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# National Security Through the Lens of the 'Five Eyes' Nations

Analyzing Domestic and  
Homeland Considerations  
for Intersectoral  
Collaboration

John Michael Weaver

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## PREFACE

Threats to border security and those stemming from within a nation are burgeoning and becoming increasingly problematic with each passing year. The security apparatus focused on domestic security has a tall order to keep their people safe from threats (manmade) and hazards (occurring from nature). To look for commonalities and to segue into synergies that could arise from collaboration, this study employs a qualitative research methodology to look for points of intersection to help the countries of the most trusted intelligence alliance, the “Five Eyes” countries, look for common ground through which they can share information in order to bring about an increased likelihood of resilience and preparatory measures to be ready for the threats and hazards they might experience. More to the point, this research looks to enhance what Earnest Boyer refers to as scholarship of integration and makes use of the Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model and a variation of a model referred to as the PISE Model (Political, Information, Security, and Economic) as it affords consideration to the four aforementioned variables.

York, USA

John Michael Weaver

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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**John Michael Weaver** is an Associate Professor of Intelligence Analysis at York College in Pennsylvania (USA), a retired DoD civilian from the United States Intelligence Community, and has served as an officer in the U.S. Army (retiring at the rank of lieutenant colonel). Since entering active duty, he has lived and worked on four continents and in 19 countries spending nearly eight years overseas (working on behalf of the U.S. government). His experience includes multiple combat deployments, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and disaster assistance support in both conventional and unconventional/non-traditional units. In recent years, John has trained and certified multinational NATO reconnaissance teams based in The Netherlands, Germany, and Spain for worldwide deployment to support full-spectrum missions. He has also personally led several reconnaissance missions throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Asia (including multiple missions in Afghanistan); none of his team members have ever been injured or killed in the line of duty. He has received formal training/certification in the following areas from the U.S. Department of Defense: Survival/Evasion/Resistance/Escapes (high risk), communications equipment & communications planning (FM radio, landline & satellite communications, encryption, and the use of cryptographic devices), digital camera use & digital photography courses, U.S. Joint Forces Command joint intelligence course, U.S. Special Operations Command counterintelligence awareness course (USSOCOM CI), U.S. Joint Forces Command counterintelligence

awareness training (USJFCOM CI), counterinsurgency course, joint anti-terrorism course, defense against suicide bombing course, dynamics of international terrorism, homeland security and defense course, the joint special operations task force course (JSOTF), defensive driving course, vehicle emergency drills (battle drills), composite risk management, airborne school, air assault school, and more. Additionally, he graduated from NATO's Combined Joint Operations Center course in Oberammergau Germany, the Air Command and Staff College, and the National Defense University's Joint & Combined Warfighting School. John earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in business management from Towson University in 1990, graduated from Central Michigan University with a Master of Science in Administration degree in 1995, earned a Master of Operational Arts and Science degree from the U.S. Air Force's Air University in 2004, and graduated from the University of Baltimore with a Doctorate in Public Administration in 2013.

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## Background Information

**Abstract** This chapter provides an overview of the history of the Five Eyes partnership. Likewise, it begins with the foundation during the Second World War and continues to more contemporary times. It also provides a grounding on the role of intelligence and the sharing of it among the five countries.

**Keyword** Cold War · FVEYs · HUMINT · NATO · Security · SIGINT · UNSC

### 1.1 OVERVIEW

To provide a foundation and to make sense of the Five Eyes (FVEYs) nations, a review of history might provide a basis regarding how this partnership began. To start, it is an alliance that began in 1946 as the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States grew (Pfluke, 2019, 302). Before 1946 and during the Second World War, American and British intelligence personnel worked together in order to decipher encoded messages by the Germans at Bletchley Park to overcome the power of encryption enabled by the Enigma machine (Wells, 2020). Likewise, a need arose to overcome the encryption used by the Japanese and their machine referred to as Purple (Wells, 2020). The

original agreement (UKUSA) afforded attention to areas including intelligence gathering, its production, and subsequent dissemination dealing with foreign intelligence (Army Navy, 1946). Moreover, this arrangement also involved the communication equipment and documents, traffic analysis, translation, cryptanalysis, as well as the likes of communication practices, equipment, organizations, and procedures (Pfluke, 2019, 303).

At the end of World War II, the United Kingdom and the United States saw a need to expand beyond their bilateral arrangement (Wells, 2020, 191). The agreement evolved in 1948 adding Canada and then burgeoned once again in 1956 when Australia and New Zealand were added (Rolfe, 2021, 1) thereby including the Dominions of the United Kingdom (Pfluke, 2019, 303). Moreover, it was a codification of understanding among the countries and involved their responsibilities emanating from international behaviors and the steadfast commitment of these member nations to support their collective security (Rolfe, 2021, 1). The understanding at the time was, in part, that the far reach of these nations could help in sharing intelligence beyond the scope of each country at the time (Pfluke, 2019, 302). The relationship among these five actors helped maintain a balance and order among Western nations as they stood in solidarity against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War (West, 2020). That stated, even though most of the FVEYs countries generally saw eye-to-eye on collective security issues, there were times when a divergence in opinions and support existed. Early on, challenges emerged because of the strength regarding the relationship between the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK); originally the United States was only allowed to enter into bilateral agreements with Canada (due to proximity in location), but had to clear subsequent arrangements with the United Kingdom if the United States desired to deal directly with Australia and New Zealand (Pfluke, 2019, 303).

