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# Dependable Computing

Design and Assessment







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## **Dependable Computing**

## Design and Assessment

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#### Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data for:

Hardback ISBN: 9781118709443

Cover Design: Wiley

Cover Image: © Yuichiro Chino/Getty Images

Set in 9.5/12.5pt STIXTwoText by Straive, Pondicherry, India

This book is dedicated to my wife Pamela for her unwavering support and encouragement in my academic pursuits, from my PhD to the present day.

– For Ravishankar K. Iyer

This book is dedicated to my wife, whose unfailing support kept me moving forward to the completion of this work.

– For Zbigniew T. Kalbarczyk

This book is dedicated to my parents, whose sacrifices have shaped what I am.

– For Nithin M. Nakka

## Contents

**Preface** xxv

About the Authors xxiii

	Acknowledgments xxvii
	About the Companion Website xxix
1	Dependability Concepts and Taxonomy 1
1.1	Introduction 1
1.2	Placing Classical Dependability Techniques in Perspective 2
1.3	Taxonomy of Dependable Computing 4
1.3.1	Faults, Errors, and Failures 5
1.4	Fault Classes 6
1.5	The Fault Cycle and Dependability Measures 6
1.6	Fault and Error Classification 7
1.6.1	Hardware Faults 8
1.6.2	Software Faults and Errors 8
1.6.2.1	The GUARDIAN90 Operating System 9
1.6.2.2	IBM-MVS (zOS) and IBM Database Management Systems 9
1.7	Mean Time Between Failures 11
1.8	User-perceived System Dependability 13
1.9	Technology Trends and Failure Behavior 14
1.10	Issues at the Hardware Level 15
1.11	Issues at the Platform Level 17
1.12	What is Unique About this Book? 18
1.13	Overview of the Book 19
	References 20
2	Classical Dependability Techniques and Modern Computing Systems:
	Where and How Do They Meet? 25
2.1	Illustrative Case Studies of Design for Dependability 25
2.1.1	IBM System S/360 25

viii	Contents		
------	----------	--	--

2.1.2	The Tandem Integrity System 26	
2.1.3	Blue Waters 28	
2.2	Cloud Computing: A Rapidly Expanding Computing Paradigm 3	1
2.2.1	Layered Architecture of Cloud Computing 32	
2.2.2	Reliability Issues in Cloud Computing 34	
2.3	New Application Domains 37	
2.3.1	Smart Power Grid Application 38	
2.3.2	Business Integrity Assurance Application 40	
2.3.3	Medical Devices and Systems 42	
2.3.3.1	Monitoring of Soldiers for Blast Impact in a Battlefield Scenario	44
2.3.3.2	Teleoperated Surgical Robots 46	
2.3.4	Wireless Sensor Networks 46	
2.3.5	Mobile Phones 47	
2.3.6	Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems 48	
2.4	Insights 52	
	References 52	
3	Hardware Error Detection and Recovery Through	
	Hardware-Implemented Techniques 57	
3.1	Introduction 57	
3.2	Redundancy Techniques 58	
3.2.1	Comparing the Reliability of Simplex and TMR Systems 60	
3.2.2	M-out-of-N Systems 61	
3.2.3	The Effect of a Voter 63	
3.2.4	Time Redundancy 66	
3.3	Watchdog Timers 67	
3.3.1	Example Applications of Watchdog Timers 67	
3.3.2	Limitations of Watchdog Timers 68	
3.4	Information Redundancy 69	
3.4.1	A Brief History of Coding Theory 69	
3.4.2	Outline of the Description of Coding Techniques 71	
3.4.3	Fault Detection Through Encoding 72	
3.4.4	Parity 72	
3.4.5	Cyclic Redundancy Checks 75	
3.4.6	Checksums 79	
3.4.7	Arithmetic Codes 80	
3.4.7.1	AN Codes 80	
3.4.7.2	Berger Codes 80	
3.4.8	Residue-Inverse Residue Codes 81	
3.4.9	Reed-Solomon Codes 82	
3.4.10	Communication Codes and Protocols 83	
3.4.10.1	Convolutional Codes 84	

