

Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy 19

Yuri Pines *Editor*

Dao Companion to China's *fa* Tradition

The Philosophy of Governance
by Impartial Standards

 Springer

Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy

Volume 19

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Yuri Pines
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Yuri Pines 

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Preface

The work on this volume started in the middle of COVID pandemic which mercilessly exposed weaknesses of every single government and political system in dealing with a major crisis. It continued when my motherland, Ukraine, became the victim of a vicious attack by what was normally perceived a fraternal state. And I write this preface at the time when my country of citizenship, Israel, is enmeshed in a new, bloodiest ever, round of its endless conflict with neighboring Palestinians. The three crises (and others, which evolve around us, even with less media attention) differ very much in their nature, background, and potential outcomes. They have only one thing in common: they expose inadequacy of political leaders, whose shortsightedness, narrowmindedness, impulsiveness, and dependence on inept aids and PR-advisors lead their countries into abyss. And these crises also demonstrate that all too often the leaders' lofty discourse of moral superiority conceals nothing but meanness of their actions.

It is against this backdrop that I ponder about the potential relevance of the millennia-old *fa* tradition (often dubbed Legalism), which prioritized impartial norms over personalized decision-making, proposed dissociating politics from moralizing discourse, and pitilessly exposed selfishness of any political actor. The texts associated with this tradition are not easy to read: they abound with provocative and outright appalling statements, and I suspect that should their authors come alive, myself and most of this volume's contributors would find ourselves in an opposing camp. However, their emotionless and realistic approach to politics has a certain allure. Besides, the practicality of their advice was valued by political leaders throughout much of China's history, even though few would openly acknowledge this.

This lack of open endorsement is not surprising. The *fa* thinkers' notorious harshness and authoritarian stance, and especially their assault on fellow intellectuals, gave rise to strong anti-*fa* sentiments which hindered studies of these texts in the past, and which discourage scholars in China and abroad from dealing with them even today. The neglect is unfortunate and self-defeating, though. Whereas few if any of us will be converted to the *fa* texts' approach, the readers will benefit immensely from understanding their rationale, their strength and weaknesses, their

intellectual and political context, and their short- and long-term impact. Introducing these topics is the goal of this volume.

Originally, this volume had two editors. Whereas my friend, Paul R. Goldin, decided to stop his involvement with the volume, his help at the initial stages of production was immense and I am deeply indebted to him. I am grateful to the contributors who continued to work on their papers even during the apex of COVID crisis and who were overwhelmingly cooperative and tolerant to editorial quibbles. And special thanks to the dedicated assistant, Dr. Avital Rom, who had not just helped in translating and revising the Chinese-language submissions, but also offered considerable editorial assistance.

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November 2023, Beijing

Yuri Pines

Contents

Introduction: The <i>fa</i> Tradition in Chinese Philosophy	1
Yuri Pines	
Part I Major Texts and Thinkers	
1 Shang Yang and <i>The Book of Lord Shang</i>	23
Yuri Pines	
2 On Shen Buhai's Legal Thought	57
Zhong Yu 喻中	
3 Morality vs. Impartial Standards in the <i>Shenzi Fragments</i>	83
Eirik Lang Harris	
4 <i>Han Feizi: The World Driven by Self-Interest</i>	99
Yuri Pines	
5 The Concept of <i>fa</i> in <i>Guanzi</i> and Its Evolution	139
Masayuki Sato 佐藤將之	
6 The Ideology of Chao Cuo	181
Christian Schwermann	
Part II Major Ideas of the <i>fa</i> Traditions	
7 Rule by Impersonal Standards in the Early Empires: Ideas and Realities	201
Maxim Korolkov	
8 <i>Fa</i> and the Early Legal System	231
Ulrich Lau and Michael Lüdke	

9	Two Perspectives on the <i>Fa</i> Tradition: Politics Versus the Rule of Impartial Standards	265
	Hongbing Song 宋洪兵	
10	Human Motivation in the <i>fa</i> Tradition: Visions from the <i>Shenzi Fragments, Shangjunshu, and Han Feizi</i>	295
	Eirik Lang Harris	
11	The Ruler in the Polity of Objective Standards	315
	Mark E. Lewis	
12	The Historiography of Political Realism	351
	Kai Vogelsang	
13	The Ruler's New Tools: <i>Fa</i> 法 and the Political Paradigm of Measure in Early China	373
	Romain Graziani	
14	Philosophy of Language in the <i>fǎ</i> 法 Tradition	405
	Lisa Indraccolo	
15	The <i>Fa</i> Tradition and Morality	433
	Alexus McLeod	
Part III <i>Fa</i> Traditions in History		
16	The Historical Reputation of the <i>Fa</i> Tradition in Imperial China	459
	Hongbing Song 宋洪兵	
17	The <i>fa</i> Tradition and Its Modern Fate: The Case of the <i>Book of Lord Shang</i>	487
	Yuri Pines	
Part IV Comparative Perspectives		
18	The <i>fa</i> Tradition Versus Confucianism: Intellectuals, the State, and Meritocracy	517
	Yuri Pines	
19	<i>Fajia</i> and the Mohists	547
	Tao Jiang	
20	Laozi, Huang-Lao and the <i>fa</i> Tradition: Thinking Through the Term <i>xingming</i> 刑名	575
	Pei Wang 王沛	
21	Machiavelli and the <i>fa</i> Tradition	595
	Jason P. Blahuta	

22 *The Book of Lord Shang and Totalitarianism’s Intellectual Precursors Compared*..... 623
Alexandre Schiele

Part V Epilogue

23 *The Han Feizi and Its Contemporary Relevance*..... 645
Tongdong Bai

Index, cumulative 677

Introduction: The *fa* Tradition in Chinese Philosophy



Yuri Pines

The intellectual tradition that is called in Chinese “The School of *fa*” (*fajia* 法家) and in English is best known as “Legalism” gained prominence in the latter half of the Warring States period (Zhanguo 戰國, 453–221 BCE). Adherents of the *fa* tradition (as we prefer to call it henceforth) were political realists who sought to attain a “rich state and a powerful army” (*fuguo qiangbing* 富國強兵) and to ensure domestic stability in the age marked by intense inter- and intra-state competition. They believed that human beings—commoners and elites alike—will forever remain selfish and covetous of riches and fame, and one should not expect them to behave morally. Rather, a viable sociopolitical system should allow individuals to pursue their selfish interests exclusively in the ways that benefit the state, namely agriculture and warfare; and a proper administrative system should allow officials to benefit from ranks and emoluments, but also prevent them from illicitly enriching themselves or subverting the ruler’s power. Both systems should remain unconcerned with individual morality of the rulers and the ruled; rather they should be based on impersonal norms and standards most commonly identified as *fa* 法—laws, administrative regulations, clearly defined rules of promotion and demotion, and the like. These recommendations were duly implemented in many of the competing polities, most notably the state of Qin 秦, which successfully unified the Chinese world and established the first imperial dynasty in 221 BCE.

