weapons, but also for the protection of the civilian population from the Russian soldateska, which is moving, murdering, plundering and raping through conquered places (keywords: Bucha, Irpin, Borodyanka). In the current situation, the delivery of weapons is “humanitarian aid” (as a Ukrainian journalist explained to her German colleague).

The West has a “responsibility” to protect Ukraine under international law. In view of the war crimes committed against the civilian population, the imperative of “humanitarian intervention” under international law applies. Only the delivery of modern weapons shortens the war – and thus saves lives.

### **“Rump Ukraine”**

Putin obviously counted on being able to capture the Ukrainian capital Kyiv in a “blitzkrieg,” depose Ukrainian President Zelensky, bring about a pro-Russian change of government, and thus gain control over all of Ukraine. After the initial military failure, the Russian army conquered a land bridge between Russia (from Taganrog Bay in Rostov-on-Don Oblast in southern Russia to the regional capital city of Kherson through the complete capture and de facto annexation (military-civilian occupation administration) of Kherson oblast, located north of the Crimean Peninsula, which is separated by 300 kilometers of Ukrainian territory under international law.

Putin’s further military goal in Ukraine, which has certainly not been abandoned, is to conquer the Odessa oblast and establish a land link as far as the Moldovan secessionist territory of “Transnistria”, which has been under Russian control since its de facto independence (1992) (14th Russian Army). Since the withdrawal of Russian troops from the vicinity of Kyiv, Russian has focused on a war of attrition in eastern Ukraine, on the complete conquest of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in Donbas (about a third of which had already been under Russian control since 2014). If the military situation were to change in Russia’s favor, the conquest of all of Ukraine is on the horizon. Predictably, in the event of a Russian victory, Ukraine will be split into annexed parts in the east (possibly including Kharkiv) and south (possibly including Odessa) and pseudo-autonomous entities in “Rump Ukraine”, which would be cut off from the sea.

As a next step the breakup of “Rump Ukraine” can be expected – just as the breakup of the “Rest-Tschechei” (“Rump Czechia”) after the annexation of the Sudeten-Land by Hitler in March 1939.

## Russian War Crimes

“Victors are not judged,” Empress Catherine II is said to have said — a statement that holds true to this day.<sup>20</sup> The President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin has even awarded the unit of his army, that ravaged the small town of Bucha near Kyiv, with the honorary title of “Guard Unit” (“gvardeiskoi”) for its war crimes — officially “for heroism [...] in combat operations to protect the fatherland and state interests.”<sup>21</sup>

War crimes are part of Russian warfare. Targeted destruction of Ukrainian cities and burying their inhabitants under the rubble is part of the Russian “art of war”. War crimes committed by Russian soldiers, systematically and individually, condoned or ordered by officers, are part of the military “craft.” Murder and rape, robbery and looting<sup>22</sup> are part of the everyday military life of the Russian army in Ukraine.

Police found the bodies of 1314 civilians murdered by Russian soldiers in Kyiv oblast alone. In the towns of Bucha, Irpin, Borodyanka, the Russian soldiery raged like lansquenets in the Thirty Years’ War; witnessed was rape and murder of parents in front of their children, violence against women and girls from eight to 80 years old — for fun and out of boredom.<sup>23</sup> The unit of the regular Russian Army involved in the atrocities in Bucha was identified: it is the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 35th Army (64-i otdelnaya motostrelkovaya brigada), troop unit 51460, stationed in the village of Knyaze-Volkonskoye in the Military District East in Khabarovsk oblast. This unit is notorious for suicides and desertions among conscripted soldiers in peacetime. In the port city of Mariupol, the Russian army killed 20,000 people in two months. The supreme war criminal in the Kremlin, President Putin systematically wages war against Ukrainian civilians. The daily death toll is not “collateral damage”; the attacks on civilian targets are carried out by precision-guided cruise missiles.<sup>24</sup> Moscow’s regular claims following these attacks, that these missiles targeted military objects, are lies.

---

20 Like Russia, the U.S. has not signed the “Rome Statute,” the treaty basis of the International Criminal Court. Like Russia, the USA, the initiators of the “Nuremberg Trials”, protect their own war criminals from international justice

21 <https://focus.ua/voennye-novosti/512650-za-reznyu-v-buche-putin-prisvoil-zvanie-gvardeyskoy-64-motostrelkovoy-brigade-foto>.