3.4.10.2	Communication Protocols for Reliable Transmission 85
3.4.11	Two-Level Integrated Interleaved Codes 86
3.4.12	RAID: Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks 88
	A Commercial RAID-Based Storage System 90
3.5	Capability and Consistency Checking 93
3.5.1	Capability Checking 93
3.5.2	Consistency Checking 93
3.6	Insights 93
	References 96
4	Processor Level Error Detection and Recovery 101
4.1	Introduction 101
4.2	Logic-level Techniques 104
4.2.1	Radiation Hardening 104
4.2.2	Selective Node-Level Engineering 105
4.2.3	SEU Hardening for Memory Cells 108
4.2.4	SEU-tolerant Latch 110
4.2.4.1	Recovery from a Particle Strike 111
4.2.5	Razor 112
4.2.5.1	Pipeline Error Recovery 112
4.2.5.2	Discussion 113
4.2.6	Built-in Soft-Error Resilience Using Scan Flip-Flop Reuse 114
4.2.7	Discussion 115
4.3	Error Protection in the Processors 115
4.3.1	Reliability Features of Intel P6 Processor Family 115
4.3.1.1	Machine Check Architecture (MCA) 116
4.3.1.2	Functional Redundancy Checking (FRC) 116
4.3.2	Reliability Features in Itanium 116
4.3.2.1	Protection of On-Chip Memory Arrays 116
4.3.2.2	Error Containment 117
4.3.2.3	Data Poisoning 118
4.3.2.4	Error Promotion 118
4.3.2.5	Watchdog Timer 118
4.3.2.6	Error Detection and Correction Logging 119
4.3.3	POWER7 119
4.3.4	NonStop Himalaya Systems 120
4.4	Academic Research on Hardware-level Error Protection 122
4.4.1	SRTR: Transient Fault Recovery Using Simultaneous
	Multithreading 126
4.4.1.1	Discussion 128
4.4.2	DIVA: A Reliable Substrate for Deep Submicron Microarchitecture
	Design 128

4.4.2.1	Discussion 129
4.4.3	Microprocessor-based Introspection (MBI) 131
4.4.4	Phoenix: Detection and Recovery from Permanent Process
	Design Bugs 133
4.5	Insights 134
	References 137
5	Hardware Error Detection Through Software-Implemented
F 1	Techniques 141
5.1	Introduction 141
5.2	Duplication-based Software Detection Techniques 142
5.2.1	Examples of Software-based Duplication Techniques 144
5.2.1.1	Duplication at the Level of Source Code 145
5.2.1.2	ED <sup>4</sup> I 146
5.3	Control-Flow Checking 146
5.3.1	The State of the Art 147
	Hardware Schemes 147
5.3.1.2	Software Schemes 152
5.3.2	Enhanced Control-Flow Checking with Assertions (ECCA) 153
	Insertion of ECCA Assertions 153
	ECCA Error Detection 155
5.3.2.4	Experimental Evaluation of ECCA 156
5.3.3	Preemptive Control Signature (PECOS) 158
5.3.3.1	PECOS Error Detection 161
5.3.3.2	Experimental Evaluation of PECOS 163
5.4	Heartbeats 166
5.4.1	Timeout Mechanism 167
5.4.2	Limitations of Traditional Heartbeats 168
5.4.3	Designing Adaptive, Smart Heartbeats 168
5.4.4	Evaluation of Smart Heartbeats 171
5.4.4.1	Experimental Methodology 171
5.4.4.2	Experimental Results 172
5.5	Assertions 173
5.6	Insights 174
	References 175
6	Software Error Detection and Recovery Through Software
	Analysis 179
6.1	Introduction 179
6.2	Diverse Programming 183
6.2.1	N-Version Programming 183

6.2.1.1	Applications of N-Version Programming 185
6.2.2	Recovery Blocks 188
6.2.2.1	Sequential Recovery Block Scheme 189
6.2.2.2	Designing an Acceptance Test 189
6.2.2.3	Distributed Applications: Recovery Block Conversations 191
6.2.2.4	Advanced Recovery Block Models and Real-Time Systems 193
6.3	Static Analysis Techniques 194
6.3.1	ESP: Path-Sensitive Program Verification in Polynomial Time 196
6.3.2	PR-Miner: Automatically Extracting Implicit Programming Rules
	and Detecting Violations in Large Software Code 199
6.3.3	Dynamic Derivation of Program Invariants 202
6.3.3.1	DAIKON 203
6.3.4	Statically Derived Application-Specific Detectors 206
6.3.4.1	Terms and Definitions 207
6.3.4.2	Steps in Detector Derivation 207
6.3.4.3	Example of Derived Detectors 208
6.3.4.4	Software Errors Covered 209
6.3.4.5	Hardware Errors Covered 212
6.3.4.6	Performance and Coverage Measurements 213
6.4	Error Detection Based on Dynamic Program Analysis 217
6.4.1	Fault Model 218
6.4.2	Derivation: Analysis and Design 219
6.4.2.1	Dynamic Derivation of Detectors 221
6.4.2.2	Detector Tightness and Execution Cost 221
6.4.2.3	Detector Derivation Algorithm 224
6.4.3	Experimental Evaluation 225
6.4.3.1	Application Programs 225
6.4.3.2	Infrastructure 225
6.4.3.3	Experimental Procedure 227
6.4.4	Results 228
6.4.4.1	Detection Coverage of Derived Detectors 228
6.4.4.2	False Positives 231
6.5	Processor-Level Selective Replication 233
6.5.1	Application Analysis 234
6.5.2	Overview of Selective Replication 235
6.5.3	Mechanism of Replication 236
6.6	Runtime Checking for Residual Software Bugs 239
6.6.1	Race Condition Checking in Multithreaded Programs 239
6.6.2	Array Bounds Checking 240
6.6.3	Runtime Verification 241
6.7	Data Audit 242
6.7.1	Static and Dynamic Data Check 243

