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George Y. Kohler
Daniel H. Weiss *Editors*

Judaism and Modern Western Philosophy: Collected Writings of Steven S. Schwarzschild

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Preface

When Steven S. Schwarzschild died unexpectedly in 1989, he left behind a great number of unfinished manuscripts—in various stages of completion. Among them were several collections of material that he obviously planned to turn into books, but in the end, although he published over 200 essays, not a single monograph written by him appeared during his lifetime. Already in 1979, he had written to Edith Wyschogrod that he had been working "for ten years" on a study tentatively entitled "Alienation—Judaism as the Philosophical Issue between Hegel and Kant," and we also know that he planned a book containing his extensive thought on what he held to be the influence of Judaism on Karl Marx. Both studies appear in their latest form in this volume, in addition to several other unfinished essays the majority of which were found in his literary remains. One can only speculate as to the reasons for the large amount of unpublished texts, with a spectrum of possible answers ranging from his well-known perfectionism to his sudden and early death. The present volume—published in the centenary year of Schwarzschild's birth—presents a first collection of what the editors believe are his most important works on the relation of Judaism to modern Western philosophy—additional volumes with further essays are to follow.

In terms of our approach to editing Schwarzschild's essays, we took a generally "archival" approach: namely, largely aiming to present readers with versions that are cleaned-up and copyedited, but which preserve the essays largely in the form that Schwarzschild himself left them. In most cases, the essays were already in close-to-publishable form. We have generally kept the rich footnotes material as it was, rather than seeking to update it with more recent scholarly material on the subjects Schwarzschild addressed. The only main exception to this is in relation to items for which Schwarzschild gave information that is now incorrect: e.g., if Schwarzschild referred to a given article as forthcoming, but the article was subsequently published, we have provided the updated publication information.

Likewise, while the essays themselves generally contain original and unpublished material, there are some shorter sub-sections that overlap with some of Schwarzschild's published essays. For instance, a section in the essay on "Alienation" contains the same material as part of Schwarzschild's essay on "The Religious

Stake in Modern Philosophy of Infinity." We have preserved the full material in the "Alienation" essay, rather than removing the overlapping section, while noting in a footnote the redundancy of that subsection with the other essay.

For some essays—particularly the Rosenzweig and Heidegger essay—there were multiple manuscript versions in existence. For each essay, we have used the latest version that Schwarzschild himself had produced. In addition, while the available manuscripts were largely complete, there were a couple of missing pages in the Spinoza manuscript, which we were unable to locate. We have noted those pages in the essay itself. Likewise, there were a few places in various essays where, due to handwriting or the state of the manuscript, the intended word was not fully decipherable, and we have likewise noted those places in the essays.

In addition, some paragraphs in the manuscript were marked with a seeming indication that they should be removed. This appears, in many cases, to be an attempt to shorten the essays with an eye toward publication in a journal. However, for the purposes of this volume, without the stricter word-count requirements of a journal, we have retained those paragraphs, so that readers can access and engage the very interesting material that they often contain.

The editors wish to thank first and foremost Prof. Maimon Schwarzschild of San Diego, Steven's son, without whose untiring help we would have been unable to publish this book. Most of the texts collected here were provided by him. In addition, we thank Robert Gibbs and Reinier Munk—who developed the initial idea for this volume and who helped greatly to realize the plan. We also thank Michael Hasin and Sam Davidson for their long hours of work on the transcriptions of the at times barely legible manuscripts. Thanks also to Reuven Leigh for his help with Maimonidean commentaries. We are grateful to Yeshiva University and its Office of Student Life for permission to republish Schwarzschild's essay "Karl Marx's Jewish Theory of Usury," which originally appeared in the 1977–78 issue of *Gesher*, pages 7–40. We likewise thank Bar-Ilan University and the Faculty of Divinity at the University of Cambridge for supporting the efforts needed for the completion of this volume.

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Introduction: Unnatural Thought—Steven S. Schwarzschild's Collected Works, Volume 1

Robert Gibbs

What is natural thought? Thought that arises from nature, or indeed from the *natal*, that is born. What is posthumous thought? That which appears after death. Despite the folk etymology, posthumous does not refer to the *humus*, the interred. It is rather an intensification of the superlative of post, like *posterus*. Posthumous thought is most-post. That than which nothing more after can appear, like a child born several months after the death of a father. Scholars often do not see their research to print; and some vital work is left in filing cabinets, drawers, on the hard-drive, and now in the cloud. In the case of Schwarzschild a rich set of texts lies unpublished, and others have been consigned to such obscure locations that they require collecting. To this we can compare the excellent volume edited by Menachem Kellner, and indeed, also *published* after Schwarzschild's death, but compiled while Schwarzschild was alive and affording him the chance to add his own afterword, *The Pursuit of the Ideal* (SUNY: 1990). Kellner includes a full bibliography, and what strikes anyone is that Schwarzschild indeed sought such obscure locations that few scholars would ever find them. Schwarzschild's afterword to that volume offers some carefully offhand comments on why he didn't publish primarily and why sometimes he did write and even publish. In the meantime, George Kohler, one of the co-editors of this volume, has published a collection of Schwarzschild on Hermann Cohen, *The Tragedy of Optimism* (SUNY: 2018), which included some of those hard-to-find published pieces and three of the unpublished manuscripts.

What you will find here, however, after a too-long delay, is a first set of hitherto unpublished manuscripts, and in Volume 3, again more of Schwarzschild's unpublished work. Volume 2 will be a mixture of essays that are collected—from obscure sites—and some unpublished work, including his PhD thesis on Cohen and Krochmal. A challenge to this publication is the vast sea of scholarship in every essay—extremely long and complex footnotes, citing a wide array of then-contemporary and also much older scholarship. The argument above the line is bold; the argument in the footnotes is rigorous, sometimes polemical, and often linked to obscure-to-us scholars. Later in this essay, I will write briefly about this kind of scholarship.

I will focus this introduction not on the challenge of resurrecting his writings from the filing cabinets, but rather on what we all will learn from them. At its heart, Schwarzschild's is a thought about justice and the task of practical philosophy—a task he identifies as Jewish Philosophy. The world and the events of this moment are incomplete, demanding an ethical intervention as they fall short of the idea of justice. Such a demand requires a rigorous account of time and infinity—that the future remains always more post. Thought is not natural, not born, but always reaching beyond death, reaching against its birth and against that circle of life and death. Neither natural nor mortal, thought is not natural, even when it can yield an account of nature, and so the dead rise again, and so this brilliant and forceful Schwarzschild becomes more post than the now domesticated postmodern.

One anecdote illustrates my claim: the graduate students at Washington University, where Schwarzschild taught most of his career, were planning a spring picnic. Spring in St. Louis is lush, full of flowers, and trees in bloom. It comes early and is warm, smelling sweetly, and with a riot of green and color. They put up a sign inviting everyone to come outside to a park near the campus, and at the bottom they included a qualification:

Except for Steven Schwarzschild, who everyone knows is at two with nature.

They were right: maybe it was his Jewishness or his German Jewishness or his Cohenian German Jewishness, but Schwarzschild did not like to sit outside and eat on the ground. He did not delight in nature—on principle. And that principle is at stake in my comments here. The needs of reason for Schwarzschild arise against nature.

Schwarzschild's MA Thesis, *On Maimonides' Philosophy of Halachah* (1948), is the last essay in this volume, but it lays out an agenda for Jewish philosophy and central tensions that will occupy him up through his latest and unpublished essays. I will offer some reflection later on the importance of that MA thesis. There is little in Schwarzschild's work that does not refer explicitly to Hermann Cohen, and even then it still does so obliquely. This is not a simple loyalty to a hero—on the contrary, the issue is always philosophy and truth itself. Kohler's earlier edited volume shows a wide range of Schwarzschild's writing on Cohen. And while Cohen is never far from Schwarzschild's attention, this current volume offers rigorous and surprising readings of many philosophers (Maimonides, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Rosenzweig, and Marx) as well as an almost constant intervention in debates with philosophers contemporaneous with Schwarzschild, especially Leo Strauss and Emil Fackenheim.

In this introduction, I do not bear the responsibility to argue that Cohen is right, or even that Schwarzschild is right about Cohen and then by extension right about Spinoza or Hegel, or the others. Instead, I hope to offer readers good reasons to find out what they may make of Schwarzschild's reading of these key historical figures; to learn from Schwarzschild's writings. I will not offer a potted history of Marburg neo-Kantianism here, nor a play-by-play of the writings before you. Instead, let me advance a few provocative claims from Schwarzschild.

Throughout Schwarzschild's work, there is a steady distinction between a metaphysics that thinks the transcendence of reason and ethics and a pantheism where

the infinite is achieved in the finite. At the core of his thought is a sense that the ideas have not yet been actualized. This unachieved messianism, unactualized truth, elusive justice—the not-yet—is a fundamental refrain of Schwarzschild's work. The opposing pantheism is any account that holds that the idea has already happened in time—a familiar view of Christology, some readings of Heidegger, and the current post-Christian Pauline thinkers of the event. The unnatural is itself a way of characterizing this refusal to see the present as already redeemed, as complete, even as adequate.