Qin’s success marked the zenith of the *fa* tradition’s influence; but it also became one of the major reasons for its subsequent denigration. Qin’s assault on private

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learning which peaked with the notorious book burning in 213 BCE made this dynasty singularly hated in the eyes of the imperial literati for millennia to come (Barbieri-Low 2022: 157–85). The short-lived Qin dynasty (it collapsed in 207 BCE) was reimagined as an epitome of cruelty, oppressiveness, senseless autocracy—in short, all that went wrong with the unified empire (Pines 2014). The *fa* tradition was identified as the major reason for Qin’s malfunction and swift collapse. Whereas many of its practical recipes remained in use throughout imperial history and beyond, leading some scholars to depict imperial China as a “Confucian-Legalist state” (e.g., Zhao 2015), the intellectual tradition itself lost an aura of legitimacy and its vitality. Beginning in the second century of the Han dynasty 漢 (206/202 BCE–220 CE), open endorsement of the *fa* legacy was no longer politically acceptable (Song, Chap. 16, this volume). Even in the twentieth century, despite partial rehabilitation of the *fa* ideology, it remained hugely controversial. Not a few scholars in China and abroad viewed (and continue to view it) as an unpleasant fact of China’s history, a kind of historical aberration that merits scanty attention if at all. Only recently the ideological tensions surrounding the study of *fa* texts began receding, allowing scholars to take a fresh look at this fascinating—even if not necessarily morally attractive—tradition.

1 Defining the *fa* Tradition

The *fa* tradition is best known in European languages as the “School of Law” or “Legalist school.” As Paul R. Goldin (2011) has demonstrated, this designation suffers from two problems. First, the term *fa* does not necessarily mean “law.” Whereas this translation is surely correct in many contexts (see Lau and Lüdke, Chap. 8, this volume), it can as often refer to “standards,” “models,” “norms,” “methods,” and the like; sometimes it refers to the entirety of political institutions designed to maintain the proper functioning of the state.¹ Second, viewing *fajia* as a “school” is misleading also because there was no self-aware and organized intellectual current of *fa* adherents on a par with the followers of Confucius 孔子 (551–479 BCE) or Mozi 墨子 (ca. 460–390 BCE).² Throughout millennia, this term was used primarily as a

¹ See the observation of Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (a.k.a. Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, 1869–1936): “*Fa* is the grand name for the political system” 法者，制度之大名 (Zhang [1900] 2000, 35: 565).

² This does not mean that the *fa* thinkers did not have devoted disciples. Suffice it to mention that the composition of the *Book of Lord Shang* (*Shangjunshu* 商君書) was performed not by Shang Yang 商鞅 (d. 338 BCE) alone but by his anonymous followers, whom Zheng Liangshu (1989) dubs “Shang Yang’s school” 商鞅學派. It is highly likely that the preservation and circulation (and possibly redaction) of the text of *Han Feizi* 韓非子 was similarly performed by Han Fei’s 韓非 (d. 233 BCE) disciples and followers. Note furthermore that *Han Feizi* refers once to Shang Yang and Shen Buhai 申不害 (d. 337 BCE) not as persons but as *jia* 家 (a term that from the Han dynasty onward referred to a “school” or “scholastic lineage”) (*Han Feizi* 43.1.1; Chen 2000: 957; for an assertion that *jia* here refers to persons only, see Petersen 1995: 3). All this suggests that some “proto-*fajia*” groups could have existed back in the Warring States period. It is clear, nonetheless,

bibliographic category under which intellectually related texts were catalogized in the imperial libraries. As such the *fajia* designation is heuristically useful; but to avoid the impression of a coherent “school” or “scholastic lineage,” most of the contributors to this volume opted for a more neutral term *fa* tradition.³

The Han and later librarians’ categorization of certain texts under the *fajia* label was not entirely arbitrary. The seeds of grouping several thinkers as belonging to the same intellectual current can be traced already to Han Fei 韓非 (d. 233 BCE), who is often considered the most significant representative of the *fa* tradition. In chapter 43 of *Han Feizi* 韓非子, “Defining the Standards” (“Ding fa” 定法), the thinker presents himself as the synthesizer and improver of the ideas of two of his predecessors, Shang Yang 商鞅 (d. 338 BCE) and Shen Buhai 申不害 (d. 337 BCE). Pairing Shen Buhai and Shang Yang, and adding Han Fei himself to them became common from the early Han dynasty (see, e.g., *Huainanzi* 6: 230, 11: 423, 20: 833). The historian Sima Qian 司馬遷 (ca. 145–90 BCE) identified these three thinkers as adherents of the teaching of “performance and title” (*xingming* 刑名) (*Shiji* 62: 2146, 68: 2227), the term which remained a secondary designation of the *fa* tradition thereafter.⁴ The fourth thinker identified in the Han imperial catalog as belonging to *fajia*—Shen Dao 慎到 (fourth century BCE)—also figures prominently in *Han Feizi*, where a whole chapter (40, “Objection to Positional Power” [“Nan shi” 難勢]) is dedicated to the defense and improvement of Shen’s ideas (Pines 2020). These four thinkers (or, more precisely, the texts associated with them) form the core of the *fa* tradition.

The term *fajia* was coined by Sima Qian’s father, Sima Tan 司馬談 (d. 110 BCE) in his essay “On the Essentials of the Six Schools of Thought” 六家之要指 (*Shiji* 130: 3289–91). It was first employed as a bibliographical category by the Han librarian, Liu Xiang 劉向 (77–6 BCE), whose catalog was later incorporated into the “Treatise on Arts and Letters” (“Yiwenzhi” 藝文志) chapter of *Hanshu* 漢書 (The Han History) by Ban Gu 班固 (32–92). The “Treatise on Arts and Letters” identifies ten texts as belonging to *fajia*. Four—Lord Shang 商君 (later known as the *Book of Lord Shang* [*Shan jun shu* 商君書], *Shēnzi* 申子, *Shènzi* 慎子 and *Han*

that these groups were much less cohesive and less visible than the Confucians and Mohists, for example. For more about the complexity of using the term *jia* as “scholastic lineage,” see Smith 2003 and Csikszentmihalyi and Nyland 2003.