6.7.2	Structural Check 243
6.7.3	Semantic Referential Integrity Check 244
6.7.4	Optimization Using Runtime Statistics 244
6.8	Application of Data Audit Techniques 246
6.8.1	Target System Software and Database Architecture 246
6.8.2	Audit Subsystem Architecture 247
6.8.2.1	The Heartbeat Element 249
6.8.2.2	The Progress Indicator Element 249
6.8.2.3	Audit Elements 249
6.8.3	Evaluating the Audit Subsystem 250
6.9	Insights 252
	References 253
7	Measurement-based Analysis of System Software: Operating System
	Failure Behavior 261
7.1	Introduction 261
7.2	MVS (Multiple Virtual Storage) 262
7.2.1	MVS Error Detection and Recovery Processing 263
7.2.2	MVS Error Detection 263
7.2.3	Recovery Processing 264
7.2.3.1	Hardware Error Recovery 265
7.2.3.2	MVS Software Error Recovery 266
7.2.4	Hardware-related Software Errors 266
7.2.4.1	Processing of Error Data 267
7.2.4.2	Analysis of Error Detection 269
7.2.4.3	Error Classification and Detection 269
7.2.4.4	Error Detection and Recovery 270
7.2.4.5	Detection of HW/SW Software Errors 271
7.2.5	Analysis of Hardware-related Software Errors 271
7.2.5.1	Recovery from HW/SW Errors 271
7.2.6	Summary of MVS Analysis 273
7.3	Experimental Analysis of OS Dependability 273
7.3.1	What to Measure and Why? 274
7.4	Behavior of the Linux Operating System in the Presence of Errors 275
7.4.1	Methodology 276
7.4.2	Error Injection Environment 276
7.4.2.1	Approach 276
7.4.2.2	Error Activation 278
7.4.2.3	Error Model 279
7.4.2.4	Outcome Categories 280
7.4.3	Overview of Experimental Results 282

7.4.4	Crash Cause Analysis 284
7.4.4.1	Stack Injection 284
7.4.4.2	System Register Injection 286
7.4.4.3	Code Injection 288
7.4.4.4	Data Injection 289
7.4.4.5	Summary 289
7.4.5	Crash Latency (Cycles-to-Crash) Analysis 290
7.4.6	Crash Severity 292
7.4.6.1	Lessons Learned 293
7.4.6.2	Value in Employing Fault Injection 294
7.4.6.3	Toolset and Benchmark Procedures 294
7.4.7	Summary 294
7.5	Evaluation of Process Pairs in Tandem GUARDIAN 295
7.5.1	Data Integrity 296
7.5.2	User Applications 296
7.5.3	Software Fault Tolerance of Process Pairs 297
7.5.3.1	Measure of Software Fault Tolerance 298
7.5.3.2	Outages Due to Software 299
7.5.3.3	Characterization of Software Fault Tolerance 300
7.5.4	Discussion 303
7.5.5	First Occurrences Versus Recurrences 304
7.5.6	Impact of Software Failures on Performance 305
7.5.7	Summary 308
7.6	Benchmarking Multiple Operating Systems: A Case Study Using Linux
	on Pentium, Solaris on SPARC, and AIX on POWER 308
7.6.1	Introduction of Case Study 309
7.6.2	Experimental Setup 310
7.6.2.1	Fault Model 310
7.6.2.2	Target Systems 311
7.6.2.3	Experimental Environment 311
7.6.3	Evaluation Procedure 313
7.6.3.1	Generation of Injection Targets 313
7.6.3.2	Execution of Fault Injection Campaigns 313
7.6.3.3	Collection and Analysis of Data 314
7.6.4	Results 315
7.6.4.1	Comparison of Target Platforms' Error Behavior 321
7.6.4.2	Feedback for Reliability Enhancements 322
7.6.5	Detailed Discussion and Analysis 323
7.6.5.1	Text Injection Analysis 323
7.6.5.2	Stack Injection Analysis 324
7.6.5.3	Register Injection Analysis 325

