Exploring Integrity in the Christian Church

Simon Robinson

palgrave
macmillan

Exploring Integrity in the Christian Church

Simon Robinson

Exploring Integrity in the Christian Church

palgrave
macmillan

Simon Robinson
School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science
University of Leeds
Leeds, West Yorkshire, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-65686-6 ISBN 978-3-031-65687-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-65687-3

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

If disposing of this product, please recycle the paper.

This book is dedicated to Harry Robinson, my youngest grandchild.
What a joy to hear him find his voice.

Contents

1 Exploring Integrity 1
The Meaning of Integrity 2
Self-Integration 3
Identity 3
Standing for Something 4
Moral Purpose 4
Developing Identity 5
Responsibility 6
The Self and Agency 6
The Self and Others: Mutual Accountability and Shared Responsibility 8
Organizational Integrity 11
Embodying Responsibility 12
God's Love 16
Loving God 17
Self-Love 19
Love of Neighbour 21
Conclusion 24
References 25

2 Who Do You Think You Are? 29
The Crisis 30
The Identity of the Church 31
Identity 33

Clericalism 33
Culture of Silence 35
Responsibility and Accountability 37
Leadership 37
Offenders 39
The State 39
Victims and Families 40
Madness or Sin? 41
Opening Out 44
Dialogue 45
Church and State 46
The Media 47
Different Voices 48
The Complex Identity of the Church 48
Conclusion 52
References 53

3 Leadership Integrity 57
Leadership Identity 58
The Integrity of Leadership 59
Controller 60
Therapist Leadership 61
Messiah Leadership 61
Eco-leadership 62
Transactional Leadership 63
Servant Leadership 63
Dialogic Leadership 65
The Learning Organization 69
Lifelong Learning 71
Dialogue and Formation 74
Faith 76
Hope 78
Community 80
Conclusion 81
References 81

4 Architecture of Integrity, a Culture of Dialogue 85
Theories and Frameworks of Governance 85
Covenant and Contract 91

Architecture 92
Orienting 93
Vision 93
Values and Principles 98
Institutionalizing 99
Clergy Codes 100
Sustaining 105
Church Councils and Boards 105
Reporting 107
External Perspectives 108
Conclusion 111
References 112

5 The Integrity of Pastoral Care 117
Pastoral Counselling 118
Establishing a Contract 121
Embodying Agape 122
Moral Meaning and New Relationships 125
Pastor 125
Self 126
God 127
Church 128
Work 128
Husband 129
Family and Parents 129
Rewriting the Self 131
Virtues 132
Friendship 136
Friendship and the Church 138
Presence 139
Developing Friendship 140
The Limits of Friendship 141
Conclusion 142
References 142

6 The Integrity of Prophecy 145
Prophecy, Presence, and Dialogue 146
Steve Biko's Funeral Sermon, September 1977 146
Dialogic Prophecy 150

Widening Dialogue 154
Slaying Giants 158
Intermediate Organizations: Developing Identity 162
Prophecy in Dialogue 166
Conclusion 168
References 168

7 Integrity and Peacebuilding 171
Homosexuality and the Anglican Communion 172
The Global Divide 173
Reflection 176
Leadership 176
Peacebuilding 181
Web Watching 189
Learning Journey and Reconciliation 194
Virtues 195
Conclusion 196
References 197

8 Integrity, Mission, and Worship 201
Integrity and Mission 202
Worship 210
Formation and Worship 210
The Word in Dialogue 213
Conclusion 221
References 221

9 Hearing Voices, Integrity, Theology, and Ethics 223
Theology 230
Finding a Voice 241
The Church 242
The Court 243
The Family 245
God 247
References 247

Index 251

Introduction

Integrity is something we all want. If you ask any gathering how many of them claim to have integrity, and I have asked a lot, the vast majority put their hands up. When asked to say what it means, things are often less clear. Nonetheless, most of us want to be seen as people of integrity. After all, 'lack of integrity' is often a term of opprobrium, especially in the popular press. None of us wants to be thought of lacking this quality, whatever it may mean. The most interesting responses are from the few who do not put their hands up. Often some are simply unsure. Many simply do not use such vocabulary in their everyday conversation and are searching for other words. Other responses are more challenging. How, for instance, can I know that I have integrity; isn't that for others to decide? This suggests that integrity involves something about reflection on self-identity, and that this needs the help of others.[1] And in that context it seems like a value word which indicates approval of us as persons. Individually and organisationally, in any context, we seek to identify ourselves as good, one of the good guys. In McCarthy's *The Road* there is the wonderful moment when the boy, who in a time of post-apocalyptic threat being protected by the man, asks the question.