The Kantian renewal at the heart of Cohen's philosophy was the task to ground or found claims of knowledge—and this task is the flip side of dogmatism. Cohen's philosophy revolves around the question *How do you know?*, and not around the more immediate (dare I say *natural)* question, *What do I know?* Schwarzschild explains how Cohen shifts to a methodological frame of thought to explain how we can justify the knowledge of science, and as well that of mathematics. This requires a methodology displayed in the mathematical calculus and led Schwarzschild (following Cohen) into a historical and conceptual interpretation of the history and philosophy of mathematics. In this volume, his exploration of mathematics is largely in some of the extensive footnotes but it does underlie much of the argument, and in particular the account of Hegel and Kant.

Schwarzschild's account of the conflict between Kant/Cohen and Hegel in "**Alienation"—Judaism as the Philosophical Issue between Hegel and Kant** is a rich and critical view of Hegel. What might surprise some more one-sided readers of the conflict is that Schwarzschild does acknowledge that Hegel's account of Judaism has much that is accurate, but that his *judgment* against this is inadequate and incorrect. Schwarzschild defines the foundational issue of alienation as a question about God—Can God become alienated from God, not only participating in the material world but actually become incarnate and dying? Kant has philosophically constructed philosophy itself as a critical enterprise and prohibits this theological alienation. Hegel, for his own part, struggles according to Schwarzschild, to overcome the radical transcendence of God, as itself a kind of alienation. This radical separation between God and the human quickly resolves into a mode of thinking we may call Jewish, and even if there are Jewish ways of thinking with Kabbalist contractions and emanations, Schwarzschild regards the gap between the human and God as a positive feature for thought, and even more for ethics. The aspiration to become good is not only our factual lot, but it also is ethical, and indeed, also epistemological.

For Schwarzschild, not all Christian thought is the same—there are distinctions between Protestants and Catholics, between thinking that converges with pantheism and the sort that embraces immanence but reserves transcendence for divinity in some way. Hegel may stand in for Christianity (and did claim to do so and thus give a philosophical account of how Judaism and its infinity has been sublated), but Schwarzschild is not assuming that Hegel is either orthodox or heterodox. But Schwarzschild keeps returning to the possibility for truly transcendent infinity—infinity not real nor in any way given in experience.

Schwarzschild insists on the well-established (and self-confessed) claim that Hegel is drawing on a supersession of Christianity beyond Judaism, and that his philosophical project sustains this theological claim throughout. Hence the pivot is the interpretation of Judaism. What perhaps will surprise others more is the complex claim in the essay **The Jewish Kant,** which is a careful distinction between claiming that Kant was a Jew and that his thought is Jewish. Clearly this dovetails closely with the previous essay, but it also explores the ongoing reception of Kant's philosophy with a wit that delights. In the first instance, Schwarzschild explores Kant's biography and his own circle to show his appeal to Jewish scholars despite familiar passages by him rejecting the Jews. But the essay comes alive in its nineteenth-century account of the embrace of Kant by rabbinic and other voices in the Jewish community ("Orthodox Jewish Kantianism"), leading to a valorizing of Kant's emancipatory and liberal agenda for the world. Philosophically, it is Jewish philosophers who then lead the charge back to Kant (after Hegel), and, of course, Hermann Cohen at the center of this. Astutely, Schwarzschild cites Kant's claim about understanding Plato better than Plato understood himself as a guide to Cohen understanding Kant better than Kant understood himself—and Schwarzschild also opens the door to understanding Cohen better than Cohen understood himself. In this context, there must be a clear gap between Kant and the neo-Kantians, but like the Oral Torah and the Written Torah, this historical gap is not a rejection, nor a sublation, but a kind of recovery and novelty. This tradition continues through Soloveitchik, Hutner, Buber, Heschel, and Levinas.

Alas, the final act of the story of the Jewish Kant is the rise of the German Kant in the early twentieth century and the violence of philosophical antisemitism, refashioning an interpretation of Kant and the silencing of neo-Kantian voices, and even critical editions. The Jewish Kant was banned in Germany, and in many ways survived, if at all, in dispersion. This story itself of this silencing has often been silenced and left in oblivion, and here Schwarzschild calls to mind both the place of the Jewish Kant and the ongoing resistance to it and to Jewish Philosophy.

In the context of the ongoing debates between Hegelians and Kantians, and even Jewish Hegelians and Jewish Kantians, Schwarzschild articulates a notion of Jewish Philosophy. His notion is more than "merely an accommodation to non-Jewish philosophical truth"—which would be interesting enough, which is a familiar claim that principles are assimilated from outside Judaism (that is, "Philosophy") and then domesticated into Judaism. Rather, insofar as Judaism is true, then its truth itself must be in principle universalizable, something that all rational beings are capable of knowing. For Schwarzschild this truth entails a fundamental "dualism" of God and the created world, and thus recognizes the unredeemed nature of our world, and which sets the ethical task of redeeming the world beyond the metaphysical task of thinking it. In the issue of alienation between Kant and Hegel, we have both a theological impasse, and also a political and moral one. For Schwarzschild moves onto the more contemporary terrain of the meaning of human alienation, and the demand to overcome that in some sort of authenticity or absolute spirit. Schwarzschild offers a sharp battle between a Kantian self who is never perfected and always on the way in a world that itself is also never perfected—a source of alienation within an

alienated world—and a Hegelian self, a mature self, who is reconciled with himself and recognizes the world as already spirit. Because of the intensity of the overcoming of alienation, not only does the perfected human become one with the already perfected world, but—of course—with God, too. And so absolute spirit arises as the already absolute subject, or rather that the human can become absolute spirit, can become God. This is for Schwarzschild, and for the Jewish tradition, abhorrent and particularly when claimed as already present, even more outrageous. Schwarzschild sees both the philosophical hubris and also the moral and political quietism as emphatically motivating, then a return to the Kantian position—a return that is not a dogmatic claim nor a particularist Jewish claim, but as an exercise of reason.

From this opposition of Hegel and Kant, it is a short step to Marx, and indeed to the continuing question of what it means to recognize the Jewish and the Jew in Marx. The two essays here (one under-published and the other unpublished) are linked offering a specific reading of biographical interpretations of Marx in relation to Judaism and his own life as a Jew, and then a specific interpretation of usury and the Jewish traditional account of limits and attitudes to money and usury, as well as Marx's own economic analysis of usury. Two books from the 1960s explore Marx as Jew (Künzli and Massiczek), and Schwarzschild uses these as a chance to shape a careful reading, more of Marx's philosophy than of his biography. The challenge is that Marx was fiercely critical of Judaism and of the Jews, and in Schwarzschild's day neo-conservative Jewish thinkers were making political use of these comments to label Marx and Marxism as antisemitic, and so motivating their claims to justify the renewal of capitalism. Schwarzschild takes up these various hostile texts by Marx; he contextualizes them in relation to Marx's parents, Marx's wife, and to the crisis of emancipation in the mid-nineteenth century. But Schwarzschild unearths both a richer account of Jewish economic history and also of the role of Jewish thought in Marx's work.

I will highlight only two of his themes about Marx: one is the relation to messianism with its critique of the present state of the world, and its consequent demand for change, and the other is the economic issues themselves, especially about money and profit. The question of messianism is fraught, most of all, due to the pseudo-messianisms, including Frankism and Sabbateanism—both of which Schwarzschild notes were prominent in the context of Marx's familial background. A vital task for Jewish Philosophy is to separate a false messianic claim to set the world right all at once from the messianism of an ongoing unceasing critique and repair of the world. The rejection of quietism and the claims that the world is already redeemed animates Marx, especially with the need not to understand the world but to change it. Schwarzschild does careful work to measure and diagnose how messianism animates Marx.

But in the short piece on usury, Schwarzschild makes clear that the critique of the Jews, that money is their God, is itself a classic Jewish anti-idolatrous criticism, deeply rooted in Biblical, rabbinic, and in different ways, medieval Jewish thought. Usury, or taking interest, is an abuse of the future, enslaving both time and the borrower. Schwarzschild martials a compelling set of texts, showing rejection of taking interest, expanding it to all borrowers, accommodating temporary needs, and in

general marking the risk of oppression and the instrumentalization of the future a severe violation of Jewish law and value. But this fits with the critical edge of Jewish Philosophy—that in the world as we find it, there still is too much idolatrous greed and economic oppression. Thus, Marx's distinction between the Sabbath Jew and the Jews in his own social world reflects the need for a prophetic (and rabbinic) critique of society.