7.6.6	Conclusions 326
7.7	Dependability Overview of the Cisco Nexus Operating
7.7	System 326
7.8	Evaluating Operating Systems: Related Studies 330
7.8 7.9	Insights 331
1.9	References 332
	References 332
8	Reliable Networked and Distributed Systems 337
8.1	Introduction 337
8.2	System Model 339
8.3	Failure Models 340
8.4	Agreement Protocols 342
8.4.1	Byzantine Agreement Problem: Solution 343
8.4.1.1	Oral Message Algorithm, $OM(f)$ 344
8.4.2	Interactive Consistency Obtained by Running the Byzantine Agreement
	Protocol 345
8.5	Reliable Broadcast 346
8.5.1	Reliable Broadcast 348
8.5.2	FIFO (First-In-First-Out) Broadcast 348
8.5.3	Causal Broadcast 349
8.5.4	Total Order Broadcast 350
8.6	Reliable Group Communication 351
8.6.1	Specification of Group Communication Service 351
8.6.1.1	Specification of Group Membership Service 352
8.6.1.2	Specification of Reliable Multicast Service 354
8.6.2	Example Implementations of Group Communication Systems 357
8.7	Replication 358
8.7.1	Replication in Hardware 360
8.7.2	Replication in Software 363
8.7.2.1	Replication at the Level of the Operating System 363
8.7.2.2	Replication at the Level Between the Hardware and the Operating
	System 364
8.7.2.3	Replication at the Level Between the Operating System and the User
	Application 364
8.7.2.4	Replication at the User-Level 365
8.7.2.5	CORBA 366
8.7.3	The Problem of Nondeterminism 366
8.7.4	Paxos and Read-Write Quorums: A Practical Approach to Achieving
	Eventual Consistency 368
8.7.4.1	Paxos 368
8.7.5	Read-Write Ouorums 369

8.8	Replication of Multithreaded Applications 370
8.8.1	System Model: Definitions and Assumptions 373
8.8.2	Specification of the LSA Algorithm 374
8.8.3	LSA Algorithm Overview 374
8.8.3.1	Failure Behavior with Error-Free Leader-to-Followers
	Communication 376
8.8.3.2	Failure Behavior with Byzantine Errors in Leader-to-Followers
	Communication 381
8.8.4	Specification of the PDS Algorithm 382
8.8.4.1	PDS-1 Algorithm Overview 382
8.8.4.2	PDS-2 Algorithm 384
8.8.5	Application-Transparent Replication Framework 385
8.8.5.1	Using the LSA and PDS Algorithms with Majority Voting 386
8.8.5.2	LSA and PDS Implementations 386
8.8.5.3	Virtual Socket Layer 386
8.8.5.4	Voter/Fanout Process 387
8.8.6	Performance-Dependability Trade-Offs 387
8.8.6.1	Performance Evaluation 388
8.8.6.2	Dependability Evaluation 390
8.8.6.3	Injections into a Replica Process 391
8.8.6.4	Lessons Learned 395
8.8.7	Conclusions 395
8.9	Atomic Commit 396
8.9.1	The Two-Phase Commit Protocol 397
8.9.1.1	Assumptions 397
8.9.1.2	Basic Algorithm 398
8.9.1.3	Disadvantages 398
8.9.1.4	The Detailed Two-Phase Commit Protocol 398
8.10	Opportunities and Challenges in Resource-Disaggregated Cloud Data
	Centers 400
8.10.1	Data Movement 402
8.10.2	Data Consistency 403
8.10.3	Fault Tolerance 403
8.10.4	ML-based Orchestration and Validation 405
	References 405
9	Checkpointing and Rollback Error Recovery 413
9.1	Introduction 413
9.2	Hardware-Implemented Cache-Based Schemes Checkpointing 415
9.2.1	Cache-Aided Rollback Error Recovery (CARER) for
	Uniprocessors 415

