

Jews and Muslims in German Print Media

Integration and Multiculturalism Versus Antisemitism and Islamophobia

Katharina F. Gallant ·
Jolanda van der Noll

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*To Luna, Tommy, Tanta*š*, Taz, and Sephi*

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Introduction

At the 20-year anniversary of German reunification, then-President Christian Wulff addressed the national identity of his country in the light of diversity with the words:

> We need to view German identity as something that is not defined merely by people's passports, family background or faith, but is [sic] something broader. Christianity is without a doubt part of German identity. Judaism is without a doubt part of German identity. Such is our Judaeo-Christian heritage. But Islam has now also become part of German identity. (Wulff, 2010)

This statement makes clear that according to Christian Wulff both Judaism and Islam are part of the German identity. Even so, is this also a lived reality and are these two religions, and their followers, Jews and Muslims respectively, indeed considered to be part of an encompassing German identity? Research (e.g., Decker & Brähler, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2018; Zick et al., 2017) has shown that both groups are subject to negative attitudes, discrimination and even violent attacks. Media play an important role in societal affairs as they can encourage certain perspectives. In the context of intergroup relations, media have the potential to promote the inclusion of different groups within a society, but they can

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also contribute to the segregation or exclusion of certain individuals or groups (Müller, 2011). In this book, we therefore seek to answer the question how Jews and Muslims are portrayed in German media. We rely on sociopsychological theories, including the needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), the integrated threat theory (Stephan et al., 2009), the acculturation theory (Berry, 1997, 2011), and outgroup homogeneity (Park & Rothbart, 1982), to interpret the results and put the portrayal of these groups into perspective. Methodologically, we use a multimethod approach, using both a qualitative approach to discourse analysis and quantitative methods, including software-assisted sentiment analyses, to capture the emotional tone of newspaper articles.

In this introductory chapter we first discuss the state of affairs in relation to different kinds of outgroup discrimination and racisms (Hall, 2000) being on the rise as a reaction to a lack of predefined points of orientation (Bauman, 2000; Beck, 1986, 1996) of liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000). Next, we elaborate on the situation of Jews and Muslims in relation to Germans and explain the sociopolitical context. Then, we focus more on the role of the media and previous research on media portrayal of different groups. Finally, we elaborate on the theoretical and practical relevance of this study and provide a short outlook regarding the following chapters.

1.1 The State of Affairs

> 'We' of the patriotic/nationalist creed means people like us; 'they' means people who are different from us. Not that 'we' are identical in every respect; there are differences between 'us' alongside the common features, but the similarities dwarf, defuse and neutralize their impact. (Bauman, 2000, p. 176)

Defining one's own identity in delimitation from others resembles innately human behavior (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As such, it has shaped the encounter of people around the globe since the onset of humanity—and continues to do so today. Our identities are manifold and represent different levels of inclusivity and abstraction (Turner & Oakes, 1986).

We identify as individuals, as members of small tight-knit groups like families or best friends, as members of bigger groups like colleagues or professionals within a certain field, as members who share with one another their belief in a divine entity, who promote the same set of values, who believe in our joint heritage, who hold the same passport, as common human beings. This list is far from complete. Yet, as all examples at group level refer to an imagined collective, they implicitly also define who is *not* part of that collective. Bauman's quote on defining one's own social identity in contrast to others who are perceived as too different from the ingroup to belong makes this very clear.

Noticeably, the quote resembles a sociological perspective on the state of affairs at the onset of the new millennium. Bauman (2000) diagnosed the era of liquid modernity, that is, of a modernity in which certainties break away, running through our fingers like water. What remains are both a plethora of potential points of orientation and a total lack of orientation due to the sheer amount of possibilities. An example for this liquidity with regard to the human need for self-categorization and relatedness is diversity as a phenomenon brought about by the sharp rise in mobility and connectedness associated with the globalized world (Bauman, 2000; Turner & Oakes, 1986). Yet again, diversity itself is contested as the range of options and relations implied by it, are challenging for humankind.