³ Among alternative designations contemplated by the contributors, one can note Vogelsang’s (Chap. 12) “Political Realists” (defended also in Vogelsang 2016: 39–45; for an earlier example, see Waley 1939). Vogelsang borrows the designation from Hans Morgenthau, who defined Political Realism as an approach that “sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics, ethics, aesthetics, or religion” (Morgenthau 1978: 5). It should be noted that this definition does not imply that the Political Realists’ rivals were mere idealists, which would be an unfair judgement; yet because such an impression may be inadvertently created nonetheless, the author of this introduction prefers to eschew the Political Realists label.

⁴ See for instance, *Qingding siku quanshu zongmu tiyao* 101: 1; I borrow translation of *xingming* from Goldin 2020: 13; see more about the term in Wang and Indraco; Chaps. 20 and 14 in this volume.

Feizi—are attributed to the thinkers mentioned above. In addition, there are also *Lizi* 李子, attributed to Li Kui 李悝, a minister and legislator in the court of Marquis Wen of Wei 魏文侯 (r. 445–396 BCE); *Chao Cuo* 鼂錯 by an eponymous Han minister (d. 154 BCE); and four other works the authors and dates of which are no longer identifiable (*Hanshu* 30: 1735). *Lizi* was lost relatively early; the works of Shen Buhai and Chao Cuo were still listed in the imperial catalog of the Liang dynasty 梁 (502–557), but were considered lost by the time of Sui 隋 (581–618; *Suishu* 34: 1003–4); they reappeared in the Tang 唐 (618–907) imperial catalog (*Jiu Tangshu* 47: 2031) and were lost again thereafter. The Sui bibliographers had also reclassified another pre-Qin text, *Guanzi* 管子 (originally classified under the “Daoist” 道家 section) as belonging to *fajia*, and this identification was followed by most later bibliographers.⁵ Our selection of texts and thinkers for the following discussion broadly follows these early bibliographical lists for the reasons outlined below.

It should be immediately recalled that bibliographical classification is not rocket science, and its usefulness diminishes once we face composite texts that comprise chapters with heterogeneous ideological content, such as *Guanzi* (Sato, Chap. 5, this volume). The heuristic advantage of school labels further diminishes once these labels are reified and turned into a major analytical device. This was particularly the case in the early 1970s, when the term *fajia* became deeply politicized in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and this politicization impacted studies of *fajia* elsewhere (Pines, Chap. 17, this volume). Back then, many thinkers, from Xunzi 荀子 (d. after 238 BCE) to Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (a.k.a. Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, 1869–1936) were classified in PRC as *fajia*, leading to their political and scholarly endorsement (Chen 2019). By contrast, such an eminent scholar as Herrlee G. Creel (1905–1994) dedicated back then a lengthy discussion to emphatically dissociate Shen Buhai from the “Legalists” (Creel 1974: 137–62). From today’s perspective, such discussions are largely pointless. Bibliographic classifications do not pretend to be precise. They do reflect certain commonalities among the texts grouped together in terms of their ideas, terminology, or argumentative patterns; but these commonalities neither mean uniformity nor do they imply strict separation of a certain group of texts from those classified under a different label. The traditional bibliographers’ observations should never be allowed to determine the nature of our research; they, however, can serve as a convenient starting point for a discussion, as is done in this volume.

The *fa* tradition that we discuss in this volume is emphatically not a single-keyword tradition. Nor does it possess any monopoly on advocacy of *fa*. The term *fa* was employed in a variety of texts of other traditions—starting from the *Yellow*

⁵In addition to *Guanzi*, *Shangzi* 商子 (i.e., the *Book of Lord Shang*), *Shenzi* 慎子, and *Hanzi* 韓子 (i.e. *Han Feizi*), the Sui bibliographers classified two other works under the *fajia* category: *On Correctness* (*Zhenglun* 正論, should be *On Administration*, *Zhenglun* 政論) by Cui Shi 崔寔 (ca. 103–170 CE), and *Essentials for our Age* (*Shiyaolun* 世要論) by Huan Fan 桓範 (d. 249 CE). Judging from the currently preserved textual remnants of both treatises, this identification is disputable; both Cui and Huan clearly viewed themselves as belonging to the Confucian tradition.

Thearch Manuscripts (*Huangdi shu* 黃帝書), unearthed in 1973 from Tomb 3, Mawangdui (Wang, Chap. 20, this volume) and ending with such a definitely non-*fajia* text as *Mengzi* 孟子 (*Mengzi* 7.1). Nor is *fa* the only keyword appropriate for the discussion of the rule by impersonal standards. In certain texts, this function can be performed by a “Confucian” concept such as ritual (*li* 禮). One of the most notable examples is the *Gongyang Commentary* on the *Springs and Autumns Annals* (*Gongyang zhuan* 公羊傳), which de-emphasizes personal cultivation and prioritizes institutional solutions to political turmoil; these solutions are usually referred to as “ritual,” but notably also as “King Wen’s *fa* and measures” 文王之法度.⁶ Should we decide to incorporate some of the above texts in our discussion, it would be more appropriate to speak of *fa* traditions rather than a single tradition.

Despite this attractive possibility to discuss the usages of *fa* in early Chinese thought in general, we opted for a narrower focus on a relatively small group of texts identified by traditional bibliographers as belonging to *fajia*. The primary unifying thread of these texts is the insistence on the superiority of impersonal standards and institutional designs over reliance on the personal qualities of rulers and ministers, or, in modern parlance, the superiority of the rule of *fa* (*fazhi* 法治) over the “rule of men” (*renzhi* 人治).⁷ There are further points of agreement among the texts discussed in this volume. Thus, they display uniform commitment to safeguarding the ruler’s authority vis-à-vis his ministers, who are more often than not identified as the ruler’s rivals. They dismiss the past models as irrelevant and insist that as “times changed,” so the sociopolitical system should be altered as well (Vogelsang, Chap. 12). They are generally dismissive of self-serving intellectuals and of their moralizing discourse (Pines, Chap. 18), although this does not necessarily means advocating “amoral” statecraft (McLeod Chap. 15 *pace* Graham 1989: 267–91). They are skeptical about the possibility that humans can overcome their innate quest for riches and fame (or social status, *ming* 名) through moral self-cultivation, and prefer to treat the people as they are and not as they should be (Harris, Chap. 10). These points can be considered the common foundations of the *fa* tradition.

These commonalities do not imply, for sure, uniformity among the texts discussed, nor even within some of these texts. The different emphases of the *fa* texts had been duly exposed already in *Han Feizi*’s “Defining the Standards” chapter. Sometimes we encounter implicit polemics between two chapters of the same text: chapter 15, “Attracting the People” (“Lai min” 徠民) of the *Book of Lord Shang*, for example, polemicizes with chapter 6, “Calculating the Land” (“Suan di” 算地).⁸ Different chapters of the *fa* texts present at times contradictory perspectives on such

⁶*Gongyang zhuan*, Wen 9.1 (Liu 2011: 301); more in Gentz 2015. For more about early meaning of *li*, when it was still dissociated from personal cultivation and was aimed to serve as a panacea to the entirety of sociopolitical problems, see Pines 2000.