> He [The Boy] sat there cowled in the blanket. After a while he looked up.
> Are we still the good guys? he said.
> [The Man:] Yes. We're still the good guys.
> [The Boy:] And we always will be.

[1] Succinctly noted by Burns in his poem *To a Louse*.

[The Man:] Yes. We always will be.
[The Boy:] Okay. (McCarthy 2007, 120.7–120.11)

The child asked the question because he saw an aggressive reaction by the man to an innocent old man. The man seeks to reassure the boy and honestly believes he is one of the good guys. He has deep sense of integrity, based in his identity as protector of the child. But questions are not encouraged. None of this makes the man bad. On the contrary he is focused in carrying 'the fire', humanity and compassion, something at the end of the novel he asks the boy to maintain. McCarthy, however, wants us to reflect on the felt need we all have to be seen as one of the good guys (approbative integrity), and with that the need to continuously reflect on who we think we are. This suggests that integrity involves not simply affirming the self but questioning the self.

My aim in this book is to explore integrity in relation to the church. It is simply an exploration and does not claim to be the last word. Indeed, as I will argue integrity eschews the possibility of the last word. This is not a work of ecclesiology, and I define the church simply as the gathered people of God in different contexts. My aim is simply to bring together different perspectives gleaned from 30 years of pastoral theology and applied and professional ethics, including work in theology, philosophy, and healthcare faculties and business schools, and invite you to explore further in your context, that is, in your practice. Hence, I focus on practice with a number of case studies.

The first chapter casts its net widely, exploring philosophical, psychological (including organizational studies) and theological views of integrity. It critically examines different views of integrity and then focuses on integrity based in identity, and a related focus on responsibility. This leads to an analysis of responsibility and identity involving three interrelated modes: critical self-reflection which tests perception of the self; relational reflection which explores responsibility and mutual accountability in the interconnected social and material environment; shared responsibility and creative response to that environment. All three inform and develop identity and agency. Central to this are narrative and dialogue which enable a learning and relational view of integrity. This involves ongoing learning engaging narrators as well as the narrative; relational learning which engages power; and holistic learning focused in agonistic dialogue. I argue that this view of integrity applies to individuals and organizations, and that it develops relational agency based in recognition of the self and others.

This leads to a theological reflection on integrity based in *agape*. As three-way dialogue, with God the self and other this enables integrity as relational learning (focused in *metanoia*) and response, moving away from narrow and binary views of integrity and identity focused in the assertion of power. Integrity then is focused not simply in principles, and consistency with practice, but in our underlying identity that we wish to present to the world, and the perspectives, feelings, ideas, and sense of worth that keep our identity in place. This is focused in a view of the self which is always in relation with a complex social environment (plural/social and dialogic self), which itself is part of God's creation in relation to Him. This provides a careful corrective to that well known description of integrity 'doing the right thing when nobody is watching'. In this view, over time, everyone who we relate to in our social context *is* watching and listening.

The rest of the book will explore and test this view of integrity in relation to the church. In Chap. 2 this focuses on the case study of the clergy child sex abuse crisis. My reason for using this is not to judge the church or any denomination but rather to view this as an example of learning, institutional, and individual. The movement is away from defence of identity, and with that *paranoia*, to *metanoia*, learning about God, the self, and other in and through ongoing dialogue. I will begin to explore the different dialogues emerging from the crisis, showing how these empower the different voices inside and outside the church. The culture of silence which characterized the response to the crisis is contrasted with the transparency of public dialogue. This has allowed the world to witness the account of the church, and explore and develop shared responsibility, mutual accountability, and shared response in practice.

Chapters 3 and 4 explore leadership and governance integrity and how these might be embodied in the church. This begins with a brief critical reflection on leadership theories, focusing on servant, eco-, and dialogic leadership which enable organizational listening, witnessing and engaging the voices within the church and beyond. In turn this enables reflection on and development of shared responsibility for the church and mutual accountability inside and outside the church. This moves the focus in the church away from individual leaders, with danger of elevation, to leadership which is focused across the people of God, defined as all members sharing responsibility for re-presenting the church in different contexts. The leadership task then becomes one of empowering others to take responsibility for this, enabling with others, a loving creative response to God and the social and physical environment. In turn this enables

members to empower others, in and outside the church, to develop responsibility. This connects to work on adult learning and development and theological reflection which enables engagement with plurality through the practice of dialogue. The practice of dialogue itself, focused in identity and responsibility, enables the development of the virtues, and I will illustrate this with the formation of faith and hope.