Bauman and others (e.g., Beck, 1986, 1996) found humankind in the current era to constantly be seeking new kinds of orientation. Some ideologies that suggest a worldview with clear rules and reference points, often following a Manichaen dualism of dividing the world into good and evil, have become "'primal shelters' of nostalgia" (Bauman, 2000, p. 214). Among these ideologies is xenophobia, which has been labeled as the "gateway drug to right-wing extremism" (Decker et al., 2020, p. 17) which, again, has in recent years become increasingly mixed with conspiracy theories hinting at the prevalence of overt anti-Semitism.[1] Xenophobia, right-wing extremism, and anti-Semitism are related phenomena as they contain racist views. Racism can thereby be understood

[1] For an approximation to a definition of anti-Semitism, please view Chap. 4.

> as a hierarchical assessment of social groups, which for these groups not only have affective, but also political, social, health-related and economic consequences and which produces systematic exclusion from positions that could change social structures. At its core, racism is a structure of dominance in which the presumed biological or cultural superiority of one or more socially hegemonic groups is constructed to justify or induce the social inequity of other groups. (Foroutan, 2020, p. 13, authors' translation)

In a diverse society, racism thus offers a tempting sense of orientation as to who belongs and who does not. As it can be directed against various different groups, speaking of a plurality of racisms seems more accurate than describing a single manifestation of the phenomenon (Hall, 2000). If concerned with a specific territory or country, racisms go along with nationalism.

"Racism and right-wing extremism are integral components of the united Germany", wrote Foroutan (2020, p. 12, authors' translation) as the opening sentence of her contribution on racism in a postmigration society.[2] In so doing, Foroutan directly pointed her finger at the sore spot in Germany's self-concept that statistics on the persistent prevalence of various kinds of racisms underline (e.g., Decker & Brähler, 2020). Particularly targeted in the German context are two groups: Jews and Muslims. While violent attacks on Jews are not only on the rise in Germany (Kiess et al., 2020), it is the particular history of the Shoah[3] as the genocide committed against the Jews on the part of the Germans that associates rising anti-Semitism in Germany with a particularly bitter and shameful aftertaste. Shocking is also the large-scale dissemination of anti-Muslim racism or Islamophobia[4] among the general population as well as its representation at governmental level in the form of right-wing parties

[2] Postmigration does not denote that migration is a concluded process but that migration is the starting point of the analysis which is linked to transformations within society on multiple levels (Foroutan, 2018). Postmigration analysis includes the normative call to end inequities associated with racisms and establish pluralism.

[3] Following Van Dijk (2009), we use the term *Shoah* instead of *Holocaust* to stress that the German genocide of the Jewish community was by no means a sacrificial act (the term Holocaust implies a burnt offering) but a "God forsaken disaster", which is how the Hebrew term Shoah translates.

[4] For a discussion of the terminology we apply in our research, please see Chap. 4.

like the Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*, AfD) (Decker & Brähler, 2020).

Extensive survey data (Pew Research Center, 2018) regarding the situation of both Jews and Muslims in Germany showed that both are subjects to discrimination such as negative stereotypes about Jews, an unwillingness to accept Muslims or Jews as neighbors or family members, and a general resentment about Muslims living in Germany. The same report found practicing Christians in Western Europe to have higher levels of negative sentiment toward religious minorities than non-practicing Christians and reported that negative sentiments toward Muslims and Jews were closely related. Similarly, Decker et al. (2020) stated that right-wing extremism was not just prevalent among non-denominational Germans but also among members of the Catholic and the Protestant church. Moreover, a review of various extensive surveys on the development of anti-Semitism in Germany reported a tendential decrease of some anti-Semitic attitudes between 2002 and 2016 while support for other anti-Semitic attitudes persisted on a rather low but nevertheless stable level (Zick et al., 2017). The same review also found anti-Semitism and discrimination of Muslims to correlate highly significantly.

Strongly targeted and affected by racism is also a third group: Sinti and Roma (Decker & Brähler, 2020). Current estimates suggest that about 70,000 to 150,000 Sinti and Roma live in Germany today. Compared to Jews and Muslims, they are far less visible in high-ranking political offices and in the media, most of all though in the German common knowledge (Engbring-Romang, 2014). The anti-Ziganism expressed against Sinti and Roma is associated with this disregard of their suffering at the hands of Germans, be it related to the Nazi genocide against the Sinti and Roma, the largely absent commemoration thereof, or current anti-Ziganism attacks (Decker & Brähler, 2020; Engbring-Romang, 2014). In contrast to Jews and Muslims, Sinti and Roma do not represent a religious identity that would be easily distinguishable from either Muslims or Christians as among Sinti and Roma are believers in Islam and various kinds of Christianity (Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, and various free churches) (Engbring-Romang, 2014). While we endorse future research specifically on the situation of Sinti and Roma, our own research presented in this book focuses on Jews and Muslims as two groups who are frequently

covered in the German media and the relation to whom is part of the established German discourse.