If I may highlight one further issue, it is the way Marx and Judaism were not a focal point for studying Marx, not in Schwarzchild's day, nor still in ours. Not unlike the case of Kant, Marx's harsh critical comments about Jews hide the deeper philosophical connection, and in several other cases also, Schwarzschild showed a remarkable rigor and insight in exploring both the sources of the critical comments *and* the sustaining Jewish orientation and philosophical association. This displays a key feature in Schwarzschild's thought: that to unearth the philosophical affinity, and indeed, the universality of Jewish Philosophy, one must read *through* the social context, to take up the sustained and hostile views of Judaism and of Jews, and also bring forward traditional rabbinic texts to assess their philosophical import. Loyalty to Judaism is not the same as a whitewash either of Jews and their communities, nor a defense of often ignorant critiques of Judaism. The task is not in any simple sense completable and so indicates one of the reasons that Schwarzschild did not publish so many of his richest writings—and what he did publish is often still open-facing.

I cannot begin to harvest the full range of fruit from all the essays in this volume, but I do wish to address two more features, and in particular to identify them in relation to two of the leading Jewish thinkers from the mid- and late twentieth century: Emil Fackenheim and Leo Strauss. Schwarzschild was unwavering in his criticism of their work, even as he engaged it carefully and with real energy. The features that I will identify are the risk of ethnicism, and the task of scholarship in Jewish Philosophy. Like Schwarzschild, both Fackenheim and Strauss were refugees from Germany. Both were deeply influenced by Franz Rosenzweig, and in two of the writings here assembled we see Schwarzschild's sustained critique of each. In the discussion of Hegel, Schwarzschild draws somewhat on Fackenheim, but in the extremely challenging essay **Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger: The German and the Jewish Turns to Ethnicism**, Fackenheim emerges as a key representative of a false and dangerous turn in Rosenzweig.

To begin, Schwarzschild's essay establishes a consistent and fierce critique of Heidegger, as a volkist, neo-pagan thinker—showing that the allegiance to a series of concepts suitable for Nazism and opposed to the rational and universal reach of an ethical philosophy begins early and continues with variation in Heidegger's thought. This is a sharp attack for Continental Philosophy, but for Jewish Philosophy it is the close alignment of Rosenzweig on the question of the Jewish people that is most troubling. Schwarzschild traces the Davos debate of Cassirer and Heidegger and moves back into Rosenzweig's works to find the articulation of ideas about the Jewish people that allow for an alignment, albeit with real differences, toward Heidegger. The claims about a *people with God* (in contrast to a people that *is* God—rejected for its idolatrous content—or *under* God, which seems closer to Hermann Cohen) approaches a biological claim that Schwarzschild (and others)

saw as risky, and even Rosenzweig recognized ethnic chauvinism as a perennial risk for Judaism. Rosenzweig was no Zionist and did not make any claim for a Jewish national state—in obvious contrast with Heidegger's German political loyalty. Schwarzschild explores the ethical and political implications for each thinker, and he also shows how the Jewish followers of both ran risks in their thinking of peoplehood, or as Schwarzschild calls it, ethnicism.

A steady refrain, however, is a recovery of the claim not merely that Judaism is not in its own sources restricted to a biological category, but also how the more essential claim—that there is a task of redeeming this world, an incompletable task—is a claim that is not exclusively Jewish, but rather is found in Plato, and in Kant, and in much of philosophy. Again, this is a restatement of the rejection of Hegel's incarnational shift to ontology and metaphysical speculation over the primacy of practical reason. There is, for Schwarzschild, an ongoing struggle against the reproach of "empty formalism" in any rigorous ethical viewpoint. His critique of Rosenzweig then responds to the suspicion that the specificity and current reality of Jews will be employed as a normative resolution supposedly lacking in neo-Kantian philosophy and its ethics. To his credit, Schwarzschild regularly takes note of how Rosenzweig is not captive to the too immanent argument for existence itself as the true ground of ethics—rather it is divine command and a God who transcends the world.

But in Rosenzweig's circle and followers, there are many who affirmed a reduction of ethics to ethnicity. Emil Fackenheim is certainly the one who stands for this—although H.J. Schoeps and Michael Wyschogrod as well as others are addressed in this essay. In each case, the role of Heidegger is in some ways more essential to their thinking, but Rosenzweig, according to Schwarzschild, lured them with his own account of the Jewish people. While different readings of Rosenzweig are possible, Schwarzschild tells the story of how Jewish philosophy was losing its way in the mid- and late twentieth century.

Schwarzschild's PhD thesis, "Two Modern Jewish Philosophies of History: Nahman Krochmal and Hermann Cohen," addressed the challenge of naturalism in 1955. I pause to refer to it, even though it won't appear until the second volume of this set, as it prepares the way from the challenge of Rosenzweig's ethnicism back to Maimonides' rationalism in the MA thesis from 1948, and a true philosophy of history. For those who know anything about the three (including Schwarzschild), the result is certainly not surprising: Schwarzschild sides unambiguously with Cohen. The work is a work of contrasts: biologicism vs. rationality; a history of peoples vs. a history of states; naturalistic thinking vs. philosophical enquiry.

Schwarzschild's forced contrast of Krochmal and Cohen is a bit sharper: on the one hand a genuine *philosophy of history* (Cohen), and on the other barely *a philosophical history*. While Cohen would have had no time for Krochmal, Schwarzschild does work Krochmal up into the one bona fide alternative to Cohen's rationalism. He engages in a critical reconstruction of the two positions and argues that there are only two alternatives, and then validates Cohen's rationalism. At the core of the difference lies the problem to justify Jewish history itself: either it is bound to a universal philosophical history and so loses its connection to the historical specificity of

the Jews, or it begins with the fact of the Jews. Either way, the project of a true philosophical historical account of Judaism is doubtful if not simply impossible. But Schwarzschild's choice for the rationalist model (that compromises on the facts of Jewish history) revolves around ethics.

Schwarzschild affirms Cohen's claims from the philosophy of history: that what makes history is human action, indeed, human freedom in action. Without that freedom, the events that comprise history are not truly historical—but simply natural and necessary, even if temporal. But the act of thinking philosophically also can be the topic for history because philosophers, too, act through freedom. They think by means of freedom, not just freedom from persecution or coercion, but the freedom to think rationally and to interpret events by the free use of reason. That ethical tone in the study of history takes us a real distance from curiosity. It is not a question of assembling a moralistic history of political or religious events, or even of philosophical positions. On the contrary, the making sense of history is about articulating moral tasks for the future. Schwarzschild offers as strong and honest a reconstruction of Krochmal as he can, but there is little doubt that Cohen is destined to be the winner—for Cohen is capable of a philosophy of history, and not just some philosophical history.

Still, there is also the possibility of a contrary philosophy of history—and one thinks here of Hegel again and again, but also of Vico, or even of the ancient Greeks. If Krochmal could not construe Jewish History into a full-fledged Jewish Philosophy of History, that is because his philosophical tools are not adequate. They are, to put it bluntly, too naturalistic. In 1955, we see just how opposed to naturalism Schwarzschild can be in this brutal parenthetical comment about idolatry:

That Krochmal would propound it makes sense in terms of his general biologistic outlook, for it is only consistent that the definition of Israel as a biologically different entity should be accompanied by a definition of history derived from the biological analogy of growth and decay and the eternal re-birth of nature. (It would be interesting to speculate whether we are not here faced with a parallel to the conflict between the religion of the Bible, the religion of God who is above nature and even contrasted with nature, on the one hand, and Canaanite nature cults, on the other, in which the same biological analogies determine theology as well as ethics. The short of it seems to be that nature is an alluring but also a deceptive mirror in which to look for the image of God or of man.) (p.81)

In contrast to any attempt to root truth in the existence of a specific community, even a Jewish one, philosophical history discerns how each of us, each moment in history, each community is animated by a striving for justice (or by a toxic claim already to be just or to restore some pretended in the past moment that was perfect). Even historical studies need to be *not* a natural mode but to be subjected to a critical idea of justice—that history is not that things have been as they should, but an account of how things should have been and were not.

But perhaps the most striking and complicated case for Schwarzschild is Leo Strauss—for from the days of his MA thesis, Schwarzschild was committed to the primacy of practical reason (less shy of it than Cohen who feared the Fichtean floodgate). It is through Schwarzschild that many first encountered the analogy for

jurisprudence as the organon of ethics with mathematics as the organon of science. And so, it is remarkable to find Schwarzschild staking out the highest place for philosophy of law in his master's thesis, in 1948. Here are the themes that recur throughout his life's work: the messianism, the historical sensibility, the engagement with Cohen, the serious reflection on Jewish philosophy. For us, this undiminishable passion for philosophy of law is a legacy. But when he writes, in 1948, he laments the minor engagement of Jewish scholars with philosophy of law, and in particular with Maimonides.

Consider this mandate:

Firstly, philosophy of law is more important to Judaism in general than philosophy at large, and secondly, the history of the philosophy of Jewish law is more relevant to today's philosophy of Jewish law than is the history of Jewish philosophy as such to today's Jewish philosophy.