⁷The terms *fazhi* and *renzhi* have been popularized in the early twentieth century, most notably through the endorsement by China’s most outstanding intellectual then, Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929); see Hong 2018: 19–39.

⁸See Yoshinami 1985 and Pines, *Forthcoming*; or see Queen 2013 for differences between two chapters of *Han Feizi* that focus on the exegesis of *Laozi* 老子.

ideas as, e.g., the qualities expected of a sovereign (cf. Lewis, Chap. 11 vs. Pines 2013 and Graziani 2015); they diverge in their modes of argumentation, in their philosophical sophistication, in the degree of their willingness to assault the moralizing discourse of their opponents, and so on. But similarities are pronounced enough to justify speaking of a single intellectual tradition. We hope that our discussion will outline the intellectual contours of this tradition and allow further investigation about the relation of other texts, which share some of the *fa* tradition's ideas and vocabulary, to this intellectual current.

2 The *fa* Texts and Studies of Chinese Philosophy

The *fa* tradition had an odd destiny in imperial China. On the one hand, many of its tenets, such as the usage of objective and quantifiable standards in assessing the officials' performance, were duly adopted by the empire's leaders (see Korolkov, Chap. 7, this volume; cf. Creel 1974: 233–93). On the other hand, some of the *fa* thinkers' basic recommendations proved untenable for the unified empire. For instance, the discontinuation of universal military service in the Han dynasty (Lewis 2000) caused a gradual atrophy of the system of ranks of merit advocated by Shang Yang, turning the crux of his social engineering program irrelevant to imperial-era statesmen (Pines 2016: 29–31). Even more consequentially, the emergence of powerful local elites early in the Han dynasty eroded another pillar of *fa* thought, the insistence on the state as the sole provider of material and social benefits. As the political and intellectual power of these elites increased, more and more ideas of the *fa* thinkers were sidelined. Such prominent tenets of *fa* thought as the evolutionary view of history, the dismissive attitude toward self-cultivation, the derision of moralizing discourse, the denigration of independent intellectuals and the like, largely disappeared from the imperial-era political texts.

The most visible development of the imperial era was rapid loss of prestige of *fa* thinkers and texts. When the Imperial Counsellor Sang Hongyang 桑弘羊 (152–80 BCE) defended Shang Yang, Shen Buhai, and Han Fei during the so-called Salt and Iron Debates of 81 BCE, this was the last major occasion in imperial China's history that a leading statesman had openly identified himself with these thinkers and proudly positioned himself as their heir.⁹ Thenceforth, manifold supporters of “a rich state and a strong army” policy would usually prefer to distance themselves from Shang Yang or Han Fei, even if admiring their deeds. The image of the *fa* thinkers was too tarnished to merit open identification. These thinkers, were viewed, following Sima Tan, as “strict and having little kindness” 嚴而少恩 (*Shiji* 130: 3289), as advocates of cruel laws and merciless punishments, and as proponents of the policies that were diametrically opposite to the cherished “educational

⁹ See particularly chapters 7 (“Fei Yang” 非鞅) and 56 (“Shen Han” 申韓) of *Yantielun* 鹽鐵論 (the text that purportedly records the 81 BCE debates; see more in Polnarov 2018).

transformation” (*jiaohua* 教化). One of the imperial China’s most brilliant intellectuals, Su Shi 蘇軾 (literary name Dongpo 東坡, 1036–1101) remarked, derivatively, “From the Han onward, scholars have been ashamed to speak about Shang Yang and Sang Hongyang” 自漢以來，學者恥言商鞅、桑弘羊 (*Dongpo quanji* 105: 14). Indeed, a few sympathetic voices notwithstanding, the overwhelming majority of the imperial-era literati preferred to distance themselves from the *fa* tradition even when applying its ideas in practice (Song, Chap. 16, this volume).

The immediate consequence of this negative image was the decline of interest in *fa* texts and their limited circulation. Of the texts classified as *fajia* in the Han, Sui, and Tang imperial catalogs, only one—*Han Feizi*, prized for its superior literary qualities—had survived the vicissitudes of time more or less intact. Two other texts—the *Book of Lord Shang* and *Guanzi* (which, recall, is only partly related to the *fa* tradition)—survived in a tolerably readable shape, albeit with many chapters having been lost or corrupted by unprofessional copyists. Two other preimperial *fajia* texts—*Shēnzi* 申子 and *Shènzi* 慎子—survived only in fragments (see Creel 1974 for the former; Thompson 1979 and Xu 2013 for the latter).

Seeds of rediscovery of these texts were sown in the late Qing 清 (1636/1644–1912) era thanks to the attention from the “evidential research” (*kaozheng* 考證) scholars. Their efforts in restoring the readability of the *Book of Lord Shang* and reassembling *Shènzi* 慎子 and *Shēnzi* 申子 fragments are invaluable, and so are advances in the textual analysis of *Han Feizi* that were simultaneously made in Japan (Sato 2013). However, *kaozheng* scholars paid little if any interest to the *fa* thought as such. It was only on the eve of the collapse of the Qing dynasty and of the imperial order itself, when, amid massive reevaluation of the past, scholars started paying attention to the long-sidelined *fa* tradition. We witness a robust interest, from the beginning of the twentieth century, in the *fa* texts, which attracted scholars because of the resonance of their ideas with aspects of modern Western thought, be it the evolutionary view of history or the idea of *fazhi*, viewed by many as compatible with the Western “rule of law.” However, as Pines shows in this volume (Chap. 17), the twentieth-century rediscovery remained somewhat abortive due to the lingering political dislike of the authoritarian aspects of the *fa* tradition, as well as mere scholarly inertia. Even the odd outburst of adoration of *fa* thinkers during the 1973–1975 campaign “Reappraise the *fa* thinkers, criticize Confucians” 評法批儒 did not result in major breakthroughs. Once the campaign ended, the interest in the *fa* tradition in mainland China receded anew, whereas elsewhere the bizarre endorsement of *fa* thinkers by Maoist radicals had actually discouraged in-depth engagement with their texts.