Chapter 4 critically examines governance theories, from regulative, imposing vison and practice, to dialogic, enabling shared reflection and testing of organizational vision and narrative, within and outside the organization. It argues that the integrity of governance is focused in dialogue which enables learning at individual and organizational level, allowing the narrative of the community to be questioned, sustained, and developed. This leads to a reflection on the architecture of integrity in governance, involving varieties of relational contracts, processes, and anchor points. This focuses on three stages of ongoing organizational development: envisioning; institutionalizing, and sustaining, informed by the work of Goodpaster and Senge.

The next four chapters focus on the integrity of different aspects of the church, pastoral care, prophecy, peacebuilding, and worship and mission. Chapter 5 examines the integrity of pastoral care, focused in *agape*, expressed in friendship. It will explore the dialogic nature of pastoral care, focusing first on pastoral counselling, and then on the shared responsibility of the church community for care in the church and beyond. It argues that *agape* seeks to engage the moral world already experienced by the counselee, enabling her to reflect on identity and worldviews and over time develop her self-identity in relation to God and her social web, exploring shared and plural responsibility and mutual accountability. The chapter then examines some of the virtues developed as part of the relationship, and critical to motivating a response. The chapter finally examines friendship across the church, and shows how pastoral counselling and the wider pastoral care of the church are both based in the embodied presence of friendship, connecting pastoral care to both learning and governance.

If the integrity of pastoral care is focused in friendship and the interlocking dialogues that make up the person in relation to God and the world this raises questions of the church's prophetic role in Chap. 6. On the face of it prophecy fits with a view of integrity as standing up *for* justice and possibly *against* the oppressor. The dynamic of Desmond Tutu's prophetic work, however, suggests a prophecy focused in dialogic encounter,

recognizing the humanity of both oppressed and oppressor, and calling all to reflect on their responsibility in relation to their religious, cultural, national, and global identity. One of the most telling examples is Tutu's call to the Afrikaans churches to reflect not simply on their religious identity but on their historical, cultural, and political narratives, generating dialogue between different groups and within their church about responsibility and accountability. Such prophecy recognizes both diversity within the church, and across different denominations (and the importance of prophecy which reflects that dialogue) and diversity across society. The chapter develops the second of these showing how prophetic dialogue developed across the different institutions in South Africa and across the world, especially universities and business. This generated interlinking dialogues, based in trust platforms, sometimes generated by business and higher education and sometimes by the church, recognizing the integrity of their actions and focusing on *kairos*, the right moment for concerted response. The dynamic of prophetic dialogue enables God's voice to engage with all the other voices, and to be heard over time. The focus there is on *metanoia* and away from *paranoia*, upon truth as relational, appreciative and creative. The chapter concludes with an exploration of prophetic dialogue in times of peace and relative prosperity focusing on Christian realism and shared responsibility for health and wellbeing.

Underlying the integrity of care and prophecy is peacebuilding and Chap. 7 explores this in the conflicts in the Anglican Communion about same-sex marriage. The combination of human rights and religious rights thinking, church history which has a difficult relationship with power and sexuality, cultural and other religions' views on sexuality (which can be both complex, volatile, and always changing) suggests that this is as much an affective as a cognitive exercise, involving several overlapping debates and dialogues and many different relationships, beyond the apparent different 'sides'. An exploration of *agapeic* dialogue follows, engaging these different relationships with the help of Lederach's, peacebuilding model, including; scepticism about 'solutions', developing trust platforms, building dialogue with the social web, and focusing on a learning journey which itself is the site of reconciliation focused in *metanoia*. Part of the complexity of this case requires critical reflection on leadership identity and the temptation to avoid genuine dialogue in order to avoid conflict.

Chapter 8 explores the integrity of mission as focused in dialogue. The 'proclamation' of the gospel holds the church to account, allowing others to test its identity and share the exploration of the meaning of the gospel

in social context. In this the practice of care, prophecy and peacebuilding bears witness to a God who communicates through the three-way *agapeic* dialogue, not simply through the church. The narrative offered to the world is found in the dialogue affirming God's continued presence for all and the call to continual creative response to and with the social web. The chapter ends with the integrity of worship focused on the same dynamic of dialogue, with worship not simply centred on God but on His world. Our conversation with Him can never be exclusive and keeps us focused on the diversity which surrounds us and how to respond.