The first claim orients not just law, but specifically the philosophy of law as at the center of Jewish Philosophy, and indeed, of signal importance for Judaism more broadly. The sort of reasoning that animates philosophy of law is the touchstone for Jewish Philosophy—practical and rational, and binding the world to be known to the task of justice. The second claim requires us to see that reason has a need for history, but that the tradition of philosophy of law is more significant in our time than is that of thinking through the history of philosophy itself. It is this second claim that locates Schwarzschild as a distinctive kind of liberal Jew. He is obliged to think about Jewish law not as simply a positive, revealed law, but also grasps that our task is to engage with the history of philosophy of law as we explore and reinterpret the past—for we cannot ignore or jettison it, but must recover and renew it, in order to recover and renew Jewish law, and thence, Jewish Philosophy.

His thesis negotiates one polarity and one opponent. The opponent is Leo Strauss, and his *Philosophy and Law* book. The polarity is Rosenzweig and Cohen. For Schwarzschild, Strauss represents the Rosenzweig side of the pole and as such also offers a mistaken way of reading Maimonides, obscuring both Maimonides' rationalism and his capacity to grasp the history of philosophy of law in Judaism. Because the thesis has as its goal a recovery of Maimonides' rationalism, Schwarzschild is largely critical of most of the more recent theory about esotericism. The key is a rejection of the claim that Maimonides could have held that some laws were anti-rational, or even super-rational. The thesis' frame and conclusion present a contrast of Cohen's rationalism with Rosenzweig's existentialism. Schwarzschild allows Rosenzweig the claim of more insight into the existential situation of observant Jews. But as the two face off in his reading, Maimonides lines up very tightly with Cohen, and rationalism for the most part wins out again. Still, there is more attention and care given to Rosenzweig as an orientation for future Jewish Philosophy.

While many years later, in the essay on Heidegger and Rosenzweig, Schwarzschild can accentuate how much Strauss helps us see the consistency of Heidegger's politics and his existential philosophy, even in his MA, Schwarzschild flagged a danger in locating Jewish revelation beyond reason and beyond time. In the shadow is the emergence of the neo-conservative account of Judaism and of political

philosophy—with its clear rejection of the liberal account of the task of the pursuit of justice. In the MA thesis, Strauss' account of super-rational revelation of law is attacked as a misreading of Maimonides.

What shines forth in the conclusion of the MA thesis, however, is a non-reducible tension between a rational religion and an existential one—where revelation does exceed reason. That Maimonides should *not* be recruited to that latter account is a clear and remarkable insight into the challenge of contemporary Jewish Philosophy. Somehow, however, we will need to attend to the history of Judaism. History of law and history of philosophy of law serve as a fascinating counter-balance to the normal liberal and rational account of the future of law. Indeed, his key hypothesis is that we need both the rationalism of Cohen with its rationalist reading of Maimonides to secure the future of Jewish law, *and* we also need some sort of account of the historical as discernable in the emergence not so much of Strauss' Maimonides, but of an existential account of Jewish religion.

I wish to include one anecdote from the days of our friendship. I was sent to meet Schwarzschild by J. Claude Evans, his colleague at Washington University when I started teaching at St. Louis University (the Jesuit school across town). Schwarzschild was hardly warm to me when we first met, but he did agree to read with me the *Lectures Talmudiques* of Levinas (which were not yet translated). I took advantage of the situation to forge an abiding friendship with Schwarzschild. A single comment of Schwarzschild's is noteworthy here: he held that Levinas (and Cohen) were serious talmudic philosophers. He divided the *serious* world into three: philosophers, talmudic scholars, and talmudic philosophers. In Levinas' case, he was not sure that Levinas was a serious philosopher, but he was wagering that he was a serious talmudic philosopher—that is, that when he thought philosophically with the talmud, he achieved a higher level of seriousness.

Schwarzschild's MA thesis addresses not merely formal considerations; instead, he set to thinking about halachah, as a philosopher. That means taking up specific texts, engaging with casuistry, not for the sake of a ruling, but for the sake of philosophy. This, despite the efforts of some Kantians, need not be a formalist reading. On the contrary, this sort of thinking finds in laws and in cases the schematism to particularity that applies the infinitesimal and the history of laws (and philosophy) to produce the truth in the unique case.

What is most striking, however, is that such a philosophy of halachah, of Jewish inflected Law, can claim to be philosophy—can become a discipline or a field of philosophy. I am not, again, arguing that to read Cohen we need all of us to restrict our focus to Jewish laws—but Schwarzschild's challenge is that we may need to examine them, *too*. Not all of his own writings are bound to Maimonides, as he was in his master's thesis. He treats many non-halachic philosophers, and indeed, many non-Jewish ones. But his orientation to them is rarely out of step with this agenda.

With this specific turn to historical study, Schwarzschild raises the stakes for doing scholarship. Beyond the impact assessment: despite his limited publication record, the thought of Hermann Cohen is still an important topic for research—and directly due to Schwarzschild's influence. The three volumes now beginning include essays on Maimonides, Halevi, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Schönberg, Adorno, Marx,

Cassirer, Rosenzweig, and Heidegger, as well as (below the line) engagement with Strauss, Rotenstreich, Guttman, Wolfson, and a whole host of other prominent and less so scholars. So much history, so little in print! Is this a lost treasure (yes!), but it seems history hidden for the future, or almost lost or…

So, beyond the philosophical point about the unnatural task of the historian, there is also the unnatural accounting by scholarship, and then the complex question for all of us about what Schwarzschild's work can mean in our reading of Cohen (or Marx or…). Will he teach us what they really said? Or will he teach us how to read or to think with them? Does his lost scholarship give us today not only a new Schwarzschild, but a new way of reading Jewish philosophy? And finally: Is Schwarzschild's scholarship itself *Jewish*? That is: Is there a way that engaging with the traditions of thinkers itself can be seen to be bound up with the unnatural metaphysics we have already seen? Were the *Wissenschaftlers* not Jewish enough, even though they made Judaism their study and generated new tools? Were they too bound to Spinoza's anti-Jewish naturalism?

I believe here we can see something that distinguishes Schwarzschild from Cohen, or rather that distinguishes Schwarzschild's reading of Cohen, and so creates part of the springboard for the future: Schwarzschild is unequivocal in the task of Jewish Philosophy as both Jewish and Philosophy. Cohen was no less committed (on Schwarzschild's reading) but was less explicit and more circumspect. In this we can see a certain imitation of Cohen by Levinas—who was no less committed personally, nor unwilling to assert the place of Jewish themes and ideas in his philosophical writings, but who also did not make explicit how Jewish his thought was.

Schwarzschild often quips things like, "I take a Jewish viewpoint," or "I write as a Jewish scholar," but his own position is that the claims he advances are also universal and rational. Is Schwarzschild's reading of Cohen, that so explicitly binds up his Judaism with his philosophy an invitation to think differently? Was Cohen's (and Levinas') discretion a rhetoric that welcomed all, or is Schwarzschild's reading not only more accurate but also a fairer invitation that lets you know what sort of healthy fare you will be provided? Thus we, reading Schwarzschild's posthumous work, can see that a focal point for our prospect will be not just a vindication of Cohen's and the ethical importance of the future and time, but also a specific identification of the way that Jewish and Philosophy belong together. Let me add, at this point, that Schwarzschild's explicitness is, of course, characteristic of his unpublished works even more so than of his published. But this explicit theme is consistent throughout his writings.

Like so much else, this uncommon opportunity to be explicitly Jewishly Philosophical, and to claim that it does not compromise the philosophical task but supports it, is one of the most important insights that I drew from our companionship, and, indeed, has survived throughout my own academic work. From Schwarzschild we learn that we can be explicit about the way that Jewish Philosophy is both—and very much philosophy. Not oblivious to the questions of compromise about Judaism as a people, and on existential experiences—but forced to make those compromises for the sake of intelligibility and above all for ethics. For him, naturalism is no more tolerable when it is Jewish than in any other guise.

To publish what was left for the future is to re-deposit it for a future beyond this moment. This is a way to allow Schwarzschild to become posthumous, to be the Jewish thinker who for our time is most post, and so to challenge our generation and the next ones to become more post. To share the scholarship and creativity of Schwarzschild's works with others is to offer a new legacy, from the tireless decades of Schwarzschild's attention and passion. It is to heed his interrogation of natural thinking—and to allow Schwarzschild to teach us that all thinking as such is unnatural.

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Chapter 1
Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger: The German and the Jewish Turns to Ethnicism [1988]

Introduction*

(*) Parts of this study have been read over the years, while I was trying to decide whether and how it should be published, at the Hochschule für Jüdische Studien, Heidelberg, at the Leo Baeck Institute, NY, at the Philosophy Department of the University of Southern Illinois, Edwardsville, IL, and at the International F. Rosenzweig Conference in Kassel, West Germany.