This legacy of lackluster interest in the *fa* tradition is still well recognizable in modern research, especially in the aftermath of Maoist “Reappraise the *fa* thinkers” campaign.¹⁰ It is most transparent in the subfield of “Chinese philosophy” in the

¹⁰ Before the mid-1970s, several Western scholars paid due attention to the *fa* texts. Most notable is Léon Vandermeersch’s *La formation du Légisme* (1965); but see also Arthur Waley’s *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China* (1939). For the Soviet engagement with the *fa* tradition (overwhelmingly focused on the *Book of Lord Shang*), see Pines, Chap. 17, this volume.

West. Even a brief survey of major introductory-level studies of Chinese philosophy through the last decades of the twentieth century and into the first decade of the twenty-first suffices to demonstrate the ongoing sidelining of the *fa* tradition. In these studies, the *fa* texts usually merit just between 5% and 10% of total space dedicated to China's preimperial thinkers.¹¹ Most of the *fa* texts are habitually ignored altogether, with attention is given only to *Han Feizi* (actually just to five–ten chapters of the *Han Feizi* corpus; other chapters—especially those based on historical argumentation—attract no scholarly attention whatsoever). Similarly, until the second decade of the twenty-first century, the *fa* thinkers merited little if any attention in major Anglophone scholarly journals that deal with Chinese philosophy, such as *Dao*, *The Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, and *Philosophy East and West*.

The reasons for this neglect are complex. One is an understandable dislike of the ideology which was portrayed for centuries (not entirely undeservedly) as supportive of authoritarianism, oppressiveness, and anti-intellectualism. Second is the bad state of preservation of most *fa* texts and their low literary appeal (with *Han Feizi* being a major exception to this rule). Third is the self-perpetuating conviction that insofar as Han Fei synthesized his predecessors' ideas, it sufficed to study his thought as a good introduction to the *fa* tradition as a whole. And fourth, a subtler but possibly more important reason for the philosophers' dislike of the *fa* texts was the overwhelmingly practical orientation of the *fa* tradition, which makes it look less philosophically engaging.

With regard to the latter problem recall the ongoing uphill battle fought by scholars of Chinese philosophy to get recognition from their peers from “general” (i.e., Euro-American) philosophy departments (Van Norden 1996; Defoort 2001, 2006, 2020; Jiang 2021: 26–34). It seems that many colleagues are still haunted by Hegel's derisive judgment of Confucius as “only a man who has a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom—one with whom there is no speculative philosophy” (Hegel 2009: 107). It may be in an implicit reply to this derision that not a few scholars of Chinese philosophy tend to prefer discussions of abstract and “speculative” matters in early Chinese thought to the engagement with practical and this-worldly issues (Pines 2015: 7–12). The *fa* tradition with its clearly pronounced preference of practical solutions to needless speculations may appear to many colleagues as something that would hinder rather than bolster the much-sought recognition of Chinese thought as “philosophy.”

¹¹ For instance, in Benjamin I. Schwartz's *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (1985), the “Legalism” chapter comprises 29 of the book's net 460 pages; in Angus C. Graham's *Disputers of the Tao* (1989), it is 26 of 440 pages; in Anne Cheng's *Histoire de la pensée chinoise* (1997), it is 15 of 292 pages dedicated to pre-Han philosophers; in Wolfgang Bauer's *Geschichte der chinesischen Philosophie* (2001), the “Legalists and the End of the Philosopher's Era” chapter occupies only 8 of 117 pre-Han pages. Later introductory-level studies eschew earlier *fa* thinkers and focus on *Han Feizi* 韓非子 alone. In Bryan W. Van Norden's *Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy* (2011), *Han Feizi* merits 15 of 200 pages dedicated to pre-Qin thought. Only in Karyn Lai's, *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy* (2008) and Paul R. Goldin's *The Art of Chinese Philosophy* (2020) do the “Legalists” and *Han Feizi* break, even if slightly, the glass ceiling of 10% of the relevant text.

These headwinds notwithstanding, since the second decade of the twenty-first century one can note a clear change. This decade witnessed a translation cum study of the *Shenzi Fragments* (Harris 2016); two translations cum study of the *Book of Lord Shang* (Vogelsang 2017; Pines 2017); publication of the *Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei* (Goldin 2013); a special issue on *fajia* (more precisely, Han Fei's) philosophy in the *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* (issue 38.1 [2011]; see Cheng 2011), and more relevant articles than were written in the previous half-century. One of the best testimonies to the ongoing change is the recent magnum opus by Tao Jiang, *Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China* (2021), in which almost one quarter of the text is dedicated to the *fa* thinkers. This increasing interest in the *fa* tradition is paralleled in China, where the topic had been largely de-politicized (as for 2023), and where a scholarly society for studies of *fajia* was formed in 2015. Overall, these new trends are conducive for in-depth engagement with the *fa* tradition. This is precisely the goal of our volume.

3 The Structure of This Volume

The 24 chapters of this volume are divided into four sections. The first introduces the major thinkers and texts associated with the *fa* tradition. Chapter 1 (Yuri Pines) deals with Shang Yang and the *Book of Lord Shang* focusing on the comprehensiveness of the text's vision and its unwavering commitment to the idea of a "total state" as the only way to ensure proper political order. In Chap. 2, Yu Zhong analyzes Shen Buhai and *Shēnzi* 申子 fragments to show that Shen decidedly belonged to the *fa* tradition, with *fa* being the pivotal term of his thought (*pace* Creel 1974). In Chap. 3, Eirik Harris analyzes the tensions between morality and politics in the *Shēnzi* 慎子 fragments, concluding that the state consequentialism advocated by Shen Dao had no moral foundation; rather that was "a state consequentialism predicated on the assumption that the ruler wishes to rule over a strong and stable state." In Chap. 4, Pines discusses tensions in *Han Feizi* thought and argues that despite different emphases among the text's chapters, Han Fei's insistence on humans' perennial self-interest as the foundational factor that shapes the political sphere remains the unifying thread of *Han Feizi*.¹² In Chap. 5, Sato Masayuki analyzes multiple usages of *fa* in *Guanzi* and presents a new hypothesis about the evolution of *fa* thought in the text. In Chap. 6, Christian Schwermann focuses on the economic thought of Chao Cuo, showing that despite his aura of pragmatism, Chao could be bookish and insufficiently understanding the realities on the ground: he was "more of a social engineer and a visionary than an economist."

Part II, the largest in the book, focuses on specific ideas of the *fa* thinkers. Given the practical orientation of the *fa* ideology the section duly starts by introducing the

¹²There is considerable resonance between Pines's observations and those of Goldin (2005: 58–65), but Pines questions Goldin's assertion (2005: 65) that Han Fei "reduces the Way to the Way of the ruler."

impact of *fa* ideas on early imperial administration. As Maxim Korolkov shows (Chap. 7), the idea of the rule by impartial standards, far from being a wishful thought, was duly applied in running the empire, especially in running the bureaucratic apparatus itself. However, in the long term, overreliance on quantifiable criteria in assessing the officials' performance proved to be less suitable to the empire's needs. The shift from impersonal standards to personalized ("Confucian") methods of personnel evaluation in the Han dynasty marked the end of robust experimentation with the *fa* ideas.