The final chapter reflects a little further on the lessons from Chap. 2, one of which is the essentially public nature of the church's identity. If the church is to hold itself to account then it has to open itself to question and dialogue about its identity and practice, in relation to God and the complex world. It is impossible to bear witness to the living presence of God without engaging that complexity. This means that the shape of the church, i.e. the boundaries can never be immutable. Boundaries are relational, established through ongoing dialogue and trust platforms which enable reflection on the shared responsibility and mutual accountability of the church and its social context.

The chapter ends with a reflection on the integrity of theology and ethics. This argues that theological integrity is focused in dialogue. The assumption of theological privilege and superiority easily slides into binary thinking which forecloses dialogue and makes it difficult to see the moral complexity and plurality of both theology and secular thinking. It also assumes that the fight to change ideology will lead to change in practice. What evidence there is suggests that change emerges from self- questioning, reflecting not simply on ideology (which is rarely fully articulated or understood as the basis of practice), but on spirituality our view of how we relate to the world and find meaning in those relationship, in other words reflection on identity, of ourselves and others. This leads to the suggestion that the integrity of ethical deliberation is focused in this dialogue, and the capacity to hear the different voices involved, especially the voices of the 'least'. Such deliberation enables all involved to find their voice and to begin to share responsibility in that context. In that light Christian Ethics is accountable to academia, the church and society. The book ends in practice, firstly in a brief reflection on the different narratives involved in the Gaza/Israel crisis experienced on university campus and how theologians

might develop trust platforms. Finally, in more detail it examines a well-known case of the separation of conjoined twins. In the unlikely context of legal proceedings it draws out the underlying dialogues, and how all involved began to find a voice, and share responsibility. At its heart is their exploration of integrity.

References

McCarthy C (2007) The road. Vintage, New York.

CHAPTER 1

Exploring Integrity

This chapter aims to provide an initial view of integrity that can be explored and developed in relation to the Christian church. It intentionally casts its net widely, exploring philosophical, psychological, and theological views of integrity. It suggests that integrity is focused in identity and that this involves responsibility, for holistic self-reflection/examination (including sense of worth and related values), for relationships (involving shared responsibility and mutual accountability), and for creative response to the social and physical environment (developing shared responsibility). This is focused in identity which is complex and plural, moving beyond behavioural integrity (consistency between principles and practice) to a view of integrity focused in commitment and response, continued holistic learning, and, with that, a continued engagement and struggle, rather than simply integration. The dynamic of this involves narrativity and dialogue, working through self-identity in plural relationships. Such a relational view of integrity recognizes the need for awareness and appreciation of the self and others, presupposing support which is both recognizes the particularity of the self and other and which challenges self and other perception. I will argue that in Christian theology love, as *agape* and related concepts of *philia* and *eros*, is key to the development of this integrity. Such integrity can be applied to both the self and to community in different forms of organizations/institutions, involving an interconnected relational network which enables ongoing self-dialogue, intra community dialogue and intercommunity dialogue.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024

S. Robinson, *Exploring Integrity in the Christian Church*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-65687-3_1

The Meaning of Integrity

As Cottingham (2010) notes it is surprising that a systematic focus on integrity does not appear in either Greek thought or the Judeo-Christian tradition. Aristotle focuses on the virtues and argues that these are interconnected, and that a person who practices one will have them all (cf. Cottingham 2010). Prior to Aristotle, Plato focused the unity of one virtue, with different aspects (Wolf 2009). This sense of unity suggests something of the core meaning of *integer* or *integras* as soundness, purity, or wholeness (Bosman 2012) with the corresponding meaning of corruption as breaking down, spoiling or decay (Ibid.). Related indicators of integrity are honesty, transparency, consistency and so on (Cottingham 2010).

The Judeo-Christian tradition has some references to integrity. The King James translation of psalm 26 begins, 'Judge me O Lord for I have walked in mine integrity'. The Hebrew root of that translation (*tum*) is wholeness or completeness. The act of sinning takes something away from that, suggesting integrity as a form of innocence (Cottingham 2010). The verses that follow however suggest a general idea of leading an upright or righteous life, rather than providing any specific account of the virtue of integrity, or any idea of unity of ethical perspective. Psalm 86 (v. 11) offers a prayer for psychological or ethical unity, 'Give me, O Lord, an undivided heart'.