In broad strokes I want to draw a diagram, as it were, of one phase of European intellectual history in the twentieth century and of some of its major political accompaniments. It is a phase that has to be of special importance to Germans and to Jews, but it must also be important to other men, for its philosophical and historical ramifications have long since engulfed the rest of mankind. Furthermore, I propose to show that this historical episode has significantly contributed to bringing all of us where we are now and that the forces that operated in it will, if continued, go on determining our and our children's future for good or ill to some considerable extent.

The episode of which I speak is the convergence of the Jewish philosophical theologian Franz Rosenzweig's developing thought from the 1910s until his death in 1929 with the thought and program of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. (Heidegger became a Nazi before Nazism even attained to power, and he never rescinded what he had said and done until literally after his death. Heidegger's philosophical influence continues to grow and to spread throughout the world to this day.) Having shown this convergence and its personal, historical, and philosophical implications, I propose also to show how its thrust effected subsequent developments, especially in the area of Jewish thought and orientation. (The German

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dimension of this subsequent development is treated in much extant literature.) And I intend to conclude with an analysis of the philosophical desiderata for a healthier social and historical evolution from here on in.

Davos

From March 17 to April 6, 1929, a philosophical seminar took place in Davos, Switzerland, which has since become quite famous and notorious. Two chief antagonists were present—Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger. The central subject of discussion turned out to be the question of the proper interpretation of Immanuel Kant. The cultural, if you please—the spiritual, and even the political implications of this philosophical subject were also articulated or at least adumbrated. Heidegger, for one, himself reported that he said on the occasion: "'*Weltanschauung*' is the presupposition of philosophizing."[1] In fact, "Davos" was almost like a medieval morality-play, in which the two antagonists represented great ideas or virtues. Even physically Cassirer embodied the spirit of civilized, humanistic, rational culture, as he did throughout his life, while Heidegger embodied the earth-bound, native *vox populi*.[2] Everybody was conscious of the fact that the former was a Jew, the other a Swabian German.[3] (Jürgen Habermas was to call Heidegger "the *philosophus*

[1] Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Frankfurt 1973, 256.

[2] Karlfried Gründer, in a lecture presented at a conference on Cassirer in Zurich Nov. 21/22, 1986, "Das Davoser Gespräch zwischen Cassirer und Heidegger," published in *Über Ernst Cassirers Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, eds. Hans-Jürg Braun, Helmut Holzhey and Ernst Wolfgang Orth, Frankfurt 1988, 290–302, formulates this perception of the occasion by lapsing into the style of fairy-tales: "Once upon a time …" Cassirer is referred to several times at the time and since as "the Olympian," "a "grand-seigneur," and a man of "aristocratic elegance." As a whole this study of Gründer's is the fullest factual account that I am aware of and a touching description of the Davos seminars.

[3] Cf. Henrik J. Pos, "Recollections of Ernst Cassirer," in *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer,* ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, Evanston 1949, 63: "The contrast (between the two) was not theoretical but human." At the end of the sessions, Heidegger refused to shake hands with Cassirer. (*Ib*., 69) (Mrs. Aron Gurwitsch, present at a reading of part of this study at the Leo Baeck Institute in New York, confirmed to me that her late husband, who attended the Davos seminar, also used to speak about this incident. Others deny that it happened—for example, Maurice de Gandillac, "Entretiens avec Martin Heidegger," *Les Temps Modernes,* Jan. 1946, 174, and Michel Palmier, *Les ecrits politiques de Martin Heidegger,* Paris, n.d., 63, 65, where he calls Mrs. Cassirer's report "ridiculous," and Gründer, *loc. cit*., who strongly doubts that what he cites Jürgen Habermas as calling "the refused handshake" ever took place.) Toni Cassirer, in her *Aus meinem Leben mit Ernst Cassirer*, New York 1950, 165ff. speaks of "Heidegger, der sich vorgenommen hatte, Cohens Leistung in den Staub zu ziehen … Ich fühlte sehr wohl, worin die Gegnerschaft zu der Marburger Schule und auch zu Ernst bestand." Cassirer's wife aptly describes Heidegger as having been more in step with the times than her husband was and, therefore, achieving rhetorical success with the students. That he was to become a Nazi strikes her as entirely consistent. (Cf. Guido Schneeberger, *Ergänzungen zu einer Heidegger-Bibliographie*, Bern 1960, 8, and Carl H. Hamburg, "A Cassirer-Heidegger Seminar," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 25:2, Dec. 1964, 208.) Thus, Fritz Kaufmann's asser-

tion that the disagreement between "Marburg" and phenomenology "has always been carried out in an exemplarily fair way ("Cassirer, Neo-Kantianism, and Phenomenology," *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, op. cit., 823) is totally false. It is curious that Herrigel (cf. below) complains about, if anything, too much conciliatoriness in the Davos debate. But he, too, comments on the even physical contrast between the two men. As late as *Philosophische Rundschau* 20:1–2, 1979, 149 Hans-Georg Gadamer (cf. below) again tried to vindicate Heidegger's behavior at Davos. Without giving any evidence, Gadamer simply issues German-professorial pronouncements. He does this in the process of superciliously rejecting Pierre Bourdieu's *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, in the German translation, in favor of his hero, Heidegger. Even if it were true that Bourdieu's sociological reduction of philosophy misses the mark, namely philosophy, idolators like Gadamer won't appreciate the service that atheists render true religion when they ground the idols in the dust—Whether Heidegger, in addition to being a Nazi ethnicist, was also an outright antisemite is also still being debated. George Steiner, *Martin Heidegger*, New York 1978, 124 denies it. So does Lucien Goldmann, *Lukàcs and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy,* London 1977, 17. I believe they are wrong: cf. Karl Jaspers, *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger*, ed. Hans Saner, Munich/Zurich 1978, 15, 278; Toni Cassirer, op. cit., 113: "Auch seine Neigung zum Antisemitismus war uns nicht fremd;" Karl Schuhmann, "Zu Heideggers Spiegel-Gespräch" (cf. below), 608; my retired friend and colleague, Prof. Herbert Spiegelberg, tells me that Prof. Hans-Georg Gadamer has spoken of Heidegger's "*Bauernantisemitismus*." In any case, I can never understand the point that those want to make who deny Heidegger's antisemitism. Is it that they think that Heidegger and his thought were dastardly, except that he was not an antisemite?—For Heidegger's nostalgia for the peasantry cf. below, and as early as 1927 Heinrich Barth (the brother of Karl), in *Philosophie der praktischen Vernunft*, Tübingen 1927, who characterizes him there as a thinker of the petty bourgeoisie, 182ff. (Cf. also Hans-Joachim Schoeps, below.) Robert Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things,* Evanston 1974, 212f., n. 7: "Heidegger's thoughts are most appropriate for the village, not the city." Emmanuel Levinas, in *Totality and Infinity,* tr. Alphonso Lingis, The Hague 1969, 46, connects ontological philosophy in general with "the destiny of sedentary peoples, owners and users of the earth … ontology of nature, impersonal fecundity, generous mother without visage… philosophy of injustice;" cf. also his *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, Paris 1967, 170f.: "It is not certain that National Socialism stems from the mechanical reification of men and that it does not rest on peasants' rootage and feudal adoration of men-in-service of masters and lords who command them. We deal here with an existence that accepts itself as natural, for which its place in the sun, its soil, its *place* orient all significance. We deal here with a peasant's *existing.* Being ordains it to be builder and cultivator, in the bosom of a familiar countryside, and maternal earth. Anonymous, neuter, it ordains it ethically indifferent and, like a heroic freedom, alien to all guilt with respect to the Other. This maternity of the earth determines in effect the entire Occidental civilization of property, of exploitation, of political tyranny and of war" (Émile-Auguste Chartier). Alain in the same connection (*Éléments de philosophie*, Paris 1941, 94) speaks of philosophy as "no more a politics than it is an agriculture" (*La philosophie n'est pas plus une politique qu'elle n'est une agriculture*.). For the Cassirer side of the matter, and specifically for the Jewish dimension of Cassirer, cf. my forthcoming "The Jewish Dimension of Ernst Cassirer's Life and Work." In any case, Heidegger had had earlier goes at him. In Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward S. Robinson, London 1962 490, n. there is a passing reference to him. Shortly before the Davos meeting, Heidegger reviewed the second volume of Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, Heft 21, 1928, cols. 1000–1012. Here, though still respectful toward the author, he already levels critique at Marburg's epistemological criticism in terms of his own ontological quest (cols. 1007f.) and falls back on *Being and Time.* Cassirer in turn refers to Heidegger in Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,* New Haven 1929, vol. 3, 149 n., 163, n., 173, n., 189, n. (This volume was published in 1929 but written before *Sein und Zeit* appeared—which explains that all these Heidegger references are in added footnotes.) (Cf. David R. Lipton, *Ernst Cassirer:*

teutonicus.")[4] The occasion was in every way the last great philosophical confrontation of the gentleman and the peasant-in-arms before the roof fell in in 1933.