Ulrich Lau and Michael Lüdke's Chap. 8 tackles the volume's major keyword, *fa* 法. The precise meaning of this term, and in particular its relation to the concept of "the law" had been discussed both by scholars of Chinese philosophy (Creel 1974: 144–51; Goldin 2011: 91–93) and those dealing with early Chinese legal texts (Brown and Sanft 2011). Lau and Lüdke's analysis of the latter documents brings them to the conclusion that *fa* often does mean "the law," and that it is "intimately connected to notions of impartial and consistent application of the law throughout society." This discussion is an important contribution to the ongoing exploration of *fa*. Whether or not this concept is an outgrowth of *fa* thought, or is "the prerequisite for the new schools of thought" remains, however, an open question.

In Chap. 9, Song Hongbing focuses on the tension between the rule of *fa* (*fazhi* 法治), which implies impartiality, fairness, and universal applicability of common game rules (which indeed strengthens the parallels between the rule of *fa* and the Occidental "rule of law"), and the more problematic aspect of the *fa* tradition, to wit, the advocacy of political trickery, secrecy, and manipulateness, usually associated with the term *shu* 術 (techniques of rule). Song avers that the shadowy nature of *shu* is not accidental: rather it reflects the *fa* thinkers' sober realization of the nature of politics as the struggle for power which cannot be completely subsumed within fair and impartial game rules. Song further asserts how the *fa* thinkers wholehearted commitment to the defense of the ruler's authority was a double-edged sword, which in due time weakened the political position of the *fa* adherents and the appeal of their ideas.

In Chap. 10, Harris analyzes the *fa* thinkers' views of human motivation, often identified as "human nature" (*xing* 性) or "dispositions" (*qing* 情), and its impact on policy making. Having surveyed the views of three major *fa* texts (the *Shenzi* fragments, the *Book of Lord Shang*, and *Han Feizi*), Harris concludes that all three "contend that, from the perspective of creating and maintaining political order, the most effective method is for the state to employ the already existing motivations of those over whom it rules. Once human motivations are understood, it becomes a relatively simple task to channel those motivations to get people to act in ways that the state wishes." Whereas the surveyed texts differ in their emphases and degrees of the discussion's sophistication, their bottom line is the same: the state should not alter the subjects' motivations (e.g., through "educational transformation") but simply utilize them.

In Chap. 11, Mark E. Lewis presents the complexity of the *fa* (especially *Han Feizi*'s) views of rulership. The magnitude of the ruler's tasks in the state envisioned by the *fa* thinkers is unparalleled; but how can one ensure that the sovereign will be

able to perform his legislative, administrative, and supervisory functions adequately? Lewis concludes that Han Fei's solution is subjecting the ruler to "rigorous intellectual self-cultivation." He situates Han Fei's views in a broader context of the Warring States-period texts which aimed at "creating a higher form of person (or embodied self)." These texts are further placed in a broader comparative context in which the "recurring interplay between the elaboration of new forms of rulership and new models of personhood can be understood as a reflection of the range of ideas embraced in the term 'power,' from the capacity for effective action in the world (necessary to creating person or self) to the essence of political organization, as embodied in the monarch."

In Chap. 12, Kai Vogelsang analyzes the surprisingly modern-looking historical outlook in the *Book of Lord Shang* and *Han Feizi*. He shows how their understanding that "times change"—an understanding shared by a great variety of Warring States-period texts—brought about the paradigmatic shift from "exemplary history" based "on the assumption that despite the difference between past and present there remains a fundamental correspondence between them" to "sequential history" in which radical departures from earlier sociopolitical patterns were justified. However, unlike supporters of historical progress in the Occident, the *fa* thinkers (whom Vogelsang calls Political Realists) never developed a philosophy of history, nor the idea of its *telos*. Their historical outlook remained just a tool in political polemics, and once their ideas "fell into disrepute," the notion of sequential history was "easily replaced by another mode of history that supported another political program."

In Chap. 13, Romain Graziani explores the connection between the concept of *fa* and that of "tools and measurement devices whose didactic images became part of the semantic vocabulary of political power." The idea of objective measurements that supersede individual qualities of merchants and artisans was applied to the political sphere resulting in the new political architecture, which "sidelined the vision of the state as a family and replaced it with the image of a complex administrative machine that extended uniformly across the territory. In this territory, no personality is indispensable in itself, including that of the sovereign, whose power and authority lie exclusively in his shrewd use of tools, techniques and methods to control his agents and his people." Graziani shows the limitations of this ideal of an objective polity, because complete depersonalization of the agents, most notably the sovereign himself, was impossible. The discussion highlights both the intellectual boldness of the *fa* tradition and the problem of the ultimate inapplicability of its recipes.

In Chap. 14, Lisa Indracoło shifts the focus to the philosophy of language of the *fa* texts—a topic that has not been systematically discussed heretofore. As Indracoło demonstrates, "the discourse about the more or less deliberate mis-use of language and the dangers it entails—not only posing a potential life-threatening risk to an advisor or minister at court, but endangering the stability of the whole government, and even the organic functioning of the state at large—plays a cardinal role in *fǎ* thinking." The *fa* thinkers were well aware of both the importance and the danger of rhetorical skills, and tried to limit their abuse, in particular through engaging in broader debates about "the urgent necessity to 'rectify names' (*zhèngmíng* 正名),

i.e. to re-establish clear, univocal correspondences between names (of titles, official positions, but in *fǎ* texts also occasionally punishments and legal forms of action) and their corresponding realities.” The article also explores the complexity of the term *xíngmíng* (刑名 or 形名) in the *fa* tradition’s texts.

In Chap. 15, the final chapter of Part II, Alexis McLeod discusses the role of morality in the ideology of *fa* texts. McLeod disagrees with a fashionable depiction of the *fa* thought as “amoral.” This view “overlooks the ways in which moral concerns were worked into *fa* tradition texts, as well as the ways in which *fa* tradition thinkers took morality to be a necessary and useful component of human life (and even, in certain rare conditions, of the ruler’s political toolkit), even if they did not take it to play the same role Confucians argued it should.” What we observe in the “*fa* tradition texts is not a rejection of morality, but an insistence on making a distinction between politics and morality, and a severing of the necessary link between the two that the Confucians insist on.”