The Christian gospel refers to the importance of finding one's *true self*. Even gaining the whole world is not enough to compensate for the loss of oneself (*heautos*) (Luke 9: 25). Later in Luke (15:17) comes the parable of the prodigal son. Of course, he regrets his prodigality, returns from exile and 'comes to himself' (*eis heauton elthôn*) (Luke 15:17). There is something in this about a rediscovery of the person's true self. This is already beginning to take the ideas associated with integrity into identity, and thus to a relational definition. The prodigal son rediscovered his identity *in relation to* his father, and hopefully at some point to his brother. In James 4:8 the author calls for purity of heart which is the opposite of being 'double-minded' (*dipsychos*). The idea of purity of heart has its analogue in Islam with the concept of *ikhlas* (cf. Michel 2014) or sincerity.

The stress on identity and dynamic of finding oneself is developed in several philosophical approaches to integrity, including integrity as self-integration; moral identity; moral purpose; and commitment.

Self-Integration

Frankfurt (1987) suggests that integrity involves the integration of different aspects of the person, viewed in terms of higher order or lower order volitions. Higher order volitions involve long term desires, and lower order volitions immediate desires. The higher order volition of the drug addict, for instance, may be to be a drug free person and the lower order volition to take drugs. Integrity, and with that free will, is achieved when the lower order volitions cohere with the higher order volitions, bringing together volition and action. In this argument integrity is achieved through making decisions which consciously bring together the different elements. Hence,

> The decision determines what the person really wants by making the desires upon which he decides fully his own. To this extent the person, in making a decision by which he identifies with a desire, *constitutes himself*. (Frankfurt 1987, 38, my italics)

For Frankfurt this leads then to consistency and what he calls 'wholeheartedness'. This integration of the different elements of the self is not confined to desire but includes principles and values, and he suggests that all of these things tend to be in a state of flux. Hence, the individual has to take responsibility for bringing them together.

Identity

A second view of integrity focuses on consistency with the person's identity. Williams (1973) argues for this as part of his argument against a utilitarian approach to ethics. One example he offers is of a dignitary who is the guest of a foreign nation. As a significant guest the visitor is offered the opportunity to kill one of twenty insurgents, allowing the other nineteen to live. A utilitarian response might support this. Williams argues that such a calculation is inadequate because it involves going against the core moral beliefs and commitments that make up the identity of the person. Such commitments are,

> 'the condition of my existence, in the sense that unless I am propelled forward by the conatus of desire, project and interest, it is unclear why I should go on at all' (Williams 1981, 12). A consequence of this is that integrity in

> this view can't be seen as a virtue. Virtues are dispositions which enable the person to act, or which motivate action. For Williams integrity is simply about acting in a way that accurately reflects the sense of who the person is.

Standing for Something

Calhoun (1995) argues for a sense of commitment which is about 'standing for something.' She suggests that this involves more than simply standing for an individual moral purpose, but rather for a purpose recognized by some community, which affords the basis for integrity. Integrity here is associated explicitly with something worth striving for, and it assumes a degree of agency, courage, and perseverance that will enable the person or group to stand up against internal and societal pressures that impose obstacles to the purpose.

This moves away from an exclusively individual view of integrity to a more social perspective, in which,

> Persons of integrity treat their own endorsements as ones that matter, or ought to matter, to fellow deliberators. (Calhoun 1995, 258)

At the heart of this is both the consistent exercise of judgement by the person and respect for the judgement of others. Calhoun argues that this is what distinguishes the person of integrity from the fanatic who lacks any proper respect for the moral deliberations of others. Underlying this is the implication that moral deliberation is not individualistic but has a social nature.

Moral Purpose

Rawls (1972) and Halfon (1989) argue that integrity must include an acceptable moral purpose at the base. For Rawls this would involve some clear conception of justice, defined in terms of fairness. Halfon is more circumspect, arguing that integrity involves setting out an ethical purpose that is conceptually clear, logically consistent, apprised of relevant empirical evidence, and careful about acknowledging as well as weighing relevant moral considerations. In effect, Halfon argues that the person of integrity will give a clear account of their moral purpose as part of following a rigorous moral decision-making process (Halfon 1989, 37).