9.2.2	Multiprocessor Cache-Based Schemes 418
9.2.3	ReVive: Cost-Effective Architectural Support for Rollback Recovery
	in Shared-Memory Multiprocessors 419
9.3	Memory-Based Schemes 421
9.3.1	Physical Memory-Based Schemes 421
9.3.2	Virtual Memory-Based Schemes 421
9.4	Operating-System-Level Checkpointing 424
9.4.1	libckpt: Transparent Checkpointing Under Unix 425
9.4.1.1	Incremental Checkpointing 425
9.4.1.2	Forked Checkpointing 425
9.4.2	Fine-Grained Rollback and Deterministic Replay for Software
	Debugging 426
9.4.2.1	Rollback of Multithreaded Processes 427
9.4.3	Transparent Application Checkpoint (TAC) Module 428
9.4.3.1	RMK Framework 428
9.4.3.2	RMK Pins: System-Level RMK Interface 429
9.4.3.3	Application-Level RMK Interface 430
9.4.3.4	RMK Core 430
9.4.3.5	An Example RMK Module: Transparent Application Checkpoint
	(TAC) 430
9.5	Compiler-Assisted Checkpointing 432
9.5.1	CATCH – Compiler-Assisted Techniques for Checkpointing 432
9.5.1.1	Potential Checkpoints 433
9.5.1.2	Sparse Potential Checkpoints 434
9.5.1.3	Adaptive Checkpointing 434
9.5.2	Compiler-Assisted Checkpointing Using libckpt 437
9.5.2.1	Compiler Directives 438
9.6	Error Detection and Recovery in Distributed Systems 438
9.6.1	Synchronous Checkpointing 440
9.6.2	Asynchronous Checkpointing: Message Logging 441
9.6.3	Sender-Based Message Logging 442
9.6.3.1	Design and Motivation 442
9.6.3.2	A Practical Implementation 445
9.7	Checkpointing Latency Modeling 451
9.8	Checkpointing in Main Memory Database Systems (MMDB) 455
9.8.1	Checkpointing of MMDB Control Structures 458
9.8.1.1	Checkpointing Framework 459
9.8.1.2	Incremental Checkpointing 461
9.8.1.3	Delta Checkpointing 462
9.9	Checkpointing in Distributed Database Systems 463
9.9.1	Definitions 464

9.9.2	The Algorithm 465
9.9.2.1	Failure Recovery 468
9.10	Multithreaded Checkpointing 468
9.10.1	Dealing with Nondeterminism 469
,,,,,,,	References 470
10	Checkpointing Large-Scale Systems 475
10.1	Introduction 475
10.2	Checkpointing Techniques 476
10.2.1	Checkpoint Coordination Techniques 476
10.2.2	Shared Memory Systems 478
10.2.3	I/O Techniques 479
10.2.4	Recovery Techniques 481
10.2.4.1	Use of Spares 482
10.3	Checkpointing in Selected Existing Systems 484
10.3.1	Blue Gene 485
10.3.2	Brazos 487
10.3.3	Winckp 487
10.3.4	Condor 488
10.3.5	Libckpt 488
10.3.6	Classification of Checkpointing Approaches in Existing Systems 489
10.3.7	Example of Evaluation of Checkpointing Schemes for a Large-Scale
	System 490
10.3.8	Determining Optimal Checkpointing Interval 491
10.4	Modeling-Coordinated Checkpointing for Large-Scale
	Supercomputers 492
10.4.1	Failure and Recovery 493
10.4.2	SAN-Based Modeling 494
10.4.2.1	Modeling Compute and Checkpointing 496
10.4.2.2	Modeling Correlated Failures 499
10.4.2.3	Results 500
10.5	Checkpointing in Large-Scale Systems: A Simulation Study 502
10.6	Cooperative Checkpointing 506
10.6.1	Other Terms and Definitions 507
10.6.2	Cooperative Checkpointing vs. Periodic Checkpointing 507
	References 508
11	Internals of Fault Injection Techniques 511
11.1	Introduction 511
11.1	Historical View of Software Fault Injection 513
11.2	Fault Model Attributes 517