Part III comprises only two chapters, which trace the ups and downs in the views of the *fa* tradition throughout the imperial period (Song, Chap. 16), and in the modern era (Pines, Chap. 17). Since both chapters have been extensively referenced in the first parts of this introduction, I shall shift here immediately to Part IV, which analyzes the *fa* ideology from a comparative perspective. This section comprises five chapters: three that juxtapose the *fa* tradition with major intellectual currents of the Warring States era, and two that compare *fa* ideas with aspects of Occidental political thought.

In Chap. 18, Pines explores commonalities and differences between two major intellectual currents in Chinese political thought—the *fa* tradition and Confucianism. Both shared common orientations of traditional Chinese political thought, such as “the quest for political stability which both traditions associated with political unification under the aegis of a single omnipotent monarch; the support for meritocratic principle of rule, the paternalistic view of the people,” and so forth. However, Pines focuses on their disagreements, the most dramatic of which concerned the views of the proper relation between the educated elite and the state. Whereas Confucians wanted to preserve autonomy and dignity of the intellectuals, the *fa* thinkers considered this detrimental to political order. These conflicting approaches shaped two radically different models of meritocracy—the top-down one in which objective criteria are used to select and monitor appointees, and the bottom-up one, in which peer opinion matters most. As Pines shows, each of the models had clear advantages and disadvantages, understanding which is relevant not only for studying early China but also for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of current meritocratic discourses.

In Chap. 19, Tao Jiang shifts attention to the often-neglected links between the *fa* texts and *Mozi*. He argues that “*fajia* thinkers were indebted to the Mohists for the moral-political norm of impartiality as well as the central notion of *fa* (law, standard) in the *fajia* theories.” Jiang identifies Mohism “as a form of universal state consequentialism that promotes a statist approach to maximize wealth, order, and population.” He then considers “the *fajia* project as a way to operationalize the Mohist project, attempting to work out in granular details how to institute the Mohist

principle of impartiality through state bureaucracy and enforcement of a uniform standard, i.e., legal and administrative codes.” By analyzing the *fa* tradition’s indebtedness to the Mohists, Jiang not only highlights interrelationships between two major non-Confucian currents, but also turns attention to the pivotal role of impartiality in *fa* thought. Jiang also explains why the *fa* thinkers failed to realize their ideals through statist means.

In Chap. 20, Wang Pei focuses on the somewhat paradoxical relationships between the *fa* tradition and *Laozi* and related texts. The *Laozi*’s avowed minimalism contrasts with the advocacy of state activism in *fa* texts; but the *fa* thinkers’ indebtedness to *Laozi* is easily discernible, especially on the level of the texts’ vocabulary. The connection is often not direct but is maintained through the intermediary texts which are usually identified as belonging to the so-called Huang-Lao 黃老 tradition. The commonality is most easily observable in the importance of the term *xingming* 刑名 in both groups of texts. Even so, common vocabulary does not mean identical ideas. Thus, whereas in Huang-Lao texts the theory of *xingming* was “based on the desire to discover the Way of Heaven,” in the *fa* texts it “has morphed into the technique of supervising the ministers.” Wang concludes that fundamentally, both currents differ in their understanding of the relations between *fa* and the Way.

Two last chapters of Part IV shift attention to cross-cultural comparison. In Chap. 21, Jason P. Blahuta compares the ideas in the *Book of Lord Shang* and *Han Feizi* with those of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527). Both the *fa* thinkers and Machiavelli sought ways of coping with sociopolitical crisis in their polities, and the remedy offered by the *fa* ideologues was “shockingly effective.” However, their unwavering advocacy of *fa* as the absolute determinant of political action fares badly in Blahuta’s eyes in comparison to a more flexible approach advocated by Machiavelli. The latter is not burdened by an unwavering belief in the monarchic form of rule as singularly acceptable; nor does he “resort to state control of all aspects of life.” By contrast, “the *fa* tradition sponsors a vision of society that is disturbingly close to some aspects of Hannah Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism,” which is not the case with Machiavelli.

The issue of whether or not the totalitarian label for the *fa* thinkers is justified is tackled in Chap. 22 by Alexandre Schiele. Schiele shows the problematic nature of the term “totalitarianism,” which he calls “a label of questionable value.” He highlights major differences between Shang Yang (whose vision of a total state makes him in the eyes of many a perfect candidate for being China’s earliest “totalitarian”) and that of Fascist thinkers, such as Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944) or Ernst Jünger (1895–1997). The difference is not just in the absence of ideological fervor in the *Book of Lord Shang* but also in the fact that the text “is predicated on establishing a stable and predictable order that the [modern totalitarians] utterly reject.” Schiele finds more useful parallels not between Shang Yang and modern totalitarians but between the former and the modern advocates of “rational-legal authority,” most notably Max Weber (1864–1920).

The disagreement between Blahuta and Schiele about the applicability of “totalitarian” label to the *fa* thinkers is one of many examples of disagreements among the

contributors. These disagreements are expectable: the contributors differ in their disciplinary background (historians, philosophers, political scientists), in their local scholarly tradition (they come from a great variety of countries from East Asia, Europe, Middle East, and North America), in their political beliefs, and in their degree of sympathy (or antipathy) toward the *fa* tradition. What unifies all of us is an unwavering adherence to the texts: each of the discussants' arguments is based on her or his reading of the *fa* texts rather than viewing the *fa* tradition through the prism of one's political likes and dislikes. Our common goal is to understand and interpret the textual evidence instead of imposing our individual views on it.

This observation brings us to the epilogue to this volume, which tackles a question that is raised only implicitly in other chapters. What is the relevance, if any, of the *fa* tradition to present-day China and to the broader world? This question has recently gained additional importance in light of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October 2022. At this Congress, CPC had formally adopted, albeit without much fanfare, a clause that places "China's fine traditional culture" (more accurately translatable as "fine aspects of Chinese traditional culture" 中華優秀傳統文化) as one of the pillars of the Party's ideology.¹³ But which aspects of traditional culture should be considered "fine" and which are redundant and moribund? And which ideas from the repertoire of the *fa* tradition fit the designation of "fine" (i.e. applicable) aspects of the past?