Scherkoske (2013) provides more detail around deliberation and integrity. He argues that integrity is an epistemic virtue, 'a stable disposition that reliably places its possessor in good epistemic position and leads to cognitive success" (Scherkoske 2013, 196, cf. Audi and Murphy 2006). In short, it is about knowing what one is doing in deliberation, how one is doing it, and taking responsibility for how core values are embodied in practice. This involves in particular three things: a disposition to take responsibility for one's convictions, such that one understands the basis of these; an awareness of the quality of deliberation in relation to convictions, distinguishing such activity from knee jerk reaction based on conviction; and a disposition to work convictions through into action. The exercise of this virtue itself develops identity.

Developing Identity

Developing the theme of integrity and identity Curzer (2014) offers a minimalist Aristotelian perspective. Far from integrity being a complex virtue or collection of virtues, he argues that it is best summed up in Aristotle's simple virtue of truthfulness (*alētheia*). This involves the accurate and reliable re-presentation of the self in relationships with others. Curzer argues that the self is seen as one's history, current character, and future projects, as expressed in one's commitments (to ideals, values, goals, projects). These in turn are key to a sense of self-worth and to one's relationships with others, especially in matters importantly related to one's reputation. This includes honesty and also remaining truthful about and to the self across all situations. This is reinforced, argues Curzer, by Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. The mean of truthfulness is flanked by boastfulness, an inflation of the truth to make the self more important, and by false modesty. A second element of the virtues is that they have appropriate passions which motivate their use. The proper motivation for truthfulness is simply a passion for the truth, *philalēthes* (Curzer 2014, 205).

These approaches to integrity embrace themes of: wholeness as integration, and related authenticity; consistency over time, and between relationships; honesty and openness; and commitment to principles and good decision-making over time. There is a strong sense of taking responsibility for deliberation, and thus the exercise of agency focused in identity. All, however, to a greater or lesser degree, fail to address the complexity of self-identity. As Cottingham (2010) notes, psychology suggests that any view or act of self-identification is often flawed, involving a capacity for

self-deception (Smail 1984; Noelliste 2003). At its most extreme this can involve a denial of responsibility (and agency) (Cohen 2001) and an assertion of values and related moral arguments to justify evil actions. Even the SS guards constructed moral justifications for their actions (cf. Burleigh 2011). Moreover, self-identity relates directly to sense of self-worth and the need to be recognized and appreciated by others. This involves a felt need to present oneself as someone of worth. This can lead to a dynamic focused in gaining approval, rather than critical self-reflection (Stets and Burke 2014). Hence, Haidt (2013) suggests that ethical decision making often involves social intuitionism, which is based in and confirmed by the worldview of one's social group. His example of the different political groupings in the USA shows two different world views and, with that, very different views of principles such as justice, equality and freedom. Far from general social agreement about the common good this suggests conflict and enmity, with different social groupings claiming and exhibiting 'wholehearted' integrity *against* each other. Any definition of integrity then has to take account of difference as well as agreement about values and the social good, and how these are handled. This demands a more complex understanding of the self and others (Curzer 2014) and has to account for how a person can grow and change radically in response to this and yet maintain integrity (Davion 1991).

Such considerations lead to a more complex view of the responsibility at the heart of integrity.

Responsibility

Responsibility can be viewed in three interconnected ways: responsibility for reflecting critically on one's identity; accountability to and responsibility for others who in different ways contribute to that identity; and responsibility for ongoing relationships and response to others (Schweiker 1995; Robinson 2009). Working through each of these suggests a more dynamic view of integrity which contributes to the development of human agency, to commitment to social relationships, and to embodying creative responsibility for the social and physical environment.

The Self and Agency

Several traditions in psychology suggest there is no simple sense of the self, but rather very different narratives which constitute the self (Burkitt 2008;

Cooper-White 2007; Cottingham 2010; Lebow 2012). The different narratives are related to different formative and ongoing relationships, most of which are asymmetrical and involve issues of power, trust, and often guilt. In this light, integrity involves struggle and even suffering (Cottingham 2010; Pianalto 2012; Lebow 2012; Beebe and Rosen 2005) including recognition of contradictions and inconsistencies in the self. Personal integrity is not then about wholeness as homogeneity, with everything fitting together neatly, but about an honest and open wrestling with the different narratives, and their associated sense of worth. This sense of worth, from conditional to unconditional, and all points between, is central to a sense of identity because it defines significant purpose and begins to shape the person's perception of the world. Hence, this suggests that integrity involves responsibility not simply for critical reflection on principles and practice as worked out in decision making (Taylor 1989) but upon underlying worldviews, including perspectives of the self and others, associated sense of worth, and associated feelings about the self and others. Self-governance or agency (Paine 1994; Mason 2001; Covaleskie (2011)), owning thoughts and actions, begins to emerge then, but as a holistic and dialogic process, which includes a concern for how we relate to ourselves and others.