1.2 Germans, Jews, and Muslims

Current figures estimate that about 5.3 to 5.6 million Muslims (as of 2019) (Pfündel et al., 2021) and 200,000 Jews (as of 2021) (321–2021: 1700 Jahre jüdisches Leben in Deutschland e.V., 2021) live in Germany today, making up 6.4% to 6.7% (Muslims) and less than 0.3% of the population (Jews). Larger yet than these differences in numbers, is the dissimilarity of the global context as the broader scope of Jewish and Muslim life, respectively. Worldwide there are about 15 million people who identify as Jewish, which is still far less than the 16.5 million of Jews who lived worldwide prior to the Shoah (DellaPergola, 2021). Germany currently ranks eighth as a country of Jewish residency, with Israel ranking first and resembling the only country worldwide where Jews have a majority status. In contrast, only about one-fifth of the world's Muslim population comprising a total of 1.57 billion people lives in a country where Muslims do not represent the majority, such that Muslims living in Germany make up only an infinitesimal share of the worldwide Muslim population (Pew Research Center, 2009).

In Germany, however, Jews and Muslims alike face a predominantly Christian population (71% as of 2017, Pew Research Center, 2018),[5] which becomes obvious in the state protection of Christian holidays, the teaching of Christian religion at public schools as well as in the role church-financed social-welfare organizations play in public life. Christianity in Germany consequently goes far beyond the realm of religion, as it is part of the country's cultural identity (Beyer, 2017).

Whereas Jews and Muslims are often equated with their respective religion, the ingroup identity of the two equally transcends the religious realm given that cultural traditions and aspects of lineage are taken as further denominators of who is or who is not a group member—in

[5] Figures from Pew Research Center (2018) show that throughout Western Europe only an average of 18% of self-identified Christians frequently attend church, whereas 46% are non-practicing.

addition to the particular political and legal standing these minorities have in the Western world (Meer & Noorani, 2008). More specifically, Islam, apart from expressing the identification with a particular faith, is also part of a particular culture which expresses itself in a specific, and visible, set of values and customs that shape everyday life as, for instance, discussions on the wearing of the *hijab* in Western countries show. In these discussions, the hijab as a marker associated with a religious tradition turns into a point of conflict with the differently cultured setting (El Hamel, 2002; Williams & Vashi, 2007). "The religious item of clothing, expressing a subjective choice and attitude … [was perceived] a political symbol requiring state regulation" (Benhabib, 2010, p. 465), wrote Benhabib when concluding her analysis on the parallels of headscarf debates in France, Germany, and Turkey.

In light of conflictual intergroup relations, the religious identity of both groups, that is, the Christian dominant group and the Muslim non-dominant group, may even become a "custodian" of the culture they are associated with (Beyer, 2017). In this vein, the politicization of the hijab happened not just in the Western Christian discourse, but it has also been found to have changed the meaning of the headscarf for Muslim women themselves from a sign of humility to a sign of contested group identity (Benhabib, 2010).

In addition to the religious and the cultural dimensions of Islam, Muslim kinship systems to date often rely on passing on the social identity patrilineally (Therrien, 2022), suggesting a link to the concept of Muslim ethnicity. Moreover, ascription of a Muslim identity through the Western dominant group frequently happens on the basis of identifying a person as a descendant of Muslim parents (Shooman, 2014). Despite this practice being highly pretentious in negating the primate of an individual's self-definition, it may be an influential factor in everyday intergroup encounters.

In Judaism, the multidimensional character of the social identity is even more apparent with the Jewish law *halacha* embracing a child born to a Jewish mother or a converted adult as a member of the ingroup, though patrilinear descent is also accepted as an ingroup definer in some Jewish traditions like Reform Judaism (Weiner, n.d.). Simultaneously, group membership to one of the twelve tribes of Israel (Jacob) as described

in the Thora is passed on entirely patrilinearly. Being religiously Jewish, however, is not a prerequisite for being a member of the Jewish ingroup (Freeman, n.d.). Instead the phenomena of Jewish-born individuals who identify as secular Jews, particularly in the post-Shoah context, or who embrace Buddhism while still holding on to high Jewish holidays point to an in-betweenness or hybridity of different religious and cultural traditions (Niculescu, 2017).