It would be foolhardy to try to answer this immensely complex question in a systematic fashion, but as a courtesy to our readers we offer one article that proposes a few tentative answers. In the last chapter of the volume, Bai Tongdong analyzes the advantages of Han Fei's ideas and their potential applicability in the present. Bai's interest in Han Fei's relevance is not confined to China (although China remains the focus of his discussion, when, for instance, he prioritizes Han Fei's ideology over Maoist practices). Yet Bai's broader goal is "to defend the soundness and the relevance of Han Fei's philosophy against a comparative background, among schools within the realm of Chinese philosophy, between Chinese and Western philosophy, and between the ancients and moderns." The point is not to advocate wholesale adoption of Han Fei's ideas (the weaknesses of which Bai, like most of the contributors to this volume readily recognizes). The point is to remind the readers: "Even if we wish to have a more complicated society with Confucian morality or contemporary Western liberal values (justice, dignity, and etc.), we still need to have a functioning polity that can bring about minimal peace and prosperity." Building a hybrid system that ensures "minimal peace and prosperity" on the

¹³The original passage in the official English translation says: "Chinese Communists are keenly aware that only by integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China's specific realities and fine traditional culture and only by applying dialectical and historical materialism can we provide correct answers to the major questions presented by the times and discovered through practice and can we ensure that Marxism always retains its vigor and vitality." The Chinese text (in simplified characters) is: 中国共产党人深刻认识到, 只有把马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合、同中华优秀传统文化相结合, 坚持运用辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义, 才能正确回答时代和实践提出的重大问题, 才能始终保持马克思主义的蓬勃生机和旺盛活力。(Xi 2022, section II).

one hand and morality and justice on the other is the task for our contemporary political thinkers. If our volume offers them some food for contemplation, then our goal had been realized.

4 Appendix: Major Critical Editions and European-Languages Translations of *fa* Texts

The brief summary below does not pretend to present systematically and comprehensively the textual history of the major *fa* texts. Instead, we briefly introduce the most convenient modern editions to help the students who want to deepen their understanding of these texts. In addition, we provide a brief summary of major translations of the *fa* texts into European languages.

4.1 Shangjunshu 商君書 (*The Book of Lord Shang*)

Currently, three major editions of the *Book of Lord Shang* can be considered adequate for the study of the text. The most easily accessible is that by Jiang Lihong 蔣禮鴻, *Pointing an Awl at the Book of Lord Shang* 商君書錐指, prepared in 1944 and published in 1986 as part of the prestigious series, *Newly Compiled Compendium of the Masters* 新編諸子集成 by Zhonghua shuju publishers. This edition, however, suffers from many inaccuracies and is superseded by Gao Heng's 高亨 (1900–1986) *The Book of Lord Shang, Commented and Translated* (商君書注譯, 1974). Gao's is one of the finest studies produced under the duress of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). His edition, however, is less appropriate for critical study of the text because of its use of simplified characters.

Among more recent editions, the most notable is that by Zhang Jue 張覺, *The Book of Lord Shang, Collated with Subcommentaries* 商君書校疏 (2012). The edition excels in consulting ten different recensions from the Ming and Qing period and recording all cases of textual discrepancies among various recensions. The text also collects most of earlier commentaries, and thus is immensely helpful for researchers. Its usefulness, however, is somewhat impaired by Zhang's refusal to engage modern studies of the text (aside from Gao Heng with whom Zhang repeatedly polemicizes) and by Zhang's rigid rejection of the vast majority of textual amendments offered by the scholars beginning in the nineteenth century. Zhang also regrettably ignores recent paleographic discoveries, which, as had been demonstrated, e.g., by Li Ling (1991), are important for resolving some of the difficult textual problems of the *Book of Lord Shang*.

The *Book of Lord Shang* merited more translations into European languages than other *fa* texts. Two earliest are the English translation cum study by Jan J. L. Duyvendak's ([1928] 1963) and the Russian translation cum study by Leonard

S. Perelomov (1968, rev. ed. in 1993). Both are excellent works and among the finest Sinological products of their times, even though the translations were somewhat impaired by the absence back then of truly good critical editions of the text. A French translation by Jean Lévi (1981; rev. ed. 2005) was directed at a broader public and was less rigorous academically. In 2017 two simultaneous translations cum studies of the text have been published: into German (Vogelsang 2017) and into English (Pines 2017). Both benefitted from the existent critical editions and from the recent scholarship of the text in European and Asian languages.

4.2 Shēnzi 申子 (*Shen Buhai's* 申不害) *Fragments*

The poor state of preservation of Shen Buhai's fragments (of which only around 1500 characters remain) explains why no critical edition of this text was published. Currently English translation cum textual study by Herrlee G. Creel (1974) remains unsurpassed.

4.3 Shènzi 慎子 (*Shen Dao's* 慎到) *Fragments*

The most systematic attempt to trace the reliability of the existent *Shènzi* fragments is that by P. M. Thompson (1979). His critical edition of the text served the foundation for its only translation into a European language—the English translation by Eirik Harris (2016). In Chinese, the *Newly Compiled Compendium of the Masters* series opted for the recent study by Xu Fuhong (2013). Note that Xu's study includes several fragments of *Shènzi*, the authenticity of which was rejected by Thompson and Harris.

4.4 Han Feizi 韓非子

The most easily accessible edition of *Han Feizi* is that by Wang Xianshen 王先慎 (1859–1922), published in 1998 in the *Newly Compiled Compendium of the Masters* series. The edition suffers from not a few problems in both punctuation and insufficient or inaccurate annotation. It is generally superseded by Chen Qiyou's *Han Feizi, Newly Collated and Annotated* 韓非子新校注 (2000). Zhang Jue's *Han Feizi, Collated with Subcommentaries* 韓非子校疏 (2010) is convenient in terms of improved textual accuracy (it is based on the collation of seven premodern editions and a few modern ones), but is less systematic than Zhang's study of the *Book of Lord Shang*. Zhang's glosses, especially on historical narratives in *Han Feizi*, are also wanting.

The earliest translation of *Han Feizi* into a European language, by the Russian Sinologist Alexey Ivanov (1912), remained largely forgotten in the aftermath of World War I and the Russian revolution. The only full translation into English (Liao 1939–1959) is by now fairly outdated. Jean Lévi’s translation into French (1999) shares the advantages and disadvantages of Lévi’s translation of the *Book of Lord Shang*. In its accessibility it is paralleled by partial English translation of the text by Burton Watson ([1964] 2003). A new full translation by Christoph Harbsmeier (forthcoming) will hopefully increase the text’s accessibility to the Anglophone audience.

4.5 *Guanzi* 管子

Guanzi merited considerable scholarly attention through much of the twentieth century, although more studies were dedicated to the text’s economic chapters and those that deal with the art of self-cultivation than to the chapters more directly relevant to the *fa* thought. The best accessible edition is that by Li Xiangfeng (2004), selected for the *Newly Compiled Compendium of the Masters* series. It does not supersede, however, an earlier and more comprehensive study by Guo Moruo et al. (1956). The only full translation of the text is the opus magnum by W. Allyn Rickett (1985 and 1998; the revised edition of the first volume was published in 2001).

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