11.4	Compile-Time Fault Injection 517
11.4.1	Source Code Mutation 520
11.4.2	Bytecode Mutation 521
11.5	Runtime Fault Injection 521
11.5.1	Time Trigger Faults 521
11.5.2	Runtime Mutation 521
11.5.2.1	Mutation of APIs and System Call Parameters 522
11.5.2.2	Software Probe 522
11.5.2.3	Network Messaging Faults 522
11.5.3	Library-Based Faults 523
11.5.4	Performance/Timing Faults 523
11.5.5	User-Space <i>Ptrace</i> -Based Faults 524
11.5.5.1	Fault Injection Using Trap Instruction 524
11.5.5.2	Fault Injection Using Debug Register 524
11.5.6	Fault Injection Using GDB 524
11.5.7	Kernel Space 525
11.5.7.1	Kernel Fault Injection 526
11.5.7.2	Driver 526
11.5.7.3	User Virtual Address 526
11.5.8	Configurable FPGAs 527
11.5.9	Security Threats 527
11.6	Simulation-Based Fault Injection 529
11.7	Dependability Benchmark Attributes 530
11.8	Architecture of a Fault Injection Environment: NFTAPE Fault/Error
	Injection Framework Configured to Evaluate Linux OS 531
11.8.1	Fault Injection Environment 531
11.8.2	Approach Overview 532
11.8.3	Kernel Profiling 533
11.8.3.1	Workload 533
11.8.3.2	Profiling 534
11.8.4	Hardware Monitoring 535
11.8.5	Control Host Overview 535
11.8.5.1	Target Generator 538
11.8.5.2	Injector Manager 539
11.8.6	Kernel-Level Support 540
11.8.6.1	Injection Controller 540
11.8.7	Breakpoint Handler 543
11.8.8	Crash Handler 544
11.8.9	Crash Dumper 545
11.8.10	Component Interactions 545
11.9	ML-Based Fault Injection: Evaluating Modern Autonomous
	Vehicles 547

11.9.1	DriveFI: Bayesian Fault Injection Framework 548
11.9.1.1	Autonomous Driving System Overview 550
11.9.1.2	Defining Safety 551
11.9.1.3	Fault Injection 552
11.9.1.4	Case Studies 554
11.9.2	Bayesian Fault Injection 554
11.9.2.1	Kinematics-Based Model of Safety 555
11.9.2.2	Machine Learning Model Describing the System's Response Under
	Faults 556
11.9.3	The ADS Architecture and Simulation 560
11.9.3.1	Overview of ADS 560
11.9.3.2	Simulation Platform 561
11.9.4	DriveFI Architecture 561
11.9.4.1	Injecting into Computational Elements: GPU Fault Models 563
11.9.4.2	Injecting Faults into ADS Module Output Variables 563
11.9.5	Results 564
11.9.5.1	GPU-Level Fault Injection 566
11.9.5.2	Source-Level Fault Injections 567
11.9.5.3	Results of Bayesian FI-Based Injections 570
11.9.6	AV-Fuzzer: Fault Injection Framework Based on AI-Driven
	Fuzzing 572
11.9.7	Related Work 573
11.10	Insights and Concluding Remarks 574
	References 574
12	Measurement-Based Analysis of Large-Scale Clusters:
	Methodology 585
12.1	Introduction 585
12.2	Related Research 587
12.2.1	Failure Data Analysis in Specific Application Domains 590
12.2.2	Analysis of Data on Security Incidents 593
12.3	Steps in Field Failure Data Analysis 594
12.4	Failure Event Monitoring and Logging 597
12.4.1	Automated Error Logging 597
12.4.1.1	Syslog 598
12.4.1.2	Blue Waters Logs 598
12.4.1.3	IBM Z/OS Logs 601
12.4.1.4	IBM Blue Gene RAS Events 602
12.4.1.5	Windows Event Logging 604
12.4.2	Human-Generated Failure Reports 607
12.4.2.1	Bug Databases and Public User Forums 607
12.5	Data Processing 608

12 5 1	Data Filtering 611
12.5.1	•
12.5.1.1	Example: Processing of Public Computer-Related Recalls Databases
10.5.0	for Safety-Critical Medical Devices 612
12.5.2	Data Coalescence 614
12.5.2.1	Time-Based Coalescence 616
12.5.2.2	Problems with Time-Based Coalescence 618
12.5.2.3	Example of Time-Based Spatial Coalescence of Failure Data from Blue
10 5 0 4	Gene/L 620
12.5.2.4	Content-Based Event Coalescence 620
12.6	Data Analysis 622
12.6.1	Basic Statistics 622
12.6.2	Repair Rates 624
12.6.2.1	Example: Root Cause Analysis from 20 HPC Systems at LANL 624
12.6.2.2	Example: Analysis of Smartphone Users' Failure Reports 627
12.6.2.3	Example: Analysis of Failures from LANs of Windows NT
	Machines 628
12.7	Estimation of Empirical Distributions 634
12.7.1	Hazard Rate Estimation 635
12.7.1.1	Hazard Rate Estimation from VAXclusters 638
12.7.1.2	Hazard Rate Estimation from a Software-as-a-Service Platform 639
12.8	Dependency Analysis 641
12.8.1	Workload/Failure Dependency 642
12.8.2	Failure Dependency Among Components 646
12.8.2.1	Steps in Correlation Analysis 647
12.8.3	Error Interaction Analysis 650
12.8.3.1	Hardware-Related Software Errors 650
	References 651
13	Measurement-Based Analysis of Large Systems: Case Studies 667
13.1	Introduction 667
13.2	Case Study I: Failure Characterization of a Production
	Software-as-a-Service Cloud Platform 667
13.2.1	Data Source 668
13.2.2	Failure Analysis Workflow 669
13.2.3	Failure Characterization 670
13.2.3.1	Output of the Coalescence Process 671
13.2.3.2	Key Factors Impacting Platform Failures 674
13.2.3.3	Impact of Timeout Errors 676
13.2.4	Failure Rate Analysis 678
13.2.4.1	Trend Analysis of the Platform Failure Rate 678
13.2.4.2	Impact of Platform Software Upgrades 681