As explained by Niculescu (2017) based on her critical discourse analysis of publications by Jewish American Jewish Buddhist teachers, this in-betweenness is congruent with Bhabha's (1994) concept of interstitial space. This is not a physical space but is characterized by the liminality of belonging to neither one of two (or more) clearly defined social identities. According to Bhabha, this interstitial space, while resulting from the distinct character of social identities, is also a creative space in which cultural hybridity as a "creative compromise" of identity construction can occur. Such hybrid identities are a phenomenon defying one-dimensional nationalist identities (Said, 1994) as well as Huntington's scenario of an unavoidable clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1993, 1997).

Yet again, Niculescu's research focuses on the identity discourse within the non-dominant group of Jewish American Jewish Buddhists, not on the discourse the dominant group embraces with regard to a non-dominant group. Clearly, the concept of an interstitial space and of a hybridity of social identities is not the determined outcome of intergroup encounter.

For Germany and Switzerland, based on an extensive analysis of prominent national newspapers, Koopmans et al. (2005) found the relationship between dominant groups (Germans and Swiss, respectively) and non-dominant group (i.e., Muslims) to be strongly influenced by an ethnic model of citizenship. This model reminds us of the nation-state as a setting in which obtaining citizenship for foreign members of outgroups is clearly restricted and right-wing groups may be given more access to the dominant discourse than Muslim immigrants (Dolezal et al., 2010).

This quick outline of group identification points not only to the variety of dimensions that can play a role in defining a social identity but it also links to the question of social hierarchies. To date, the German, predominantly Christian group has clearly established itself in a position of

power, compared to the two groups of Jews and Muslims. We therefore refer to the latter two also as non-dominant groups, thus defining them rather according to their position in the social hierarchy than based on mere counts of members.

Germany has openly acknowledged its particular historic responsibility deriving from the Shoah to support Jewish life in Germany (e.g., ZJDVtr, 2003). Germany has furthermore confirmed its identity as a country of immigration in 2001 (Unabhängige Kommission "Zuwanderung" 2001), while explicitly linking the topic of immigration and integration to the situation of Muslims in Germany in the very same report. These official statements of acknowledgment of both Jews and Muslims would be in line with a German self-concept as a diverse society which seeks to establish plurality as societal unity in difference (Bauman, 2000), thus as a society in which individuals and groups are endorsed to embrace a dual identity as German *and* simultaneously as Jewish, Muslim, Christian or other (Dovidio et al., 2007).

Yet, the persistence of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, in addition to many variations of racisms, clearly shows that diversity is challenged, thus hindering the establishment of plurality in Germany. How Germany deals with this discrepancy between endorsed identity in theory and espoused identity in practice becomes visible in the public debate on Jews and anti-Semitism, and Muslims and Islamophobia, respectively. This debate does not only take place in parliament or in informal encounters in daily life but it is condensed and reflected upon in the media.

1.3 Sociopolitical Context

Investigating the framing of the two groups, the German context is of interest as Jews and Muslims have a special standing given the country's history: University students from 12 different cultural backgrounds identified World War II as the most crucial world history event in the last 1,000 years, and 11 out of 12 stated Hitler as the person who had the largest impact on history within the same timeframe when asked for their opinion in an open-question survey format (Liu et al., 2005). These results located "Germany in an unenviable identity position as a universal

historical villain" (Liu & Hilton, 2005, p. 544). The horrific atrocity that positions Germany as a perpetrator identifies Jews as victims whose suffering in the Shoah is widely considered unprecedented (Novick, 1999).