The two chief lecturers and their adherents produced a good deal of literature that resulted in various ways from this encounter,[5] and there is also a good deal of secondary literature in various languages that deals with the history and the philosophical ramifications of the Davos seminar.[6] It should perhaps be mentioned, in

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The Dilemma of a Liberal German Intellectual in Germany 1914–1933, Buffalo 1978, 140 and index. Lipton propounds a silly thesis—that Cassirer swerved from Marburg neo-Kantianism, allegedly abstract and irrelevant, between World War I and 1927 and that after 1927, as illustrated in the last volume of the *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, he reverted to Cohenian logicism [*Ib*., 150ff. et al.]. All parts of this simplistic thesis are false. Lipton himself points out that Verene and Hendel, for example, esteem the third volume most highly [*Ib*., 192, n. 4]. Cassirer did tend to try to conciliate all sorts of deviations from Marburg neo-Kantianism—Natorp, Husserl, and even Heidegger, etc., but this was a manifestation of his intellectually aristocratic irenicism—or, as Prof. Krois put it once at the previously mentioned conference on Cassirer in Zurich, he always lifted his hat to everything he passed, perfect gentleman that he was; thus, instead of arguing against Heidegger, he claimed that he was addressing himself to questions beyond, not necessarily opposed to, those of Heidegger.) At the very end of Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, New Haven 1946, 293, he mentions Heidegger in a warning against totalitarianism—as one says in Hebrew, and Cassirer would have said, had he known Hebrew: "*vehamaskil yaskil*."

[4] Cited in Stéphane Mosès, *Système et Révélation:La philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig*, Paris 1982, 307.

[5] See e.g., Cassirer's "'Spirit' and 'Life' in Contemporary Philosophy," in *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer,* op., cit. = *Neue Rundschau,* 41, 1930. This essay was written down after having been orally delivered at Davos; cp. Prof. Donald Verene's tentative catalogue of Cassirer's papers in the Rare Books and Manuscripts Library of the Beinecke Library of Yale University, nos. 94f., 100, 103/2. "Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation," *Kant-Studien* 36, 1931, 1–26 (Verene catalogue, no. 196/a) and "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke S. Gram, Chicago 1967. Heidegger's lectures at the University of Marburg in the winter-semester 1925/1926 (Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 21, Frankfurt 1976, ed. Walter Biemel) clearly prepare the way for his presentation at the Davos Seminar. (Indeed, as Gründer points out in his previously mentioned lecture at the Zurich Cassirer conference, Heidegger claimed at Davos that he was delivering an extemporaneous lecture, whereas in fact he had delivered the same lecture twice previously—some day someone will have to explain to me why a man would want to mystify his own life even when this does not seem to serve any discernible purpose.) Hermann Cohen and Marburg neo-Kantianism constitute one of the principal targets for criticism in these lectures of Heidegger's (cf. 51, 271f., 282, etc.). Heidegger states that *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* resulted from his university lectures in 1927/1928 (op. cit., and 3rd ed., Frankfurt, 1965—2nd ed., 1951) and from the Davos meeting (Ib., preface). The 4th ed. supplies Heidegger's own record of the Davos discussions in an appendix (250ff.). For Heidegger's other extensive treatments of Kant and Kantianism, cf. the extant bibliographies.

[6] *Die II. Davoser Hochschulkurse 17. März bis 6. April*, Davos 1929; *Davoser Revue* 4:7, 1929; Guido Schneeberger, *Nachlese zu Heidegger: Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken*, Bern 1962, especially Ludwig Englert, "Als Student bei den zweiten Davoser Hochschulklassen," 3; Hamburg, op. cit.; Lipton, op. cit., 155–159; Joseph E. Doherty, *Sein, Mensch und Symbol Heidegger und die Auseinandersetzung mit dem neukantianischen Symbolbegriff*, Bonn 1972, esp. chapt. 2, "Heidegger's Critique of Cassirer's Philosophy of Culture." See also Else-Rahel Freund, *Franz Rosenzweig's Philosophy of Existence*, The Hague 1979, 78; Ludwig Marcuse, in a later letter to *Der Spiegel*, who speaks of it having been "harmonious" and, for the rest, follows the line

view of the main thrust of my discussion below, that a considerable number of Jews played important roles in organizing the Davos seminar: the Frankfurt sociologist Salomon de la Tour, who described himself to Karlfried Gründer as a descendant of a Cohen and *Mordbrenner*, set it up; Albert Einstein raised money for it by playing the violin. I certainly cannot fully explore its philosophical content—important though particularly this is.

The intellectual contrast between Cassirer and Heidegger centered on their respective understanding of Kant. Cassirer was the most important thinker in the second generation of Hermann Cohen's Marburg neo-Kantianism. Putting it too simply, this school of thought held that the dominant lesson to be learned from Kant is that man—all men—create their world (scientifically, ethically and socio-politically, artistically, and religiously) by their various ways of using reason and that this reason is a priori, pure, and, therefore, among other things, universal. This is the pristine source of Kant's ideal of cosmopolitanism ("*Weltbürgertum*"), which Cohen and Cassirer extrapolated for their times. At Davos, Cassirer lectured formally on "Fundamental Problems of Philosophical Anthropology"—a title that, as his preserved notes show, really announced a careful, yet conciliatory, critique of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*.[7] (He also gave a special lecture on "The Opposition of Spirit and Life in Scheler's Philosophy"—again, as the published text shows, a conciliatory critique.) In the course of this, he reasserts his basic Marburg neo-Kantianism and identifies himself with Hermann Cohen as not exclusively the critical epistemologist against whom Heidegger polemicizes but as primarily a rationalistic ethicist.

Heidegger came to Kant by a different route. Having started out as a Jesuit novice, he began with the Christian scholastics and their Greek forebears[8]— found himself in the world of German academic philosophy at the beginning of this century (where many neo-Kantianisms and then anti-Kantianisms competed for predominance)—fell under the influence of Edmund Husserl—and at the time of the Davos seminar was actually occupying what had been Hermann Cohen's chair at the University of Marburg.[9] His *magnum opus*, *Being and Time*, had just been published (1927) and was, as it remained, the great event of the time. On Heidegger's reading of Kant the chief lesson to be learned is that reason is an instrument of the

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of splitting Heidegger into the (great) philosopher and the (bad) politician; Otto F. Bollnow, "Gespräche in Davos," in *Erinnerungen an Martin Heidegger*, ed. Günter Neske, Pfullingen 1977, who confirms my reconstruction completely.

[7] Cassirer and Heidegger each had his own reporter. The published reports on Cassirer's lectures do not reflect the concentration on Heidegger's texts. Heidegger, in any case, wrote his own report. (Cf. Gründer, *loc. cit*., 293.)

[8] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (dedicated to Heinrich Rickert), Tübingen 1916, op. cit., 27ff., 35ff.

[9] Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Lehrstuhles seit 1866," in *Die Philipps-Universität zu Marburg 1527–1927*, eds. Heinrich Hermelink and Siegfried August Kaehler, Marburg, 1927, 680–687, with an extended discussion of all the major figures in the Marburg School, and Elizabeth Hirsch, "Remembrance of Martin Heidegger in Marburg," *Philosophy Today* 23:2/4, summer 1979, 160–169.

finitude, the radical limitedness, of man[10] (thus in the fullest sense of one traditional Christian doctrine, the symptom of man's fallen estate),[11] and that the imagination, in a technical philosophical sense, is the womb out of which, on the one hand, reason is born and through which, on the other hand, true metaphysical reality, "Being," may enter the human world.[12] This Being has, however, been lost by man throughout intellectual and cultural history, resulting in "the oblivion of Being" ("*Seinsvergessenheit*"). (Thus Socrates is for Heidegger the Adam that fell, or, he puts it, that "was thrown.") "*Geschichte ist Irrtum*."[13] (History is for Heidegger in turn only the ontic exfoliation of what is true ontologically—i.e., in more traditional language, the phenomenalization of the metaphysical human condition—that existence [man] is guilty before and without having done anything wrong.)[14] We find ourselves then at the end of (traditional) philosophy,[15] and philosophy can be rehabilitated only by carrying out the task of searching for Being by means of nonconceptual, or pre- conceptual, envisionments[16]—what Heidegger calls "primal" (*anfänglich*) instead of degraded (*abkünftig*) thinking,[17] or as *besinnliches* vs. *rechnendes* thinking ("sense-finding" vs. "calculating"), the former being the thinking of *Gelassenheit* ("lassitudinousness" vs. activism). (Heidegger is then a

[10] Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem*, op. cit., 3rd ed., 29. In the 4th ed., 267, this is the last point he reports having made in Davos.