13.2.4.3	Impact of the Workload Volume on the Platform Failure Rate 683
13.2.4.4	Impact of the Workload Intensity on the Platform Failure Rate 683
13.2.5	Conclusions 684
13.3	Case Study II: Analysis of Blue Waters System Failures 686
13.3.1	Data and Methodology 690
13.3.1.1	Characterization Methodology 692
13.3.2	Blue Waters Failure Causes 693
13.3.2.1	Breakdown of Failures 693
13.3.2.2	Effectiveness of Failover 698
13.3.3	Hardware Error Resiliency 700
13.3.3.1	Rate of Uncorrectable Errors Across Different Node Types 701
13.3.3.2	Hardware Failure Rates 703
13.3.3.3	Hardware Failure Trends 704
13.3.4	Characterization of Systemwide Outages 706
13.3.5	Conclusions 708
13.4	Case Study III: Autonomous Vehicles: Analysis of Human-Generated
	Data 710
13.4.1	Examples of AV-Related Accidents 711
13.4.2	AV System Description and Data Collection 714
13.4.2.1	AV Hierarchical Control Structure 715
13.4.2.2	Data Sources 717
13.4.3	Data-Analysis Workflow: Parsing, Filtering, Normalization,
	and NLP 718
13.4.4	Statistical Analysis of Failures in AVs 721
13.4.4.1	Analysis of AV Disengagement Reports 722
13.4.4.2	Analysis of AV Accident Reports 730
13.4.5	Discussion 733
13.4.6	Limitations of this Study 734
13.4.7	Related Work 735
13.4.8	Insights and Conclusions 736
	References 737
14	The Future: Dependable and Trustworthy AI Systems 745
14.1	Introduction 745
14.2	Building Trustworthy AI Systems 748
14.2.1	An AI System and Its Key Components 748
14.2.2	A System Perspective on Trust in AI Systems 751
14.3	Offline Identification of Deficiencies 753
14.3.1	Assessment and Validation of a System and Its Design 753
14.3.1.1	Formal Verification 753
1/312	

<b>cxii  </b> Content
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14.3.1.3	Model-driven Fuzzing, Falsification, and Fault Injection 758
14.3.2	Post-Mortem Analysis to Track the Causes of Incidents
	Systematically 760
14.3.2.1	Adversarial Learning: A Red Team Approach 761
14.3.2.2	Adversarial Learning: A Systematic Approach to Mislead
	AI Systems 761
14.3.2.3	Generative Adversarial Networks 763
14.3.3	Smart Malware with Self-Learning Capabilities 768
14.4	Online Detection and Mitigation 769
14.4.1	Formalization 769
14.4.2	Monitoring 769
14.4.3	Mitigation 770
14.5	Trust Model Formulation 772
14.5.1	An Illustrative Trust Model 772
14.6	Modeling the Trustworthiness of Critical Applications 775
14.6.1	Autonomous Vehicles and Transportation 775
14.6.1.1	Addressing Uncertainty 777
14.6.2	Large-Scale Computing Infrastructure 778
14.6.2.1	Model Formulation 779
14.6.2.2	Addressing Uncertainty 780
14.6.3	Healthcare AI/ML 781
14.6.3.1	Model Formulation 782
14.6.3.2	Addressing Uncertainty 785
14.7	Conclusion: How Can We Make AI Systems Trustworthy? 786
	References 788

Index 797

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### **Preface**

Dependability of systems has transitioned over the years from a feature to a necessity for end users, and from an add-on to a core design principle for those who are designing and implementing computing or computer-based systems. The need for dependability has grown not just in its breadth in terms of the areas where it is applicable but also in depth. Given any one of the many systems where dependability techniques are applied, their relevance is seen in every layer of the system stack. The aim of this book is to help readers navigate through the evolution of dependability, from taxonomy, mathematical concepts, and fundamental theory to design, implementation, validation, deployment, measurement, and monitoring. Finally, the book brings its audience right up to the modernity of the field by looking at critical societal applications such as autonomous vehicles, large-scale clouds, and engineering solutions for healthcare, illustrating the emerging challenges faced in making artificial intelligence (AI) and its applications dependable and trustworthy.