Muslims and Germans, again, have not been in an open large-scale conflict in the national context but their contact is linked to Germany's immigration politics. Figures provided by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) show that alone in the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 a total of 1,362,586 people filed for asylum in Germany, nearly 74% of whom identified as Muslim and the majority of whom came from Syria (BAMF, 2016, 2017, 2018). Despite the high numbers, the largest group of immigrants in Germany to date has a Turkish background,[6] amounting to a total of about 2,797,000 people (Destatis, 2017). Back in 2011, 68% of Muslims living in Germany were of Turkish origin (DIK-Redaktion, 2016). As highlighted by Wagner et al. (2001), Turkish immigration to Germany was strongly linked to the country recruiting cheap foreign laborers, so-called *Gastarbeiter*, between 1955 and 1973. Associated with this German policy was the expectation that Turkish laborers would later return to their country of origin. Many Turkish immigrants, however, stayed in Germany and had their families join them so that there are now people of Turkish origin living in Germany in the third generation (Wagner et al., 2001). Nevertheless, figures from Destatis (2017) indicate that Turkish migrants remain at a disadvantage compared to socioeconomic data on Germans without migration background. To date, people with a Turkish migration background and Muslim refugees from Syria are two major groups of migrants living in Germany.

Our analysis is concerned with the period of the 2010s. This decade comprises a number of events that are of relevance to one or both non-dominant groups and their relation to the broader society. From a Jewish perspective, the 2010s have been referred to by Jonathan Greenblatt, CEO and National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, as "The

[6] According to the official definition on the part of the Federal Office for Statistics (Destatis) an individual is considered to have a migration background if she or he was born abroad or if at least one of the individual's parents was not born a German national (Destatis, 2017). While this definition is not in line with most international standards, it is applied for this study as it is Germany's official definition and this study is situated in the German context.

Decade That Normalized anti-Semitism, in America and Across the Globe" (Greenblatt, 2020). This statement referred to violent anti-Semitism attacks in the United States, "including the deadliest attack against Jews in U.S. history" (Greenblatt, 2020). Regarding the European context, Greenblatt synopsized:

> In 2012, a self-proclaimed jihadist attacked a Jewish school in Toulouse, murdering seven people including a rabbi and three children in the playground in front of the building. And in 2014, a terrorist gunned down four people at the Jewish Museum of Belgium. In 2015, another jihadist entered the Hyper Cacher kosher market in Paris, leading to an hours-long siege that left four hostages dead. Just a few weeks later, yet another gunman attacked the synagogue in Copenhagen, murdering the community's security director. In 2017 in Paris, Sarah Halimi was murdered and thrown from a window by a man shouting "Allahu Akbar," and in 2018, also in Paris, Mireille Knoll, a Holocaust survivor, was killed in an anti-Semitic attack. Both victims were killed in their own homes.
>
> Most recently, on Yom Kippur in Halle, Germany, a gunman attempted to enter a synagogue with the intent of murdering as many Jews as he could. Two people were killed and only a locked door stopped him from carrying out his insidious plan. (Greenblatt, 2020)

While shocking in itself, this list of incidences does not even include anti-Semitic attacks on individual Jews, for instance, in the German cities of Berlin, Bonn, and Düsseldorf, at which occasions individuals wearing a *kippa* were attacked, or the large-scale demonstrations against Israeli politics in multiple German cities, during which anti-Semitic paroles were chanted and Israeli flags were burnt.

With regard to the Muslim group, the particular context of the 2010s was strongly affected by several large-scale Islamist attacks on the West, leaving hundreds dead and injured. Among these are, according to the *Global Terrorism Database* (START, 2022), a series of attacks in France in January and November 2015 as well as in July 2016 and March and December 2018; different attacks in Great Britain in March, May and June 2017, and the attack on a German Christmas market in December 2016, to name examples from the European context. However, the decade also comprised bloody large-scale attacks *on* Muslims executed by

right-wing extremists. Among these attacks are the attacks in Oslo and Utøya in July 2011, which were intended to stop the supposed Islamization of Europe, the attack on three Muslim students in Chapel Hill, NC, in February 2015, the attack in a shopping center in Munich in June 2017, or the attacks on mosques in Finsbury in June 2017, Québec in January 2017, and Christchurch in March 2019 (START, 2022). On a smaller scale, authorities have registered thousands of Islamophobic incidents in Germany throughout the 2010s, including the late recognition that a series of murder cases in the early 2000 had been based on a racist (and Islamophobic) ideology. Furthermore of importance in the German context, were major sociopolitical debates on the role of Muslims and Islam in Germany in general and, more specifically, on veiling, and male circumcision, with the latter topic being relevant to both Jews and Muslims (Yurdakul, 2016). Finally, as mentioned above, Muslim immigration was influential to the sociopolitical debate in the second half of the 2010s.—We will further address the history of Jews and of Muslims in Germany within the scope of our qualitative analysis (particularly Chap. 4, Sect. 4.3) to provide context for the development of the relationship between Germans and Jews, on the one hand, and Germans and Muslims, on the other hand.