[11] Cassirer recognizes the covert Christian theological notions in Heidegger's thinking. He uses the term "the fall" with respect to Heidegger's onticism and cites Luther and Kierkegaard.—Comp. also Max Scheler, "Das Realitätsproblem," in *Späte Schriften,* ed. Manfred S. Frings, Bern and Munich 1976, *Gesammelte Werke* vol. 9, 283 and 292, n. 1 about Protestant Christianity as the product of "the hysterical Jew Paul."

[12] Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem*, op. cit., 3rd ed., section 3; cp. "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," Original essay from 1938, republished in *Holzwege* (collection of essays = vol. 5 of Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt 1977, 106).

[13] There is also much talk in Heidegger about "*Irrniss.*" In his usual punning way, he uses "*irren*" in the sense of roaming as well as in the sense of erring. (Fritz H. Heinemann, *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament,* New York 1958, 216, then calls Heidegger an "*Irrgeist.*") History—and human existence—as a cosmological fault is, of course, a perennial gnostic theme. Cf. Susan A. Taubes, "The Gnostic Foundations of Heidegger's Nihilism," *Journal of Religion* 34:3, July 1954, 171; Hans Jonas, "Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism," *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology,* New York 1966, esp. 223; and comp. Otto Pöggeler, *Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger*, Munich/Freiburg 1972, 33f., 53f.

[14] Michael Wyschogrod, *Kierkegaard and Heidegger: The Ontology of Existence,* New York 1954, 106ff.

[15] Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens,* Tübingen 1969—one of the typical regurgitations of his earlier writings.

[16] Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem*, op. cit., 210f.

[17] Martin Heidegger, *Was heisst Denken?,* Tübingen 1954/1961, 4, et al.: "Science does not think;" "Letter on Humanism," in *Philosophy in the 20th Century: An Anthology,* eds. William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, New York 1962, 297: "a mode of thinking more rigorous than the conceptual." (This anti-philosophy is part of Heidegger's famous "turn"—i.e., his late position, as against that of *Being and Time.*)

counter-revolutionary in the strict sense of the word someone who wants to go back to a state prior to a revolution in both philosophy and society.)[18]

At Davos, Heidegger presented his slightly later book on Kant in the form of lectures. He had given the same course a few weeks earlier in Riga. The text was intended to become part of the second volume of *Sein und Zeit*, which never came to be.[19]

The confrontation between Cassirer's rationality and civility, on the one hand, and Heidegger's visceral mysticism and propensity for brutality,[20] on the other hand, was, as we have stated, played out almost like a morality-play at Davos in the spring of 1929. Gründer quotes a contemporary report: "The difference between these two doctrines is ultimately based on fundamental, basic postures that cannot be logically discussed."[21] The allusion is, I think, not only to intellectual differences but above all to the culture of the Teutonic countryside versus the culture of Jewish urbanity. That it occurred in Davos of all places is the more symbolic for the fact that, as men of my generation remember only too vividly, the Jewish student David Frankfurter committed the first great act of assassinating a Nazi, the local party-leader Wilhelm Gustloff, in that town a few years later, in 1936.[22]

F. Rosenzweig on Davos

Franz Rosenzweig died in 1929. As practically the last writing that he produced before his death, he wrote (actually, he painfully dictated) a short notice of the second and much improved edition of Hermann Cohen's *Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism* under the title "Switched Fronts" ("*Vertauschte Fronten*").[23] It had to be published posthumously.[24] The essay, only three printed pages long, was written, as the editors of his *Kleinere Schriften* state, "under the impact of the academic conference in Davos of the spring of 1929."[25] The first two pages of the notice

[18] Cf. Heinemann, op. cit., 94.

[19] Heidegger lists several neo-Kantians in order to reject them. The name of Paul Natorp does not appear there. Of course, Natorp, in his post-Cohennian and post-neo-Kantian old-age, was involved in procuring Heidegger's professorial appointment for him.

[20] Cf., e.g., "Die Zeit des Weltbildes" (1938), *loc. cit*., 112: "Only where the completion of modernity attains to the unscrupulousness (*Rücksichtslosigkeit*) of its inherent greatness is future history being prepared."

[21] Cf. Gründer, *loc. cit*., 300.

[22] Cf. Emil Ludwig, *Der Mord in Davos*, Amsterdam 1936.

[23] Franz Rosenzweig, "Vertauschte Fronten", *Der Morgen* 6, Apr.1930, 85ff. The editors of the Jewish journal add that the essay had originally been intended for a daily newspapers.

[24] Cf. Franz Rosenzweig, *Kleinere Schriften*, eds. Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinmann, Berlin 1937, 354–356 *(= Zweistromland: Kleine Schriften zu Glauben und Denken [Der Mensch und sein Werk: Gesammelte Schriften,* vol. 3], eds. Reinhold and Annemarie Mayer, Dordrecht 1984, 235ff.).

[25] *Ib*., 545.

deal with the publishing history and earlier interpretation of the *Religion of Reason*. One page then blocks out what Rosenzweig regards as the strategy of the intellectual relations between Cohen, himself, Cassirer, and Heidegger. This is what he says:

> What could still appear to be a personal opinion of mine about the philosophical tendencies of the present age when I expressed it five years ago [i.e., 1924][26] in my introduction to Cohen's "Jewish Writings" has meanwhile become common knowledge. Recently a colloquy took place before an European audience between Cohen's most significant disciple, Cassirer, and the current occupant of Cohen's Marburg professorship, Heidegger. Hermann Herrigel[27] reported on it extensively in the academic supplement of the "*Frankfurter*

[26] Rosenzweig's claim that in his Introduction to Cohen's *Collected Jewish Writings* he had said in 1924 exactly what he is saying now, in 1929, though now with reference to Heidegger, is no more than the bare truth. Everything we are about to read regarding Cohen, the fundamental "turn," "*Kehre*" if you please, away from "the system" by means of the "correlation," "God-created reason," even the passage from Cohen's letter to Stadler, etc., is expounded there at greater length than here: XLI - L. (That all this is Rosenzweig's tendentious misinterpretation of "the late Cohen" will have to be considered in extenso below.)

[27] Hermann Herrigel (2.6.1888-19.10.1973) was himself the author of *Das neue Denken,* Berlin 1927, which puts forward ideas that are basically consonant with Heidegger's. In it (I am using the 2nd ed. of 1928) Rosenzweig plays a not insignificant part (169f., 228–232, 241f.). Cassirer and Natorp also occur (135, 171, 235, and 9–30, 70, 78), and the whole thing is really an attack, however respectful, on allegedly abstract, destructive idealism. "Idealism must be attacked, wherever it occurs, from the ideology of the youth-movement to the most secret corners of idealistic epistemology." (*Ib*., 82) (Comp. Else-Rahel Freund, op. cit., 144; also Rosenzweig, *Briefe und Tagebücher, Gesammelte Schriften, op. cit*. vol. 2, 1014f., 1069, 1074, 1095, 1204, and the journal, *Die Kreatur*, vol. 1 [1926/1927] and vol. 3 [1930], 30ff., 39ff., 263ff.) Cf. also Hermann Herrigel's "Die Theologie Wilhelm Herrmanns" (the friend and colleague of Hermann Cohen), *Zwischen den Zeiten* 5, 1927, 331–353. Herrigel belonged to the "Frankfurt Bund," among whose other members were Martin Buber (cf. Hermann Herrigel's "Ein Bericht über das Marburger Religionsgespräch" [which here deals with Luther and Zwingli] in *Aus unbekannten Schriften: Festgabe für Martin Buber zum 50. Geburtstag*, Berlin 1928, 108–116], Natorp, and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy). (Cf. Hans Kohn, *Martin Buber: Sein Werk und seine Zeit*: ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte Mitteleuropas 1880–1930, Hellerau 1930, 362) (Another deviant Cohen-disciple, Hinrich Knittermeyer, also uses Herrigel laudatorily: *Staat und Mensch*, Bremen 1931, 14, n. 2.) Rosenzweig's purposes, as well as the dangers that inhere in them, could be entirely paralleled in Herrigel. Gründer, *loc. cit*., calls Herrigel's report in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on the Davos controversy the best among all those extant. Gründer also claims that Herrigel invented the term "the new thinking." Herrigel stayed true to himself, as far as one can judge, throughout a long life. As late as 1954, he published an extended philosophical study of Nikolai Hartmann, the erstwhile but hostile disciple of Hermann Cohen, "Der Ansatz der Ontologie," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 8:2, 1954, 267ff. Here the deeply flowing anti- Marburgianism of both Hartmann and Herrigel is still and again manifest in their rehabilitation of what Kant and Cohen had, one should have thought, eliminated once and for all—the primacy of ontology, and an ontology, at that, which asserts its truth on the basis of an irrational "natural attitude." This irrationalism then pervades Hartmann's entire philosophical edifice, contrary to Herrigel's repeated assurances but to his applause. In this connection, Herrigel also stipulates differences between Hartmann and Heidegger, but he admits: "Heidegger and Nicolai Hartmann, however far their paths diverge, agree that Being itself does not enter into cognition and cannot be found there but that we can direct our thinking to Being only in the preceding natural attitude" (Ib., 279). The Heidegger/Hartmann/Herrigel kinship goes further: they all glorify "the hardness of reality," express deep skepticism about science, use terminology like *"Lebenszusammenhang*" and *"Lebensphilosophie*," and assert the basic indistin-

Zeitung" of Apr. 22, 1929, and he described it as a representative confrontation between the old and the new thinking. It was Heidegger, the Husserl disciple,[28] the Aristotelian scholastic, whose occupancy of Cohen's professorial chair can be felt only as an irony of intellectual history by every "old Marburgian," that represented here, in opposition to Cassirer, the posture of our—of the new—thinking, which further extends the line that was begun by "the last Cohen."