Ricoeur (1992; cf. Taylor 1989) suggests this as a process of narrative identity development (cf. Ford 1999). This stresses the responsibility to generate meaning in relationship through becoming the author of one's own narrative. Narrative has a number of characteristics for Ricoeur. First, it engages complexity, it holds together both harmony and dissonance, mediating sameness and difference over time (Ricoeur 1992). Second, life is both experienced and reported, this means we are both author and reader (Ricoeur 1992). This focuses on self-understanding as interpretation.

Third, narratives involve ongoing learning and innovation, developing new identity, and sedimentation, setting out an agreed identity (Ricoeur 1987). Fourth, narrative identity mediates between "what is" and "what ought to be". Narration occupies a middle ground between neutral description and ethical prescription. Narrative identity is not reducible to neutral description and ethical identity is also not reducible to narrative identity. Fifth, narrative identity mediates between two kinds of permanence in time, between two poles of self-identity, broadly involving sameness and uniqueness. Sixth, narrative identity demands both reliance on a situated and bounded self (which enables a sense of distinctiveness), and also sustained and healthy scepticism about the self.

This hermeneutical process leads to re-reading of the self and the provocation to think and act differently, suggesting a view of integrity which is focused in learning, in seeing thing differently and responding. This is not simply the development of a self-critical faculty. In narrative identity, the person is not merely the one who tells the story, or the one about whom the story is told, but 'appears both as a reader and the writer of its own life' (Ricoeur 1987, 246) a process of 'distanciation' (Van der Ven 1998; see also Freeman 1993). The individual is both the interpreter and the interpreted, as well as the recipient of the interpretations. This enables awareness of otherness, of the social and physical environment and of the self as another. This is close both to the idea of meta-cognition, the ability to reflect on how we think, and mindfulness, awareness of oneself in relation (Marlatt and Kristeller 2003; see also Chaps. 3 and 5 on the virtues).

Ricoeur's (1992, 2000) narrativity then presumes a plural and dialogical self (Burkitt 2008; Taylor 1989) which can over time engage difference, including other perspectives of the world and even other perspectives of one's own self in the world. As Taylor writes,

> We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us. Even after we outgrow some of these others—our parents, for instance—and they disappear from our lives, the conversation with them continues within us as long as we live. (1989)

Our decision making locks into those internal and external dialogues and constitutes our identity. Such different perspectives may involve actual or implied judgement not just about my reasoning or the principles I hold but about myself, and thus my worth. Fundamentally this involves determining my responsibility, for purpose, projects and people in the social and physical environment. At an individual level this may involve dialogue about responsibility for family, work colleagues, intermediate organizations, profession, and so on.

The Self and Others: Mutual Accountability and Shared Responsibility

The relational nature of integrity is developed further as individuals and organizations begin to work out their identity through defining their responsibilities and for determining how they are accountable to others.

Focused in ongoing and interconnected dialogues (Bakhtin 1993) this reveals to each other different accounts of the self but also different accounts of how we relate to each other and to our wider world, and how we take responsibility not just for ourselves but for each other and for shared projects; being true not just to the self but to others. Accountability is often assumed to be based exclusively in formal contract, where an agreement has been made between individuals, or individuals and organizations, or between organizations. However, accountability is involved in all relationships and is the subject of different ongoing formal and informal social dialogues (Bakhtin 1993).

A good example of these interrelated dialogues is healthcare. A medical doctor, for instance, is not simply responsible for fulfilling a discrete job but shares responsibility for the social good of healthcare in a particular context, for how she works with others, other professions, patients, families, particular healthcare institutions and so on. In all this she is accountable to her professional body (who is in turn accountable to society for the regulation of the profession). Both professional body and individual practitioner share responsibility for the integrity of the profession, and failure to fulfil this could affect the identity of the profession, and the relationship of trust with society and politicians. Decisions in medicine may be informed by any or all of these relationships and focused in mutual accountability of all involved and shared responsibility for health as a common good. This plural and mutual accountability is tested and developed through ongoing interconnected dialogues, personal, intra-organizational, and inter-organizational and with the wider community. This tests and develops identity at a personal, organizational (Brown 2005) and social level in the particular context of health and well-being. Elements of this can be set out in psychological, ethical (codes), or social contracts. The UK National Health Service Constitution (UK) (2021), for instance, begins with a narrative of public ownership of the NHS and some consideration of patient and staff responsibility as well as rights. For the patient this means reflecting on accountability to the self, including self-care, the family, particular carers and even for the NHS as a whole. Patient and carer then have shared responsibility for the National Health Service, and accountability to each other. Most often, responsibility is worked out through dialogue in the particular situation as patient, doctor, healthcare institution, and family work through their response to a life challenge.