1.4 On the Role of the Media

Whereas large-scale surveys on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia allow for insight into how Jews and Muslims are perceived in Germany, they are conducted too infrequently to capture shorter-term trends. Therefore, Bleich et al. (2015) suggested complementing poll data with media analysis on the status of different identity groups.

Not only is it relevant whether there is coverage on news events that link to different groups of society but also how these groups are portrayed therein. Media can reflect societal norms and power relations but, unlike a mirror, it can also create reality by representing issues in a specific way (Matthews, 2017). Thus, it is of great interest for an analysis of how mainstream Germans position themselves to Jews and Muslims, respectively, how the two non-dominant groups and their

relation to the dominant group are depicted in the media. Are they portrayed as victims of attacks or of group-focused enmity (Zick et al., 2008; Heitmeyer, 2012) in general, or does the media associate them with a source of violence? Are there differences between the portrayal of the two non-dominant groups or does media coverage follow a "one-size-fit-all" principle?

Due to the crucial and continuous role that newspapers play for informing the broad public and their contribution to opinion formation (KEK, 2018), our research aims to shed light on the media representation of Jews and Muslims in German print media. We thereby keep in mind that, given German demographics, non-Jews are much more likely to read about Jews in German newspapers than to consciously interact with a Jewish individual (Baugut, 2022). Thus, the media may be their main source of information on the non-dominant outgroup. Similarly, at least prior to the strong Muslim immigration in the context of the war in Afghanistan and the Syrian Civil War, Germans relied predominantly on the media as a source of information on Muslims and Islam (Foroutan et al., 2014).

1.5 Previous Research

As politically independent press, newspapers are not just crucial for opinion formation but also for reflecting the ongoing public debate, for example, on cultural diversity. Newspaper articles are not neutral regarding which topics or aspects thereof they portray and how they choose to do so. While this has been generally acknowledged by social psychologists, a shortage of longitudinal panel studies that are suitable to analyze the role of the media on group beliefs has been identified (Stangor, 2009).

The existing literature on the media portrayal of non-dominant groups shows a sizable body of research that focuses on Muslims and Islam. As stated by D'Haenens and Bink (2007), Islam has been widely discussed and linked to terrorism, extremism, and suppression. Interestingly, a large share of the research on Muslims and Islam focuses on the British context (e.g., Bleich et al., 2015; Baker et al., 2013; Moore et al., 2008), which in terms of the shares of Muslims and Jews as a percentage of the

total population is comparable to the situation in Germany (Bleich et al., 2015; Pew Research Center, 2018). However, many studies on the representation of Muslims and Islam have been criticized for choosing a qualitative analysis with uncertain reliability of results (Bleich et al., 2015), potentially displaying merely pre-existing, yet ill-founded ideas which were confirmed through selective pieces of proof rather than subjecting them to a rigorous analysis (Vanparys et al., 2013). A further point of criticism of the existing literature is the absence of information on effect sizes and other statistical indices as detected by a recent content-based meta-analysis of media representations of Muslims and Islam between 2000 and 2015, which comprises a total of 345 studies (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017).

These points of criticism also apply to literature about the representation of Jews and Judaism in the media (Rashi & Rosenberg, 2017; Strote, 2016). However, far fewer studies on the subject were detected when searching the traditional psychological, sociological, political science and education literature databases. Moreover, the studies that do exist tend to either portray Jewish media outlets (e.g., Avni, 2015) or focus on the achievements of Jewish journalists (e.g., Strate, 2006). Only a small number of studies were explicitly directed at the media portrayal of Jews and Judaism (Bleich et al., 2018; Partington, 2012). Yet, even these studies tend to either focus on the era leading up to the Shoah (Whitaker, 1981), on the time of the Shoah or on the remembering of the Shoah (Meer & Noorani, 2008). Others rather briefly address the situation of Jews and Judaism as a point of reference when discussing the media portrayal of Muslims and Islam (Bleich et al., 2015), such that Baugut recently declared "[c]omprehensive content analyses of German media's actual media coverage of Jews are lacking" (Baugut, 2022, p. 416). An explanation for this lack of studies stems from Elias and Bernstein (2007) who investigated the medial portrayal of—immigrated Russian—Jews to Germany (as one out of three countries of interest):