Sections of the book are intensely pedantic and technical. However, with the support of practical case studies and use cases from both academia and real-world deployments, we have attempted to guide our audience through their journey in fathoming the developments in this ever-growing field. For a beginner, a systematic study from the beginning will help in building strong foundations, but we encourage all readers to whet their appetite with any of the case studies that spark their interest. For seasoned designers and academicians in the area, we attempt to provide a near-current reference for dependability research and development.

The prerequisites for the content of this book are a basic understanding of statistical concepts, computer systems and organization, and, preferably, a course on distributed systems. Above all, a keen interest in delving into this exciting field to unravel and possibly discover new techniques will maintain a reader's enthusiasm, as it has done ours over the past years. Certainly, well-written texts are already available in this area. However, the authors felt that we lacked a single compendium spanning the myriad areas in which dependability has been applied,

providing theoretical concepts and applied knowledge with content that would excite a beginner yet rigor that would satisfy an expert. That feeling led us to embark on the long journey of bringing forth this book.

Chapters 1 and 2 describe dependability taxonomy and briefly compare and contrast classical techniques with their modern counterparts or extensions. Chapters 3–7 help the readers walk up the system stack, from the hardware logic via operating systems up to software applications, with respect to how those layers are hardened for dependability. Chapters 8-12 expand into the domain of distributed systems to explore the techniques and applications therein. Those chapters also delve a great deal into a measurement-based understanding of the systems being studied, an aspect that the authors feel honored to have had the opportunity to significantly contribute. Chapter 13 focuses on the most recent and upcoming trends that are shaping developments in dependability. Finally, looking into the future, Chapter 14 delves deeper into the novel challenges that are being faced in making AI systems dependable and trustworthy.

In summary, with the support of practical case studies and use cases from both academia and real-world deployments, we guide our audience through a journey of developments, including the impact of AI and machine learning on this evergrowing field.

## Acknowledgments

In writing this book, we were inspired by Professor Dan Siewiorek's groundbreaking research and the unmatched book *The Theory and Practice of Reliable System Design* by Siewiorek and Swarz, now in its third edition, as well as the foundational work of Professors Ed McCluskey and Al Avižienis, which continues to impact the field today.

We are indebted to many of our current and former students, postdoctoral associates, and academic and industry colleagues whose research contributed in important ways to material in this book, including Karthik Pattabiraman, Lelio DiMartino, Bob Horst, Saurabh Bagchi, Homa Alemzadeh, Long Wang, Tim Tsai, Saurabh Jha, Phuong Cao, Keywhan Chung, Shengkun Cui, and Archit Patke. Some of our colleagues have also adopted a draft version of this book in teaching dependability courses to graduate and senior students in their respective institutions, which has bolstered our confidence in the usefulness of this content. The administrative and technical proofreading staff members, including, Carol Bosley, Heidi Leerkamp, Jenny Applequist, and Kathleen Atchley, have contributed immensely to this effort by their critical linguistic polish of this technical content and also by their logistical work in keeping the authors and publishers in synchrony to accomplish this massive task. We are grateful to all of them as well as many others who shared their insights.

Special thanks to our colleagues at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign who provided a rich, supportive environment that allowed us to pursue this project.

The research presented in this book was supported by numerous funding agencies and industry partners, including NSF, NIH, NASA, DoD, DARPA, DOE, IBM, Sandia National Lab, Nvidia, the Mayo Clinic, Infosys, and Xilinx.

Apart from the immense technical support we have received, we are very grateful to our families, who have been ever so patient in supporting us. They have transformed their "Are we there yet?" to "Looks like we are getting close" to keep our enthusiasm alive on an emotional front while we gave all we could to tame

#### **xxviii** Acknowledgments

this mammoth. In spite of all the support that we have received both professionally and personally, added to our over 100 years of combined experience in this area, we feel that our attempts to gather all that we could in this ever-expanding and interesting field may have fallen short in some application domains, not given enough justice to some, or even at times made unintentional errors in comprehending and explaining the content. A significant portion of our time was spent in making sure that we kept the content current and relevant for our audience. However, as the field is growing at the rate that it is, we had to reconcile ourselves to the hope that we may offer more in a future edition! We invite readers to send us their feedback on the content or any errors that may have escaped our scrutinous efforts to maintain relevance and correctness.