22 Items stolen from Ukrainian houses and apartments in Kyiv oblast were hawked at bazaars in neighboring Belarus; via cell phone, women back home placed “orders” (for example, shoe size) to looting soldiers in Ukraine for stolen items to bring home. The Russian soldiers believe that Putin allowed them to loot, according to phone calls intercepted by the Ukrainian security service, SBU. In any case, they can be sure of complete impunity. One woman “allowed” her husband to rape Ukrainian women; however, he should use a condom. In the soldiers’ chats with their families, sentimentality mixes with cynicism.

23 “Vpershe take bachymo.” In Dekoder, 03.06.2022, referring to the Russian online medium “Holod”; <https://www.dekoder.org/de/article/krieg-ukraine-gewalt-folter-armee>.

24 Cruise missile: unmanned military missile that steers itself to the target, where it detonates a warhead.

Whether there will ever be a trial against the main war criminals, a “Nuremberg II”, is unlikely.<sup>25</sup>

### Defense of Europe through Military Support of Ukraine

The conquest of all of Ukraine is Putin’s ostensible military goal. But Putin wants more: he wants to destroy the European order that was established after the end of the Cold War – with Russia’s participation. He seeks Russian domination over all of Eastern and East-Central Europe, as it existed in the 19th century and in the wake of World War II. Therefore, the war in Ukraine is also a war against the European Union, in which the states of the former “Eastern Bloc” are united with “Western Europe”.

Having failed to reorganize Europe to include Russia in his interests – recall Moscow’s initiatives “Free Trade from Lisbon to Vladivostok” and “Pan-European Security Architecture from the Atlantic to the Pacific” (see Chapter VII.10 in Volume 2) – Putin now wants to ruin the European Union. By political and economic destabilization, by promoting national-populist movements, by propagating harmful fake news, by fomenting tensions between member countries, by indirectly promoting famine migration from Africa as a result of the war, and most recently by using natural gas as a weapon, he is pursuing the EU’s disintegration from within – just as his Soviet Union disintegrated three decades ago. During the war in Afghanistan (2001–2021), according to German Defense Minister Peter Struck (2002–2005), Germany was defended “in the Hindu Kush”; today, Europe is defended in Ukraine. Military support for Ukraine is an imperative of European security.<sup>26</sup>

Putin will wage war, no matter what the cost (to Russia). His paranoid mental state does not allow for retreat, let alone defeat. Therefore, the cost of war for Russia must be increased. Ukraine must be defended – “whatever it takes,” in the words of Mario Draghi, former president of the European Central Bank (2011–2019, who saved the Euro in its most serious crisis to date with this expression of determination in London in 2012). The West must maintain the supply of weapons to Ukraine “as long as it takes” (German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz).

Thus the West has not only a moral obligation to stand by Ukraine against the Russian aggressor; probably not for the USA, but certainly for the European Union its security is at stake, i.e. its very own vital interest. Shot down tanks and missiles had the slogan “On to Berlin! (“na Berlin!”) painted on them. Magomed

25 Christian Tomuschat: Russlands Ueberfall auf die Ukraine. Der Krieg und die Grundfragen des Rechts. (Russia’s Assault on Ukraine. The War and Basic Questions of Law), in: Osteuropa, Vol. 1-3, 2022, pp. 33-50, here: I, 2), pp. 41 ff.

26 After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Author published an article entitled: “The ‘Putin Doctrine’ – the End of European Security,” in Reiter, Erich (ed.): The Strategic Situation in the East of the EU; International Institute for Liberal Politics Vienna, May 2014, pp. 73–125; online publication; <https://docplayer.org/67125585-Erich-reiter-hg-die-strategische-lage-im-osten-der-eu.html>.

Daudov, the president of the parliament of the (autonomous) Chechen Republic, predicted a march to Berlin: “If Vladimir Putin doesn’t stop us, God willing, we will reach Berlin.” In the TV show “Evening with Vladimir Solovev” (“Večer s Vladimirom Solovevym”), Berlin is increasingly the target of Russian rhetoric: in 106 seconds, a nuclear missile would reach Berlin. Even if “Berlin” has not yet been named as a target by Putin, such statements reveal the spirit that prevails in Russia. The Berlin mantra—“Security only with, not against Russia”—no longer applies since February 24, 2022; now the task is to create “security against Russia”.

Ukraine is defending Europe on Ukrainian soil; by defending their freedom, Ukrainians are defending Europe’s freedom. And because the citizens of the European Union do not want to fight themselves, supplying weapons to the fighting Ukraine is the least the EU can do—and must do. All other aid, financial support for the Ukrainian budget, generous reception of Ukrainian refugees, and political support for Ukraine in international bodies, while important, are secondary as long as the war lasts.