> For many years, it had been taboo in Germany to discuss Jewish images in the media, due to the significant contribution of the German media to the construction of the most distorted portrayal of Jews as an 'ugly race' during the Nazi regime. (Elias & Bernstein, 2007, p. 27).

While this is a legitimate explanation, failing to systematically study the media representation of Jews and Judaism in Germany also implies that stereotypes and framing that are detrimental to a multicultural society might go unnoticed and uncriticized, thus also impeding the setting up and implementation of corrective actions.

The lack of research especially regarding the media portrayal of Jews and Judaism goes hand in hand with a lack of information on the general context when describing, for instance, the affective tone of media coverage on a minority group. This also limits our understanding of how status hierarchies are represented in the media and how they may vary across time (Bleich et al., 2018). In this vein, a recent study by Nisar and Bleich (2020) encourages to define the geopolitical focus of the media portrayal as the tone of the latter was found to be different depending on whether Jews and Muslims were associated with domestic (British or US) affairs or with the MENA region. Introducing their discourse analysis and sociological perspective on the portrayal of Muslims in present times and Jews prior to World War II in British media, Meer and Noorani went as far as to state: "Comparisons of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim sentiment … are noticeably absent" (Meer & Noorani, 2008, p. 195). Since only a comparison allows conclusions regarding the particularity of framing of a specific group, this design is chosen for our present study. In so doing, this study follows in the footsteps of Ünal (2016, p. 36) who started out his article on Islamophobia and anti-Semitism by highlighting that comparing must not be misunderstood as declaring that the situations or challenges faced by two groups were equal (for an extensive discussion on the particularities of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, please consult Chap. 4).

In light of these considerations, our research aims to systematically analyze how Jews and Judaism as well as Muslims and Islam are represented in two superregional German newspapers and to assess in which ways the two newspapers contribute to a differentiated presentation of the two minority groups. For this purpose, the newspapers *Die Welt* (*Welt*), which represents a conservative perspective, and *Die Tageszeitung* (*taz*) as a progressive outlet (FAZIT Communication, 2012) are subjected to a media content analysis for the period from January 2010 until December 2019. In so doing, our research differs from previous published work in

a number of important aspects. Publications covering analyses of minorities in the media often focus on one minority only (most notably on Muslims). In contrast, we provide an analysis of the representation of Jews and Muslims in the German print media, allowing for a direct comparison of the reporting on different groups. In addition, previous publications on the representation of Muslims and Islam have often been event-specific: first and foremost, they focused on the media coverage of specific terrorist attacks (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017). Ahmed and Matthes found other studies to focus on how the media reports on events situated in the non-Western "Muslim world" (e.g., civil unrest and war related to the Arab Spring) while others (nearly 10%) investigated the reporting of non-Western mainstream media outlets. Furthermore, our project applies a multimethod approach, including qualitative analyses of the phenomenal structure of the reporting on these minorities, and quantitative analyses, including software-assisted sentiment analyses, to test hypotheses deduced from sociopsychological theories.

1.6 Theoretic and Practical Relevance

Our research contributes to the body of literature on stereotyping and framing of non-dominant groups within the context of acculturation. Thereby, the focus of comparison lies on the majority perspective, which was found to be less frequently studied than the minority perspective (Brown & Zagefka, 2011). More precisely, our research addresses the prevalence of certain stereotypes that, in accordance with Simon and Schaler (2007), might express a negative bias or be a means of discrimination and hostility toward Jews and Muslims, respectively.

Analyzing a conservative and a progressive newspaper grants an overview of the full range of representation in superregional German newspapers across ideological, value-related, and political spectra. Furthermore, coding articles for two different groups allows for comparisons of how non-dominant groups are represented in German newspapers and thus for insights on the broader context of intergroup relations that are generally overlooked when focusing on one non-dominant group only or on the interaction of the dominant group with one non-dominant group.