Such dialogue then is both ontological (focused in being and relationships) and epistemological (understanding both the relationships and how

they are embodied), not principally dialectical (Bakhtin 1993). Key to this dialogue is often the negotiation of responsibility. Finch and Mason (1993) suggest that this process develops ethical identity more effectively than simply reference to principles. Beliefs and values are anchored in mutual revelation of each other, greater self-knowledge and over time lead to greater self-knowledge and a more authentic re-presentation of the self (Sidorkin 1999). Inevitably this dialogue is agonistic (Cottingham 2010; Pianalto 2012), precisely because different views of accountability and responsibility may be contested and possibly denied. This also involves wrestling with power imbalance. For Bakhtin (1993) this is most forcefully expressed in the overall dialogue between authoritative knowing and carnivalistic knowing. The first of these is the narratives of authority that everyone has to deal with, from family, school, professions, institutions and the workplace and so on. Such narratives are based in relationships of authority which both communicate the wider groups values and but also dominant relationships. Carnivalistic knowing is precisely a socially accepted way of challenging dominance which is not subversive, akin to the relationship of fool to king and equally suffused with humour (Bakhtin 1984).[1]

The temptation for those who hold power is to foreclose on such dialogue. Responsibility can then become focused on unquestioning loyalty, homogeneity, and isomorphism (Robinson 2013). The dominant narrative then slips into a narrow binary view of integrity, defending organizational identity against its enemies (cf. Haidt 2013). This is often accompanied by fragmentation of responsibility within the organization, focused on judgement and individual blame. Dialogue requires both a suspension of judgement and disciplined attention to difference, focusing on taking responsibility for aporia or possible conflict (Bauman 1993). Integrity then requires an openness to mutually test and challenge identity. It focuses on sameness and difference, locating worth in both. Awareness of sameness involves mutual acceptance. Awareness of difference allows challenge to identity. Hence as Williams (2000) argues, integrity demands an attitude of humility, recognizing that the individual and the organization are always developing their identity in relation to each other and to the wider social web.

[1] Humour itself focusing in difference such as incongruity and offering different ways of seeing the self and other.

Organizational Integrity

To this point I have suggested that integrity is focused in individual identity, connecting to organizations through dialogue on purpose, worth and so on. In turn such a view of integrity applies to organizations, which can be seen as analogous to persons (Goodpaster 2007; Brown 2005; French 1979), i.e. are involved in decision making and social relations. Business organizations, for example, are constantly trying to give an account of their relationship to society and to the physical environment. This may involve different accounts of responsibility to society, narrow (Sternberg 2000) or broad (King III). Whatever the identity asserted, the business will look to claim integrity based in a moral perspective (cf. Sternberg 2000). Once, this is articulated it becomes open to challenge beyond academia, with face-to-face account (cf. Ford 1999) in the public domain (cf. Brown 2005). The public here in effect act as witnesses to the claims of integrity.

A good example of this dynamic is the Nestle case where the firm gave an account of marketing of breast milk substitute in the developing world to the US Congress (Oyugi 2012). Having described the conditions of poverty (including infected water supplies) and the consequences in children's death, the chair of the Congressional committee asked the head of the European arm of Nestle if they did not see if they had any responsibility in the situation. The visibly flustered response was 'We can't have that responsibility, sir'. Fixed on possible legal claims Nestle defined their responsibility as vendor rather than as social agent. Social concerns were the responsibility of politicians. Such a defensive view also led to earlier simplistic *ad hominem* arguments about activists trying to bring down the free market.

The dynamic of this exchange was striking. The chair did not condemn Nestle so much as invite them to reveal something of their self-identity. The world witnessed Nestle choosing to deny responsibility for responding to significant suffering partly connected to their marketing practice. This is how they saw themselves and they wanted to convince the world of their integrity. It is fair to say that in a short time, after swift dialogue with shareholders and stakeholders, Nestle began to see themselves differently, dropping the *ad hominem* defence. Peter Blackburn the Nestle CEO noted that this moved into a widening dialogue with other providers and