What else is it when Heidegger, in opposition to Cassirer, sets philosophy the task of revealing to man, the "specifically finite being," his own "nullity in all his freedom" and to "call him back from the lazy aspect of a man that merely uses the works of the spirit into the severity of his destiny"?[29] What else is that concluding formulation of the philosophical task but a passionate defense of the individual *quand même*, as over against the notion of

guishability between "*erleben*" and cognizing. Even historically one has reason to be wary: one notices that as Heidegger lived through the Nazi period without discomfort, so also Hartmann published without difficulty during those years. (The writer's "natural attitude" is to ask: what did you do, daddy, at that time?) (The same issue of *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* carries a review of a book on Schelling by Hartmann's life-long friend and ex-Marburg-student Heinz Heimsoeth, in which the Germanic mania for myth-making, which so affected also Rosenzweig, still comes to the fore.) Hermann Herrigel must not be confused with Eugen Herrigel. Cf. Gershom Scholem, "About Eugen Herrigel and E(liezer) Livneh's Article" (Hebrew), *Ha'aretz,* July 3, 1959 = Sivvan 27, 5759, vol. 41, no. 12, 135, 10.

[28] The Husserl-Heidegger relationship is another sore and much discussed spot. Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg, "From Husserl to Heidegger," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 2:1, Jan. 1971. In a letter from Husserl to Alexander Pfänder (which Prof. Spiegelberg has kindly shown me), the writer describes at some length and painfully his relations with Heidegger. He also describes how with his help Heidegger was given preference over Cassirer (and possibly Nicolai Hartmann) when the Marburg chair of philosophy was to be filled. Cf. also Palmier, op. cit., 35f., 41, 46, 49, 51f., 59, 61. For Rosenzweig's occasional, nasty remarks about Husserl, cf. his *Briefe und Tagebücher*, op. cit., vol. 2, 619, 981. The Husserl Archives in Louvain contain a letter from Cassirer to Husserl, dated Apr. 10, 1925 (copy of which, too, Prof. Spiegelberg has given me), in which the writer, with his typical quintessential gentlemanliness, tries to establish kinship between phenomenology and critical idealism. One of the questions which Jewish intellectual historians ought to address is what accounts for the high proportion of apostate Jews among Husserlians, not to speak of Husserl and Mrs. Husserl themselves. Leo Strauss once said in print: "I have heard it said though that the Husserlian equivalent (of Heidegger's Nazi proclamations in 1933 and 1953) was his conversion, not proceeding from conviction to Christianity" (Leo Strauss, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Political Philosophy", *Interpretation* 2:1, summer 1971, 2.)

[29] This sentence is italicized and indented in Herrigel's original article. It can be found in Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem*, 4th ed., op. cit., 203 (cf. Doherty, op. cit., 59). I would suspect that Rosenzweig interpreted it more spiritually, morally, rather than physically, heroically, as intended by Heidegger (who loves the heroic language of Sparta and Germany—e.g., "*wacker*—"awake"/"courageous" as synonymous with "good")—the way the Talmudic rabbis interpreted the Biblical wars as struggles about the Torah. But even if Rosenzweig took the sentence in its originally intended meaning, one is bound to say that he himself displayed incomparably more heroism, both physical and moral, in his life than did Heidegger. Buber put this well in Martin Buber, "Rosenzweig und die Existenz," *Mitteilungsblatt* 24:52, Dec. 28, 1956 = *Der Jude und sein Judentum: Gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden,* Cologne 1963, 825ff., where he contrasts Rosenzweig with Heidegger: "Wer über die menschliche Existenz … zu philosophieren wagt … muss seine existentialistische Wahrheit in seiner Existenz und mit seiner Existenz bewähren. Daran hat es mancher representativer Philosoph unserer Zeit fehlen lassen. … [As for Rosenzweig] So sieht Wahrheit—bewährende Existenz aus."

> the "scholar-bourgeois," that, as Cohen wrote to Stadler after Gottfried Keller's death,[30] "we must honor the thinker in the soul and, accordingly, regard his intellectual transfiguration in the eternity of culture as the chief power and the authentic value of the poor human individual," which was the vital personal source of what matured into a philosophical understanding only a quarter of a century later in "the last Cohen"? While Heidegger said in Davos that what he calls "ex-istence" ("*Dasein*") could not be expressed with one of Cassirer's concepts, my introduction to Cohen's "Jewish Writings" showed how, starting with the fundamental conception of Cohen's last philosophy, the "correlation," as the late Cohen uses it, the path leads—to put this in Heideggerian language—to "the leap into existence" ("*Einsprung in das Dasein*").[31] Not in vain does that chapter of genius stand in Cohen's last work, which replaces the "originating" reason of idealism with the God-created reason of the creature, thus leaving all of "Marburg" far behind.
>
> The survivors of the "school"—not Cassirer!—would like to make a school-master out of the dead master. The live, on-going history of the spirit withdraws him from such an epigonic undertaking. This history does not bother with such claims and switches fronts, now that the dead Cid rides forth anew. The school with its school-master dies; the master lives.[32]

This last piece of Rosenzweig's writing calls for a great deal of explanation—enough to fill a book. His sparkling, literate, polemical style, even while expiring his last on his long-endured death-bed, is undiminished. The entire history of his personal and intellectual relationship with Hermann Cohen is here once more

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[30] *Gabe Herrn Rabb. Dr. Mobei zum 50. Geburtstag dargebracht,* Frankfurt 1921, 9–11. (My copy of this *Festschrift* bears my late father's signature, dated Chanukkah 5682/1921.) The letter is reprinted in Hermann Cohen, *Briefe,* eds. Bertha and Bruno Strauss, Berlin 1939—the last, no. 92, of the "Schocken Bücherei." (Ernst Simon, in *Aufbau im Untergang: Jüdische Erwachsenenbildung im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland als geistiger Widerstand,* Tübingen 1959, 76–91 movingly interprets the Schocken Bücherei as Jewish spiritual resistance to Nazism and no. 92 at its end as a symbol of the history of German Jewry.) Cf. also Helmut Holzhey, "Hermann Cohen und Gottfried Keller," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 20, 1969, Beilage "Literatur und Kunst." (Stadler was a close disciple of Cohen's. The two had, for example, together studied the Kant archives in Königsberg: cf. "Zur Orientierung in den losen Blättern aus Kants Nachlass," Hermann Cohen, *Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte*, eds. Albert Görland and Ernst Cassirer, Berlin 1928, vol. 1, 432.) The sentence of Cohen's that is here being quoted reads in full like this: "Indeed, when one has liberated oneself from the scholar-bourgeois notion of honoring the thinker in the soul and accordingly to regard his intellectual transfiguration in the eternity of culture as the chief power and the authentic value of the poor human individual, then the ineffable and the transient in moods and, at best, in the attitude of his fellow-men remain as the authentically enduring that is to be esteemed as the human value and as the eternal in the terrestrial." Rosenzweig here re-interprets, or as usual misinterprets, so as to make Cohen say what he, Rosenzweig, would have liked him to say. (Cf. Steven S. SchwarzschiId, "Rosenzweig's Anecdotes about Cohen," in *Gegenwart im Rückblick: Festgabe für die Jüdische Gemeinde zu Berlin 25 Jahre nach dem Neubeginn*, eds. Herbert A. Strauss and Kurt Grossmann, Heidelberg 1970, 209–218.) In fact, a few sentences down the page Cohen goes on to say that Keller refuted "the kind of mythological religiosity that claims to be cognition;" instead, we have "One unchangeable task …"

[31] Comp. Martin Heidegger, "*Einsprung in das Seiende*," *Sein und Zeit*, Halle 1927, 220, etc.

[32] In the Marburg School, there was much personal discussion as to the sense in which Cohen was "the master:" e.g., *Nikolai Hartmann und Heinz Heimsoeth im Briefwechsel*, eds. Frida Hartmann and Renate Heimsoeth, Bonn 1978, 293f., 297f. Rosenzweig here seems to be alluding to that situation, with some irony.