### Nuclear Escalation

The fear in Europe—and also in the USA—of an escalation of the conventional war in Ukraine into a global nuclear Armageddon<sup>27</sup> is understandable. Inevitably, the question arises whether Putin is suicidal, whether he, who himself is rattling the nuclear saber, can be deterred by nuclear weapons, indeed whether the “balance of terror” still functions at all?<sup>28</sup> It is to be feared that Putin’s nature is similar to Hitler’s, who dragged Germany into his own downfall. A possible psychotic disturbance of his instinct for self-preservation could make Putin act according to the motto: “after me, the deluge.”

In Soviet times, the rulers in the Kremlin thought rationally in this regard; they were not suicidal. Today, paranoia reigns in the Moscow Kremlin; it is to be feared that the natural will to live is impaired. The West still hopes that Putin’s entourage is not tired of life, that for all the irrationality of their actions, there is still a vestige of sanity. Michael Gorbachev<sup>29</sup> declared in June 1991 that “the risk of global nuclear war has practically disappeared.” This specter has now been retrieved from the mothballs of history by Putin.

The West’s fear of nuclear escalation weakens its willingness to supply weapons to Ukraine; that is the purpose of Putin’s threats with Russia’s nuclear potential. But the conclusion to stop supplying weapons to Ukraine is wrong. Such a decision would not persuade Putin to end the war against Ukraine; on the contrary, it would encourage him to continue the conventional war.

---

27 Borrowing from Hebrew via Greek Harmageon. John, Apocalypse, chapter 16, verse 16.

28 MAD-Doktrine: mutually assured destruction.

29 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) from March 1985 to August 1991 and President of the Soviet Union from March 1990 to December 1991.

Claudia Major—the head of the security policy research group of the German “Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik” / SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs) speaks of nuclear blackmail: already talking about nuclear weapons is a weapon. The nuclear threat is to be taken seriously, but no reason to panic. Nuclear weapons are not “weapons of warfare”, but “weapons of war prevention”. The use of nuclear weapons, even tactical ones, would be a “breach of civilization”. However, Putin is certainly not afraid of such a breach; the invasion of Ukraine already is a “breach of civilization”.

Putin has so far not “armed” Russian nuclear weapons—i.e., ordered the “stage 2” of combat readiness; he has so far not had the links in the chain of command, the “command links” established, in order to be able to give the launch order at all, to press the “red button,” explains Gustav Gressel, an expert on Eastern Europe and the military.<sup>30</sup>

Walter Slócombe, the former U.S. undersecretary of defense, does not consider such a “taboo-breaking,” the crossing of the “nuclear threshold,” entirely improbable in the event, that a military defeat poses an existential threat to Putin’s regime (“below 5%, but conceivable”). Putin might be inclined to shock Western public opinion with a demonstrative nuclear strike with limited damage.

### **Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Psychological Warfare**

A first use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia, Slócombe argues, must be followed immediately by a nuclear counterstrike—calibrated to reduce the risk of further escalation. If this did not happen, the credibility of deterrence, U.S. nuclear retaliation, would be weakened, not only among allies but also among Russians. And this would only make the feared nuclear war more likely. In this regard, a certain ambiguity in Western rhetoric is more deterrent than its unambiguity; ambiguity is called for regarding the nature and scope, conventional or nuclear, of the Western response to a Russian first strike.

The danger of Putin dropping tactical nuclear weapons—possibly as a threat over the Baltic Sea—is real. Richard K. Betts calls for planning for this contingency.<sup>31</sup> The danger would be highest if the war took a turn in favor of Ukraine. Betts also believes it is possible that, in order to avoid defeat, Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons against the Ukrainian army—“or set off a

---

30 Experte sieht bei “Illner” nur einen Ukraine-Ausweg—eine “krachende Niederlage” für Putin (Expert sees only one way out in Ukraine—a “resounding defeat” for Putin), in: Merkur.de. 20.05.2022; <https://www.merkur.de/politik/maybrit-illner-zdf-ukraine-russland-gressel-waffenlieferungen-eubeitritt-wiederaufbau-vonderleyen-zr-9156...>

31 Richard K. Betts: Thinking about the Unthinkable in Ukraine. What happens if Putin uses nuclear weapons? In Foreign Affairs, July 4, 2022; <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-07-04/thinking-about-unthinkable-ukraine>. Richard Kevin Betts is an American political scientist (International Relations), currently “Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies” in the Department of Political Science and Director of the International Security Policy Program at the “School of International and Public Affairs” at Columbia University, New York.