When diving deeper into the FVEYs relationship, it is one underpinned by secrecy. Moreover, it looks at the intelligence sharing among each member on topics gravitating around global security concerns (Rolfe, 2021, 1). It is grounded by an interdependent relationship, predicated upon an implied partnership, and then looks to promulgate a standardization wherever possible among collection modes, the analysis of the collected raw data, decryption of signals intelligence, and the subsequent linguistic translation of communications (Rolfe, 2021, 1).

Policymakers need intelligence analysis as it can help them understand trends and assist them in predicting upcoming challenges (McLaughlin,

2014, 82). This is especially important as the world is becoming even more unstable and divided (NSS, 2022, 7–11). Early efforts focused on the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries (Pfluke, 2019, 303). After the United States' National Security Agency was set up in 1952, whose focus was on signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, efforts were underway to facilitate the centralization of aspects of communications intelligence in this nation (Pfluke, 2019, 304). This partnership helped foster access and placement to intelligence throughout the world though, geographically, it mostly centered on North America, Europe, and Asia. It lacked a member nation's presence in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America (aside from embassies) (Shiraz & Aldrich, 2019; Matei & Bruneau, 2011; Navarro, 2010).

As of the present time, and according to open source scholarly data, the FVEYs partnership has at least 25–40 distinct and identifiable dialogues and other cooperative arrangements among these member countries (Rolfe, 2021, 1). Though there are 25 to 30 such arrangements among the nations, it is not a foregone conclusion that any internal coherence exists, nor has there been a formal overarching or coordination relationship between any two or among the five partner countries. Just a few years ago (as of 2017), The FVEYs Intelligence Oversight and Review Council came into existence to better promote idea exchanges and to help run a comparative analysis of oversight and best practice methods (Rolfe, 2021, 2).

Though it is commonly understood that the relationship promotes signals intelligence sharing, and by extension, one can deduce that this includes exchanges of intelligence emanating from human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence, other inferences can be assumed (Rolfe, 2021, 2). The militaries of all member nations have their own intelligence capabilities to help protect their forces.

Accordingly, military intelligence helps provide insight into ground capabilities (tanks, air defense systems, artillery, infantry formations, armored personnel carriers, and more) to their respective armies (Weaver, 2021). Likewise, air intelligence looks at adversarial jet fighters, bombers, drones, tankers, strategic & tactical airlift, space, and more to provide this intelligence to their nations' air forces (Weaver, 2021). Finally, maritime intelligence provides sensitive information on aircraft carriers, submarines, and frigates to their naval personnel. Moreover, because of the collective defense arrangements among the FVEYs members, one can assume that the relationship also includes the sharing of intelligence centered

on military capabilities (Rolfe, 2021, 2). This could be underscored by all five countries and their involvement in special operations in Regional Command South (and later Southwest) in Afghanistan during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission which, one can argue, was the most dangerous region (regions) in Afghanistan during the span of that conflict.

The partnership expands beyond the intelligence members and the militaries of these countries. Moreover, there have been ministerial discussions looking at a whole host of issues that include but are not limited to borders & immigration, attorneys general, treasuries, and more (Rolfe, 2021, 2). There will be a need for countries to invest in the likes of critical infrastructure, a more robust industrial strategy, greater economic security, defensive technological products, advanced computing, semiconductor production, artificial technology, climate mitigation strategies, biodefense initiatives, combating transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and terror organizations, as well as quantum systems (NSS, 2022, 14–15, 21, 30, 32). Likewise, it moves beyond the scope of intelligence and looks at the participation in joint global operations as well as the development of technologies gravitating toward contemporary collection and intelligence analysis (Pfluke, 2019, 305); this can include the likes of the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), the AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) alliance, and the FVEYs (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) partnership (NSS, 2022, 17).

Underscoring these defense relations, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met with the Canadian Prime Minister in June 2022 at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Headquarters. During this meeting, the U.S. Defense Secretary underscored the importance of this bilateral defense relationship (Austin, 2022). The week prior, Austin met with Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to attest to the United States' support of the NATO Alliance ahead of the annual summit (Austin Press Release, 2022).

What is surprising, the FVEYs partnership generally remained out of public knowledge until 1999 (Pfluke, 2019, 304). This had been the case until such time that Australia's head of the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) was candid about his nation's participation in the relationship (Pfluke, 2019, 304). Leaks also occurred in recent times resulting in the public learning about SIGINT capabilities. Most notably, the Echelon